© REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

When Greta Thunberg made her speech at the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit last September she concentrated on governments and corporations. Interestingly enough, she did not point her finger at the military. The armed forces are not an environmentally-friendly organization and frankly they are not designed to be one. They focus on the most effective means to dominate and defeat the enemy. But a culture of environmental oblivion cannot be sustained, especially when climate change impacts the military’s operational capabilities. NATO, whilst not the first responder to climate change, can help to collectively address this challenge.

A “Greener” NATO—Why Now?

Climate change will be increasingly present on NATO’s agenda for three reasons. First, by acting as a threat multiplier it will inevitably affect NATO’s core business and its deterrence and defense posture. Thus, in the course of its broader adaptation, the alliance will have to embrace issues related to climate change in all strategic directions.

In the south, the war in Syria proved that climate change could cause or fuel conflicts. Between 2005 and 2011 Syria experienced severe consecutive droughts. Hoping to find employment, farmers migrated to cities. Competition over resources and jobs, already scarce following decades of poor governance, was one of the factors that pushed people in Syria to rebel.

In the north, the melting of the polar ice cap is starting to ease the access to vast deposits of oil, gas, and metals. The changing climate will open a transpolar passage across the Arctic Ocean via the North Pole. This will attract interest from a broad range of actors and increase the maritime traffic through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and nearby waters. From Moscow’s point of view, this will facilitate the movements of vessels between the Pacific and the Atlantic, thus putting additional stress on the strategically important GIUK gap. Another interested party will doubtless be China, which will likely lead to a commensurately increased presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Second, motivated by political and economic factors, individual allies will try to strengthen NATO’s response to climate challenges. Allies are already implementing the “Green Defense” framework that was adopted in 2014. It seeks to make NATO more operationally effective through changes in the use of energy, while also meeting the environmental objectives of using fewer resources. “Greening” NATO’s militaries allows some allies to rally public support and promote their domestic technologies whist providing tangible military benefits. This trend will intensify in the near future.

In the years to come, investments in green energy will form one of the pillars of the EU growth strategy. As Europe prepares itself to face the economic recession that will follow the COVID-19 pandemic, many argue that public investments in sustainable energy sources can act as a lifeline. In this context, a broad coalition of European nations (including Greece, Poland, and Spain)have called on the European Commission to forge an industrial policy for renewables. At the same time, France and Germany tabled the idea of creating “green recovery roadmaps” for every economic sector to overcome the shock. Inevitably, these views will spill over to NATO through European allies.

Third, the COVID-19 pandemic will reinforce existing vicissitudes, with the public demanding a more coordinated response to global challenges such as climate change. Social mobilization around climate change will have winners and losers. On the winning side will be organizations that provide pro-active responses to climate change. Entities that undermine environmental stability will lose out.

NATO’s Three Core “Green” Tasks

NATO will have to address the challenges posed by the climate emergency in a holistic manner and sink in the climate change factor in its policies. NATO’s approach to climate change should follow the logic of its three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.

Collective defense is NATO’s bread and butter task. Including insights from climate projection and modelling in NATO’s intelligence products and processes is definitely not enough. In fact, NATO should not be afraid to act strategically by expanding the NATO Pipeline System (NPS) to its eastern flank. The NPS is a network of fuel pipelines and storage sites, with the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) as its chief element. It spans from ports in France and the Benelux countries to Germany, ending on the former border between East and West Germany. Today, the CEPS mostly serves commercial clients (such as airports in Brussels, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt), whilst maintaining the readiness to supply the military in times of crisis. According to official data, the pipeline transports the equivalent of roughly 1,110 diesel-powered military trucks, running round the clock, day in, day out. In other words, the CEPS helps safeguard the environment, while providing the military with a reliable logistic system for their fuel supplies.

Despite those benefits, the NPS has not been expanded to NATO’s eastern flank. Instead, the military has to rely on road and rail transports toppled by pre-positioned storage sites. Academic research proves that pipelines shipments are substantially less energy-consuming than rail, road, and water transport. In turn, pipelines reduce greenhouse gas emissions by between 61 and 77 percent compared with rail for transporting oil over long distances. Expanding the NPS to the eastern flank would help NATO to significantly “green” its fuel supply logistics, while enhancing the fuel supply of its military forces and plugging the alliance in a broader effort to stimulate the post-pandemic economies. In fact, an expanded NPS could be used to supply the soon-to-be-opened Berlin-Brandenburg airport and the future Solidarity Transport Hub in Poland.

Taking on Disasters

Crisis management is another of NATO’s core tasks. Allies and partners are not immune to droughts, floods, mudflows, wildfires, hurricanes, storms, and earthquakes. Climate change exacerbates hazards and amplifies the risk of extreme weather disasters. NATO was not designed to tackle these challenges, but over the last couple of years was able to develop relevant instruments and mechanisms. There are at least two vehicles that could help NATO to better streamline climate change into its crisis management tasks.

First, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which is NATO’s principal civil emergency response mechanism. In recent months, the EADRCC became famous for coordinating allied responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. But it has a long-standing record of coordinating both requests and offers of assistance mainly in case of natural and man-made disasters. The EADRCC regularly conducts field exercises based on scenarios encompassing environmental challenges. Allies should consider strengthening the EADRCC’s role, including via potential cooperation with private sector.

Second, there are the seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness which help allies to enhance resilience as agreed at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. Those requirements are being regularly updated in order to reflect recent developments such as 5G networks or lessons learned so far from the COVID-19 crisis. Future updates should consider how climate change impacts civil preparedness and resilience, especially energy supplies, food and water resources, critical infrastructure in disaster-prone areas, and allies’ ability to deal with the uncontrolled movement of people.

Cooperative security will be an important element of NATO’s approach to tackle climate change, too. Sharing lessons learned with partners and introducing concrete solutions to help their armed forces to become more climate change-cognizant could create a more predictable and secure neighborhood. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Program (SPS) should play a leading role in this regard. The SPS should become a prime vehicle for developing and promoting cooperation on the smart and energy efficient technologies between allies and partners, including from the Middle East and North Africa, but also from Eastern Europe. Equipping the militaries with sustainable energy sources, such as deployable camps that typically rely on fuel-consuming and polluting diesel generators for power production, could be a case in point.

The Way Ahead

Climate change will affect the central business of NATO, including its three core tasks. The alliance can help to address this challenge by creating a culture of environmental consciousness. At the same time, NATO should not become obsessed with climate change and thus measure its policy decisions primarily through the environmental lens. Other simultaneous challenges will continue to exist. Therefore, NATO cannot afford to be a world leader in combating climate change. But it definitely can be at the forefront of environmental stewardship, especially in the context of the upcoming NATO Summit in 2021.

N.B. All opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institution they represent.

The post Op-Ed: Toward a “Greener” NATO appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Kacper Pempel

The political relationship between the United States and the European Union is fractious. From trade to foreign policy, both sides are taking increasingly divergent, and sometimes contradictory, perspectives.

So much so that the US ambassador to the European Union, Gordon Sondland, called for a reset in the relationship, believing that the new cohort of senior EU Commission and Council leaders, due to take office in December, will “make impasses go away.” Developing closer working relationships with these new leaders can help to an extent, but the US should also look within the Trump administration to reset its own policies. Only then can the US foster a more productive defense relationship with the EU.

State of Play

The defense relationship between the US and the EU already exists, including at the operational level. In 2011, both signed a framework agreement that enables Washington to contribute civilian personnel to “crisis management operations.” More recently, US military forces have worked alongside their EU counterparts, primarily through United States Africa Command and the EU Military Staff, in places like Mali and Somalia. Both the US and the EU have also strengthened joint situational awareness and coordinated activities in the Sahel more broadly.

Despite this practical cooperation at the operational level, there is greater friction at the strategic level. The US has long been skeptical of efforts by some EU member states, like France, to allocate a greater role in defense to the EU. Washington, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has feared that an EU with defense responsibilities could harm the cornerstone of European and transatlantic security: NATO.

The “Three D’s” of “no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication,” as outlined by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright back in 1998, encapsulates this sentiment. Yet this skepticism does not mean US policymakers do not want Europe, as a whole, to shoulder greater responsibility, whether by increasing defense spending to invest in certain capabilities or deploying troops and equipment. Instead, US policymakers want European countries, the EU member states and NATO allies among them, to become more capable partners.

EU member states, many of which are also NATO allies, view Washington’s behavior as schizophrenic. On the one hand, they argue, the US asks its European counterparts to shoulder more of a burden. On the other, when Europeans do take concrete steps to invest further in defense, the US criticizes the approach. EU member states, according to an EU official, lament the “mixed messages from the American side,” viewing the 2016 EU Global Strategy as the response to the longstanding US request.

Although the Global Strategy’s “ambition of strategic autonomy” should be taken with a grain of salt—particularly because, in practice, it does not enjoy support from all member states—there is an important sentiment that EU member states should take on more responsibility. To the majority of member states, Brussels’ role in defense should complement that of NATO and, according to the same EU official, enable the EU to become a “reliable and effective partner.”

The Right Way Forward?

Against the backdrop of achieving strategic autonomy, EU member states are moving forward with their own initiatives, primarily the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The EDF provides a financial incentive for member states to develop capabilities jointly. It is particularly noteworthy that the European Commission is co-funding this effort—at €13 billion over the course of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The actual development of the joint capabilities will occur through PESCO, a political commitment among 25 member states to deepen defense cooperation. There are currently 34 projects that cut across all domains, from maritime to land. The EDF and PESCO, according to a French official, are a “direct response to [the] call by Americans on burden-sharing.”

Although there are more nuanced positions both among and within member states on these two initiatives, there is broad agreement that the EU should take greater responsibility in defense. This belief stems from an understanding that the European security environment is growing more challenging, but also from two dynamics internal to the European security architecture.

EU member states not only recognize that America is becoming a less reliable partner, due to President Donald Trump’s seeming ambivalence toward European security, but also that the United Kingdom is leaving the EU. Certainly London will remain actively involved in European defense policy, primarily through NATO and its bilateral defense relationships, but British officials, post-Brexit, will no longer be “in the room” to share expertise when member states debate whether and how to launch, for example, a Common Security and Defense Policy mission. It is therefore imperative that the EU develops a stronger defense capability for its member states to rely more closely on each other.

The US, however, has significant reservations regarding the EDF and PESCO. These concerns relate chiefly to the way in which a third country can participate in the new EU defense initiatives. As a non-member state, the US is interested in securing flexible terms that enable it, and primarily its defense industry, to participate. President Trump’s link between trade and security is driving ambition for US defense firms to compete for contracts and encourage Europeans to “buy American.” A joint letter from senior Defense and State Department officials is among the latest effort by the Trump administration to secure such access—this time including a veiled threat to consider “similar reciprocally imposed US restrictions.” Without access for its firms, Washington will remain opposed to the EU defense initiatives.

A Constructive Role

 The divergences between the US and the EU will not disappear overnight. Nonetheless, as the US administration embarks on its reset, it should take two steps to shift its position and strengthen the US-EU defense relationship.

First, it should both acknowledge that the EU has a role to play in this field and support certain EU defense initiatives. Although NATO is and should remain the central pillar of European security, member states are pursuing some promising initiatives within the EU context. Certain PESCO projects, like Military Mobility, whose goal is to ensure the smooth movement of defense equipment across Europe in the event of a conflict, has a positive impact for NATO. In fact, the EU—unlike NATO—can regulate and provide assistance with infrastructure funding to ensure platforms are not “stuck at customs.”

Likewise, the EDF can bolster member states’ defense capabilities. According to a French official, the EDF is the “key initiative within the EU,” providing an incentive to develop capabilities jointly. The Franco-German Main Ground Combat System and Future Combat Air System projects are two that could develop through the EDF with other countries, as demonstrated by Spain’s recent inclusion in the latter.

The European Pillar in NATO

Overall, “one possible scenario” for the EU, from the perspective of Julian Ostendorf, an adviser to German MP Roderich Kiesewetter, foreign affairs spokesman for his CDU/CSU caucus, is to serve “only as the sous chef of NATO.” Accordingly, Ostendorf argues, the challenge for France, Germany, and “other core EU member states” is to work toward a consensus regarding “what strategic autonomy really means in practical military terms,” without contradicting NATO’s defense planning. It is the role for the EU defense initiatives, to support and strengthen the European pillar within NATO, that the US should recognize and promote.

Second, as the US develops its own defense relationship with the EU, Washington should prioritize in which of the defense initiatives it is interested in participating. As it stands, according to Rachel Ellehuus of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, American officials tend to state their blanket interest in joining the EU defense initiatives, notably the EDF and PESCO, based less on a desire to be part of specific projects and more on the general principle that third countries should be included.

Instead, the US should prioritize and explain to the EU institutions and member states in which projects it could contribute most. Engaging more selectively and making a stronger case for certain projects might lead Brussels to consider how Washington can plug into initiatives and bring niche expertise. Without a more considered approach, EU member states could grow increasingly unwilling for the US to play any role related to the EU.

Toward a New Relationship

Despite its checkered past in developing a greater EU role in defense, member states are moving forward with new initiatives. By rejecting the manner in which Brussels develops into a defense actor, however, Washington risks losing its ability to shape that discussion—one that is crucial for the future of NATO. The US should encourage member states to sustain their momentum in order to become more capable partners. To do so, Washington should not only pursue a reset that engages the new European Commission and European Council leaders, but also alters its defense policy toward the EU. Only then can the US develop a stronger defense relationship with the EU and, ultimately, Europe as a whole.

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Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer, as a Saarlander, you’re well known for your dedicated, pro-European stance. But you’ve yet to make a name for yourself in the realm of foreign policy—is it a subject that interests you? Foreign policy was what led me into politics in the first place. Back then, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the debates over the NATO double-track decision.

Today I find that there are still axes about which we should be concerned. Let’s call the first of these the European axis. It remains firmly in Germany’s national interest to ensure that Europe has the power to act. The second axis is a functioning transatlantic axis. At the moment, however, discussions between the United States and Europe, Germany in particular, have grown harsher and more difficult. A major challenge for us is to preserve this alliance and this friendship, because it’s just as important as ever. It’s a real warning sign when a survey of German nationals indicates that they now have greater confidence in the presidents of Russia, and even China, than in the President of the United States.

But you yourself have said that you find Trump and Putin equally difficult. Doesn’t that sound a little like you’re equating the two? No, it’s not a case of equating the two. In terms of attitudes, values and historic solidarity, I’m much closer to the United States—regardless of current political discussions. What I meant by that was that both nations have their own challenges in the present climate. For the US, the challenge lies primarily in the fact that, for the time being at least, we have a political administration that is disengaged to some extent from international agreements. This path of action has a considerable effect on geopolitical matters.

By contrast, Russia is a much larger and more significant neighbor to Germany—but also a more problematic one. Russia has its own agenda. And this agenda evidently includes an attempt to destabilize Europe and, consequently, Germany. It seeks to use its weaker neighbors to boost its own strength. This is counter to European and German interests. 

Since we’re on the subject, I should also mention the challenge posed by China. China is governed by a very powerful regime, whose values differ clearly from ours. It wants to implement its own rules in the world in the long term.

Let’s take a closer look at the USA. Aren’t the Germans deluding themselves with their skepticism over Trump? After all, the American tendency to withdraw into itself was evident under Barack Obama, too—he himself failed get the Paris Climate Accord properly ratified. There has certainly always been a tendency towards national introversion in American politics, including under Obama. Over the course of history, we see both of these orientations—international engagement and withdrawal—at war with each other. What’s new, however, is that under Trump international policy is viewed as big business. The same can be said for the relationship with Europe, and with NATO.

Do you think that it is possible to come back from this? Some will say, of course, that the US is certain to continue down this road. Do you think it can be rectified? For the time being, I still can’t see any extensive debate in the United States which might indicate a change of course. That’s why Germany and Europe are needed—it’s why we have to assume more responsibility. The entire debate revolves around security and defense policy. It’s a matter of our standing in a changing world. We must ask ourselves whether we’re content to simply be one of the strongest economies in the world, or whether we want to take on more political responsibility. What we’re facing is a very difficult discussion about domestic policy.

So in your view, Germany is not just a “big Switzerland”? No, Germany could never be a “big Switzerland”. Germany has to seize more responsibility. We are now a very strong centre in Europe, that’s something I noticed in Brussels. Germany has the capacity to take on the diverse interests of its smaller European partners as well and ensure a balance—and this is what is expected of us. But we have to play a greater role in defense. The Two Per Cent debate is more than just a matter of money, it’s also a question of quality. We have to discuss cyber security, infrastructure and its protection, as well as equipment and sheer manpower. It makes no sense at all to increase NATO troops, if you can’t move them around Europe in an emergency because its streets and bridges are not equipped for the job.

Doesn’t that sound like a diversionary tactic, part of the 2-percent-goal that Germany has not reached? Particularly as the German government is only aiming for 1.5 percent by 2024. We want to stick to the Two Per Cent target but a percentage of GDP alone is not particularly conclusive in itself, as in periods of economic recession you could point to rising rates without additional money. With steady GDP growth, 1.5 percent is already a considerable but necessary effort. A government must of course deal with other requests for expenditure in its budget. But, as I say, we also need to have a debate about quality. You might look at the calculations for other nations: to some extent this will be for nuclear forces, and partly for maintenance of expensive overseas bases.

Why won’t you give any exact numbers—wouldn’t that be a more honest approach? As things stand, wouldn’t 1.5 percent of the budget for the federal armed forces equal around €60 billion? I have no problem at all with giving clear numbers. The numbers manifest at the latest during medium-term financial planning and in the budget. In this respect, however, I’m reminded of the responsibility of parliament: alongside the federal armed forces, we also have a parliamentary army which can only be put to work following resolutions made in the Bundestag. However, as budgetary legislator, the Bundestag must also ensure that the federal armed forces are sufficiently equipped to return from deployment in generally good health. Otherwise you would have to hold an honest debate and call, essentially, for the dissolution of the armed forces.

Why does it seem to be so difficult in Germany to have an open debate about foreign policy and security? Perhaps it has something to do with our history. But times have changed: Europe and Germany stand at a crossroads. Do we want to play an independent role globally? If so, we have to make greater efforts in this vein—and this applies particularly to Germany. Especially since we, unlike almost any other nation, rely heavily on a stable international situation for our exports. As I say, there is no longer a classic difference between domestic policy on one side and foreign policy on the other. As we’ve seen with migration policy, destabilization in the area surrounding Europe will sooner or later impact upon politics at home. That’s why it tends to be aggravating when debates follow the familiar pattern of one side supporting arms and the other supporting poor German pensioners. This kind of debate has little to do with a responsible German politics.

The former Minister for Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel has warned of another effect: could increased military spending on Germany’s part spook its EU neighbors? Which is true, Gabriel’s warning, or the words of former Defense Minister Volker Rühe, who claimed that the Federal Armed Forces should be the strongest army in Europe? Well, I think we’ve some way to go before becoming the strongest army in Europe (she laughs). Nor is that my goal. Gabriel’s warning is false on two counts, because we’re not talking about a competition between separate national armies. We’re talking about the armed forces that are involved in alliances like NATO, which are, in many ways, closely entwined with Europe. And my express aim is that we work to develop an additional European army in the long term. In my view, there is no danger of Germany becoming a threat in itself.

Do you think the integration of Europe should entail France expanding its nuclear shield across Germany and the EU, as suggested by the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger? We certainly have a new situation on our hands, what with the suspension of the INF Treaty. But all efforts should aim first of all towards achieving an agreement in the remaining six months. We would actually require a treaty that includes not only Russia and the United States, but also other powers such as China or other nations with nuclear weapons. Apart from that, I would leave no option off the table and I would not commit myself to any specific option from the outset.

You say you would leave no option off the table. Do you mean you would consider nuclear arms for Germany? No, never.

You accused Russia of seeking to destabilize Germany and the EU. Shouldn’t the government be taking an entirely different approach to dealing with Moscow? First of all, Russia is a very large, diverse country with wonderful people and an incredible amount of potential. At the same time, you have a Russian government in place that takes drastic, uncompromising action in its own country and denies other peoples the right to self-determination—the conflicts in Georgia and East Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have shown this. We have to be clear about this. If Russia is using factories of trolls to run campaigns of misinformation in the West or influence elections, we can’t sweep that kind of thing under the rug.

Many are now complaining about the EU’s economic sanctions. But the critics have yet to name an alternative. They do not believe that we must accept Russia’s actions, which flout international law, but neither do they offer any ideas for other sanctions. Since we have ruled out military intervention, I support keeping the sanctions in place until a smarter solution presents itself.

But doesn’t the Nord Stream 2 pipeline fly in the face of this? In my view, Nord Stream 2 poses a conflict of interests. It’s an economic project that was set in motion a long time ago under a different German government. Besides, we maintained economic relations with Russia during the height of the Cold War, also in cases of energy provision. These were stable. So really, it’s a matter of interests—Germany’s interests, of course, but also those of Ukraine and the people of Eastern Europe. Then there are partners like the US, which is certainly pursuing its own economic interests. It is of course legitimate to question whether Germany is making itself too dependent on Russian gas. We are currently also building LNG terminals—potentially for American gas. In this respect, I don’t think dependency poses a considerable risk.

As controversial as the pipeline is, one has to be realistic and say that it is inevitable. There are contracts and permits to think about. I have no time for politics which makes vigorous pronouncements to the public about what should be done—all the while being quite aware of the contractual situation.

But the US is still stepping up pressure to complete the pipeline—even with the threats of sanctions. Threatening each other with sanctions is not the best way of dealing with partners and friends. The US has its own economic interests, which are legitimate. And it is concerned that Germany, one of the strongest economies in the world, is too dependent on Russia. But Washington needs to hear Germany’s reply: we are in the process of diversifying and we have other sources of supply. And we have the experience from history that tells us that Russia has always been a reliable gas supplier, even at the height of the conflict.

But isn’t Nord Stream symbolic of the fact that you do not always pay due regard to the interests of the smaller EU partners you described earlier? For myself and many others, Nord Stream 2 is not a project which is close to our hearts. But the fundamental decisions at the heart of the project were made in the past. The project cannot simply be reversed. We also have very legitimate economic interests when it comes to energy supply. The consultations in Brussels have shown that no-one is desperate to get his or her own way. The fact remains that keeping an eye on the interests of our European neighbors and implementing said interests have always been and remain a constant in German foreign policy.

Does China pose more of a challenge or an opportunity? We have always viewed the social market economy as both an economic model and a model for society. This model proved its superiority in the old system conflict with the communist states. But China is one of our competitors, one that is economically successful without sharing our social model. And that is a huge new challenge.

I am not afraid of China. However, we certainly need some kind of strategic industrial policy in this competition between systems.

Take the EU resolution on Siemens-Alstom. Bearing in mind all the European and national competition laws, you can understand why the EU Commissioner for Competition came to the decision she did. But it’s a stretch to say that China will not have risen to become a significant competitor in the rail sector in Europe in the next eight to ten years. That’s why I think the words of the Minister for the Economy, Peter Altmaier, provide an absolutely necessary and long overdue opportunity for reflection. I am firmly convinced that we need a different strategic position in industrial policy at one point or another. This is in no way related to my support for the development of state-owned enterprises. That is a discussion which is considerably overhyped.

Do you worry that Europeans will eventually be crushed between the two superpowers of the USA and China—or that they will have to pick a side? We Europeans are at a crossroads. If we are no longer able to assert our own politics and values, we run the risk of becoming a pawn in the games of one nation or the other. To prevent this, we need a united Europe which has the power to act.

A different question for you: where do you draw the geographical limits of Europe and, by extension, the EU? When you see two of the founding EU nations, France and Italy, working together now, you realize that the more pressing problem surrounds the quality of our community, rather than any question of geographical dimensions.

The interview was conducted by Andreas Rinke and Martin Bialecki.

NB. This is a translation; the interview was conducted in German.

The post “Russia Wants to Destabilize Europe” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/US Navy Handout

In April 2018, one of China’s most visible military diplomats, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, gave a speech at Kings College London. He was asked about the vexed issue of “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea. A year before the colonel’s talk, three Chinese naval warships had transited through the English Channel en route to exercises with Russia in the Baltic Sea. They had passed through British territorial waters without interference. How then would China respond toward Royal Navy warships passing through Chinese-claimed territorial waters in the South China Sea?

Colonel Zhou’s answer was succinct but disturbing: China obeys British rules in British waters, so the United Kingdom should obey Chinese rules in Chinese waters.

If this is truly a reflection of Chinese attitudes to international law, then the implications are alarming. It would mean that China doesn’t really believe in the concept of universal principles governing the law of the sea everywhere on the planet. The Chinese military will make use of freedom of navigation in other parts of the world but deny that it applies in its own claimed waters, where it says Chinese rather than international rules are in effect . Both the UK and China have signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the document is clear. It is entirely legal for naval ships from any country to sail through even the most hotly disputed regions of the South China Sea.

Threats to Freedom of Navigation

Nevertheless, it appears that China is attempting to reverse centuries of international consensus and close off access to the sea for military vessels. We saw an ominous example of this on September 29, 2018 when a Chinese destroyer, the Lanzhou, deliberately sailed in front of a transiting American warship, the USS Decatur, and threatened it with the warning, “If you don’t change course you will suffer consequences.”

If actions such as these go unchallenged, the world will be reverting to an era when navies had to fight their way through blockades and when seaborne trade, the lifeblood of the global economy, was subject to the whims of coastal states. If the UK and France adopted the same legal position as China, they could have blocked the Chinese navy from passing through the English Channel. In Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore could use the same argument to block the Strait of Malacca to Chinese vessels. Is this the world that China wants to create—where states can unilaterally close waterways? The consequences for international peace would be dire.

This is a key reason why the disputes in the South China Sea should concern the wider world. While they may appear to be a fight over nothing—tiny, economically useless islands—they are also a fight about everything: whose rules will run the 21^st-century world?

Paracels, Spratlys, & Co.

Each of the major claimants argues that it is the sole rightful owner of entire groups of rocks and reefs in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam both claim the Paracels and Spratlys in their entirety; the Philippines claims a subset of the Spratlys, which it calls the Kalaayan Island Group. Malaysia occupies five reefs close to Borneo. Brunei claims one reef in the same area. None is willing to give ground to the others, and the result has been a long period of diplomatic stalemate punctuated by periodic crises.

China began the construction of artificial islands in the Spratlys, in the southern part of the South China Sea, in September 2013. They are now almost ready. Beijing has insisted that these are civilian installations, but satellite imagery has clearly revealed the presence of military facilities, including hangars for surface-to-air missiles, barracks, and weapons systems. US military sources say China has also deployed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems to the new bases.

Three of the new islands feature  three kilometer-long runways, easily usable by military aircraft. At the time of writing, only civilian aircraft and unarmed transport planes have actually used these runways, but it is likely that China has the ambition to deploy fast attack jets to the bases at some point. If past behavior is anything to go by, then it will wait for a pretext—some perceived “provocation” by the US, for example—before it does so.

Beefed-Up Chinese Naval Presence

More importantly for China’s Southeast Asian neighbors and other states with an interest in peace and security in the region, the artificial islands give China the capacity to maintain a large-scale presence of naval and coastguard ships in disputed areas. China has the ability to monitor other countries’ activities and intervene at short notice.

This presence has given China also the ability to prevent the other coastal states from developing resources in the South China Sea. One tactic is explicit threats of military force: in 2017 and 2018, we saw China intimidate Vietnam into blocking the Spanish energy company Repsol from developing gas fields in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claimed by Vietnam but desired by China.

Events took a similar course in the Philippines, which faces a looming and critical energy shortage because of the depletion of its existing offshore gas field, Malampaya. It currently generates over a fifth of the Philippines national electricity output. One potential solution is for the country to develop the large gas resources under the Reed Bank, not far from Malampaya. An International Arbitration Tribunal ruled in 2016 that these resources are within the Philippines’ EEZ. However, President Rudigro Duterte of the Philippines said in May 2017 that his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, had told him there would be “war” if Manila tried to exploit that gas.

In short, China’s actions in the South China Sea present a threat to the rule of law globally and to the security of Southeast Asian states. The overlap of territorial disputes between the rival claimants and the maritime disputes that involve powers from outside the region creates the potential for a local incident to turn into a serious conflict.

Resolving the Disputes

For many observers, the territorial disputes over the islets have appeared too complex to be resolved. That impression has been reinforced by the claimants’ deployment of pieces of purported historical evidence dating back centuries. My own conclusions from examinations of this evidence is that most of it can be discarded since it consists of vague mentions of undefined locations.

Under contemporary understandings of international law, what is required to prove ownership of an uninhabited feature (i.e. piece of land) is evidence of practical administration (in legal language, à titre de souverain). Moreover, as the 2008 judgment by the International Court of Justice concerning features disputed between Malaysia and Singapore demonstrates, a legitimate claim to one specific feature does not necessarily apply to other features in its vicinity.

There is, on paper, a simple solution to the disputes in the South China Sea: all the competing claimants agree to maintain their current positions on the various rocks and reefs, recognize the other claimants’ current occupations, and commit to occupying no further features. They would then divide up the resources of the sea according to the rules laid down in UNCLOS and cooperate to manage them sustainably.

The governments of the rival claimant states would still need to persuade their own populations that this is a reasonable course of action. They would, in effect, need to tackle the “emotional” claims to the rocks and reefs that have built up over recent decades. The best way to do this is through the presentation of evidence. This is unlikely to be a simple process. However, both China and Vietnam are “propaganda states”: their one-party systems have been very successful at persuading their populations to accept changes in ideology over the years. This would be just another iteration of national belief.

Europe’s Contribution

At present, there are three likely outcomes to the disputes in the South China Sea: First, the current situation continues with periodic rises in tension and the risk of military escalation. Second, the Southeast Asian claimants submit to Chinese pressure and abandon their territorial and maritime claims. Third, some kind of recognition of the status quo as an equitable solution.

The first option carries the constant risk of war. China would prefer the second option, but the cost to its reputation and relations with the other states would be simmering resentment. In fact, I would argue that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are a major obstacle to its overall strategic interests in Asia, which require the peaceful development of cooperative relations with its neighbors. A key reason why those neighbors seek to engage the US and other powers in regional security is because of their concerns about China’s territorial agenda. If China were to resolve the disputes, it would reduce its neighbors’ desires to seek alternative security relationships. The third option is difficult but has the best chance of generating a lasting peace.

This difficult road is worth taking because it preserves the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and the primacy of international law. It is based upon a belief, well understood in Europe, that states must settle rival claims on the basis of right rather than might.

How, then, could Europe contribute? It would require two separate interventions: one aimed at resolving the underlying territorial disputes and the other at the defense of UNCLOS.

There are many experts within European universities and think-tanks with the expertise to collate, translate, and assess the evidence put forward for the various territorial claims. Recent academic research suggests that, in most cases, it would be clear there has only ever been one effective occupant of each feature. An “academic taskforce” could be assembled to evaluate the evidence and disseminate it to the claimant governments as well as the experts and academics in those countries, together with associated media campaigns in the relevant languages to inform the wider publics. It would provide an empirical basis for compromise.

The defense and promotion of UNCLOS requires a different approach. The EU and its member states need to maintain clear support for the convention in all their public statements on maritime affairs and communicate this frequently to the South China Sea claimants. The next step would be an investigation of which claims in the sea are compliant with UNCLOS and which are not. This would be followed by public statements and diplomatic representations to defend the UNCLOS regime. In particular, suggestions that China enjoys “historic rights” that supersede UNCLOS must be challenged and refuted.

Those EU states with the capacity to do so should be encouraged to demonstrate their continuing interest in the peaceful international order by deploying naval vessels into the South China Sea to demonstrate that Europe regards a threat to the international order in one part of the world to be a threat to it everywhere.

European states have other levers, too. They could refuse Chinese naval ships permission to make port visits and reduce other forms of military cooperation. They could help Southeast Asian states to build up the capacity to monitor and control their legitimate EEZ claims and increase military cooperation with them. They could sanction Chinese companies that are engaged in predatory behavior within other countries’ legitimate EEZs. They could add stipulations about respecting legitimate EEZ claims to all maritime agreements with the claimant states and insist that fish catches, for example, are traceable to domestic EEZs. These, and other relevant and targeted, countermeasures could be adopted to deter rule-breaking in the South China Sea.

This is clearly an idealistic strategy. It would demand funding and time and carries diplomatic risk. The alternative, however, is worse.

This year’s Munich Security Conference will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

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What would you consider as the greatest challenge in international politics in 2019? The world seems to be losing its sense of direction and purpose as conflicts of interest between major countries surge to the surface. The changes that emerged in 2018 will continue to evolve this year. We may use “choices” to define what’s confronting us. Among the many choices we need to make, the following two are most prominent:

Firstly, will China and the United States choose to escalate tensions in their relationship and “decouple”—the direction some in the US are pushing for—leading the world into division and ultimately all-out confrontation? Or will they seek coexistence within the unified world economic system by making adjustments and returning to the track of cooperation?

The choices that China and the US will affect not only their respective economies but also where the world will be heading. I believe it’s also the hope of the rest of the world that China and the US choose wisely and responsibly. The recent tensions between China and the US have been escalating faster than many expected, and the frictions are spilling over from trade to other areas. The outcome will be one of the determining factors for the future direction of the world.

Secondly, will the world continue to “advance” toward or “retreat” from economic globalization and multilateralism? Countries are pondering this big question, wondering if closer cooperation can lead to improved global governance and fairer benefits. Will we have a better future if we choose to “retreat”? The answer is most likely to be negative, as “retreat” will lead to vicious competition, making the world fall back into division and isolation. As one of the long-standing driving forces for multilateralism, Europe’s choice will be of critical importance.

In an evermore complex world, do you think every country should rely upon itself–or do you see a better future in more international cooperation? And do we need new institutions? In a globalized world, self-reliance and openness/inclusiveness cannot be absolute and should not be mutually-exclusive. Rather, they should be complementary to each other. It’s natural that countries and enterprises build their own research and development capabilities, but it should be an open, rather than isolated, effort. In today’s world, scientific and technological advances are built on previous progress. And this should be furthered through open cooperation and be confined by commonly accepted norms and ethical standards.

As for China, one critical condition that allowed the country to embark on reform and opening-up forty years ago was that the world had entered the era of peace and development. Today, this remains the main trend, as does China’s commitment to reform and opening-up. Now China and the US are each other’s most important trading and business partners, it is unrealistic for them to “decouple”. Global resources, industries, and markets have become so integrated and interdependent that it would be unimaginable to sever the bonds among countries. As a case in point, the design, manufacturing, assembly, and sales of an American iPhone is a journey that best reflects “globalization.” In the field of security, “decoupling” may also have serious consequences. Many global problems will have to be addressed by a concerted effort of the international community. If major countries insist on seeking exclusive security, new security dilemmas will ensue, pushing mankind into the shadow of Cold War or even hot war again.

Indeed, international cooperation faces some difficulties. But cooperation remains the better choice. On one hand, this is the inevitable path for coping with global challenges such as climate change, pollution, and security threats; on the other, the coming technological revolution will create more synergies for international cooperation. The international institutions and rules established after World War II, such as World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), are still broadly accepted and supported, but adjustments and reforms are also necessary. It is neither feasible nor necessary to scrap the existing institutions and start all over again. But new reinforcement is needed, i.e., new rules to regulate competition and cooperation in new areas, such as deep sea, deep space, polar region, cyber and artificial intelligence.

Do you agree that we’re living in times of groundbreaking change, and what‘s driving it?
 Among the most important ground-breaking changes in the world today are the industrial transformation brought about by scientific and technological innovations that are changing the ways people live and communicate. By the end of 2016, 140 million Chinese were connected through the Mobile Internet of Things. The number of M2M (machine-to-machine) application terminals in China had reached 100 million, accounting for 31 percent of the world’s total.

Driven by internet, big data, blockchain, and Artificial Intelligence, the new, ever-ongoing, and unpredictable transformation can erupt at any time–and it’s hard to know which new technology will break through, or whether they will do so individually or at the same time. All of them are constantly changing our understandings about the world, and hopefully for the better.

The fundamental driving force for such change is “mankind”—its aspiration for better lives. Infinite aspiration inspires infinite creativity. Admittedly, there will always be times when some can’t suppress the urge to apply new technologies for war. Therefore, the rapid progress of modern technologies has set higher requirements for mankind’s self-discipline and moral constraint. There is no doubt that the majority of the young generation who grew up in the internet era do not want to see war. The questions is whether and how human creativity can be used to maximize the prospects of world peace and the benefits for the widest possible population, rather than to cause inequality and even war.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping explained, “the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved. What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.” To some extent, this is also true about the world. While the new technologies have been greatly improving our lives, they are also bringing about risks in security, privacy, and other unpredictable areas. Only by strengthening cooperation can countries achieve compatibility between technology and growth and, through consultations, jointly address the challenges caused by unbalanced and inadequate development. Only in this way can we march toward a community of shared future for mankind.

This year’s MSC will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

The post “Are the US and China ‘Decoupling’?” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

What are the greatest challenges in international politics in 2019? It’s very tempting to point to the current US administration as the greatest international challenge today. Indeed, Washington has been very active in challenging the foundations of the contemporary world order. Pursuing its immediate goals, the United States does not seem to care much about international law or about multilateral institutions. It unilaterally withdraws from critically important agreements and tries to impose its unilateral decisions on other countries and on international organizations. The White House does not hesitate to bluntly pressure its partners, which leads to less stability, greater risks, and less predictability at the global and regional levels.

However, in my view, it would be a dangerous oversimplification to blame all the world’s problems on Donald Trump and the United States. The reality is much more complicated. These days, the world is going through a profound technological, economic, social, and cultural transformation—and our final destination is unclear. The increased pace of change calls for a new level of global governance, but old political habits still prevent us from moving to this level. I would venture to say that the greatest challenge of our times is a deficit of solidarity between nation states, including those entrusted by the United Nations Charter with a special responsibility to maintain global peace and security. Until these states can put their disagreements on specific matters aside and stand up to the common challenge, the world will not be a safe place.

What is driving the changes you’re describing? It would be difficult to single out just one factor that drives the profound changes in the world that we all observe today. In most cases, we focus our attention on new problems rather than on new opportunities. For instance, we talk a lot about the growing tensions between US and China are much talked about, about how there are implications for the whole world, including a global recession and a new geopolitical bipolarity. It’s unclear where the Middle East is heading socially and politically, but it’s apparent that what is happening there is likely to affect all of us.  We should also not underestimate the danger of a US-Iran or a Saudi-Iran clash. Regretfully, the Ukrainian crisis remains unresolved, and the limited progress on North Korea’s nuclear program is still very fragile and reversible.

Each of these conflicts, threats, and challenges has its own roots, participants, trajectory, and dynamics. They might look completely unrelated to one another. However, this is not the case. All of them feed into each other, destroy trust among major international players, paralyze international organizations, and complicate cooperation at various levels. I think that a “perfect storm”–the cumulative impact of several crises taking place simultaneously –is the greatest challenge of 2019 and the years to come.  We may end up completely destroying the old international system before we’ve even got started building a new one.

In an evermore complex world, do you think every country should rely upon itself, or would you see a better future in more international cooperation? And do we need new institutions? In the 21st century, states remain the most important international players. That means that we should keep states strong and efficient; they have to be indispensable building blocks in the emerging world order. Nevertheless, there are certain limits on what even the most powerful states can accomplish unilaterally. In times of accelerated globalization, these limits become more and more apparent–both in the area of social and economic development and in the area of international and even domestic security. Unfortunately, today we see many powerful countries creating more problems than offering solutions. The US is arguably the most graphic example of a state taking explicitly unilateralist, shortsighted, egotistic foreign policy decisions.   Given the US’s unique role in the modern international system, this obsession with unilateralism in Washington appears particularly dangerous.

However, let me underscore once again: this is not about the United States only. All states – big and small, rich and poor, in the West and in the East–have to work together in the very condensed, crowded, and interdependent world of today and of tomorrow. So far, none of us can convincingly claim that his or her country has fully mastered the difficult art of multilateralism. We now see that even in the European Union–the recognized leader of multilateral diplomacy–multilateralism faces serious and diverse challenges. It would be better for all of us to study the art of multilateralism jointly, not separately. This might sound unrealistic under the current dire political circumstances, but I see no other way–neither for Europe, nor for the world at large. In the world of today, security is indivisible, and so is prosperity.

This year’s MSC will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

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© REUTERS/Michaela Rehle

What do you see as the greatest international political challenge of 2019? It’s not a single issue but a general problem: the world lacks an anchor of stability. Rules are being broken, institutions ignored or maligned. That creates instability and unpredictability, and it’s dangerous. I’m not sure whether we would really be capable of keeping a real crisis in check. On what–and on who–could we rely on in an emergency?

Do you agree that we live in a time of great upheaval? And what is driving this development? Yes, one day people will look back on this time as an epochal watershed. Many foreign policy certainties are all of a sudden in question. That has partly to do with global, strategic power-political shifts, but partly also with domestic political developments in important countries.

In an ever more complex world, should every country reflect on itself, or is more cooperation the future? Do we need new institutions? Efforts to find our salvation in a new nationalism will lead to a dead end. I hope that we don’t have to learn this lesson over again. But unfortunately, at present, the principle of multilateralism is well and truly under pressure. New institutions won’t solve this problem, though. We need to make better use of existing institutions.

Which three issues are a special focus for the 2019 conference? The future of transatlantic relations, the self-assertion of the EU, and the danger of escalating great power rivalries.

Do you have a favorite memory from a Munich Security Conference, a greatest moment? Joe Biden’s 2009 appearance at the first security conference where I was chairman is a special memory for me. Biden gave the first important foreign policy speech of the new Obama administration and generated a feeling of optimism about a reset–not just with Russia but also in the transatlantic relationship. One result of that was the New START treaty.

What have you found especially unpleasant? The increasing tendency of top politicians from the EU to refuse to sit on the same stage as certain colleagues. In the past that only happened when countries had been enemies for decades. That massively upsets me¾and makes me sad.

Which result of a conference were you particularly pleased about? One of the principles of the MSC is that we don’t produce any communiqués. We try to offer the best possible platform for an exchange, thereby creating or keeping open possible courses of political action. That frequently works, but it often takes years before we see the results. The American-Russian disarmament negotiations or the rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia are good examples. If it all culminates in something years later, it makes me really happy.

When the world is doing badly, it’s good for the MSC, right? The attention over the past few years has certainly increased even further. But we would love to be able to have a conference totally dedicated to long-term challenges rather than dominated by the many crises roiling daily politics.

What’s the one thing an MSC can’t go without? The big names!

What is never allowed to happen there? If we are in danger of stirring up tensions around an issue rather than having a positive influence, then our sense of responsibility demands that we don’t even spark such a debate.

Is there a guest still missing from your “collection”? The Pope! So far, though, we haven’t had a US or Chinese president as a guest. I’m really pleased about the huge interest we get from every part of the world–from Australia to Iceland, from Rwanda to Mongolia.

John McCain will really be missed at the MSC–do you see anyone as a potential successor? John McCain was the best friend the MSC had in the US Congress. He leaves a big gap behind. But Senators Lindsey Graham and Sheldon Whitehouse have been coming for many years. They will–and I’m very confident about this–continue to bring a strong “co-delegation” to Munich in the coming years, fully in the spirit of John McCain!

This year’s MSC will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

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© REUTERS/Yoan Valat/Pool

The European Intervention Initiative (E2I), outlined by French President Emmanuel Macron during his September 2017 Sorbonne speech, will take a more concrete form this November following the ministerial meeting and Military European Strategic Talks (MEST) setting the political guidance and technical processes. So far, nine countries—Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom—have signed a Letter of Intent, and others may soon join.

The announcement of the initiative led to much confusion and speculation a year ago. French officials have since carried out important work further explaining the proposal, and the perspectives of signatory states have largely converged. The success of E2I will now depend on countries’ political willingness to engage in this format—a challenge for Berlin in particular—as well as on balancing each other’s strategic priorities.

Although the long-term goal of the initiative is to build a shared European strategic culture, the most concrete objectives of E2I is to enable closer cooperation “between the armed forces of European states that are willing and able to carry out military missions and operations, throughout the spectrum of crises.” It will include intelligence sharing and scenario planning as well as serve as an international forum to conduct exchanges on operational needs and doctrine. In fact, France designed the initiative to provide a clear political mandate for European militaries to develop working groups on some security issues that used to be taboo.

However, is not intended to become a separate intervention force or organize military exercises, but rather help better anticipate future crises and plan operational cooperation. For the moment E2I is primarily a military-to-military “strategic workshop.” Although this mandate may seem small in contrast to its political hype, France has deemed it crucial to benefit missions and projects implemented in the EU or NATO formats, as well as to build ad hoc coalitions. Indeed, while some countries, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, already have strong bilateral exchanges on such issues through liaison officers, E2I will now be elevated to a multilateral working platform to include smaller partners. This makes it particularly valuable for Estonia and Portugal, among others, as it allows their militaries to benefit from recent experiences of leading European armed forces.

Exclusivity and Flexibility

Most countries agree E2I should remain an exclusive initiative; not only to guarantee its efficiency but also to ensure all members show the political willingness to address complex operational issues and share perspectives on power projection beyond the Europe. France and the United Kingdom are adamant the number of participants should not exceed 14 or 15 countries. Even Finland, expected to sign the Letter of Intent by the end of the year, promotes the idea that E2I should be kept limited in number.

However, the exclusivity of the initiative is more problematic for Germany, which considers it to undermine the idea of European unity and warns it may cause tensions with countries not party to the E2I. The Netherlands and Spain shared similar concerns, which have since been addressed. Indeed, Germany now seems to be the only country advocating for more inclusivity.

A raison d’être of E2I is institutional flexibility. The majority of participating states share France’s assessment that EU decision-making processes and bureaucracy have proven incapable of leading to ambitious, time-sensitive deployments. Non-affiliation to the EU also has the benefit of allowing cooperation with CSDP opt-outs like Denmark and of tying the UK to wider European defense after Brexit.

Also, E2I aims to reinforce the efforts undertaken in much larger initiatives at the EU and NATO levels; hence, fears of competition and disunion shouldn’t be exaggerated. Although concerns as to how to articulate E2I and PESCO were originally raised by several countries, many of these have now dissipated, and the lack of institutional link between the two projects does not constitute a major issue moving forward. Again, Germany is the only exception. Berlin favors gathering European defense initiatives under the inclusive EU umbrella, for instance linking E2I with the German-led EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core PESCO project.

A Modest Structure

Despite Macron’s grand rhetoric, E2I is a modest and flexible structure with no quantifiable deliverables, thus keeping political cost for joining low. Once countries received guarantees that signing the E2I would not entail any major commitments in terms of staff, new institutions, or budget, they were willing to showcase their willingness to participate in the European defense effort.

Indeed, E2I will only succeed as a modular non-constraining framework that countries can participate in with as little red tape as possible. Three issues in particular will determine its successful implementation.

First, France will have to prove that it is ready to listen to partners and prevent the initiative being viewed purely as a French endeavor. This can be showcased by the organization of future MEST in different countries and by developing working groups dedicated to issues that are not French priorities. A scenario presented by the Dutch of dedicating the first working session to an environmental crisis in the Caribbean was therefore a welcome opportunity.

Second, Germany will have to clarify its position on an exclusive and non-EU format. Germany’s participation is key, but other countries are not ready to make serious compromises on these issues.

Third, the integration of new states will partly determine the future of the initiative. Nordic partners such as Norway and Sweden may follow Finland, introducing new priorities while reinforcing the case for E2I’s institutional freedom. The signature of the Letter of Intent by Italy—postponed until now mostly due to French-Italian frictions—would also confirm the political success of the E2I at the European level.

Editor’s note: For this piece, the authors spoke to officials from the nine participating countries plus Finland in order to highlight key elements of the initiative and explain how it could complement other initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation). An expanded version of this piece will be published in the Berlin Policy Journal issue of November/December 2018. For more BPJ coverage of European defense, check out our September/October issue, especially Jana Puglierin’s cover story on the backsliding German defense debate.

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© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

Stefan Zweig once wrote that people are often “denied recognition of the early beginnings of the great moments which determine their times.” If you were wandering the halls of the Munich Security Conference last weekend, you would have inevitably been confronted by the search for that recognition. The question— “What keeps you up at night?“—was, in some ways, the organizing logic of MSC 2018. Some answered nuclear proliferation. Others cyber. Some spoke dutifully about China and One-Belt-One-Road. A handful of mostly American internationalists raised alarm bells about Putin and his phalanx of trolls, bots, cyber spooks, and rotten money.

Generally, world leaders offered up crises of the day: Iran’s growing malevolence in the Middle East; the evolving proxy war in Syria; North Korea; a ghosting US administration; and Ukraine’s continued struggle for territorial integrity. Some tried to cut through the cacophony of immediate hotspots pointing to climate change and the coming tech revolution in war.

But all noted that the classic set of instruments—treaties, international institutions, effective deterrence, contact groups—are not fit for purpose to address these challenges. If political systems, the instruments, and the elites that manage them are no longer able to address, it begs the real question: to what extent is all this still useful?

That was the real question that kept MSC goers up at night. The poignancy of MSC 2018 was seeing some of the world’s most creative, dogged institution-builders grapple with the sense that the operating system that they and their forbearers created to tackle the world’s problems is on the brink of collapse.

They are not the only ones asking this question. The loaned legitimacy that MSC established – diplomats, experts, party leaders, the press and defense planners – had benefited from for decades is receding. People in Wiesbaden, St. Louis, and Manchester no longer see this class of rarefied thinkers worthy of esteem. They have their own opinions about North Korea, Russia, and international trade. The Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki brought this sentiment into Bayerischer Hof, the conference hotel, with his scripted line that the West should invest more in armored tanks and less in think tanks.

Lazy Thinking

It is not a coincidence that in an unscripted moment, Morawiecki made the stunning equivalence that there were “Polish perpetrators as there were Jewish perpetrators” of the Holocaust. The audience was taken aback by his remarks. But the ooze of such lazy thinking is making its way into many of Europe’s illiberal parties, including Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), likely soon to be the country’s second largest party.

It is a reality that many do not know how to confront. One instinct is to retreat into the past, into their own version of Stefan Zweig’s “golden age of security.” They pine for the world of yesterday with Atlanticist heroes like Joe Biden, Sam Nunn, and Wolfgang Ischinger. One bright spot was the strong Congressional turnout. But it was the unique force of McCain’s personality kept the MSC spirit alive. Will his successors, even if they are well-meaning, be as charitable with their time for the liberal world order?

At its core, the Munich Security Conference has really been a German-American affair. As one conference veteran wryly observed, the MSC is most electric when the transatlantic relationship is bad. When it is good, the gathering is listless. But then, the participant noted darkly, Munich 2018 seemed to be both listless against the backdrop of a deteriorating Atlantic alliance and a world on fire.

The Trump administration has ghosted from so many world fronts. The reality of Trumpism has set in with its nativism, vulgarity, ethno-nationalism, transactionalism, endemic corruption, and indifference to democracy, human rights, institutions, and notions of international community that US hegemony has provided from Europe to Asia, even Latin America. The administration’s Orwellian talking point—that the world should pay no attention to the president’s words but rather US. actions – received well-deserved derision from a professional class who recognize that rhetoric is primer for action.

But a new source of unease was Germany, itself. The German delegation led by a troika of future past, Sigmar Gabriel, Ursula von der Leyen, and Thomas de Maziere, the foreign, defense, and interior ministers respectively. They did their best to present the brave face of the status quo and even gave accents of policy change on the margins—Franco-German cooperation in joint European security for example. But the growing gap between the status quo they represent and the popular frustration with the establishment hit a boiling point, even in Germany—the world’s premiere status quo power. It is plausible that all three—and the political outlook they represent—could be gone in a year’s time.

In fact, the German political establishment looks a bit like an Antarctic ice shelf. Seemingly stolid, imposing, even magisterial, all at once it crashes into the ocean never to return. This could be the fate of the leaders, the Volksparteien, or people’s parties, and the consensus values they carry with them.  If it does not collapse, it will be owed to the rank-and-file of the Social Democrats (SPD), who are casting their ballots on whether to enter into another government with Chancellor Merkel’s conservatives. The SPD base—whose largest age bloc is between 71-80—dutifully remembers.

Zweig wrote about moments where the world history departs from its iterative plodding and changes forever, what evolutionary theorists call punctuated equilibria. The entire MSC class knows this. They just don’t know how to respond.

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Munich Security Conference chairman Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger didn’t waste time, delivering a warning in his opening speech: “The red alarm lights are blinking.” According to Ischinger, the risk of interstate conflict has never been this high since 1989. A tense international security situation set the tone for this year’s MSC, and neither Europe nor the United States seemed to have any plan to address the threats facing them both.

These risks were spelled out in brutal detail in the course of the conference: the situation in the Near and Middle East, North Korea, the risk of cyber warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the growing power of illiberal superpowers. The clearer the picture of the dangers facing the West became over the three days, the more worrisome the lack of any concrete strategy to minimize these risks. The West, which finds itself locked in conflict with illiberal states, seems to be paralyzed by complex challenges and deep divides within its own camp.

EU Governments Are Ready to Cooperate

Over the first two days, discussions focused on the state of the European Union and NATO; PESCO, or “permanent structured cooperation,” a defense framework the EU launched last year, was one of the central themes. The EU defense initiative, which will also coordinate funding in EU member states, was spurred by three developments: first, reduced confidence in the USA since the election of President Donald Trump; second, a need to demonstrate the resilience of the EU in the face of Brexit; and third, a desire to better coordinate the growing defense expenditures the EU states were making in the course of meeting the “2 percent of GDP” goal NATO demands.

The criticism of PESCO that has been expressed in recent weeks also appeared in both official statements and informal conversations in Munich—an unpleasant surprise for Europeans, who had assumed that the USA would see a strengthening of the EU’s defense capacities as a step in its own interests. This fact was pointed out by NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, who said that “stronger defense cooperation in Europe is not an alternative to NATO,” and stressed that the non-EU members of the defense alliance would not be at a disadvantage; after all, with the Brexit decision 80 percent of NATO defense spending will soon come from non-EU countries.

Some participants indeed thought they could see Washington’s fingerprints on Stoltenberg’s statement. The American government is concerned that the USA could lose access to the EU market and be excluded from future developments. In unofficial discussions, representatives of the smaller EU member states also worried that they themselves could be among the losers, in particular if the European defense industry should consilidate. So far, however, despite all criticism, PESCO remains a project the NATO planning staff is firmly committed to. At the same time, over the coming months and years it will need to be evaluated against the hopes that have been placed upon it.

Germany and France Seem Ready to Get Going

Additional ideas came from Berlin and Paris during the joint appearance by acting German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and her French counterpart Florence Parly. Von der Leyen underlined the foreign policy stance of the recently concluded coalition agreement, saying “We want to remain transatlantic, but become more European.” She supported a “PESCO that would also serve European foreign policy”—that is, the possibility to proceed further as a smaller group that would make decisions by majority. Parly underlined the new level German-French defense cooperation had reached since the German-French summit in July 2017, both “operationally”, as in the stabilization operation in Mali, and in terms of its equipment and procurement. That being said, behind the German-French dynamic on stage, it was clear that differences of opinion remain. Parly highlighted the “European Intervention Initiative,” which is seen as something of a second priority to PESCO in Berlin. Germany wants to build up the EU’s capacities, while France wants to build up its own operational strength, leaving PESCO a less significant role.

On the following day, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker underlined the EU’s “desire for independence” in its foreign and security policies, though he stressed that this was not directed at the US or NATO. He also expressed strong support for majority-based decision-making in these areas. However, appearances by new Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz made it clear that this enthusiasm is in no way shared throughout the entire EU.

Post-Brexit Cooperation with Great Britain Remains Unclear

British Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech brought long-hoped for clarification on a few issues related to the Brexit process. The Prime Minister suggested a security alliance between the EU and UK following Britain’s departure from the union. Within this framework, cooperation in the area of internal security would be continued, according to May. In saying this, she made an important concession: in cooperating with the EU authorities, London will “respect” the decisions of the European Court of Justice.

Despite these statements, May’s speech lacked a clear unifying message: While she did clarify that Great Britain was “unconditionally” committed to the defense of Europe, her warning that disunity would “damage both sides” revived fears that London would use its security assets as negotiating leverage. The general reaction to May’s speech in Munich was hence mixed.

The USA: Continuity Against Trump

The mission of US participants to the 2018 Munich Security Conference was clear: they needed to convince their NATO allies that the transatlantic relationship was sturdy, that guarantees made to allies were trustworthy, and that US foreign policy would maintain continuity. From the German side, the friendlier tones were welcomed, and acting German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned in his speech that Germany would have to contribute more to making Europe stronger and more capable of acting on its own, and in doing so improve the cooperation with the USA. Europe cannot shape the world or defend the liberal order that it has profited from by itself, according to Gabriel.

General H. R. McMaster, US President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, delivered a mostly “classic” pro-transatlantic speech: he stressed the common values the USA shares with Europe, and labeled three issues as particularly high priorities in the USA’s foreign policy: the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the war on terror, and the strengthening of international organizations; the last of these, admittedly, appeared slightly disingenuous in light of the massive criticism Trump has leveled at these same organizations. Unlike in the previous year, when Vice President Mike Pence and US Secretary of Defense Mattis vanished from the podium after their talks, McMaster was prepared for a dialogue in Munich. In the course of this discussion, McMaster distanced himself from the president in confirming that it was now “indisputable fact” that Russia had acted to influence the US presidential election. Trump reacted furiously on Twitter over the weekend.

Asked about the Hobbesian views he sketched in an op-ed he published in the Wall Street Journal with Trump’s chief economic adviser Gary Cohn in May 2017—namely, that he saw the world as an (economic) war in which every nation had to fend for itself—McMaster clarified in Munich that his thesis only applied to the competition between free and unfree states, and that he in no way meant to include the relationships between allies, a tactical re-interpretation that is nevertheless contradicted by many of the things Trump himself said throughout 2017.

On the annual MSC Congressional Panel, the four speakers worked across party lines to present a credible image of continuity in US foreign policy. Should the White House deviate from the previous line, Congress would intervene, as for example in the case of the Russia sanctions or the State Department’s financing.

Escalatory Rhetoric Instead of Dialogue

The panel, focused as it was on communicating continuity, also showed what has changed leading up to the start of the 2018 MSC: From Washington’s point of view, North Korea has become the most significant risk, while at the past MSC, terrorism had topped the list. The fact that Trump’s escalatory rhetoric has made inroads among the foreign policy-makers in Congress was demonstrated by Senator Jim Risch (R-ID), who warned that any military action from Pyongyang would fail “massively” and bring loss and destruction of “biblical proportions.” During the panel on nuclear arms control, US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan and former Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergei Kislyak accused each other of pursuing aggressive nuclear arms policies. They traded the kind of verbal blows that one would hardly expect to hear even at the height of the Cold War.

In general, there was little from the US side about national maximization of utility and transactional dealmaking. In fact, the opposite was true: the Americans present worked to restore greater credibility to Washington’s place in the Western alliance and the Western community of values. In this they were only partially successful. Participants still considered Trump’s word to be final, whatever his representatives might say.

From the Post-Western World to Systemic Conflict

In 2017, the fall of the West and its international relations paradigm and the rise of a “post-Western” world, created by Russia and Iran among others, was one of the central topics of discussion. In the 2018 MSC, however, debates about the international security situation were held against the backdrop of a more and more openly acknowledged systemic conflict between Western, liberal democracies and authoritarian, sometimes protectionist regimes. Foreign Minister Gabriel said, for example, “This new world, which is much more complex than the world of the Cold War, is defined by systemic competition between developed democracies and authoritarians.”

The Americans who were present worked to deliver a clear statement on this systemic conflict, one that would place them on the side of Europe. In this context, former Vice President Joe Biden attacked Russia directly: “Putin is doing everything he can to destroy the transatlantic alliance and the international liberal order.” According to Biden, it was easier for the Russians to attack the West than to repair the political, economic, and social fractures in their own society.

Russia Once Again Plays the Victim

In fact, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s appearance showed that Russia still sees itself as a victim of Western expansionism above all, and is still far removed from the political mainstream. In a speech that was gloomy even for Lavrov, the foreign minister liberally mixed Nazi revisionism with developments since the 1989 fall of the Soviet Union, and characterized the charges filed against 13 Russian citizens by Special Counsel Robert Mueller due to their interference with the US election as “gossip”. Turning to the conflict in Syria and the conditions necessary for a regional security structure, he showed little interest in returning to productive cooperation with the West.

The Elephant in the Room: China

China’s roll warrants further reflection. In the plenary session, Foreign Minister Gabriel was the only one to explicitly refer to it; he interpreted the Belt and Road Initiative as an attempt “to establish a comprehensive system to influence the world in line with Chinese interests.” China is a counter-balancing force in the systemic conflict, and at the moment the only one pursuing a thoroughly thought-out global strategy. The EU has to develop more internal consistency and help the member states develop a common sense of their interests in the union’s foreign relations. It must then develop strategies and instruments to implement these interests together.

China was otherwise relegated to the fringes of the discussion, although even here it was clear that certain things were being thought of differently: belief in China’s transformation, for example—both in terms of its step-by-step democratization and in its transition to a market economy—seemed to no longer be present, even among representatives of the business community. The Belt and Road Initiative is seen as a threat, and not only because China is strategically investing to secure access, undermine Western norms, and build up its own position, but also because it has the potential to divide inner-European unity.

Dealings with China, Central Asia, and the Eastern neighborhood of the EU are themes for which the EU currently has no persuasive strategy. At the same time, with the USA’s withdrawal the EU will have to learn to work with the powers in these regions.

This new significance of the relationship with China was hardly seen at the conference. Investments in dialogue with China are urgently necessary. In Fu Ying, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, the Chinese sent an experienced diplomat and a representative of the Chinese nomenklatura to the MSC discussion on nuclear arms control; otherwise, however, the challenges posed by China, India, and a rising Asia remained largely unaddressed.

There were few actual programmatic discussions in Munich; with the exception of Foreign Minister Gabriel’s, the closest were delivered by the emir of Qatar, Sheik Tamim Al-Thani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The last suggested an “inclusive” security structure for the Gulf Region, one built step by step, but simultaneously rejected the notion that Tehran was responsible for the current tense situation and dodged a question about Israel’s right to exist. It was also typical of the political environment that when there were specific suggestions made there was hardly any reaction.

The EU: More Strategy, More Ability, More Engagement!

Cooperation within the EU paints a mixed bag: There has been progress with the creation of structures and processes in the area of defense, and despite initial skepticism the Central and Eastern Europeans seem to be on board. However, strategies for handling the most significant risks, whether an escalation of the situation in the Middle East, the actions of North Korea, or a destructive cyber attack, were absent on both sides of the Atlantic.

Thus the hoped-for “step back from the brink” failed to occur during the Munich Security Conference. Instead, several debates seemed much more suited to spur on ongoing conflicts, as with the debate about the situation in the Middle East on the final day. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular used his talk as a reproach to Tehran more than anything else: in the course of his address, he held up a part of an Iranian drone recently shot down in Israeli airspace.

No one should expect the international situation to quiet down. German and European international policy-makers have great tasks ahead for which they are not yet sufficiently prepared. As Foreign Minister Gabriel demanded, they must become much more strategically capable, as well as more active and innovative, in order to succeed in this new systemic conflict and help reduce instability. There isn’t much time left.

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