© Charlotte Graham/Pool via REUTERS

Can a leader be incompetent and lacking in ideas—while at the same time be convinced that he is a revolutionary? In the case of Boris Johnson, the answer seemingly is “yes.”

Britain’s prime minister, courtesy of Eton College and Oxford University, makes for an unlikely agitator against the Establishment. But this master of reinvention and marketing is determined to go down in history as one of the greats who will change his country – and the world. Like his lodestar, Winston Churchill, Johnson thinks he is battling to save his nation from the enemy.

It is, of course, all nonsense, a figment of his ever-fertile brain. But it matters because he believes it, and a worrying proportion of voters believe him too.

What therefore is the grand plan? Johnson doesn’t do detail—his chaotic handling of the coronavirus pandemic attests to that. But he does have a sharp eye for the popular (and populist) and has spent a career constructing a persona around that. He identified from early on, from the mid-late 1980s, the benefits he would accrue from euroskepticism. He then pursued it relentlessly. Many interlocutors attest to the fact that he didn’t actually believe it. But that wasn’t the point.

His entire identity has been artfully constructed—his shambolic appearance, his unfortunate turns of phrase, his ostentatious unpunctuality. It has allowed him to stand out from the crowd, to build a base. Like US President Donald Trump, he turned conventional wisdom on its head. Personality traits that mainstream members of public life regard as weaknesses, he saw as a strength. Like Trump, he has not trimmed these back since taking office, defying those who predicted that he would.

Hitting Easily Identifiable Targets

Like Trump, Johnson has not learnt gravitas in the face of the biggest global crisis for 75 years. He stumbles around, suggesting laws, changing his mind, blithely indifferent to the effect the shambolic leadership style is having on ordinary lives. What is remarkable, however, is how his opinion poll ratings have dropped only slightly—and in line with a normal first year in office for a leader.

He must therefore be doing something right. I scratch my head to see what exactly it is. But I will attempt to deconstruct the underpinnings of an agenda for the Johnson premiership.

First of all, he is good at hitting easily identifiable targets. He said he would “get Brexit done,” come what may, and unlike his predecessor, the dithering Theresa May, he did just that. He had no idea what would follow, but he deduced that decisiveness was, in voters’ minds, more important than content. Even as the negotiations floundered over the spring and summer, he declared that he would not delay the deadline for transition —deal or no deal—whatever the consequences.

Throwing Money Around

COVID-19 may have diverted him from his post-Brexit reveries; it may have exposed his failings, but, bizarrely for a crisis as existential as this one, it has also allowed him to luxuriate in his customary optimism—and to invite the Great British Public to do the same. How so? As with other countries, the economic exigencies have required the Treasury to throw the rule book into the bin. He can now throw money around with abandon, giving expression to his preferences and his prejudices. It did not go unnoticed around the world that pubs in Britain opened earlier than schools.

Like the British children’s television character, Bob the Builder, he has allowed himself to be termed Boris the Builder. “Build, build, build” was the slogan pinned to the lectern when he gave a speech in the English Midlands recently. Not content with being compared to Churchill, Johnson now likens himself to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Promising a “New Deal” to “rebuild Britain,” and blaming his predecessors for Britain’s woes, he vowed to use the coronavirus crisis “to tackle this country’s great unresolved challenges of the last three decades.” He continued: “To build the homes, to fix the National Health Service, to tackle the skills crisis, to mend the indefensible gap in opportunity and productivity and connectivity between the regions of the UK. To unite and level up.”

Much of the money will be spent in the North of England, which he is right to say has been starved of investment for decades. Johnson recognizes that many people in poorer, non-metropolitan parts of the country, the so-called “Red Wall” of traditional Labour voters, enabled his big majority in December’s general election by “lending” him their support. They did so because of Brexit, antipathy towards the then Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn—and his promises to “level up” the country. At the same time, Johnson’s people believe that they can keep a portion of the younger, more environmentalist, voters on side by pushing ahead with a green agenda. This could include incentives towards jobs and projects that help meet or even accelerate the country’s net zero carbon targets.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak—the only member of the cabinet to have emerged from coronavirus crisis with his standing enhanced—will announce a National Infrastructure Strategy as part of his budget in October. By then, unemployment in the UK will have soared as the well-received salary deferral scheme comes to a close. And most likely a second wave of the pandemic will have led to either a second national lockdown or more selected local ones. The atmosphere will be one of frustration and anxiety.

Taxes or Spending

Longer term, Johnson faces two interlinked dilemmas. With the UK having spent the best part of a decade under David Cameron paying down the deficit, he will have accrued one that dwarfs all previous challenges. Public opinion and economic thinking have long since moved away from ultra-austerity, but this current government will, within a few years, have to start addressing the problem. If Johnson refuses to cut spending, he will have to raise taxes. Which brings me to his underlying philosophical dilemma—if that isn’t too fancy a term to give it. How does he reconcile the dreams of many Brexiteer ideologues of creating a low-tax, low-regulation Singapore on the Thames, with his high-spending, earthy, nostalgic view of Britain? Could he create both? Could he have his cake and eat it. It is highly unlikely, but not impossible. He will try.

He has a certain amount of wriggle room. The Conservatives’ standing on the economy remains considerably above that of Labour, a traditional advantage they have almost always enjoyed over the years. Yet the steely and forensic approach of the still-new Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, is beginning to unnerve Downing Street.

Even if Johnson’s ratings for economic competence begin to suffer, he has something else to fall back on. Again, in a mirror of Trump, he plays the culture war whenever he feels he is having a bad week.     

His agitator-in-chief, Dominic Cummings, having ignored the condemnation of his breaking lockdown rules and driving 400 kilometers from London to his parents’ home in the city of Durham, is back at his voracious best (or worst). Johnson’s right hand man loves to be noticed. This Rasputin-meets-Richelieu is even creating a new fashion, of dress-down tracksuit with shepherd’s walking stick. His call at the start of 2020 for “misfits and weirdos” to apply to work with the new government attracted the attention that was no doubt intended.

English Exceptionalism 2.0

Cummings likes to identify enemies and then remove them. He has already got rid of the government’s most senior civil servant, the Cabinet Secretary, and his equivalent in the Foreign Office. He wants wholesale reform of Whitehall and has also set his sights on the defense sector and the intelligence agencies. The assault on the BBC is incessant.

The plans have two aims. One is to create greater efficiency, which is to be applauded. Many a prime minister, not least Tony Blair, lamented the bureaucracy’s ability to stop fresh thinking. Alongside this is a more pervasive idea to create an English Exceptionalism 2.0. This borrows from nostalgic notions of an island nation, freed from the shackles of unprincipled Europeans, a nation of true-born and free Englishmen where liberties are uppermost. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has recently taken to attacking Russia and China for their human rights records, gliding over the fact that a parliamentary report into Russian influence, which Johnson refused to publish for nearly a year, revealed the extent to which the government deliberately failed to investigate Kremlin involvement in the Brexit referendum or the 2019 election.

Just as COVID-19 has turned all governments’ plans on their heads, so other events will also intervene. Two are easy to predict. Scottish parliamentary elections in May 2021 could produce a further uptick in support for the Scottish National Party. That will encourage Nicola Sturgeon to push hard for a second independence referendum. Johnson will seek to refuse it, leading to an epic struggle.

The single most important event will be the US presidential elections. If Trump wins (God forbid), Johnson’s role as the president’s best buddy will be enhanced. A trade deal with the US will be easier to negotiate (albeit more on the Americans’ terms). Yet it will cement a US-UK relationship that will be seen by much of the world as dangerously toxic. If Biden prevails, Johnson will have lost his prop. He will have to operate in a world that may, just may, be returning to the mainstream. How would he operate then? Would he be capable of another reincarnation? Such is his hubris, he would certainly try, suggesting all along that he was never the nationalist-populist that he was so “unfairly” accused of being.

John Kampfner’s new book Why the Germans Do It Better (Altantic Books) is out now.

The post The Master of Reinvention appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Hannah McKay

Brexit was always an emotional rather than instrumental venture. It was based on a yearning for national sovereignty and a nostalgic view of the United Kingdom’s role in the world. Its biggest weakness, however, lies elsewhere.

Its architects could not make up their mind about which of two visions they were projecting. Was Britain going to become Singapore-on-the-Thames, a low-tax, low-regulation island of futuristic start-ups that was open to all-comers, as long as they had the skills and the thirst? Or, unshackled from the European Union, was it going to do more to protect its own, to give the state more of a say in determining and equalizing outcomes? The likes of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove—the leaders of the 2016 Leave campaign and presently prime minister and minister for the cabinet office respectively—never resolved this dilemma, because they knew they couldn’t, and because they wanted to have their cake and eat it.

June Is the Real Deadline

Now, with COVID-19 tearing apart lives and communities, exposing the lack of planning, strategy, and investment in the National Health Service and decimating the economy, logic might dictate that the government let up in its determination to meet the December 31 deadline for the transition period out of the EU. Not a bit of it, say ministers, displaying the same hubris that led them initially to dismiss the coronavirus as a serious threat to the UK.

According to one adviser, those around the prime minister believe they can still make the deadline—even though that deadline is not actually the end of the year, but the end of June. As the Withdrawal Treaty states, any request for a one- or two-year extension must be submitted by then.

With the two men at the heart of the negotiations, the EU’s Michel Barnier and the UK’s David Frost, having previously been struck down by the virus, and with discussions only now resuming by video link after a sizeable pause, the chances of any meaningful agreement in weeks are negligible at best.

The aim is a free-trade agreement, with a zero-quota, zero-tariff deal similar to the one the EU agreed with Canada (after years of talks). They also have to tackle aviation, nuclear energy, international security, and the small but politically vexed question of fisheries. Thus, the timetable was always going to be ambitious. When the first round of negotiations began, the two sides admitted that they faced “very serious divergences.”

Johnson’s Corona Setback

Bizarrely, given how much of a mess his government has made of its response to the pandemic, Johnson is politically unassailable. His 80-seat majority in the House of Commons gives him legislative carte blanche. His opinion poll ratings are sky high, boosted by a sympathy vote after he was admitted to hospital with the coronavirus. The Labour Party’s new leader, Keir Starmer, will provide a much more forensic opposition than Jeremy Corbyn ever did, but he will take some time to make a mark in this “wartime” setting.

Longer term, Johnson knows that COVID-19 has delivered a setback to his plans to remake Britain in his image. He knows that he cannot opt for a low-tax regime, such will be the UK’s indebtedness. He also knows that he will not be able to lavish money on his pet projects. Thus, there will be no Singapore-on-the-Thames nor will there be a great social transformation.

Yet, as one former aide to Theresa May points out, Johnson has nowhere else to go. “He has to make this new political geography work. He has to make this realignment permanent. They will be desperate for the budget not to be swept away.” The advisor was referring to the so-called Red Wall, the constituencies in the North of England and the Midlands that had been traditionally Labour, but were won over to the Conservatives in last December’s general election because of their twin pledge to “get Brexit done” and to invest more in their regions.

On his victory, Johnson thanked those voters for “lending” their support, knowing that they could easily transfer it back if they felt the promises had been broken. Hence his visceral reluctance to “do a May” on Brexit, to follow his predecessor in delaying the departure process, irrespective of the circumstances. In addition, if he is unable to make as much of a difference in domestic policy as he had hoped, then Brexit becomes even more talismanic for him.

Oven-Ready or Not

When Johnson declared during the election campaign that a deal “was oven-ready,” it seems he meant it. Or rather he meant that he believed the country was ready for either leaving without a deal or with the most minimalist of deals, both of which translated into the hardest of Brexit and future trading on World Trade Organization terms—plus a special protocol for Northern Ireland. He didn’t even see the point of an accord on security matters or on aviation.

The plan was, literally, to get it all done as soon as possible, both the January 31, 2020, departure and the December 31, 2020, end of transition. The idea was to absorb the economic shock early in the cycle of the parliament.

The British economy might have been just about robust enough in normal times, but now? The counterargument is that, given that a post-COVID-19 recession (or depression) will last years and not months, a short-term delay will not make much difference. That is a cavalier approach—but Johnson is a cavalier politician.

Downing Street has other rhetorical weaponry to deploy. First of all, it can argue that the UK will be saving money by not paying any more into Brussels’ coffers. That is correct, in a narrow sense. It can also point to the fact that the EU has hardly covered itself in glory during the pandemic, closing borders, slapping bans on the export of vital equipment even within Europe, fighting over coronabonds, and the richer North refusing to help out the poorer South, as happened during the eurozone debt crisis a decade ago.

At the same time, the UK cannot point to a single area where being outside of the EU’s institutional framework has helped it plan logistics and purchase equipment to tackle the virus.

U-Turn in the Offing?

Johnson, like Margaret Thatcher, manages the twin feat of sounding unyielding while being perfectly willing to compromise or make a U-turn. The easiest way for him to agree to a delay is if both sides agree to it jointly. This would require Barnier’s agreement as the current requirement is a request coming from London. Any joint agreement could be dressed up as technical and purely in light of the COVID-19 crisis.

Already ultra-Brexiteers are crying foul. They started to sense something was afoot when a former Tory MP, Nick de Bois, who had served as chief of staff to Dominic Raab, now the Foreign Secretary, penned an opinion piece in the Sunday Times newspaper in early April explicitly calling for a delay. “First, it would be incomprehensible to many members of the public if this government devoted time and energy on these talks until the pandemic was under control. The controversy over testing policy and logistics illustrates how intense government efforts must both be and seen to be,” he wrote. “Second, it will strike business, already on life support, as utterly illogical and inconsistent with the government’s efforts to support business, to impose the prospect of greater disruption by not extending the transition period.”

Nigel Farage, who since the December 2019 election has fallen off the political radar, sensed an opportunity when the question of a delay was first mooted. “We need to be free completely of the EU so that, as we emerge from the crisis, we are free to make all of our commercial and trade decisions,” he told his dwindling band of supporters. Tory MPs and former ministers are making similar noises.

The more “Remainers” or “soft Brexiteers” advocate a delay, the harder it will be for Johnson politically. In any case, the final decision will be guided by public opinion. Polls currently show a small majority supporting a delay, although that number drops sharply among ardent “Leavers”. Most floating voters were relieved to have forgotten about Brexit and have little desire or cause to think about it during the pandemic.

Stretching the Truth

Downing Street has already been stung by well-sourced media accounts of how Johnson paid little attention to the coronavirus outbreak during the crucial five weeks from the end of January (while the Germans and others were frantically trying to prepare themselves). He was too busy celebrating “Brexit day” and planning his assault on institutions from the BBC to the civil service. He knows the public will not tolerate another “distraction”.

In the end, if there is no trade deal, and if the UK leaves at the end of the year in the midst of post-corona economic carnage, Johnson will have made his decision on a precise calculation. One of his considerations will be this: voters, no matter how much they suffer, would not be able to disaggregate his move. He could say that Brexit had nothing to do with it. He could lay the blame entirely on the pandemic. It wouldn’t be the first time in his career he had—to put it ever so politely—stretched the truth.

The post Not for Turning appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© Frank Augstein/Pool via REUTERS

After the Brexit negotiations is before the Brexit negotiations. The first phase was difficult enough. The major difficulties stemmed from the UK’s side: Theresa May suffered more parliamentary defeats than her five predecessors together, and Boris Johnson also lost his theoretical majority within a few weeks. Only the snap elections at the end of 2019 provided clarity, after which the United Kingdom was able to leave in an orderly fashion after all on January 31, 2020.

The EU-27, on the other hand, were characterized by unusual unity. The Withdrawal Agreement secured the rights of EU citizens in the UK and the British commitments to the EU budget, and set a transition period until the end of 2020 and how to deal with the special situation in Northern Ireland. However, only the divorce issues of this complex separation are sorted out, with the exception of Northern Ireland. Now the real question of the Brexit needs to be answered: under what conditions should the EU cooperate with this ex-member, Europe’s second largest economy and a close NATO partner?

The political context for the next negotiations has changed significantly. First, Brexit has become irreversible, at least in the medium term. Until the end of January, remaining within the EU was still a possible outcome for the UK. According to the ruling of the European Court of Justice, London could have withdrawn the withdrawal notice at any time before the country had formally left the EU. The opponents of Brexit therefore focused on a second referendum: time and again, MPs in the House of Commons fought over whether Brexit should happen at all, and less about what should happen afterwards. This political struggle has now been decided.

Second, the negotiations are taking place under even greater time pressure than before. Article 50 set a two-year deadline for the withdrawal negotiations, which because of the internal political blockade in London had to be extended three times in order to prevent a no-deal Brexit. Partly because of these extensions, the transition phase set for the end of 2020 shrank to just eleven months, during which the future relationship is now to be negotiated. This is very ambitious compared to the average duration of about five years in EU free trade negotiations.

Moreover, the post-Brexit agreement is intended to regulate many more complex areas: economic cooperation in all its facets (goods, capital, services including financial ones, data, energy, mobility of persons, transport, aviation, fisheries), internal security (operational cooperation, data exchange), external security (foreign policy coordination, sanctions, CSDP operations) and a common institutional framework. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Johnson has publicly rejected the legally available option of extending the transition period and had it anchored in law that the UK shall not use it.

Danger of a No-Trade-Deal Brexit

The negotiators will thus have to finish a new accord within the remaining few months. At the end of the transition period, however, the threat is no longer a chaotic “no-deal Brexit”—after all, the UK has already left the EU in an orderly fashion. Instead, “only” a no-trade-deal Brexit looms, i.e. the UK leaving the EU single market and customs union without a trade agreement in place. It would be possible to avoid major chaos, but the economic consequences of the reintroduction of customs and border controls between the EU and the UK would be significant, in particular for the UK. However, London is playing down concerns about this outcome: Johnson now speaks of an “Australia model” as an alternative to a trade agreement. Australia does not have a fully-fledged trade agreement with the EU, but it does have arrangements for regulated dealings, for example regarding aviation. The political conclusion is paradoxical: precisely because the consequences of a no-trade-deal Brexit are less than those of a no-deal Brexit, political inhibitions are lower so the scenario has become more probable

Last but not least, the domestic political conditions in London are completely changed. Until December 2019, the British government, parliament, and society were deeply divided on Brexit and could not agree on a clear negotiating position. Compromises agreed by the UK government in Brussels rarely survived the infighting in the Conservative Party. The House of Commons in particular rejected a no-deal Brexit, but also voted down the Withdrawal Agreement, a second referendum, or any other Brexit option.

No Tory Rebels Left in Power

Although British society is still divided—a narrow majority now views Brexit as a mistake—the Brexiteers have achieved a resounding domestic success. With the slogan “Get Brexit Done,” Johnson captured the mood of the British electorate and won a clear majority in parliament. The much-contested ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement became a formality. At the same time, Johnson decisively triumphed in the Conservatives’ internal power struggle over their European policy, which has lasted for over 30 years. All members of the government and Tory deputies have had to subscribe to a policy of hard Brexit. Since the latest reshuffle, all major ministerial offices in cabinet were given to politicians who supported Brexit before the 2016 referendum.

It is symbolically important that none of the Tory rebels who pushed through the anti-no-deal legislation against the will of the government in autumn 2019 made it back into the House of Commons. Domestically, Johnson now has a largely free hand to set his Brexit policy. The only restraint may come from Northern Ireland and Scotland, as a hard Brexit would exacerbate the pressure on the union of the British state. Nevertheless, the direction for the UK government seems clear—a full break with the EU, with a regular free trade agreement but no conditions that would prevent the UK from setting its own standards, laws, or autonomous trade policy.

The EU and the United Kingdom are thus facing a different round of very critical negotiations. Unlike before, the line of conflict will no longer run through the British Parliament, but between London and Brussels. Although many structural factors are similar, this different political dynamic will fundamentally change the next phase of the Brexit negotiations. Therefore, the EU should not make the mistake of uncritically maintaining its—so far successful—approach. In the short time available for the negotiations, the EU-27 face four strategic challenges.

Developing a UK Model

The overarching challenge is to find a new model for cooperation with a large European third country that does not want to integrate into the EU. Until February 2020, the EU has avoided defining this model and retreated to the position that future relations with the United Kingdom could only be negotiated after the United Kingdom has withdrawn. Politically, the chaos in London and the possibility of a second referendum contributed to the fact that the EU-27 did not have to answer this question. In consequence, the most crucial matters of Brexit remained ambiguous in the first phase of negotiations, with the legally non-binding “political declaration” only sketching in what areas the UK and the EU want to cooperate in the future.

Now Johnson has clearly expressed a preference for a model with the greatest possible distance from the EU. He has also distanced himself from May’s ambitions to negotiate at least frictionless trade in goods, if not services. All the “soft” models of Brexit, from a customs union to deeper access to the internal market, are thus politically off the table. The EU member states, in their mandate for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations, are also aiming for a regular free trade agreement.

Viewed positively, there is thus common ground to start from. However, due to the UK’s geographic proximity, its economic size, and its close economic links to the EU after almost 50 years of joint membership, the EU and its member states want stricter provisions in terms of a level playing field than in other comparable trade agreements. Within the short time frame, the negotiators will therefore have to develop a new “UK model” of partnership―a new balance between close partnership, British and EU sovereignty, more limited access to the common market and to EU programs, and corresponding obligations.

Expanding the Barnier Method

Closely related to this is the second strategic task: to preserve the unity of the EU-27. In the first phase, the EU-27 succeeded in asserting their interests in part because they were more united than ever before. This unity was based on two factors.

On the one hand, the EU institutionally developed a clear, consistent negotiating line with the “Barnier method.” The European Commission and its chief negotiator Michel Barnier were given sole responsibility for the negotiations, and national governments did not conduct their own bilateral negotiations with London. At the same time, Barnier kept everyone on board with high transparency, a lot of technical coordination at the working and political level as well as very regular reassurances of support from the national capitals. On the other hand, the EU-27 also benefited from the political framework of the Article 50 negotiations, in which they were able to agree on a common objective—to protect the integrity of the EU and the internal market—with solidarity toward the special concerns of individual member states (Ireland in regards to its border to Northern Ireland, Central and Eastern Europeans in relation to their citizens in the UK, and so on).

In the negotiations now to come, the Commission will continue with the same method, as Barnier has been re-appointed and given a new mandate. Technically, the EU-27 are again very well prepared. However, it will become more difficult to maintain political unity. The EU-27 will have to make a dual strategic choice— both in terms of the trade-offs outlined above, but also of the priorities to be negotiated in the short transition period. The mandate that the EU states have given to the Commission is extensive, partly because they have not yet been able to decide between different priorities of the member states. Should the focus be on fisheries (important for North Sea countries), the level playing field (important for EU countries with strong economic ties to the UK) or security cooperation (important for Central and Eastern Europe)? Confronted with a British government that is strengthened at home and prepared to play off and promote differences between EU member states, the EU-27 therefore needs, in addition to good technical preparation and negotiation management by Barnier, stronger political coordination of the national governments.

Triangular negotiations

The third strategic challenge lies in a potential struggle with the United States over Britain’s trade, but also foreign and security policy anchoring. With Brexit, the UK is losing its already weakened role as a “transatlantic bridge.” Instead, London needs to reposition itself. From a European perspective, it is important to prevent London from turning fully toward the US.

In trade policy, triangular negotiations are on the agenda for 2020—the UK wants to negotiate simultaneously with Washington and Brussels, and the EU and the US government have also begun talks on a (less ambitious) trade agreement. Although the UK trades much more with the EU than the US, a quick agreement with Washington is of the utmost political importance for the Brexit proponents. US President Donald Trump also has an interest in a success before the US elections in November 2020. Publicly known US negotiating goals include opening up the UK markets for US products that would not be admissible under current EU regulatory standards. Similarly, the EU wants to establish level playing field provisions to ensure that existing European standards are maintained in the UK, if not—as demanded by some national governments—a “dynamic” alignment to EU standards. London wants to use these triangular negotiations to its advantage. The EU will thus also have to consider the global dimension in the negotiations with the British government. Protecting existing standards, for example, may be more in the European interest than a very hard negotiation stance insisting on dynamic alignment, and thus driving London into the arms of Washington.

Albeit under different circumstances, this also applies to foreign and security policy. Remarkably, since 2016, the British government has taken a stronger European stance on foreign policy issues where the Trump government and the majority of Europeans differ. This applies, for example, to dealing with Iran, the Paris Climate Accords or, most recently, Huawei in 5G infrastructure. So far it has also been possible to separate tensions in the Brexit negotiations from foreign policy cooperation. Even after Brexit, the EU states, above all Germany and France, have an interest in involving London in foreign and security policy. This will not, or only to a very limited extent, be achieved through the EU institutions, where the UK as a third country cannot have a seat. What is needed here is close bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as the E3 group on Iran, without undermining the EU framework.

Forging a New Partnership

The forthcoming negotiations with London will be difficult and again tie up a lot of political energy and attention in the EU. The pressure on the unity of EU-27 will increase. The changed political dynamic in London also means that the risk of a domino effect is returning. Until now, the chaos in London encouraged a perception of Brexit as a deterrent in other EU countries. Now Johnson is the political winner, at least domestically, whereas negative economic consequences have not (yet) materialized to such a large extent. In the medium to long term, the UK can become a close partner, but also an economic and political counter-model to EU integration. Even now, hard-core Brexit supporters argue that London should support euroskeptics across Europe.

The EU’s response to this challenge cannot be to “punish” Britain by making negotiations as tough as possible. While the EU should draw a clear dividing line between membership and partnership, it has a vested interest in placing the partnership with London on a lasting and successful footing. The fourth strategic task is therefore ultimately the most important one for the EU: strengthening itself and increasing the attractiveness of EU membership. After all, the best response to the challenges posed by the Brexit would be to demonstrate the advantages of the successful model of European integration.          

The post Wanted: A British Model appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

We are conducting this interview on a sad day, January the 31^st. The United Kingdom is departing the European Union tonight. With the EU’s second largest economy gone, where does this leave the EU? The immediate reaction of the EU has been to circle the wagons and to maintain and re-emphasize unity—in the face of the first such event, the first time a country has left the EU, and obviously concerned about potentially hostile relations in a hostile world. So, in the first place the EU has strengthened its unity. The second point is, that Britain’s departure hasn’t made any of the obvious problems within the EU any easier, except that it’s removed one moderately problematic member—but until the Brexit vote happened, not an enormously problematic member, because in some of the most difficult issues the EU faced, Britain wasn’t involved: the eurocrisis, where the UK was neither helpful nor a hindrance. It’s obviously not really involved, or hasn’t been at least since the early 2000s, in relations between the old members and the new members of Central and Eastern Europe or in the relations with Russia. It doesn’t actually even have very much to do with relations with America. But that might change.

So, I don’t think Britain’s departure solves any problems for the EU. Third, there’s a diminution in the perceived international weight of the EU. Because of its history and location, Britain has exceptionally close—exceptional by the standards of other members—relationships with countries around the world. You know, people know Britain pretty well, in Asia, the Americas. There are other member countries with important relations like Spain with Latin America, but I think Britain was exceptional. So, people feel this is an EU they know less well. Germany is less well-known, for example. And they also feel that, I think, if Britain is leaving, something is wrong with the EU. There is a sort of weakening of credibility, which will have to be re-established, and the sense, well, maybe there will be more break-ups.

And finally, I think that Britain’s departure will probably mean a sort of change in the policy culture of the EU itself. I would expect it to become more southern—it must do so—less economically liberal, more continental. And I would expect therefore cumulatively over time the orientation of the EU and the policy choices of the EU will be somewhat different than they would have been if Britain had remained a member. Remember that the single market, as we know it, wouldn’t have happened. It would have been quite different, it’s quite a big deal. I expect the EU to be somewhat more inward-looking, somewhat more defensive, somewhat more regulation-minded.

The ambitions of the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen, of course, go a completely different way. Absolutely. And we will have to see if she succeeds.

Von der Leyen promised a “geopolitical commission,” most likely using geo-economic tools. If you look into the EU’s toolbox, is there much to look at? I think the problem the EU has is that it has lost its big alliances, particularly with the United States. The EU is not and—whatever they pretend—will not in the near future be a security player of big weight. That would require a policy revolution, above all in Germany. And we’re not seeing much sign of that at the moment. So, it’s geo-economics. There are two big areas where in theory the EU could play big role. The first is trade. Globalization is a big interest of the EU. It is a very open economy. Actually, it is the most open of the large economies. If you regard the EU as a whole, it’s substantially more open than China or let alone the US. And the other one is climate.

The problem in both cases is that though the EU is big, it’s not big enough on its own to shift the world. And it’s not clear who its allies are going to be. The United States obviously has become highly unilateralist and protectionist. So, that makes a globalization program very difficult. Indeed, the effort is going to be devoted clearly just to managing the bilateral relations with the US. And vis-à-vis China, it is very difficult to know how to make progress with China. It’s a very complicated story. The EU has a lot of interests in common with the US, but the US is not coordinating with it or not very much. Creating a critical mass of willing countries that will make a really big difference to the progress on the trade front will not be impossible, but it will be very, very difficult.

And on climate it’s basically the same story. You’ve got the US out of the picture, which is a big loss, and again China is in a very different place in terms of its development, its ambitions. It may be possible to construct some sort of climate alliance with China, but it’s going to be a tremendously big problem. The EU is in a very different stage of development with very different priorities from China, which is still a very fast-growing, emerging economy. So I think in those big areas, the EU can do interesting things and important things. I don’t underestimate them, but shifting the global dial is going to be very, very difficult.

Do you think the rapid worsening of transatlantic relations can be reversed after President Donald Trump? It obviously will depend, first, on what happens in the presidential elections and the congressional elections later this year. Speaking now, it looks rather likely to me that Mr. Trump will be re-elected. But I think, there’s a second question, which is how much difference it would make if a Democrat won. It would depend rather on who the Democrat was, but I think, the general balance of opinion in the US has shifted in a more inward-looking direction, a more protectionist direction, a more anti-Chinese direction. I think a Democrat will be much friendlier to the Europeans; it would make it much easier to have good international relations, but I think, it will be very difficult to get a Democratic administration to focus on any huge, ambitious global endeavor. I mean, the world in which the Europeans and the Clinton administration completed the Uruguay Round for example, 26 years ago, seems unimaginably distant.

Donald Trump is on tape saying the EU was constructed to “screw up” the United States… And he’s not entirely wrong. This was very clearly not the German view in the 1950s and 1960s, but it was a French view. One of the raisons d’être of the EU and more recently the euro was to challenge American power. The French have a pretty consistent view going back to Charles de Gaulle. They got out of NATO; later they wanted to upgrade the euro as a rival currency. So, the Americans aren’t completely wrong. Nonetheless, the dominant view of the US until the end of the Cold War was that the Europeans were very important allies. There were on the forefront in the global war with Communism. And the stronger Europe was economically and politically, the better. They didn’t take the French threat too seriously for perfectly good reasons.

The end of the Cold War changed everything. The first period, the 1990s , were “the holiday from history.” Everything was fine, the world was perfect. Then you got into the post-9/11 period and you got into a really big split between America and Europe over the Iraq war, and it’s an important split. The Europeans were right, but that doesn’t make the Americans like them better, and there was a split within Europe, because the British went their own way, which was itself, I think, a revealing fact.

But at that point, Europe began to just look less important. It’s no longer the front, because there is no front there anymore. Russia has gone away, that’s what we felt, and we are now interested in the Middle East and the pivot to Asia, which came later. What’s Europe got to do with that? Nothing. It’s a nuisance in the Middle East and as far as Asia is concerned, it’s irrelevant. So, the Americans increasingly became a mixture of hostile and indifferent, more indifferent than hostile, but there was some real hostility.

Then in the post-financial crisis period, there’s been the long period of economic crisis in Europe, at least it was seen as a crisis. I talked to a lot of American policy makers: Was Europe a help? No, it was a nuisance. There was a tremendous worry that Europe would create the next stage of the financial crisis and then, finally, we get to the Trump era. Now, Putin is a bit more of a threat, but he’s not seen as a threat like the Soviet Union by most Americans. Trump likes him, whereas Europe is not seen as central to America’s concerns and is seen—on the right—as moralistic and unhelpful.

There are still some Americans in the center-left who admire Europe, admire Europe’s civic culture, they admire the social democratic systems and values. Probably, if you talked to Elizabeth Warren, she would say actually Europe is the way we should do things. I don’t underestimate that, but I think basically Europe simply doesn’t play the same role in America’s interests. And then you get this very Trumpian, protectionist view: Europe is running a big trade surplus with us, so it’s hostile. Europe depends on our defense umbrella and it’s not paying enough for it, so we’re providing them with a valuable thing for free, so they’re freeloaders and then they moralize at us all the time and tell us how bad we are.

So I think for Trump, given his protectionist views on climate change, his very transactional view of international relations, Europe is really, really irritating. And then it’s stuffed full of liberal democracies and he doesn’t much like liberal democracies. So, for him to be lectured by the German chancellor about how to behave as a decent democrat is, I think, pretty well unbearable. And the fact that I agree with Angela Merkel doesn’t make it any better.

Is there any chance of the EU achieving the French aim of strategic autonomy? Well, it would be possible for Europe to achieve a fair degree of strategic autonomy. It is very big, 450 million people. It is still the second largest economy after the US, depending on how you measure it. It has clear economic weaknesses, it is slow-growing, very slow-growing, it is aging, it is not doing as well in the frontier technologies with America and China, but still it is a big power.

But the real question is whether it can develop a collective will and purpose to achieve that. Does it really want strategic autonomy? Does it want to exert power in the world with its economic wealth and weight? There two pretty big obstacles to doing this. One is Germany. What is it that Germany wants? My strong impression is that Germany remains emotionally very committed to not being a great power, which is the post-war situation. Second, Europe remains a mosaic of very different countries and cultures with very different attitudes. Can you create a genuine, coherent whole out of it? Otherwise, if you cannot do it, you need much more political integration. Much more!

So, I do not think it is likely to be. The French ambition, which is basically the French idea, when they say, “Europe must have strategic autonomy,” they mean, “You must do exactly what France wants and put everything behind France.” Well, that is not how it is going to work. I have to say, in these matters France is actually closer to Britain than it is to Germany and Germany is a very different, for very obvious reasons.

Would a US-China confrontation reverse the trend of deteriorating transatlantic relations? This is a really important question. Trump is very peculiar in that he is so unilateralist and so indifferent to a lot of alliances. Another president may also be concerned with balancing China while having very substantial interests and views in common with Europe. I have talked to German businesses in China: they have very similar concerns to those of the Americans.

So in economics it is perfectly possible to imagine an alliance of Europe and America, and Japan as well, confronting China. But of course in a geopolitical and geostrategic confrontation with China, Europe is not going to be relevant. It does not have relevant forces outside economics, to bring to bear in this. Europe is no longer a strategic front, which is a very good thing. Who wants to be the strategic front? It was not much fun when the Soviet army were here [in Berlin].

By the way, there is another possibility, which is relevant to this: Europe has the potential to extend its economic influence by forging very close relationships with what used to be the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is now minus America. At some point I think the US will go back in. So, an alliance of liberal-market democracies on the economic side is conceivable and China could break that. That could yet be an important strategic opportunity.

So, if the Americans are moderately intelligent, you could imagine a world, five to ten years from now, in which you have China and probably Russia on the one side and a Western-led alliance of liberal democracies on the other. And Europe would be an important part of that. That would involve a pretty big shift in American thinking at the moment, but I could imagine that happening.

The interview was conducted by Henning Hoff. Assistance: John-William Boer and David Schmitt. Martin Wolf was speaking at the “After Populism” conference organized by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

The post “The EU Is Not Big Enough to Shift the World” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

“We know very well the sun rises tomorrow and a new chapter for our union will start,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said wistfully in a speech on Brexit Day. “With it comes a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make sure the EU leads the way.”

Standing aside European Council President Charles Michel and European Parliament President David Sassoli in Brussels, von der Leyen and her cohorts were keen to stress they were here to talk about the EU, not about the United Kingdom. On the previous day, the three had held a retreat at the Jean Monnet House in France to talk about their visions for a post-Brexit EU. More specifically, they were discussing how they want to organize the upcoming Future of Europe conference.

They reiterated their insistence that in order for the UK to have access to the EU’s single market, it cannot diverge from EU rules, but that was it. They let a joint op-ed in European newspapers today more fully explain their negotiation position.

Today was not a day to focus on the future EU-relationship, but a day to talk about Europe, and what might be possible now that the UK is leaving. “It’s an exceptional day for the EU, and we have mixed feelings,” said Michel. “It’s never a happy moment when someone leaves, but we are opening a new chapter. And we will devote all our energy to building a stronger and more ambitious EU.”

No More Holding Back

Ambitious is the key word. In Brussels, there has long been a feeling that the UK has held the EU back from taking the measures that would make it a more powerful force in the world. This has always particularly irked the French. Now, with the British leaving, things are possible that weren’t possible before. And French President Emmanuel Macron wants to push forward with them.

The UK had always blocked attempts to create a defense role for the EU, fearful it would be in competition with NATO. With the UK leaving, work on creating a “defense union” for the EU has already been ongoing for over a year. EU enlargement—always pushed by London, but resisted by Paris and Berlin—has had the brakes thrown on. It is only a matter of time before Turkey’s EU accession bid, pushed for so long by London and Washington, will be officially ended. Endless enlargement dilutes the ability of the EU to be a strong unified bloc, Paris and Berlin believe, and would turn it into nothing more than a free trade area. This, of course, is what London always wanted—hence why they pushed expansion.

Rather than believing that Brexit portends the end of the union, many in Brussels think the experience of the Brexit negotiations over the past three years has put the wind in Europe’s sails. Contrary to expectations, the EU27 showed remarkable unity throughout, with not a single member breaking ranks to conduct bilateral negotiations with London, despite the most intense efforts on the part of the UK.

Across Europe, polling has shown that the percentage of Europeans who want their country to leave the EU has plummeted since the Brexit referendum as Europeans have watched the car crash of Brexit. Polling shows there is no country in the EU in which anything close to a majority of people want to leave.

“Within these three-and-a-half years there was a very precious experience made by the EU27,” von der Leyen said. “The experience of how much unity counts, how strong we are in unity—way more than each single country would have on its own.”

So now, what to do with that momentum? The leaders acknowledged that though the idea of other countries leaving the EU is not a winner with the public, they are also skeptical of the idea of a stronger EU. The idea of the Future of Europe conference, which is set to start in May with citizens agoras hearing from people about what they want from the union, is to both take on citizens’ desires and communicate to them the benefits of a strong sovereign Europe.

“We have to work to make sure Europe is better loved among citizens,” said Michel. “Our concern is going to be to stop using jargon, to cut down red tape. We have the digital agenda, the green deal, and on security we will defend our values. On top of that we need the right methods to implement our short and long-term plans.”

“It’s essential in the future to take much more into consideration the expectations of the citizens, and it’s also important to explain what’s the daily added value of this political project,” he added.

Skeptical Forces from Without and from Within

European Parliament President David Sassoli acknowledged that it isn’t just the British who are skeptical about the idea of a stronger EU. There are strong forces trying to disrupt the European project—forces from without, and forces from within.

“Why are so many people working so hard to break up the EU?”, he asked. “That is the question. Because within our countries, too, there are certain people who are trying to run with this torch. There are groups, forces who are trying to weaken the EU, but what’s their agenda?”

“We want proper rules to govern this European dimension. You can defend the more vulnerable when you have rules. In the absence of rules, it becomes the jungle. Might becomes right. But there are those who want to defy us because they are afraid of a rules-based world.”

Michel agreed. “When we are together and united, when we share a common approach, we are a real political and economic force, believing in personal dignity. These are the values that underpin the European project.”

The question now will be convincing the citizens of a post-Brexit EU that these values are worth fighting for.

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By winning 365 of the 650 parliamentary seats, Boris Johnson’s Conservatives have changed Britain’s political landscape for the next five years, possibly for the next decade. After the last three to four years of knife-edge votes and parliamentary paralysis, the coast will be clear for them to introduce whatever legislation they wish.

The 80-seat majority at the December 12 election was at the very top end of predictions, indeed beyond the expectations of most Tory strategists.

Johnson will move quickly. He will have learnt the lessons of Tony Blair, who failed to capitalize on his landslide in 1997. Brexit will take place on January 31, this time without any last-minute hiccups. A budget will be introduced in March that is likely to include spending commitments on the National Health Service and infrastructure, particularly to reward his new-found voters in the North of England and the Midlands. Expect also early decisions on a series of ideologically driven challenges to the civil service and the BBC, two right-wing pet hates.

A detailed analysis of the results suggests, however, that overall support for the Conservatives is by no means as comprehensive as may initially have seemed.

Leave United, Remain Divided

Their big margin of victory can be attributed to three factors—the demographic particularities of Brexit, the electoral system, and clever strategizing.

Brexit: the Conservatives were clear winners in constituencies that voted Leave in the 2016 EU referendum. They won almost three quarters of all these seats. The writing was on the wall for pro-Remain groups when Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party announced at the start of the campaign that it would not compete in constituencies that the Tories were defending.

The Leave caucus found itself united. By contrast, the Remain one was not. Some small-scale alliances were formed involving the Liberal Democrats, Welsh nationalists, and Greens; but these were marginal and had very little effect. The fact that the Lib Dems (who had advocated revoking the original Article 50 decision) and Labour (who couldn’t quite work out what its position was) fought furiously against each other was a gift to Johnson.

As a result, the Remain vote was split, with a crowded field of parties sharing the seats between them.

The Conservatives won an impressive 294 of the 410 seats that had opted to get out of the EU. Labour secured only 106, in spite of Jeremy Corbyn’s refusal to accede to the demands of most of his parliamentary party to endorse a second referendum.

Corbyn Trumped Brexit

His equivocation on the issue didn’t do him an enormous amount of good on the other side of the divide either. Of the 240 seats that had a majority opting to remain in 2016, Labour won only 96. The Conservatives trailed, but not by much, with 71, confirming the assertion that Johnson’s role in securing Brexit was regarded as less of a threat to voters than the prospect of a Corbyn government. In heavily pro-Remain Scotland, the SNP pro-independence and pro-EU party won a hugely impressive 48 of the 59 seats available.

The constitution: Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system was designed to ensure “strong” government. This is in direct contrast to, say, Germany or other countries, where consensus is regarded as the goal. That is why the UK has had so few coalitions. Even though the one it had between 2010 and 2015 involving the Conservatives and Lib Dems was stable, conventional wisdom has been hostile to any change in the way votes are distributed.

One can understand why any governing party would be resistant. The winner has a disproportionate amount of power. On a purely proportional system, the UK would have had a hung parliament, and the Tories’ 43.6 percent share of the vote would have required them to try to create an alliance with another party. The Lib Dems and Greens have long been the biggest losers in the present system. This time was no different.

The message: Conservative strategists realized long before Johnson called the election that they did not need to be popular. They needed merely to emphasize the unpopularity of Corbyn. The plan worked perfectly. Labour had their worst return of seats in any general election since 1935. They fell backwards in every region of the UK, declining by an average of 8 percentage points. In the northeast of England, their previous heartland, they shed 13 points—almost all of the swing going to the Tories. Even in the most affluent London and the southeast, they lost over 6 percentage points—mainly to the Lib Dems.

The following figures perfectly demonstrate the unfairness of the system. The Lib Dems gained an extra 4 percent of voters, yet lost one seat, ending up with a paltry 11. The Greens and the SNP went up too. The Tory vote only increased by 2 percent overall, but in spite of that small rise, they are seen to have triumphed.

Thanks therefore to a skewed voting system, an unpopular Labour leader, smart Tory strategy, and the failure of pro-EU parties to unite, the UK faces a long period of hegemony by a right-wing populist-nationalist party voted in by less than half of the population. That is the depressing state of Britain’s constitution and political culture.

A More Diverse Parliament

Yet some other data suggest that long term trends may be different. Northern Ireland, on the front line of the Brexit battle, now has for the first time more nationalist than unionist MPs. Parliament will have a record 63 members who come from an ethnic minority, an increase of 11 from two years ago. And a total of 220 women have been elected. This is 12 more than the previous high of 208 in 2017 and constitutes just over a third of the total number. Labour and the Lib Dems have more female than male MPs.

A more diverse parliament, just like a more diverse corporate boardroom, is a good thing in itself. Whether it produces a different mindset is much harder to say.

What is clear from these results is that the United Kingdom is a patchwork of voters with very different backgrounds and priorities. That one party and prime minister have acquired unbridled power, in effect able to do whatever they like for a minimum of five years, is the most dangerous of the many quirks in the British system.

The post Europe by Numbers: A Very British Election appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© Ben Stansall/Pool via REUTERS

The British general election on December 12 can be seen as a de facto second referendum on Brexit. Certainly, other important issues were brought up during the campaign, most of them domestic. But the resounding victory for Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the Conservatives can only be interpreted as a clear endorsement of his Brexit approach: to leave the EU at the end of January 2020 and to subsequently pursue his vision of a more distant future relationship with the EU.

One can argue with good reason that before the 2016 referendum, the UK did not have a well-informed debate about the consequences of leaving the EU. But after two-and-a-half years of negotiations with Brussels, many hours of debate in Parliament, and a broad public discussion, British voters had a better idea of what Brexit meant. For instance, they knew that that, once outside, trade with the EU would no longer be “frictionless” and that UK citizens would lose their freedom of movement within the EU. Nevertheless, British voters confirmed their 2016 decision. While the UK’s first-past-the-post system makes the Conservative victory look bigger than it was, the fact is that the party promising to “Get Brexit Done” won a clear majority to do just that.

For the EU, there is one immediate upside to the election outcome. There is now certainty that the UK’s withdrawal can take place in an orderly manner. The EU and its most affected member states had put in place serious contingency planning to prepare for “no-deal”. Once the parliament in Westminster and the European Parliament have ratified the withdrawal agreement Johnson renegotiated in the fall, the EU will have succeeded at defending its vital interests: EU unity has been maintained throughout the Brexit process; the rights of EU citizens living in the UK (and vice versa) have been secured; a solution for the Irish border question has been found; and the UK has signed up to a financial settlement of its membership obligations as well as to a political framework for future relationship.

Toward a New Cliff Edge

In the UK, the impact of leaving will not immediately be felt on February 1, 2020. The withdrawal agreement provides for a transition phase in which the UK essentially continues to enjoy all benefits of EU membership without participating in the EU institutions: Britain continues to be part of the single market and even free movement will continue.

And yet, most of the decisions that will shape the relationship between the UK and the EU—probably for decades—have yet to be taken. A key difference between the “Johnson deal” and that of his predecessor Theresa May (“May deal”) is that Johnson’s pursues—at least in economic terms—a rather distant relationship with the EU in the future. Norway, Switzerland and even Turkey have closer economic ties with the EU than the UK will have once the transition phase ends. The difficult decisions that this approach entails will become clear quite quickly once the second phase of the negotiations begins.

As for the EU, maintaining unity among the 27 member states was key to securing a withdrawal agreement within the given time frame. But it may be more difficult to stick together during the negotiations on the future relationship. EU members, having secured their key interests in the withdrawal agreement, may find it tempting to pursue national interests more assertively now in upcoming negotiations with a non-member state.

Also, there will be enormous time pressure. The transition phase is limited to the end of 2020 unless an extension of one or two years is mutually agreed by June 2020. In their manifesto, the Tories committed to not extending the transition period. And in contrast to the earlier two-year withdrawal negotiations period which started in March 2017, two safety valves no longer exist: a last minute extension, called for by the UK on three occasions in order to avoid a disorderly withdrawal, is no longer an option. And revoking Article 50 (which set the withdrawal process in motion) will no longer be possible, either. The new cliff-edge at the end of the transition may be less steep, but much more difficult to avoid.

Stay or Go?

The medium- and long-term impact Brexit will have on Scotland’s and Northern Ireland’s place in the UK also difficult to assess. While the Scottish Nationalists (SNP) interpret their strong showing as a mandate to pursue a second referendum on independence, Johnson has rejected the idea, while most polls continue to show a narrow majority for Scotland staying in the UK. And a referendum in  in (Northern) Ireland is even less of an issue at the moment.

However, with the SNP ascendant, the question of Scottish independence is not going away. And the fact that Northern Ireland will remain in the EU’s market for goods for all practical purposes and that there will eventually be customs checks in the Irish sea may contribute to a change in dynamic there too.

In both cases, the effect would not be limited to the UK itself or UK-Irish relations: The EU would have to respond to both a membership application from an independent Scotland or a move towards the unification of Ireland. So the EU will want to watch domestic developments in the UK closely even after Brexit.

At the same time, there is a very sobering dimension to the election result for the EU itself. Anyone who still hoped for a reversal of the 2016 referendum result can now give up that dream. In addition, the EU can no longer console itself with the notion that the rejection of membership in one of the EU’s biggest, most prosperous member states could be explained by dissatisfaction with domestic policy issues or as being a result of poor information about the consequences of leaving the EU. If the withdrawal negotiations demonstrated in detail the difficulties of departure from the EU, voters in the UK essentially shrugged them off. In that sense, the UK election serves as a reminder for the remaining EU members that popular support for European integration should never be taken for granted.

The post Brexit’s Point of No Return appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

On the morning Phil Hogan was nominated as the EU’s next trade commissioner, he told Ireland’s public broadcaster RTÉ his priority was “to get Mr. Trump to see the error of his ways.” The US president should abandon his “reckless behavior” when it came to China and the EU.

His remarks did not go unnoticed. EU diplomats in Washington reported back immediately that there was outrage in the White House. “We were told it was fortunate that John Bolton [the hawkish former National Security Adviser] had just been fired the same day,” recalls a close aide, “or that the president himself might have tweeted his reaction.”

Trump didn’t tweet, but his ambassador Gordon Sondland delivered the message to Politico, accusing Hogan of a “belligerence” that would lead to an impasse between the EU and US. “Then people start to do things that you don’t want them to do.”

It was a combative start, confirming Hogan’s reputation as a political bruiser with a sharp tongue. However, many in Brussels felt Hogan was right. The US was waiting for the new EU executive to take office, and Hogan was reminding the world who the new interlocutor would be.

His timing, however, may have been unfortunate. The next day, the WTO ruled in a decades-old dispute with Boeing that Europe had granted illegal subsidies to Airbus. As a result, Trump was expected to announce up to $10 billion in tariffs on European products.
Making the Strategic Case for Trade

All told, the 59-year-old, hailed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as a “brilliant” and “firm” negotiator, could not have taken up his post at a more turbulent time. The United States and China are locked in a trade war, China is accused of wholesale technology theft, Trump is threatening more tariffs on European goods, and Brexit is sapping the EU’s energy.

European efforts to sail above the turbulence as the self-identified defender of the rules-based global order are limited. “So far, the EU has benefitted from the turmoil created by Trump’s trade war,” says Sam Lowe, a research fellow with the Center for European Reform (CER), “which provided the political impetus to conclude trade agreements with Japan, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam; but the waters ahead look choppy.

“Phil Hogan will need to make the strategic case for a resilient trade policy. But he will face a European Parliament looking for greater reassurance that the EU’s trade policy complements its environmental ambitions, and an inwardly focused European agriculture lobby.”

That lobby has been up in arms over Hogan’s role in negotiating the EU-Mercosur trade agreement as agriculture commissioner. South American farmers will enjoy increased access to the EU, but the access for beef―an annual quota of 99,000 tonnes―has enraged farmers, not least in Hogan’s home country.

The Irish Farmers Association claims Mercosur beef will cost European farmers €5 billion annually, compounded by a lack of traceability, food safety, animal health, and environmental controls. Hogan hit back: “There will be no product that will arrive in the EU from the Mercosur countries without complying with existing EU food safety standards.”

The Road from Kilkenny

Hogan was born just outside Kilkenny in south-east Ireland to a small-holder farming family. He followed his father into politics and won the parliamentary seat for the center-right Fine Gael party that had always eluded his father.

He was a junior finance minister in 1994 in the Fine Gael-Labour coalition, but was forced to resign when a staff member accidentally leaked details of the annual budget. Observers say Hogan nursed a longstanding grievance at his premature fall and was determined to make a return to ministerial politics.

It started by being appointed party chairman. “This put him in a position of extraordinary influence,” says a longstanding associate. “He got to know the organization intimately. He became director of elections, selecting candidates, placing candidates.”

Hogan honed his skills as a ruthless political operator. When in 2010 a minister attempted a coup against Enda Kenny, the party leader turned to his longtime friend Hogan for advice. Hogan told him to sack the entire shadow front bench.

Kenny promptly did so the next morning. While 15 rebel MPs assembled in front of the Irish Parliament to declare the revolt, Hogan rounded up 40 loyalists and sent them to the same spot. The coup was over as soon as it had begun.

Happily Unpopular

But Hogan soon made a bigger impact on Irish politics. In 2011, Fine Gael swept to power following the collapse of the Irish economy due to the banking and sovereign debt crisis. Hogan was appointed environment minister.

Under the advice of the EU-IMF troika administering the bailout, the government established a new state utility, under Hogan’s direction, which would introduce water charges in Ireland for the first time.

Hogan insisted the new charges would cost as little as €2 per week, but there was a backlash when he warned that those who did not pay would see their water supply “turned down to a trickle for basic human health reasons.” To many reeling from the austerity of the bailout years, this was callous in the extreme.

The theory is that Hogan took on the poisoned chalice of water charges because he knew Kenny would appoint him Ireland’s Commissioner three years later. “There was a neat choreography,” says one source close to Hogan. “Kenny needed someone with balls to do the job, and who was also happy to be unpopular because they weren’t going to be around.”

Journalist Michael Brennan, who has just published a book on the affair, In Deep Water, says, “It was one thing to take a bullet for other people. It’s another when you’re casual about doing it, knowing you have the job in Brussels sown up. He had to convince people this was a charge worth paying and he failed to do that. Within months of his going to Brussels, they had torn up the Hogan plan and came up with a very different approach.”

Negotiating Brexit

But Hogan had other things on his mind when he arrived in Brussels. Within two years the United Kingdom launched its Brexit referendum. Hogan was the only senior EU official given a license to make the case to remain, travelling to farm meetings and agricultural shows around the UK.

“He spoke very well about the importance of the EU for farmers,” recalls a senior European Commission official, “both in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and in trading opportunities. But he spoke as an Irishman as well, in terms of keeping the UK and Ireland together in the EU. He made a real contribution. He might even have swung quite a number of votes.”

That Hogan, a searing critic of Brexit, will be Brussels’ top negotiator when the future EU-UK trade talks start has not been lost on Boris Johnson’s government.

Going the Extra Mile

He is described as a tough negotiator. Despite the hostility of the farming lobby, Hogan’s supporters say he went the extra mile to limit the access of South American beef, holding up the Mercosur talks and irritating member states keen to get the deal over the line.

“Mercosur would not have been done without him,” says one EU source. “He doesn’t hold back in protecting Europe’s defensive interests. Farming often ends up as one of the final issues, and depending on your desire to close a deal for the sake of it, people can be more amenable at the last minute. He would step in and say, we won’t give on that.”

Hogan will have his work cut out for him. He is said to have a reasonable relationship with US Trade Secretary Robert Lighthizer dating back to when they negotiated the EU-US hormone-free beef deal. But he will have to tread carefully when it comes to the problem of how to resolve disputes between WTO members. The US has declined to appoint judges to the Appellate Court until the matter is resolved, but has been slow to suggest solutions.
The EU and Canada are working on a mechanism that would bypass the WTO, but a broader framework will be needed to uphold the multilateral rules-based order the EU wants to spearhead.

Lads, Give Us Five Minutes

“Bridge building will be the immediate challenge for Hogan,” says Peter Ungphakorn, a former senior WTO official. “If WTO members feel the US is undermining multilateralism, some kind of alliance could be forged between the EU and China to break this. That is definitely a possibility.”

That will require the ability not just to reconcile the interests of the US and China power giants, but to understand the nuances of diplomacy.

Hogan, who enjoys life in Brussels and can often be seen in one or two of the city’s fabled Irish pubs to watch rugby or Gaelic football, has, say his aides, the skills needed, including for one-on-one encounters.

“I’ve seen him in various places where there are two delegations,” says one aide, “and he’ll say, ‘You might give us five minutes, lads,’ and we’d leave. You’d be amazed at what can happen between two politicians in five minutes.”

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© REUTERS/Luke MacGregor

Every day brings new twists and turns in the Brexit saga that make predictions difficult. But whatever the exact date and form of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, Brexit will have major geostrategic implications for the EU.

Any analysis of the longer-term impact has to go beyond the UK-EU relationship itself and address the broader implications for both the EU and the UK in itself, not only in economic terms, but also with regard to geostrategy and security. It is true that there can also be positive aspects to Brexit, especially if the EU reacts by building strategic capability and enhancing policy cohesion. But, in the end, Brexit mainly creates risks, which need to be handled and prepared for.

It is worth recalling that the embittered, tortuous Brexit negotiations so far have only been the beginning of the exit process: the talks have focused only on the exit modalities (Northern Ireland border, financial obligations, citizens rights, and transition). The more substantive negotiations on the long-term relationship, including the economic relationship, are still to come. These will be even more difficult than the exit talks, and chances are high that no deal can be reached. Even though some companies or regions could benefit if competitors for market share or investment are weakened, the economic impact will be negative for the EU overall.

The Dangers of “UK First”

Failing to reach a deal on the framework for UK-EU trade would inflict significant economic costs, making integrated, cross-border value chains impossible unless the UK (or parts of it) remains tied to the Single Market, as Northern Ireland now looks likely to. These economic costs are probably higher for the UK in both relative and absolute terms. But the impact on the EU and its member states is far from negligible, especially for countries with close economic ties to the UK, such as Belgium and the Netherlands. No deal would hit Ireland particularly hard, potentially necessitating special assistance from the EU.

But the long-term effect could be even more significant. The EU-27 could be faced with a competitor posing far more fundamental challenges than a UK still closely integrated and conforming to EU rules. The UK could pursue a far more aggressive industrial strategy in an effort to support domestic industries: a “UK First” approach. There could be mercantilistic competition and conflict, including for contested resources and markets in areas such as fishing and energy.

With no deal, the level-playing-field provisions included in the Withdrawal Agreement would not come into force, opening up the possibility of the UK adopting lower standards. It is premature to presume that the UK would not go down this route, given the economic necessities that will arise after Brexit. For example, driven by a necessity to quickly establish new economic relationships, the UK could pursue trade deals around the globe by undercutting the EU. If the UK drives down standards for environmental protection, labor rights, tax and competition, and consumer and data protection to gain a competitive advantage, some EU member states would push for the bloc to follow suit, potentially undermining the EU’s regulatory ambitions.

Risks for the Financial Sector

With Brexit, the EU is losing a significant part of its economic capability across a wide range of sectors. The strength of some of these sectors is geo-strategically important to the EU. Simply put, the EU must be a significant player in these sectors in order to play a role at the global level. Achieving strategic autonomy in related policy areas will become much more difficult.

The sectors where the UK makes a disproportionately large contribution to the EU economy include defense, aviation/space, research/academia, and business and legal services, as well as parts of the new technologies sector. Thus Brexit will have an impact on the EU’s ability to, for example, maintain industrial competitiveness, expand its services exports, provide security hardware, and boost innovation and technological sovereignty. A particular case in point are financial services and capital markets, where a breaking-away of the UK could well result in the loss of an EU global financial center, with implications for the availability and cost of financial services and capital.

The impact will depend on how close the economic ties between the UK and the EU will be after Brexit. If the UK were to remain part of the Single Market, these capabilities would stay within the economic structure of the European Economic Area. Conversely, a no deal outcome would severely impair the economic ties between the UK and the EU. While it is undoubtedly true that the UK would lose significant parts of these industries, this does not necessarily imply that the economic activity would simply shift to the EU, given the global opportunities that exist for example for the financial services sector.

One particular concern is the instability a chaotic Brexit might trigger in the financial sector, for example, if there is significant capital flight or speculative attacks on sterling in the aftermath of an (unexpected) no deal Brexit. This could affect the stability of UK-based financial institutions and have knock-on effects on the global financial system. At the very least, stabilizing the situation might require a concerted effort of the Bank of England, together with the European Central Bank and other international financial actors.

Neighbors, Allies, and Rivals

The UK leaving will also profoundly change the EU’s relationship with other countries. The political geography of Europe would change, affecting, for example, Gibraltar and the Channel Islands. The EU’s relationship with countries such as Switzerland, Norway, and Turkey would also be altered, in part depending on the model chosen for the EU-UK relationship. The EU will most likely have to define much more concretely what kind of relationship it wants to have with European countries that have no intention of becoming member states. The current models, such as integration within the Single Market or countries being within the accession process, are unlikely to be applicable, so Brussels will have to develop new models, such as, for example, a permanent strategic partnership or associate membership.

Post Brexit, there is also a good chance that the UK could become a pawn in global great power rivalries. The UK would need to seek new and separate strategic relationships with key countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China—but it would be vulnerable given post Brexit economic pressures and political instability. Other powers would have an opening to employ divide-and-conquer tactics, to try to push the UK and EU to take divergent positions on crucial global policy issues such as the global multilateral trade system or openness to investment in strategic sectors. The UK could be seen as a Trojan horse to undermine the EU and/or Western liberal democracy, which would in turn have consequences for the possible level of ambition in the UK-EU relationship, including in terms of openness for trade and investment.

There are no guarantees that the UK would remain aligned to EU policy priorities after Brexit; indeed, over time, it is likely that the UK will start diverging. The continuation of cooperation on issues such as climate change, development or combatting tax havens cannot be taken for granted. Non-alignment on global issues, for example on pursuing the sustainable development goals, would reduce the effectiveness of EU action and undermine the possibility of achieving global progress on these issues, not least since it would strengthen divergent standpoints. However, Brexit could also have a positive effect if it increases pressure on the EU27 to act jointly, removing the possibility of hiding behind British opposition to further integration in the foreign policy field.

Less Influence, More Risks

Losing the UK will have certainly a negative impact on the EU’s strategic culture. The UK has—together with France—been the only big power in the EU that has had a more strategic approach to external affairs and a more global strategic culture than that of other member states. In addition, a lack of policy alignment would be a particular challenge in the field of international policy and internal and external security, where UK capacities remain critically important for the EU27, including within the NATO context. If, for example, there was a significant divergence in views on issues such as the Iran nuclear agreement, or if the UK’s departure were to weaken the resolve of the remaining member states, e.g. on Russian sanctions, it would (further) reduce the likelihood that the EU could affect such global policy issues and hinder the ability of the EU to develop further capacity in future.

One area where cooperation will become significantly more difficult, even given good will on both sides, is internal security, the fight against organized crime and counterterrorism in particular. European arrest warrants will no longer be available to the UK, implying that extradition will revert back to being a lengthy and uncertain process. This is likely to benefit internationally mobile criminals and terrorists, including UK nationals who might seek refuge from British jurisdiction elsewhere in Europe, reducing security for the UK and for the rest of the EU.

Limitations on cooperation will also affect the ability to share data, again reducing the ability to combat terrorism and crime. The EU will lose the member state that probably still has the greatest access to covert intelligence information, leaving a gap in its capabilities. In the online world, cooperation on cybersecurity is likely to be reduced, mirroring international cooperation on such issues rather than the more closely integrated cooperation within the EU, again reducing effectiveness.

It is not just that the UK’s departure will take one of Europe’s main hard security providers out of the EU—there are also real questions about whether the UK’s capability can be maintained beyond Brexit. Potential territorial fragmentation, fiscal pressures, and overstretch could force the UK to scale back its commitments, for example in relation to peace-keeping, including in Cyprus. And in the longer term, the stress of Brexit might create challenges to the UK’s nuclear capabilities and its seat on the UN security council, reducing European influence as a whole. This might hasten the need for the EU to become a more significant actor in its own right. But in the meantime, it would reduce its capacity to deal with international challenges.

An Era of Conflict?

Hindering cooperation is one thing, but a no-deal Brexit could also bring about direct EU-UK conflict, for example when it comes to Gibraltar, fishing grounds, resources such as energy, migrants crossing EU territories to get to the UK, or Northern Ireland. Conflict does not necessarily mean physical confrontation, although it might come to that in some instances, similar for example to the “cod wars” between the UK and Iceland. But even in the absence of such an escalation, it will be necessary to find dispute resolution mechanisms for such issues.

Whichever way the Brexit process ends, there is likely to be a significant community in Northern Ireland dissatisfied with the outcome. Re-instituting border controls would be unacceptable to large parts of the population in Northern Ireland, putting into question the constitutional status quo. In fact, a referendum about the reunification of the island could well be back on the agenda. The unionists would resist this. But the republicans would challenge a hard border. The potential for violence is high under both scenarios.

A re-eruption of violence would also draw the EU27 into the conflict, not only because of the role the Republic of Ireland would have to play but also because a significant part of the Northern Ireland population now has EU passports, making them EU citizens who can demand support. If it becomes necessary to patrol the border in Northern Ireland to keep the peace, the Northern Ireland police service is unlikely to be able to do it alone (if at all). But the involvement of UK armed forces would be highly contentious, raising the question of what role the EU would need to play.

Disintegration and Discord

In addition to potential changes to Northern Ireland’s constitutional status, there is a significant chance of territorial disintegration, with Scotland separating from the United Kingdom. No deal would make a second independence referendum in Scotland almost certain. Current opinion polls indicate that a chaotic exit might well be enough to lead to Scottish independence, which would almost certainly be followed by an EU membership application. There are positive aspects of such a possibility, with the EU potentially gaining a committed member, demonstrating the desirability of EU membership, but so far there is little thinking in the EU about how to react to such a scenario.

The dissolution of the UK would, among other impacts, change its capacity as a global actor, for example with regard to its role in NATO and its capacity to maintain a nuclear deterrent, given that the UK’s nuclear submarines are berthed in Scotland with no obvious facilities available elsewhere in the UK.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the Brexit process has been the unity displayed by the EU27. But unity might well fray in a no-deal scenario. In the countries hit hardest by a disorderly Brexit, there will be strong domestic pressure to find quick-fix solutions, even if these go against common EU positions. If the UK reneges on its commitments made in the first phase of the negotiations (on EU citizens’ rights, financial obligations, and the Northern Ireland border), the potential of conflict between member states increases further. Indeed, the hole Brexit is leaving in the EU budget is already creating discord.

Address the Strategic Issues

But as difficult as no deal would be, the EU doesn’t have to sacrifice its principles simply to ensure an orderly Brexit. It is in the EU’s economic and political interest to remain united on its red lines, which also limits what can be offered to the UK at this point; caving in to British cherry-picking would, in the end, pose an existential threat to the EU itself.

However, the EU needs to tackle the hard strategic questions Brexit poses. It has to address the multifaceted and long-term impact, including questions that an acrimonious divorce would raise, including how to best to mitigate the negative impacts of Brexit and how to manage future conflict with the UK; and perhaps most importantly how to increase the EU’s capacity and capability in areas that are weakened by Brexit.

The EU27 will need to redefine not only its relationship with the UK, but also with other neighbors and the rest of the world. Crucially, the EU member states need to maintain unity and agree a common strategic negotiation position in case it comes to no deal. If the worst-case scenario cannot be averted, the EU27 must be fully prepared.

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© REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw

In July, when former German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a confirmation vote in the European Parliament by just nine votes, she emphatically thanked MEPs and said she looked forward to starting her new job as European Commission President on November 1.

But three months later, von der Leyen will not be starting as scheduled. MEPs, still angry over the circumstances of her appointment, lashed out earlier this month by rejecting the nominee to be her internal market commissioner, Sylvie Goulard from France. Their real target was the man who nominated her, French President Emmanuel Macron, who killed the parliament’ Spitzenkandidaten system for choosing the Commission President in June.

The parliamentarians also rejected the Romanian and Hungarian nominees, for more traditional reasons. Now, with questions over Macron’s replacement nominee, Thierry Breton, and Romania’s government in chaos, it’s looking like von der Leyen may not be able to start until 2020.

No More Gender Balance

Perhaps the most lasting effect of this month’s drama in the European Parliament is that it has destroyed the chance for the EU to have its first gender-balanced college of commissioners. When she announced her team in September, von der Leyen was keen to trumpet the fact that it would be the first gender-balanced one in history—with half of the team women (13 out of 27, or 48 percent).

But Macron has replaced Goulard with a male nominee–Breton is a former economy and finance minister under Jacques Chirac and a businessman. Romania’s ousted prime minister is battling with that country’s president over who can nominate someone to replace their rejected female nominee, but both of the people being considered are men.

To make matters worse, with Brexit being extended until January 31, 2020 (for more see below), it will now be necessary for Boris Johnson to nominate a temporary commissioner before von der Leyen’s commission can begin. The most likely choice will be for Julian King, the current British commissioner, to stay on. That would mean only 11 out of a team of 28 would be women—a ratio of 39 percent. This is roughly the same ratio the commission of outgoing president Jean-Claude Juncker had.

Romanian Chaos

But the gender imbalance may be the least of von der Leyen’s worries. Though Hungary’s replacement nominee Olivér Várhelyi looks set to sail through, the French nomination is complicated, and the Romanian nomination is a mess.

Breton and Várhelyi will have their confirmation hearings next Wednesday and Thursday in the European Parliament in Brussels. Many MEPs are not happy with Macron’s choice. Unlike Goulard, Breton has no EU experience and is considered far more conservative than the previous nominee. He is nominated for the same vast internal market portfolio as Goulard was and there are still concerns that his position will be too powerful. There have also been questions about his current job as CEO of technology company Atos. He reportedly owns about €34 million worth of shares in the company, which he would be regulating as part of his new job.

MEPs say they are preparing some tough questions for him. It’s highly unlikely they would reject him, after having already rejected one French nominee, but they may hold up his appointment for several weeks.

Romania has still not put forward a replacement, because since the original nomination was made the government of Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă has collapsed. That hasn’t stopped her from putting someone forward anyway—the Socialist MEP Victor Negrescu. But Romanian President Klaus Iohannis is challenging her right to do this, arguing that because the government has fallen, it is now his responsibility. He reportedly wants to nominate Liberal MEP Siegfried Muresan.

Meanwhile, there are reports in London that Johnson may refuse to nominate a new commissioner—fearful that it would suggest to the British public ahead of December 12 election that the UK is not leaving the EU. Lawyers at the commission are looking to see if there is any way around the rule that there must be one commissioner from each EU member state.

None of this, from the Spitzenkandidat fight to the Romanian chaos to the Brexit meltdown, is von der Leyen’s fault. But she has found herself seriously hampered by all of it before her tenure has even begun. And her inability to react robustly to the unfolding situation has many in Brussels questioning her fitness for the job. This is unnerving for her team, considering she still has to survive a second confirmation vote, along with her whole college of 28 commissioners, in the European Parliament.

Another Brexit Delay

The other major event meant to take place tomorrow was Brexit. But after Boris Johnson failed to ram his renegotiated Brexit deal through the British parliament in record time, MPs voted this to call an election for December 12. The EU granted an extension of three months, until 31 January 2020, even before that vote.

This is the third time the UK has requested, and the EU granted, an extension to the Brexit deadline which was originally supposed to be at the end of March. The continuing extensions have left everyone exasperated.

French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly came close to vetoing the request for extension—delivered by Johnson under duress (or so he pretended) because of a piece of UK legislation requiring him to do so. On the EU side, there is a strong desire for the UK to leave as quickly as possible, but in an orderly fashion. People in Brussels are tired of having the Brexit issue hijack European summits and slowing the EU agenda. “As much as I hate Johnson, I have to say I hope he wins a majority in December because it would mean the British are finally gone,” admitted one EU civil servant in Brussels.

But the divisions in the UK are making that exit seem almost impossible. Polls currently point to a resounding victory for Johnson, but they were also predicting that ahead of his predecessor Theresa May’s snap election in June 2017. May ended up losing her majority in that election. An inconclusive result could mean months of more uncertainty and possibly in a second referendum being called.

The European Union is ending 2019 in a state of paralysis. With the start of both the new commission and the new EU of 27 delayed until 2020, decisive action in Brussels seems as far away as ever. It is certainly not where Emmanuel Macron wanted to see the EU two years into a presidency. The European renaissance, which he and the many people who believed in him, had hoped for, seems still some way off.

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