© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

Here are three takeaways from the earthquake in German politics:

First, the next leader of Germany’s conservatives will be a man—and politically quite different from Chancellor Angela Merkel and her preferred successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who announced her resignation on Monday. Personally speaking, my money is on Jens Spahn, the current health minister, over the former CDU grandee Friedrich Merz and North Rhine-Westphalia State Premier Armin Laschet.

Second, the Christian Democrats’ new leader will face Herculean task. He will need to reconcile the different political wings and bridge the deep divide between East and West within the party. He also must find an effective way of countering the rise of the extreme-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Otherwise, Merkel’s CDU risks marginalization.

Third, please look at who has, at least for now, survived once again: Angela Merkel and her grand coalition. Both have weathered hard storms. Merkel is still looking cool and unruffled while her SPD coalition partners appear increasingly frazzled, but don’t count either out. Both the chancellor and her government could last until the end of their regular term in the fall of 2021.

Stability and Turmoil

Germany is a strange mixture of stability and turmoil these days. Despite numerous coalition crises, Merkel is well into her 15^th year in office at home and well respected, even admired abroad. A safe pair of hands if ever there was one, she is a safe haven from the rapid, profound changes that have upturned politics in most Western countries.

Germans largely share this view. Angela Merkel continues to be the country’s most popular politician—a truly astonishing feat after such a long time in office. At the same time, a quick survey showed, most Germans do not want her to change her mind about leaving the Chancellery and run for a fifth term in office. Even though they are risk averse, they are conscious of how stagnant the country has become under Merkel.

In late 2018, when she gave up the party leadership, Merkel also promised not to run for chancellor again. With her blessing, the CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a centrist from the western state of Saarland, to lead the party. AKK, as she is known, also seemed likely to become Merkel’s successor in the chancellery.

Having Her Power and Eating It

But all too quickly, the fault lines of Merkel’s succession project became visible: you can’t have your power and eat it. Merkel was determined to hold on to control over her government as well as her legacy, and AKK wasn’t ruthless enough to challenge her. As a result, her authority over the party was weak. Of course, she made mistakes, too, both as party leader and later as defense minister. Kramp-Karrenbauer’s doomed proposal for an international security zone in Syria—made with no prior consultation even within the German government—is just one example.

Nevertheless, AKK might have continued and recovered if not for the political impasse in the small eastern state of Thuringia. Regional elections last autumn resulted in heavy losses for the state’s Christian Democrats, who were then faced with a devilish choice: vote for a government led by the formerly communist Left Party, join votes with the far-right AfD to elect a state premier, or accept that no coalition can be formed and call for new elections.

The face and leader of Thuringia’s AfD is the right-wing extremist Björn Höcke, a wily player who managed to lure the CDU deputies into jointly voting for a Liberal candidate. For the first time, a mainstream politician in Germany gained office due to votes from the AfD. Outrage ran high, and the new state premier resigned after only a day. But for AKK, who proved unable to enforce her ban on fraternizing with the AfD, the damage was done. It didn’t help that Merkel interfered from abroad, calling the vote “unforgivable.” The Thuringia CDU has fallen in the polls since the scandal , while the Left Party is gaining support.

Kramp-Karrenbauer threw in the towel on Monday. In her statement, she included a sharp dig at Merkel. “Separating the chancellery from the party chairmanship, the open question of who will be candidate for the chancellery, this weakens the CDU,” she said.

Not So Quick

Yet AKK did not call for a quick changeover of power. According to the timetable she presented, she plans to remain in office as party leader of the CDU until the next regular congress in December. At that gathering, the CDU would choose a new chair, who would also be nominated as top candidate for the next elections. Merkel and her coalition government could remain in place until the autumn of 2021, according to AKK’s plan.

Can the CDU’s leadership issues wait that long? Possibly not, but Merkel’s would-be successors also recognize the dangers of being nominated too far ahead of an election. On Monday, Spahn, Merz, and Laschet all showed a great deal of restraint in claiming the top job.

Whoever it will be, whenever it happens—the new CDU leader’s job is not going to be easy. After nearly two decades of Merkel’s centrist policy, the party is torn between continuing along her line or moving back to the right. There is no consensus, either, about how to deal with the AfD’s success particularly in eastern Germany. After Thuringia, the next regional elections in the East will take place in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, very possibly leading to similar political impasses.

But after this Monday, one thing at least is clear: whether it takes 18 months or less, for Angela Merkel and the stable state she has come to represent, the countdown has begun. Brace for change in Germany and Europe.

The post Brace for Change in Germany appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschnke

Angela Merkel’s government is stumbling toward its end. Her junior coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is in turmoil after party leader Andrea Nahles threw in the towel on June 2. Merkel’s own conservative bloc is suffering from the inexperience and gaffes of her chosen successor, the new CDU leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.

So watch out for early elections in the European Union’s most populous country this fall—which could possibly bring the first Green chancellor in German history to power. For the first time ever, one opinion poll showed the Greens overtaking not only the SPD, but Merkel’s CDU/CSU, too. The Green party is on a roll, boosted by an enormous surge of public concern over climate change and other environmental issues. But their meteoric rise is also the consequence of the weakness of those presently in power.

A forsa Trendbarometer poll published on June 1 saw the Greens at a staggering 27 percent of the vote, three times what the party got at the last federal election in 2017. The CDU/CSU would come a close second at 26 percent (minus 7 percent) and the SPD a distant third at 12 percent (minus 8.5 percent). “This is the latest culmination of a development that has been in the make for years: a loss of trust in the conservatives and in particular in the SPD, which is in danger of drifting into complete insignificance,” the head of the polling institute, Manfred Güllner, explained. (An Insa poll, published June 3, had the Greens at 25 percent, one point behind the CDU/CSU at 26 percent, with the SPD registering 14 percent.)

SPD in Disarray

For sure, the SPD—a party with a proud tradition reaching back more than 150 years—is in full disarray. Under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the last SPD politician to hold that office, it lost much of its soul when it grudgingly endorsed Schröder’s labor market and social benefits reforms. Since then, the SPD has been worn down as junior partner in three of Merkel’s four coalition governments.

When Nahles, 48, took over the chair of the SPD in September 2017, she was hailed as the last hope of a party that was sinking ever faster. It was also replacing its leaders at alarming speed (often enough with Nahles’ help—she was instrumental in getting rid of Franz Müntefering in 2009 and of Sigmar Gabriel in 2017).

Nahles has a brilliant analytical mind and huge experience both within the party and in government, yet her sharp rhetoric was often jarring even to SPD supporters. So when the European elections on May 26 went so terribly wrong for the SPD, Nahles got all the blame. Exhausted by the mobbing, she resigned as party and Bundestag group leader and announced her retirement from politics. “Thank you and take care,” she told journalists when leaving the SPD headquarters for the last time.

An interim party leadership consisting of three regional SPD politicians is now charged with mapping the way forward. This will include a discussion at the end of June over whether to continue the “grand coalition”, or GroKo (“Grosse Koalition”) under Merkel, that much of the SPD grass roots hate anyway.

Keeping Up Appearances

Merkel played it cool, at least initially. She did not believe that a change of leadership in the SPD was a signal of instability, the chancellor declared publicly. The SPD’s personnel decisions, she added, should not keep the government from doing its work. Yet even Merkel must have known how false those words sounded, given the sorry mess that her own party, the Christian Democrats, is in, too.

Back in December 2018, Merkel stepped down as CDU party leader, making way for Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. But AKK’s (as she is known) honeymoon was short. Merkel, enjoying rising personal popularity scores, showed absolutely no willingness to cede the chancellery to Kramp-Karrenbauer early. Nor did she exert herself in the European election campaign. Meanwhile, AKK made her own mistakes, trying to please the different groups within her party and mishandling social media.

Ironically, it’s the SPD’s tragedy that for now is stabilizing the CDU. The party’s establishment is keenly aware of how many mandates its stands to lose—and how easy it is to be drawn into the same kind of downward spiral that the SPD is experiencing. Not only the forsa poll suggests that voters who Merkel was able to attract by being more liberal than her party are now switching their support to the Greens.

But even if the CDU has every interest to avoid early elections, the coalition is not likely to outlast this year. “I believe it will last until the fall. But until Christmas—nobody can say,“ said Armin Laschet, the powerful state premier of North Rhine-Westphalia and one of the leading CDU contenders for Merkel’s succession.

Moment of Truth

The moment of truth is likely to come with regional elections scheduled in three eastern German states this fall. Here, disappointment with the governing parties has not benefitted the Greens as much as in the west; instead, the clear winner is the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

To make matters worse, the east German AfD groupings tend to be particularly radical, revisionist, and xenophobic, which will push the entire party even further to the right. Every vote for the AfD will weaken Merkel, whom the AfD depicts as Germany’s worst public enemy because of her policy on refugees in 2015/16.

In the elections in Saxony on September 1, the AfD is expected to come close to the ruling CDU; on the same day, the SPD will probably lose Brandenburg, one of its few remaining regional strongholds. The elections in Thuringia will follow six weeks later, but by then, the damage for Merkel’s coalition will probably have been done. The SPD, giving in to grass roots pressure, will probably pull out.

“No, they won’t stay,” said Wolfgang Merkel (no relation), a Berlin political scientist and long-time SPD associate. “At that stage it will be rational to say that we cannot stop the downswing while in government. We will have to try to find a new drive in an opposition role.”

The Greens Are Coming

Merkel could try to carry on, either in a new coalition with the Greens and the liberal FDP, or as head of a minority government. Neither is likely given the fact that the Greens will do everything to push for early elections to cash in on their extraordinary surge.

The result would likely be a historic first for Germany: a coalition between the conservatives and the Greens at the federal level (if the conservatives come in first), or the first Green chancellor ever (if the Greens win the pole position).

Robert Habeck, the party’s charismatic and charming poster boy, would be the obvious choice, but Annalena Baerbock, his co-leader at the head of the party, is credited with a cooler intellect and better people skills. So far, the Greens themselves have carefully avoided discussing who would be their candidate for the chancellery.

”Stop that chancellor nonsense,” Habeck keeps saying. It’s a sound strategy—don’t jinx it, and avoid raising hackles for as long as possible. However, given the quickly worsening state of Merkel’s coalition, the Greens may soon have to address that issue.

The post Watch Out for a Green Chancellor appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Annegret Hilse

For Germany, the European elections on May 26 offer three particular insights: First, in this rapidly ageing country, politics are becoming generational, pitting the young against the old. Second, the rise of the Greens and the decline of the Social Democrats, the country’s oldest democratic party, is happening faster and faster. Third, given the sharp losses incurred by Angela Merkel’s conservative bloc, the GroKo—the country’s grand coalition (Grosse Koalition) of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats—is in for times of high tension and uncertainty.

In today’s Germany, the Greens at 20.8 percent have become the second largest party, leaving the SPD far behind. In comparison to the last federal elections in 2017, a total of 1.5 million Social Democratic and 1.2 million conservative voters went over the Greens, setting historic records all around. The most important aspect, however, of this shift is the generational divide that is opening up: Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats are for old people; the Greens attract the young. Among 18- to 24-year olds, every third voter opted for them on Sunday; informal polls in schools give them an even higher percentage with teenagers.

Shifting Political Grounds

The fear of climate change and worsening damage to the global environment is the biggest single reason for this shift. 2018 was an extremely hot and dry year in Germany, bringing the reality of climate change home. Merkel, who was once known as the Klimakanzlerin (climate chancellor), has had to admit that Germany will not reach the emissions goals her government has set. Reports about the extinction of ever more species on earth and about plastic trash found in the deepest parts of the ocean and on the most remote islands have added to the shock.

Add to this the powerful effect of Greta Thunberg’s Fridays for Future movement. The political drive started by the 16-year old Swede brings tens of thousands of school children to the streets every Friday to call for action on climate change. Rarely has a political issue so explicitly set the young against the old. Germany’s established parties have painfully learnt that their paternalistic first reaction—a pat on the back for young people getting engaged in politics—did not go over all that well.

Catering to the Old

It’s not just about climate change, either. Both the Social and Christian Democrats are old parties, with an age average of members of 60 years, and GroKo policies cater largely to this public, delivering benefits worth tens of billions of euros to pensioners. Whereas pensioners have seen their income rise by more than ten percent since the financial crisis of 2007, young people’s income has mostly stagnated. Low earnings and uncertain jobs translate into a much higher risk of poverty for the young. Yet Merkel’s coalition continues to squabble over how to dole out more money to the old.

It’s not just content, its’s packaging, too. It became painfully obvious just how out of tune the Christian Democrats are with digitalization and social media when, in the run-up to the election, a YouTuber called Rezo got millions of people to watch him ranting against the CDU. Merkel’s successor at the helm of the party, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, didn’t quite seem up to modern times when she responded with an eleven-page PDF (!) document.

No Spring Chickens

The Greens aren’t exactly spring chickens, either; the average age of their members is 50. But not only do they manage to come across as hip and successful—a group you would like to join—but their competence, the environment, has made a huge comeback. The Greens also have a clear-cut, positive message about EU integration and about immigration, which gave them a forceful European message for the election campaign. This has translated into enormous credibility: a staggering 57 percent of all voters in Germany, according to pollsters infrastest dimap, say that the values that are important are represented by the Greens.

Interestingly enough, the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) had a similarly clear if euroskeptic message which gained them a solid 11 percent of the votes overall, but with much stronger results in the formerly communist east, where resentment and xenophobia run high. But overall, Manfred Güllner from polling institute Forsa said, the AfD was likely to have reached the limits of its potential with voters susceptible to extreme right-wing ideas.

Anything But Stable

Yet even with the AfD plateauing, German politics will be far from stable over the coming months. The CDU, badly shaken by registering a result below 30 percent, may be feeling the pressure to replace Merkel as chancellor sooner rather than later–possibly not even with Kramp-Karrenbauer, who has lost a lot of her initial glow. Still, in comparison to Merkel’s junior partner in government, the Social Democrats, Merkel and Kramp-Karrenbauer are all laughs.

For the SPD, the European elections represent a terrifying realization: they still haven’t hit rock bottom. From 27.3 percent five years ago, they have fallen to 15.8 percent, which means that they have lost their position as runner-up to the chancellery and power broker to the Greens. Even more humiliating was the result in Bremen, Germany’s smallest federal state, which on the day of the European elections also voted for a new state parliament. For the first time since World War II, the SPD came in second, leaving the lead to the CDU candidate, a blunt entrepreneur with little political experience.

Such a defeat would under most circumstances make changes at the top of the party inevitable—were it not for the fact that the SPD has been using up leaders at alarming speed anyway. Current head Andrea Nahles is the eight party leader to try to get the better of Merkel’s CDU. Any potential successors may also find it convenient to keep Nahles in place until the fall, so that she can take the blame if the SPD gets battered in another round of regional elections.

Losers may try to cling together to avoid collapse; or they can trample each other in the scramble to reach firmer land. In the immediate aftermath of the European elections, Angela Merkel’s grand coalition appears to be choosing the former. But as the SPD gets more and more desperate, and as the CDU’s fear grows that it may be entering a similar downhill path, all bets are off. It will be interesting times for German politics.

The post Germany’s New Fault Line: Young vs. Old appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Philippe Wojazer

With the end of her political career in view, Angela Merkel has changed. She appears much more relaxed, speaks without notes, and occasionally—for instance at the Munich Security Conference in February—even manages to inspire emotions in an audience.

But for all her new-found openness, there is one person who is still waiting for a true answer from the German chancellor. That’s Emmanuel Macron, the French president, who relaunched his grand appeal for a renewal of the European Union in an open letter published in 28 newspapers across Europe on March 5.

Instead, it was Merkel’s successor at the helm of the Christian Democratic Union, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who wrote a response to Macron. On March 10, she contributed a lengthy opinion piece to the Die Welt am Sonntag newspaper explaining her views on Europe. It was not, to say the least, a very inspired piece. But it underlines her ambition to succeed Merkel as chancellor.

“The world is in flux, and Europe is faced with a choice,” Kramp-Karrenbauer wrote. “My own is clear: we have to get Europe right. We need strategic strength for our industry, technology and innovations, a feeling of security for our European citizens, and common foreign and security capabilities to bring our interests to bear.”

Traditional Red Lines

In her piece, Kramp-Karrenbauer, nicknamed AKK, proposes a single market for banks, an EU innovation budget and university chairs to educate teachers of Islam in a spirit of tolerance. She wants more Europe on defense and migration policies but puts an emphasis on subsidiarity almost everywhere else. She also reaffirms Germany’s traditional red lines: no common European debt, no European social security system, no European minimum wage.

None of this is necessarily wrong and yet the Kramp-Karrenbauer article leaves a stale taste. The new head of the CDU is clearly intent on reassuring her domestic audience that she will be no pushover on European affairs. That’s underlined by two proposals that go directly against France’s positions: abolishing the European Parliament’s seat in Strasbourg and establishing a European Union seat in the UN Security Council (instead of the French, bien entendu). As a result, AKK gives as little of a positive answer to Macron as Merkel has done.

Yes, there have been some discussions and even agreements between France and Germany over the past year. That holds true for defense policy in particular where the EU, coming from a very low base, has made some progress. After long hesitations, Germany also agreed to a separate eurozone budget, even if it’s one that will be a lot smaller than Macron hoped for.

No Big Picture

But neither Merkel nor Kramp-Karrenbauer have ever given Germany’s perspective on the big picture: They have never described the Europe they would wish to see; nor have they explained how the EU might be able to get there; nor have they said what Germany should contribute.

This is baffling given that German voters are still overwhelmingly pro-European. According to a Eurobarometer poll published in the fall of 2018, an impressive 81 percent of Germans believe that EU membership is a good thing for Germany.

It’s extremely disappointing, too, for Macron who may have hoped that AKK, a native of Saarland, Germany’s most western and most Francophone state, would be more open to his ideas than Merkel. No wonder, then, that the reaction in Paris to Kramp-Karrenbauer’s piece was cool. A head of state, French officials grumbled, does not respond to a mere party chief. One wonders, however, whether Macron would have stuck to that rule, had he liked AKK’s answer better.

Macron is not only passionate about Europe, he is persistent, too. And while his pathos may sometimes appear exaggerated, few people will deny his sincerity. And, just as importantly, pro-Europeans do know what is at stake: if Macron fails, there is a strong possibility of right-wing populist leader Marine Le Pen and her reformed Front National—now called Rassemblement National—gaining power in France.

Personalities and Politics

So why does the German government so consistently fail to give a comprehensive answer about the future of Europe? Some of it has to do with personality: Merkel is not a visionary, and AKK appears to follow that pattern. In her speeches as party chief, she has put the emphasis on delivering on concrete issues. Both also want to avoid reopening divisions within the conservative bloc which, particularly in Bavaria, has a fair share of euroskeptics.

But the main reason is different. Merkel—and by extension, AKK—is deeply afraid that Macron’s proposals, if backed by Germany, would lead to the gradual disintegration of the European Union. Not so much along the North-South divide, though fiscally conservative EU countries in the North founded their own grouping, the New Hanseatic League, last year to oppose Macron’s budget, tax and social policies.

The most dangerous split runs between East and West: between EU countries like Poland or Hungary with their authoritarian and anti-European governments, and countries like France that can well envisage a much smaller European Union. Germany, the EU’s largest country at the center of the continent, is desperate to hold both sides together, a desire made even more urgent by Brexit. This means an absolute “No” to any major reforms that would require EU treaty changes and ratification in all member states.

“It’s Impossible”

“In today’s societal and political situation, it is impossible to get treaty changes ratified in all 27 member states. That is why all the possibilities offered by the current treaty, including flexible solutions such as PESCO and all majority voting rights, should be used,” a leading CDU politician, the MEP Elmar Brok, told the Berlin Policy Journal. “The alternative is to carry on with a smaller union. Macron can envisage that. But for us Germans, that’s impossible. We cannot turn Poland into a second-class country. That’s fundamentally against our political, economic, and historic interests.”

Merkel and AKK most likely think the same but they wouldn’t want to say it that bluntly.  Berlin does not want to bow to governments in Poland or Hungary that are undermining European values. That would not be acceptable to France. Nor would it play well with a German public that is angry over eastern European countries which receive substantial subsidies from Brussels while rejecting common EU policies on asylum and migration.

Times may change, they hope in Berlin, and future governments in eastern Europe could be easier to work with. In the meantime, silence appears the best strategy.

The post Macron’s Appeal Hits a German Wall, Again appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer, as a Saarlander, you’re well known for your dedicated, pro-European stance. But you’ve yet to make a name for yourself in the realm of foreign policy—is it a subject that interests you? Foreign policy was what led me into politics in the first place. Back then, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the debates over the NATO double-track decision.

Today I find that there are still axes about which we should be concerned. Let’s call the first of these the European axis. It remains firmly in Germany’s national interest to ensure that Europe has the power to act. The second axis is a functioning transatlantic axis. At the moment, however, discussions between the United States and Europe, Germany in particular, have grown harsher and more difficult. A major challenge for us is to preserve this alliance and this friendship, because it’s just as important as ever. It’s a real warning sign when a survey of German nationals indicates that they now have greater confidence in the presidents of Russia, and even China, than in the President of the United States.

But you yourself have said that you find Trump and Putin equally difficult. Doesn’t that sound a little like you’re equating the two? No, it’s not a case of equating the two. In terms of attitudes, values and historic solidarity, I’m much closer to the United States—regardless of current political discussions. What I meant by that was that both nations have their own challenges in the present climate. For the US, the challenge lies primarily in the fact that, for the time being at least, we have a political administration that is disengaged to some extent from international agreements. This path of action has a considerable effect on geopolitical matters.

By contrast, Russia is a much larger and more significant neighbor to Germany—but also a more problematic one. Russia has its own agenda. And this agenda evidently includes an attempt to destabilize Europe and, consequently, Germany. It seeks to use its weaker neighbors to boost its own strength. This is counter to European and German interests. 

Since we’re on the subject, I should also mention the challenge posed by China. China is governed by a very powerful regime, whose values differ clearly from ours. It wants to implement its own rules in the world in the long term.

Let’s take a closer look at the USA. Aren’t the Germans deluding themselves with their skepticism over Trump? After all, the American tendency to withdraw into itself was evident under Barack Obama, too—he himself failed get the Paris Climate Accord properly ratified. There has certainly always been a tendency towards national introversion in American politics, including under Obama. Over the course of history, we see both of these orientations—international engagement and withdrawal—at war with each other. What’s new, however, is that under Trump international policy is viewed as big business. The same can be said for the relationship with Europe, and with NATO.

Do you think that it is possible to come back from this? Some will say, of course, that the US is certain to continue down this road. Do you think it can be rectified? For the time being, I still can’t see any extensive debate in the United States which might indicate a change of course. That’s why Germany and Europe are needed—it’s why we have to assume more responsibility. The entire debate revolves around security and defense policy. It’s a matter of our standing in a changing world. We must ask ourselves whether we’re content to simply be one of the strongest economies in the world, or whether we want to take on more political responsibility. What we’re facing is a very difficult discussion about domestic policy.

So in your view, Germany is not just a “big Switzerland”? No, Germany could never be a “big Switzerland”. Germany has to seize more responsibility. We are now a very strong centre in Europe, that’s something I noticed in Brussels. Germany has the capacity to take on the diverse interests of its smaller European partners as well and ensure a balance—and this is what is expected of us. But we have to play a greater role in defense. The Two Per Cent debate is more than just a matter of money, it’s also a question of quality. We have to discuss cyber security, infrastructure and its protection, as well as equipment and sheer manpower. It makes no sense at all to increase NATO troops, if you can’t move them around Europe in an emergency because its streets and bridges are not equipped for the job.

Doesn’t that sound like a diversionary tactic, part of the 2-percent-goal that Germany has not reached? Particularly as the German government is only aiming for 1.5 percent by 2024. We want to stick to the Two Per Cent target but a percentage of GDP alone is not particularly conclusive in itself, as in periods of economic recession you could point to rising rates without additional money. With steady GDP growth, 1.5 percent is already a considerable but necessary effort. A government must of course deal with other requests for expenditure in its budget. But, as I say, we also need to have a debate about quality. You might look at the calculations for other nations: to some extent this will be for nuclear forces, and partly for maintenance of expensive overseas bases.

Why won’t you give any exact numbers—wouldn’t that be a more honest approach? As things stand, wouldn’t 1.5 percent of the budget for the federal armed forces equal around €60 billion? I have no problem at all with giving clear numbers. The numbers manifest at the latest during medium-term financial planning and in the budget. In this respect, however, I’m reminded of the responsibility of parliament: alongside the federal armed forces, we also have a parliamentary army which can only be put to work following resolutions made in the Bundestag. However, as budgetary legislator, the Bundestag must also ensure that the federal armed forces are sufficiently equipped to return from deployment in generally good health. Otherwise you would have to hold an honest debate and call, essentially, for the dissolution of the armed forces.

Why does it seem to be so difficult in Germany to have an open debate about foreign policy and security? Perhaps it has something to do with our history. But times have changed: Europe and Germany stand at a crossroads. Do we want to play an independent role globally? If so, we have to make greater efforts in this vein—and this applies particularly to Germany. Especially since we, unlike almost any other nation, rely heavily on a stable international situation for our exports. As I say, there is no longer a classic difference between domestic policy on one side and foreign policy on the other. As we’ve seen with migration policy, destabilization in the area surrounding Europe will sooner or later impact upon politics at home. That’s why it tends to be aggravating when debates follow the familiar pattern of one side supporting arms and the other supporting poor German pensioners. This kind of debate has little to do with a responsible German politics.

The former Minister for Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel has warned of another effect: could increased military spending on Germany’s part spook its EU neighbors? Which is true, Gabriel’s warning, or the words of former Defense Minister Volker Rühe, who claimed that the Federal Armed Forces should be the strongest army in Europe? Well, I think we’ve some way to go before becoming the strongest army in Europe (she laughs). Nor is that my goal. Gabriel’s warning is false on two counts, because we’re not talking about a competition between separate national armies. We’re talking about the armed forces that are involved in alliances like NATO, which are, in many ways, closely entwined with Europe. And my express aim is that we work to develop an additional European army in the long term. In my view, there is no danger of Germany becoming a threat in itself.

Do you think the integration of Europe should entail France expanding its nuclear shield across Germany and the EU, as suggested by the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger? We certainly have a new situation on our hands, what with the suspension of the INF Treaty. But all efforts should aim first of all towards achieving an agreement in the remaining six months. We would actually require a treaty that includes not only Russia and the United States, but also other powers such as China or other nations with nuclear weapons. Apart from that, I would leave no option off the table and I would not commit myself to any specific option from the outset.

You say you would leave no option off the table. Do you mean you would consider nuclear arms for Germany? No, never.

You accused Russia of seeking to destabilize Germany and the EU. Shouldn’t the government be taking an entirely different approach to dealing with Moscow? First of all, Russia is a very large, diverse country with wonderful people and an incredible amount of potential. At the same time, you have a Russian government in place that takes drastic, uncompromising action in its own country and denies other peoples the right to self-determination—the conflicts in Georgia and East Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have shown this. We have to be clear about this. If Russia is using factories of trolls to run campaigns of misinformation in the West or influence elections, we can’t sweep that kind of thing under the rug.

Many are now complaining about the EU’s economic sanctions. But the critics have yet to name an alternative. They do not believe that we must accept Russia’s actions, which flout international law, but neither do they offer any ideas for other sanctions. Since we have ruled out military intervention, I support keeping the sanctions in place until a smarter solution presents itself.

But doesn’t the Nord Stream 2 pipeline fly in the face of this? In my view, Nord Stream 2 poses a conflict of interests. It’s an economic project that was set in motion a long time ago under a different German government. Besides, we maintained economic relations with Russia during the height of the Cold War, also in cases of energy provision. These were stable. So really, it’s a matter of interests—Germany’s interests, of course, but also those of Ukraine and the people of Eastern Europe. Then there are partners like the US, which is certainly pursuing its own economic interests. It is of course legitimate to question whether Germany is making itself too dependent on Russian gas. We are currently also building LNG terminals—potentially for American gas. In this respect, I don’t think dependency poses a considerable risk.

As controversial as the pipeline is, one has to be realistic and say that it is inevitable. There are contracts and permits to think about. I have no time for politics which makes vigorous pronouncements to the public about what should be done—all the while being quite aware of the contractual situation.

But the US is still stepping up pressure to complete the pipeline—even with the threats of sanctions. Threatening each other with sanctions is not the best way of dealing with partners and friends. The US has its own economic interests, which are legitimate. And it is concerned that Germany, one of the strongest economies in the world, is too dependent on Russia. But Washington needs to hear Germany’s reply: we are in the process of diversifying and we have other sources of supply. And we have the experience from history that tells us that Russia has always been a reliable gas supplier, even at the height of the conflict.

But isn’t Nord Stream symbolic of the fact that you do not always pay due regard to the interests of the smaller EU partners you described earlier? For myself and many others, Nord Stream 2 is not a project which is close to our hearts. But the fundamental decisions at the heart of the project were made in the past. The project cannot simply be reversed. We also have very legitimate economic interests when it comes to energy supply. The consultations in Brussels have shown that no-one is desperate to get his or her own way. The fact remains that keeping an eye on the interests of our European neighbors and implementing said interests have always been and remain a constant in German foreign policy.

Does China pose more of a challenge or an opportunity? We have always viewed the social market economy as both an economic model and a model for society. This model proved its superiority in the old system conflict with the communist states. But China is one of our competitors, one that is economically successful without sharing our social model. And that is a huge new challenge.

I am not afraid of China. However, we certainly need some kind of strategic industrial policy in this competition between systems.

Take the EU resolution on Siemens-Alstom. Bearing in mind all the European and national competition laws, you can understand why the EU Commissioner for Competition came to the decision she did. But it’s a stretch to say that China will not have risen to become a significant competitor in the rail sector in Europe in the next eight to ten years. That’s why I think the words of the Minister for the Economy, Peter Altmaier, provide an absolutely necessary and long overdue opportunity for reflection. I am firmly convinced that we need a different strategic position in industrial policy at one point or another. This is in no way related to my support for the development of state-owned enterprises. That is a discussion which is considerably overhyped.

Do you worry that Europeans will eventually be crushed between the two superpowers of the USA and China—or that they will have to pick a side? We Europeans are at a crossroads. If we are no longer able to assert our own politics and values, we run the risk of becoming a pawn in the games of one nation or the other. To prevent this, we need a united Europe which has the power to act.

A different question for you: where do you draw the geographical limits of Europe and, by extension, the EU? When you see two of the founding EU nations, France and Italy, working together now, you realize that the more pressing problem surrounds the quality of our community, rather than any question of geographical dimensions.

The interview was conducted by Andreas Rinke and Martin Bialecki.

NB. This is a translation; the interview was conducted in German.

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© REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach

As soon as an extremely relieved Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer had ascended the conference stage in Hamburg on December 7 and accepted the leadership of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), it was obvious what Germany’s right-wing political establishment made of her. Old men, their yearning for simpler times written in little veins across their pink cheeks, were elbowing each other aside to find a TV camera into which they could bluster and denounce the failure of nerve among the great Christian conservatives.
The attack lines were foreshadowed, and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), to which the CDU has been bleeding votes, was getting ready for a field day. In fact, AfD Bundestag member Gottfried Curio had already come up with an appropriate gag: “AKK,” he told the chamber just over a week earlier, could only be short for “absolut konstante Katastrophe” (“an absolutely constant catastrophe”).

Not another Angela Merkel! Not another aloof, careful, centrist prevaricating compromiser. Not another woman! By shying away from Friedrich Merz, the political embodiment of the alpha-male DAX boardroom, the party of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl had missed the chance to carve out a clear new path (or at least re-carve a weed-ridden old path).

But there are more complex interpretations. Those struggling to spot the differences between Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and her predecessor might want to go on YouTube and watch one of AKK’s annual performances as “Cleaning Lady Gretel” in the carnival in Saarland, the state she governed for seven years.

They might find it more painful than funny (the forced mirth of western Germany’s Karneval might be the tradition that forever calcified the country’s comedy reputation). Still, watching the sight of a top conservative in an apron and broom delivering a solid half-hour of slapstick gags might also help one understand why a majority of CDU delegates picked her in Hamburg, and why many may even have thought of her as a more amenable leader than Merkel herself.

Your Friendly Neighborhood Winner

Kramp-Karrenbauer is more “approachable” than the chancellor, according to Eva Quadbeck, journalist and co-author of a rather well-timed biography published in October. “She’s the kind of woman you could have a chat with if you saw her in the supermarket,” she said.

More than this, this Catholic mother-of-three holds all the right values for the CDU: she expressed her opposition to gay marriage in 2015, and is against abolishing the infamous Paragraph 219a from Germany’s criminal code, which forbids advertising abortion. This has already been a source of tension with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the government coalition.

In fact, suggested Olaf Boehnke, political analyst at Rasmussen Global, Merkel and AKK may already have agreed to play out a “good-cop, bad-cop” routine. While Merkel concentrates on her international duties and maintains a relatively liberal course to keep her coalition together, Kramp-Karrenbauer, with no seat either in the cabinet or the Bundestag to actually affect government policy, will make all the right conservative noises on domestic issues to keep the party on her side while she awaits her turn.

Kramp-Karrenbauer’s record also suggests she has “more courage to take risks than Merkel,” Quadbeck argued. In 2012, the then newly-appointed Saarland state premier, impatient with infighting in the allied Free Democratic Party (FDP), dissolved her coalition and called an early election, even though polls had the CDU neck-and-neck with the SPD. “Merkel advised her against this, quite vehemently in fact,” Quadbeck said. “But she did it anyway, and won the election.”

To show the boss that this was no fluke, Kramp-Karrenbauer repeated the trick at the next Saarland election in March 2017, trouncing the SPD with a full 40 percent of the vote, a victory that was credited with bringing the campaign train of SPD chancellor-candidate Martin Schulz to a grinding halt. Merkel once again took note, before securing her own victory over the Social Democrats in September.

What Now?

If AKK can help pull the same results off in next autumn’s state elections in eastern Germany, even the CDU’s old-school traditionalists will surely revere her. The AfD is currently claiming close to a quarter of the electorate in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. According to Boehnke, that means that Kramp-Karrenbauer will have to prioritize the issues of migration and border controls and look significantly tougher than Merkel.

“She has to shape the profile of the CDU as the one party that is looking for regulation of migration,” said Boehnke. “From a CDU perspective, it’s about limiting the damage of [the refugee influx in] 2015, and trying to win back the supporters who left for the AfD.” For Europe, “that would mean taking all the immigrant quota issues off the agenda.”
“She pretty much backs what Merkel is already doing at a European level,” Boehnke added. “She is definitely a European by passion, but she has to favor the national interest over European interest.”

Kramp-Karrenbauer is already hardening her rhetoric on immigration. She said in November that she would like to see Germany’s rules on dual nationality re-examined—in other words, she would potentially force the grandchildren of immigrants to choose to own one passport only.

Nor is AKK above a bit of the kind of right-wing populism that Merkel has conspicuously avoided: on the campaign trail in November, Kramp-Karrenbauer criticized the fact that some kindergartens had taken to calling traditional children’s St. Martin’s Day processions simply “lantern processions” rather than using the Christian term. “That’s not tolerance, that’s self-diminishment!” she told a local CDU gathering in Berlin, and “no part of her speech got more applause,” DER SPIEGEL reported.

These aren’t necessarily just populist gestures. Indeed, all of Kramp-Karrenbauer’s public statements suggest that, as chancellor, she would steer Germany back onto the pre-Merkel paths that those old CDU conservatives prefer. According to Quadbeck, AKK is “very much in the tradition of Helmut Kohl and his west-orientated world view, while Merkel had adopted a much more multilateral world.”

Ultimately, all this is about securing the future of the CDU, which is currently polling nationally at just under 30 percent. As Boehnke put it: “If Kramp-Karrenbauer can guide the CDU back to 36 percent, she’ll be good to go for the chancellery.”

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© REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach

She knew to keep it short. When Angela Merkel stepped up to Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who had just been elected as Merkel’s successor at the helm of Germany’s biggest political party, she briefly grasped Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer by the shoulder and by the hands. A quick nod, an even quicker smile, and then Merkel turned away.

AKK, as she is known in Germany, was Merkel’s choice for the party and eventually the chancellery, too. She has all the experience, the values, and the commitment to democracy and Europe that Merkel could wish for in a successor. But from now on, as both know perfectly well, nothing could be more damaging for the new head of the Christian Democratic Union than to be seen as too close to the chancellor.

Over the coming months, the two women will need to perform an intricate dance of support and distance, continuity and change. If they succeed, Merkel may be able to leave the chancellery with as much applause as she just received for her last speech as head of the CDU at the Hamburg party conference.

Kramp-Karrenbauer, in turn, can take over a functioning coalition in time to bolster her public image for the next federal elections due 2021. The exact date that the hand-over would happen is anybody’s guess, but about a year before election day would be reasonable.

Political chaos, of course, is another very real possibility. Merkel and AKK could mess it up—the one by playing up her remaining power (though that would seem a bit out of character), the other by proving herself unable to rally the party. Both could be pushed out of their respective offices, resulting in early elections and possibly even a part of the CDU splitting off.

AKK, however, is a politician with enormous experience at the regional and even national level. At 56, she has spent nearly 20 years in government in her home state of Saarland, a region of just under a million inhabitants. As prime minister of this most western of German states, she was re-elected twice. Kramp-Karrenbauer is clear and outspoken. She also has a reputation for being not only more openly emotional and accessible than Merkel, but also more decisive.

“You always stand on your predecessor’s shoulders,” a very self-confident Kramp-Karrenbauer said after her election in a television interview. “What is good, we shall continue, and where something needs to be changed, we will change it.“

Not Just Mini-Merkel

At Merkel’s initiative, AKK was elected secretary-general of the CDU in February 2018, a very useful learning period for the job she holds now. Over the past several months, she has also been able to demonstrate where her beliefs differ from Merkel’s: Kramp-Karrenbauer is far more socially conservative, opposing same-sex marriage, and favoring the reintroduction of conscription or an equivalent social service.

Back in 2015, Kramp-Karrenbauer had supported Merkel’s decision to keep Germany’s borders open to refugees. She hasn’t gone back on that, but she now dwells much more on the need to re-establish law and order in Germany. This is a theme that plays well within a party that is still divided over the refugee issue and desperate to regain ground from the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

The refugee issue is a good example to show how ambivalent relations between Merkel and AKK are bound to become. Kramp-Karrenbauer needs to infuse the CDU with new ideas and new confidence but she cannot afford to disown Merkel or her policies in government. There, the scope for change is particularly small as the CDU is bound to a very detailed coalition agreement. Its partners in government, the volatile Bavarian CSU and the desperately weak Social Democrats, are unlikely to want to do AKK any favors.

It used to be that the CDU was quite happy supporting its chancellor in power. That was its role from the very beginning under Konrad Adenauer in 1949, and it made the CDU quite a different organization from the Greens or the Social Democrats that have a more ideological outlook.

But after 18 years of Merkel as head of the party—and with her in the chancellery for the last 13 years, which reduced the party’s role even more—Germany’s Christian Democrats are desperate for change. Over the past six weeks, with lively debates between the main contenders for the party’s leadership, the CDU has discovered a new taste for inner-party democracy.

Hurdles on the Horizon

What’s worse is the enormous time pressure that the new party leadership is facing. Next year brings a series of important elections, from the European Parliament in May to regional elections in Bremen (also in May), to regional elections in the East German states of Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg in the fall. In East Germany, the CDU will struggle not to be outdone by the AfD. If it fails, Merkel—and with her Kramp-Karrenbauer—are sure to be handed part of the blame.

It doesn’t help either that Kramp-Karrenbauer only won the election to the party chairmanship so very narrowly. In the second round, 517 party delegates voted for her, while 482 supported Friedrich Merz, a former opposition leader and long-time Merkel rival who is revered by many in the party for his free market convictions and gifted rhetoric.

Merz’s supporters were bitterly disappointed by the result. Some started spreading rumors that Merz had been treated unfairly by the pro-Merkel, pro-AKK camp that had organized the party congress in Hamburg. One poisonous story said that his microphone had been toned down for his final presentation to the delegates to make him appear weak.

AKK tried to build bridges by nominating Paul Ziemiak, the conservative leader of the CDU’s youth organization and a Merz supporter, as the party’s new secretary general. Still, many delegates remain skeptical. Even though he was running as the only candidate, Ziemiak received just 63 percent of the vote.

Despite such little blemishes, and despite the dangers ahead, both AKK and Merkel won an important battle in Hamburg. The prizes for the two of them are power and a good place in history. But the picture is bigger than that. On December 7, Germany’s biggest political party reaffirmed its commitment to being open, democratic, and pro-European.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

Long before she entered politics, married, and acquired her tongue-twisting, double-barrel surname, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer’s dream was to be a teacher. Plan B: midwife.

She may need all the skills of those two jobs, and much more besides, if on Friday she becomes the eighth leader of Germany’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

Everything has come at once for the woman known to all as AKK. And not just for her: ordinary Germans are struggling to understand the 56 year-old who seems to have emerged from nowhere as Angela Merkel’s heir apparent.

And yet her apparent overnight success masks a long climb up the ladder of power. That began with her 1984 election as councilor in her small town home of Püttlingen in Saarland, a tiny southwest German state, on the French border.

Along the way she has bettered CDU grandees, party colleagues, and, when she became the Saarland interior minister in 2000, promoted by state governor Peter Müller, she faced down local police and state prosecutors who openly questioned her authority. Those questions vanished, at the very latest, when she succeeded Müller as governor of Germany’s smallest state.

Taking Nothing For Granted

Eventually she heads to Hamburg leading in opinion polls, with 48 per cent of CDU supporters behind her, AKK is taking nothing for granted.

The new party leader will not be chosen by voters but 1,001 regional party delegates in a secret ballot. No one knows for sure how they will vote and, after an eight-stop tour of the country, AKK knows many are impressed with Friedrich Merz. The 63 year-old is the CDU’s prodigal son, a former deputy leader who clashed with Merkel and left but has returned from the wilderness to succeed her. He is a strong speaker, and doesn’t lack in confidence, while the tiny Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer can struggle to be noticed.

But unlike her main rival she has 18 years of uninterrupted government experience under her belt.

Many analysts have dubbed her Angela Merkel 2.0, given both are women and prefer compromise and ego-free politics. Like Merkel, Kramp-Karrenbauer owes her rise to hard work, being underestimated, and a love of calculated risk. But, from her record, AKK loves risk even more than the outgoing CDU leader.

Risk-Taker

In January 2012, a year after taking over as Saar state premier, she swapped coalition partners in office then called—and won—a snap election. Merkel was annoyed by AKK’s risk-taking but impressed with the results. Last February, Merkel lured her to Berlin as CDU secretary general.

Neither woman mentioned the obvious gravitas of the decision, confidantes say: becoming secretary general—as Merkel did many years before her—is AKK’s best chance to lead the CDU.

If she wins on Friday, analysts may soon spot similarities between the Saarland politician and another CDU leader: the late Helmut Kohl, from neighboring Rhineland-Palatinate. Like him, AKK has a sharp political mind and a knack for wrapping hard political polemic in mild regional German vowels.

That has allowed her both defend and attack the hot button political issue in this leadership race: Merkel’s refugee crisis response of 2015-16, that saw over one million enter Germany.

During the regional road show she backed the Merkel approach at the time, not to close German borders. Yet she has promised regional delegates that criminal asylum seekers should be deported at speed and “never allowed set foot again on European soil”—even if they come from war-torn Syria. Somehow she has managed to do so without being denounced as a populist hardliner.

Similarly, though pitching herself as the centrist continuity candidate, she has made a play for CDU conservatives—attacking liberal abortion laws and standing by remarks likening same-sex marriage to pedophilia and polygamy.

More Emotional, Less Deliberate

For journalist Kristina Dunz, author of the first AKK biography, the politician is a value conservative with a left-wing social policy heart, whose differences to Angela Merkel are more interesting than the similarities.

“She doesn’t wobble in her positions, even when criticized,” said Dunz. “She is more emotional … and not as slow and deliberate as Merkel. She is also more belligerent.”

AKK knows no one would believe her if she distanced herself too much from the woman who promoted her. She promises to keep the chancellor’s conciliatory approach to leadership—finding compromises that make everyone look good—but promises a more dynamic political style.

What will this look like in practice? An end, she vows, to the  “leaden” Merkel era of sitting out decisions or imposing “without alternative” decisions from above.

Instead her CDU will turn grassroots concerns into government policy, she says. As well as more dynamism vertically, she wants a horizontal transformation to re-invigorate the CDU’s various wings—from conservative to centrist—and revive the party’s profile as a catch-all, center-right Volkspartei .

That is the best way to beat back the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and pull back lost CDU voters, she says.

No Moment to Rest

If elected CDU leader on Friday, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer will have no moment to rest. She has to give back hope to the party—struggling on 28 percent in polls and down five points from the 2017 election disaster result.

Beyond revitalizing the party, and preparing it for two difficult state elections next year, she has to accommodate herself with Angela Merkel, who plans to stay on as chancellor until 2021.

Finally, the new CDU leader has to revive a grand coalition lumbering under its own leaden reputation. Its coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD), are down to just 17 points in opinion polls and skidding from one identity crisis to the next. After taking six months to get into office, it is far from a given that this government will last the distance. If not, AKK—already thrust into the CDU leadership with little warning—could find herself running for the chancellery sooner than expected.

And, almost without planning it, the Saarland politician could soon find herself at the helm of the EU’s largest and most powerful member state—and effectively heading the bloc itself—in uncertain of times.

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Artwork: © Dominik Herrmann

Long before she became chancellor, Angela Merkel thought about how important it was for a politician to know when it was time to leave politics. This was in 1998, and Merkel had just witnessed how Helmut Kohl’s electoral defeat put an ignominious end to his 16-year chancellorship. She reasoned that she never wanted to leave politics as a lame duck herself. Ever since, she has considered an exit on her own terms the ideal end to a successful political career.

The chancellor’s hesitation to confirm her candidacy in the fall of last year was likely connected to that hope. She was aware of the fact that every missed chance to determine the end of her career herself reduces the chances that she will be able to at all. At the same time, given Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Brexit, there has hardly been a worse time for the most experienced and powerful European head of state to leave the stage.

Politicians who intend to stay in office as long as they are able have no need to consider their succession, but one who would determine her own exit must. Yet since her surprising rise to the top of the CDU in the year 2000, Merkel has been too busy warding off her intra-party challengers to pay any attention to who might come after her. Early on, she surrounded herself with a close circle of trusted advisers – Peter Altmaier, Ronald Pofalla, Hermann Gröhe – but these were sworn to unconditionally defend Merkel’s chancellorship rather than advance their own prospects. It may be a coincidence, but the chancellor removed the only person who showed the ambition and talent to one day inherit her position – Norbert Röttgen – in 2012. No wonder that in 2017, no one at the top of the CDU or within the administration presents him- or herself as an obvious alternative.

Angela Merkel has announced that she will run once more this fall for a full legislative period. Assuming she is successful, that leaves her four years to establish a successor. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble would have been an obvious choice during the refugee crisis.  In the turbulent period at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, he might have seemed like an anchor of stability if Merkel had fallen over her controversial management of the situation. But if she has the chance to hand over power on her own terms in four years, Schäuble will be nearly eighty, too old for serious consideration.

The Merkel Generation

The situation is somewhat different with the second name that has cropped up in recent years: Ursula von der Leyen. The 59-year-old has gone out of her way to play down any ambitions of her own. She has said that “a generation only needs one chancellor,” making it clear that in her case, it is Angela Merkel. Nevertheless, Berlin politicians and observers are firmly convinced that not only, von der Leyen can easily imagine herself as Merkel’s successor, but that she also believes herself to already have the skills necessary for the top job.

A doctor by training, von der Leyen made her first appearance in national politics in 2004. Since then, she has headed three federal offices: the ministry for women and family and the ministry for labor and social affairs in addition to her current post at defense. Her foreign policy credentials may also put her ahead of the competition. During the refugee crisis, von der Leyen was one of Merkel’s most visible and loyal defenders – and yet she is also one of the very few CDU politicians who have openly fought with the chancellor, and done so as an equal.

Clearly, von der Leyen is different from the chancellor.  She is a politician who is willing to eloquently and forcefully pursue her projects. But this trait has not only helped her become one of Germany’s most visible political actors; it has also hurt her in the CDU. Like Merkel, she is a modernizer. But where Merkel mostly declines to spell out her plans, implementing them either bit by bit or in sudden bursts, von der Leyen represents her positions openly and is happy to engage in public debate. This has led the party to direct its criticism of her efforts to modernize the military, for example, toward von der Leyen rather than the chancellor herself. This is one reason for the obvious distance between the defense minister and her party, and a possible obstacle to any future in the chancellery.

Respected, Not Revered

Within her party, Merkel is one of the most respected politicians. But unlike Helmut Kohl, she is hardly a revered leader. For twelve years now, she has guaranteed that the party remained in power, but she did so by pragmatically incorporating the shifts of a changing society rather than directing them according to the preferences of the Christian Democrats. Merkel’s twelve years in office have thus been accompanied by a certain lack of enthusiasm from her own party, which cannot escape the feeling that it has traded its values for power. This poses a challenge as well as an opportunity for her successor: any aspiring candidate who promises to pay more heed to the party’s vision should have a fairly low bar to clear.

The CDU politician currently pursuing this strategy most avidly is Jens Spahn. This ambitious young politician has become a beacon of hope to those who want the CDU to return to its conservative, fiscally liberal profile. Spahn is only 37 but has already been in the Bundestag for 15 years. He is highly driven: already in 2013, after the last national election, he saw himself as destined for a position in the cabinet. When he did not get it, he fought a very public battle for a place on the CDU executive committee, the party’s most powerful body. Schäuble himself took him under his wing as his “parliamentary state secretary” at the finance ministry. While this is not a particularly important office in government, Spahn has nevertheless become one of the most well-known and influential CDU politicians. In a party that avoids public debate, he will publicly contradict Merkel and turn such attacks into his personal brand. For some time now, he has been on the rather short list of politicians credited with the clout to succeed her.

Similar to Spahn, Julia Klöckner set herself apart from Merkel during the 2015–16 refugee crisis. Ever since, she has made discomfort with Islam into her theme. Had she won the 2016 state election in Rheinland-Pfalz, she would be the favorite to succeed Merkel today. She did not win, but she still isn’t out of the running. As deputy party head, Klöckner has given the CDU a youthful, friendly face. She also offers something to the long-disappointed Christian Democrats who are interested in tradition and homeland without playing exclusively to the party’s conservative wing or indulging in the bitterness that sometimes characterizes Spahn. She is just as ambitious, but manages to conceal her aspirations with a certain winning charm. For a party that experienced the Kohl-Merkel transition as a loss of political orientation, she represents an emotional homecoming.

Still, Klöckner has headed neither a federal ministry nor a state government. She is seen as inexperienced and cannot rely on charisma alone to sweep her into the chancellor’s office. If Merkel were to offer her a cabinet post in the future, she’d become one of the most promising candidates.

A Dark Horse

Given the current office holder, it is fitting that the politician with the best chance of succeeding is not the ever-present Ursula von der Leyen, the ultra-ambitious Jens Spahn, or the happy warrior Julia Klöckner. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer may be a dark horse, but she resembles the current chancellor the closest. Like Merkel, she is an unpretentious, pragmatic, technocrat who does not give the appearance of using politics as a stage to realize her personal ambitions. And that is not the only reason why the minister president of the tiny state of Saarland actually stands a chance of becoming the next chancellor: she is one of Merkel’s most unquestioningly loyal followers, has pursued Merkel’s modernization plans, and supported the chancellor unequivocally during the refugee crisis. She has also proven her ability to exercise power: in Saarland, against the chancellor’s wishes, she broke up the CDU, Green, and FDP coalition, saying that the FDP was not sufficiently serious to be a real partner. Unlike Spahn, who is inclined toward economic liberalism, Kramp-Karrenbauer stands for a CDU anchored in the social welfare economy. She won the most recent election in her state by an unexpectedly wide margin. This was the beginning of a series of disappointments for Martin Schulz, who was to be the SPD’s savior in September’s federal elections.

For each of the potential successors, it would be extremely helpful if the chancellor gave them the chance to build a stronger profile in office – allowing them to take the reins a year before the next election, for example. But Merkel has made it clear that she wants to fulfill another full four-year term if she is re-elected later tnis month. So there will likely be a piecemeal shift in power rather than a single dramatic change. Kramp-Karrenbauer, for example, could take over the job of party chief in the middle of the legislative period which would give her a strong claim to the top job when the next campaign season begins.

Merkel, however, has always believed that her predecessor Gerhard Schröder made a serious mistake when he gave up the office of SPD chief during his chancellorship as this was seen as a clear sign of political defeat. Merkel will not make the same error; she will likely hand over the reins of the party only as a signal of an upcoming transition, and only when she is ready. It would be the first step in the final farewell that she has contemplated for two decades.

But Merkel also knows that in politics, little goes according to plan. Few chancellors have managed to determine their own exit, and the plans of those who would become chancellor in their place are rarely more successful. It was the same after Kohl was voted out, when many in the CDU hoped their own fortunes would rise, only to see their ambitions dashed. In the end, it was Merkel who rose to power, someone no one had on their radar in 1998. And who knows – history could repeat itself.

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