© REUTERS/Yves Herman

As often happens in disasters and wartime, leaders across Europe are riding high in the polls at the moment. Sociological studies have shown that in the initial moments of crisis, people tend to avoid negative thoughts about their governments because it makes them anxious.

As prime ministers and presidents bask in the glow of their high polling, they have been keen to run the show on their own. They have not let Brussels so much as lift a finger without their permission, nor have they coordinated with other leaders.

Uncoordinated Exits

This power dynamic is on display this week, as the European Commission adopts a pan-EU lockdown exit strategy on Wednesday. The strategy was supposed to be adopted last week, but at the last moment several EU member states including France, Spain, and Italy objected. They were concerned that any discussion of lockdown exits would be dangerous ahead of the Easter weekend when people would be tempted to go out, as they prepared to announce extensions. France, for one, will be in lockdown until May 11 at least.

These objections came despite the fact that the strategy, a draft of which governments had already seen, only contained guidelines rather than instructions for when national governments should end their lockdowns. The strategy will only communicate the European Centers for Disease Control’s advice for how restrictions should be gradually lifted and coordinated with neighbors. But that was too much for national capitals, even though they themselves had asked the Commission to draw up these guidelines on March 26.

In the ensuing week, national governments have pressured the Commission to water down the strategy so much as to make it essentially meaningless. The new draft shared with national governments on Tuesday changes the title from a roadmap toward “exiting” the lockdowns to one toward “lifting” the containment measures.

Scrubbed from the text are any mentions of an “exit.” Language saying governments “should” do things has been changed to “could.” The main recommendation is that any loosening of restrictions should be “gradual” and the general lockdowns should be replaced by targeted ones, for instance only for vulnerable groups.

Getting Restless

In the week’s delay, some national governments have become tired of waiting and have adopted their own national measures. Austria is starting its lockdown phase-out today, and Denmark and the Czech Republic have also announced their own exit plans. The Belgian government is expected to present its lockdown exit strategy tomorrow before the Commission unveils the EU strategy. National guidelines on mask-wearing have been contradictory, with Austria requiring it while other countries like Belgium are discouraging it.

What’s clear is that the Commission has lost the momentum on the exit strategy and has been preempted by national actions. Lockdown exits will probably be as uncoordinated, and perhaps also as chaotic, as their imposition. And this is far from the only area in which European countries look set to diverge.

Eurobond Divisions

Last week finance ministers from the eurozone countries—known as the Eurogroup—met for a grueling 16 hours of video conferencing over three days in a desperate attempt to overcome North-South divisions on what Europe’s economic response to the coronavirus crisis should look like. In the end, they were able to agree on making available a half trillion euros of funds available to firefight the economic fallout. But on the most contentious issue, joint guarantees on debt, they kicked the can to a summit of prime ministers and presidents on April 23.

The chief protagonists have emerged as the Netherlands on one side, representing the less-affected frugal countries of Northern Europe, and Italy on the other, representing the more-affected indebted countries of Southern Europe. They were able to reach a compromise on use of the European Stability Mechanism, an instrument set up after the 2008-12 financial crisis, which enabled both sides to declare victory. Though ESM funds normally come with conditions and oversight, that was seen as inappropriate in this crisis because the early heavily affected countries did nothing wrong. In the end they agreed on just one condition: the funds, up to 2 percent of national GDP, can only be spent on healthcare.

But on the debt issue, the Dutch as still giving a firm “nee.” Italy, France, Spain, and six other countries are asking for the eurozone to issue Coronabonds, rebranded Eurobonds. Germany’s response has been softer than its notorious resistance to Eurobonds a decade ago. The Netherlands has emerged as the most uncompromisingly staunch opponent, leading to vilification of the Dutch in Southern Europe over the past week.

Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra says it would not be “reasonable” to “guarantee the debt of other countries.” For the Brussels press pack, it’s déjà vu. It would seem little has changed in terms of European solidarity, even in a new crisis where concerns about “moral hazard” and wasteful spending are not relevant. With little prospect of the Dutch relenting, some in the French government have floated the idea of doing regional joint bonds instead—perhaps a “Club Med Bond” for France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

Fraying Federations

It was only to be expected that the EU’s response to the initial panic phase of the crisis would be underwhelming. As a supranational confederation that has very few powers over health or borders, the EU isn’t built for circumstances like that. Where the EU has proven its worth in the past is in the response to crises, particularly in the economic response. But as the weeks go by, the shift to “more Europe” promised by European Council President Charles Michel is not materializing.

It is an issue being faced by federations across the world, from Russia to Brazil to the United States. On Monday two blocs of US states—a West Coast “Pact” and an East Coast “Council” —banded together to ignore the flailing federal government and form their own regional entities to coordinate lockdown exit measures. With California Governor Gavin Newsom still referring his response to that of a “nation state,” the implications of these regional decisions to ignore Washington could be profound.

It is clear that the coronavirus crisis is presenting an existential challenge to the European Union. But it is also presenting a challenge to the union of American states, one that could have long-lasting consequences. The outbreak may be global, but its effects are being felt in extremely varying ways locally, and it is not respecting national borders or federations. All governing structures are at risk.

The post Struggling for Unity appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Johanna Geron

Over the past decade, each successive crisis has been deemed to be a “critical test” for the European Union. And each time, from the eurozone debt crisis to the migration crisis to Brexit, the EU held strong. This time is different.

In those past crises, the EU stuck rigidly to its rules in the initial stage—sometimes in the face of great criticism. As Greece collapsed, the EU at first stuck to dogmatic thinking about collective debt. As migrants drowned in the Mediterranean, the EU would not deviate from its system that left border countries entirely responsible. And as the British have sought to secure privileged and unprecedented access to the European single market without following its rules, the 27 remaining EU countries have been united in saying no.

But in the initial days of the Coronavirus crisis, the EU response has been the opposite.

The European Commission has shown remarkable flexibility. Countries were able to close border to other member-states, a violation of the EU fundamental freedom of movement and normally one of the most politically sensitive issues for Brussels, without facing significant criticism. Even the most staunch Europeans let it slide. “We shouldn’t have an ideological approach on this border issue, we should be pragmatic,” said French MEP Pascal Canfin, a close ally of French President Emmanuel Macron. “The point is, Does it make sense? Is it proportionate and justified from a sanitary perspective?”

It isn’t just borders. Normally sacred restrictions on state aid were suspended until the end of the year so that member-states could save companies from bankruptcy. Rules governing national budgets, put in place after the debt crisis, were quickly suspended too. Even the eurozone’s famous reluctance to collectivize debt with eurobonds now seems to have vanished.

EU Flexibility

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s flexible approach has won plaudits for some and condemnation from others, but the reality is she probably had little choice. Unlike in the financial and internal market realms, healthcare is almost entirely a national competence. A health crisis, therefore, was always going to see more national responses than European ones.

EU member states have gone ahead with their own diverging measures, from closing borders to instituting lockdowns to restricting the export of medical equipment. Von der Leyen has been playing catch-up, trying to find a consensus direction where all the governments are moving and creating around that as much of an “EU policy” as possible.

This was the main purpose for the Commission’s proposal on Monday, implemented by national governments this week, to only allow EU citizens through the bloc’s external borders. Von der Leyen hoped that the external border ban would convince countries to drop their internal border restrictions, which are holding up goods transport, risking empty shelves at grocery stores.

But so far, countries have not relented. Two-thirds of EU member states right now have closed borders with EU neighbors, erecting blockages where none existed before. The closures in Hungary and Poland are so extreme that people are prevented from even transiting through on the way back to their home countries.

Similarly, the Commission’s ban on EU countries exporting medical equipment outside of the EU was meant to convince countries like Germany to end their restrictions on exports to other EU countries. But Berlin and others have been slow to let this equipment spread throughout the bloc.

In such a fast-moving crisis that has manifested itself in different ways in different countries, the EU has shown flexibility on its rules and has given a green light to varying national solutions. The key question is this: now that this Rubicon has been crossed, is there any going back?

European Council President Charles Michel has said this crisis calls for “more Europe.” In reality, the exact opposite is happening—for now at least. But it may be that while the initial health and security response is national, the economic recovery efforts to come are European.

Europe’s Forte: The Economic Response

After initial stumbles, the European Central Bank decided Wednesday night to finally issue a “whatever it takes” plan to launch an additional economic stimulus program worth €750 billion. The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program will buy corporate and government debt from across the eurozone to spread the money among countries in need.

“There are no limits to our commitment to the euro,” said ECB chief Christine Lagarde. “We are determined to use the full potential of our tools, within our mandate.”

The funds are in addition to the ECB’s €120 billion measure announced last week and a €20 billion-a-month bond-buying program. It would be the largest monetary stimulus package ever in under a year. This is on top of the European Commission’s €37 billion emergency funding from the EU budget to prop up economies, and the €50 million “RescEU” fund to stockpile medical equipment.

These structures will provide the basis for the EU response to come—a response that will be coordinated from Brussels once the initial panic has subsided. But will these temporary suspensions on normally sacred EU rules really end at the end of the year?

Schengen rules stipulate that internal EU borders can be temporarily shut in a health emergency for an initial period of twenty days. This can be renewed, with approval from the European Commission, for a total period not exceeding two months. If the national border closures are still in place in June, it will be the first indication that the Coronavirus may have dealt the European project a fatal blow.

Getting Stronger

For pro-Europeans, there is still hope. A temporary relaxation of sacred EU rules in such an acute crisis does not, as many are now opining, signal the demise of the European project. “Europe was blamed ten years ago for not doing enough and doing it too late,” says Canfin. “So what we’re now working on is a full package response that would use first all the flexibilities of the growth and flexibility pact. The commission is saying, Okay, do whatever you have to do to help your economy recover in the short term.”

The previous crises forced the EU to take unprecedented action, which in fact strengthened its powers rather than weakening them. Brussels gained control over budgets and received commitments to share the burden of border policing, with new funds for the EU’s Frontex border force. America’s retreat from the world under Donald Trump, another crisis for the EU, has forced countries to drop their long-standing opposition to the EU taking on a military defense role. The result has been the first-ever European Defense Union and a new defense department in the Commission.

It’s notable that the first place the world looked to for a European response to the Coronavirus crisis was Brussels, rather than national capitals. Brussels may not have been able to give the world the definite answers it was looking for in the first weeks of the crisis, but the fact it was even asked shows just how much things have changed over the past 20 years.

No one knows how the virus is going to evolve in the coming weeks and months. But as the initial panic stage subsides, Brussels has the tools to step in and lead the longer-term response. And in that process, a crisis could again turn into a moment where the EU finds its authority strengthened rather than diluted.

The post The Pandemic Means Less Europe—For Now appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

“We know very well the sun rises tomorrow and a new chapter for our union will start,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said wistfully in a speech on Brexit Day. “With it comes a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make sure the EU leads the way.”

Standing aside European Council President Charles Michel and European Parliament President David Sassoli in Brussels, von der Leyen and her cohorts were keen to stress they were here to talk about the EU, not about the United Kingdom. On the previous day, the three had held a retreat at the Jean Monnet House in France to talk about their visions for a post-Brexit EU. More specifically, they were discussing how they want to organize the upcoming Future of Europe conference.

They reiterated their insistence that in order for the UK to have access to the EU’s single market, it cannot diverge from EU rules, but that was it. They let a joint op-ed in European newspapers today more fully explain their negotiation position.

Today was not a day to focus on the future EU-relationship, but a day to talk about Europe, and what might be possible now that the UK is leaving. “It’s an exceptional day for the EU, and we have mixed feelings,” said Michel. “It’s never a happy moment when someone leaves, but we are opening a new chapter. And we will devote all our energy to building a stronger and more ambitious EU.”

No More Holding Back

Ambitious is the key word. In Brussels, there has long been a feeling that the UK has held the EU back from taking the measures that would make it a more powerful force in the world. This has always particularly irked the French. Now, with the British leaving, things are possible that weren’t possible before. And French President Emmanuel Macron wants to push forward with them.

The UK had always blocked attempts to create a defense role for the EU, fearful it would be in competition with NATO. With the UK leaving, work on creating a “defense union” for the EU has already been ongoing for over a year. EU enlargement—always pushed by London, but resisted by Paris and Berlin—has had the brakes thrown on. It is only a matter of time before Turkey’s EU accession bid, pushed for so long by London and Washington, will be officially ended. Endless enlargement dilutes the ability of the EU to be a strong unified bloc, Paris and Berlin believe, and would turn it into nothing more than a free trade area. This, of course, is what London always wanted—hence why they pushed expansion.

Rather than believing that Brexit portends the end of the union, many in Brussels think the experience of the Brexit negotiations over the past three years has put the wind in Europe’s sails. Contrary to expectations, the EU27 showed remarkable unity throughout, with not a single member breaking ranks to conduct bilateral negotiations with London, despite the most intense efforts on the part of the UK.

Across Europe, polling has shown that the percentage of Europeans who want their country to leave the EU has plummeted since the Brexit referendum as Europeans have watched the car crash of Brexit. Polling shows there is no country in the EU in which anything close to a majority of people want to leave.

“Within these three-and-a-half years there was a very precious experience made by the EU27,” von der Leyen said. “The experience of how much unity counts, how strong we are in unity—way more than each single country would have on its own.”

So now, what to do with that momentum? The leaders acknowledged that though the idea of other countries leaving the EU is not a winner with the public, they are also skeptical of the idea of a stronger EU. The idea of the Future of Europe conference, which is set to start in May with citizens agoras hearing from people about what they want from the union, is to both take on citizens’ desires and communicate to them the benefits of a strong sovereign Europe.

“We have to work to make sure Europe is better loved among citizens,” said Michel. “Our concern is going to be to stop using jargon, to cut down red tape. We have the digital agenda, the green deal, and on security we will defend our values. On top of that we need the right methods to implement our short and long-term plans.”

“It’s essential in the future to take much more into consideration the expectations of the citizens, and it’s also important to explain what’s the daily added value of this political project,” he added.

Skeptical Forces from Without and from Within

European Parliament President David Sassoli acknowledged that it isn’t just the British who are skeptical about the idea of a stronger EU. There are strong forces trying to disrupt the European project—forces from without, and forces from within.

“Why are so many people working so hard to break up the EU?”, he asked. “That is the question. Because within our countries, too, there are certain people who are trying to run with this torch. There are groups, forces who are trying to weaken the EU, but what’s their agenda?”

“We want proper rules to govern this European dimension. You can defend the more vulnerable when you have rules. In the absence of rules, it becomes the jungle. Might becomes right. But there are those who want to defy us because they are afraid of a rules-based world.”

Michel agreed. “When we are together and united, when we share a common approach, we are a real political and economic force, believing in personal dignity. These are the values that underpin the European project.”

The question now will be convincing the citizens of a post-Brexit EU that these values are worth fighting for.

The post For the EU, the Sun Also Rises appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

©REUTERS/Regis Duvignau

This week the European Commission adopted its stance on how to run the “Conference on the Future of Europe,” a two-year soul-searching exercise aimed at changing the way the EU works after Brexit—the pet project of French President Emmanuel Macron. But if the commission and national governments get their way, it may be a useless exercise that will be quickly forgotten.

Last week the European Parliament was the first of the EU’s three governing institutions to adopt its position on how to run the conference, set to begin in May. Their position, adopted by 494 votes to 147, would create a highly organized system of citizens’ assemblies across Europe, composed of up to 300 people each. Several bodies would be set up to run the conference, including a “conference plenary,” a “steering committee” and an “executive board.” Former Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt, who has been the parliament’s Brexit spokesperson, was chosen to lead the process.

Constitutional Convention

Most significantly, the parliament would give citizens specific questions to wrestle with, involving structural changes to the EU to make it more fit for the challenges to come in the 21^st century. They want to ask citizens if they think EU elections should be more direct, for instance by directly electing the European Commission president, and if they think it should be easier for the EU to make foreign policy and tax decisions by removing the ability for a single country to use its veto. The prospect of achieving this through treaty change, something that still terrifies EU national governments since the Lisbon Treaty nightmare ten years ago, is embraced by the European Parliament. MEPs say this conference should result in major changes in how the EU works.

Indeed, what the parliament is envisioning resembles the Convention on the Future of the European Union which ran from 2002 to 2003 and ended with the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. That constitution was notoriously rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005. The EU then set out on a long arduous process of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, which contained most of the structural changes of the defeated constitution without the trappings of a federation (and therefore not subject to a referendum in France).

That was then, this is now. Macron, backed by the European Parliament, believes that the situation has changed dramatically in the last 15 years. The combined lessons of Brexit and Donald Trump have shown Europeans that a strong EU is needed to guarantee European sovereignty. In 2005 the EU was a backburner issue few people thought about, and indeed polling showed the reason for the constitution’s defeat had more to do with punishing sitting national governments than its actual contents.

The Dreaded T Word

The conference should “propose all the necessary changes to our political project, without any taboos, not even treaty revision,” Macron said when proposing the idea last year. But outside Paris, national capitals don’t feel the same way. The crises prompted by the French and Dutch constitution rejection in 2005 and the Irish Lisbon Treaty rejection in 2008 still haunt them. Last month the European Council of 28 national leaders showed little enthusiasm for the project when they half-heartedly endorsed the idea but refrained from saying anything about it.

National EU ambassadors are expected to discuss the issue this week ahead of the EU affairs ministers’ first discussion on the conference next Tuesday. But it’s very uncertain whether leaders will adopt a position at their March European Council summit—something that would be necessary for the conference to start in May as planned. More than likely, they will delay the start of the conference as long as possible—to Macron’s great irritation.

While Angela Merkel has publicly spoken positively of Macron’s idea, privately she is said to be terrified of the idea of it leading to treaty change and would prefer for it to remain a purely public relations exercise. Once again, Macron’s appeals for EU reforms are hitting a German wall.

Ursula’s Open-Ended Plan

It was within this context that the European Commission set out its vision of the conference this week—caught, as it so often is, between the ambition of the European Parliament and the conservatism of the European Council.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen couldn’t be in Brussels herself for the adoption of the commission’s position on Wednesday, as she was speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos at the same time. “This is about Europe shaping its own future,” she told the world’s rich and powerful meeting in the Swiss mountain resort. “But to be more assertive in the world, we know we must step up in some fields. Recent events have exposed where we have to do more.”

However, the commission’s position on the future of Europe unveiled just 30 minutes later in Brussels didn’t seem to reflect this sense of urgency. Instead, the communication to citizens seems to say von der Leyen believes the EU is functioning just fine.

The commission goes into little detail about how the conference should be run, but it rejects the parliament’s idea for citizen assemblies saying instead it should “build on the well-established citizens’ dialogues.” One could be forgiven for having never heard of these town-hall-style dialogues, even though 1,850 have been held between citizens and commissioners in 650 locations across Europe, according to the commission.

Announcing the commission’s proposal to the press, Dubravka Šuica, Vice President for Democracy and Demography, said the conference should first focus on the EU’s headline policy ambitions of climate change, economic equality, and digital transformation.

A second, seemingly less important strand would focus on structural issues. A reference in an earlier version of the text to taking legislative action and proposing treaty change “if appropriate” was taken out.

“This will be a bottom-up forum for open and inclusive debate accessible to people from all corners of the union,” said Šuica. “We want to go beyond the cities, beyond the capitals, we want to reach also those who are critical toward the EU.”

Conducting the conference at sporting events or festivals could be one way of reaching those citizens who are not currently engaged, she said.

Šuica said an open-ended approach is better than one which already tells the citizens what the structural problems are that need to be solved. “This will be more a listening exercise than talking. And when we hear what citizens want, we will try to transpose this into policies and maybe some legal acts.”

An Unusable Cacophony

“We are not going to pre-empt what will be the outcome of these roundtables. We will allow citizens to tell us what they want. If they want treaty change, we are open to this. Parliament and council have more to say on this than the commission—but we have nothing against it.”

It might sound very democratic, but critics point out that it is unrealistic to expect citizens to know what the structural problems are or what treaty change means. Without asking citizens specific questions about what they want, and rather just sitting back and saying, “Tell me what you want,” the feedback is likely to result in an unusable cacophony of voices. This may perfectly suit those national leaders who don’t want the exercise to result in a specific mandate to change how the EU works.

Critics have also questioned the commission’s decision to primarily focus on current policy priorities and place secondary importance on long-term governance issues. Given this is a conference on the future of Europe, why is it being restricted to the policy preoccupations of the present?

German MEP Gabriele Bischoff, a Social Democrat member of the European Parliament’s working group on the conference, told the EUObserver news website that the commission’s position is “not very ambitious, not very clear, not very outspoken, and is not addressing what should come out of this conference.”

However, she said at least the commission has not ruled anything out, as the council seems likely to do.

Once the council adopts its position, the presidents of the three institutions will meet to agree a consolidated approach. Given that the parliament’s position will be drastically different than the council’s, von der Leyen will be the one casting the deciding vote. If she sides with the MEPs she will score points with Macron, but anger Merkel and others.

Observers say that if she decides to demure to Berlin and other national capitals on how to run the conference, it could render it a useless exercise that is ignored and then quickly forgotten.

The post Has EU Reform Ended Before It Began? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

After a week of watching in dismay as the Iran nuclear deal seemed to come to a final collapse, the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom made a gesture that was as expected as it was futile.

“We have expressed our deep concern at the actions taken by Iran in violation of its commitments since July 2019. These actions must be reversed,” Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Boris Johnson said in a statement on January 12, urging Iran to return to full compliance with its commitments under the 2015 deal in which Tehran agreed to halt development of a nuclear weapon.

The statement was in response to Tehran’s announcement that it will cease to abide by the terms of the agreement following the US assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani earlier this month.

The deal had already been on thin ice since US President Donald Trump pulled out in 2018. Since then, the EU has been left desperately trying to salvage it by trying to continue rewarding Iran, by providing investment and facilitating trade, for the country’s sticking to the terms despite the US pulling out.

Brussels’ Main Focus: The Nuclear Deal

As the week’s dramatic events unfolded—with Tehran launching missiles against US airbases in Iraq in retaliation and accidentally shooting down a Ukrainian passenger plane as a result—the unravelling of the nuclear deal has been something of an afterthought for the rest of the world. But for Brussels, it has been the main focus. It has left observers scratching their heads as to whether this represents a genuine belief in Europe that the nuclear deal’s preservation is the most pressing issue, or whether this focus is simply the result of preserving the nuclear deal being the only thing everyone can agree on.

After initial criticism for her slow response to the unfolding crisis, Ursula von der Leyen, the new European Commission president, gave a statement last week with the new EU High Representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, calling for restraint amid the escalation. But the statement from the Commission and the European Council seemed to go mostly unnoticed. The situation has once again shown how much the EU is left as a bystander during such military incidents.

That Brussels has stayed so focused on the nuclear deal even as the cycle of violence has spun out of control has struck some as odd. Borrell’s first reaction to the assassination of Soleimani was steadfastly neutral, which likely reflects member state divisions on the US decision to carry out the attack. While the UK and some Eastern European countries have expressed some support for the decision, the reaction in core Europe has been very different. Many were concerned by the lack of justification from Washington for why it carried out the strike, and even more were horrified by President Trump’s subsequent threat to bomb Iranian cultural sites.

NATO “Shares the US Concern”

Meanwhile, on the other side of Brussels, the reaction from NATO has been more clearly supportive of the US. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg held a special meeting to deal with the developments, after which he told reporters “the US provided the rationale behind the action against General Soleimani.” While stressing that “this is a US decision” and not a NATO one, he said NATO shares the US concern about Iran’s activities in the region.

Perhaps this is why Trump said after this meeting that he would like to see more NATO involvement in the Middle East, with the alliance even perhaps expanding into the area and being rebranded “NATOME”. The idea has been met with skepticism by Europe’s core powers, who see it as a shield for US withdrawal from its responsibilities in the region.

Meanwhile, an increased role for the EU in the region, in the short or longer term, has not been mentioned.

As protests escalate in Iran in response to the accidental downing of the passenger plane, the EU will continue to try to find its footing. It is a military conflict between two long-time enemies which does not directly involve European countries. But in a world in which the new commission president just two months ago pledged to make the EU a more relevant geopolitical actor, people will be expecting more from Brussels than it has delivered so far.

The post Always the Bystander appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Yves Herman

European Council summits in Brussels can often be filled with rancor, never more so than when they involve money. This week’s EU summit in Brussels was a case in point.

EU national leaders held only a brief discussion about the multiannual financial framework (MFF), the EU’s seven-year budget due to start in 2021. Predictably, a new proposal to drastically cut the Commission’s proposed budget from Finland, which currently holds the rotating EU presidency, was welcomed by Northern countries and condemned by the South and East. But it was the proxy battles fought over climate and defense funding that were most interesting to watch.

Heading for Net-Zero

Western European members have spent six months trying to convince the Eastern members to support a target of completely decarbonizing the European Union by 2050. It finally looked like everyone would get on board at the summit after new EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen offered a €100 billion “just transition” fund to ease the way for countries reliant on coal.

Indeed, at the last moment, after intense negotiations, Hungary dropped its opposition last night. Czechia fell in line too after other member-states agreed that the summit text could make reference to nuclear power. That left only Poland. It was thought that Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki would take negotiations late into the night, in order to get as much money as possible, and relent in the end. That’s because this was the last possible moment he could effectively wield his veto.

Von der Leyen has said she will propose binding legislation in March to set the 2050 target, whether or not there was unanimous political approval from all 28 (soon 27) EU member states. While the Commission prefers to get unanimous consent from the Council before proposing big items of legislation, it is not legally necessary. Once the legislative proposal is made, it only needs a qualified majority of member states to vote for it in order to become law. Poland can no longer veto.

“In Our Own Pace”

As he left the summit, Morawiecki said he had secured an “exemption” to the target. “The conclusions give us enormous flexibility,” he said, saying that Poland will not have to abide by the target but will still get “a very significant part” of the just transition fund. “We’ll reach it in our own pace,” he said. “We will be able to conduct the transformation in a way that’s safe and economically beneficial for Poland.”

However Poland will not be exempt from the 2050 legislation once it’s adopted. It will apply to all member states equally. This veto was largely symbolic, and all it has accomplished is angering the other EU member states and the commission, who are now not at all minded to be generous with Poland when it comes to the just transition fund.

Morawiecki’s grandstanding was certainly meant for domestic political consumption in Poland, where his Law and Justice party (PiS) likes to be seen as standing up against the EU and its supposedly burdensome climate legislation that would hold back Polish economic growth. But in fact he has probably just vetoed his way out of just transition funding.

French President Emmanuel Macron made the funding threat explicit in his closing press conference. He described Poland’s lack of participation as “temporary.” “If Poland was not to confirm its participation, it would step outside the European mechanisms also in terms of solidarity financial mechanisms,” he said, implicitly threatening to withhold not just the just transition funds, but also standard solidarity funds.

Defense Fight

Leaders were also meeting in the shadow of a contentious NATO summit last week in London, where US President Donald Trump lashed out at French President Emmanuel Macron for calling NATO “brain-dead.” Macron was also privately reprimanded by German Chancellor Angela Merkel for his comments.

Of course, Macron was merely using different words to make the same observation that Trump has made many times in the past—that NATO is “obsolete.” The dispute led to much discussion about the purpose and future role of NATO, and attention inevitably turned to the EU’s plans for a “defense union”—something that many fear is an attempt to replace NATO.

What that “defense union” is depends on who you ask. The French, who have always been NATO-skeptic, say it is needed because Europe needs the capacity to defend itself without American support. The Germans say it is merely a cost-saving exercise meant to stop duplication of efforts between EU countries and improve the efficiency of military procurement. And the British, Polish, and Americans believe it is a French plot to destroy NATO and build an “EU army.”

It has fallen to von Der Leyen to explain what exactly it is. Under her leadership, the commission is creating its very first Directorate-General (DG) for Defense, Industry, and Space, to be presided over by Margaritas Schinas, the vice president for promoting (originally “protecting”) the European way of life.

The Language of Power

“Europe must also learn the language of power,” von der Leyen said during a speech on European policy in Berlin last month. “On the one hand, this means building our own muscles where we’ve long been relying on others—for example in security policies.”

The Defense Union plan calls for a new EU military doctrine, a new EU fund for defense, a EU permanent military cooperation, a single EU headquarters for military operations, and a commission defense department.

The European Commission already deals with some defense and security matters, but they have never before been organized into one department. The new DG is expected to be complete next year. Its stated main purpose is to efficiently manage the €13 billion European Defense Fund. But many believe its powers will be steadily expanded over time.

Not everyone is so enthusiastic about this surge of military spending. In their budget proposal, the Finns have drastically cut the commission’s envisioned defense spending. Von der Leyen says this is unacceptable. “If one is serious about this then one has to invest,” she said last week.

It appears that the battles in both the climate and defense fights are going to move to the ongoing negotiations over the EU’s long-term budget. As is often the case in politics, money makes the world go round.

The post Show Me the Money appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

On Monday, at long last, the European Parliament agreed to confirm all of the people nominated for Ursula von der Leyen’s college of commissioners. This followed a month of high drama after MEPs rejected an unprecedented three nominees. This included, to everyone’s shock, the French nominee Sylvie Goulard. Three replacement nominees—the other two from Romania and Hungary—have now been confirmed.

Von der Leyen says she’s now ready to start work on December 1—but she is still not out of the woods. The extension to the Brexit deadline agreed last month means that the United Kingdom is still a member until at least January 31, 2020. Under EU rules, every EU country should have a commissioner. For domestic political reasons, Prime Minister Boris Johnson is refusing to nominate anyone until after the December 12 UK election. A ding-dong match with the commission during the campaign would help buttress Johnson’s image as the man who sticks it to Brussels.

Because of logistics, waiting for the UK nomination would mean von der Leyen cannot take office until 2020. But her lawyers say they have found a loophole and can get away with starting on December 1 with a team of only 27 commissioners. Doing so, however, would expose the new commission to legal challenges against any decisions it takes in those first weeks: complainants could argue that it has been illegally constituted. So just to be safe, the new commission will probably not make any decisions or proposals until 2020. In the meantime, von der Leyen is taking Johnson to court over his refusal to nominate.

The simpler solution would have been to change the rules. Technically, the rules were already changed by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which would have shrunk the commission to 18 by letting the larger member states always have a commissioner, while the small ones would rotate having one. Smaller countries, predictably, didn’t like this. And after the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a first referendum, a provision was added that allows national governments to delay implementation of this change. This, in theory, is what got the treaty over the line in the second Irish referendum.

So for a legally sound way forward, the European Council of 28 national governments could just change the rules to shrink the proscribed size of the commission. But Ireland and other small countries are refusing to do this, fearful that it will set a precedent for permanently shrinking the European Commission in the future.

An Absurd Situation

All of this comes after the Spitzenkandidat debacle in July, when the European heads of governments refused to go along with the European Parliament’s unofficial system of choosing the president from candidates who campaigned during the EU election—first used in 2014 to select Jean-Claude Juncker. MEPs had said they would not confirm anyone who was not a candidate—which von der Leyen, pushed by French President Emmanuel Macron, wasn’t. But after an intense stand-off, the European Parliament lost its nerve and confirmed her by just nine votes. The MEPs’ lingering resentment, however, caused them to lash out at Macron three months later by rejecting Goulard, his commissioner nominee.

The entire formation of the EU’s executive following May’s European election has been an embarrassment. First, voters were told their vote for an MEP would determine who becomes the next EU President—only to be denied later by national governments, albeit with good legal reason: according to the European treaties, it is the right of the European Council to pick the President of the European Commission.

Then, von der Leyen was unable to fulfill a promise of gender parity in the next college because men were forced upon her by national governments. What’s more, her start date was delayed because of political and institutional power games that have nothing to do with the qualifications of the nominees. And in perhaps the most absurd final twist, one member state that is planning to leave doesn’t want to have a commissioner in the college and is thus causing more insecurity, and possibly delay.

Not a Federation (Yet)

The EU is not a country and, strictly speaking, not (yet) a federation. But it is pretty close, which means comparisons are sometimes clarifying. So it’s worth asking, what other federal government would operate this way—forcing a president to assemble a cabinet of ministers that has a proscribed number from each of the constituent states? What system would refuse to allow a president or prime minister to choose their own cabinet?

The rules governing commissioner appointments are all the more absurd when you take into account that commissioners are explicitly not supposed to be representing their countries or their political parties while in the commission. The EU executive was not set up to be a representative body. Commissioners do not answer to voters or to their national governments, and that is by design. They are supposed to be free to take decisions in the European interest, and never show national favoritism—much as a cabinet minister should also not be only thinking about the interests of their own constituents. A national government cannot remove their commissioner once they are confirmed, which is why the politics of a commissioner don’t always match their national government, which may have changed parties in the meantime.

All this being said, everyone in Brussels knows this theoretical neutrality is not always the reality. Commissioners from the biggest member states tend to be leaned on heavily by national governments—the French and German commissioners in particular. This is why national governments fight so hard over which portfolio their nominee is assigned. However, the principle isn’t completely ignored. Commissioners from small member states tend to be the best at representing the European interest over their national interest. And most commissioners are from small member states.

Time for Treaty Change

This system of each country having a commissioner was invented in 1957, when there were only six EU countries. With 28, the situation has become unwieldy.

EU leaders know the system is broken; that’s why they tried to reform the college formation rules with the Lisbon Treaty. The most obvious problem is that there are far more commissioners than needed, resulting in some being given silly titles like “commissioner for multilingualism.” As a workaround, since 2014 the commission has been assigning multiple people to the same portfolios. There are two in charge of energy, digital, defense, and taxation—just to name a few.

The too-many-commissioners problem could be resolved with a simple vote by the European Council, if the objections of Ireland and others can be overcome. But that won’t be enough. For deeper reform, treaty change is needed.

Unfortunately, “treaty change” has become a term that makes European capitals shudder. They are still scarred from the traumatic European Constitution-Turned-Lisbon-Treaty experience that lasted from 2001 to 2009. The French and Dutch rejection of the constitution in 2005 nearly derailed the European project.

But treaty change is long overdue. Before Lisbon, the EU treaties had been changed roughly every eight years. The EU hasn’t adopted a new treaty in a decade—and the latest framework was first drafted in 2001. The Lisbon experience may make treaty change scary, but it doesn’t make it any less necessary.

The Right to Choose

Here is one potential solution to the Commission formation problems: What if the president could choose for themselves how many commissioners they want, like a national president or prime minister can choose the size of their cabinet? What if the president could choose those commissioners themselves with no nationality restrictions?

Given the sensitivities of a confederation like the EU, perhaps lifting all geographic restrictions isn’t realistic. But why should the restrictions be national? Why can’t they be regional, reflecting the North, South, East and West divisions that are still very pertinent in Europe today (perhaps more pertinent than national borders). The treaties could specify that there must be at least two commissioners each from Europe’s North, South, East, and West to ensure geographic balance. The remainder could be at the president’s discretion.

And if people wanted to be particularly democratically ambitious in this treaty change, they could finally establish the commission presidency as a directly elected post.

Could this be done before the next European election in 2024? There’s no reason to think it couldn’t. But it would take EU national leaders with real ambition and drive to get this done. Right now, the only leader who seems to have this is Macron. But he appears to be more interested in protecting French interests than in instituting real EU reform that might take power away from national capitals, as these reforms certainly would.

This has been the perpetual problem with the European project: ever-closer union requires national governments to surrender some powers. Only leaders who can think strategically and long-term have been able to do that in the past. And such leaders seem to be lacking today.

The post The EU’s Broken Commission Model appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw

In July, when former German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a confirmation vote in the European Parliament by just nine votes, she emphatically thanked MEPs and said she looked forward to starting her new job as European Commission President on November 1.

But three months later, von der Leyen will not be starting as scheduled. MEPs, still angry over the circumstances of her appointment, lashed out earlier this month by rejecting the nominee to be her internal market commissioner, Sylvie Goulard from France. Their real target was the man who nominated her, French President Emmanuel Macron, who killed the parliament’ Spitzenkandidaten system for choosing the Commission President in June.

The parliamentarians also rejected the Romanian and Hungarian nominees, for more traditional reasons. Now, with questions over Macron’s replacement nominee, Thierry Breton, and Romania’s government in chaos, it’s looking like von der Leyen may not be able to start until 2020.

No More Gender Balance

Perhaps the most lasting effect of this month’s drama in the European Parliament is that it has destroyed the chance for the EU to have its first gender-balanced college of commissioners. When she announced her team in September, von der Leyen was keen to trumpet the fact that it would be the first gender-balanced one in history—with half of the team women (13 out of 27, or 48 percent).

But Macron has replaced Goulard with a male nominee–Breton is a former economy and finance minister under Jacques Chirac and a businessman. Romania’s ousted prime minister is battling with that country’s president over who can nominate someone to replace their rejected female nominee, but both of the people being considered are men.

To make matters worse, with Brexit being extended until January 31, 2020 (for more see below), it will now be necessary for Boris Johnson to nominate a temporary commissioner before von der Leyen’s commission can begin. The most likely choice will be for Julian King, the current British commissioner, to stay on. That would mean only 11 out of a team of 28 would be women—a ratio of 39 percent. This is roughly the same ratio the commission of outgoing president Jean-Claude Juncker had.

Romanian Chaos

But the gender imbalance may be the least of von der Leyen’s worries. Though Hungary’s replacement nominee Olivér Várhelyi looks set to sail through, the French nomination is complicated, and the Romanian nomination is a mess.

Breton and Várhelyi will have their confirmation hearings next Wednesday and Thursday in the European Parliament in Brussels. Many MEPs are not happy with Macron’s choice. Unlike Goulard, Breton has no EU experience and is considered far more conservative than the previous nominee. He is nominated for the same vast internal market portfolio as Goulard was and there are still concerns that his position will be too powerful. There have also been questions about his current job as CEO of technology company Atos. He reportedly owns about €34 million worth of shares in the company, which he would be regulating as part of his new job.

MEPs say they are preparing some tough questions for him. It’s highly unlikely they would reject him, after having already rejected one French nominee, but they may hold up his appointment for several weeks.

Romania has still not put forward a replacement, because since the original nomination was made the government of Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă has collapsed. That hasn’t stopped her from putting someone forward anyway—the Socialist MEP Victor Negrescu. But Romanian President Klaus Iohannis is challenging her right to do this, arguing that because the government has fallen, it is now his responsibility. He reportedly wants to nominate Liberal MEP Siegfried Muresan.

Meanwhile, there are reports in London that Johnson may refuse to nominate a new commissioner—fearful that it would suggest to the British public ahead of December 12 election that the UK is not leaving the EU. Lawyers at the commission are looking to see if there is any way around the rule that there must be one commissioner from each EU member state.

None of this, from the Spitzenkandidat fight to the Romanian chaos to the Brexit meltdown, is von der Leyen’s fault. But she has found herself seriously hampered by all of it before her tenure has even begun. And her inability to react robustly to the unfolding situation has many in Brussels questioning her fitness for the job. This is unnerving for her team, considering she still has to survive a second confirmation vote, along with her whole college of 28 commissioners, in the European Parliament.

Another Brexit Delay

The other major event meant to take place tomorrow was Brexit. But after Boris Johnson failed to ram his renegotiated Brexit deal through the British parliament in record time, MPs voted this to call an election for December 12. The EU granted an extension of three months, until 31 January 2020, even before that vote.

This is the third time the UK has requested, and the EU granted, an extension to the Brexit deadline which was originally supposed to be at the end of March. The continuing extensions have left everyone exasperated.

French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly came close to vetoing the request for extension—delivered by Johnson under duress (or so he pretended) because of a piece of UK legislation requiring him to do so. On the EU side, there is a strong desire for the UK to leave as quickly as possible, but in an orderly fashion. People in Brussels are tired of having the Brexit issue hijack European summits and slowing the EU agenda. “As much as I hate Johnson, I have to say I hope he wins a majority in December because it would mean the British are finally gone,” admitted one EU civil servant in Brussels.

But the divisions in the UK are making that exit seem almost impossible. Polls currently point to a resounding victory for Johnson, but they were also predicting that ahead of his predecessor Theresa May’s snap election in June 2017. May ended up losing her majority in that election. An inconclusive result could mean months of more uncertainty and possibly in a second referendum being called.

The European Union is ending 2019 in a state of paralysis. With the start of both the new commission and the new EU of 27 delayed until 2020, decisive action in Brussels seems as far away as ever. It is certainly not where Emmanuel Macron wanted to see the EU two years into a presidency. The European renaissance, which he and the many people who believed in him, had hoped for, seems still some way off.

The post An EU Delayed appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Johanna Geron

With just three hours left before the start of this week’s critical European Council summit, EU and UK negotiators at long last agreed a Brexit deal. It is an arrangement in which Northern Ireland will have a “soft Brexit,” while the rest of the UK will have the hard version.

It is remarkably similar to the arrangement first offered by the EU to Theresa May—having a “backstop” insurance policy in which Northern Ireland remains in a customs union with the EU while the rest of the UK was not. Except it’s no longer a backstop. Unlike the original idea, which would have kicked in only if the UK and EU were unable to reach a free trade agreement allowing an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, this new version kicks in no matter what—even if a free trade deal has been agreed.

When the original Northern Ireland-only backstop idea was presented to Theresa May, she refused. She said no British prime minister could contemplate an arrangement which would put a customs border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, mindful of the fact that she had made herself dependent on the protestant Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) after her disastrous 2017 snap election. She opted instead for a backstop that would cover all of the UK. But this was an arrangement that was unacceptable to the British Parliament, and they rejected her deal.

From Backstop to “Frontstop”

This time, the arrangement is coming with a number of caveats that both Johnson and the EU hope will be enough to get it approved by the British Parliament when it votes on Saturday. The biggest is that the vast majority of the UK will have a clean break from the EU.

On customs, a compromise has been reached in which Northern Ireland will officially be part of the UK’s customs territory, but it will have to follow EU customs rules and will be de facto in the EU zone, meaning a customs border will be placed in the Irish Sea. But because it will still be officially in the UK’s customs area, it can be part of any free trade deals that the UK signs with other countries after Brexit.

The original backstop would have kicked in in 2021, after a two-year transition period, only if the EU and UK had been unable by then to agree a free trade arrangement that would make border checks on the island of Ireland unnecessary.

But the new arrangement would start in 2021 whether or not a free trade deal has been agreed. It can be ended by a majority vote of the Northern Ireland assembly—but that vote can’t take place until 2025 at the earliest, and the exit from the customs union wouldn’t take place for another two years after the vote. Given the dynamics of the assembly, which hasn’t sat in two years, it seems unlikely such a vote to set up a hard border with the rest of the island would ever be taken.

Boris Johnson, who once said a customs border in the Irish Sea would be unacceptable, is now betting that MPs will be willing to accept an arrangement that may be worst for Northern Irish unionists, but better for Leave supporters in the rest of the UK.

Getting It Through Parliament

But Johnson knows this will be a tough pill to swallow for MPs. That’s why he reportedly urged EU leaders last night to explicitly say in their conclusions that they will not grant another Brexit extension. Johnson wants to put the deal to the British Parliament tomorrow saying, “It’s this deal or no deal”.

But MPs believe that if they reject this deal, Johnson will be required by the Benn Act to ask the EU for another extension to give time for a general election or second referendum. The opposition Labour Party may support the deal with the condition that it be put to the people in a referendum, meaning an extension would be required.

The EU did not give in to Johnson’s demand to rule out an extension. They didn’t address the issue in their conclusions, but speaking at a press conference last night, European Council President Donald Tusk seemed to suggest they will grant another extension if the deal fails in London. “Our intention is to work towards ratification,” he said. “Now the ball is in the UK’s court. I have no idea what will be the result on Saturday. But if there is a request for extension, I will consult member states to see how to react.”

Now all eyes are on London to see how MPs react. It is still possible that Johnson will defy the law and not ask for an extension even if the deal is defeated, in which case the EU can’t grant one. In that case, a no-deal Brexit could still be around the corner.

Broken Accession Promises?

After they put the Brexit issue to bed last night, leaders turned to a contentious debate over whether EU accession talks should begin with North Macedonia.

For years, the country’s EU membership bid had been blocked by Greece, which insisted it change its name from just ‘Macedonia’ because it is the same name as a Greek region on its border. This year Skopje complied, and the expectation was that EU accession talks would now begin.

However, France vetoed the opening of those talks last night, in a discussion over the paired accession of North Macedonia and Albania. There is palpable anger with French President Emmanuel Macron at the second day of the summit in Brussels.  He says his country is not ready for the start of talks—he was alone in that opinion, but it only takes one country to veto.

Several other leaders shared similar concerns over Albania, and there was hope that he would at least agree to move forward with North Macedonia while delaying the other accession talks, but he wouldn’t budge.

Eastern EU countries are particularly angry with Macron. They say the EU’s credibility is at stake. “We promised them,” grumbled Czech PM Andrej Babiš last night.

Macron Explains His Veto

But Macon says the entire accession process needs reform. The EU can’t keep using membership as a carrot for good behavior. On this point there are plenty who agree with him, and some leaders may be letting Macron take the heat for the North Macedonia decision. The issue came up also in the discussion on Turkey’s incursion into Syria last night, as people call for Turkey’s moribund EU accession process to finally be formally ended.

Many in Brussels say Turkey’s EU accession process is a holdover from when the United States (and the UK) pressured the EU to use the prospect of accession as a carrot for good behavior in neighboring countries—on issues that have nothing to do with the EU. Washington and London wanted Turkey to stay on side with the West, and many believe they pressured Brussels into opening the accession talks in order to string them along.

Now the UK is leaving and the US has lost leverage. The accession charade with Turkey, Ukraine, and others should be ended, many in continental Europe believe.

Even people who think that the five remaining Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia) should join the EU and then enlargement should end say that, before this can happen, the “Western Balkans and then the EU is complete” plan needs to be made clear.

The leaders will revisit the issue in December.

The post Two Member States Don’t Enter, One Leaves? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

In an unprecedented move, the European Parliament’s internal market and industry committees overwhelmingly voted on Thursday to reject Sylvie Goulard, the French nominee, to become the next EU internal market commissioner. As a result, the commission of incoming president Ursula von der Leyen will not start on November 1 as planned—and there is even speculation in some quarters she may never start.

Though the rejection is ostensibly over potential ethics issues during her time as an MEP, it has more to do with the parliament’s unfinished business from its battle with French President Emmanuel Macron this summer. Though the Parliament warned they would only confirm one of the official election candidates to become European Commission president, Macron disregarded their warnings and refused to honor their system for electing the commission president. (According to the EU treaties, Macron had every right to do so, as they stipulate that the European Council—the group of heads of governments—picks the commission president.)

Macron instead put forward Ursula von der Leyen, the German defense minister, who was not a candidate during the EU elections in May. In the end the parliament backed down from its threats and confirmed her by just nine votes. But she only made it across the line because of support from far-right parties in Hungary and Poland.

“Resentment? Pettiness?”

Macron may have thought he was out of the woods—that the parliament was all bark and no bite. But yesterday MEPs, led by rejected center-right Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber, took their delayed revenge.

Macron was left stunned. “I need to understand what played out,” he said at a press conference. “Resentment? Pettiness?”

He said von der Leyen had assured him Goulard would pass, and that she had been personally told this by center-right EPP leader Weber and center-left S&D leader Iratxe Garcia Perez. But Weber and Garcia Perez deny having any such conversation with von der Leyen, who has not responded to Macron’s accusation.

Macron’s assertion that this has more to do with institutional politics than Goulard’s qualifications is shared by most people in Brussels. The EPP itself made this more than obvious when it accidentally sent out a tweet yesterday before the vote with a WhatsApp conversation in the background saying, “Guys we are going to kill her in the vote later but do not say.” The tweet has since been deleted.

The stated reason for rejecting Goulard, a close ally of Macron, is allegations that she used a European Parliament assistant for domestic political work while she was an MEP in 2009. There was also discontent over the fact that while she was an MEP she was receiving $10,000 a month from a US consultancy firm for whom she appears to have done little work.

But this explanation doesn’t quite hold water. Though it might be distasteful, there is nothing illegal about having a second job as an MEP and Goulard fully disclosed what she was earning. Almost a third of MEPs have such second jobs, according to public data, with many earning far more than Goulard.

As for the payment scandal, though she has been questioned by investigators there has been no formal investigation launched against her. After a tough first round of grilling she promised MEPs that she would resign if she was ever found guilty of improperly using her MEP funds. There were far more serious doubts about the ethics and competence of other nominees, but they sailed through.

MEPs also had objections to her very broad portfolio, but in truth it is not that much bigger than in previous commissions.

Von der Leyen Is in Trouble, Again

Every five years, these confirmation hearings are often more about political games than the actual competencies of the nominees. The European Parliament wants to flex its muscles and show it can’t be pushed around by the other EU institutions, so it always rejects at least one nominee. But this year, after suffering such a humiliating climb-down in July, it had more to prove than normal.

The parliament had already rejected two Eastern European nominees even before their hearings—from Hungary and Romania. They were deemed by the legal affairs committee to have conflicts of interest. Given that the two governments who nominated them are political pariahs accused of violating the rule of law, the rejections were not that surprising.

The Hungarian was from the EPP, and the Romanian was from S&D. Those two groups then focused their attention on Goulard and Macron’s Renew Europe group of liberals, the third largest in the parliament.

Clearly, the parliament was not content with just catching the usual Eastern European small fish. They wanted a big fish to show Macron they can’t be trifled with—and that big fish was Goulard. She is only the second nominee to ever be rejected from a Western European country; the first being Italy’s Rocco Buttiglione in 2004 who was voted down for his homophobic views.

Lacking a Majority

This wasn’t just a humiliation for Macron, it has also critically wounded von der Leyen. Her own EPP group, which is led by Weber, has very publicly and ostentatiously disobeyed her. They also apparently disregarded an intervention by Angela Merkel, who urged them not to do anything that would delay the new commission’s start date on November 1—a crucial time with Brexit scheduled for October 31.

That the EPP ignored both of these women shows that von der Leyen does not command a majority in the parliament. This was always the worry with her very slim confirmation victory. Like Goulard, von der Leyen has found herself stuck in the middle of an institutional power battle she did not start. And some people in Brussels are questioning whether she can survive.

Von der Leyen, after all, has only passed one out of two confirmation votes. She must still be confirmed by the parliament again, along with her college of 28 commissioners. Under the EU treaties a commission cannot start work until it has been approved by the parliament. If there is no majority for any commission led by von der Leyen, then a new president would have to be found.

With the collapse of the Romanian government this week delaying a new nominee from Bucharest, there is now no prospect of von der Leyen’s commission being approved before the intended November 1 start date. Von der Leyen tacitly admitted this herself in a statement following Goulard’s rejection.

A delay itself is not a mortal blow, and indeed von der Leyen may be breathing a sigh of relief that there is now no risk her first day will be occupied by a no-deal Brexit. But if she cannot get a confirmation for her college by December 1, people will start asking whether they need to start over with a new president.

It’s a road few want to go down, and the parliament is likely to be content having taken their revenge against Macron. But MEPs may have kicked off a tit-for-tat process that could snowball out of control.

The post Weber’s Revenge appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.