© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

“We know very well the sun rises tomorrow and a new chapter for our union will start,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said wistfully in a speech on Brexit Day. “With it comes a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make sure the EU leads the way.”

Standing aside European Council President Charles Michel and European Parliament President David Sassoli in Brussels, von der Leyen and her cohorts were keen to stress they were here to talk about the EU, not about the United Kingdom. On the previous day, the three had held a retreat at the Jean Monnet House in France to talk about their visions for a post-Brexit EU. More specifically, they were discussing how they want to organize the upcoming Future of Europe conference.

They reiterated their insistence that in order for the UK to have access to the EU’s single market, it cannot diverge from EU rules, but that was it. They let a joint op-ed in European newspapers today more fully explain their negotiation position.

Today was not a day to focus on the future EU-relationship, but a day to talk about Europe, and what might be possible now that the UK is leaving. “It’s an exceptional day for the EU, and we have mixed feelings,” said Michel. “It’s never a happy moment when someone leaves, but we are opening a new chapter. And we will devote all our energy to building a stronger and more ambitious EU.”

No More Holding Back

Ambitious is the key word. In Brussels, there has long been a feeling that the UK has held the EU back from taking the measures that would make it a more powerful force in the world. This has always particularly irked the French. Now, with the British leaving, things are possible that weren’t possible before. And French President Emmanuel Macron wants to push forward with them.

The UK had always blocked attempts to create a defense role for the EU, fearful it would be in competition with NATO. With the UK leaving, work on creating a “defense union” for the EU has already been ongoing for over a year. EU enlargement—always pushed by London, but resisted by Paris and Berlin—has had the brakes thrown on. It is only a matter of time before Turkey’s EU accession bid, pushed for so long by London and Washington, will be officially ended. Endless enlargement dilutes the ability of the EU to be a strong unified bloc, Paris and Berlin believe, and would turn it into nothing more than a free trade area. This, of course, is what London always wanted—hence why they pushed expansion.

Rather than believing that Brexit portends the end of the union, many in Brussels think the experience of the Brexit negotiations over the past three years has put the wind in Europe’s sails. Contrary to expectations, the EU27 showed remarkable unity throughout, with not a single member breaking ranks to conduct bilateral negotiations with London, despite the most intense efforts on the part of the UK.

Across Europe, polling has shown that the percentage of Europeans who want their country to leave the EU has plummeted since the Brexit referendum as Europeans have watched the car crash of Brexit. Polling shows there is no country in the EU in which anything close to a majority of people want to leave.

“Within these three-and-a-half years there was a very precious experience made by the EU27,” von der Leyen said. “The experience of how much unity counts, how strong we are in unity—way more than each single country would have on its own.”

So now, what to do with that momentum? The leaders acknowledged that though the idea of other countries leaving the EU is not a winner with the public, they are also skeptical of the idea of a stronger EU. The idea of the Future of Europe conference, which is set to start in May with citizens agoras hearing from people about what they want from the union, is to both take on citizens’ desires and communicate to them the benefits of a strong sovereign Europe.

“We have to work to make sure Europe is better loved among citizens,” said Michel. “Our concern is going to be to stop using jargon, to cut down red tape. We have the digital agenda, the green deal, and on security we will defend our values. On top of that we need the right methods to implement our short and long-term plans.”

“It’s essential in the future to take much more into consideration the expectations of the citizens, and it’s also important to explain what’s the daily added value of this political project,” he added.

Skeptical Forces from Without and from Within

European Parliament President David Sassoli acknowledged that it isn’t just the British who are skeptical about the idea of a stronger EU. There are strong forces trying to disrupt the European project—forces from without, and forces from within.

“Why are so many people working so hard to break up the EU?”, he asked. “That is the question. Because within our countries, too, there are certain people who are trying to run with this torch. There are groups, forces who are trying to weaken the EU, but what’s their agenda?”

“We want proper rules to govern this European dimension. You can defend the more vulnerable when you have rules. In the absence of rules, it becomes the jungle. Might becomes right. But there are those who want to defy us because they are afraid of a rules-based world.”

Michel agreed. “When we are together and united, when we share a common approach, we are a real political and economic force, believing in personal dignity. These are the values that underpin the European project.”

The question now will be convincing the citizens of a post-Brexit EU that these values are worth fighting for.

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Artwork: Claude Cadi

The process of European integration has reached a critical point.” 25 years ago, this sentence set the stage for the famous Schäuble-Lamers memorandum and its bold vision for Europe.

The always humble foreign affairs expert Karl Lamers and the notorious Wolfgang Schäuble, both members of Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU), warned that a “regressive nationalism” was taking hold in Europe, feeding fears of unemployment, migration, and societal change. Single countries could not tackle these problems—national sovereignty had become “an empty shell.” Indeed, only through the European Union could the continent’s nation-states be sovereign at all.

At the same time, enlargement would make the union more diverse and lead to a “significant power gain” for Germany. It would also overstretch the EU’s institutions and render it less effective. The EU was thus at risk of degenerating “into a loose formation essentially focused on economic aspects.”

But “such an ‘enhanced’ free trade area could not cope with the existential problems of European societies and their external challenges,” the two men from Baden-Württemberg argued. To secure France’s backing for enlargement and get the EU institutions ready, Bonn should propose new measures for “a strong, capable and integrated Europe.”

État-Nation vs. Europe

Their idea: the EU’s founding members (except Italy!) should pursue political union on their own and form a “core Europe” with a common migration and social policy, coordinated budget policies, and strong defense and foreign policy capacities. Building this core Europe should “reconcile two a priori contradictory goals—deepening and enlargement,” Schäuble and Lamers wrote.

The proposition got almost no traction in France. As Berlin is today, Paris in 1994 was in a state of paralysis. François Mitterrand’s presidency had entered its last year, and the socialist in the Élysée had to share power with a center-right government. And while EU flags then as now fly next to the Tricolore above every school entrance in France, Paris is, when push comes to shove, often more than hesitant to give up sovereignty for Europe’s sake. France is after all the literal État-nation, where the state created the nation and still embodies it.

The clear-sighted Schäuble and Lamers anticipated this, writing in the 1994 paper that “when German propositions are unequivocally presented, then France must also decide clearly. It has to rebut the impression that although it does not allow others to doubt its fundamental will to Europe’s unification, it time and again hesitates on concrete integration steps.”

Joschka Fischer’s Avant-garde

At the turn of millennium, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer revived Schäuble’s “core Europe” idea. In a speech at the Humboldt University, Fischer argued a group of EU countries should form “the avant-garde, the driving force for the completion of political integration.”

This time, Paris at least replied. Addressing the Bundestag, President Jacques Chirac called for a “group of pioneers” to cooperate more closely on economic and defense policy. But for the Gaullist, “pioneers” was code for a more inter-governmental mode of cooperation that would boost France’s leverage. A “European super-state” was not the goal, Chirac said. Paris was beaming with self-confidence at the time, as France experienced a brief economic boom.

Fischer did not get far with his proposal. At the 2000 Nice summit, Berlin and Paris preferred to fight over their respective voting rights within EU bodies. The French “No” to the EU constitution in 2005 did not help either. And once Eastern enlargement was a reality, Angela Merkel ditched the “core Europe” idea for good, arguing the new EU members shouldn’t be pushed to the periphery again.

Not Just a Market

This is all history of course. But there is one person who has studied it well: Emmanuel Macron. Before entering the Élysée, he had his shot at a Humboldt speech in January 2017, outlining his vision for Europe. Citing the Schäuble-Lamers memorandum and Fischer, he apologized that France had not taken up their initiatives and promised to continue their fight.

Macron has certainly kept his word and the overlap between his ideas and those of Schäuble and Lamers is indeed astonishing. Europe’s biggest mistake in the last decade “was to abandon this word: sovereignty,” Macron says. He doesn’t stop exclaiming “Europe is not a big loose market!,” but a political union giving citizens a sense of control in a globalized world.

And as Schäuble did in 1994, Macron believes creating this “sovereign” EU necessitates, first, that enlargement be linked to institutional reform. “Let’s be honest … the system of consensus at 27 doesn’t work. … The ones who want enlargement must also accept more qualified majority voting,” Macron told the press at the London NATO summit in December 2019. And, second, that the EU’s willing members need to move forward on their own, regardless of the others.

Full Circle

That Wolfgang Schäuble, now the president of the German Bundestag, endorsed Macron’s European initiative on December 5 in a speech at … yes, the Humboldt University, is thus nothing but consequential.

Schäuble said Macron’s “Europe that protects” slogan is the right formula. The EU needs to reimpose the primacy of politics in a globalized world. And in a sideswipe against Merkel, he added, “The French president is impatient—who could not forgive him? It is the result of too much waiting—for our answer, German ideas, and common leadership.”

Schäuble citing Macron who cites Schäuble relaunched his “core Europe” idea, arguing that “we cannot afford that the most hesitant, the slowest EU member determines the tempo.” Schäuble called for a “Google tax,” the protection of Europe’s data from the United States and China, the investment of Germany’s trade surplus in climate change measures abroad, more qualified majority voting in European foreign policy, and—chiefly—for Berlin to get serious about EU defense.

The security focus is not only a reaction to NATO’s “problems,” as Schäuble, a committed transatlanticist, put it in his speech. Instead, he sees security as “the inner core of sovereignty,” adding that “knowing about one’s own sovereignty is key to defining a people’s relationship to itself and each other.” Therefore, Schäuble argues that developing Europe’s “capacity to defend itself is an essential factor for the stabilization of an EU identity.”

Schäuble Support

In Schäuble’s thinking, the project of an EU army could bring Europe’s east and west together. And like Macron, Schäuble pleaded for reconsidering the EU’s relationship with Russia, while acknowledging that Germany’s commitment to Nord Stream 2 puts it in a bad position to reassure eastern Europeans.

All of this is strong stuff in Germany, and not yet wildly discussed. But as the Bundestag president says, the country needs this “unpopular debate.” Schäuble can certainly count on Paris not to let go.

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Artwork © Claude Cadi

Emmanuel Macron is not known for selling himself short. At the moment he is openly relishing having won the EU top jobs game—the French President has dealt himself a promising hand for future poker rounds in Brussels.

In fact, this is not just a good hand but a royal flush.

The king card is Ursula von der Leyen. The President-elect of the European Commission is a proven pro-European who knows she owes her promotion to the Elysée Palace. The queen is Margrethe Vestager. The “US giant slayer” sits atop the competition portfolio and will keep up the pressure on monopolistic internet giants and corporations seeking undue tax advantages.

Paolo Gentiloni is the jack. The Italian is set for the economic policy portfolio and will supervise the application of the EU’s fiscal rules. This is crucial for France because at the height of the Yellow Vests protests, Macron boosted spending and dropped his goal of achieving a balanced budget by the end of his term in 2022. He can count on Gentiloni to show him some leniency here.

The ace is Sylvie Goulard. As internal market commissioner, Macron’s close ally will drive the EU’s industrial strategy offensive and regulate the digital economy. Moreover, she will also oversee the implementation of the European Defense Fund. So far, the fund is Macron’s only EU success with a potentially significant fiscal dimension. France’s aerospace and defense industry hopes to benefit. In Paris, there is a sense of awe at how Macron managed to include both the single market and defense in the Frenchwoman’s portfolio.

The French Influence

Taking a closer look at the mission letters von der Leyen sent to her commissioner candidates makes Macron’s influence appear even greater.

Take climate policy. Raising the targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions, boosting Green spending, turning the European Investment Bank into a climate bank, introducing a EU carbon border tariff—the new commission’s agenda reads like a carbon copy of La République En Marche’s European election manifesto.

Moreover, von der Leyen’s policy program includes a series of French evergreens, such as a eurozone budget and an EU-wide tax for the likes of Google. She has ordered a strengthening of the EU’s trade defense measures and will insist on reciprocity when it comes to opening up Europe’s public procurement markets. The former German labor minister also vows to introduce a common minimum wage framework that could lead, à terme, to an EU-wide unemployment (re-)insurance scheme.

Work To Do in the Council

While the French President has clearly won the battle over the Commission’s future policy priorities, it may still turn out to be a hollow victory. Macron remains the only European head of state that has articulated a comprehensive vision for the EU in a series of speeches. That the notoriously pro-integrationist European Parliament and Brussels machinery are closely aligned with his vision of a “European Renaissance” is no surprise.

But to get any of his landmark projects over the line, Macron ultimately needs his counterparts in the European Council on board. So far, most leaders have preferred to let Macron speak and enjoy the limelight, rather than take the stage themselves and truly engage with him. Some of them have reservations about Macron’s ambitions.

Paris does hope, however, that the tide is turning. The political and the macroeconomic picture—above all in Germany—has changed and is opening avenues to French ideas.

First, climate change has risen to become the preeminent theme. For Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU and the SPD, the centrist parties governing in Berlin, the Green surge has become the primary electoral concern. However, addressing climate change ultimately requires greater state involvement in the economy and investment. For the German government, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify clinging to the Schwarze Null. To use late President Jacques Chirac’s metaphor: When the house is burning, firefighters don’t worry about running up the water bill. Paris follows the German debate about deficit spending with great attention. It has not gone unnoticed that some SPD leadership candidates and now even former CDU finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble are proposing to revise the debt brake.

Second, Germany is about to enter a recession. This is no good news for France, which exports more goods across the Rhine than to anywhere else. But it nourishes hopes in Paris that the slowdown might prompt Berlin to reconsider some of its traditional policy stances.

After years of resistance, German banks and the finance ministry are warming to the idea of Europeanizing the hitherto national bank deposit insurance schemes. With the country’s two largest banks in a fragile state, completing the banking union could play also to Germany’s advantage. Moreover, the reform would open the possibility of a European merger for Deutsche Bank or Commerzbank. Berlin prefers this to the idea of an American takeover.

Finally, Macron has another ace up his sleeve: Christine Lagarde. She guarantees a continuation of the European Central Bank’s ultra-lax monetary policy. As long as the eurozone’s fiscally conservative countries do not change course, Paris can at least rely on record-low interest rates and run profit-yielding deficits.

Playing the Cards Right

In 1986, the need to revive growth and the (neo-)liberal wave provided fertile ground in which the EU leaders could pass the Single European Act. It represented a giant leap of integration, truly transforming the union into one single market as discussed by the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek in a remarkable 1937 essay.

Today, with Europe once again looking for growth, the climate imperative may provide the springboard for the EU to take another leap forward. And this time in a fashion more closely aligned to France’s economic philosophy—one that favors investment over savings and a voluntarist over the night-watchman or ordoliberal state.

Above the Elysée, the stars seem to be aligning. A pro-EU government is back in power in Rome. Budapest and Warsaw are isolated, and their economies still very much depend on EU fiscal transfers. Macron wants to move fast. But in poker, when you have good cards, you maximize your win by slightly understating your hand. Macron has reason to be grinning again, but he should also practice his poker face.

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© Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

Two weeks ago, a wormhole seemed to have opened up at the Élysée Palace, transporting us back to the 1960s. Addressing France’s assembled ambassadors, Emmanuel Macron sounded at times like a 21^st century Charles de Gaulle.

Fresh off his diplomatic success at last month’s G7 summit in Biarritz, the French president proclaimed: “We are not an aligned power… We need to work with our European friends, which we have to respect… But to put it in simple terms, we are not a power that considers that the enemies of its friends must also be ours.” For history buffs, that was nothing short of a direct riff on de Gaulle’s foreign policy tenets.

Once Paris had buried its imperial ambitions in the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, President de Gaulle reimagined France’s role as an independent geopolitical power, removed from the Cold War schism. “Having given independence to our colonies, we have to retake our own independence,” de Gaulle famously said in 1963. France should be a free agent on the world stage, which led de Gaulle to create the force de frappe, France’s independent nuclear deterrent. In 1966, the general ordered Washington to close its French army bases.

In the diplomatic sphere, this so-called “policy of free hands” translated into an early recognition of communist China (1964) and above all a rapprochement with Moscow. In a bid to further distance himself from Washington, de Gaulle embarked on a “Ostpolitik” avant la lettre, travelling from Kiev to Novosibirsk in 1966 and making the case for a détente. “Soviets and French, we can shake hands!” he told a roaring crowd.

“Useful Idiot”?

It seems Paris is gearing up to embrace Moscow once again. The Iranian nuclear deal, the Syrian civil war, the stalemate in Libya and Eastern Ukraine—Russian President Vladimir Putin has made himself indispensable to resolving all these issues. Moreover, with US President Donald Trump pulling out of the INF treaty, the threat of a new arms race is returning to Europe with a vengeance. In Macron’s mind, isolating Putin simply doesn’t work anymore.

In Paris, many doubt that Macron’s overture toward Russia will yield any tangible returns. In 1966, de Gaulle did not obtain much from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in return for his Soviet pivot. His diplomatic somersault was rewarded with a couple of trade agreements and a direct telephone line from the Élysée to the Kremlin.

Much like in the 1960s, Putin may simply see Macron as a “useful idiot” that might help him to break up the joint US-EU sanctions front. The Kremlin’s gambit seems to be paying dividends already: France supported Russia’s return to the Council of Europe this year.

Return to Grandeur

But like de Gaulle, Macron seems to be thinking above all about his domestic audience. In 1966, the general’s triumphant Russia trip was also a giant propaganda show. It was supposed to signal that France was de retour and—perhaps more importantly—the French themselves were keen to forget the memories of the disastrous Algerian war.

Macron presented himself to French voters in 2017 as a vigorous leader who would reform the European Union and create, in tandem with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a “Europe that protects.” Politically and fiscally more integrated, such a “sovereign Europe” would be able to resist Trump’s unilateralism and to ring-fence China’s state capitalism.

But Berlin and a coalition of northern and eastern European countries soon frustrated Macron’s ambitions. A eurozone budget was agreed on in name only, and a EU-wide tax on America’s digital giants seems dead in the water. Macron’s powerlessness in Europe became more and more visible, most of all to the French.

But by positioning himself at the center of the global diplomatic game, Macron is now attempting to recover some of his fading authority and standing at home. It seems to be working: after the G7 summit in Biarritz, Macron’s ratings reached their highest level since the start of the “yellow vests” crisis late last year.

A Gaullist European

Banking on Merkel has proven a flawed strategy for Macron. Consequently, talk of Franco-German cooperation was noticeably absent his latest Élysée speech. Instead, Macron could not help pointing out once more that Berlin is much better at organizing support for its views within the EU. His marching order to the assembled ambassadors was clear: go and strengthen France’s bilateral relations, particularly with eastern and Nordic EU countries.

It is these countries that are most worried about a rapprochement with Putin’s Russia—especially since Trump, now that his hawkish national security advisor John Bolton is out of the picture, cannot be trusted to be tough on Putin. The Baltic countries are well aware that in a crisis, France is the only EU nuclear power with a president at its helm that can send troops across the continent on a whim.

Macron is playing billiard diplomacy. By rekindling his relationship with Putin and becoming Europe’s geopolitical wheelhouse, he hopes to increase his leverage within the EU and upend the rivalry with Germany—an old trick in French foreign policy. Ironically, in a Europe where many are still reticent about further integration, Macron seems to hope that going for a walk with Putin may do more wonders than charming Merkel. If Macron is taking a Gaullist turn, he still has his sights firmly set on Europe.

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© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

The international system is undergoing rapid change. Power is shifting from Western states to rising powers; Russia and China are working to discredit civil and political rights; populists are eroding democracy by stealth; and America appears to be losing interest in upholding the liberal international order. The European Union, whose principal purpose is to protect human dignity by means of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, finds itself increasingly challenged in the realm of ideas.

Faced with threats to its cultural identity, Europe needs to mount a cultural response. EU member states have long practiced cultural diplomacy as a form of “soft power,” and EU ministers have stated that culture must also be an integral part of the EU’s international relations. Under EU law, cultural policy is primarily a national competence, but the EU may support it, including in foreign affairs.

For many years the European Commission has subsidized mostly short-term cultural development projects in various regions of the world. However, it has set neither geographical nor thematic priorities, and current spending patterns do not amount to an integrated strategy. In practice, the EU operates not one, but three foreign cultural approaches that reflect the geographical and budgetary logic of the relevant Commission Directorates General, with one responsible for culture, another for development, and a third for relations with the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbors.

Links with the EU’s foreign policy priorities are tenuous. The European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic and foreign service, is short of cultural expertise and largely depends on the commission to fund external actions. Fragmented, under-resourced, and lacking a sense of direction, EU cultural diplomacy is in need of reform. Foreign cultural policy should be integrated with other policy domains, including human rights, development, and citizenship.

New Approaches Needed

There are a number of approaches the EU can take. Firstly, to push back against oppression, EU governments should step up support for the main international human rights regimes. It is hard to think of a reason why countries like India or Singapore could not be persuaded to join the UN Convention Against Torture, or why Malaysia must remain outside the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And, occasional outbursts from Washington grandees notwithstanding, there is no reason why the EU should not continue urging its partners to end impunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by joining the ICC.

European diplomats should also speak out more often and openly in support of freedom of expression. Too often, when artists are silenced, filmmakers arrested, or books banned, the EU stays silent. Thirdly, the EU should speak out more forcefully to defend academic freedom. When China cracks down on local academics or blocks access to European academic journals, and the EU looks away, China rightly regards this as a sign of weakness. Defending academic freedom is not only a task for governments. Universities, too, must face up to their responsibilities.

Countering Disinformation

Meanwhile, Russia systematically engages in disinformation to disrupt liberal democracies. The EU has adopted counter-measures that range from legislation to counter cyberattacks to a fledgling “strategic communications” unit. It also urges social media companies to act as gate-keepers of information. But this way of privatizing public responsibilities poses risks to freedom of expression; the EU would be on safer ground by adopting legally enforceable measures to secure the transparency and accountability of social media platforms.

China’s efforts to control information go beyond domestic censorship and surveillance. They include deterring and combating foreign critical voices. China’s measures range from exporting surveillance technology, disinformation, and intimidation to the pursuit of a new international media order.

As part of its response the EU should increase its political and financial support of independent, quality journalism, including within Europe itself, where such journalism has come under increasing pressure from governments, such as in Hungary and Serbia. The EU’s response could also include citizenship education that builds the capacity to think independently and distinguish truths from falsehoods.

An Integral Part

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals focus on the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. They do not include a separate goal on culture. Instead the SDGs indicate culture must be an integral part of policies to alleviate poverty, promote education, gender equality, and sustainable urbanization, and build peaceful societies that respect universal human rights.

As the world’s leading donor of official development assistance, the EU would be well-placed to promote this ambitious agenda. So far, the EU and EU member states have been slow to embrace the SDGs, as managing migration took priority. The incoming European Commission will have an opportunity to break the deadlock. Areas where the EU could make a difference include culture and education, culture and freedom of expression, and culture and conflict management.

Europe’s partners in the world expect Europe to change the traditional model of donor-recipient relations, and replace it with models of exchange and cooperation between equal partners. Too often Europe is felt to be extending aid, whereas what it should be offering is recognition and respect.

President Macron led the way by offering to return African heritage in French museums, much of it obtained in dubious ways under colonial rule, to the countries of origin. Other EU governments are still considering their approach. The issue would benefit from some European coordination, if only to avoid decisions being taken largely along national lines—in an unintended but no less awkward echo of previous colonial competition.

EU ministers could take the lead. Using the EU budget, they could agree to coordinate their national support for cultural institutes and museums in Africa and other parts of the world. A practical and highly symbolic way to cement their cooperation would be to launch a European program for investment in cultural infrastructure and cultural cooperation with the Global South.

Leading by Example

To stand for freedom and other rights outside its borders the EU must lead by example. Arguably, credibility begins at home, by standing up for the rule of law in the EU itself.

There is no democracy without liberty, and “illiberal democracy” poses an existential threat to European values and institutions. Popular discontent in Europe is fueled by a pervasive sense of economic injustice and political disenfranchisement, and by cultural changes. National responses must address each of these dimensions, visibly supported by the EU. Along with fair but restrictive immigration policies, this means countering unemployment and the excesses of free markets, citizen empowerment, and national and European financial support for citizenship, education, and culture.

Most Europeans regard culture as the factor that does most to create a feeling of community among them as EU citizens. There is much the EU could do to “bring the common cultural heritage to the fore,” as the EU Treaty explicitly allows.

Too often EU citizens feel treated as economic entities only, and not as citizens of a common political project based on humanist values. Cultural heritage, citizenship education, and language education could be among the building blocks of national and European policies to strengthen the saliency of European citizenship, along with steps to restore the humanities at the center of public education. The EU would have to secure sufficient financing in its new multi-annual financial framework for common programs like Erasmus, Creative Europe, Europe for Citizens, and the new European Values Instrument.

There is no quick road to soft power; cultural diplomacy is not a panacea. It requires both modesty and ambition from its politicians. Demand too much and the policy backfires; do too little and it fails to deliver. In and by itself culture cannot resolve either intra-national conflicts or international ones. But culture can facilitate independent thinking, dialogue, and understanding, provided it is employed freely and independently.

The EU is still a long way from realizing the potential of cultural diplomacy. The EU should upgrade its policies for international cultural relations and integrate them with its other policies to defend and promote the rights and liberties that are at the core of Europe’s identity, at home and abroad.

N.B. The article is based on the author’s paper Cultural Freedom in European Foreign Policy (Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, 2019).

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Artwork © Katinka Reinke

The chaotic Brexit saga suggests that states in Europe are no longer able to settle their differences in a constructive manner. The 2019 European elections have already been marked by a renaissance of sovereignist rhetoric. Pro-European politicians are at odds with each other regarding the required EU reform agenda. Can integration thrive in an atmosphere of conflict and chaos? Can the EU prosper in a new era of national pride and glory? How many crises can the EU digest before losing its mission and purpose? And most crucially, is Europe disintegrating?

There are no convincing answers to these pressing questions. This is partly because it is difficult to understand the fast-moving events, and pessimists have been proven wrong many times in the process of European integration. Europe emerged stronger from previous crises, and the present-day challenges can again be overcome in due time.

It is also difficult to predict disintegration because we lack a plausible narrative, let alone the theory to discuss it. For mysterious reasons, successive generations of intellectuals, commentators and politicians have always focussed on European integration while neglecting the opposite scenario. This is like discussing peace without trying to comprehend war. We may well be in favor of peace, but peace cannot be maintained without any understanding of the causes and implications of war. Similarly, can we comprehend democracy without talking about autocracy?

No wonder we are so confused at present. We do not really know what causes disintegration and what are its symptoms. Is disintegration a process, or something resembling sudden death? Does Brexit weaken or strengthen the integration of the remaining 27 states? How can we stop or reverse disintegration?

In the absence of plausible theories of disintegration, we can try to envisage some scenarios of the EU falling apart. Three outcomes seem most plausible at present. The first sees Europe’s leaders losing control over financial or political events. The second involves leaders trying to address problems, but ending up making things worse. The third scenario envisages a benign neglect policy with not-so-benign implications.

The “Big Bang” Scenario

At the peak of the euro crisis, an economic avalanche beyond anybody’s control was seen as the most likely disintegration scenario. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel repeatedly declared that the plunge of the euro would mean the collapse of Europe. Poland’s Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski added that the outcome of this scenario could well be war. Neither came to pass, but numerous analysts still argue that the common currency without a common fiscal government is not sustainable in the long-term.

We will be able to verify this pessimistic claim only when faced with another huge financial crisis. Such a crisis is difficult to predict and locate. The last financial shock came from New York, not Brussels. The next one could come from Shanghai or Rio de Janeiro. Financial turbulence may well be caused by a security crisis.Another huge refugee crisis could also lead to the implosion of EU institutions. Environmental disaster or a pandemic could cause events to spiral out of anybody’s control. None of these things can be predicted for sure, but any of them could happen with or without the purposeful contribution of the EU.

During emergencies, chaos and conflict are a normal state of affairs. Germany as the most powerful country would be at the center of crisis management. Some countries would join a bandwagon behind Germany; others would try to form a counter-alliance. Since chaos is heaven for populist politics, nationalism would thrive. The politics of territorial claims and financial recriminations would ensue. It is hard to see the EU surviving an avalanche of mutual accusations, retaliations and recriminations. Under this scenario, disintegration would be spectacular. It would resemble a cosmic big bang or sudden death.

Such drama appeals to our imagination, but it is difficult to speculate about the “unknown unknowns” that could trigger it. Not every crisis results in an Armageddon. The EU has a record of impressive resilience. Brexit, for instance, will hurt the EU more than is currently being acknowledged, but it is unlikely to lead to disintegration. In fact, the UK is more likely than the EU to disintegrate in the aftermath of Brexit. Moreover, it is difficult to suggest specific policies that could prevent a European Armageddon caused by hypothetical threats, however frightening.

The Gorbachev Scenario

The Soviet Union collapsed after Mikhail Gorbachev began introducing economic and democratic reforms. Gorbachev wanted to strengthen the Soviet Union, not dismantle it. Historians point to the reforms of the Hapsburg Empire as accelerating its demise. The so-called Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 that led to the creation of a dual monarchy with two separate parliaments and prime ministers in Budapest and Vienna provides a good example.

The EU has not attempted major reforms for the last three decades, but the lower-key measures that member states did agree proved highly contentious. This especially applies to the 2012 Fiscal Compact. Its critics say it is driving the eurozone apart because it imposes unjust and excessively rigid, counter-productive policies on the debtor states. Efforts to reform the EU’s asylum system have proved equally contentious with numerous states, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, refusing to accept the central redistribution of refugees.

In the run-up to the 2019 European elections, politicians launched numerous reform proposals—many of them contradictory rather than complementary. If the most ambitious of them were to be implemented, this would generate not only conflicts, but also unwanted or unexpected side effects.

Plans to create a more ambitious economic and political union are likely to have the most profound implications. A political and economic union of many distinct entities, however interdependent, would struggle to identify a set of common interests that could guide its policies. It would only work if composed of a few like-minded and similar looking European states.

Such a core of Europe would create a new divide across the continent, raising fear and suspicion. Some EU member states would be worried about being excluded, while others would fear that joining would subject them to domination by core members. In other words, the jump into a fully-fledged union would likely destabilize relations among European states, and break cooperative arrangements. A federation, however light, may well be attempted with the intention of saving EU integration—but in reality it could prompt disintegration.

Even less contentious reforms, such as those aimed at strengthening Europe’s defenses, especially against cyber-attacks, may require treaty changes—and in some countries referenda. Those have proved to be a festivals of populism benefitting euroskeptic campaigners. As such, they could be a vehicle of disintegration.

Reforms aimed at the repatriation of certain powers from Brussels to national capitals and the reduction of budgetary contributions may also drive the EU apart. These reforms are chiefly sponsored by euroskeptic parties and not those supporting tighter integration. After all, repatriation of power from Brussels is usually associated with disintegration rather than integration.

The “Benign Neglect” Scenario

Reforms, especially the major ones, are always risky, and politicians usually avoid risk. Moreover, in a Europe split along numerous political and economic differences it is difficult to agree any reform, let alone a highly ambitious one. Pro-European liberals would be particularly opposed to reforms coming from the anti-liberal camp even if decentralization may make the EU more flexible and competitive.

Under the “benign neglect” scenario, disintegration would take place by default or in disguise. Rather than trying to look for European solutions to national problems, member states would increasingly try to solve problems on their own or in a non-EU framework. They would not openly abandon the European project, but use it merely as a public relations tool.

The long history of the Western European Union (WEU) is a good example of such a symbolic cooperative frame. The WEU existed for many decades, but was hardly ever utilized for its envisaged security purposes. Members of the WEU met regularly and adopted resolutions. The WEU administrative structure and even the parliamentary assembly functioned seemingly normally.

And yet, when serious challenges arose in the field of defense and security, WEU member states ignored the WEU structure and used NATO, the EU, the UN, the OSCE, or informal frameworks instead. The 1990s war in the Balkans uncovered the price of this policy: Europeans found themselves without a common security strategy, divided on the question of which institution should handle the war, and without the effective military capabilities to do anything meaningful.

A policy of benign neglect and of muddling through comes at a price, but it is better than endorsing highly ambitious, hazardous projects. In a period of economic turmoil and ideological confusion, pragmatism is a valid alternative to idealism; a gradual approach may work better than a revolutionary one.

This probably explains the policy of European leaders at present. They are clearly reluctant to invest their careers and resources in policies with highly uncertain outcomes. While they will do the minimum to avert financial meltdown and political confrontation, it will not be enough to halt the process of creeping disintegration. The EU itself is the obvious victim of such an approach, with some of its key institutions progressively marginalized.

However, institutions have a very long half-life, even when they are not working, which suggests that the EU—or rather its façade—will survive. Europe will increasingly resemble a maze with different actors moving in opposite directions, whilst maintaining the appearance of dialogue and cooperation. The informal mode of decision making will become more important than dysfunctional treaties. Stronger states, especially Germany, will find themselves in the position of kingmaker by default rather than design. Emerging problems will have to be addressed, and if Brussels proves unable to do anything helpful, the public will expect solutions from Germany. This may prove a mixed blessing.

Grassroots Reform

None of the three envisaged scenarios bode well for Europe and Germany. Yet the measures currently being entertained to prevent disintegration seem inadequate. They also lack broad public backing.

Perhaps the only way to prevent disintegration is to reverse its dominant logic. Integration does not need to be a matter of nation states only; cities, regions and civil society organizations can be given tangible access to EU decision-making and resources. Integration can well be forged along functional rather than territorial logic because different fields require different memberships and modes of governance.

Spreading out power within Europe and bringing it closer to the citizens may help legitimize European policies more than the current centralized system. Such changes will not come from the top; they need to be pushed from the bottom. Are Europeans prepared to take things into their own hands?

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© REUTERS/Philippe Wojazer

With the end of her political career in view, Angela Merkel has changed. She appears much more relaxed, speaks without notes, and occasionally—for instance at the Munich Security Conference in February—even manages to inspire emotions in an audience.

But for all her new-found openness, there is one person who is still waiting for a true answer from the German chancellor. That’s Emmanuel Macron, the French president, who relaunched his grand appeal for a renewal of the European Union in an open letter published in 28 newspapers across Europe on March 5.

Instead, it was Merkel’s successor at the helm of the Christian Democratic Union, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who wrote a response to Macron. On March 10, she contributed a lengthy opinion piece to the Die Welt am Sonntag newspaper explaining her views on Europe. It was not, to say the least, a very inspired piece. But it underlines her ambition to succeed Merkel as chancellor.

“The world is in flux, and Europe is faced with a choice,” Kramp-Karrenbauer wrote. “My own is clear: we have to get Europe right. We need strategic strength for our industry, technology and innovations, a feeling of security for our European citizens, and common foreign and security capabilities to bring our interests to bear.”

Traditional Red Lines

In her piece, Kramp-Karrenbauer, nicknamed AKK, proposes a single market for banks, an EU innovation budget and university chairs to educate teachers of Islam in a spirit of tolerance. She wants more Europe on defense and migration policies but puts an emphasis on subsidiarity almost everywhere else. She also reaffirms Germany’s traditional red lines: no common European debt, no European social security system, no European minimum wage.

None of this is necessarily wrong and yet the Kramp-Karrenbauer article leaves a stale taste. The new head of the CDU is clearly intent on reassuring her domestic audience that she will be no pushover on European affairs. That’s underlined by two proposals that go directly against France’s positions: abolishing the European Parliament’s seat in Strasbourg and establishing a European Union seat in the UN Security Council (instead of the French, bien entendu). As a result, AKK gives as little of a positive answer to Macron as Merkel has done.

Yes, there have been some discussions and even agreements between France and Germany over the past year. That holds true for defense policy in particular where the EU, coming from a very low base, has made some progress. After long hesitations, Germany also agreed to a separate eurozone budget, even if it’s one that will be a lot smaller than Macron hoped for.

No Big Picture

But neither Merkel nor Kramp-Karrenbauer have ever given Germany’s perspective on the big picture: They have never described the Europe they would wish to see; nor have they explained how the EU might be able to get there; nor have they said what Germany should contribute.

This is baffling given that German voters are still overwhelmingly pro-European. According to a Eurobarometer poll published in the fall of 2018, an impressive 81 percent of Germans believe that EU membership is a good thing for Germany.

It’s extremely disappointing, too, for Macron who may have hoped that AKK, a native of Saarland, Germany’s most western and most Francophone state, would be more open to his ideas than Merkel. No wonder, then, that the reaction in Paris to Kramp-Karrenbauer’s piece was cool. A head of state, French officials grumbled, does not respond to a mere party chief. One wonders, however, whether Macron would have stuck to that rule, had he liked AKK’s answer better.

Macron is not only passionate about Europe, he is persistent, too. And while his pathos may sometimes appear exaggerated, few people will deny his sincerity. And, just as importantly, pro-Europeans do know what is at stake: if Macron fails, there is a strong possibility of right-wing populist leader Marine Le Pen and her reformed Front National—now called Rassemblement National—gaining power in France.

Personalities and Politics

So why does the German government so consistently fail to give a comprehensive answer about the future of Europe? Some of it has to do with personality: Merkel is not a visionary, and AKK appears to follow that pattern. In her speeches as party chief, she has put the emphasis on delivering on concrete issues. Both also want to avoid reopening divisions within the conservative bloc which, particularly in Bavaria, has a fair share of euroskeptics.

But the main reason is different. Merkel—and by extension, AKK—is deeply afraid that Macron’s proposals, if backed by Germany, would lead to the gradual disintegration of the European Union. Not so much along the North-South divide, though fiscally conservative EU countries in the North founded their own grouping, the New Hanseatic League, last year to oppose Macron’s budget, tax and social policies.

The most dangerous split runs between East and West: between EU countries like Poland or Hungary with their authoritarian and anti-European governments, and countries like France that can well envisage a much smaller European Union. Germany, the EU’s largest country at the center of the continent, is desperate to hold both sides together, a desire made even more urgent by Brexit. This means an absolute “No” to any major reforms that would require EU treaty changes and ratification in all member states.

“It’s Impossible”

“In today’s societal and political situation, it is impossible to get treaty changes ratified in all 27 member states. That is why all the possibilities offered by the current treaty, including flexible solutions such as PESCO and all majority voting rights, should be used,” a leading CDU politician, the MEP Elmar Brok, told the Berlin Policy Journal. “The alternative is to carry on with a smaller union. Macron can envisage that. But for us Germans, that’s impossible. We cannot turn Poland into a second-class country. That’s fundamentally against our political, economic, and historic interests.”

Merkel and AKK most likely think the same but they wouldn’t want to say it that bluntly.  Berlin does not want to bow to governments in Poland or Hungary that are undermining European values. That would not be acceptable to France. Nor would it play well with a German public that is angry over eastern European countries which receive substantial subsidies from Brussels while rejecting common EU policies on asylum and migration.

Times may change, they hope in Berlin, and future governments in eastern Europe could be easier to work with. In the meantime, silence appears the best strategy.

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© REUTERS/Benoit Tessier

On the streets of Paris and cities across France over the holidays, it seemed that the country’s yellow vest movement had lost steam—until another eruption of violent protests on January 5. It is already clear, however, that the protests have left lasting scars on President Emmanuel Macron’s image, at home and abroad. That looks set to have a significant impact the 2019 European elections.

What started as a protest against a planned increase in fuel and diesel taxes—Macron has since cancelled those plans—turned into a revolt against the political elite, the distribution of wealth, and government policy. It was sparked in large part by people in rural areas who need their car to go to work. For them, the additional fuel tax would have made it even harder to make ends meet. They are among a growing group of French people who feel politicians in the capital have forgotten their needs.

Their anger has put Macron in a difficult position, grasping for answers to the most severe crisis he has had to face in office. Stéphane Wahnich, head of the Paris-based survey institute SCP communication, thinks Macron’s ways and style of communication will now have to change, and quickly.

“The French like their president to be a monarch—on condition that he doesn’t look down on them,” he said. “Macron will have to become a more classical president like the center-right Jacques Chirac, smoother and less populist. The times of his controversial comments are finished.”

Wahnich calls this a second term within the presidential term and predicts a reversal of Macron’s policies. “He will be obliged to implement more socially acceptable policies that are in favor of the poor,” he estimated.

A New Playbook

That will be necessary if Macron wants to right the ship. Since the beginning of the crisis in November 2018, the president’s popularity—already low—has plummeted. Only between 20 and 30 percent of the French have a positive opinion of him, according to a survey done by polling institute Ipsos on behalf of the magazine Le Point in late December; that’s compared to around 60 percent at the beginning of his term.

Meanwhile, Macron made significant concessions to the yellow vest protestors in a televised address, cancelling the planned taxes and announcing measures to boost workers’ income. However, right after his speech, more than 50 percent of those polled said they supported the demonstrators. More recent polls are showing that at least 60 percent of the French are still supporting the protesters.

“He waited until two seconds before the crash to take action. The fact that all this violence had to happen for him to respond is very damaging for his image,” said Bruno Cautrès from the Center for Political Research at Sciences Po University in Paris. He believes Macron won’t be able to regain his lost popularity.

The president has indeed come across as patronizing to many. He once told an unemployed person that it was easy to find a job—he just had to cross the street. And he called the French “Gauls who are resistant to change” and “lazy.”

Macron’s recent efforts to change his image and his policies probably won’t be enough to help him score high in European elections scheduled for May. A poll by IFOP on behalf of the newspaper L’Opinion shows that Macron’s party La République En Marche has lost ground since the protests began. Meanwhile, Marine Le Pen and her far-right Rassemblement National—formerly known as Front National—and the far-left Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (NDA) have climbed in the polls.

“Macron has lost large parts of his aura,” said Philippe Marlière , a professor for French and European Politics at University College London. “He used to be seen as a modern, dynamic president who could reform France while having a balanced approach of left- and right-wing policies. But more and more, people realize that he’s less balanced than they thought and they doubt his ability to bring about change—in France and within the European Union.”

Running Out of Steam?

Macron’s EU reform plans could now indeed become even more difficult to push through. He has been pledging to establish a post for an EU finance minister, a sizable eurozone budget, and a separate eurozone Parliament to oversee economic policy.

But Germany’s Angela Merkel has so far agreed only to a rather small eurozone budget as part of the overall EU budget. And, with Macron’s struggles at home, she may have even more reason to be reluctant. Macron’s main argument had always been that he deserved support for EU reform in exchange for his success in reforming France. That success is now no longer assured. What’s more, Macron’s concessions to the yellow vest protestors are likely to push the French deficit above 3 percent of GDP, the Maastricht fiscal criterion. That sends the wrong signal to European partners, especially Germany.

Looking even further ahead to the next presidential elections in 2022, a rethink seems to be taking place among rival mainstream parties. “Up until now, the center-right Republicans had been on Macron’s side, but over the past few weeks, they have been harshly criticizing him. It looks like they have decided to go it alone and are already gearing up for their own election campaign,“ said political analyst Cautrès. Similar things are happening on the left, although the Socialist Party still needs more clarity on its exact strategy, he added.

Indeed, many analysts in France and Europe seem to largely agree that Macron’s leadership has taken a lasting hit. The president himself, though, seems to believe a relaunch of his presidency is still possible. During his recent announcements, he called the protesters’ anger a “chance” and the current times an “historic moment for the country.” The government has started national debates with protesters, trade unionists, and local politicians in the hope that doing so will help Macron regain his sheen and push through his plans for next year. Indeed, the president confirmed his determination to implement them in his New Year’s speech.

Yet these include reforms to housing benefits, the pension system, and unemployment insurance—benefits that many of the protestors have enjoyed until now. For example, people whose income has increased over the past year could lose state support for their rent. Macron intends to simplify the country’s pension system, aligning private and public pensions but still keeping the retirement age at 62; he also plans to reduce unemployment benefit payments and pension rights for the unemployed.

Those left out of pocket may not support the larger vision behind the reforms, and some are likely to head back to the barricades. The gilets jaunes movement is winding down, but the simmering anger at Macron could erupt again at any time, blocking any efforts to see through his agenda.

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© REUTERS/Vincent Kessler

“Europe needs to grasp its destiny more firmly in its own hands, because the times where we could rely unreservedly on others are over.”

There was little doubt in the European Parliament chamber on Tuesday about who Angela Merkel was talking about as she delivered her opening speech in a debate on the future of Europe. Even as she spoke, US President Donald Trump was delivering a diatribe against France on Twitter, sparked by recent comments by Emmanuel Macron.

Last week The Wall Street Journal quoted the French president as saying the EU needs its own army to protect it from potential threats from “Russia, China and even the United States of America.” The Elysee later clarified that this specific quote was referring to cyber threats, but the sentiment remained largely the same. This infuriated Trump, who has spent the week attacking Macron, France, and the European Union.

“Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the US, China, and Russia,” he tweeted Tuesday afternoon. “But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two – How did that work out for France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the US. came along. Pay for NATO or not!”

Given that Merkel’s speech to the parliament came just two hours after these comments, some expected her to back off on some of her prepared remarks. But instead she explicitly supported Macron’s call for a European army, showing mettle and European solidarity in the face of Trump’s threats.

“A common European army would show the world that there would never again be war in Europe,” she said. Her remarks drew loud applause from the chamber but also some boos from euroskeptics, particularly from British members. “I am really pleased about this,” she replied. “I come from a parliament too, I won’t be put off.”

Skeptical France

France has long been skeptical of the US-dominated NATO and has for years pushed for Europe to establish a military capability free from the United States. Germany has until now not embraced this idea, fearful that it would weaken NATO.

Merkel was at pains in her speech to stress that “this is not an army against NATO, it can be a good complement to NATO.” But she said that the time has come for a European army.

While France has not allowed US troops to be stationed in its territory, there are still 40,000 American soldiers stationed in Germany today, compared to 170,000 total active German military personnel. There are 10,000 US soldiers stationed in the United Kingdom.

Some proponents of a European army say such deployments are not only humiliating but also present a security threat in the age of Trump. A European army, they say, would lead to a European capability for self-defense that would allow countries to ask the American troops to leave.

Macron said in an interview with CNN on Sunday that he agrees with Trump that Europe needs to spend more on its militaries, but it should spend that money on its own military and its own hardware rather than funding NATO and buying equipment from America.

European Finish

Merkel’s speech was part of a series of debates over the past several months held with the 28 leaders of EU member states on the future of Europe. She used the occasion to signal her priorities for her legacy. Having announced last month that she will step down from her party’s leadership and not seek another term, she is now focusing on securing her legacy in history as her leadership comes to a close.

From her speech, it would appear she wants that legacy to be a European one. She is prepared to hug Macron close in the face of threats from Trump, as she illustrated in the ceremony marking the 100-year anniversary of Armistice Day earlier this week.

She used her speech to decry the rising tide of “nationalism and egoism.” Though not named, her targets were clear – Trump and the leaders of Hungary, Poland, and Italy.

“Tolerance is the soul of Europe and an essential basic value of the European idea”, she said in Strasbourg. The challenges Europe faces can only be tackled successfully if Europe acts united and if we “treat the interests and needs of others as our own.”

“Solidarity is based on tolerance and this is Europe’s strength. It is part of our common European DNA and it means overcoming national egoisms”. She had particularly targeted criticism for Italy’s populist government, which is preparing to implement a budget that does not live up to EU commitments to balance the books. “If you try to solve problems by making new debts, you disregard commitments made and question the foundations for strength and stability of the eurozone,” she said.

She finished with a plea for support for the European project, and a signal that she will defend the EU as her country enters into uncertain political territory with her departure.

“Europe is our best chance for peace, prosperity, and a good future. We must not let this chance slide; we owe this to ourselves and to past and future generations. Nationalism and egoism must never have a chance to flourish again in Europe. Tolerance and solidarity are our future. And this future is worth fighting for”, she concluded.

Though Macron has been frustrated with German reticence to embrace his ambitious European reform plans since he was elected last year, the chancellor’s speech this week may signal that she is ready to join hands in the waning months of her leadership.

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© REUTERS/Eric Vidal

The day after announcing her phased departure from politics, Angela Merkel sought to reassure her international counterparts. “I believe that the negotiating position won’t change,” she said at a joint press conference with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah as-Sisi on October 30 in Berlin. “One could even say that I will have more time to concentrate on my tasks as head of government.”

It was a disingenuous remark—surely, governing is less about making time available and more about having the political leverage to make an agreement stick. At the same time, Merkel is right: neither her departure as head of her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), in December, nor her eventual retreat from the chancellery will mean that Germany’s negotiating position will change.

With several rivals vying for her succession, in the short term Merkel is bound to stick more firmly than ever to Germany’s established stances. This will be true for several reasons: she won’t want to open herself to criticism from any of her would-be successors, nor does she want to openly take sides. Most importantly, however, Merkel has given up the power to make her coalitions partners and her party accept painful compromises.

In terms of European policy, this means that any hope that French President Emmanuel Macron may still have harbored of moving toward a more integrated EU is dead for now. Then again, his prospects hadn’t been bright anyway: even before announcing her gradual retreat from politics, Merkel had been lukewarm about supporting Macron’s proposals.

As it looks now, the EU is unlikely to take substantive policy decisions before 2020. The upcoming European elections in May 2019, followed by the selection of a new European Commission, mean that the window for reform is closing soon. By 2020, there will probably be a new chancellor, too. Merkel’s regular term in office only ends in 2021, but there is a strong likelihood that her coalition won’t last that long.

Solving a Problem Like Italy

Pro-Europeans will deplore this long stretch of stagnation, but it is truly dangerous only if the spending plans of Italy’s populist government trigger a new euro crisis. An Italian debt crisis could spell the end of the common currency.

It is difficult to see a weakened Merkel agree to any rescue plan which, given the size of Italy’s economy and debt, would need to be massive. The Italian government is not only profligate, but also openly xenophobic and euroskeptic, which doesn’t win it many sympathies in Germany. Also, while the Italian state is heavily indebted, its people on average are actually wealthier than the Germans.

Merkel—as well as her potential successors—would certainly hope that Italy and the EU can solve the budget dispute without upsetting financial markets. Such a respite would give Europe and Germany the time to have a new Commission and a new chancellor in place, most probably after new elections.

What happens next depends to a large extent, of course, on who actually wins the race to replace Merkel, both at the head of the conservative bloc and in the chancellery. Today’s contenders span the spectrum from very pro-European (Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the CDU’s secretary general and presumably Merkel’s preferred choice) to somewhat critical (Jens Spahn, Merkel’s youngish and very conservative health minister, as well as Friedrich Merz, one-time leader of the conservative Bundestag caucus and a long-time enemy of Merkel’s).

Yet their initial outlook matters perhaps less than would appear at first glance. Any future chancellor will find his or her path severely constrained. Given Germany’s economy, its history, and its geopolitical position at the center of Europe, a leader of this country will be driven toward European integration and the defense of the liberal world order.

Wanting the EU to Work Well

Of all European countries, Germany has perhaps the strongest reasons to want the EU to work well, and of all European leaders, the German chancellor is most dependent on the EU for his or her success. And while it is possible, of course, to have a leader who does not conform to the interests of his or her country, it is not the most likely outcome.

Gerhard Schröder, for instance, was no European idealist when he became chancellor in 1998, yet he eventually forged a close partnership with France. Schröder was also key to brokering the financial and institutional solutions that made EU enlargement possible.

Angela Merkel, in turn, started out with a closer rapport with the United States than the EU. But she also found herself working ever more closely with various French presidents as well as moderating agreements at the EU level. While she never turned into a Europhile, she did become the safe pair of hands that Europe now is afraid of losing.

The three most critical events of Merkel’s time as chancellor illustrate how much a German leader needs to work through the EU.

Merkel was reasonably successful in managing the euro crisis because she largely relied on Brussels. It’s a very different story for the Energiewende, the shift toward renewables, which has proved ineffective as well as expensive for Germany’s consumers. After the Fukushima meltdown, Merkel unilaterally took the decision in 2011 to end nuclear power production in Germany, without waiting for either an EU energy policy or the construction of an EU-wide grid.

Finally, there is the refugee issue, which has deeply divided German society and profoundly damaged Merkel’s standing at home and abroad. With a more European approach, much of this could have been avoided. To be fair, any EU agreement on refugees would never have been easy. But in 2015, Merkel didn’t even try very hard before deciding to keep Germany’s borders open.

As her long term in public office draws to a close, Merkel unlikely to do great European deals in order to shape her legacy—apart from the political pressures, that would just be out of character. But neither is there reason to believe that her successor will be more skeptical about future integration than she has been, at least not after an initial learning phase.

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