© REUTERS/ Eva Plevier

The European center-right took on a troublemaker in its own ranks on Wednesday when the European People’s Party (EPP) indefinitely suspended Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s populist Fidesz party. Fidesz will lose its voting rights within the EPP and its ability to put forward candidates for party positions.

In an effort to show that the EU’s largest political family can rein in its own extremes, Orbán’s party was put on notice—and expulsion after the European elections in May remains an option. But by not kicking out Orbán’s party, the EPP avoided, for now, giving a boost to the populist and anti-migration forces in Europe that are expected to do well at the ballot boxes. And Orbán has been able to spin to the ruling to show that he is still in control, calling the compromise a “good decision” and noting that the motion says Fidesz and the EPP “jointly” agreed on it.

In a heated three-hour debate among the around 260 national party delegates in Brussels on Wednesday, even Orbán’s closest allies within EPP supported a compromise decision to suspend Fidesz indefinitely. EPP members had gradually grown frustrated with Orbán, who has eroded democratic freedoms and the rule of law back home while criticizing EPP leaders for being weak and supporting migration. In his latest stunt, which propelled the EPP into action, Orbán oversaw a campaign against EU commission president Jean-Claude Juncker, a fellow EPP member and Orbán critic. In recent weeks, thirteen national parties have called for Fidesz to be expelled from the EPP.

The EPP and Fidesz agreed on an “evaluation committee” led by former EU council chief Herman Van Rompuy and including former Austrian prime minister Wolfgang Schuessel. They are tasked with determining whether Fidesz respects the rule of law and adheres to conditions set out by the EPP’s lead candidate in the European elections, Manfred Weber. The conditions include ending the anti-Juncker campaign and allowing the Central European University, a prestigious school founded by US billionaire George Soros and targeted by Orbán, to remain in Budapest. (Schuessel was himself rebuffed by the EU in 2000 for forming a government coalition with the far-right Freedom party, with a three-member team scrutinizing his decision.)

A Punishment or a Reprieve? 

But the EPP allowed Orbán to turn the suspension into a victory march. The wording of the document adopted by 190 members of the EPP’s political assembly lets Fidesz argue to his voters that, in fact, it decided to suspend itself. “We cannot be expelled, and we cannot be suspended,” Orbán told reporters after the meeting. Earlier in the day, Orbán had threatened to pull his party from EPP if it was suspended unilaterally, giving him leverage in negotiating his own punishment.

Back in Hungary, the network of pro-government media promoted Orbán’s interpretations of events as a victory. “No expulsion, no suspension,” was the headline of the news website Origo. “The pro-migration action has failed, they could not push Fidesz out,” was the title of another story. The public broadcaster has called EPP’s punishment a “huge victory”.

Orbán announced at his press conference that he is also setting up a three-member group with MEP Jozsef Szajer, EU State Minister Judit Vajda, and Katalin Novak, the state secretary for family issues, to report back after the elections on the issue of whether Fidesz should remain in the EPP. The team would be negotiating with the Van Rompuy group, Orbán said, although the EPP’s internal document on the decision mentions no need for negotiations. In Orbán’s world, it is Fidesz that decided to suspend its membership to assess whether EPP is true to its Christian democratic values. Orbán even told reporters: “We never had any campaign against Juncker,” giving an insight into the absurdity of the Hungarian government’s propaganda.

“Thirteen parties wanted to push the right wing of the party out,” Orbán said at the presser, arguing that it was thanks to his negotiations and willingness to compromise that party unity was preserved. “I hope we can lead a united campaign, and liberal ideas will not dominate the party, but it will be a balanced party family with Christian conservatives inside it,” he added.

Eyeing the Commission Presidency

Weber, who hails from the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) party, was keen to put the “Orbán problem” behind him as his campaign picks up for the EU commission presidency. The EPP camp is now trying to shift the harsh spotlight onto its rivals, arguing that the Socialists need to rein in their Romanian member party, the ruling Social Democrats, who have curbed judicial independence in Bucharest, and that the Liberals need to scrutinize their Czech member which has been dogged by corruption.

How did Orbán escape expulsion? He had threatened last year that he could easily set up an anti-migration political alliance outside of the EPP with like-minded parties, and his EPP colleagues took notice. There was real concern in the EPP that expelling Fidesz now could not only send the wrong message about party unity in the middle of the European campaign, but could also give a boost to populist, anti-migration parties in the run up to the vote.

Orbán has openly hinted at setting up a new party with Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), which is also shunned by the EU for putting the judiciary under political control. Italy’s interior minister Matteo Salvini, whose anti-migration League party is expected to be the second biggest national party in the next European Parliament, has also reached out to PiS and praised Orbán.

The compromise allows both Orbán and the EPP to await the final results of the European elections and rethink their strategy. Fidesz MEPs will continue to be allowed to sit with the EPP in the European Parliament for the few remaining sessions in this term. As the EPP is expected to lose dozens of MEPs in the next elections, Fidesz MEPs could provide useful support in the future for Weber’s quest to find a majority that supports his bid for the commission presidency. 

By sidelining Orbán, Weber also aims convince the other EU leaders—whose backing he needs for the commission top job—that he can rein in the populists. Indeed, Weber wanted to demonstrate to his potential allies that Orbán will not push the EPP to the right, and Hungary’s self-described “illiberal” leader cannot set the agenda for the entire party. “Fidesz will have no say any more on the EPP’s political approach,” Weber told reporters after the meeting.

However, critics—even within his own party—say Weber is not tough enough and the suspension only kicks the issue of dealing with Orbán further down the road. “Shameless move by Manfred Weber: a suspension just in time for the European elections, after nine years of attacks on rule of law by Orbán, and an evaluation in the fall, just before knowing if he needs Orbán’s votes to get the European Commission presidency,” former Green MEP Rui Tavares said in reaction to EPP’s rebuke. Tavares’s 2013 report in the European Parliament already warned about Orbán’s rolling back of democratic freedoms.

Despite Weber’s efforts, the questions persist: who is in charge of the EPP, and is the tail wagging the dog? 

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© REUTERS/ Inquam Photos

European Parliament committee hearings are normally quite mundane. But then again, they aren’t usually centered around Laura Codruta Kovesi.

Kovesi is Romania’s star anti-corruption prosecutor. And when she took the floor in Brussels in to make her pitch to MEPs for the EU’s new top prosecutor job, she had journalists scrambling for spots and some European lawmakers applauding her sharp rebuttals.

“I am aware that you have been exposed to a lot of negative information about me. I have absolutely nothing to hide,” Kovesi told MEPs last Tuesday (26 February), whose bid for the politically sensitive European Public Prosecutor’s Office has been under siege by Romania’s Social Democrat-led government, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency.

The 45-year-old former professional basketball player rose to fame in Romania as the unrelenting prosecutor who has run the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) since 2013. Under her leadership, the DNA has launched thousands of investigations, exposing high-level corruption and helping bring about the sentencing of – as she told MEPs – over sixty high-ranking officials, such as ministers and lawmakers.

“You have given us a sense of confidence in the Romanian system,” Ingeborg Grassle, a powerful German MEP leading the budget control committee in the parliament told Kovesi during the hearing.

Cleaning up Corruption in Bucharest

Romania ranked 25th among the EU’s 28 countries on the 2018 Perceived Corruption list compiled by Transparency international, ahead of only of Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary. However, Kovesi’s efforts have given Romanians new trust in their anti-corruption institutions. According to a 2015 poll, Romanians trust the DNA as much as the Orthodox church, a startling success in one of the most religious countries in the EU, where mistrust in the state is deep-seated.

Kovesi, who also served as the youngest general prosecutor of Romania – a country where judicial reform and anti-graft fight have been under scrutiny by the EU since it has joined the bloc in 2007 – has caught the attention of transparency advocates and the European Commission, which said in its 2016 report on Romania’s judiciary that “the track record of the key judicial and integrity institutions in addressing high-level corruption has remained impressive.”

To her supporters, Kovesi is a heroine standing up to a corrupt political elite; to her critics she is a zealot who has used her powers excessively with a broad interpretation of “abuse of power”. Indeed, Kovesi has not shied away from stepping on the toes of the powerful. Last June, Liviu Dragnea, chair of the ruling Social democratic party (PSD) and de facto leader of the country, received a three-and-a-half-year prison sentence for abuse of office (pending appeal). In 2016, Dragnea had already received a two-year suspended sentence for election fraud, preventing him from serving as prime minister.

The PSD-led government first came for Kovesi last February: the justice minister called for her dismissal, accusing prosecutors under her command of falsifying evidence and saying Kovesi had harmed Romania’s international reputation. While Romanian President Klaus Iohannis initially refused to sack her—he is also a political opponent of Dragnea—a Constitutional Court ruling supporting the government’s position meant that Iohannis was unable to stop her dismissal. A month after Kovesi’s departure, an estimated hundred thousand Romanians took to the streets to protest against the government’s legislative changes weakening the rule of law.

Then when Kovesi decided to seek office on a European level, the Romanian government launched a campaign to stop her. Kovesi announced in December that she would run for the office of the European Public Prosecutor, a new body created with the support of 22 member states to investigate and prosecute fraudulent use of EU taxpayer money. But she faces concocted charges of malfeasance, bribery, and perjury from a new agency set up by Bucharest. She denies the allegations.

“I was independent. My results are speaking for me. We investigated members of different parties. We investigated people that have important positions, wealth. The independence was provided by law. Now, there are attempts to limit our independence,” Kovesi told MEPs last week.

The race for the EU job

The Bucharest government’s efforts to undermine Kovesi’s candidacy put a spotlight on the race. Kovesi was picked by an expert panel to be the best for the job. However, a secret-ballot vote among EU ambassadors ranked a French candidate, Jean-Francois Bohnert as favorite. Kovesi came in second, together with Germany’s aspirant.

Does she have enough support to get the job? While Romania’s campaign against its anti-corruption champion ruffled feathers in western European capitals, it is a problem for any candidate when his or her country is not supporting the bid, an EU diplomat said.

With the two relevant European parliamentary committees firmly supporting Kovesi, the parliament will start negotiations with the representatives of member states, led by the Finnish EU ambassador and including the Portuguese and Croatian ambassadors (whose countries will give the next EU presidencies), to decide on who will get the job in the end.

Bohnert, the French candidate who addressed MEPs in several languages, is a strong candidate and a safe bet with his experience in helping to set up Eurojust, the EU’s judicial cooperation agency.  He told lawmakers that fighting corruption could make the chief prosecutor’s office a new tool to boost democratic trust in the EU, but added that as a prosecutor he would not “name and shame” member states when asked by an MEP what he would do in countries where EU money fraud is systematic.

But Kovesi’s possible rise to power – she would be a rare eastern European woman in top EU position still dominated by western European men – isn’t just unnerving politicians in Bucharest. She has also become a symbol for anti-corruption campaigners in Bulgaria and Hungarian opposition politicians railing against graft in prime minister Viktor Orban’s government.

Maltese center-right MEP and anti-corruption campaigner Roberta Metsola welcomed Kovesi at the parliament hearing by saying that “in spite of every imaginable obstacle being put in your way, your dignified courage in the continued onslaught has inspired people across the continent”.

More Oversight from Brussels

Kovesi’s candidacy also sheds a light on the EU’s efforts to keep a closer eye on how eastern and central European countries spend EU funds. Last year, the commission tabled proposals to link EU funding to the health of the rule of law in member states in an attempt to sanction those governments that threaten the independence of the judiciary.

The commission’s proposal is already interpreted in Warsaw and Budapest as a political attack on eastern member states. Kovesi’s appointment could send a strong signal from the EU to countries on the eastern flank and member states with systemic corruption issues–but selecting such a politicized figure could also prompt a backlash there.

Hungary and Poland are already among the six EU countries that have opted out of the prosecutor’s office, fearing further oversight by EU institutions in the affairs of national governments. Budapest and Warsaw’s interference in the independence of their judiciaries has already triggered an EU sanctions procedure for both countries.

While the member states hope to agree on the top prosecutor by the end of March, negotiations could drag on for months if the parliament and EU countries dig in their positions. “This is all very dramatic,” MEP Claude Moraes, chairman of the civil liberties committee, quipped during the parliament vote on the nominees.

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© REUTERS/Stephane Lecocq/Pool

It was a classic elephant-in-the-room situation: In early November, Europe’s largest political alliance, the European People’s Party, held its all-important pre-election congress in Helsinki with speeches from German Chancellor Angela Merkel and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. Several EPP heavyweights talked about upholding democratic freedoms and values, but notably, no-one explicitly named the target of their warnings—the person sitting right next to them: Hungary’s illiberal premier Viktor Orbán.

The EPP was keen to display unity at the congress as it heads into the European Parliamentary elections next May. The gathering followed months of speculation over whether the EPP could split after the election, with some liberal-minded deputies joining a yet-to-be formed alliance with France’s president Emmanuel Macron, and whether Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party would leave to lead their own alliance with other like-minded European nationalists.

The EPP has had an Orbán problem for years. The Hungarian premier has been systematically undermining rule of law and democratic values in Hungary, and challenges those same fundamentals in the European Union. Ongoing demonstrations in Budapest for independent media and courts, and against a labor law increasing overtime hours, will cause further headache for Europe’s largest political alliance. This week, opposition MPs were violently thrown out of the public media’s headquarters in Budapest, the central propaganda-machine for Orbán, after they vowed to read protestors’ demands on air. Orbán, who has never faced political consequences on the European level for his actions, is unlikely to back down, putting the EPP in an uncomfortable spot.

The EPP is the powerhouse party in Brussels and much of Europe. Its politicians head the three most important institutions in the European Union and command seven governments in the (still) 28-member EU, plus they hold the Romanian president’s post. The EPP has sheltered Orbán for years, with the party’s president Joseph Daul, an influential French politician, amicably referring to Orbán as the party’s “enfant terrible.”

The EPP’s Red Lines

Initially, EPP members were arguing that keeping Orbán close would tame the Hungarian prime minister, who likes to see himself as a “street-fighter,” and curb his autocratic tendencies. It set out what it called “red lines” over Orbán’s targeting the Central European University in Budapest, but failed to act when the CEU did decide to move to Vienna as the Hungarian government refused to secure its future in the Hungarian capital. Despite mild EPP criticism, Orbán kept running his anti-EU, anti-liberal, anti-migration campaigns, and continued to centralize power back home. Liberal-minded EPP members in the European Parliament grew increasingly annoyed with the lack of disciplinary action, and saw Orbán as a dangerous pull for EPP to the right.

The frustration with Orbán boiled over last September, when the majority of EPP members in the European Parliament, including its leader, Bavarian Manfred Weber, who is running for the presidency of the EU commission, voted to launch a sanctions procedure against Hungary under Article 7 of the Lisbon treaty for breaching EU rules and values. But the procedure is unlikely to lead anywhere, as deciding on biting sanctions depend on fellow member states reluctant to challenge each other’s internal measures.

Despite calls to kick Fidesz out, the EPP party leadership refused to tackle the issue, arguing that according to the party rules, seven member parties from five different member states need to come forward with a request. No such request has been made. Petteri Orpo, the leader of the Finnish National Coalition Party, tentatively said that if there were other six parties, his group would join in calls for Fidesz’s expulsion.

Clear Intentions

Orbán isn’t hiding his intention to pull the EPP to the right either. He made it clear in a speech in June 2018 that he does not want to leave the EPP and create what he called a “successful anti-immigration” party, but rather he wants the center-right alliance to turn his direction and return to its “Christian democratic roots.”

He argued that the EPP could either become a flavorless, colorless party stuck in an anti-populist coalition with the social democrats and liberals, or move to the right and continue shaping EU politics. “The other model which has been successfully tested in Austria and Hungary is taking up the challenge, is not creating such a people’s front, is taking the issues raised by new parties seriously, and is giving responsible answers to them,” Orbán said at the time.

The EPP attempted to portray itself in Helsinki as a united political force that can stop the threat of extremist and populism in Europe. Yet speakers at the congress were more interested in rallying EPP members against their socialist and liberal contenders than populists. The party leadership also knows that Orbán will deliver at the ballot boxes. His party alliance is expected to win well over a dozen MEPs to the party in May’s election, much needed by the EPP, which could lose 30-40 seats, according to projections.

Orbán argued at the party should respect winners. “What is even more important to understand: we have to win, not just survive, and victory must be wanted. Let us not listen to our opponents, and let us not measure ourselves by the standards of the leftist parties and the liberal media. […] The European elections must be won at home, in each of our countries. In order for the EPP to become the party of the winners again, we need winning prime ministers,” he told delegates.

EU council president Donald Tusk retorted in his speech following Orbán: “We all want to win the upcoming elections. But let us remember that at stake in these elections are not benefits and jobs, but the protection of our fundamental values. Because without them, our victory will make no sense.”

The most recent EPP argument for not stepping up criticism of Orbán cites Brexit. Party officials argue that the Brexit process really started when British Conservatives, led by David Cameron, left the EPP and formed their own group in 2009. This started the UK’s drift away from the EU core, they say. The same could happen with Hungary if Orbán is put under more pressure. Meanwhile, EPP president Daul insists on keeping the party as large and wide-reaching as possible. The continued support for Orbán’s autocratic measures will nevertheless further encourage the Hungarian leader. It might also signal an EPP shift to the right during and after the European elections.

The post Can Europe’s Center-Right Handle Orbán? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Andreas Gebert

Germany’s Die Grünen, now polling around 20 percent as the second-strongest party after Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats and surging in regional elections in Bavaria and Hesse, refer to themselves as the “alternative to the Alternative” in a poke to the German anti-immigration, far-right party, Alternative für Deutschland. Indeed, the pro-Europe, pro-environment, pro-immigration party offers strikingly different answers to the issues mostly dominated by the far-right rhetoric recently.

Their sister parties in Belgium and in the Netherlands have also done well at the polls. In the 2017 general Dutch elections, while all eyes were on far-right Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party, the GroenLinks clinched the highest number of seats in parliament in their history. With their roots in environmental protest movements, Green parties can claim to be outsiders rather than mainstream.

The Greens have been picking up voters who feel betrayed by socialists or social democrats, and are uncomfortable with the far-right’s fear-mongering. They have been less successful in persuading liberal or center-right voters in significant numbers, except in Germany. Nevertheless, they seem to be well-equipped for a political arena that is no longer only divided by left and right, but is also dissected along fault lines between open and closed societies, pro-European and nationalist, urban and rural.

Isolated Successes

But despite the enthusiasm around the Green momentum this fall, it’s not likely to translate into a substantially bigger portion of the seats in the European Parliament at next spring’s election, or a bigger say in EU affairs. The Greens are not expected to dramatically increase their numbers, currently at 52 MEPs, although top mainstream parties, the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), and the center-left Party of European Socialists (PES), are both likely to lose dozens of seats.

Yet the Green group’s co-chair in the European Parliament Belgian MEP Philippe Lamberts sounds optimistic that Greens can deliver the recipe against populists in an age of anxiety about climate change and migration, coupled with the fear of being left behind by globalization.

“I have a good feeling about this election. The situation is worrying, populism is on the rise, but their victory is not a given. They have won in Italy, but have performed worse than expected in Sweden and the Netherlands,” he said recently.

While French president Emmanuel Macron is pitching himself against champions of illiberal democracy in Europe, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán or Italy’s Matteo Salvini, expectations that he could transform European politics have dipped sharply. Macron has been mired in a political crisis at home, facing protestors whose cause the Greens are aiming to embrace.

“Macron is right that this election will pit national-populists against ‘progressives.’ But he is mistaken as far as the subject of the confrontation is concerned. This is about who offers the most credible and desirable alternative to mainstream policies, which Macron himself embodies—policies that make the EU the vehicle of adaptation for our countries to the neo-liberal version of globalization,” Lamberts quipped.

 Addressing Common Concerns

Greens are arguing for a need to address the concerns of voters who fled to the far-right. They point to deprived rural areas, where people feel abandoned as public services withdrew due to spending cuts. They point to the middle classes who are struggling to make ends meet, and some in the party argue that a socially blind green party has no future.

“We have put human dignity rather than the obsessive pursuit of short-term profit maximization at the center. Today, human beings and the planet are made to serve the economy, which in turn is made to serve finance. We have to reverse this and put finance at the service of the economy and the economy at the service of a dignified life for all human beings,” Lamberts added.

That means rethinking some of the underlying policies of the European project, such as pursuing economic growth above anything else. “What is good for Volkswagen is not automatically good for Germany. We have to do away with this thinking,” the Belgian politician said.

Greens emphasize that this approach could quell anxieties about migration as well, arguing that in the October elections Greens gained votes not despite, but because of migration.

“Either you run exclusion policies inside and outside, or you promote solidarity outside and inside,” Lamberts said, adding: “People want to hear a realistic solution on migration, that combines humanism and realism.”

“Not a Luxury Thing”

Lamberts’ emphasis on the social aspects has a practical side. Greens have to battle the perception that they represent well-off urbanites who can afford to worry about whales and forests.

“Green issues are not a luxury thing,” the German co-chair of the Green group in the EU parliament, Ska Keller said. She is one of the party’s lead candidates in the European election. “Climate change is very much a social issue,” she added, pointing out that rich people can move away from bad air quality or buy better quality food products.

But while it seems that uncertain voters in Germany and the Nordic countries hear that message, it has been far less successful in eastern and southern Europe.

Doru Frantescu, director of VoteWatch Europe, a think-tank in Brussels, said it is unlikely there would be a green wave next May. Victories are isolated and do not represent a continent-wide trend, he added. However, if the German Greens maintained their position as second biggest party at home, the party could come 5th overall in the EU parliament next year.

“But that’s the exception, not the rule,” Frantescu said. “Greens are quasi non-existent in Spain, Poland, and Italy.” According to VoteWatch Europe’s projections, the Greens will more or less maintain their numbers in the European Parliament, he added.

Few and Far Between

Currently, the Greens have two Hungarian MEPs who hail from different national parties, and a few from the Balkans and the Baltics. In general, however, Greens are seen as too radical and too left-wing in much of central and eastern Europe to attract sizeable support. While environmentalists played an important role in standing up for human rights and the rule of law, they face considerable obstacles in actually becoming viable political forces in countries that tend to be culturally more conservative, Frantescu said.

Keller, however, insists the tide is turning. “It’s not just a northern, western thing. In the south and the east of Europe we are doing well, too” the German MEP said, pointing out that a Green party managed to put forward candidates in each district in local elections in Poland recently. Green topics have also come to the forefront in Bulgaria, she added.

Indrek Tarand, an independent Estonian politician who sits with the Greens in the European Parliament said he hoped that voters would pick “a humanist trajectory for Europe, instead of those who want to take us back to the Middle Ages,” he said, referring to populist and extremist forces.

He also pointed out that Die Grünen in Germany were founded almost 40 years ago. “Perhaps we need more time,” he said.

The post Green Sprouts, But No Early Spring appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

When in Hungary, you cannot escape pálinka. It starts and end meals, mends broken hearts, and soaks up a variety of sorrows. The New York Times called it a drink that tastes like a “slap in the face.” It’s made of fruit, and its alcohol content must be between 37.5 percent and 86 percent. Pálinka is recognized by the EU as unique to Hungary and covered by its “protected designation of origin” laws.

True to his populist leadership style, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán put the brandy on his patriotic flag early on. After his return to power in 2010, the Hungarian premier championed a law allowing citizens to distill 50 liters of their own pálinka tax-free if they used approved equipment and did not sell it to others. The liquor industry and the EU were not impressed, but Hungarians, whose rate of alcohol consumption is, by the way, among the highest in Europe, were happy. They downed a shot with the cheer: “Egészségedre!” (“To your health!”)

Yet for all the battles Orbán fought with the EU, on pálinka, he chose to give way to Brussels. In fact, when it comes to pálinka, he’s even stood down twice. There have been two infringement procedures against Hungary over the government’s efforts to institute ultra-low taxes on brewing of the national drink. In the first case, the European Court of Justice struck down Budapest’s attempt to allow tax-free home brewing in 2014. So the following year, Hungary complied and began to tax home-brewed pálinka. But in new proposals published in early June this year, the government introduced a so-called health tax that applied to soft drinks but excluded spirits like pálinka–causing a second infringement procedure. This time the government did not wait for the court decision: it introduced an increased tax rate on the fruit brandy right away.

Choose your Fight

Orbán likely wanted to avoid a protracted battle with Europe when so many other issues are looming. Still, pálinka is no small matter in Hungary. It is consumed in a particular glass with a round belly to bring out the fruity flavors. Unlike vodka, it is not supposed to be served cold. Indeed, people who keep their pálinka in the refrigerator draw scornful looks across Hungary. Serving it cold kills the fruity aroma, everyone knows that! Hungarians are also known to boast about their own home-made pálinka.

The national drink, much like its home country, has had an impressive run over the last few decades. Even though home-brewing was illegal under communist rule, many defied the rule. Quality, however, often suffered. That was true, too, for commercially produced pálinka. Socialism meant that there shouldn’t be high quality drinks at prices suited only to an affluent bourgeoisie.

Since Hungary’s democratic transition, pálinka has built a reputation as a fine liquor, with tasting festivals popping up across the country and half-liter bottles costing as much as €50. There are about 600 distilleries in the country, and the number of commercial brewers jumped from 72 to 138 between 2010 and 2017, according to the agriculture ministry.

Pálinka Politics

Like many of Orbán’s battles with Brussels, the fight for the right to a tax-free, homemade pálinka is more than just a levy issue. It plays into the perception that Orbán is a self-made man from the countryside who takes on the high-minded urban intelligentsia and truly understands the Hungarian psyche. He protects Hungary’s national identity in the face of foreign pressure and is at the same time down-to-earth—someone you could throw back a pálinka with anytime. He’s known to say “Isten-isten,” another toast meaning “God-God,” before knocking back a shot.

Orbán, though not a heavy drinker, likes to pose with a shot of pálinka, especially during campaigns. In a 2013 photo album of his family’s Christmas celebrations, the paterfamilias posed with a glass in the company of his son-in-law, István Tiborcz. According to media reports, the EU’s anti-fraud office OLAF found “serious irregularities” in EU-funded projects carried out by a company once controlled by Tiborcz. OLAF recommended that Hungary’s public persecutors pursue charges, and that the European Commission should recover more than €40 million spent on the projects.

Hungarian authorities did launch a follow-up investigation, but they are unlikely to be tough on the prime minister’s family. One more reason to drink! And when you reach for that glass, remember that in 2012 Orbán likened Europe to alcohol. “Europe will slowly become like alcohol: it inspires us to achieve great goals but also prevents us from reaching them,” he told a crowd at one of his state-of-the-nation speeches.
If Europe is alcohol, Orbán is sure to stay sober.

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© REUTERS/ Bernadett Szabo

After a landslide victory at the ballot boxes for his Fidesz party in April, Hungary’s strongman, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has wasted no time continuing his crusade against civil society.

He has set his sights squarely upon NGOs funded by US billionaire George Soros’s Open Society Foundation, as well as the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, which Soros founded. Orbán’s aim is to continue the omnipresent political campaign against migrants and liberalism in order to distract from massive corruption in his government and among his supporters; he also aims to consolidate his place as the main anti-liberal ideologue in Europe.

On Tuesday Orbán’s government submitted the so-called “Stop Soros” legislation package. The legislation further restricts NGOs working on migration; it also makes it more difficult to monitor the government’s migration policy, and easier to crack down on its critics. Meanwhile, Orbán is refusing to sign a deal with CEU that would secure the university’s future in Budapest.

The bill, according to a briefing by Fidesz group leader Mate Kocsis on Monday, will make “organizing illegal migration” a crime. How is this defined? For example, assisting people who have not been victims of persecution at home to initiate an asylum procedure would become illegal. Such deeds would be punishable by 5-90 days behind bars. The question of determining whether someone was persecuted, however, usually takes place during the asylum procedure itself. Distributing information leaflets on migration and monitoring the border for human rights or asylum law violations would also count as illegal “organization”, according to Kocsis.

Finally, Fidesz also plans to use its two-thirds majority in parliament to amend the constitution to ensure that the EU cannot force Hungary to accept migrants. Orbán wants the Stop Soros bill passed by parliament by June 20.

The Hungarian government already tightened regulations on foreign-funded NGOs in June of last year. That legislation broke EU rules, according to the European Commission, which referred the law to the European Court of Justice last December. But it could be years before the ECJ makes a decision, and until then, the law remains in force—of course, that was part of Orbán’s strategy.

Civil Society Under Pressure

Many Hungarians support these measures. The prime minister’s loyalists argue that NGOs are taking up a political role without having been elected.

“Those loopholes that still exist in the legal system that allow organizations not entitled…to meddle in political decision-making should be closed,” government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs said after April’s elections. Yet it is the government’s onslaught on human rights that forced some NGOs to take a stance in the political arena.

Orbán’s government claims it wants to ensure greater transparency, but NGOs say the legislation and the accompanying government propaganda has stigmatized them and their work. While some NGOs have decided to comply with the government’s new demands, many of those dealing with migration and human rights initially refused. But then Orban stepped up the pressure: After the election, government-friendly media published the names of some 200 people working in migration, including members of the human rights organization Amnesty International, the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International, refugee advocates, investigative journalists, and faculty members from CEU.

The publication of the list revived memories of the darkest days in Hungary’s history and shook up civil society. In response, Soros’s Open Society Foundation (OSF) removed all names and contact details of its Budapest employees from its website, citing concerns over the security of staff. A month later, the OSF decided to relocate its regional headquarters from Budapest to Berlin, blaming “an increasingly repressive political and legal environment.” The pro-democracy foundation has helped to transform post-communist Hungary into a liberal democracy, but it is clearly no longer welcome in Orbán’s illiberal state.

Some of the threatened NGOs are forging ahead, saying they are receiving more funding from individual citizens. “We have received many supportive messages,” said Marta Pardavi, co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, which provides legal services for asylum-seekers, including from EU ambassadors. Nevertheless some partners – typically public institutions involved in implementing projects—are reluctant to continue their work under political pressure.

CEU’s Fate Up in the Air

It’s not all about migration. Orbán is not backing down is his battle against the Central European University either. For the prime minister and his far-right friends, who want to protect the nation state and a perceived European Christian identity from globalization and multiculturalism, the liberal institution is another pillar in a world order that they see as outdated. Indeed, in early May, Orban welcomed Steve Bannon, the far-right former chief strategist to Donald Trump who denounces liberal migration policies and “the EU” at every turn.

After the government amended the higher education law, a deal to secure CEU’s future appeared to be within reach last autumn. But Orban has yet to sign off the agreement. CEU says it has done everything to comply with the government’s requests, including opening a US campus. Foreign minister Peter Szijjarto said last week that the government is awaiting a report from a government committee that visited the US campus in April. Zsolt Enyedi, CEU’s pro-rector and a political scientist, says the government is clearly stonewalling.

Enyedi told me that, in order to start planning for the next academic year, the university would like to have certainty from the government by graduation at the end of June. “By then, we would like to be able to tell our students something,” he said.

He added that he thinks the government’s delay could be a tactic to force CEU to force to Vienna, or to use the university as a bargaining chip in talks with Brussels and Washington. “By now it is clear that the government cannot hide behind professional and regulatory reasons, the question is whether the prime minister wants to kick out CEU from Hungary or not,” he said.

An Illiberal State

 In 2014 Viktor Orban set out to build what he called an illiberal state. The announcement was met with surprise, disbelief, and even amusement among observers. But four years later, Orban has scored three consecutive election victories and plans to stay in power until at least 2030.

Enyedi said Orban has been successful in dismantling the institutional checks and balances in Hungary’s liberal democracy, but he has not been completely successful in convincing Hungarians that liberal democracy is a bad thing. “The average Hungarian still sees his/her future in a western-type liberal democracy and in the EU, but there is uncertainty, which partly stems from the EU’s uncertainty,” he said. “People perceive that real power is with the anti-liberal populist forces rather than the EU, while the EU has been increasingly seen as a fragmented and weak project.” For a leader seeking to build an illiberal democracy in Europe, a “weak” EU is a very good thing.

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© REUTERS/ Philippe Wojazer

It seems young Europeans have caught the Euroskeptic bug, too. According to a survey released in early May by polling institute YouGov, three out of four young Europeans think the backbone of the European Union is economic cooperation, not shared values. More than one in three think the EU should return powers to the national level, particularly in the UK and Greece. A common European culture, on the other hand, resonates little with the young – only 18 percent say there is a shared cultural basis for Europe.

The poll, commissioned by Germany’s Hanover-based TUI Foundation, surveyed some 6,000 young people between the ages of 16 and 26 in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK on their attitudes towards Europe.

Troublingly, only a little more than half – 52 percent – of young Europeans think democracy is the best form of government. Fewer than half in France (42 percent), Italy (45 percent), and Poland (42 percent) are convinced that democracy is the best way to run a society; these are all EU countries where establishment politics have been shaken to the core in recent elections, and forces deeply critical of liberal democracy have gained strength in the last few years.

In France, far-right Marine Le Pen finished as runner-up in last year’s presidential election, and while staunchly pro-EU Emmanuel Macron defeated her, his presidency is not a guaranteed bulwark against nationalist sentiments. Italy’s national election in March upended the country’s political system as well, with the far-right Lega’s Matteo Salvini fast becoming a rising political star in the debt-ridden country. Meanwhile Poland’s ruling nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) is at loggerheads with Brussels over what critics see as serious breaches of rule of law.

It is perhaps no surprise that the majority of respondents in Greece (66 percent), Germany (62 percent), and Spain (57 percent) still think democracy is the best form of government: The two southern countries emerged from dictatorships in the 70s and Germans overcame both the Gestapo and the Stasi. Young Germans on a whole place more trust in the EU than young respondents in the other countries.

While peace is still a core value of the EU in the eyes of many young Europeans, especially Germans and French, the value-based European project of integration is no longer a given. Young people are just as skeptical about their own future, democracy, and Europe, as the rest of society. More than half of them expect things to take a turn for the worse and believe their living standards will be lower than their parents’ level.

But what does Europe actually mean for young Europeans? For youth in the UK and Poland, Europe is mostly geography; Europe as formed by the EU, and its member countries, is most commonly perceived in Italy and Spain. As for shared values, among 40 percent of young people associate human rights with the EU, while 31 percent think democracy is a core European value.

Interestingly, 80 percent of young Europeans are in favor of sanctioning EU member states that violate human rights, and 79 percent supported penalties for the violation of democratic principles. Even Poles agreed, albeit to a lesser extent – and that despite the fact that their own country is under EU scrutiny for violating rule of law standards.

Only one in five European youth thinks his or her country should exit the bloc. However, it is telling that a significant number of young people in Greece (31 percent), France, and Poland (20 percent) are in favor of leaving the EU. In Spain and Germany only 12 percent would vote to leave the union.

Open-Closed

The political dynamics of globalization translate clearly among young people too: Those who are skeptical of the European project see globalization as more of a threat than a boon – only some 28 percent of Euroskeptic youth polled said they believed globalization presented an opportunity, compared to 53 percent of EU supporters.

This dichotomy is driving change in the West, dismantling the traditional left-right division the political landscape and giving birth instead to the open-closed binary of politics. The poll suggests this is not a glitch in time, but an historical trend.

In Brussels, the European Commission has registered the problem and is keen to engage young Europeans more intensively. In its proposal for the next EU budget set to start in 2021, the Commission wants to double funds for the Erasmus+ student exchange program to 30 billion euros. It also plans to spend 700 million euros over seven years to support Interrail train passes for young people in the hope that more traveling will make them committed to upholding the European project. The EU executive also wants to spend more than one billion euros on the European Solidarity Corps, an initiative that supports young people volunteering in European projects.

Presenting the new EU financial plan, budget commissioner Gunther Oettinger called the proposal to double Erasmus+ funds the “right answer to populism and euroskepticism.” But it fails to address how these funds will succeed in engaging skeptical young Europeans – those who are less open, less inclined to travel, and not proficient in different languages. A 2016 Eurobarometer survey showed that fewer than one in ten young Europeans has volunteered abroad. Another 2016 survey found that a large majority of young Europeans (61 percent) do not want to study or work in another EU country, compared to only 32 percent who would.

The YouGov survey however suggests that it is not only the European project that needs an overhaul, but democracy, too. One will not survive without the other.

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© REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger

Something is broken in Hungary’s still young democracy, born nearly 30 years ago from the ashes of the Soviet empire. Some observers and opposition politicians shy away from calling the country undemocratic, or even autocratic—and indeed, voters in Hungary cast their ballots Sunday to give a sweeping two-thirds majority to the ruling Fidesz party for the third time in a row. In fact, Fidesz was the only party to gain seats in the vote.

That in itself is not a problem. The issue is whether that result was achieved democratically. In a preliminary report following the election, international observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the state and Fidesz were inseparable during the election campaign. “The ubiquitous overlap between government information and ruling coalition campaigns, and other abuses of administrative resources, blurred the line between state and party,” their report said. They also described the propaganda machine run by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz as a powerful force that had created hostile and intimidating campaign rhetoric, limited space for substantive debate, and diminished voters’ ability to make an informed choice.

It is difficult to see how any of this would change for the better by the next election in 2022, after yet another four years of Fidesz ruling with a two-thirds majority. And as the co-director of the Budapest-based think tank Policy Solutions, András Bíró-Nagy, adds, the opposition could have achieved better results if they had actually worked together.

The opposition consists of the radical right-wing nationalist Jobbik, several liberal parties, the Socialists, and the green LMP; they all failed to learn the lessons of the past. In the 2014 election, the results were largely shaped by a new electoral law introduced by Fidesz three years earlier. The legislation paved the way for gerrymandering, compensation awarded to large parties, and voting rights for thousands of Hungarians in neighboring countries, to name a few measures; the law helped thrust Fidesz to victory and ensure that opposition parties spent more time bickering than challenging the governing party.

Opposition Failure

“Opposition parties could have stopped Fidesz from gaining two-thirds of the votes if they had coordinated on a minimum level. Yet instead of coordination, they pushed the responsibility of choosing a single opposition candidate in local districts to voters,” Bíró-Nagy said, adding that opposition parties will now have to start rebuilding from scratch.

It was more than gerrymandering, however. Orbán also came up with a convincing storyline that was powerful enough to win over Hungarian voters. After the opposition scored a surprise win in a mayoral by-election in February, Fidesz turned up the notch on the anti-migrant, anti-Islam rhetoric, making it the basis of their campaign. Orbán’s bet paid off.

“The election result showed that migration overrides everything. There are 2.5 million people who believe the fear of migrants is more important than corruption scandals or their everyday problems,” Bíró-Nagy said.

The 54-year old Orbán is often credited with intuitively sensing political trends and possibilities, and his party-state machine has been feeding a story of fear to the citizens. A significant number of Hungarians seemed to be content with believing the Fidesz claim that US billionaire philanthropist George Soros wants to bring a million migrants into Hungary to destroy Christian and European identity—with the help of the EU, UN, and Hungarian opposition. Fidesz did especially well in villages; it was able to mobilize an extra quarter of a million voters over 2014.

A large turnout helped secure 48 percent of the vote for Fidesz, and it has emboldened Orbán as well (the party received 52.7 percent of the list votes in 2010 and 44.8 percent in 2014). A Fidesz party spokesman said on Monday that the government will submit the so-called Stop Soros legislation package next month—it aims to paralyze NGOs dealing with migration. The proposed legislation is seen by some as another tool to stifle criticism.

European Stakes

Far-right and populist politicians across Europe, from France’s Marine Le Pen to the Dutch Geert Wilders and Beatrix von Storch from Germany’s anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and Matteo Salvini from Italy’s powerful far-right Lega party, were all quick to congratulate Orbán.

As mainstream European parties watch populist parties win over, Orbán represents a dangerous and appealing alternative. With his large mandate, the Hungarian prime minister will go to Brussels further cemented in his policies and political legitimacy.

Populists across Europe see Orbán as an unapologetic, skilled political master able to defy Brussels and liberal critics. His use of national and identity politics and conspiracy theories are a blueprint for populist far-right politicians who often use the same tools. Orbán’s third election win could inspire others to copy his template for illiberal democracy, in which the characteristics of democracy—the system of checks and balance, press freedom, and the rule of law—are scaled back significantly.

In Brussels, however, it was business as usual. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker sent a letter of congratulations to Orbán; after all, the two represent the same political family—the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), which has so far been willing to provide political cover for Fidesz in the face of criticism and widespread concern. Juncker said he will call Orbán to discuss “issues of common interests” and “joint challenges,” as one commission spokesman put it. Germany’s Manfred Weber, head of EPP group in the European Parliament, also congratulated the Hungarian premier on his sweeping victory.

While the Commission has launched several probes into Hungarian legislation that ran afoul of EU rules, their objections have only resulted in cosmetic changes. At the end of the day, the EU Commission also has an interest in de-escalating the conflict with the euroskeptic Orbán. In fact, the EU executive now says there is no systematic threat to the rule of law in Hungary.

Proving Orbán Right

The EU’s inability to address democracy issues in Hungary only proves Orbán right, who argues that the Brussels “liberal elite” is out of touch with citizens and intervenes in internal politics only to help his political adversaries. And Orbán’s European political allies, who want to see less interference from Brussels, also caution the EU. Germany’s interior minister Horst Seehofer from Angela Merkel’s Bavarian allies, the Christian Social Union (CSU) on Monday said that the EU must drop its “arrogance and condescension” toward Hungary.

A frequent Orbán critic, Luxembourg’s foreign minister Jean Asselborn however sounded the alarm in German daily, Die Welt. “Today it is Hungary and Poland, tomorrow others in Eastern and Central Europe, even a big founding country of the EU, could develop a taste for undermining values and scaremongering.” It is up to Germany and France and other member states to “neutralize this tumor of values,” he said.

But that is unlikely to happen before Orbán’s illiberalism and populism leaves its mark on other EU countries as well.

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© REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

“This will be the first time that I will vote since I reached voting age 20 years ago. I feel like something must change. I just don’t know who to vote for,” laments Eva, a hairdresser in her late thirties in Budapest.

She symbolizes hundreds of thousands of voters in Hungary who will head to the polls on Sunday, April 8. They want change and a break with Viktor Orbán’s corrupt and illiberal regime, but they don’t have a party.

There is little doubt the anti-communist youth leader-turned-nationalist politician, along with his ruling Fidesz party, will secure another majority in parliament on Sunday. They might be short of a constitutional two-thirds majority, but they will likely secure more than 50 percent in parliament, meaning a third consecutive term for Orbán.

Yet there are several unpredictable factors that could upset Orbán’s re-election. A shock victory for an opposition candidate in a mayoral election in February galvanized the deeply fragmented opposition parties, which range from urban liberals to far-right supporters of the Jobbik party. The myth of Fidesz’s invincibility was shaken by the mayoral vote in the city of Hódmezővásárhely in southeastern Hungary, causing bewilderment on both sides. Fidesz chose to escalate its campaign’s hate rhetoric, while opposition parties attempted to coordinate.

Ahead of Sunday’s national vote, two factors could still tip results in an unexpected way: High turnout, and a last minute push by voters to force opposition parties to unite behind single candidates against Fidesz candidates in local districts. Oligarch Lajos Simicska, a once-powerful Orbán ally, has funded an increasingly critical media that has leaked a series of high-profile corruption cases in recent weeks – and those leaks could impact the vote as well.

The polls also offer a range of possible outcomes: They have tilted towards Orbán’s party, probably in part because people are afraid to reveal their real preferences for fear of reprisal, but they have offered varying predictions for his margin of victory. One Republikon Institute poll from March showed voters supporting Fidesz by 49 percent, while the far-right Jobbik – which has been forced to move towards the center, as Fidesz has increasingly adopted pro-nationalist and anti-immigrant positions – is at 19 percent. The Socialists came in at 17 percent.

But another poll conducted by Median showed 53 percent support for Fidesz, which could translate to a two-thirds majority in parliament. Built-in advantages in the election system will boost Orbán’s success. This poll would also mean that Fidesz only needs to mobilize its core voters to succeed – in other words, the party has no need to reach out to new voters. The opposition parties’ appeal, meanwhile remains weak – the Socialists are struggling to regain credibility, while Jobbik and the liberals have limited voter bases.

Fear is a predominant factor in the election. The Hungarian premier has promised to take vengeance on those who are critical of his system. And the government’s hate campaigns dominate the media and billboards, stoking fear of migrants and foreigners. In the final days of campaigning, Orbán suggested that voters who choose the opposition are traitors. He said Hungary’s existence is at stake at the ballot boxes. It is ironic that it was 20th-century Hungarian politician and political thinker István Bibó who warned: “Above all, being a democrat means not being afraid.” Whether voters can free themselves from a cycle of fear will be a key factor in Sunday’s election.

A Test for Illiberalism

On Sunday, eight million voters will be asked to decide whether Hungary should continue on the illiberal path set by Orbán and based on models such as Turkey and Russia. Orbán has succeeded in tapping into a deep disillusionment with democratic transition in Hungary, and has promised to build a successful alternative to Western liberal democracy. By this point, the costs of a shift might be too high.

Orbán’s illiberalism in Hungary has meant drawing up imaginary enemies, from Brussels bureaucrats to US billionaire philanthropist George Soros; it has also meant dismantling democratic institutions while facilitating massive corruption. And it has inspired admirers and followers across Europe, from Poland’s government to Italy’s far right Lega Nord, which won 18 percent in that country’s national election.

If voters hand down a surprisingly bad result for Fidesz, it could show that the illiberal logic of constant escalation has its limits, and that corruption does not go unnoticed.

“In a way, what is at stake in this election is to see whether hate campaigns really work,” said Ablonczy Bálint, a columnist at the conservative weekly Heti Válasz. “If Fidesz loses, it shows they have their limits, and that high-profile corruption cases bite. If they win, it will prove that they managed to tap into underlying fears in society that override everything.”

András Bíró-Nagy of the progressive political research institute Political Solutions in Bundapest said that the likely scenario is a confident Fidesz win, but added: “This election could show if Fidesz is past its peak, and could facilitate the start of its decline.” However, Sunday’s elections could decide who will be the main challenger to Orbán – Jobbik, under leader Gábor Vona; or the Socialists, who borrowed Gergely Karácsony, a popular politician from the green, liberal Dialogue for Hungary party, as their candidate for prime minister. With European and local elections coming up in 2019, opposition parties will soon have another chance to weaken Fidesz’s hold on the country.

Whatever the outcome, Fidesz will remain the strongest party in Hungary, and Orbán an unchallenged leader. Consolidation is not in Orbán’s cards, and any easing on his grip on power is out of the question, even if elections show a loss in support. A further concentration of pro-Fidesz media and a crackdown on civil society groups is widely expected.

“Illiberalism is a one-way street; you can’t back up, the only way is forward,” warned Péter Krekó, director of the research and consulting institute Political Capital in Budapest.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

In recent years the European Union has weathered an economic crisis and a migration crisis; today, it is still deep in the throes of battling both a rise of nationalism and managing a messy divorce from the UK. The bloc is gearing up for next year’s European elections with the hope of forging closer connections to European citizens and enlisting them as allies in future crises.

That is one reason European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker two weeks ago laid out his ideas on how to reform the EU institutions to bring them closer to the people. He re-committed to the controversial Spitzenkandidat—“lead candidate” in German—system for choosing his successor.

In the Spitzenkandidat process, Europe’s major political groups each select a lead candidate; whichever party wins the election fields the new president of the Commission. It is something of an institutional coup pulled off by the European Parliament and engineered by then-EP president Martin Schulz four years ago. Making use of the loose wording of the Lisbon Treaty, the parliament took control of who will be the next EU executive chief—a decision that until then belonged to the leaders of the member countries alone.

National governments reacted too late to this development in 2014. European political parties nominated their candidates and the European People’s Party put forward the former eurogroup president and ex-leader of Luxembourg, Juncker, but nobody thought he would eventually become Commission head. In the end, the EPP won and German Chancellor Angela Merkel threw her weight behind the idea, succumbing to pressure at home to support what is seen as a more democratic process. In hindsight, it is fitting that at the time only the UK’s David Cameron and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán opposed the appointment of Juncker; the UK is now leaving the EU and Hungary is drifting ever further away from liberal democracy.

The Spitzenkandidat process remains a key battle between national governments and the European Parliament: It is a symbol of the ongoing ideological and practical struggles between those who prefer a community of member states and those who want a more integrated European community.

The parliament this time raised its bets by trying to tie the leaders’ hands even further, arguing that the Spitzenkandidat system “is a principle that cannot be overturned.” This is partly how the EP is trying to turn around rapidly shrinking voter participation rates in European elections.

No Automacity

Juncker insisted the lead candidate process must go ahead, saying: “We have to make sure that Europe is at the heart of the election campaign.” That’s why it might have seemed odd at first glance that one of the most vocal opponents of the Spitzenkandidaten system is French president Emmanuel Macron, who ran a pro-Europe campaign last year. But Macron doesn’t yet have a European party to belong to and would be unable to influence who takes the Commission top post.

In a nod to Macron, Juncker urged parties to commit themselves to a European political group. There is speculation in Brussels that Macron is working on setting up his own La Republique en Marche on the European level, perhaps with the help of Spain’s Ciudadanos party, Matteo Renzi’s social democrats in Italy, and some smaller parties. He hasn’t announced an intention to do so, but it seems the French president wants to change the political landscape first and then help define the European Commission presidency.

Other governments were also on the lookout this time. Liberal Macron will find strange bedfellows in his opposition to the lead candidate system. Illiberal Hungary and its allies in the Visegrad Four, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, want as little divergence as possible from the rules laid down in the Lisbon treaty: in a statement they argued that EU countries should propose the Commission president “taking into account” the outcome of the European elections, then allow the European Parliament to guide their decision.

But it’s not just Macron and the usual suspects who oppose the change. Some diplomats in Brussels sound reluctant as well, noting that turnout for the 2014 elections was the lowest ever since direct elections were introduced on the European level, and the Spitzenkandidat system did not manage to build a link between European citizens and the EU as intended. Juncker hoped to bridge that by fielding multilingual candidates and staging televised debates across the continent.

When EU leaders gathered last Friday in Brussels for an informal summit, there was little love in the air for the Spitzenkandidat system. European Council President Donald Tusk, who leads the gatherings of EU leaders, asked them to think about whether they want to automatically accept the outcome of the Spitzenkandidat process or let leaders themselves to decide how to honor the election results. All agreed that the European Parliament does not have monopoly over choosing the next Commission president, and there is no “automaticity” in the system.

Tusk pushed back even further. “The idea that the Spitzenkandidat process is somehow more democratic is wrong,” he told reporters after the summit, standing next to Juncker. German chancellor Angela Merkel added that no clear majority is expected in next year’s election, so leaders will have to see which parties can form a coalition before nominating the Commission president for the Parliament to approve.

Now the European Parliament must decide next year whether to play hardball and reject the Council’s nominee. It would be yet another move in the battle with member states over which institution has the ultimate democratic legitimacy in the EU—and who has the ability to bring the bloc closer to its citizens.

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