Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán does not like to talk to the independent press, preferring more managed media appearances. However, in November 2018, followers of his Facebook page were made privy to a video he made with the action star Chuck Norris. “I’m a streetfighter basically,” said Orbán, as he drove by Budapest’s Heroes’ Square, the setting for his epochal “Russians go home” speech in 1989. “I’m not coming from the elite, I’m coming from a small village.”

Orbán’s PR was canny as ever. Norris is a cult figure in Hungary and the memory of Heroes’ Square is a gift that keeps on giving, even three decades on. But he was also showing a self-awareness that is not always apparent to Hungary observers. “Orbán loves to fight,” his biographer Paul Lendvai told the Berlin Policy Journal. His Fidesz party and Orbán project themselves as the only real genuine fighters for the national interest, for Christian values, against the barbarian invasion,” Lendvai added.

The Viktor Orbán story is one of ambition and opportunism. It began with opportunism, too. It began in 1989 with a speech that Orbán made to some 250,000 people at the symbolic reburial of Imre Nagy, the martyr of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Orbán decried the Soviet Union and called for the withdrawal from Hungary of Soviet troops. It was an opportunistic move—the speakers that day had allegedly agreed to demur on the topic of Russia’s departure—but with it, he entered the history books. As one of his biographers Jozsef Debreczeni described it, “it was the meeting of an extraordinary luck with an extraordinary talent.”

Orbán has been a legacy politician from the start, even though a video from around that time shows him denying any interest in a political career, saying he would rather be a professor. Yet one of his university teachers has recalled having to break the news to a young, crestfallen Orbán that he would never fulfil his ambition to become US president, because he was not born in the country. His years in liberal circles left Orbán with a bitterness from being mocked by Budapest’s intellectuals. But if he was outclassed on an academic level, his political instincts have helped him prevail.

“He Has Become Illiberal”

Given his current dominance of Hungary’s political landscape, it is easy to forget that Orbán failed to gain an outright majority in Hungary during the first 20 years. However, since 2010 he has won three supermajorities that have allowed him to rewrite and amend the constitution at will. After three decades in politics—Orbán, now 55, has been at Hungary’s top table since he was 26—voters want him because of his personality.  That’s how the one genuine pretender to his crown, János Lázár, a leading member of Fidesz, has described Orbán’s enduring success.

According to political scientist and researcher Zoltán Gábor Szűcs, “Orbán is smart, self-reflective (but not a philosopher), aggressive, manipulative. I’m not sure if he knows that people are not just his means and instruments,” he added. Orbán always wants to win and he’s simply unable to play by the book. Through all the ideological about-turns—since 1989 Orbán has changed his stance on liberalism, the clergy, Russia, and Europe—it is relentless ambition that has been the common thread that runs through his career. What motivates him is “winning, crushing his rivals,” said Szűcs. “He is always pushing the boundaries. Usually it works for him. During his first term (from 1998-2002) he was much less relevant than now. It was a different time, a different Europe, and Hungary was not in the EU,” Szűcs added.

Orbán’s early academic ambitions are still manifest in his willingness to meet star intellectuals. The latest academic to receive an audience with Orbán was French liberal philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, who said after a coffee with him this month that he had “deciphered Orbán’s secret.” Lévy recalled that he met Orbán 30 years ago as a member of President François Mitterrand’s delegation.  “Orbán was completely different. A liberal, anti-totalitarian person,” Lévy said. “He has become indeed illiberal.”

Razor-Wire For the Borders

Since 2015, Orbán has made immigration a signature issue. He has called migrants “a poison,” and has said that “Hungary does not need a single migrant for the economy to work, or the population to sustain itself, or for the country to have a future.” However according to Szűcs, the rise of Orbán on a European level was as much down to the lack of reactions of his political opponents, as the speed with which Orbán himself acted.

“He was incredibly cynical and also extremely lucky that neither his opposition nor the EU were able to take advantage of his shocking mismanagement of the migration crisis. It was a total failure, a complete meltdown of the Hungarian administration,” Szűcs said.

“For months they were paralyzed. But still the opposition missed this unique opportunity just like the EU did. Ever since then the migration issue pays off for him way more than he could have reasonably expected when he started this whole gamble.”

So, while Orbán built razor-wire fences along Hungary’s southern borders with Serbia and Croatia, an inactive EU allowed him to set the agenda, which Orbán will seek to profit from in the European Parliament elections at the end of May.

In a Favorable Position

Orbán’s turn to the right has seen Fidesz suspended from the major center-right group in the European Parliament, the European People’s Party. It remains to be seen whether the party will make amends with its EPP allies or seek other alliances after the European elections in May.

Europe is increasingly important to him. “He is not endangered on the home front. He plays it by ear; that is, if the radical right from Matteo Salvini to Marine Le Pen and Austria’s FPÖ is strengthened, he is in a very favorable position,” said biographer Lendvai. Fidesz will then likely forge an alliance with those who think similarly to the Hungarian governing party, and fight for a ‘Europe of nations,’” he added.

“I guess his most optimistic scenario is that the status quo will end for good and he can profit from the subsequent chaos,” Szűcs said. “Maybe he can strengthen his position in the EPP, maybe he can find new friends. Perhaps his worst-case scenario is that the EPP won’t need him anymore. Anyway, as long as his position in Hungary is stable, he has plenty of time to wait for the next opportunity.”

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© REUTERS/Stephane Lecocq/Pool

It was a classic elephant-in-the-room situation: In early November, Europe’s largest political alliance, the European People’s Party, held its all-important pre-election congress in Helsinki with speeches from German Chancellor Angela Merkel and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. Several EPP heavyweights talked about upholding democratic freedoms and values, but notably, no-one explicitly named the target of their warnings—the person sitting right next to them: Hungary’s illiberal premier Viktor Orbán.

The EPP was keen to display unity at the congress as it heads into the European Parliamentary elections next May. The gathering followed months of speculation over whether the EPP could split after the election, with some liberal-minded deputies joining a yet-to-be formed alliance with France’s president Emmanuel Macron, and whether Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party would leave to lead their own alliance with other like-minded European nationalists.

The EPP has had an Orbán problem for years. The Hungarian premier has been systematically undermining rule of law and democratic values in Hungary, and challenges those same fundamentals in the European Union. Ongoing demonstrations in Budapest for independent media and courts, and against a labor law increasing overtime hours, will cause further headache for Europe’s largest political alliance. This week, opposition MPs were violently thrown out of the public media’s headquarters in Budapest, the central propaganda-machine for Orbán, after they vowed to read protestors’ demands on air. Orbán, who has never faced political consequences on the European level for his actions, is unlikely to back down, putting the EPP in an uncomfortable spot.

The EPP is the powerhouse party in Brussels and much of Europe. Its politicians head the three most important institutions in the European Union and command seven governments in the (still) 28-member EU, plus they hold the Romanian president’s post. The EPP has sheltered Orbán for years, with the party’s president Joseph Daul, an influential French politician, amicably referring to Orbán as the party’s “enfant terrible.”

The EPP’s Red Lines

Initially, EPP members were arguing that keeping Orbán close would tame the Hungarian prime minister, who likes to see himself as a “street-fighter,” and curb his autocratic tendencies. It set out what it called “red lines” over Orbán’s targeting the Central European University in Budapest, but failed to act when the CEU did decide to move to Vienna as the Hungarian government refused to secure its future in the Hungarian capital. Despite mild EPP criticism, Orbán kept running his anti-EU, anti-liberal, anti-migration campaigns, and continued to centralize power back home. Liberal-minded EPP members in the European Parliament grew increasingly annoyed with the lack of disciplinary action, and saw Orbán as a dangerous pull for EPP to the right.

The frustration with Orbán boiled over last September, when the majority of EPP members in the European Parliament, including its leader, Bavarian Manfred Weber, who is running for the presidency of the EU commission, voted to launch a sanctions procedure against Hungary under Article 7 of the Lisbon treaty for breaching EU rules and values. But the procedure is unlikely to lead anywhere, as deciding on biting sanctions depend on fellow member states reluctant to challenge each other’s internal measures.

Despite calls to kick Fidesz out, the EPP party leadership refused to tackle the issue, arguing that according to the party rules, seven member parties from five different member states need to come forward with a request. No such request has been made. Petteri Orpo, the leader of the Finnish National Coalition Party, tentatively said that if there were other six parties, his group would join in calls for Fidesz’s expulsion.

Clear Intentions

Orbán isn’t hiding his intention to pull the EPP to the right either. He made it clear in a speech in June 2018 that he does not want to leave the EPP and create what he called a “successful anti-immigration” party, but rather he wants the center-right alliance to turn his direction and return to its “Christian democratic roots.”

He argued that the EPP could either become a flavorless, colorless party stuck in an anti-populist coalition with the social democrats and liberals, or move to the right and continue shaping EU politics. “The other model which has been successfully tested in Austria and Hungary is taking up the challenge, is not creating such a people’s front, is taking the issues raised by new parties seriously, and is giving responsible answers to them,” Orbán said at the time.

The EPP attempted to portray itself in Helsinki as a united political force that can stop the threat of extremist and populism in Europe. Yet speakers at the congress were more interested in rallying EPP members against their socialist and liberal contenders than populists. The party leadership also knows that Orbán will deliver at the ballot boxes. His party alliance is expected to win well over a dozen MEPs to the party in May’s election, much needed by the EPP, which could lose 30-40 seats, according to projections.

Orbán argued at the party should respect winners. “What is even more important to understand: we have to win, not just survive, and victory must be wanted. Let us not listen to our opponents, and let us not measure ourselves by the standards of the leftist parties and the liberal media. […] The European elections must be won at home, in each of our countries. In order for the EPP to become the party of the winners again, we need winning prime ministers,” he told delegates.

EU council president Donald Tusk retorted in his speech following Orbán: “We all want to win the upcoming elections. But let us remember that at stake in these elections are not benefits and jobs, but the protection of our fundamental values. Because without them, our victory will make no sense.”

The most recent EPP argument for not stepping up criticism of Orbán cites Brexit. Party officials argue that the Brexit process really started when British Conservatives, led by David Cameron, left the EPP and formed their own group in 2009. This started the UK’s drift away from the EU core, they say. The same could happen with Hungary if Orbán is put under more pressure. Meanwhile, EPP president Daul insists on keeping the party as large and wide-reaching as possible. The continued support for Orbán’s autocratic measures will nevertheless further encourage the Hungarian leader. It might also signal an EPP shift to the right during and after the European elections.

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Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

When in Hungary, you cannot escape pálinka. It starts and end meals, mends broken hearts, and soaks up a variety of sorrows. The New York Times called it a drink that tastes like a “slap in the face.” It’s made of fruit, and its alcohol content must be between 37.5 percent and 86 percent. Pálinka is recognized by the EU as unique to Hungary and covered by its “protected designation of origin” laws.

True to his populist leadership style, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán put the brandy on his patriotic flag early on. After his return to power in 2010, the Hungarian premier championed a law allowing citizens to distill 50 liters of their own pálinka tax-free if they used approved equipment and did not sell it to others. The liquor industry and the EU were not impressed, but Hungarians, whose rate of alcohol consumption is, by the way, among the highest in Europe, were happy. They downed a shot with the cheer: “Egészségedre!” (“To your health!”)

Yet for all the battles Orbán fought with the EU, on pálinka, he chose to give way to Brussels. In fact, when it comes to pálinka, he’s even stood down twice. There have been two infringement procedures against Hungary over the government’s efforts to institute ultra-low taxes on brewing of the national drink. In the first case, the European Court of Justice struck down Budapest’s attempt to allow tax-free home brewing in 2014. So the following year, Hungary complied and began to tax home-brewed pálinka. But in new proposals published in early June this year, the government introduced a so-called health tax that applied to soft drinks but excluded spirits like pálinka–causing a second infringement procedure. This time the government did not wait for the court decision: it introduced an increased tax rate on the fruit brandy right away.

Choose your Fight

Orbán likely wanted to avoid a protracted battle with Europe when so many other issues are looming. Still, pálinka is no small matter in Hungary. It is consumed in a particular glass with a round belly to bring out the fruity flavors. Unlike vodka, it is not supposed to be served cold. Indeed, people who keep their pálinka in the refrigerator draw scornful looks across Hungary. Serving it cold kills the fruity aroma, everyone knows that! Hungarians are also known to boast about their own home-made pálinka.

The national drink, much like its home country, has had an impressive run over the last few decades. Even though home-brewing was illegal under communist rule, many defied the rule. Quality, however, often suffered. That was true, too, for commercially produced pálinka. Socialism meant that there shouldn’t be high quality drinks at prices suited only to an affluent bourgeoisie.

Since Hungary’s democratic transition, pálinka has built a reputation as a fine liquor, with tasting festivals popping up across the country and half-liter bottles costing as much as €50. There are about 600 distilleries in the country, and the number of commercial brewers jumped from 72 to 138 between 2010 and 2017, according to the agriculture ministry.

Pálinka Politics

Like many of Orbán’s battles with Brussels, the fight for the right to a tax-free, homemade pálinka is more than just a levy issue. It plays into the perception that Orbán is a self-made man from the countryside who takes on the high-minded urban intelligentsia and truly understands the Hungarian psyche. He protects Hungary’s national identity in the face of foreign pressure and is at the same time down-to-earth—someone you could throw back a pálinka with anytime. He’s known to say “Isten-isten,” another toast meaning “God-God,” before knocking back a shot.

Orbán, though not a heavy drinker, likes to pose with a shot of pálinka, especially during campaigns. In a 2013 photo album of his family’s Christmas celebrations, the paterfamilias posed with a glass in the company of his son-in-law, István Tiborcz. According to media reports, the EU’s anti-fraud office OLAF found “serious irregularities” in EU-funded projects carried out by a company once controlled by Tiborcz. OLAF recommended that Hungary’s public persecutors pursue charges, and that the European Commission should recover more than €40 million spent on the projects.

Hungarian authorities did launch a follow-up investigation, but they are unlikely to be tough on the prime minister’s family. One more reason to drink! And when you reach for that glass, remember that in 2012 Orbán likened Europe to alcohol. “Europe will slowly become like alcohol: it inspires us to achieve great goals but also prevents us from reaching them,” he told a crowd at one of his state-of-the-nation speeches.
If Europe is alcohol, Orbán is sure to stay sober.

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© REUTERS/ Bernadett Szabo

After a landslide victory at the ballot boxes for his Fidesz party in April, Hungary’s strongman, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has wasted no time continuing his crusade against civil society.

He has set his sights squarely upon NGOs funded by US billionaire George Soros’s Open Society Foundation, as well as the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, which Soros founded. Orbán’s aim is to continue the omnipresent political campaign against migrants and liberalism in order to distract from massive corruption in his government and among his supporters; he also aims to consolidate his place as the main anti-liberal ideologue in Europe.

On Tuesday Orbán’s government submitted the so-called “Stop Soros” legislation package. The legislation further restricts NGOs working on migration; it also makes it more difficult to monitor the government’s migration policy, and easier to crack down on its critics. Meanwhile, Orbán is refusing to sign a deal with CEU that would secure the university’s future in Budapest.

The bill, according to a briefing by Fidesz group leader Mate Kocsis on Monday, will make “organizing illegal migration” a crime. How is this defined? For example, assisting people who have not been victims of persecution at home to initiate an asylum procedure would become illegal. Such deeds would be punishable by 5-90 days behind bars. The question of determining whether someone was persecuted, however, usually takes place during the asylum procedure itself. Distributing information leaflets on migration and monitoring the border for human rights or asylum law violations would also count as illegal “organization”, according to Kocsis.

Finally, Fidesz also plans to use its two-thirds majority in parliament to amend the constitution to ensure that the EU cannot force Hungary to accept migrants. Orbán wants the Stop Soros bill passed by parliament by June 20.

The Hungarian government already tightened regulations on foreign-funded NGOs in June of last year. That legislation broke EU rules, according to the European Commission, which referred the law to the European Court of Justice last December. But it could be years before the ECJ makes a decision, and until then, the law remains in force—of course, that was part of Orbán’s strategy.

Civil Society Under Pressure

Many Hungarians support these measures. The prime minister’s loyalists argue that NGOs are taking up a political role without having been elected.

“Those loopholes that still exist in the legal system that allow organizations not entitled…to meddle in political decision-making should be closed,” government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs said after April’s elections. Yet it is the government’s onslaught on human rights that forced some NGOs to take a stance in the political arena.

Orbán’s government claims it wants to ensure greater transparency, but NGOs say the legislation and the accompanying government propaganda has stigmatized them and their work. While some NGOs have decided to comply with the government’s new demands, many of those dealing with migration and human rights initially refused. But then Orban stepped up the pressure: After the election, government-friendly media published the names of some 200 people working in migration, including members of the human rights organization Amnesty International, the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International, refugee advocates, investigative journalists, and faculty members from CEU.

The publication of the list revived memories of the darkest days in Hungary’s history and shook up civil society. In response, Soros’s Open Society Foundation (OSF) removed all names and contact details of its Budapest employees from its website, citing concerns over the security of staff. A month later, the OSF decided to relocate its regional headquarters from Budapest to Berlin, blaming “an increasingly repressive political and legal environment.” The pro-democracy foundation has helped to transform post-communist Hungary into a liberal democracy, but it is clearly no longer welcome in Orbán’s illiberal state.

Some of the threatened NGOs are forging ahead, saying they are receiving more funding from individual citizens. “We have received many supportive messages,” said Marta Pardavi, co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, which provides legal services for asylum-seekers, including from EU ambassadors. Nevertheless some partners – typically public institutions involved in implementing projects—are reluctant to continue their work under political pressure.

CEU’s Fate Up in the Air

It’s not all about migration. Orbán is not backing down is his battle against the Central European University either. For the prime minister and his far-right friends, who want to protect the nation state and a perceived European Christian identity from globalization and multiculturalism, the liberal institution is another pillar in a world order that they see as outdated. Indeed, in early May, Orban welcomed Steve Bannon, the far-right former chief strategist to Donald Trump who denounces liberal migration policies and “the EU” at every turn.

After the government amended the higher education law, a deal to secure CEU’s future appeared to be within reach last autumn. But Orban has yet to sign off the agreement. CEU says it has done everything to comply with the government’s requests, including opening a US campus. Foreign minister Peter Szijjarto said last week that the government is awaiting a report from a government committee that visited the US campus in April. Zsolt Enyedi, CEU’s pro-rector and a political scientist, says the government is clearly stonewalling.

Enyedi told me that, in order to start planning for the next academic year, the university would like to have certainty from the government by graduation at the end of June. “By then, we would like to be able to tell our students something,” he said.

He added that he thinks the government’s delay could be a tactic to force CEU to force to Vienna, or to use the university as a bargaining chip in talks with Brussels and Washington. “By now it is clear that the government cannot hide behind professional and regulatory reasons, the question is whether the prime minister wants to kick out CEU from Hungary or not,” he said.

An Illiberal State

 In 2014 Viktor Orban set out to build what he called an illiberal state. The announcement was met with surprise, disbelief, and even amusement among observers. But four years later, Orban has scored three consecutive election victories and plans to stay in power until at least 2030.

Enyedi said Orban has been successful in dismantling the institutional checks and balances in Hungary’s liberal democracy, but he has not been completely successful in convincing Hungarians that liberal democracy is a bad thing. “The average Hungarian still sees his/her future in a western-type liberal democracy and in the EU, but there is uncertainty, which partly stems from the EU’s uncertainty,” he said. “People perceive that real power is with the anti-liberal populist forces rather than the EU, while the EU has been increasingly seen as a fragmented and weak project.” For a leader seeking to build an illiberal democracy in Europe, a “weak” EU is a very good thing.

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© REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

Many in Europe see this as a sweep of Viktor Orbán and his illiberal democratic order in Hungary. How did he pull that off? I think there were plenty of reasons. The election presented a Catch-22 for the very fragmented opposition. For many years, there has been a leadership crisis on the opposition’s side, namely that there was no leader who had enough appeal and strength to convince other parties to follow him or her. Also, the election system was significantly manipulated when it was modified in 2013. It’s very difficult now to get into parliament because of the five percent threshold. It’s a badly constructed election law, intentionally so because it serves the strongest party, which right now is Fidesz. Also, the media did not allow any alternative coverage of Fidesz’ omnipresent anti-immigrant campaign. Only the government had the opportunity to appear in large public media and dominate the narrative on the issue.

So you’re saying it wasn’t a fair election? No, it wasn’t and we’re actually questioning whether it was free or not because if citizens don’t have the right to make a judgement on parties running with equal opportunities, they no longer have the right to choose.

At the same time, we have seen mass demonstrations on the streets of Budapest to protest Orbán’s victory. What is the state of Hungary now, after the vote? There have been huge demonstrations since the election, with 100,000 people in streets of Budapest every week. It’s really a significant mass of people. These are frustrated and angry people who believe this unfair election didn’t serve Hungary. The problem is that this is a civilian movement. There is no party representation of this mass of people. So it demonstrates that Hungarian voters feel somewhat abandoned by the political parties. The task in the next few years, and ahead of next year’s European elections, is to capture the attention and passion of this disappointed mass of people. They represent 52 percent of voters. These are students, people from countryside, (the far-right) Jobbik and its supporters—it’s a very diverse group. It will be a big challenge for any political force to pull these people towards believing in their platform. In the fall of 2019, there will be municipal elections, so that gives parties a year and a half to reorganize themselves to run again. But the situation is very dire and it’s not just because the parties are seriously hit. Orbán announced during a rally in March that he would take revenge on anyone who did not support Fidesz. Nobody knows what this revenge means.

Given that the Hungarian economy is doing quite well, why did Orbán resort to an anti-Western, anti-migrant, anti-Soros, anti-UN, racist campaign platform to attract voters, especially when there are not even many migrants in Hungary? It’s symbolic. You don’t need migrants to be anti-migration. It’s a very important learning point for European countries because non-European migrants mean a cultural threat. You don’t have to have any within your country, you just have to highlight the fact that there are people in Europe who are non-Europeans, who have different churches, religions, habits, attitudes. This is enough—at least in a country where you have no history of multiculturalism. It’s beyond the natural political discourse. It’s about the existence of European culture and it’s about identity. With that approach, you can gather voter support from people who are actually very different from each other. This is why Orban’s voting base is also very diverse.

What does his victory mean for Europe going forward? This is a threatening victory. Orbán received a huge boost confirming that he is a clearly illiberal leader and is still supported by people. We are afraid he will now attack the judiciary and take over further media. We worry he will target NGOs, civil society—specifically because he believes the political opposition may not threaten his power, but civil society can. So with the new mandate, he can produce more and more legislation that go against European norms. And what’s more, judging from the strange and incompetent response we have seen from the European Union’s institutions and other European countries, he can go ahead with his illiberal state.

What would a competent answer look like? I think the Europeans need to look at this systematically. It’s not one step or another; not one infringement process or another. The entire legal system is now filled with—in European terms—undemocratic, unlawful networks. It should be regarded as one whole package. And don’t wait for what Orbán is going to do because we know what his plans are. In one month he’ll have a government and a whole summer to implement his platform.
Still, I think it’s very important that Hungary is well integrated into the European economic system as well, that we see a lot of funds and investment not translated in any way into European values. The EU institutions and also large companies active in Hungary should do something on the financial question because at the moment, they are actually financially supporting the base of an illiberal state that is undermining European values and European cohesion.

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© REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger

Something is broken in Hungary’s still young democracy, born nearly 30 years ago from the ashes of the Soviet empire. Some observers and opposition politicians shy away from calling the country undemocratic, or even autocratic—and indeed, voters in Hungary cast their ballots Sunday to give a sweeping two-thirds majority to the ruling Fidesz party for the third time in a row. In fact, Fidesz was the only party to gain seats in the vote.

That in itself is not a problem. The issue is whether that result was achieved democratically. In a preliminary report following the election, international observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the state and Fidesz were inseparable during the election campaign. “The ubiquitous overlap between government information and ruling coalition campaigns, and other abuses of administrative resources, blurred the line between state and party,” their report said. They also described the propaganda machine run by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz as a powerful force that had created hostile and intimidating campaign rhetoric, limited space for substantive debate, and diminished voters’ ability to make an informed choice.

It is difficult to see how any of this would change for the better by the next election in 2022, after yet another four years of Fidesz ruling with a two-thirds majority. And as the co-director of the Budapest-based think tank Policy Solutions, András Bíró-Nagy, adds, the opposition could have achieved better results if they had actually worked together.

The opposition consists of the radical right-wing nationalist Jobbik, several liberal parties, the Socialists, and the green LMP; they all failed to learn the lessons of the past. In the 2014 election, the results were largely shaped by a new electoral law introduced by Fidesz three years earlier. The legislation paved the way for gerrymandering, compensation awarded to large parties, and voting rights for thousands of Hungarians in neighboring countries, to name a few measures; the law helped thrust Fidesz to victory and ensure that opposition parties spent more time bickering than challenging the governing party.

Opposition Failure

“Opposition parties could have stopped Fidesz from gaining two-thirds of the votes if they had coordinated on a minimum level. Yet instead of coordination, they pushed the responsibility of choosing a single opposition candidate in local districts to voters,” Bíró-Nagy said, adding that opposition parties will now have to start rebuilding from scratch.

It was more than gerrymandering, however. Orbán also came up with a convincing storyline that was powerful enough to win over Hungarian voters. After the opposition scored a surprise win in a mayoral by-election in February, Fidesz turned up the notch on the anti-migrant, anti-Islam rhetoric, making it the basis of their campaign. Orbán’s bet paid off.

“The election result showed that migration overrides everything. There are 2.5 million people who believe the fear of migrants is more important than corruption scandals or their everyday problems,” Bíró-Nagy said.

The 54-year old Orbán is often credited with intuitively sensing political trends and possibilities, and his party-state machine has been feeding a story of fear to the citizens. A significant number of Hungarians seemed to be content with believing the Fidesz claim that US billionaire philanthropist George Soros wants to bring a million migrants into Hungary to destroy Christian and European identity—with the help of the EU, UN, and Hungarian opposition. Fidesz did especially well in villages; it was able to mobilize an extra quarter of a million voters over 2014.

A large turnout helped secure 48 percent of the vote for Fidesz, and it has emboldened Orbán as well (the party received 52.7 percent of the list votes in 2010 and 44.8 percent in 2014). A Fidesz party spokesman said on Monday that the government will submit the so-called Stop Soros legislation package next month—it aims to paralyze NGOs dealing with migration. The proposed legislation is seen by some as another tool to stifle criticism.

European Stakes

Far-right and populist politicians across Europe, from France’s Marine Le Pen to the Dutch Geert Wilders and Beatrix von Storch from Germany’s anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and Matteo Salvini from Italy’s powerful far-right Lega party, were all quick to congratulate Orbán.

As mainstream European parties watch populist parties win over, Orbán represents a dangerous and appealing alternative. With his large mandate, the Hungarian prime minister will go to Brussels further cemented in his policies and political legitimacy.

Populists across Europe see Orbán as an unapologetic, skilled political master able to defy Brussels and liberal critics. His use of national and identity politics and conspiracy theories are a blueprint for populist far-right politicians who often use the same tools. Orbán’s third election win could inspire others to copy his template for illiberal democracy, in which the characteristics of democracy—the system of checks and balance, press freedom, and the rule of law—are scaled back significantly.

In Brussels, however, it was business as usual. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker sent a letter of congratulations to Orbán; after all, the two represent the same political family—the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), which has so far been willing to provide political cover for Fidesz in the face of criticism and widespread concern. Juncker said he will call Orbán to discuss “issues of common interests” and “joint challenges,” as one commission spokesman put it. Germany’s Manfred Weber, head of EPP group in the European Parliament, also congratulated the Hungarian premier on his sweeping victory.

While the Commission has launched several probes into Hungarian legislation that ran afoul of EU rules, their objections have only resulted in cosmetic changes. At the end of the day, the EU Commission also has an interest in de-escalating the conflict with the euroskeptic Orbán. In fact, the EU executive now says there is no systematic threat to the rule of law in Hungary.

Proving Orbán Right

The EU’s inability to address democracy issues in Hungary only proves Orbán right, who argues that the Brussels “liberal elite” is out of touch with citizens and intervenes in internal politics only to help his political adversaries. And Orbán’s European political allies, who want to see less interference from Brussels, also caution the EU. Germany’s interior minister Horst Seehofer from Angela Merkel’s Bavarian allies, the Christian Social Union (CSU) on Monday said that the EU must drop its “arrogance and condescension” toward Hungary.

A frequent Orbán critic, Luxembourg’s foreign minister Jean Asselborn however sounded the alarm in German daily, Die Welt. “Today it is Hungary and Poland, tomorrow others in Eastern and Central Europe, even a big founding country of the EU, could develop a taste for undermining values and scaremongering.” It is up to Germany and France and other member states to “neutralize this tumor of values,” he said.

But that is unlikely to happen before Orbán’s illiberalism and populism leaves its mark on other EU countries as well.

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“This will be the first time that I will vote since I reached voting age 20 years ago. I feel like something must change. I just don’t know who to vote for,” laments Eva, a hairdresser in her late thirties in Budapest.

She symbolizes hundreds of thousands of voters in Hungary who will head to the polls on Sunday, April 8. They want change and a break with Viktor Orbán’s corrupt and illiberal regime, but they don’t have a party.

There is little doubt the anti-communist youth leader-turned-nationalist politician, along with his ruling Fidesz party, will secure another majority in parliament on Sunday. They might be short of a constitutional two-thirds majority, but they will likely secure more than 50 percent in parliament, meaning a third consecutive term for Orbán.

Yet there are several unpredictable factors that could upset Orbán’s re-election. A shock victory for an opposition candidate in a mayoral election in February galvanized the deeply fragmented opposition parties, which range from urban liberals to far-right supporters of the Jobbik party. The myth of Fidesz’s invincibility was shaken by the mayoral vote in the city of Hódmezővásárhely in southeastern Hungary, causing bewilderment on both sides. Fidesz chose to escalate its campaign’s hate rhetoric, while opposition parties attempted to coordinate.

Ahead of Sunday’s national vote, two factors could still tip results in an unexpected way: High turnout, and a last minute push by voters to force opposition parties to unite behind single candidates against Fidesz candidates in local districts. Oligarch Lajos Simicska, a once-powerful Orbán ally, has funded an increasingly critical media that has leaked a series of high-profile corruption cases in recent weeks – and those leaks could impact the vote as well.

The polls also offer a range of possible outcomes: They have tilted towards Orbán’s party, probably in part because people are afraid to reveal their real preferences for fear of reprisal, but they have offered varying predictions for his margin of victory. One Republikon Institute poll from March showed voters supporting Fidesz by 49 percent, while the far-right Jobbik – which has been forced to move towards the center, as Fidesz has increasingly adopted pro-nationalist and anti-immigrant positions – is at 19 percent. The Socialists came in at 17 percent.

But another poll conducted by Median showed 53 percent support for Fidesz, which could translate to a two-thirds majority in parliament. Built-in advantages in the election system will boost Orbán’s success. This poll would also mean that Fidesz only needs to mobilize its core voters to succeed – in other words, the party has no need to reach out to new voters. The opposition parties’ appeal, meanwhile remains weak – the Socialists are struggling to regain credibility, while Jobbik and the liberals have limited voter bases.

Fear is a predominant factor in the election. The Hungarian premier has promised to take vengeance on those who are critical of his system. And the government’s hate campaigns dominate the media and billboards, stoking fear of migrants and foreigners. In the final days of campaigning, Orbán suggested that voters who choose the opposition are traitors. He said Hungary’s existence is at stake at the ballot boxes. It is ironic that it was 20th-century Hungarian politician and political thinker István Bibó who warned: “Above all, being a democrat means not being afraid.” Whether voters can free themselves from a cycle of fear will be a key factor in Sunday’s election.

A Test for Illiberalism

On Sunday, eight million voters will be asked to decide whether Hungary should continue on the illiberal path set by Orbán and based on models such as Turkey and Russia. Orbán has succeeded in tapping into a deep disillusionment with democratic transition in Hungary, and has promised to build a successful alternative to Western liberal democracy. By this point, the costs of a shift might be too high.

Orbán’s illiberalism in Hungary has meant drawing up imaginary enemies, from Brussels bureaucrats to US billionaire philanthropist George Soros; it has also meant dismantling democratic institutions while facilitating massive corruption. And it has inspired admirers and followers across Europe, from Poland’s government to Italy’s far right Lega Nord, which won 18 percent in that country’s national election.

If voters hand down a surprisingly bad result for Fidesz, it could show that the illiberal logic of constant escalation has its limits, and that corruption does not go unnoticed.

“In a way, what is at stake in this election is to see whether hate campaigns really work,” said Ablonczy Bálint, a columnist at the conservative weekly Heti Válasz. “If Fidesz loses, it shows they have their limits, and that high-profile corruption cases bite. If they win, it will prove that they managed to tap into underlying fears in society that override everything.”

András Bíró-Nagy of the progressive political research institute Political Solutions in Bundapest said that the likely scenario is a confident Fidesz win, but added: “This election could show if Fidesz is past its peak, and could facilitate the start of its decline.” However, Sunday’s elections could decide who will be the main challenger to Orbán – Jobbik, under leader Gábor Vona; or the Socialists, who borrowed Gergely Karácsony, a popular politician from the green, liberal Dialogue for Hungary party, as their candidate for prime minister. With European and local elections coming up in 2019, opposition parties will soon have another chance to weaken Fidesz’s hold on the country.

Whatever the outcome, Fidesz will remain the strongest party in Hungary, and Orbán an unchallenged leader. Consolidation is not in Orbán’s cards, and any easing on his grip on power is out of the question, even if elections show a loss in support. A further concentration of pro-Fidesz media and a crackdown on civil society groups is widely expected.

“Illiberalism is a one-way street; you can’t back up, the only way is forward,” warned Péter Krekó, director of the research and consulting institute Political Capital in Budapest.

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There is no question that 2018 will be another challenging year for the European Union, with Brexit negotiations moving to the next phase, Germany’s prolonged political uncertainty, and Italy’s pending election—but deciding how to deal with the bloc’s increasingly “illiberal” member states might prove to be the most difficult of them all.

Hungary and Poland continue to challenge the EU’s authority as their nationalist governments undermine the rule of law at home and common EU policies on the European stage. Both had refused to comply with an EU decision to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy at the peak of the migration crisis in 2015, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has made it clear he will not back down.

Meanwhile, Poland’s dramatic overhaul of the judiciary last year created the deepest rift with the EU since eastward enlargement of the bloc in 2004. In December, the European Commission launched for the first time the so-called “nuclear option” – the Article 7 sanctions procedure against Poland for creating a “clear risk of a serious breach of rule of law.” Article 7 was introduced as a check on member states to prevent them from violating European values and the rule of law.

However, real sanctions are a distant possibility: all 27 member states would need to agree to levy sanctions and suspend voting rights, and Hungary has already vowed to veto any decision against Poland. As a sign of the ever-closer ties between the two countries, the new Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki traveled to Budapest on his first official foreign visit in January.

The EU has been trying to align Warsaw and Budapest with EU rules and values at the core of the European project, but it has struggled to tame these two governments on rolling back the rule of law and democracy. A lack of political willingness among fellow member states to sanction one of their peers has been one of the reasons, but the EU also has a poor toolkit to discipline governments on the rule of law.

Frustration Boiling Over

As discussions on the next seven-year EU budget get under way in Brussels this year, there is increasing support among member states who pay more into the EU budget than they get back to tie EU funds not only to economic performance, but also to respect for the rule of law.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel already warned Hungary in September 2017 that it could lose EU funds if it failed to comply with an earlier European Court of Justice ruling on accepting refugees based on quotas. At the end of last October, EU justice commissioner Vera Jourova backed up earlier proposals from the EU executive on tying EU funds to rule of law adherence. “In my personal view we should consider creating stronger conditionality between the rule of law and the cohesion funds,” she said at a conference in Helsinki. “Countries where we have doubts about the rule of law should face tougher scrutiny and checks.”

Juho Romakkaniemi, the head of cabinet of the EU Commission vice president, suggested in a tweet that EU countries might become reluctant to support countries where EU core values are challenged. At a meeting of EU ministers in November, Germany, France, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden indicated they were in favor of linking EU funds to the respect of the rule of law. Last November several high profile former European officials, including Pascal Lamy and Hans Eichel, also argued for linking up funds with political conditions; they urged the EU Commission to suspend EU funds to Hungary because basic freedoms are being violated and corruption is soaring.

EU negotiations on the next budget will kick off in May, and the proverbial battle lines have been drawn. The stakes are high: the EU allocated €86 billion in structural funds to Poland in the current 2014-20 period, while Hungary is receiving €25 billion during the same timeframe.

As the Commission gears up to present its proposals, the budget commissioner Günther Oettinger in January said the EU executive is looking into the legal feasibility of linking EU funds to the respect for the rule of law. He pointed out that for the conditionality to become reality, all member states would have to agree—making any radical move almost impossible.

What Comes Around Goes Around

Linking EU funds to political conditions goes against the EU treaties, central and eastern European officials argue. “I think these proposals are stillborn. The EU is based on treaties, and there is nothing in there that would create this possibility [of linking funds to the rule of law],” Viktor Orbán said late December in a radio interview. His government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs has called it a form of “political blackmail.” Orbán also warned that the EU budget needed to be approved unanimously among EU countries, so Hungary has ample tools to stop this proposal from becoming reality.

Central and eastern European officials point out that taxpayers in the net contributing countries also benefit from the EU cohesion funds. They say profits on the investments fuelled by EU funds trickle back to the West. Poland’s deputy minister for economic development Jerzy Kwiecinski said in October that for every euro invested in cohesion funds, 80 cents go back to EU-15, the net contributors. Even commissioner Oettinger underlined this notion in an interview in early 2017. “The Poles use the money to place orders with the German construction industry, to buy German machines and German trucks. So net contributors such as Germany should be interested in the structural funds. From an economic perspective, Germany isn’t a net contributor but a net recipient,” he said.

Officials also warn that EU funds are one of the reasons why support for the EU among the population of central European countries is still high despite a general sense of lack of trust in the EU on the continent. Central and eastern European officials controversially argue that EU funds are not charity, but a necessary compensation for opening their markets to the rest of the EU when their post-communist economies were still weak and vulnerable in the 2000s. “Don’t try to suggest that [the] EU cohesion fund is a gift for central and eastern member states,” spokesman Zoltan Kovacs said in Brussels last September.

The issue is politically toxic, as it reinforces the notion in central and eastern Europe that its citizens are only second-class in the EU. But that notion—while alive and well on its own—is being thoroughly exploited by governments in Hungary and Poland. They argue that political conditions alone infringe upon national sovereignty. As discussion over the next budget—which will undoubtedly be smaller than the current one as the UK leaves the EU—heat up, so could tensions among the continent’s eastern and western flank.

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In 1956, Western European countries took in anti-Soviet refugees from Hungary. Six decades later, Budapest seems less than inclined to react in kind. To keep refugees and migrants out, Hungary has erected barbed wire fences along its southern border. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, nationalism is surging. In a speech last month, he commemorated the 1956 revolution by warning Hungarians that the European Union was intent on making their country part of a homogeneous mass, void of identity. “Hungary’s everyday life is threatened,” said Orbán. “The forces of globalism are trying to bash open our door, trying to make us become ‘Homo Brusselicus’ instead of Hungarians.”

Orbán’s polemic comes at a time when ties with Brussels are more strained than ever. A number of thorny issues have burdened the relationship, from Russia’s ties with ex-Soviet satellite states, to George Soros’ influence in the region. But no issue has roiled the waters more than migration. Hungary closed off its southern borders in 2015, building a double layer of fences to effectively – and visibly – protect its status as what Orbán calls Europe’s last “migrant-free zone.” Any migrants who approach the border and apply for asylum status are immediately detained in a prison camp along the border region.

Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party have also refused to comply with the EU’s compulsory quota system to distribute migrants among member states. Budapest (along with Slovakia) appealed to the European Court of Justice to avoid participating in the system and lost, but continues to defy the court’s ruling.

Children Not Welcome

The recent case of Öcsény, a village in southwestern Hungary, highlights how fraught the debate over migration has become. In September, a private hotel owner offered to host a group of refugee children at his hotel for a free holiday. Though the children had already been granted refugee status, Zoltán Fenyvesi’s proposal sparked fury among villagers, triggering clashes and stoking anti-migrant sentiment. Fenyvesi was threatened several times, and his car tires were slashed. The local mayor resigned over the issue, blaming himself for having entered into the fray in the first place. Prime Minister Orbán failed to condemn the violence that swept the town. He told Hungarian journalists at the recent EU summit in Tallinn, “there have been so many lies regarding the migrant issue that if anybody says there will be children coming, then the Hungarians’ answer is: first the children, then parents, then the family, and then we’re all in trouble.”

A few days later the mayor of Cserdi publicly offered to host the children for a long weekend in his hamlet. He faced abuse almost immediately: a villager spat in his face, and a car tried to hit him on the crosswalk near his home. The government again failed to address the violence. Instead, Budapest keeps pointing the finger at the man they see as responsible for the influx of migrants: billionaire businessman and financier George Soros.

The Soros Question

George Soros is hard to miss in Hungary these days. The government has funded a massive billboard campaign featuring his face and the message: “Let’s not let Soros have the last laugh.” Fidesz and state media accuse the Hungarian-born philanthropist of orchestrating the “Soros Plan,” a strategy that will supposedly bring millions of migrants to Europe and advance left-wing politics. Orbán’s government has also threatened to shut down the Soros-funded Central European University in Budapest; a bitter battle to keep it open is ongoing.

Soros and his Open Society Foundation say Orbán’s accusations of a nefarious left-wing conspiracy have no merit. The billionaire, who backs pro-democracy and human rights initiatives, has urged Europe to screen and resettle refugees safely in order to help developing countries that are shouldering an unfair burden. As a Hungarian-born Jew who survived Nazi occupation, Soros has said Budapest’s billboard campaign recalled “Europe’s darkest hours.”
“It is horrifying to see journalists [and] media workers being listed and labeled by the government media as Soros henchmen,” said Tamas Vitray, a prominent Hungarian journalist and talk show host. “I’m outraged and I think we’re playing with fire.”

The European Union does not share the Hungarian government’s views of George Soros. At the latest EU summit, Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group (ALDE) and MEP, called on Orbán to approve a permit to keep the Central European University open. Verhofstadt pointed out that the Open Society Foundation sponsored several Fidesz politicians’ studies in the early 1990s as well, including Viktor Orbán’s semesters abroad. EU leaders have also called Hungary’s refusal to resettle its share of migrants unacceptable.

Eroding Support

Yet Fidesz is not backing down. It has launched what it calls a national consultation on the EU’s resettlement plan, sending out surveys to millions of voters to ask whether they agree with Orbán’s position. Officials have already begun delivering the surveys and setting up stands across the country where government-paid advocates stop passersby. One such booth at Budapest’s Corvin metro station on a late October morning read “Say no to Soros’ devious plan!”

It remains to be seen how much support the government’s consultation will actually garner. The far-right radical opposition party Jobbik recently financed a survey by the Compass Institute, a Budapest-based conservative nationalist think tank. Less than half of those surveyed actually agree with the government’s views on migration. Only 39 percent believed that the Soros Plan exists, while 43 percent say they don’t think so. Also, 57 percent of Hungarians deemed the national consultation a bad idea – including 29 percent of Fidesz’s own supporters.

Jobbik, for its part, has been highly critical of Soros’ alleged interference. But it has also questioned why the government is not sounding the alarm over a “Merkel Plan” or a “Juncker Plan,” arguing that the German leader and European Commission President have championed the rights of migrants far more than Soros. Now the State Accounting Office has launched an investigation into Jobbik’s own party finances. Gabor Vona, Jobbik’s leader, claims the probe is a government attempt to demoralize its critics.

New Friends

As opposition appears to be slowly gaining ground at home, Viktor Orbán is seeking friends abroad. His government has steadily been building closer ties to Vladimir Putin, and Hungary has enlisted Moscow’s help to refurbish and expand its Paks nuclear power plant, which was built under Soviet rule in 1982. The EU is examining the legality of the power plant expansion.

Putin visits Hungary regularly. During his last visit in August, he said: “Our Hungarian partners are eager to have our projects completed.” Peter Szijjarto, Hungary’s minister of foreign affairs, has told the press that the Paks project will “start to materialize as soon as next January.”

Still, the majority of Hungary’s large construction projects are made possible by the bloc’s funding. According to the European Commission’s own website, EU investment generates 6.3 percent of Hungary’s Gross National Income (GNI), making it “one of the countries that benefits most from EU funding.” More than 95 percent of all public investments are co-financed by the EU, according to the site. Various EU leaders have warned that Budapest could face financial consequences if it continues to defy the court’s ruling on the migrant quota. It is unclear, however, what legal means they can actually exercise to withhold funding.

Balázs Bodacz from the center-left Democratic Coalition party says even Fidesz and Viktor Orbán are concerned about the prospect of losing EU financial support. “There is no Hungarian economy without the EU’s markets or companies. Leaving the EU therefore would mean bankruptcy for the country, which none of the political powers could want,” he said.

Even so, some of Orbán’s opponents are worried about what will happen if Fidesz holds onto power in next spring’s parliamentary elections. “If Orbán and his government get another four-year term – and right now it very much looks like they will – we can bid farewell to our future. We have only six months to either lay the foundations or to give up our children’s and grandchildren’s future,” Gergely Lazar, an opposition analyst, wrote in an open letter. “It is not the Hungarians that have a problem with Europe, but it is Viktor Orbán himself who has a problem with Europe.”

Lazar also criticized opposition parties for not doing enough to hold Orbán’s government responsible for its actions and represent the voice of Hungarians who want to remain in the European Union. He is calling on them to unite, particularly as parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place in spring 2018, draw closer. Orbán and Fidesz have already begun their efforts to drum up support.

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The EU faces a disintegration threat that is much more dangerous than Brexit. The attempts by the Hungarian and Polish governments to capture core state institutions and close civil society space threaten not only democracy in their own countries, but also the community of law that underpins European integration. The European Commission and the European Parliament have tackled the threat through legal action and political pressure. But member governments are still sitting on the fence. They need to take decisive action in the Council now that the German elections are over.

The sovereignty reflex is deeply ingrained: under the EU’s treaties, every country decides its own constitutional arrangements. As a result, EU governments’ default reaction to undemocratic moves in a fellow member is first to ignore the offensive behavior. If it continues, they outsource monitoring and criticism to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe. The next move is to sit out the problematic government’s term in the hope that the party will be voted out by its own electorate. But those procrastination strategies are now running out as the Polish and Hungarian governments continue to push back.

Undermining the Entire EU

The EU’s role is not to get involved in domestic political fights. But it has to ensure that its members stick to the rules and commitments they agreed to, which allow citizens and businesses to operate across borders without discrimination. If two members get away with reneging on core commitments, the contagion effect is huge. More governments, both in the EU but also in the surrounding region, will be tempted to override constitutional checks and balances, to intimidate journalists, to stifle critical voices by controlling universities and NGOs, and to defy common rules and agreements that they don’t like.

The first problem is the corruption of the rule of law within member states. From the single market to justice and home affairs cooperation, European integration depends on well-functioning, independent public institutions at the national level. If Poland’s justice minister can control every level of the court system, as the government’s proposed laws would allow, judicial rulings would be politicized, but judges in other countries would still be bound to abide by them under the principle of mutual recognition. The single market would no longer be a level playing field, as businesses could not be sure of fair treatment in that country. Political influence over the judiciary also makes other members reluctant to send their citizens for trial in that country under the common arrest warrant, so it also affects police cooperation and the Schengen area of passport-free travel.

Now there is a second challenge to EU law: reneging on an EU-level agreement. Budapest is defying a decision by the Council – in which its own minister participated – to establish a scheme to relocate asylum-seekers to other member-states in order to relieve the burden on the countries of first entry, principally Italy and Greece. The European Court of Justice ruled in September that the Council agreement has the force of law, and that the effectiveness of the relocation scheme was undermined by the failure of Hungary, Slovakia and Poland to implement it. Now the Hungarian government has pledged to continue its defiance of the agreement despite the ruling, something that previous awkward partners never did. Although the United Kingdom often fought to block agreements in the Council on measures that its public did not like, London could be relied upon to implement them once they were agreed under the common rules.

What Can the EU Do?

The Commission has done well at setting out why the measures contravene EU laws and values. Its legal approach has been consistent. Now the legal procedures need political backup from the Council.

Governments should intensify their bilateral diplomacy at two levels: in private, they must leave no doubt as to their support for the Commission’s actions. Membership of the European People’s Party still matters to Fidesz, the ruling party in Hungary since 2010. This party group has long given the Hungarian government protection, so its members bear a special responsibility.

In public, European leaders should issue unequivocal statements. They should not let US President Donald Trump have the last word in Warsaw. Ministers need to speak out, especially when the Hungarian and Polish governments make misleading comparisons to claim that their proposed legislation is similar to practices in other countries. The member states’ embassies should more actively raise rule of law concerns bilaterally.

If PiS and Fidesz do not back down, the Commission and European Parliament will have to decide whether to go through with their threats to launch Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union. This provision was designed to ensure all member states respect the EU’s common values and includes two measures: Article 7.1 allows the Council to issue a warning to any country in violation of those values; if the violation continues for a prolonged period, Article 7.2 introduces sanctions and strips the country of its voting rights in the Council.

In considering Article 7, the Commission and Parliament must put forward reasoned proposals. The attitudes of the other 26 member countries will be decisive. If the Commission puts forward a reasoned proposal and fails to gain the sufficient majority in the Council, the EU as a whole will lose face and probably any hope of using Article 7 in the future. But if the Commission holds off only because it is not confident of gaining the member-states’ backing, PiS could also claim victory.

However, if Article 7.1 is successfully launched, meaning that all of the EU institutions agree that there is a clear risk of a serious breach, that would send a powerful political signal. This would be true even if mutual protection between Warsaw and Budapest makes it impossible to gain unanimity in the European Council to activate any sanctions.

Money Matters

All EU-level action must be well framed and communicated to avoid fueling nationalism and deepening the sense of an East-West divide; this rift has widened also because of the debate over the future budget of the EU and the potential of “variable geometry,” or differentiated integration for member states when there are irreconcilable differences. The Polish and Hungarian governments are using every opportunity to claim they are being unfairly targeted by the members that joined before 2004. All EU actors must therefore communicate clearly that this is about protecting core standards, and that similar steps will be taken against any offending government. Strong statements from other Central European governments would be particularly helpful. The EU can also counter claims of double standards by getting tougher on bad behavior by member states across the board, particularly on corruption and misuse of public funds.

The year 2018 will see new initiatives for EU institutional and policy reform, as well as negotiations on the next financial framework, which will open opportunities to introduce new instruments to protect the rule of law. There are plenty of options to consider. Most pertinent to the cases of Hungary and Poland are greater possibilities for judicial review by the Court of Justice to capture the cumulative effect of a series of infringements that create a systemic challenge.

Money matters, too. Germany and other countries are debating whether to introduce new conditions that would tie access to EU funds to a country’s performance on governance and rule of law. Legally and politically, this will be complicated to introduce, but it would have a powerful deterrent effect. In the meantime, more rigorous enforcement of existing rules on misuse of funds would strengthen popular support for EU action against abuse of power in all its members.

The EU has to get more active in countering false claims. Two-thirds of Hungarians have a favorable view of the EU, as do three-quarters of Poles. To try to reduce this level of support, the Hungarian government this year funded a huge campaign of anti-EU slogans and false claims about the EU’s role in deciding energy prices, taxes, and migration, among other things. To counter this propaganda, the EU’s representatives need to better communicate the facts about EU laws and policies, as the Commission did for the first time this year in a rebuttal fact-sheet. This kind of engagement helps Hungarian and Polish civil society hold their own governments to account and uphold their own constitutions – and shows that criticism of governments does not mean rejection of the people.

Showdown Time

As unwelcome as divisions are in the EU while Brexit is underway, member governments cannot run away from a showdown now. More heads of state and government must speak up, privately and publicly, and explore new ways of ensuring high standards of political and legal governance to complement the ones on economic governance. They need to make it clear that they will exact a high price from any member – present or future, East or West, North or South – that undermines the EU’s foundations as a community of law and its soul as a community of values. They should back the warnings from Commission and Parliament to Poland and Hungary that there is a serious breach of values.

If 22 of the member governments (a four-fifths majority) agree that values are breached, that formal EU position under Article 7 of the Treaty would in itself be a strong political signal from the whole Union that it is prepared to defend its values – even if the eventual sanctions foreseen under the Treaty are out of reach because Hungary and Poland protect one another in the Council.

Even so, there is only so much that any external actor can do to rescue democracy and the rule of law in another country. The ultimate remedy lies with the tens of thousands of Hungarians and Poles who have been protesting against the attempts to capture their states. The vast majority of the people in these two countries want to stay part of the European mainstream, so they need to hear other Europeans expressing support for the rule of law that serves everyone.

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