© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

On Monday, at long last, the European Parliament agreed to confirm all of the people nominated for Ursula von der Leyen’s college of commissioners. This followed a month of high drama after MEPs rejected an unprecedented three nominees. This included, to everyone’s shock, the French nominee Sylvie Goulard. Three replacement nominees—the other two from Romania and Hungary—have now been confirmed.

Von der Leyen says she’s now ready to start work on December 1—but she is still not out of the woods. The extension to the Brexit deadline agreed last month means that the United Kingdom is still a member until at least January 31, 2020. Under EU rules, every EU country should have a commissioner. For domestic political reasons, Prime Minister Boris Johnson is refusing to nominate anyone until after the December 12 UK election. A ding-dong match with the commission during the campaign would help buttress Johnson’s image as the man who sticks it to Brussels.

Because of logistics, waiting for the UK nomination would mean von der Leyen cannot take office until 2020. But her lawyers say they have found a loophole and can get away with starting on December 1 with a team of only 27 commissioners. Doing so, however, would expose the new commission to legal challenges against any decisions it takes in those first weeks: complainants could argue that it has been illegally constituted. So just to be safe, the new commission will probably not make any decisions or proposals until 2020. In the meantime, von der Leyen is taking Johnson to court over his refusal to nominate.

The simpler solution would have been to change the rules. Technically, the rules were already changed by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which would have shrunk the commission to 18 by letting the larger member states always have a commissioner, while the small ones would rotate having one. Smaller countries, predictably, didn’t like this. And after the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a first referendum, a provision was added that allows national governments to delay implementation of this change. This, in theory, is what got the treaty over the line in the second Irish referendum.

So for a legally sound way forward, the European Council of 28 national governments could just change the rules to shrink the proscribed size of the commission. But Ireland and other small countries are refusing to do this, fearful that it will set a precedent for permanently shrinking the European Commission in the future.

An Absurd Situation

All of this comes after the Spitzenkandidat debacle in July, when the European heads of governments refused to go along with the European Parliament’s unofficial system of choosing the president from candidates who campaigned during the EU election—first used in 2014 to select Jean-Claude Juncker. MEPs had said they would not confirm anyone who was not a candidate—which von der Leyen, pushed by French President Emmanuel Macron, wasn’t. But after an intense stand-off, the European Parliament lost its nerve and confirmed her by just nine votes. The MEPs’ lingering resentment, however, caused them to lash out at Macron three months later by rejecting Goulard, his commissioner nominee.

The entire formation of the EU’s executive following May’s European election has been an embarrassment. First, voters were told their vote for an MEP would determine who becomes the next EU President—only to be denied later by national governments, albeit with good legal reason: according to the European treaties, it is the right of the European Council to pick the President of the European Commission.

Then, von der Leyen was unable to fulfill a promise of gender parity in the next college because men were forced upon her by national governments. What’s more, her start date was delayed because of political and institutional power games that have nothing to do with the qualifications of the nominees. And in perhaps the most absurd final twist, one member state that is planning to leave doesn’t want to have a commissioner in the college and is thus causing more insecurity, and possibly delay.

Not a Federation (Yet)

The EU is not a country and, strictly speaking, not (yet) a federation. But it is pretty close, which means comparisons are sometimes clarifying. So it’s worth asking, what other federal government would operate this way—forcing a president to assemble a cabinet of ministers that has a proscribed number from each of the constituent states? What system would refuse to allow a president or prime minister to choose their own cabinet?

The rules governing commissioner appointments are all the more absurd when you take into account that commissioners are explicitly not supposed to be representing their countries or their political parties while in the commission. The EU executive was not set up to be a representative body. Commissioners do not answer to voters or to their national governments, and that is by design. They are supposed to be free to take decisions in the European interest, and never show national favoritism—much as a cabinet minister should also not be only thinking about the interests of their own constituents. A national government cannot remove their commissioner once they are confirmed, which is why the politics of a commissioner don’t always match their national government, which may have changed parties in the meantime.

All this being said, everyone in Brussels knows this theoretical neutrality is not always the reality. Commissioners from the biggest member states tend to be leaned on heavily by national governments—the French and German commissioners in particular. This is why national governments fight so hard over which portfolio their nominee is assigned. However, the principle isn’t completely ignored. Commissioners from small member states tend to be the best at representing the European interest over their national interest. And most commissioners are from small member states.

Time for Treaty Change

This system of each country having a commissioner was invented in 1957, when there were only six EU countries. With 28, the situation has become unwieldy.

EU leaders know the system is broken; that’s why they tried to reform the college formation rules with the Lisbon Treaty. The most obvious problem is that there are far more commissioners than needed, resulting in some being given silly titles like “commissioner for multilingualism.” As a workaround, since 2014 the commission has been assigning multiple people to the same portfolios. There are two in charge of energy, digital, defense, and taxation—just to name a few.

The too-many-commissioners problem could be resolved with a simple vote by the European Council, if the objections of Ireland and others can be overcome. But that won’t be enough. For deeper reform, treaty change is needed.

Unfortunately, “treaty change” has become a term that makes European capitals shudder. They are still scarred from the traumatic European Constitution-Turned-Lisbon-Treaty experience that lasted from 2001 to 2009. The French and Dutch rejection of the constitution in 2005 nearly derailed the European project.

But treaty change is long overdue. Before Lisbon, the EU treaties had been changed roughly every eight years. The EU hasn’t adopted a new treaty in a decade—and the latest framework was first drafted in 2001. The Lisbon experience may make treaty change scary, but it doesn’t make it any less necessary.

The Right to Choose

Here is one potential solution to the Commission formation problems: What if the president could choose for themselves how many commissioners they want, like a national president or prime minister can choose the size of their cabinet? What if the president could choose those commissioners themselves with no nationality restrictions?

Given the sensitivities of a confederation like the EU, perhaps lifting all geographic restrictions isn’t realistic. But why should the restrictions be national? Why can’t they be regional, reflecting the North, South, East and West divisions that are still very pertinent in Europe today (perhaps more pertinent than national borders). The treaties could specify that there must be at least two commissioners each from Europe’s North, South, East, and West to ensure geographic balance. The remainder could be at the president’s discretion.

And if people wanted to be particularly democratically ambitious in this treaty change, they could finally establish the commission presidency as a directly elected post.

Could this be done before the next European election in 2024? There’s no reason to think it couldn’t. But it would take EU national leaders with real ambition and drive to get this done. Right now, the only leader who seems to have this is Macron. But he appears to be more interested in protecting French interests than in instituting real EU reform that might take power away from national capitals, as these reforms certainly would.

This has been the perpetual problem with the European project: ever-closer union requires national governments to surrender some powers. Only leaders who can think strategically and long-term have been able to do that in the past. And such leaders seem to be lacking today.

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Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

On the morning Phil Hogan was nominated as the EU’s next trade commissioner, he told Ireland’s public broadcaster RTÉ his priority was “to get Mr. Trump to see the error of his ways.” The US president should abandon his “reckless behavior” when it came to China and the EU.

His remarks did not go unnoticed. EU diplomats in Washington reported back immediately that there was outrage in the White House. “We were told it was fortunate that John Bolton [the hawkish former National Security Adviser] had just been fired the same day,” recalls a close aide, “or that the president himself might have tweeted his reaction.”

Trump didn’t tweet, but his ambassador Gordon Sondland delivered the message to Politico, accusing Hogan of a “belligerence” that would lead to an impasse between the EU and US. “Then people start to do things that you don’t want them to do.”

It was a combative start, confirming Hogan’s reputation as a political bruiser with a sharp tongue. However, many in Brussels felt Hogan was right. The US was waiting for the new EU executive to take office, and Hogan was reminding the world who the new interlocutor would be.

His timing, however, may have been unfortunate. The next day, the WTO ruled in a decades-old dispute with Boeing that Europe had granted illegal subsidies to Airbus. As a result, Trump was expected to announce up to $10 billion in tariffs on European products.
Making the Strategic Case for Trade

All told, the 59-year-old, hailed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as a “brilliant” and “firm” negotiator, could not have taken up his post at a more turbulent time. The United States and China are locked in a trade war, China is accused of wholesale technology theft, Trump is threatening more tariffs on European goods, and Brexit is sapping the EU’s energy.

European efforts to sail above the turbulence as the self-identified defender of the rules-based global order are limited. “So far, the EU has benefitted from the turmoil created by Trump’s trade war,” says Sam Lowe, a research fellow with the Center for European Reform (CER), “which provided the political impetus to conclude trade agreements with Japan, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam; but the waters ahead look choppy.

“Phil Hogan will need to make the strategic case for a resilient trade policy. But he will face a European Parliament looking for greater reassurance that the EU’s trade policy complements its environmental ambitions, and an inwardly focused European agriculture lobby.”

That lobby has been up in arms over Hogan’s role in negotiating the EU-Mercosur trade agreement as agriculture commissioner. South American farmers will enjoy increased access to the EU, but the access for beef―an annual quota of 99,000 tonnes―has enraged farmers, not least in Hogan’s home country.

The Irish Farmers Association claims Mercosur beef will cost European farmers €5 billion annually, compounded by a lack of traceability, food safety, animal health, and environmental controls. Hogan hit back: “There will be no product that will arrive in the EU from the Mercosur countries without complying with existing EU food safety standards.”

The Road from Kilkenny

Hogan was born just outside Kilkenny in south-east Ireland to a small-holder farming family. He followed his father into politics and won the parliamentary seat for the center-right Fine Gael party that had always eluded his father.

He was a junior finance minister in 1994 in the Fine Gael-Labour coalition, but was forced to resign when a staff member accidentally leaked details of the annual budget. Observers say Hogan nursed a longstanding grievance at his premature fall and was determined to make a return to ministerial politics.

It started by being appointed party chairman. “This put him in a position of extraordinary influence,” says a longstanding associate. “He got to know the organization intimately. He became director of elections, selecting candidates, placing candidates.”

Hogan honed his skills as a ruthless political operator. When in 2010 a minister attempted a coup against Enda Kenny, the party leader turned to his longtime friend Hogan for advice. Hogan told him to sack the entire shadow front bench.

Kenny promptly did so the next morning. While 15 rebel MPs assembled in front of the Irish Parliament to declare the revolt, Hogan rounded up 40 loyalists and sent them to the same spot. The coup was over as soon as it had begun.

Happily Unpopular

But Hogan soon made a bigger impact on Irish politics. In 2011, Fine Gael swept to power following the collapse of the Irish economy due to the banking and sovereign debt crisis. Hogan was appointed environment minister.

Under the advice of the EU-IMF troika administering the bailout, the government established a new state utility, under Hogan’s direction, which would introduce water charges in Ireland for the first time.

Hogan insisted the new charges would cost as little as €2 per week, but there was a backlash when he warned that those who did not pay would see their water supply “turned down to a trickle for basic human health reasons.” To many reeling from the austerity of the bailout years, this was callous in the extreme.

The theory is that Hogan took on the poisoned chalice of water charges because he knew Kenny would appoint him Ireland’s Commissioner three years later. “There was a neat choreography,” says one source close to Hogan. “Kenny needed someone with balls to do the job, and who was also happy to be unpopular because they weren’t going to be around.”

Journalist Michael Brennan, who has just published a book on the affair, In Deep Water, says, “It was one thing to take a bullet for other people. It’s another when you’re casual about doing it, knowing you have the job in Brussels sown up. He had to convince people this was a charge worth paying and he failed to do that. Within months of his going to Brussels, they had torn up the Hogan plan and came up with a very different approach.”

Negotiating Brexit

But Hogan had other things on his mind when he arrived in Brussels. Within two years the United Kingdom launched its Brexit referendum. Hogan was the only senior EU official given a license to make the case to remain, travelling to farm meetings and agricultural shows around the UK.

“He spoke very well about the importance of the EU for farmers,” recalls a senior European Commission official, “both in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and in trading opportunities. But he spoke as an Irishman as well, in terms of keeping the UK and Ireland together in the EU. He made a real contribution. He might even have swung quite a number of votes.”

That Hogan, a searing critic of Brexit, will be Brussels’ top negotiator when the future EU-UK trade talks start has not been lost on Boris Johnson’s government.

Going the Extra Mile

He is described as a tough negotiator. Despite the hostility of the farming lobby, Hogan’s supporters say he went the extra mile to limit the access of South American beef, holding up the Mercosur talks and irritating member states keen to get the deal over the line.

“Mercosur would not have been done without him,” says one EU source. “He doesn’t hold back in protecting Europe’s defensive interests. Farming often ends up as one of the final issues, and depending on your desire to close a deal for the sake of it, people can be more amenable at the last minute. He would step in and say, we won’t give on that.”

Hogan will have his work cut out for him. He is said to have a reasonable relationship with US Trade Secretary Robert Lighthizer dating back to when they negotiated the EU-US hormone-free beef deal. But he will have to tread carefully when it comes to the problem of how to resolve disputes between WTO members. The US has declined to appoint judges to the Appellate Court until the matter is resolved, but has been slow to suggest solutions.
The EU and Canada are working on a mechanism that would bypass the WTO, but a broader framework will be needed to uphold the multilateral rules-based order the EU wants to spearhead.

Lads, Give Us Five Minutes

“Bridge building will be the immediate challenge for Hogan,” says Peter Ungphakorn, a former senior WTO official. “If WTO members feel the US is undermining multilateralism, some kind of alliance could be forged between the EU and China to break this. That is definitely a possibility.”

That will require the ability not just to reconcile the interests of the US and China power giants, but to understand the nuances of diplomacy.

Hogan, who enjoys life in Brussels and can often be seen in one or two of the city’s fabled Irish pubs to watch rugby or Gaelic football, has, say his aides, the skills needed, including for one-on-one encounters.

“I’ve seen him in various places where there are two delegations,” says one aide, “and he’ll say, ‘You might give us five minutes, lads,’ and we’d leave. You’d be amazed at what can happen between two politicians in five minutes.”

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© REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw

In July, when former German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a confirmation vote in the European Parliament by just nine votes, she emphatically thanked MEPs and said she looked forward to starting her new job as European Commission President on November 1.

But three months later, von der Leyen will not be starting as scheduled. MEPs, still angry over the circumstances of her appointment, lashed out earlier this month by rejecting the nominee to be her internal market commissioner, Sylvie Goulard from France. Their real target was the man who nominated her, French President Emmanuel Macron, who killed the parliament’ Spitzenkandidaten system for choosing the Commission President in June.

The parliamentarians also rejected the Romanian and Hungarian nominees, for more traditional reasons. Now, with questions over Macron’s replacement nominee, Thierry Breton, and Romania’s government in chaos, it’s looking like von der Leyen may not be able to start until 2020.

No More Gender Balance

Perhaps the most lasting effect of this month’s drama in the European Parliament is that it has destroyed the chance for the EU to have its first gender-balanced college of commissioners. When she announced her team in September, von der Leyen was keen to trumpet the fact that it would be the first gender-balanced one in history—with half of the team women (13 out of 27, or 48 percent).

But Macron has replaced Goulard with a male nominee–Breton is a former economy and finance minister under Jacques Chirac and a businessman. Romania’s ousted prime minister is battling with that country’s president over who can nominate someone to replace their rejected female nominee, but both of the people being considered are men.

To make matters worse, with Brexit being extended until January 31, 2020 (for more see below), it will now be necessary for Boris Johnson to nominate a temporary commissioner before von der Leyen’s commission can begin. The most likely choice will be for Julian King, the current British commissioner, to stay on. That would mean only 11 out of a team of 28 would be women—a ratio of 39 percent. This is roughly the same ratio the commission of outgoing president Jean-Claude Juncker had.

Romanian Chaos

But the gender imbalance may be the least of von der Leyen’s worries. Though Hungary’s replacement nominee Olivér Várhelyi looks set to sail through, the French nomination is complicated, and the Romanian nomination is a mess.

Breton and Várhelyi will have their confirmation hearings next Wednesday and Thursday in the European Parliament in Brussels. Many MEPs are not happy with Macron’s choice. Unlike Goulard, Breton has no EU experience and is considered far more conservative than the previous nominee. He is nominated for the same vast internal market portfolio as Goulard was and there are still concerns that his position will be too powerful. There have also been questions about his current job as CEO of technology company Atos. He reportedly owns about €34 million worth of shares in the company, which he would be regulating as part of his new job.

MEPs say they are preparing some tough questions for him. It’s highly unlikely they would reject him, after having already rejected one French nominee, but they may hold up his appointment for several weeks.

Romania has still not put forward a replacement, because since the original nomination was made the government of Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă has collapsed. That hasn’t stopped her from putting someone forward anyway—the Socialist MEP Victor Negrescu. But Romanian President Klaus Iohannis is challenging her right to do this, arguing that because the government has fallen, it is now his responsibility. He reportedly wants to nominate Liberal MEP Siegfried Muresan.

Meanwhile, there are reports in London that Johnson may refuse to nominate a new commissioner—fearful that it would suggest to the British public ahead of December 12 election that the UK is not leaving the EU. Lawyers at the commission are looking to see if there is any way around the rule that there must be one commissioner from each EU member state.

None of this, from the Spitzenkandidat fight to the Romanian chaos to the Brexit meltdown, is von der Leyen’s fault. But she has found herself seriously hampered by all of it before her tenure has even begun. And her inability to react robustly to the unfolding situation has many in Brussels questioning her fitness for the job. This is unnerving for her team, considering she still has to survive a second confirmation vote, along with her whole college of 28 commissioners, in the European Parliament.

Another Brexit Delay

The other major event meant to take place tomorrow was Brexit. But after Boris Johnson failed to ram his renegotiated Brexit deal through the British parliament in record time, MPs voted this to call an election for December 12. The EU granted an extension of three months, until 31 January 2020, even before that vote.

This is the third time the UK has requested, and the EU granted, an extension to the Brexit deadline which was originally supposed to be at the end of March. The continuing extensions have left everyone exasperated.

French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly came close to vetoing the request for extension—delivered by Johnson under duress (or so he pretended) because of a piece of UK legislation requiring him to do so. On the EU side, there is a strong desire for the UK to leave as quickly as possible, but in an orderly fashion. People in Brussels are tired of having the Brexit issue hijack European summits and slowing the EU agenda. “As much as I hate Johnson, I have to say I hope he wins a majority in December because it would mean the British are finally gone,” admitted one EU civil servant in Brussels.

But the divisions in the UK are making that exit seem almost impossible. Polls currently point to a resounding victory for Johnson, but they were also predicting that ahead of his predecessor Theresa May’s snap election in June 2017. May ended up losing her majority in that election. An inconclusive result could mean months of more uncertainty and possibly in a second referendum being called.

The European Union is ending 2019 in a state of paralysis. With the start of both the new commission and the new EU of 27 delayed until 2020, decisive action in Brussels seems as far away as ever. It is certainly not where Emmanuel Macron wanted to see the EU two years into a presidency. The European renaissance, which he and the many people who believed in him, had hoped for, seems still some way off.

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© REUTERS/Vincent Kessler

One of Ursula von der Leyen’s top priorities is to preside over what she calls a “geopolitical” European Commission, one not afraid to stand up for EU’s interest in a competitive world. While the objective is certainly right, the label is wrong. Based on the set-up and plans for her team, her commission will be primarily a “geo-economic” one—an executive laser-focused on the EU’s economic power.

Instead of strengthening traditional foreign policy and EU diplomacy, the next Commission is setting out to reinforce Europe’s international footprint in those areas where the EU is strongest and has a real competitive edge. A former German defense minister, von der Leyen knows that the EU is still a military dwarf and the much-heralded Common Foreign and Security Policy often little more than a cacophony of diverging interests. She is now steering clear of these EU foreign policy black holes and focusing on trade, competition, and regulation.

The push for global relevance is based on the accurate assessment that Europe has fallen behind in an increasingly dog-eats-dog world. Whereas the United States and China embrace global competition and don’t shy away from using economic instruments to bring allies and competitors in line, the EU tends to bank on the power of international agreements and diplomacy. However, the Commission has often overlooked the heavy economic weapons that can make a difference.

Sharpening the EU’s Weapons

Take sanctions policy. The power to cut off trade or financial flows is one of the EU’s most potent and often-used weapons. For the past few years, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini has been in charge of the unit in the European Commission that oversaw the member states’ implementation of the embargoes.

But in the von der Leyen commission, the sanctions officials will get a new boss and a new mission. Under the auspices of executive Vice-President Vladis Dombrovskis for the economy, they will now be fighting for EU’s “economic sovereignty” and are supposed to make sure that Europe is more resilient to the threat of extraterritorial sanctions. The recent US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, which forced European businesses to comply with Washington’s sanctions, has clearly pushed the EU to rethink its priorities.

A similar pivot to the EU’s economic strengths is taking place in the area of defense. While EU civilian and military missions demonstrated little ambition in recent years, the commission did become more active in propping up Europe’s defense industries. And now the new  Directorate-General for Defense Industry and Space will be responsible for both funding Europe-wide defense capability projects and encouraging cross-border military mobility. Indeed, thanks to the €13 billion European Defense Fund, the Commission will be the third-largest defense investor in the post-Brexit EU.

Von der Leyen is also adjusting the executive’s working methods and streamlining its geo-economic agenda. A new group for external cooperation—naturally with its own acronym, EXCO—will tie together the outward work of the large bureaucracy and prepare the leadership meetings. Given that von der Leyen’s diplomatic advisor is co-chairing the group, together with Borrell’s deputy head of cabinet, one expects the new commission president to have a big influence on how this body wields external power. Moreover, her three executive vice-presidents received additional powers over the commission machine rooms to direct EU action on climate action, digitalization, and economic potency.

Changing the Face of EU Foreign Policy

Von der Leyen’s geo-economic commission aims to change the face the EU presents to the world. Previously, pushing for “global Europe” often meant upgrading the post of EU High Representative, which the Spanish Socialist Josep Borrell is scheduled to take over. Since the Lisbon treaty, the EU foreign policy chief has also been tasked with coordinating the commission’s external relations as one of its vice-presidents—with mixed success in the past.

Instead of empowering the high rep, von der Leyen plans to relegate Borrell and his European External Actions Service to a more supporting role. In her letter to Borrell, von der Leyen made it unmistakably clear that he will work “under her guidance” and “support” her in coordinating the commission’s external work. This is very different from the “pragmatic partnership” and “full” role in ensuring the effectiveness of EU’s external action that outgoing Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker offered Mogherini back in 2014.

Borrell will not have an executive position in the commission that could draw on its economic resources. He will be in charge neither of implementing EU sanctions nor of coordinating the commission’s work on defense industries, which is one element in his mission to build a European Defense Union. The Spaniard will chair the commissioners group on “A Stronger Europe in the World”, but with von der Leyen and her three executive vice-presidents now coordinating the big economic-related portfolios, it’s not clear how much influence he will have on the commission’s geo-economic agenda.

And while Mogherini had a green light to tap into commission resources on climate action, energy, transport, migration, and home affairs, Borrell is left with the vague instruction to “work closely” with his peers. It remains to be seen whether, under these conditions, he will be able to exert greater influence on European foreign policy than his predecessors could.

The New Game

The meager results of EU diplomacy in recent years have left their mark. The EU cannot escape the trend of increased global competition; it needs to sharpen its economic sword. Borrell’s post as the EU’s chief diplomat is not the top priority anymore in the new game of geo-economics.

The focus on geo-economics could pay off. But everything will depend on whether von der Leyen succeeds in getting on board the member states that have played the greatest role in European foreign policy in the past. She would be well advised to establish good cooperation with the European Council and Charles Michel—and to leave Borrell enough room for maneuver.

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Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

The life of Josep Borrell Fontelles, the next high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Vice-president of the European Commission, is extraordinary, as is the man himself. The son of a baker, he was born in 1947 in the small town of La Pobla de Segur, in the Catalan Pyrenees, near Andorra.

After attaining several degrees in aeronautical engineering and economics (including a masters in oil industry economics and technology in Paris) he had a doctorate by the age of 29 and was a full professor in economics at Madrid’s Universidad Complutense by the age of 35. He then turned to politics, becoming secretary of state for the Treasury at 37 and then minister of public works and the environment under the Socialist PSOE government of Felipe González at 44.

He became president of the European Parliament at 57, president of the European University Institute at 63, and then returned to Spanish politics to serve as minister of foreign affairs under Pedro Sánchez. Now at the age of 72 he is to become the chief diplomat for 500 million Europeans, with 4,000 civil servants under his command––quite an intense journey even for such a brilliant mind.

Intensity is actually one of Borrell’s defining character traits. His drive and single-mindedness have brought him great success. He was responsible, for example, for the modernization of the Spanish tax system, including the introduction of VAT, necessary to finance the welfare system when Spain entered the EU in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s he also played a key role in the decision to start building much of the infrastructure that today makes Spain the envy of the world. No small feat.

A Loner, Not a Team Player

However, his strong character and occasional irascibility have sometimes worked against him. At the core, Borrell is a mathematician, and an exceptional one. Not many Spaniards would have been able to get a Fulbright scholarship in the 1970s, still under the Franco dictatorship, to study Applied Mathematics at Stanford University. Yet he did. This outstanding mathematical mind allows him to be Cartesian in his approach to problem-solving but also means that he can easily become impatient when things don’t work out. This is reflected in his favorite hobby: hiking. Having been born in the mountains, wherever he goes he is immediately looking around for the highest mountain to climb.

Hiking, though, is more an individual than a group effort, and that is also one of Borrell’s traits. He is more of a loner than a team player. His intellectual mind is somewhat allergic to social conventions. In a country obsessed with football, he does not like the sport. He also hates networking (maybe the reason he never led the PSOE, although he was close in 1998 when he won the support of the party base). This does not mean, however, that he does not have a full book of contacts. Even after he left power, people would call him to pick his mind. This is a sign of his strong personality and independent thinking.

Recently a senior official at the German Foreign Office told me that Borrell needed to be brave. He must help unite the Europeans internally (starting with the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen) and project European power externally. If courage is required, Borrell has tons of it. Keen on rafting and other extreme mountain sports, he does not shy away from a good fight if he is convinced it is for a good cause. Already as a junior civil servant he fought his bosses, voicing his opposition to the first fiscal amnesty of the González era, and more recently he stood by Pedro Sánchez when the PSOE apparatus wanted to get rid of the leader and very few thought he had any chance to become the Spanish prime minister. Yet another example of Borrell’s determination paying off.

What You See Is What You Get

People who work under him highlight that Borrell is extremely demanding, and that this also extends to himself. Slightly workaholic, he prepares the dossiers in-depth and tries to look at the problems from different angles. He has a critical mind and is always looking for improvement. And above all, he is sincere. He does not suffer fools gladly. What you see is what to get with Borrell. This makes him come across as blunt but has also given him the courage to criticize obvious misbehavior.

In 2006, as president of the European Parliament he told Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face in a summit in Lahti, Finland, that he was a human rights offender. Later, in 2010, when, in the middle of the euro crisis, he became the president of the European University Institute in Florence he also dared to tell the faculty that they should climb down from their ivory tower and do more policy-oriented research.

This brought positive changes, like the introduction of the now well-established “state of the union” conference, the Migration Policy Center, and the Global Governance Program, as well as the chairs on the “Governance of EMU” and “Energy and Climate Change.” However, it also led to a conflict of interests for being on the board of the energy firm Abengoa and his ultimate resignation. This was not the last time his involvement in Abengoa would give him headaches. In 2015 he sold €9,000 worth of shares belonging to his wife with insider knowledge and was later fined. But overall it is clear that Borrell has never used his power to get rich. His austere lifestyle proves that.

Hatred of Catalan Separatism

The biggest fight of his political life has been with the Catalan separatists. Influenced by the French state culture, which earned him the reputation for being something of a “Jacobin,” he has never understood the obsession of so many of his fellow Catalans with the creation of an independent state. Borrell is proud to be Catalan, speaks Catalan, but has always hated Catalan nationalism. This has been a thorn in the side of secessionists. His successful career has been a vivid example that Catalans are not oppressed by the Spanish state.

He has also sought to counter the idea of the “economics of independence” by publishing a book entitled Las Cuentas y los Cuentos de la Independencia (“The numbers and fairy tales of independence”) where he contests the myth that Catalonia pays annually €16 billion into the coffers of the Spanish state. And he also gave a significant speech on October 8, 2017 (one week after the referendum which Spain declared illegal) in Barcelona in front of 1 million people calling for the unity of Spain. His speech showed that he is a convinced Catalan, Spaniard and European, who is adamantly opposed to any form of ethno-nativist nationalism.

This open Weltanschauung—already as a young student he left Spain to work on a farm in Denmark and in the construction sector in Germany, and he even spent some time in an Israeli kibbutz—will be useful for his job as high representative for the EU. In a time when US foreign policy has become much more nationalistic and reemerging powers like China have become more assertive, the chief European diplomat needs to be a tough negotiator, but also someone convinced that the multilateralist path is the right one.

Dealing with China

A lot of his attention over the next five years will no doubt be devoted to problems in the Middle East and North Africa, including issues like migration and Iran. The future of Africa will be a big dossier too. But hiker Borrell needs to look for higher peaks. Dealing with the Chinese challenge is one of them. Strategically it might be the most defining issue during his mandate. And here, he is convinced that only engagement and cooperation are viable routes.

In short, Borrell will be different to his predecessors. He will not try to find the lowest common denominator in foreign policy. After thinking hard about the problem at hand, he will present his vision and negotiate his way through in order to find a consensus for it. He is determined to make the EU a heavyweight in foreign affairs, expanding today’s G2 into tomorrow’s G3. His experience and determination will be his main advantages. As a convinced European, I wish him luck.

Editor’s note: Watch out for our November/December issue which will focus on European foreign policy.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

In national parliaments confirmation hearings for government nominees are often more about theater than substance. The European Parliament is no different, and this week has already seen its fair share of drama in Brussels.

Before she can take office on November 1, incoming European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen must have her entire team of 26 commissioners approved by the European Parliament. And historically, at the start of each term MEPs like to reject one nominee in order to flex their muscles.

Given the humiliation the parliament suffered in July over the failed Spitzenkandidaten process, it was clear from the start that MEPs would be out for more blood than usual this year. But nobody predicted that the parliament would reject two candidates even before the hearings began.

Last week the legal affairs committee exercised its new powers for the first time by finding that Romanian nominee Rovana Plumb and Hungarian nominee László Trócsányi had too many conflicts of interest to even have a hearing. This in turn prompted an angry response from MEPs not on that committee, feeling robbed of their chance to grill the nominees. Power games all around.

The parliament’s leadership asked the committee to reconsider and vote again, and when it again rejected the two nominees, Budapest and Bucharest begrudgingly withdrew them. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has nominated career diplomat Olivér Várhelyi as a replacement, and Romania’s embattled prime minister Viorica Dăncilă, barely clinging on to power at home as she faces a no-confidence vote, has issued von der Leyen an ultimatum.

She has nominated a man, Romanian MEP Dan Nica, as a replacement – knowing full well that this will upset the impressive gender parity ratio von der Leyen was keen to trumpet when she announced her commissioners earlier this month. She has floated a second name, Gabriela Ciot, but said she will only put her forward if Hungary puts forward a woman also. It isn’t entirely clear what she’s playing at, but there are likely discussions happening now between her, von der Leyen and Orbán that could involve a portfolio swap. Hungary was supposed to be getting the enlargement portfolio, while Romania was to get the transport portfolio.

Poor Polish Performance

The confirmation hearings started in Brussels on Monday, and on day two Poland’s nominee Janusz Wojciechowski, slated to become the new agriculture commissioner, ran into trouble with the parliament’s agriculture committee. MEPs said he did not seem to have adequately prepared, that his answers were vague and garbled, and that he contradicted himself during the hearing in an effort to agree with every MEP questioning him.

Even without the poor performance on policy issues, there was a question mark over Wojciechowski. He is part of Poland’s governing Law and Justice party, accused of dismantling democratic institutions and disrespecting the rule of law. He is also under investigation by the EU’s anti-fraud office for misuse of funds while he was an MEP.

To make matters worse, his party is not in any of the Parliament’s main political groups but instead in the much unloved European Conservatives and Reformists, the breakaway group created in 2009 by David Cameron. It is currently the second-smallest group in the parliament, with only the far-left being smaller. While the Hungarian nominee benefits from being part of Angela Merkel’s European Peoples Party, the largest group in the parliament, the Polish nominee has no such protection.

From his face, it was clear Wojciechowski knew he was in trouble at the end of his hearing, when committee chair Norbert Lins asked MEPs for a round of applause and was met with silence in return. At a minimum, it appears he will be brought back for further questioning. But some MEPs are already saying they will vote against him, which would mean Poland has to nominate someone else. This is already Warsaw’s second nominee. The government originally put forward Krzysztof Szczerski, the head of President Andrej Duda’s cabinet, but he withdrew following a meeting with von der Leyen for reasons that are still unclear.

The Underrepresented East

The confirmation troubles are part of a larger EU problem of under-representation for Eastern Europe at the start of this new term. Already in July, when the EU’s five top jobs were awarded to a German, a Belgian, a Spaniard, an Italian, and a Frenchwoman, it did not go unnoticed that this completely excluded Eastern Europe—a notable absence after the council presidency of former Polish prime minister Donald Tusk. With von der Leyen promising to make Dutchman Frans Timmermans and Dane Margrethe Vestager “executive vice presidents” in a deal to secure conformation by the European Parliament (they were both Spitzenkandidaten), the Western orientation of the new EU leadership was starting to look obscene.

Von der Leyen appointed a third executive vice president – Valdis Dombrovsksis from Latvia, saying at her press conference that this would rectify the situation and provide geographic balance. But many have noted that Dombrovskis has a much smaller role than the other two deputies, and fewer staff. And some in the “Visegrad Four” (encompassing Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) have grumbled that the Baltic states shouldn’t count toward meeting an Eastern Europe quota.

With the core Eastern states being made to field new, more technocratic commissioner nominees, their influence in this commission will decrease even further. This comes at a time when nationalist parties unfriendly toward the EU have powerful voice in the East.

On the third day of hearings, two western nominees with potential corruption problems—Belgium’s Didier Reynders and France’s Sylvie Goulard—faced some difficult questions. But MEPs appeared reassured about the allegations against Reynders, given that a Belgian prosecutor has mostly cleared him of fault. And Goulard, who was interviewed by French authorities for potential ethical lapses while she was an MEP, may be protected by her alliance with Emmanuel Macron. Reynders and Goulard are part of Macron’s liberal Renew Europe group, the third-largest in the parliament. MEPs may not be keen to pick a fight with the French president.

And so once again the European Parliament has set its crosshair on Eastern nominees as the sacrificial lambs of the confirmation process. Last time around, in 2014, in was the former Slovenian prime minister Alenka Bratušek who was rejected. This time, it may be three nominees from the east.

The geographic disparity may just be an unfortunate coincidence. But at a time when politics in Eastern Europe are become increasingly hostile toward the EU and liberal democracy in general, it’s not a great look.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

“The world needs more Europe, the world is calling for more Europe,” incoming European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told journalists as she announced her new commission portfolio assignments. “Therefore, we have to stand up.”

With this she announced what is perhaps the most outward-looking portfolio organization in the commission’s 50-year history. It reflects a newly assertive Europe on the world stage, with the EU eager to take on rivals like China and a protector and ally, the United States, that Europeans no longer trust.

Three “executive vice presidents” will serve under von der Leyen: the Lithuanian Valdis Dombrovskis will be Vice President for the Economy, the Dutch Frans Timmermans will be Vice President for the Green Deal (while also serving as climate commissioner), and the Dane Margrethe Vestager will serve as Vice President for Digital Affairs (while also continuing to serve as competition commissioner).

“We need to work on our technical sovereignty,” von der Leyen said of the latter combination.

Alongside them the Greek Margaritis Schinas will serve as a regular vice president (non-executive) for “Protecting Our European Way of Life.” What exactly this will entail is still unclear, and some are already complaining about its creepy connotations after Schinas announced his portfolio will include migration. “Protection from what?” one journalist asked. Are migrants threatening the European way of life?

But the intention behind this title may have been something more consistent with the themes of European sovereignty that von der Leyen is stressing. In draft versions of the portfolios, Schinas’s title was going to be “Commissioner for Defense.” According to EU sources, this was changed after EU member states objected to the idea of the commission muscling in on a national competence.

All in all, the portfolios paint a picture of a commission that is going to aggressively defend European sovereignty in the face of increasing competition and commercial ownership from China and a less and less reliable military alliance with America.

Digital Competition

Vestager’s surprise double appointment drew gasps in the press room as it was announced. The combination signals a drastic politicization of the role of competition commissioner, a job that has until now been considered to be ring-fenced away from the Commission’s political functions.

In recent years there has been intense pressure, particularly from Paris and Berlin, for the EU’s competition policy to take into account political objectives, for instance by allowing the creation of “European champions” to take on global rivals. Vestager drew criticism for blocking a proposed merger of German Siemens and French Alstom, which could have created a “Trainbus” to see off competition from China. She responded that if they want such things to be taken into account, they need to change the defined remit of the competition commissioner.

By making Vestager both competition commissioner and vice president for digital—one of the areas which the EU has fought the United States most fiercely—von der Leyen is signaling that she is ready to change the remit. Vestager has already gone after the American tech giants—Google, Facebook, and Microsoft—and the logical conclusion of the combination is that these investigations will increase. Von der Leyen’s “technical sovereignty” comment also signals that she will push for the EU to develop alternatives to US technical products. She specifically mentioned GPS, owned by the US military, during her press conference. Europe is working on its own satellite alternative, Galileo.

European Defense

In the face of Donald Trump’s attacks on NATO, the European Union drew up plans last year for an “EU Defense Union” that would pool the military resources and know-how of member states. Long opposed by the United Kingdom as the dreaded “European Army,” the idea has only been made possible with the impending exit of the UK from the EU. Contrary to many portrayals of the idea, it does not involve a single EU military but rather national militaries pooling their resources in order to be more efficient.

Most significantly, the defense union is designed to be independent of the United States, unlike NATO, which relies on America. Von der Leyen, formerly German defense minister, was at pains to defend the plan against criticism that it is meant to be a competitor to NATO—concerns which have not only come from London but also from Warsaw and other Eastern European capitals. “The European Union will never be a military alliance,” she insisted. “NATO is our collective defense, and it is the strongest military force in the world.”

But she also said the purpose of the defense union is for common procurement of military equipment from European suppliers, something Washington has fiercely resisted, having been a big seller of military equipment to Europe for decades.

It remains to be seen how Schinas will interpret his remit as vice president. Already there is talk that the European Parliament may insist the name of his title be changed back to commissioner for defense or commissioner for security. Though much of the initial reaction took his title to be saying Europe is under attack from migrants, others have interpreted it as being protecting Europe from American cultural, commercial, and military influence (for instance, from chlorinated chicken). Josep Borrell, the Spaniard nominated to be the next EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, has had his title adjusted by von der Leyen to “Vice President for a Stronger Europe in the World.”

The defense commissioner was meant to head the new directorate-general for defence and space, a new department in the commission von der Leyen has created—alarming many national governments who see military matters as a national competence and worry it threatens NATO. Despite the commissioner name change, this department will still exist, and Schinas will be presiding over it.

Energy Independence?

Von der Leyen’s choice of the Estonian Kadri Simson as energy commissioner also maintains this emphasis on European sovereignty. Estonia is on the front line of concerns about Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, and the country has consistently urged drastic action to safeguard European energy security by diversifying supply.

Estonia, along with other Eastern European governments, has been fiercely against the controversial Nord Stream II pipeline bringing gas from Russia to Germany.

Her choice of trade commissioner—Ireland’s Phil Hogan—can also been seen as confrontational towards the UK in a post-Brexit world. He can be counted on to play hardball with London in negotiations over a future trade deal that will take place in the coming years. Currently serving as agriculture minister, Hogan has also wanted to play hard ball in free trade negotiations with Brazil, Argentina, and the United States, leaning toward provisions to protect European farmers from global competition.

Enter the Parliament

The 27 portfolio nominations must now be approved by the European Parliament after confirmation hearings that will take place over the next two months. Traditionally, the parliament likes to claim at least one scalp every five years, rejecting one nominee to demonstrate its power.

After the humiliation suffered by the parliament in having to accept the rejection of the Spitzenkandidat process in July, this year MEPs may want to claim two scalps, or maybe even three. In 2014 it was quite obvious who would get blocked–Slovenia’s Alenka Bratusek. But this time ,it’s more unclear.

There may already be targets on the backs of Hungarian commissioner nominee László Trócsányi, who has been put in charge of enlargement at a time when no enlargement is anticipated. Poland’s nominee Janusz Wojciechowki, put in charge of agriculture, may also face a rough ride.

If all goes smoothly, von der Leyen and her team will take office on November 1. But as the incoming president noted today, it’s not up to her whether the process will be done by then. “I’m not the one deciding on timelines. MEPs will decide when they’ve heard enough,” she said.

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© REUTERS/Vincent Kessler

After a traumatic two months of fighting between the European Union’s institutions and political groups, it all came to an end last night. The European Parliament voted to confirm German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen as the next President of the European Commission – but by a margin of just nine votes.

The result was uncertain right until the last moment, with MEPs across the political spectrum still angry that the prime ministers of the European Council had ignored the Spitzenkandidat system of injecting democracy by running presidential candidates in the EU election. The national leaders chose non-candidate Von der Leyen at a marathon Brussels summit two weeks ago. The center-left Socialists & Democrats group was particularly angry because their Spitzenkandidat, Frans Timmermans, was rejected by a coalition of right-wing and center-right EU leaders.

So when the S&D announced two hours before the vote that it was joining the center-right EPP and the Liberal Renew Europe in endorsing her, it was assumed she would pass by a healthy majority. But this was a secret ballot, and things did not go as planned.

A sizable number of MEPs in those three centrist groups – the three largest in the Parliament with 443 sets between them – must have voted against her. Because she ended up with just 383 votes.

Right-Wing Support

Worst still, the pre-announced voting intentions of populist parties not in those groups means the number of pro-European centrists that voted for her was even lower still. The 14 MEPs in Italy’s governing Five Star Movement, 26 MEPs in Poland’s governing Law and Justice, and 13 MEPs in Hungary’s governing Fidesz all said they voted for her.

The reason is that their three prime ministers had supported her nomination at the European Council Summit, after fiercely opposing the nomination of Timmermans, who as Commission Vice President has opened punishment procedures against Poland and Hungary for rule of law violations. Following that summit, Orban bragged in Hungary that he and his illiberal allies had “won” the summit by blocking Timmermans and choosing Von der Leyen.

That Europe’s right-wing populist forces were rooting for Von der Leyen may seem odd, given she is an avowed federalist who wants to see a “United States of Europe” and ever-closer union. Indeed, on paper there is little for them to like about her. During her speech to the Parliament yesterday she said she would continue the Commission’s efforts to go after those EU countries where the rule of law violations are occurring, though she would not mention Poland and Hungary by name.

And yet, she will know that she owes her Commission presidency to the governing parties of Poland and Hungary – not just for her appointment in the Council, but also for her confirmation in the Parliament.

Asked about that uncomfortable reality in a press conference following her confirmation vote, she did not confront the implications head on.

“I don’t know who voted for me,” she told journalists. “I know it was very difficult to achieve a majority. But I think today the most important question was giving a speech which reflected my convictions, a pro-European speech, but one in which there was an attempt to find a solution to the divisions that exist between West and East.”

“A majority’s a majority in politics,” she added. “I didn’t have a majority when I came here two weeks ago, people didn’t know me. And as I can understand, there’s a great deal of resentment surrounding the Spitzenkandidat process.”

But the result gives credence to an idea put forward by the Greens, fresh off an election victory in May, that Von der Leyen will owe her commission presidency to the right-wing populists. Orban himself is likely to trumpet the parliament vote result in Hungary as another win for his party, as he did after the Council summit. Whether or not the Commission president actually feels beholden to him, the impression will be there.

Von Der Leyen’s backers were at pains last night to stress that the historic opposition to her in the Parliament was not about her as a politician but rather about the process in which she was appointed – something for which she bears no guilt. On this, they are correct. Indeed, some of the MEPs who voted against her said as they were leaving the chamber that despite their vote, they liked her very much. It was about the principle of defending the integrity of the European Parliament, which the Council had insulted by ignoring the Spitzenkandidaten.

Spitzenkandidat No More

One thing that everyone could agree on last night was that they were glad the ordeal is over. But the Parliament has emerged badly weakened. And in an act of revenge, they have weakened Von der Leyen as she starts her term.

One thing is clear – the Spitzenkandidat system for allowing voters a say in choosing the Commission President is dead.

Von der Leyen has promised the Parliament she will work to develop a new system for democratically selecting the Commission president in time for the next EU election in 2024. She said it will incorporate transnational lists, something pushed for by French President Emmanuel Macron but rejected by her center-right EPP Group in a European Parliament vote last year.

In the end, it will not be her decision to make. That will be up to the 28 national leaders of the EU, who under the treaties retain the sole right to nominate a Commission President. They never signed up to the Spitzenkandidat system; it was an invention of the European Parliament that wasn’t grounded in law. But they gave in to pressure in following it the first time it was used in 2014, to appoint EPP candidate Jean-Claude Juncker.

With Macron strongly opposed to the system this time around, the Parliament and Council never reached an agreement before the election on whether to use it. The Parliament decided to go ahead and run it anyway, thinking they could pressure the Council again as they did in 2014. It didn’t work out that way, and the failure of communication between EU institutions resulted in the ugly process that has played out over the past two months.

Now, the EU has a Commission president who is starting to look less like a compromise candidate and more like a compromised candidate. The Parliament has been left humiliated and angry, while the Commission has been left with a leader who risks being seen as illegitimate. In time, Von der Leyen’s historically narrow confirmation may become but a distant memory. But for now, it has exposed some of the EU’s worst decision-making flaws at a time when it can least afford such a blow to its reputation.

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© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

Less than 24 hours after being nominated as the new president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, until now Germany’s minister of defense, began her battle for acceptance. On a flying visit to Strasbourg, von der Leyen met with the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest group in the European Parliament.

“It’s here in the European Parliament that the heart of European democracy beats, and that’s why it is so important to immediately start the dialogue,” von der Leyen said. Time is short for her charm offensive: the confirmation vote in Strasbourg has been scheduled for July 16. Von der Leyen must persuade 376 out of 751 deputies to approve her, an absolute majority, with no second chance.

It will be an uphill battle. But the main reason is not what you would expect. It’s not that other Europeans fear that von der Leyen’s confirmation would cement German dominance over the EU. No, it’s actually the Germans themselves who most fiercely oppose her—the first German politician since 1967 to be nominated as president of the European Commission.

Personal Antipathy

An absurd situation in many ways: In the European Council, von der Leyen’s nomination was approved by every government leader’s vote, except Chancellor Angela Merkel’s. She was forced to abstain because her own coalition could not agree to support this German candidate.

Many Germans disapprove of von der Leyen because of her mixed record as defense minister. Others do for reasons of European democracy. With her nomination, EU leaders trashed the European Parliament’s Spitzenkandidat system (leaders were only supposed to choose from among the lead candidates standing at the recent European elections). Both are valid reasons. Yet mixed into them is also an astonishing amount of personal antipathy for the only minister who has served with Chancellor Angela Merkel since her first term in 2005.

On paper, Ursula von der Leyen, 60, fits every European bill.

Just look at her CV. She was actually born in Brussels. Her father, Ernst Albrecht, had a European career before eventually becoming premier of the state of Lower Saxony. She speaks fluent French and excellent English, having studied in Britain and the United States. She also managed the unbelievable feat of having seven children while training and working as a medical doctor.

In terms of politics, her references are just as glowing. Von der Leyen is a passionate European, a conservative modernizer, a forceful advocate of gender equality, skillful at building a network of friends and contacts throughout Europe and the North-Atlantic community. She has been unfailingly loyal to Merkel while also fostering a close friendship with Wolfgang Schäuble, a powerful CDU grande and Merkel skeptic.

Bad Vibes from the Coalition

And yet Ursula von der Leyen is disliked by many. From the very start of her political career, she raised hackles. Maybe she is just too picture perfect at combining a career and a family. Maybe it’s her background as an affluent aristocrat. Maybe it’s her voice that comes across as a bit nannyish or that she has a reputation being distant and even cold. Whatever it is, it is there—and it makes her long and successful political career all the more remarkable.

These bad vibes have turned political criticism into vitriolic attacks against von der Leyen’s nomination—not just by Germany’s opposition parties, but from within Merkel’s government, too. Even her own Christian Democratic party did not support her unanimously. The Werteunion, an ultra-conservative group, said the fact that “an unsuccessful minister” was being promoted that way was “a sign of the repeated failure of the chancellor’s foreign policy.”

“Democracy has lost,” said Markus Söder, the head of the Christian Social Union, the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, who is peeved that his fellow party member Manfred Weber, who had been the European People’s Party’s Spitzenkandidat, was rejected by the European Council.

The sharpest words came from the German Social Democrats, Merkel’s junior partner in government. Former Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel called von der Leyen’s nomination an “unprecedented piece of political trickery” and said this was sufficient reason for the SPD to walk out of the government. Katarina Barley, newly elected leader of the SPD deputies in the European parliament, declared that she and many of her colleagues would not vote for von der Leyen.

The SPD, of course, has enormous problems of its own. The party has no leader and no idea how to stop its freefall in the polls; it is also divided about whether to stay in the government coalition or try to recover as an opposition party. Failures and scandals at the defense ministry—including an ongoing parliamentary enquiry into the ministry’s use of consultants that could have become dangerous to von der Leyen as minister—are a welcome distraction.

Chancellor Hopes Long Dashed

In domestic terms, von der Leyen’s career had reached its apex. While she survived the defense ministry for longer than most of her predecessors, the length of her stint there—nearly six years—also means that she is being made increasingly responsible for the equipment failures, procurement snafus, and personnel shortages that plague the Bundeswehr. Any hope she may have had to be nominated Merkel’s successor as chancellor have long evaporated.

Still, von der Leyen was smart enough to keep quiet about any hopes for a big job in Brussels. To have French President Emmanuel Macron propose her as Commission president must have come as a godsend. And while she cannot do much about the dislike she frequently evokes in Germany, she can work on winning over European minds and hearts.

In terms of policies, this means at least two things: should von der Leyen become Commission president, she cannot afford to be soft on possible rule-of-law infringements by EU member states like Hungary or Poland. Those were the governments that successfully derailed the nomination of the Social Democratic Spitzenkandidat Frans Timmermans.

The second element concerns the need for democratic reform: precisely because von der Leyen was not selected through the Spitzenkandidat process, she will need to find ways to reestablish it in the future. At her initial visit with the EPP group in Strasbourg, von der Leyen made a big promise. “Over the next few years, we will be developing a Spitzenkandidat model which will be supported by the Council, by all member states and by all members of Parliament,” she said according to a news report by Politico.

Will this be enough? It just might, particularly as the parliament is painfully conscious of its own failings. EU leaders could only settle on an outside candidate because over the past six weeks, none of the Spitzenkandidaten emerged with a workable majority in parliament. If it does, it will be a double victory: for von der Leyen herself, but also for Angela Merkel, who will have opened the way to the first German president of the Commission in over 50 years and the first woman in that job ever.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

Last week, on the margins of a European Council summit driven to distraction by Brexit, Europe’s Liberals dealt what could be the decisive blow to the young Spitzenkandidat system for choosing European Commission presidents.

As a result, the next two months of debate between the presidential candidates ahead of the EU election on 23-26 May could all be for nothing.

The system was used for the first time during the last European election in 2014, after years of debate about how to address the “democratic deficit” in selecting people for the EU’s top posts. The idea is that each European political family nominates a Spitzenkandidat (“lead candidate” in German) to become the European Commission president. The candidate of whichever party obtains the majority vote in the European Parliament election­­—or can command a majority in the European Parliament—becomes president.

The system was pushed by both the commission and parliament but was opposed by the council of 28 national leaders, who said the choice of commission president is theirs alone. The EU treaties simply state that the decision should be made “taking into account the result of the European Parliament election.”

While it’s clear that the council appoints the commission president, he or she must be approved by the parliament. And the parliament refused to approve anyone who wasn’t a Spitzenkandidat. So in the end, the national governments bowed to pressure and appointed Jean-Claude Juncker, the Spitzenkandidat of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) which had attracted the most votes in the election.

The system was enthusiastically embraced in 2014 by Liberal leader Guy Verhofstadt. But this year he’s done an about-face. That’s because it is strongly opposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. The Liberals are trying to woo Macron into taking his En Marche party into their ALDE political family.

Macron has come out early and fiercely against the system, which he says is an EPP stitch-up because Europe’s largest political family is always guaranteed to get the most votes. He says the system is a way to guarantee the appointment of this year’s EPP nominee Manfred Weber, a man nobody is particularly enthusiastic about.

The “Seven Dwarves”

Until last week, the Liberals had refused to even participate by fielding a candidate. But in the end, they decided to hedge their bets. We’ll participate, they said, but we’ll do it our way.

Last Thursday, at the pre-summit of Europe’s eight Liberal prime ministers in Brussels, they unveiled a “Team Europe”—five women and two men—as their candidates for all the EU’s top jobs. That is, commission president, council president, parliament president, and High Representative for Foreign Affairs.

The other parties have reacted furiously, with many accusing the Liberals of cheating the system.

The European Parliament, digging in its heels in the face of Macron’s opposition, has said it will not nominate any commission president who was not one of the Spitzenkandidaten ahead of the election. This means that while the other groups have just one person as a possibility (or two in the case of the Greens and far-left GUE), ALDE will have seven. One could say their chances of getting a Liberal commission president just increased seven-fold.

“It’s a dirty trick,” one EPP member grumbled privately.

However, the effectiveness of this trick is diluted by the stature of the candidates, who have been mocked in Brussels as “the seven dwarves.” The only two people on the list with a high profile in Europe are EU Competition Commissioner Magrethe Vestager and Guy Verhofstadt.

The other five are the former European commissioner from Italy, Emma Bonino (much beloved in Italy but unknown outside), Nicola Beer of Germany’s Free Democrats, Spanish politician Luis Garicano from the upstart party Ciudadanos, EU Transport Commissioner Violeta Bulc from Slovenia, and Hungarian politician Katalin Cseh from the small Momentum party.

Vestager’s Quiet Candidacy

Verhofstadt was seriously in the running to become EU Commission President in 2004, but he was vetoed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair who saw him as too federalist. Feelings about Verhofstadt among national leaders has only become more negative since then, with many seeing him as a showboating politician with impractical solutions.

Even if Verhofstadt were to attract a majority vote in the European Parliament to become commission president, it’s difficult to see national leaders accepting this. EU national governments have always been reluctant to appoint any commission president who they think would be adversarial toward them and try to dilute national power (many see the council’s appointment of Jacques Delors in 1985 as the biggest mistake made by the council in this institutional power struggle).

Vestager, however, is a different story. She has won plaudits for her tenure as competition commissioner over the past five years—not just for the boldness of her decisions but also for her clear and direct style of communication. Many, including The Economist magazine, think she is exactly the woman the EU needs at the helm in this difficult time. She does not call herself a federalist, but rather a realist.

Vestager has been careful not to be seen as campaigning for the job, and even during last week’s launch she was studiously understated. She only joined the ticket in order to “inspire people to take part” and to “engage in the debate,” she told reporters. When pressed about whether she wants to be commission president, she said: “First things first. We need to know what is the task … before we start handing out CVs and job applications.”

If she were to stick her neck out further, people might start sharpening the knives in Paris and Berlin. Her recent decision to block a proposed merger between Germany’s Siemens and France’s Alstom prompted a furious reaction from the two countries, and some have speculated the decision has doomed her chances of becoming president because either country would veto it.

On the other hand, her courage in taking the decision could increase her stock with the EU’s 26 (or 25, should Brexit happen) other countries, eager for a president who is not afraid to take on the Franco-German behemoth.

Vestager herself has in the past insisted that her biggest obstacle to becoming president is her native Denmark. The current government, projected to still be in power by the end of the year, is a political foe and unlikely to propose her as their commissioner for the next term. That being said, it is unlikely a small country like Denmark would turn down the opportunity to have a Dane as president, no matter her politics.

Spitzencan, or Spitzencan’t?

Were Vestager to become the next president, it would hardly be a victory for proponents of the Spitzenkandidat system. The Liberals have essentially disrupted it by fielding “Team Europe” and Vestager is merely hedging her bets by participating.

The fact that the system does not enjoy the support of Europe’s third-largest political family, led by one of the most pro-European federalist politicians in the form of Verhofstadt means its credibility has been severely damaged. The parliament may be insisting it will not appoint anyone who was not a candidate, but in Brussels people are openly talking about other names for the post, including chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier. If someone interjects by saying, “But he’s not a Spitzenkandidat!,” they are greeted with laughter.

It could be that Weber or Frans Timmermans, the Socialists & Democrats’ candidate, become president and the system is vindicated. But this seem increasingly unlikely. Should anyone other than these two men become president, including any of the Liberal seven, the Spitzenkandidat system will probably be consigned to the dustbin of history.

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