© REUTERS/Yves Herman

European Council summits in Brussels can often be filled with rancor, never more so than when they involve money. This week’s EU summit in Brussels was a case in point.

EU national leaders held only a brief discussion about the multiannual financial framework (MFF), the EU’s seven-year budget due to start in 2021. Predictably, a new proposal to drastically cut the Commission’s proposed budget from Finland, which currently holds the rotating EU presidency, was welcomed by Northern countries and condemned by the South and East. But it was the proxy battles fought over climate and defense funding that were most interesting to watch.

Heading for Net-Zero

Western European members have spent six months trying to convince the Eastern members to support a target of completely decarbonizing the European Union by 2050. It finally looked like everyone would get on board at the summit after new EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen offered a €100 billion “just transition” fund to ease the way for countries reliant on coal.

Indeed, at the last moment, after intense negotiations, Hungary dropped its opposition last night. Czechia fell in line too after other member-states agreed that the summit text could make reference to nuclear power. That left only Poland. It was thought that Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki would take negotiations late into the night, in order to get as much money as possible, and relent in the end. That’s because this was the last possible moment he could effectively wield his veto.

Von der Leyen has said she will propose binding legislation in March to set the 2050 target, whether or not there was unanimous political approval from all 28 (soon 27) EU member states. While the Commission prefers to get unanimous consent from the Council before proposing big items of legislation, it is not legally necessary. Once the legislative proposal is made, it only needs a qualified majority of member states to vote for it in order to become law. Poland can no longer veto.

“In Our Own Pace”

As he left the summit, Morawiecki said he had secured an “exemption” to the target. “The conclusions give us enormous flexibility,” he said, saying that Poland will not have to abide by the target but will still get “a very significant part” of the just transition fund. “We’ll reach it in our own pace,” he said. “We will be able to conduct the transformation in a way that’s safe and economically beneficial for Poland.”

However Poland will not be exempt from the 2050 legislation once it’s adopted. It will apply to all member states equally. This veto was largely symbolic, and all it has accomplished is angering the other EU member states and the commission, who are now not at all minded to be generous with Poland when it comes to the just transition fund.

Morawiecki’s grandstanding was certainly meant for domestic political consumption in Poland, where his Law and Justice party (PiS) likes to be seen as standing up against the EU and its supposedly burdensome climate legislation that would hold back Polish economic growth. But in fact he has probably just vetoed his way out of just transition funding.

French President Emmanuel Macron made the funding threat explicit in his closing press conference. He described Poland’s lack of participation as “temporary.” “If Poland was not to confirm its participation, it would step outside the European mechanisms also in terms of solidarity financial mechanisms,” he said, implicitly threatening to withhold not just the just transition funds, but also standard solidarity funds.

Defense Fight

Leaders were also meeting in the shadow of a contentious NATO summit last week in London, where US President Donald Trump lashed out at French President Emmanuel Macron for calling NATO “brain-dead.” Macron was also privately reprimanded by German Chancellor Angela Merkel for his comments.

Of course, Macron was merely using different words to make the same observation that Trump has made many times in the past—that NATO is “obsolete.” The dispute led to much discussion about the purpose and future role of NATO, and attention inevitably turned to the EU’s plans for a “defense union”—something that many fear is an attempt to replace NATO.

What that “defense union” is depends on who you ask. The French, who have always been NATO-skeptic, say it is needed because Europe needs the capacity to defend itself without American support. The Germans say it is merely a cost-saving exercise meant to stop duplication of efforts between EU countries and improve the efficiency of military procurement. And the British, Polish, and Americans believe it is a French plot to destroy NATO and build an “EU army.”

It has fallen to von Der Leyen to explain what exactly it is. Under her leadership, the commission is creating its very first Directorate-General (DG) for Defense, Industry, and Space, to be presided over by Margaritas Schinas, the vice president for promoting (originally “protecting”) the European way of life.

The Language of Power

“Europe must also learn the language of power,” von der Leyen said during a speech on European policy in Berlin last month. “On the one hand, this means building our own muscles where we’ve long been relying on others—for example in security policies.”

The Defense Union plan calls for a new EU military doctrine, a new EU fund for defense, a EU permanent military cooperation, a single EU headquarters for military operations, and a commission defense department.

The European Commission already deals with some defense and security matters, but they have never before been organized into one department. The new DG is expected to be complete next year. Its stated main purpose is to efficiently manage the €13 billion European Defense Fund. But many believe its powers will be steadily expanded over time.

Not everyone is so enthusiastic about this surge of military spending. In their budget proposal, the Finns have drastically cut the commission’s envisioned defense spending. Von der Leyen says this is unacceptable. “If one is serious about this then one has to invest,” she said last week.

It appears that the battles in both the climate and defense fights are going to move to the ongoing negotiations over the EU’s long-term budget. As is often the case in politics, money makes the world go round.

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Europe’s Lack of Military Transport Aircraft; sources: IISS, EDA

The German Defense Minister’s proposal for a protection zone in Northeast Syria, voiced just after Turkey and Russia reached an agreement in Sochi that allowed Turkey to invade the north of the country, met with a lot of criticism within Germany and abroad. Indeed, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer left out the details. How did she imagine such a mission playing out?

On top of that, it was too late for the mission: now that Turkey and Russia already have forces on the ground in northeast Syria, the situation has become quite difficult. On the one hand, the Europeans cannot push them out because doing so would require threatening the use of force against Moscow or Ankara. Europe is unlikely to do that. Yet running the mission jointly with Russia or Turkey would only provide a fig leaf of de facto recognition for Turkey’s plan for ethnic cleansing in northern Syria and Russia’s support for Assad’s reign of terror. This needs to be avoided both for moral and political reasons. If the proposal had been in 2018, after Trump expressed his desire to leave Syria and abandon the theater, the proposal would have been more interesting—and perhaps more feasible.

But how practicable is such a proposal really? It is worth digging a bit deeper into what such a mission would have meant for Europe, whether in 2018 or 2019. Could the Union’s member states have replaced the US in Syria as guardian of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)? What would it have meant for European capabilities? The Syrian civil war has raged since 2011. While the refugee crisis in 2015 shook the political landscape in Europe, the war continued another 5 years without the Europeans coming to terms with what to do and how to do it. Although the war now might end with the victory of the Assad regime (and more refugees fleeing repression), Syria is not be the only unstable country in the Middle East and North Africa. Iraqis are protesting en masse. Algeria has to manage a transition of power. Egypt is only stable due to severe repression. Before 2015, the rationale of the German elite was that the traumatic experiences of World War II, in other words the prevailing pacifist and anti-interventionist political environment, would make it easier for Germany to accept one million refugees than to send 1,000 soldiers abroad into a risky combat operation. After the sharp rise of the AfD and the political turmoil the crisis caused in other European states, this rationale may no longer be valid. Thus the “what if” game is a useful exercise to remind us what could be done and what could not.

Shape and Ambition

Before one can determine whether the Europeans could have pulled out such a mission, one needs to think about what would the force have to look like and what the determining parameters would have been. The protection force would have to have multiple aims: to ensure the survival of the SDF and a non-Assad governed Northeast Syria, to deter both Turkey and Russia from an armed incursion, and to provide security assistance to fight Islamic State fighters and other insurgent groups.

The American military footprint in Northeastern Syria was relatively small—1,000 to 2,000 special forces that trained and advised local SDF fighters. However, in order to take over this mission, the Europeans would have had to deploy substantially more forces on the ground to perform the same function. Why? First, because American firepower is outsourced to the US Air Force—which has bases in Kuwait, Turkey (although no strikes are launched from there), United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—and the US Navy, which has a carrier presence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. It can call in heavy strategic bombers from overseas bases—an asset Europeans don’t have. And more importantly, it conducts continual (electronic) reconnaissance flights from these bases, using both unmanned and manned aircraft to gain as much situation awareness as possible. Europeans do not have these assets, or only in very limited numbers. They would then have to rely on physical presence on the ground to be aware of new developments and threats, and they need conventional ground-based fire support to make a punch (tanks, artillery). Increased physical presence also means more logistics on the ground, and in a counter-insurgency theater, such logistical movements need to be protected against mines and ambushes, again expanding the number of ground forces needed to do the same job.

What’s more, the United States is an offshore balancer that can draw in sizable forces from beyond the horizon if necessary. Russia would ultimately risk nuclear escalation if it engaged US forces in serious manner. Hence even a very limited number of US troops would be able to deter any Russian-Turkish military incursion into Syria. By their mere presence, they create “no-go” zones for Moscow and Ankara. With European powers, things are not that clear. They might considerably hurt Turkey in the case of confrontation, but not at least because of the refugee issue, Erdogan believes he has as much leverage over the Europeans as they have over him. Russia could out-escalate any conflict with minor nuclear powers in Europe, although it is still be doubtful whether Moscow would really want to risk such an escalation over Syria (probably not). Still, the Europeans would have to field heavy forces, including a sizable number of armored maneuver forces into the theater to successfully deter an armed incursion by one of the neighboring states. This force could not just be the usual peacekeeping force. It would have to be able to stand its ground in major fights, such as those between US Special Forces and Russian-mercenary led Syrian forces in May 2018.

What Would the Mandate Be?

The mandate would have been another issue. Since Russia and China have continuously blocked any UN presence in Syria (including fact-finding missions on chemical weapons), such a mission would have to be carried out without a UN mandate. One way to legitimize a military presence in Syria without an UN mandate would be to recognize the SDF leadership as legitimate government and seek its consent. However, that would probably spark a Turkish full-scale invasion to start with, as preventing exactly this is Erdogan overall war aim. The third option would be to cite Europe’s responsibility to protect, as the extension of the rule of both Assad’s regime or Erdogan’s Turkey over the region would have dramatic consequences for the civilian population. While it is possible to make this, one should not believe that all European member states would follow this line and contribute troops. Even in Germany, where the idea originated, the political establishment would have to fight an uphill battle. And most smaller states would probably decline to send troops under any circumstances (their contributions usually are only symbolic, so in the end it would hardly matter).

Logically, the European force could not deploy and supply itself via the shortest and most convenient route, through Turkey. Doing so would create a logistical Achilles heel and make Europe politically dependent on Ankara—think of how the West has had to go through Pakistan to supply forces in Afghanistan. If Israel and Jordan granted the Europeans the right to fly over their territory (which is likely as neither Tel Aviv nor Amman has much interest in strengthening Assad in Syria) and conduct air operations from Jordan, there would be an air-bridge close to the theater of operation. But the bulk of the mission would need to be deployed and supplied via Iraq. The theater of operations in North-Eastern Syria does not have a large operational airport (Dei es Zur is on the other river-bank). Therefore, due to the lack of transport aircraft, the heavy equipment would have to be shipped to Kuwait via the Suez Channel and then transported via the land route. And those transport ships would have to be leased from the private sector or the US Sealift Command because Europeans do not have capacities on their own.

The Numbers Don’t Add Up

Do the Europeans have enough forces to mount the mission? Well in theory yes, but it would still be tricky. According to the European Defense Agency, EU member states have 405,000 deployable land force soldiers. On paper only of course! Unfortunately, the most recent data set compiled by the EDA does not list the troops per country. The 2013/2014 booklet was the last to cite numbers for each country and hence provides an opportunity to check the numbers.

Overall, 276,395 land forces soldiers were deemed deployable in 2014, but due to reorganization in their armed forces, Italy and Germany at the time did not provide numbers. Both are professional armies, and assuming they would declare the bulk of their land forces deployable, the figure could well end up at 400,000. But that also illustrates how useless this number is, as no country would be willing or able to commit its entire army to one mission. Still, one should also look at the Eastern-Flank armies like Poland, Romania, or Sweden: their number of deployable troops plummeted in 2014, because most—even high readiness troops—got re-assigned to tasks of national deterrence and defense. This is a limited factor that needs to be taken into account: these states will keep the bulk of their forces, and particularly heavy, mechanized forces in their own country and not send them abroad – they simply fear a Russian incursion into their own country more than a Russian incursion into Eastern Syria.

Another, more useful number is that of sustainably deployable land forces. As there needs to be an alternation between training/formation, recreation, and deployment, only a limited number of soldiers can be deployed at the same time. This number should indicate how many forces a country could deploy over longer periods of time in a theater. In 2016, the 94,000 soldiers were earmarked as sustainably deployable. In fact, for many countries (like France, Germany, or the United Kingdom) this number represents the maximum number of personnel they could possibly deploy. During the heyday of Western interventionism in 2008, when most European soldiers were deployed, the EU member states mustered roughly 80,000 deployed soldiers, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2011, 71,000 soldiers from EU member states were still deployed abroad. But since then, defense budgets have plummeted due to financial difficulties, and in 2014 additional tasks of deterrence, reassurance and national defense against Russia were added. So while the number cited above looks fine on paper, the actual number of deployable troops will be considerably lower.

Again, a look into the 2014 data set provides an overview over the national distributions. Assuming roughly 20 percent of German and Italian forces are sustainably deployable, adding them would give us approximately the numbers of 2016. Hence one may assume that between 2014 and 2016 (and most likely now), there was very little change as armed forces are quite large bureaucratic apparatuses.

This has to be measured against existing commitments. In 2016, EU member-states had 35,000 soldiers deployed in missions. Existing missions could hardly be abandoned, so any new mission would have to come on top.  Again, comparing this to 2014 figures (if the German deployments were added, it would add up to roughly the same number), one can see the heavy commitment of France in particular to missions in Africa. The drawdown of troops in Afghanistan has, though, likely made more UK troops available.

Another problem would be the composition of these forces. Most deployable forces of smaller nations are light infantry units best suited for peacekeeping. They would be rather ornamental contributions in this scenario, without much practical value. Special forces would still be useful to fight ISIS, paratroopers, marines, and other elite-infantry units good at training and advising local SDF fighters. But then there is the issue of who would commit heavy armored forces to deter Russian and Turkish incursions. This would not only be the most expensive deployments; these forces would also face the greatest danger.

Here, only France, Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain have heavy mechanized forces that are not immediately committed to national defense tasks. But given the dire state of real readiness (in contrast to strength on paper) of the Bundeswehr and the Spanish and Italian armed forces, as well as the already high commitment of French forces, it would to a large extent come down to London’s willingness to commit forces.

When it comes to the air war, the situation is similar. On paper, the EU has enough fighters. But in practice, the air forces of smaller nations are only capable of domestic air-policing. They are not meant to be deployed. Those air-forces who do have the capabilities to fight and be an effective air-support force in Syria already have existing commitments in many overseas territories. And aircraft and their crews need to rotate too.

Lacking Air Power

Nevertheless, judging purely theoretically, on the basis of readiness, roughly 180 tactical fighters (Eurofighters, F-16, Mirage 2000, Rafale, Tornados, F35) could probably be scrambled across the entire continent for an air campaign. Here the availability of airbases would be the most restraining factor. Only France has an aircraft carrier with full strike capability; all other planes would need to be based in Cyprus (extensively air-refueled), Jordan, Iraq, and with air-refueling, in the Gulf. So in fact there would be fewer fighters used, but Europe could provide them.

But the status of other key enabling factors is weaker. Only the UK has (a handful of) C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, which can carry a battle tank. With 50 percent readiness assumed for the A-400, 57 of them could transport other armored vehicles. The various C-130s have a lower payload and would only be suitable for light vehicles and follow-on supplies. Hence the bulk of the force would have to deploy by ship. This would take time and would give Russia and Turkey the opportunity to preempt such a mission.

Air refueling is an even bigger bottleneck. Assuming that heavy-loaded transports and fighters from distant bases need mid-air-refueling to transit to the theatre of operations, and assuming 60% readiness for its tankers, Europe could muster 15 A-330 MRTTs, and 2 KC-767s, and if France’s deterrence forces can spare it, then a single KC-135. Most of these aircraft would be British. Europe is even more reliant on London in terms of electronic reconnaissance aircraft and drones, where the UK either has unique capabilities or French counterparts are already committed. Still, even if London did weight in, it could only muster a tiny fraction of what the United States currently fields in the Middle East.

Now while this is just an approximation based on available data (EDA defense data and the IISS Military Balance 2019), the exercise is worth doing just to remind Europeans how precarious the situation regarding power projection and deployment is. Europe’s shortfalls on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, air-transport, mid-air refueling, drones, etc. have been known for decades. But grand speeches about European strategic autonomy, a European Defense Identity, and a Defense Cooperation do not provide these assets—only hard money in procurement budgets does. Given the continuous unrest in the Middle East, the unreliability of the commander in chief in the White House, and the specter of Brexit, one should look twice at this theoretical game-play and ask oneself whether Europe can still afford to just muddle through in defense matters.

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© REUTERS/ Olivier Matthys/Pool

Policy-making is often like the dreaded writing of to-do lists: one tedious problem after another needs to be sorted, tackled, and—rarely—crossed off. This is particularly true when it comes to foreign policy: crisis management is its heart and soul. Most of the time, foreign policy has to deal with urgent developments ranging from armed conflicts to diplomatic incidents, and forward planning rarely goes beyond the horizon of one year. It is very much a “firefighting and avoiding the worst” portfolio.

The foreign policy to-do list of Ursula von der Leyen’s “geopolitical” commission is no different: relations with Russia and the United States need to be improved one way or other, but as fast as possible; those with China need to be redefined; an entire continent (Africa) has to be lifted out of poverty to prevent mass migration, and wars in the Middle East and North Africa need to be ended before new ones break out, in that region or elsewhere.

In short, one rarely gets the chance to write a foreign policy bucket list filled with positive things to be achieved as one races from problem to problem. But let’s try it here.

Take the Middle East and North Africa, a region that carries “bad news” as its byword. The nine ongoing, frozen, ending, or emerging conflicts in the region are all playing out against a dirty background of raging youth unemployment, militarization, and human rights violations. Discouragingly, efforts to improve the situation have not led to the desired results of forging a more prosperous and peaceful region.

A Solar Powerhouse at Europe’s Doorstep

But this does not mean that the new European Commission should simply continue as the old one has done, or worse, give up on the region altogether. In fact, beyond the rubble and the drama lies an opportunity that should be on the foreign policy bucket list: turning the region into a solar energy powerhouse.

Granted, this will involve an effort that goes beyond the commission’s five-year term, but the transition needs to start now. By 2035 at the latest, the region could be waving goodbye to rentierism and celebrate having become climate-neutral; it then could help Europe do the same, cooperate in a trans-continental electricity grid, create jobs, and meet exploding energy needs.

Turning to green energy on a massive scale would also help mitigate instability in states that are not ready for the end of oil, such as Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria. This in turn would save the EU from more trouble down the line. It would require climate financing for those states that have already requested it (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia), but also some climate diplomacy—reaching out to those states that do not require financing but a political nudge in the right direction, such as Saudi Arabia or Iraq. If all goes well, lessons learned here can very well be applied to sub-Saharan Africa, too.

Another cluster of issues on the EU’s foreign policy to-do list involve the United States and China. Beyond the troubled bilateral status of affairs lurks a populist new world order in which, or so it seems, Europe and the multilateral, liberal old world have evaporated.

Take the Lead on Climate Change

Here, too, the EU’s usual foreign policy tools have failed to deliver: diplomacy and sticking to European values have not stopped Donald Trump’s US from breaking diplomatic norms, or China from becoming the first digital dictatorship. With a bit of luck, some say, a new American president will take us straight back to 2009, but this is wishful thinking: Obama did not care that much more about us Europeans than his successor; he just spoke more elegantly.

Instead, Europe has to come up with a plan for what it wants to be in 2030, and the basis for it needs to be created now. And if the future is to be European, we need to take the lead on climate change and related technology.

In the future, carbon neutrality and related technologies will not be merely environmental assets— they will be strategic assets, too. The vacuum the US has left by disengaging from the fight against climate change is one that Europe can easily fill—and be greatly rewarded for doing so. States that lead in this field will have more allies and friends, sell their technology, and be aspirational leaders. The Chinese leadership has understood this, which is why China is leading in this field, not us. Being a climate leader will also mean relying on renewable energy (also coming from the Middle East and North Africa) and therefore being less energy dependent (hint: from Russia).

Develop a Strategic Capacity to Act

Speaking of Russia: no matter what one thinks of Moscow, it knows how to talk “military”—a language the EU is still learning to speak as a collective. But while some of us still think that this is a language made up of neat and snappy acronyms and abbreviations, its most important component is the will to act. As the annexation of Crimea and the Syrian war have shown, Russia will not be deterred by diplomatic or economic language only. Indeed, in the past five years Russia only changed track when it had to fear a military confrontation, with Turkey and with the United States.

Make no mistake, though: the case made here is for a robust posture, not for military action. But this is precisely where Europe struggles the most: with addressing violence and conflict generally, and specifically dealing with military matters. Most EU missions abroad are civilian in nature.

What is needed on the bucket list in this connection is therefore not to create a Europe-only NATO, or to push more energetically for PESCO, CARD, or EDF. Rather, the EU needs to develop the strategic capacity to act. The current debate about Europe achieving strategic sovereignty is far too focused on assets. It misses the point of what sovereignty is: a mind-set, a self-awareness, an attitude that uses these assets.

Therefore, achieving European strategic sovereignty is not about purchases or procedures; it is a process whereby European states understand what they want to achieve in the world, and by what means. For the EU, this means less bureaucracy and more inner-European diplomacy. The exchange on foreign policy needs to be revitalized, common ground needs to be found, the different bodies need to be integrated, and honest conversations need to be had.

Speak an Authentic Language

Last but not least, a revolution in foreign policy communication, perhaps not in itself a foreign policy objective, is key to all of the above. European—and international—audiences today understand our bureaucratic and anodyne language even less than before; emotion, authenticity, and humanity will have to become part and parcel of how we Europeans speak about what we do in the world, or we will continue to lose credibility very quickly.

With these key points, the EU’s foreign policy bucket list is short yet aspirational. It will never replace short-term to-do lists, but it would help us maintain a positive momentum as we manage one crisis after the next—and lead to concrete achievements by 2024.

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© REUTERS/Kacper Pempel

The political relationship between the United States and the European Union is fractious. From trade to foreign policy, both sides are taking increasingly divergent, and sometimes contradictory, perspectives.

So much so that the US ambassador to the European Union, Gordon Sondland, called for a reset in the relationship, believing that the new cohort of senior EU Commission and Council leaders, due to take office in December, will “make impasses go away.” Developing closer working relationships with these new leaders can help to an extent, but the US should also look within the Trump administration to reset its own policies. Only then can the US foster a more productive defense relationship with the EU.

State of Play

The defense relationship between the US and the EU already exists, including at the operational level. In 2011, both signed a framework agreement that enables Washington to contribute civilian personnel to “crisis management operations.” More recently, US military forces have worked alongside their EU counterparts, primarily through United States Africa Command and the EU Military Staff, in places like Mali and Somalia. Both the US and the EU have also strengthened joint situational awareness and coordinated activities in the Sahel more broadly.

Despite this practical cooperation at the operational level, there is greater friction at the strategic level. The US has long been skeptical of efforts by some EU member states, like France, to allocate a greater role in defense to the EU. Washington, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has feared that an EU with defense responsibilities could harm the cornerstone of European and transatlantic security: NATO.

The “Three D’s” of “no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication,” as outlined by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright back in 1998, encapsulates this sentiment. Yet this skepticism does not mean US policymakers do not want Europe, as a whole, to shoulder greater responsibility, whether by increasing defense spending to invest in certain capabilities or deploying troops and equipment. Instead, US policymakers want European countries, the EU member states and NATO allies among them, to become more capable partners.

EU member states, many of which are also NATO allies, view Washington’s behavior as schizophrenic. On the one hand, they argue, the US asks its European counterparts to shoulder more of a burden. On the other, when Europeans do take concrete steps to invest further in defense, the US criticizes the approach. EU member states, according to an EU official, lament the “mixed messages from the American side,” viewing the 2016 EU Global Strategy as the response to the longstanding US request.

Although the Global Strategy’s “ambition of strategic autonomy” should be taken with a grain of salt—particularly because, in practice, it does not enjoy support from all member states—there is an important sentiment that EU member states should take on more responsibility. To the majority of member states, Brussels’ role in defense should complement that of NATO and, according to the same EU official, enable the EU to become a “reliable and effective partner.”

The Right Way Forward?

Against the backdrop of achieving strategic autonomy, EU member states are moving forward with their own initiatives, primarily the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The EDF provides a financial incentive for member states to develop capabilities jointly. It is particularly noteworthy that the European Commission is co-funding this effort—at €13 billion over the course of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The actual development of the joint capabilities will occur through PESCO, a political commitment among 25 member states to deepen defense cooperation. There are currently 34 projects that cut across all domains, from maritime to land. The EDF and PESCO, according to a French official, are a “direct response to [the] call by Americans on burden-sharing.”

Although there are more nuanced positions both among and within member states on these two initiatives, there is broad agreement that the EU should take greater responsibility in defense. This belief stems from an understanding that the European security environment is growing more challenging, but also from two dynamics internal to the European security architecture.

EU member states not only recognize that America is becoming a less reliable partner, due to President Donald Trump’s seeming ambivalence toward European security, but also that the United Kingdom is leaving the EU. Certainly London will remain actively involved in European defense policy, primarily through NATO and its bilateral defense relationships, but British officials, post-Brexit, will no longer be “in the room” to share expertise when member states debate whether and how to launch, for example, a Common Security and Defense Policy mission. It is therefore imperative that the EU develops a stronger defense capability for its member states to rely more closely on each other.

The US, however, has significant reservations regarding the EDF and PESCO. These concerns relate chiefly to the way in which a third country can participate in the new EU defense initiatives. As a non-member state, the US is interested in securing flexible terms that enable it, and primarily its defense industry, to participate. President Trump’s link between trade and security is driving ambition for US defense firms to compete for contracts and encourage Europeans to “buy American.” A joint letter from senior Defense and State Department officials is among the latest effort by the Trump administration to secure such access—this time including a veiled threat to consider “similar reciprocally imposed US restrictions.” Without access for its firms, Washington will remain opposed to the EU defense initiatives.

A Constructive Role

 The divergences between the US and the EU will not disappear overnight. Nonetheless, as the US administration embarks on its reset, it should take two steps to shift its position and strengthen the US-EU defense relationship.

First, it should both acknowledge that the EU has a role to play in this field and support certain EU defense initiatives. Although NATO is and should remain the central pillar of European security, member states are pursuing some promising initiatives within the EU context. Certain PESCO projects, like Military Mobility, whose goal is to ensure the smooth movement of defense equipment across Europe in the event of a conflict, has a positive impact for NATO. In fact, the EU—unlike NATO—can regulate and provide assistance with infrastructure funding to ensure platforms are not “stuck at customs.”

Likewise, the EDF can bolster member states’ defense capabilities. According to a French official, the EDF is the “key initiative within the EU,” providing an incentive to develop capabilities jointly. The Franco-German Main Ground Combat System and Future Combat Air System projects are two that could develop through the EDF with other countries, as demonstrated by Spain’s recent inclusion in the latter.

The European Pillar in NATO

Overall, “one possible scenario” for the EU, from the perspective of Julian Ostendorf, an adviser to German MP Roderich Kiesewetter, foreign affairs spokesman for his CDU/CSU caucus, is to serve “only as the sous chef of NATO.” Accordingly, Ostendorf argues, the challenge for France, Germany, and “other core EU member states” is to work toward a consensus regarding “what strategic autonomy really means in practical military terms,” without contradicting NATO’s defense planning. It is the role for the EU defense initiatives, to support and strengthen the European pillar within NATO, that the US should recognize and promote.

Second, as the US develops its own defense relationship with the EU, Washington should prioritize in which of the defense initiatives it is interested in participating. As it stands, according to Rachel Ellehuus of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, American officials tend to state their blanket interest in joining the EU defense initiatives, notably the EDF and PESCO, based less on a desire to be part of specific projects and more on the general principle that third countries should be included.

Instead, the US should prioritize and explain to the EU institutions and member states in which projects it could contribute most. Engaging more selectively and making a stronger case for certain projects might lead Brussels to consider how Washington can plug into initiatives and bring niche expertise. Without a more considered approach, EU member states could grow increasingly unwilling for the US to play any role related to the EU.

Toward a New Relationship

Despite its checkered past in developing a greater EU role in defense, member states are moving forward with new initiatives. By rejecting the manner in which Brussels develops into a defense actor, however, Washington risks losing its ability to shape that discussion—one that is crucial for the future of NATO. The US should encourage member states to sustain their momentum in order to become more capable partners. To do so, Washington should not only pursue a reset that engages the new European Commission and European Council leaders, but also alters its defense policy toward the EU. Only then can the US develop a stronger defense relationship with the EU and, ultimately, Europe as a whole.

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© REUTERS/Gleb Garanich

There’s a lot to be said for having a European policy on arms exports: a joint set of rules could prevent weapons manufactured in Europe from being used in a way that violates international humanitarian law, for example. Arms embargoes can constrain aggressive behavior by depriving a country of military resources, or at the very least send a strong signal condemning human rights abuse. Weapons exports can improve defense cooperation with allies by improving troop interoperability. And, in individual cases, they can improve the defense capabilities of strategic partners in order to help them tackle globally significant security challenges like piracy or terrorism.

All of these measures are more effective when Europeans work together. Weapons embargoes in particular are similar to economic sanctions in that the more countries that participate, the stronger the impact. Hence, an embargo on Saudi Arabia imposed unilaterally by Berlin may help to alleviate the German conscience, but does little to prevent British and French arms from being delivered to Saudi Arabia for use in the war in Yemen.

Despite this, the European Union has thus far failed to enforce a joint weapons export policy.  The goal of a Europe that is “weltpolitikfähig” (loosely translated: capable of geopolitics) and pursues a foreign policy stance based on shared values doesn’t seem to have provided sufficient motivation. Now, however, von der Leyen’s aim of creating a defense union leaves Europe no choice but to tackle the question of exports—the absence of a coherent arms export policy undermines not only the strategic interests and the credibility of a values-based EU, but also its defense capabilities.

European governments will only join forces in the development of military equipment if they are able to trust their partners to provide the necessary components to export customers and to other EU members. In order to achieve this, they need to agree on a transparent and predictable set of export rules.

New Initiatives

Exporting to third countries allows defense companies to enlarge their customer base and create economies of scale. At the same time, it pushes European firms to make more competitive products. By spending money on defense R&D, the EU could help companies be more selective about where to export to in the future and prioritize European technology requirements over those of external customers.

EU member states and institutions have developed a string of new initiatives for the improvement of defense coordination. Among them are the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the European Defense Fund, and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

Ideally, the future of EU defense industrial cooperation will look something like this: EU institutions and governments identify gaps in the bloc’s defense capabilities and draw up a list of the military equipment required; a group of capable countries decides to develop the equipment in question; in return they receive EU funding for the research into and development of necessary technology.

But the EU does not have a plan for how to proceed if member states cannot reach agreement on arms export rules. Without a reliable and consistent arms export policy at the European level, the union’s high-profile plans to improve European defense capabilities risk falling flat.

A European Regime

The European Council adopted a common position on arms export controls in 2008, which defines common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. If it were properly implemented, the Common Position would be one of the strongest arms export frameworks in the world. But although it is legally binding, the Common Position is poorly enforced. There is no formal mechanism to punish non-compliance. Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU affirms that defense decisions taken by member states for the protection of their security interests are outside the remit of EU law. As a result, member states often fall far short of their obligations under the Common Position and fail to apply its criteria to their export decisions. In addition, licenses are only granted under the EU Common Position on a case-by-case basis. Authorities probe whether a particular export violates any of the eight criteria outlined in the Common Position. This methodology often means that the authorities fail to take into account the wider geopolitical context and the cumulative effect weapons exports might have.

A Defense Union

The EU’s plans to build a Defense Union raises the question of whether there could ever be “more EU” in arms export policy. The commission has begun slowly carving out a role for itself in EU defense industrial policy. It recently tightened the regulation of cyber-surveillance equipment, which could bolster its influence over trade in dual-use goods. But the European Defense Fund guidance stipulates that funding from the commission should not have any influence over the export decisions of those military goods that were developed with the support of EU funds—this was the result of rigid opposition by member states to any EU authority over exports.

Civil society organizations have expressed concern that transferring powers to the European Commission, which is less accountable to voters than national governments, could decrease rather than increase transparency around defense exports. And an EU-wide policy would necessarily be based on the smallest common denominator and thus have limited impact.

The European Parliament has so far not been very involved in the EU’s new defense activities. When it first voted on the European Defense Fund in April 2019, 328 MEPs supported it, while 231 voted against. Those who are fundamentally opposed a greater EU role in defense matters aside, lawmakers took issue with the defense industry’s participation in the development of the commission’s proposal and questioned the plan to use EU funds for supporting new technologies (including artificial intelligence, robotics, and unmanned systems) that could pose ethical dilemmas. The parliament may want to have more control in the future over questions such as who will be eligible to import military goods financed by the EU.

Some Proposals

It is unlikely that EU member states will cede national control over their arms exports to the EU. There is no political will to do so, neither in Berlin nor elsewhere. Any attempt to establish an EU supervisory body to report on violations of the Common Position would require a change to the EU treaties and therefore unanimity among EU member states.

But there are a few things Europeans could do right now to improve the workings of the Common Position. A recently concluded review process is promising but limited in scope. For example, member states are obligated to provide an annual report on the export licenses they have granted. The EU should start imposing strict deadlines and standardize the report’s format. The reporting requirements should further include actual deliveries rather than just exporting licenses. This would facilitate a more precise analysis of situations in which the sudden arrival of arms could imperil a fragile ceasefire, for example. For this reason, members should also inform one another of their respective risk assessments. Some countries have difficulties meeting even the current reporting requirements due to a lack of resources and know-how. The EU should organize a peer-review meeting that would allow governments to share best practices for the purpose of data collection.

The EU could also encourage member states to conduct their own controls with regard to the end use of exported weapons. Export licenses should only be granted if the seller is aware of who might end up using the weapons and how they will be deployed. There is no export regime that does not run the risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands. This is particularly true for small arms, which cause the majority of casualties in both domestic and cross-border conflicts. End-use control is expensive, time-consuming, and requires political influence in the recipient country. The EU could contribute by deploying to importing countries teams of experts made up of employees of the Commission and the European External Action Service. This would have to be negotiated in advance and incorporated into export agreements, however, and the EU would have to find a way to handle the difficult exchange of sensitive data.

But in the absence of a credible EU-wide weapons export regime, a positive step toward harmonizing EU arms exports would be for smaller groups of member states to come together, following the model of the Farnborough framework agreement of 2000. In 2019, Germany and France signed the Treaty of Aachen, an extension of the 1963 Elysée Treaty. The two countries promised to “develop a common approach to arms exports with regard to joint projects.” According to the EU truism that nothing happens without consensus between Germany and France, any agreement between Berlin and Paris could be expanded to include other countries, or member states could forge similar agreements with one another. This process could be expanded step by step in order to make the guidelines for weapons exports more predictable for all EU members. But in order to further EU foreign policy goals, these agreements would have to be much farther-reaching than the one proposed by Berlin and Paris, and they would have to encompass legally-binding export rules.

What is more, the agreement recently reached by Paris and Berlin is reminiscent of the Debré-Schmidt accord, which was signed in 1972 by the countries’ then-defense ministers Michel Debré and Helmut Schmidt and stipulated that neither side could block the export of jointly developed weapons systems. Germany nonetheless decided to impose an arms export ban on Saudi Arabia in 2018. This highlights the fact that the problem is not so much a lack of agreements, but rather a lack of a common strategic perspective on regional threats.

What Next?

Before a common weapons export policy can be developed, EU member states must agree on the interests the bloc has in a particular conflict, which is often difficult. Opinions diverge, for example, on whether exporting weapons to Saudi Arabia stabilizes or destabilizes the Gulf region. And arms exports or embargoes must form part of a larger foreign policy strategy, since they are often ineffective on their own in changing state behavior. The most effective embargoes are usually accompanied by other measures such as economic sanctions.

EU member states must take on the enormous task of reaching a shared view on the security context of arms exports. They should also improve the wording of the Common Position and reporting by member states, tighten end-use controls, and conclude far-reaching inter-governmental export agreements. The new incentive: without an effective European arms export policy, the European defense union is unlikely to succeed.

This article is based on the CER Policy Brief “Up in Arms: Warring over Europe’s arms export policy,” co-authored with Beth Oppenheim.

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Deterrence, transparency, risk reduction. They have all become buzzwords, especially as Russia’s relations with the West hit an all-time low. Numerous experts have become concerned about a new arms race and its implications for transatlantic security. Alexander Graef, in his recent Berlin Policy Journal article “Getting Deterrence Right on NATO’s Eastern Flank”, sets up a discussion about the right balance between deterrence and transparency. He refers to all three buzzwords, suggesting that “without confidence and trust-building measures, rhetoric about deterrence—and deploying additional forces—risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy that might bring about what it is supposed to prevent: real military conflict, where all sides would lose.”

This piece will not concentrate on the importance of deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank nor seek to rebut the suggestion that an increased US presence in Poland might start a vicious circle of increasing insecurity and new deployments. Rather, this article will try to frame the discussion about the role of transparency and risk reduction.

It is true that the current relationship between Russia and NATO (or more broadly the West) is marked by a mounting lack of trust as well as growing risks. Therefore, transparency is often perceived as a silver bullet solution. Yet transparency is not isolated or unconnected from strategy. Since 2014, Russia has decided to instrumentalize risk, treating it as a security policy concept. Russia’s continues to pick and choose which arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and agreements it complies with. In fact, Russia’s policy of selective violation and non-compliance, as well as its practice of exploiting loopholes in the existing frameworks, significantly increases uncertainty and unpredictability.

The Benefits of Openness

In such circumstances, why does transparency still matter for NATO and the West? For one, when properly implemented, it promotes predictability between competitors, increases the chances to reduce risk, and helps to (re)build mutual trust. Yet transparency should not undermine security, nor hinder NATO from having a credible deterrence and defense posture.

There are three main goals that transparency should contribute to. First, security, which is indivisible. The ultimate task is to eliminate any security grey zones or regions of unequal security. Second, stability, which should be based on reciprocity. Indeed, only balanced final results will maximize incentives for parties to stay in compliance with any arms control, disarmament, or non-proliferation obligations. Thirdly, verification, which in practical terms means the ability to assess compliance. Transparency should increase the possibilities for deterring possible violations.

From an eastern flank perspective, there are three main platforms which should be used to achieve greater, yet measured and reciprocal, transparency: NATO-Russia contacts, the OSCE framework, and finally, bilateral/regional dialogue.

NATO-Russia Founding Act

In his piece, Alexander Graef suggests that “the alliance could publicly announce that it is willing to uphold the threshold of “substantial combat forces” on the Eastern flank implied by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and propose to clarify the exact meaning of this term in negotiations with Moscow.” In fact, such a solution is a non-starter for Allies on NATO’s eastern flank. Not only would it belittle Russia’s political and military violations of the Act, but it would also undermine the concept of equal security among all allies, which is one of the goals transparency should contribute to. Therefore, a return to a discussion about the NATO-Russia Founding Act is counterproductive as this document should be perceived as a Russian “political A2/AD tool” inside NATO.

Instead, one should concentrate on achievable steps. Both the NATO-Russia Council as well as direct military contacts between SACEUR and the Russian Chief of Defense offer valuable instruments to increase predictability and potentially reduce risks. Currently, risk reduction is one of the integral elements of the NATO-Russia Council meetings, which entail reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military exercises. At the same time, the meetings and phone calls between SACEUR and the Russian Chief of Defense allow both sides to maintain strategic military-to-military contacts, thus serve increasing predictability. However, from NATO’s perspective a qualitative change in the transparency and risk reduction pillar can only happen when Russia starts to address the most destabilizing elements in its military posture, such as inherently destabilizing snap exercises. Informing NATO about the start of a snap exercise (so-called ‘day one transparency’), for example via the SACEUR-Russian Chief of Defense line of communications, would considerably contribute to practical risk reduction.

Revitalize the OSCE

Alexander Graef suggests that “Russia could agree to give military observers access to newly deployed and modernized units or provide notification and invite NATO officers to military exercises unregulated by the OSCE’s Vienna Document”. At a first glance, such a solution might seem tempting. Yet, voluntary measures should not distract us from the fact that Russia does not deliver on the obligatory requirements of the Vienna Document, such as inviting observers to exercises with 13,000 troops or more. In fact, since 1990 Russia has never officially organized a military exercise involving more than 13,000 troops in the Vienna Document zone of application. Official or not, this makes no sense—such exercises happen on a regular basis, including near NATO borders.

Therefore, the goal should be to enhance the OSCE framework, which was primarily designed to increase transparency and help reduce military risk, but also to allow participating states to (re)build confidence among them. However, in the last few years the OSCE platform—despite ongoing constructive attempts by the West—has failed to properly tackle the issue of transparency and risk reduction.

First, chapter III of the Vienna Document (“Risk Reduction”) has never been properly tested. In a real life situation, on the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in March 2014, its value proved limited.

Second, Russia, despite some initial interest, did not agree to modernize the Vienna Document. The Polish proposal to amend paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document (‘Co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature’), currently co-sponsored by more than half of the OSCE participating states, has so far not attracted Russian politico-military attention.

Third, the Structured Dialogue—launched in 2016 to work on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area—has produced limited results. This informal platform was designed to tackle the issues of concern that for political reasons could not be effectively addressed in the formal fora (e.g. snap exercises, hybrid warfare). Yet to this point Russia’s engagement in the Structured Dialogue process has been far from constructive.

Finally, the OSCE discussions on military doctrines—a crucial element of reciprocal confidence building and a perfect platform for strategic and technical military to military contacts—has not brought much added value in recent years. In short, the OSCE framework still has untapped potential to make a lasting contribution to transparency and risk reduction.

What is achievable? In a short-term, one could ensure that technical elements for risk reduction are in place. The OSCE Secretariat (Conflict Prevention Center) could organize an exercise during which national points of contact for military incidents would be tested. However, the precondition for any substantial change, including the modernization of the Vienna Document, is a Russia willing to engage constructively.

Bilateral/Regional Dialogue

Graef also advocates agreeing additional bilateral measures between Russia and the West (“bilateral agreements on Vienna Document-like evaluation visits”). In the Baltic Sea region, additional bilateral confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) were agreed upon between Russia and the Baltic States in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the past decade, among them CFE-like information exchanges. The latter were terminated by Russia after it suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty. In addition, in 2001 Russia and Lithuania had agreed to allow for one reciprocal evaluation visit beyond the regular Vienna Document quota to be carried out in the territories of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania. This provision was cancelled by Russia in April 2014. Currently, only Finland has bilateral agreements with Russia (signed in 2000 and 2002) allowing for one additional evaluation visit per year as well as biannual exchange of naval visits to Finnish bases at Upinniemi or Pansio and Russian bases at Kaliningrad or Kronstadt.

In the current security environment, entering into new bilateral agreements with Russia will be politically and militarily difficult for most of the countries in the Baltic Sea region, but also for e.g. Black Sea littoral states. Nevertheless, both sides should at least start looking into this option as a mid-term to long-term goal. Such an approach should encompass the necessary internal national preparations, including setting the expected objectives as well as conducting the intra-agency brainstorming.

Finally, one should not forget that regional dialogue can also prove to be useful in rebuilding trust. In the recent years in the Baltic Sea region, two working groups, which included among others Russia and NATO, contributed to increasing air safety for both civilian and military aircraft. The work of the ICAO-facilitated Baltic Sea Project Team (2015) as well as Finnish-led Expert Group on Baltic Sea Air Safety (2017) led to a reduction of air incidents in the region. The engagement of the Russian side in the works of both groups confirmed that there is interest on technical and military level to establish additional principles to enhance air safety. The full implementation by Russia of the rules and procedures for air safety and engagement in safe and responsible airmanship will help to potentially replicate the Baltic Sea experience in other regions (e.g. Black Sea, North Sea).

More Than Just Transparency

Transparency and risk reduction are certainly important elements in the deteriorating relationship between NATO and Russia. The West should continue to pursue achievable steps, such as OSCE or NATO dialogue and bilateral agreements where possible. But until Russia stops conducting a policy of intentional escalations and provocations to enforce its interests and exercise influence, transparency will never reduce tensions as much as some strategists believe.

The views and opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the institution he represents.

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The end of any hope for liberal convergence; the tougher tone in international affairs; the United States’ focus on competition with China, and also with Russia; Donald Trump’s ruthlessness toward Europeans; and not least Brexit—all these developments have shaken Europe’s decades-old “business model.”

Europeans increasingly realize that to leave defense and strategic leadership largely to the US and to focus mainly on domestic affairs isn’t going to work anymore—with a US president who often refuses to define US interests in a broad sense, one that includes the interests of allies and partners.

Europeans are now faced with the question of how to articulate and assert their common interests and ideas, and how to deal with old and new threats. Can they become, together, a relevant player in regional and global power politics? Are they able to collective unite behind the free and open international order that is essential for Europe’s security, freedom, and prosperity?

In a new global strategic environment in which rough power politics increasingly dominates, Europe must become more powerful itself, in order to be able to co-shape the international order according to its principles and interests. But the existing institutions and platforms aren’t really up to this task. The European External Action Service, headed by a High Representative with extended responsibilities since 2009, is not in a position to forcefully push for joint European interests.

When it comes to relations with major powers—the US, China, Russia—or the use of considerable resources and especially military means, Brussels only plays a minor role. Wherever Paris or Rome, Berlin or Warsaw see important national interests at play, they act unilaterally where necessary and at best try to get other capitals and EU institutions on board to support them afterwards.

Yet even France or Germany on their own are relatively powerless against a player like China. European cooperation has thus become vital for the geopolitics even of the bigger European states. Of course, ad hoc formats can be used and have often been used: the EU3 that negotiates with Iran, or the recent meeting of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel plus Commission President Jean Claude Juncker with the Chinese state and party leader Xi Jinping.

A New Institution

Such formats, however, lack consistency and coherence, and the legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of Europe. Therefore, it makes sense to think about a new institution, the prospect of which has already mentioned by Macron and Merkel: a European Security Council (ESC).

An ESC would have to combine two main features: it would have to be efficient, and it would have to be legitimate, i.e. rely on broad approval. That means that not everyone can be at the table, but to have critical mass is indispensable.

With 28 heads of government, there would be maximum legitimacy, but little efficiency. The 28 would either agree to not deal with a matter that is delicate or too controversial, or paper over differences and come out with a minimal consensus that achieves little. The big member states who still have, in some areas, a foreign policy of broader relevance—particularly France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—would still act largely unilaterally according to their particular interests and views.

An ESC would have to take into account this reality of power and bring together those who do matter because of their size and capabilities. Yet in order to marry power with legitimacy, it should also offer the smaller countries the opportunity to occasionally take part in the negotiation. Thirdly, the EU institutions, which dispose over some resources and some legitimacy, should also be involved. And fourthly, in order to speak for the whole of Europe, the UK would have to be there, whether Brexit happens or not.

Such an ESC, which could meet twice a year at the level of heads of government and have a coordinating, non-executive role, could be composed of the three biggest states: France, the UK, Germany and the next three big ones: Italy, Spain, Poland. It would also include the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council as well as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs. In addition, there would be rotating seats for two or three smaller states. The task would be to provide a space for open and frank debate and for tentative agreement—perhaps published in a short document—about the big strategic questions in a world more and more shaped by great power competition.

The advantage of an ESC would be that twice a year it would draw Europe’s attention to major strategic issues and force leaders to come up with some kind of consensus. It could become one building block for a strategy of European self-assertion in a dramatically changing geopolitical environment.

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Germany, along with France, was the driving force behind the initiatives that have given new momentum to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) since the summer of 2016. With the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), Berlin and Paris have succeeded in bringing new life to a policy area that had been deadlocked for decades and written off by many observers. As a result, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was recently able to, with some justification, underline the progress the EU has made towards a “European Defence Union” and the speed it is demonstrating. Without Germany’s involvement, she noted in the German newspaper Handelsblatt, the way would not be paved for a comprehensive change in the understanding of the EU’s, particularly the Commission’s, role in military security.

Nevertheless, Germany consistently faces criticism for not playing a role commensurate with its political clout and the size of its economy, whether it’s because the government still spends too little on defense—and the current US president is not the first one to lament this—or because it doesn’t do enough to make Europe capable of quick and effective military action, a common complaint in Paris. Not ambitious enough, too hesitant, too inflexible, too dogmatic—Berlin hears it over and over again. How can this German approach be explained? How does the German government think European security and defense should be organized? What does Berlin want to achieve with which instruments and how does it define success? Putting on our “German glasses” to look at the CSDP initiatives, the French-created European Intervention Initiative (EI2), and the consequences of Brexit allows us to take stock.

Holding the EU Together

The CSDP has many functions for Germany. For one, the European framework gives domestic legitimacy to Germany’s defense-policy engagement. For large parts of the population, the idea of Germany going it alone is still unthinkable. More than a few Germans are also wary of NATO. They don’t want increased cooperation with the US, especially since Donald Trump took office; instead they advocate close connections with European partners, above all France. Embedding German defense policy in the EU takes the edge off it. In Germany, the EU Army (or the European Army or Army of Europeans, depending on how the politicians calling for it feel on the day) has for years been a popular rhetorical tool for affirming the commitment to defense in an EU framework—in part because its realization is always just beyond the horizon.

Moreover, by further developing the CSDP, the German government is pursuing the goal of tying another band around the EU to hold it together. After the Brexit vote of June 2016, attention turned to finding a joint future project with France, and both governments saw security and defense policy as having the most potential. The strengthening of the CSDP serves, then, as an additional measure to promote the cohesion of EU member states, which can no longer be taken for granted these days.

But it would be wrong to accuse Berlin of having no ambitions for the CSDP beyond favorable rhetoric and EU integration. Germany wants to substantially and sustainably build up the CSDP with “confidence-building intermediate steps” and not “in a hurry,” as von der Leyen puts it. For example, for Berlin it is not about the ability to send large numbers of soldiers to Africa for military intervention as quickly as possible. Rather, Berlin wants to work to improve Europe’s ability to act in the long term, in the hope that the bloc’s decision-making capabilities will improve along with it in the coming years.

Strategy with a Downside

These considerations absolutely make sense. Trust in the EU as a defense actor still has to grow in many member states. Germany does see itself, along with France, as a driver of the CSDP, but it also tries not to leave any country behind—in Berlin one speaks of an “inclusive” CSDP. One reason PESCO is currently being described as a success is that nearly every EU country is taking part in the format, including countries like Poland that initially took a skeptical view. The downside of the strategy, however, is that Germany must face accusations that it is setting up CSDP institutions in order to register their mere existence as a success, rather than using the CSDP to take concrete action against the threats on Europe’s borders.

One thing is often neglected in the public debate in and about Germany: for most German decision-makers, including in the defense ministry and the Bundeswehr, NATO under US leadership remains the key pillar of German defense. This is true (for now) despite the Trump factor in Washington and the “beer tent” speech in which Chancellor Merkel obliquely questioned the US’s reliability. Germany’s leadership of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and its participation in the Baltic air-policing mission and the NATO Battlegroup in Lithuania are often overlooked in the domestic and international debate. The decision-makers do not consider the CSDP an alternative to NATO but rather a means to expand the European footprint in the alliance with the Americans in the long term.

The French Initiative

For Germany, multilateral institutions are the linchpin of the international order. On the other hand, there is little understanding for “more flexible” or “more pragmatic” formats. Attacks on multilateral institutions—which come from all sides, a particularly clear instance being US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech in Brussels on December 4—are from Berlin’s perspective not to be answered by strengthening ad-hoc coalitions in supranational structures. This explains why Berlin has so far only reluctantly gone along with the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which aims at enabling closer cooperation between the armed forces of European states that are willing and able to carry out military missions. In Berlin’s view, however, the goals of the French initiative remain unclear. Germany fears EI2 may even undermine the CSDP because it has been set up outside of EU structures.

That is why Berlin has clearly spoken in favor of moving the EI2 into the EU framework, and sooner rather than later. In the German understanding of the European security architecture, there is no place for efforts involving only a few select countries. Concerns about fragmentation and the weakening of multilateral organizations in which Germany has invested so much capital, political as well as real, are too great. This is even true for the special relationship with France: While Berlin subscribes to the idea of a Franco-German “motor” in the CSDP, the bilateral Aachen Treaty does not go appreciably beyond the existing multilateral commitments.

However, in their efforts to hold the EU together, many in Berlin overlook the fact that the EI2 can make a strong contribution to Europe’s ability to act—and that it does not necessarily conflict with the CSDP. Admittedly, it was difficult to grasp the ambition and scope of the initiative in the first weeks and months after President Macron announced it. But in its current form, the EI2 is bound by sensible and clear limits: it is not the silver bullet of European defense, but it is well-placed to fill gaps, for example in terms of Europe’s common analysis of threats. What’s more, it includes the United Kingdom.

Brexit and Its Consequences

Berlin’s understanding of the CSDP has an effect on the German approach to security and defense cooperation with Britain after Brexit, both in a European and a bilateral context. The German government understands the CSDP to be inwardly inclusive but outwardly exclusive. As with the entire Brexit process, the feeling is that, with regard to the CSDP, there must be a significant difference between EU member states and third countries. It is a matter of not making mere cooperation with the EU appear as attractive as EU membership. Even though Germany is seeking to create a close and constructive relationship with Britain after Brexit, from Berlin’s point of view the goal cannot be to duplicate the level of cooperation that takes place in the EU framework.

In the Brexit negotiations, the unity of the remaining 27 member states has always been the top priority for Berlin. Therefore the government has avoided undermining the divorce process with bilateral agreements and creating the impression of a “special relationship” between Germany and the UK. Even the “Joint Vision Statement” on closer cooperation on security and defense policy was only released after some hesitation, while a corresponding and nearly-complete declaration on foreign policy is still parked in a desk drawer. In order to limit the space for security cooperation outside of the EU and NATO (and the UN), neither statement has objectives as ambitious as those in the Lancaster House treaties between France and Britain.

On top of that, many in Berlin argue that real progress in the CSDP has only been possible since Britain voted to leave. They see Brexit as more of a liberation than a loss. To prove their point, they point to the obstructionist British stance that for years prevented the CSDP from reaching the agreements it has since the Brexit vote, for example on a European headquarters for EU missions. From this perspective, keeping Britain too close risks allowing a Trojan horse into the EU. The argument that cutting the cord to the greatest military power in Europe could lead to problems in the quest for autonomy is not catching on. Nor does Berlin really fear the frictions that could arise when it comes to cooperation with Britain in the NATO framework.

From a German point of view, Britain should take part in the CSDP within the framework of third-country cooperation, as is already common practice. It’s important for Berlin that political control and decision-making authority remain EU competencies if Britain takes part in PESCO projects on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the European Defense Fund, the approach is that no EU money should flow to third countries and that Britain should participate financially in the fund. There is a long-term interest in keeping in check the Commission’s decision-making authority over European arms policy should the Brussels executive act against German interests.

However, the German position is not yet set in stone on every point, and there are certainly different positions in the relevant ministries. Thus the way Brexit plays out will influence Germany’s position. It is already clear that, in the course of the Brexit process, much of the trust in the British negotiating partner has faded away.

Form Follows Function

The creation of a “European Defense Union” serves in Germany’s eyes to create a connective framework in which as many EU member states as possible can come together and cooperate. Only in the long term is it an instrument for strengthening Europe’s ability to defend itself, which Berlin continues to see as something guaranteed by NATO. The German government has been clear that it doesn’t want any parallel structures or incentives–neither bilaterally nor as “coalitions of the willing”—that could undermine EU institutions.

But since, at the moment, there is no shared understanding among all the EU member states about which EU foreign policy interests are the most important and must be defended, member states will inevitably and increasingly set up ad hoc formats in which smaller groups of EU and NATO countries can act directly. There is of course the danger that the supranational and binding power of CSDP will be subverted. But the risk of creating EU formats incapable of action is even greater.

After all, every format in which Europeans work together on defense policy strengthens Europe’s ability to act, whether through improved interoperability or the harmonization of threat analyses. Berlin should not only support the EI2 but also push harder to expand cooperation between the EU and NATO. The European security situation demands all hands on deck.

If the EU, as a complement to NATO, is indeed to become an organization that “produces” European security, it also needs to offer attractive “docking mechanisms” to those countries that are central to European security, even if they are no longer EU member states. If attractive participation mechanisms for strategic partners—like the British, the Norwegians, in some cases even the Turks—are not created soon, the CSDP won’t be able to live up to its promises. An “inclusive” CSDP is only effective with the inclusion of Britain.

So Germany should get more involved in EU negotiations about third-country participation in the CSDP. With regard to industrial cooperation in the field of defense, Berlin is less dogmatic than, say, Paris. The Brexit negotiations haven’t yet reached the stage of “future relations.” But on the EDF, for example, the EU is already agreeing on directives that stipulate the “strict conditions” under which third countries can take part in EU-promoted defense capabilities projects. In the next few years, member states will have to weigh security and defense interests, economic interests, and the union’s security of supply in a crisis. On this issue, Berlin should join the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries to speak out for the unproblematic participation of like-minded third countries in EU defense capabilities projects.

With regard to British participation in CSDP decision-making and the operational participation of British associations, it is understandable that Berlin has doubts about the sincerity of Britain’s newfound enthusiasm for the CSDP. Berlin should, though, give Britain the opportunity to prove that its offer to become an “ambitious” CSDP partner is a serious one.

At the heart of Berlin’s efforts is the goal of making the EU into an international organization capable of action on defense. This ambition for the distant future does not, however, meet the challenges of the current threat situation. The pressure on Europe is acute. The CSDP has to be able to deliver on its promises if it is to to be effective against the dangers Europe is confronted with—especially in areas where NATO is unwilling or incapable of action.

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© REUTERS/Fabian Bimmer

Once upon a time, the German navy had a beautiful sailing ship. The Gorch Fock, a handsome three-masted barque built in Bremen in 1958, crisscrossed the oceans for nearly 60 years. It was not just an outstanding training vessel, but also a superb good-will ambassador. As a symbol of the new Germany’s openness to the world and of its sailors’ skills and hardiness, it was an extraordinary success.

The ship always drew admiring crowds. The Gorch Fock was so popular that a picture of it under full sails adorned the 10-Deutschmark note. There is even a special Gorch Fock song for the crew. The ship has its own fan website with travel reports and some fine amateur poetry devoted to life on board.

It has also played a serious role for Germany’s military. Over the years, nearly 15,000 navy officers and NCOs have done part of their training on the Gorch Fock. During the seven or eight weeks they spend on the ship, cadets learn to man the yards—as high up as 45 meters—in any weather and sleep in hammocks slung in several tiers for lack of space.

It is, navy commanders insist, a formative experience that has taught many young people not only a good bit of seamanship, but also how to deal with their fears, push their limits, and work as a team. As a result of their stint on the sailing ship, Germany’s navy officers are a much more close-knit community than their counterparts in the army or the air force.

Out of Order

Since November 2015, however, the Gorch Fock has been laid up for repairs. Month by month, more problems with the ageing ship were discovered. Early on, for instance, the masts were repainted; several layers of varnish were applied. When doubts surfaced about the masts’ soundness, the paint had to be stripped off again. Detailed analysis then showed that the masts needed to be replaced altogether. Eventually, the hull was also found to be corroded. Not even the pumps worked properly.

What has emerged is a saga of incompetence and cutting corners, of institutional arrogance and spiraling costs, of lack of leadership and corruption. Once more, the Gorch Fock has turned into a powerful symbol—but this time of a Bundeswehr that is struggling to become a modern, effective force.

On a more personal level, part of the blame for the Gorch Fock debacle is being laid on Ursula von der Leyen, the Christian Democratic politician who has headed the defense ministry since December 2013. Von der Leyen, Germany’s first female defense minister and once seen as a strong candidate to succeed Angela Merkel as chancellor, has become bogged down by the huge difficulties of Bundeswehr reform.

To be fair, running the defense ministry has always been a poisoned chalice, and von der Leyen has coped for much longer—and with better results—than most of her predecessors. Coming to grips with an entrenched and sometimes unwilling bureaucracy is difficult. Von der Leyen reached out to external consultants to help prepare and push through decisions. Now she faces a parliamentary enquiry into why her ministry spent so much money on consultants.

Ill-Spent Peace Dividend

The origins of the Bundeswehr’s troubles go back to the early 1990s. When the Cold War ended, Germany was happy to enjoy the peace dividend, especially because of how expensive reunification was proving. For a quarter century, little money and attention went to the Bundeswehr. Troop numbers were cut radically; equipment orders were postponed or reduced, and any remaining resources were redirected toward out-of-area peacekeeping missions.

Then, in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and started to wage war in eastern Ukraine. Territorial defense within NATO suddenly regained importance. Very quickly, it became obvious that the Bundeswehr did not have the means to sustain both a credible defense at home and several missions abroad.

In 2015, von der Leyen pushed through what has been dubbed a triple turn-around: more money, more equipment, and more personnel for the Bundeswehr. Since then, Germany’s defense budget has been rising steadily, from €32.4 billion in 2014 to €43.2 billion this year. Still, it’s a slow process. New equipment takes years to order, the bureaucracy is byzantine, and suppliers from Germany and elsewhere are infamous for their delays and cost overruns.

Rising Cost

Just look at the Gorch Fock: when the ship was first brought in, the shipyard said repairs would cost €10 million and take 130 days. In March 2016, the cost estimate rose to €12.6 million, in June to €22 million, in August to €33.5 million, and in September 2016 to €64,5 million. Works were stopped but started again with von der Leyen’s approval when she was assured that bringing back the ship would cost at most €75 million.

Those assurances were false. “At first, we wanted to repair just a few things, but then we looked behind the boards, and you could see that she needed a complete makeover,” von der Leyen recently said. “With the exception of the keel, nearly everything needs to be replaced.” From €128 million in early 2018, the repair bill has currently moved to €135 million.

Last month, the Federal Court of Auditors sent the defense ministry a scathing report on the mismanagement of the Gorch Fock repairs. The 39-page report, which was leaked to the press, said the Bundeswehr had done no economic feasibility study before ordering repairs. It had also never seriously investigated whether it might have been cheaper to build a new ship.

Hans-Peter Bartels, Germany’s parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, did not mince his words either. In his yearly report presented at the end of January, he pointed to the Gorch Fock as a prime example of how time and money gets wasted at the Bundeswehr. “Nobody seemed to have the task to ask: ‘Is it normal that the price of repairs increases 13-fold from €10 million to 135 million?’,” Bartels said.

Brought Down

The German navy isn’t just short of an unarmed sailing ship, either. For years, it has been waiting for the delivery of new frigates and corvettes; the old fleet is outdated and worn-out. Only three of six submarines are fit to dive, and because of engine failure, the only two tank ships have both been out of order since the summer of 2018.

The picture is the same for the army and the air force: tanks don’t roll, planes don’t fly. Soldiers don’t even get enough personal equipment—protective vests, boots, clothes, helmets, night-vision glasses—Bartels said in his report. “The Bundeswehr had to make an enormous effort to equip the 8000 soldiers who took part in the NATO exercise Trident Juncture in Norway in the fall with winter clothing and protective vests.”

No wonder that the Bundeswehr is finding it increasingly difficult to hire enough young people to keep the force at its current 181,000 soldiers—the economy is doing well, after all, and the many reports about equipment shortages and bad working conditions aren’t helping. “Bundeswehr Disgrace: Everything’s Junk! (with the exception of our soldiers),” screamed a recent front-page headline in BILD, Germany’s largest mass-circulation tabloid.

It’s not just the troops who are suffering because of the break-downs. Over the past several months, the German chancellor, the federal president, and several ministers have found themselves stranded in remote airports because of engine and security problems with government planes that are run by the Bundeswehr. Stung by public embarrassment, Berlin has taken a decision to buy three new government aircraft.

Germany’s soldiers now hope for more sympathy from politicians—more resources, quicker decisions, and less bureaucracy. But it will take years to bring Germany’s military back up to scratch.

Still, for the Gorch Fock, at least, there is hope. With so much money already spent on rebuilding the ship, Defense Minister von der Leyen has decided to let the repair works go ahead. The shipyard’s management has been replaced, and investigations into alleged corruption are ongoing. According to the navy’s most recent time-table, the Gorch Fock will be sailing again in 2020.

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© REUTERS/Vincent Kessler

“Europe needs to grasp its destiny more firmly in its own hands, because the times where we could rely unreservedly on others are over.”

There was little doubt in the European Parliament chamber on Tuesday about who Angela Merkel was talking about as she delivered her opening speech in a debate on the future of Europe. Even as she spoke, US President Donald Trump was delivering a diatribe against France on Twitter, sparked by recent comments by Emmanuel Macron.

Last week The Wall Street Journal quoted the French president as saying the EU needs its own army to protect it from potential threats from “Russia, China and even the United States of America.” The Elysee later clarified that this specific quote was referring to cyber threats, but the sentiment remained largely the same. This infuriated Trump, who has spent the week attacking Macron, France, and the European Union.

“Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the US, China, and Russia,” he tweeted Tuesday afternoon. “But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two – How did that work out for France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the US. came along. Pay for NATO or not!”

Given that Merkel’s speech to the parliament came just two hours after these comments, some expected her to back off on some of her prepared remarks. But instead she explicitly supported Macron’s call for a European army, showing mettle and European solidarity in the face of Trump’s threats.

“A common European army would show the world that there would never again be war in Europe,” she said. Her remarks drew loud applause from the chamber but also some boos from euroskeptics, particularly from British members. “I am really pleased about this,” she replied. “I come from a parliament too, I won’t be put off.”

Skeptical France

France has long been skeptical of the US-dominated NATO and has for years pushed for Europe to establish a military capability free from the United States. Germany has until now not embraced this idea, fearful that it would weaken NATO.

Merkel was at pains in her speech to stress that “this is not an army against NATO, it can be a good complement to NATO.” But she said that the time has come for a European army.

While France has not allowed US troops to be stationed in its territory, there are still 40,000 American soldiers stationed in Germany today, compared to 170,000 total active German military personnel. There are 10,000 US soldiers stationed in the United Kingdom.

Some proponents of a European army say such deployments are not only humiliating but also present a security threat in the age of Trump. A European army, they say, would lead to a European capability for self-defense that would allow countries to ask the American troops to leave.

Macron said in an interview with CNN on Sunday that he agrees with Trump that Europe needs to spend more on its militaries, but it should spend that money on its own military and its own hardware rather than funding NATO and buying equipment from America.

European Finish

Merkel’s speech was part of a series of debates over the past several months held with the 28 leaders of EU member states on the future of Europe. She used the occasion to signal her priorities for her legacy. Having announced last month that she will step down from her party’s leadership and not seek another term, she is now focusing on securing her legacy in history as her leadership comes to a close.

From her speech, it would appear she wants that legacy to be a European one. She is prepared to hug Macron close in the face of threats from Trump, as she illustrated in the ceremony marking the 100-year anniversary of Armistice Day earlier this week.

She used her speech to decry the rising tide of “nationalism and egoism.” Though not named, her targets were clear – Trump and the leaders of Hungary, Poland, and Italy.

“Tolerance is the soul of Europe and an essential basic value of the European idea”, she said in Strasbourg. The challenges Europe faces can only be tackled successfully if Europe acts united and if we “treat the interests and needs of others as our own.”

“Solidarity is based on tolerance and this is Europe’s strength. It is part of our common European DNA and it means overcoming national egoisms”. She had particularly targeted criticism for Italy’s populist government, which is preparing to implement a budget that does not live up to EU commitments to balance the books. “If you try to solve problems by making new debts, you disregard commitments made and question the foundations for strength and stability of the eurozone,” she said.

She finished with a plea for support for the European project, and a signal that she will defend the EU as her country enters into uncertain political territory with her departure.

“Europe is our best chance for peace, prosperity, and a good future. We must not let this chance slide; we owe this to ourselves and to past and future generations. Nationalism and egoism must never have a chance to flourish again in Europe. Tolerance and solidarity are our future. And this future is worth fighting for”, she concluded.

Though Macron has been frustrated with German reticence to embrace his ambitious European reform plans since he was elected last year, the chancellor’s speech this week may signal that she is ready to join hands in the waning months of her leadership.

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