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Try to picture what Angela Merkel would be like as a man, slightly younger and of West German origin. But just as solid, rational, and pragmatic as the woman who has governed Germany for the last 15 years. Unimaginative, yet endowed with a wicked sense of irony (mostly kept private). Combining political flexibility with a lot of experience and a deft hand at power play.

You are bound to end up with Olaf Scholz, 62, current vice-chancellor and finance minister. In terms of character and politics, he is Merkel’s twin—and so far, also her most important ally in the cabinet. And if it was up him—and now his party, too—Scholz would become her successor as well.

In a surprise coup, Germany’s Social Democrats on August 10 nominated Scholz as their candidate for the chancellery in the 2021 elections. The surprise was in the timing, a very long 13 months away from the likely polling day, and in the unanimity of the decision. But not in the choice itself: in a party that has used up leaders at a crazy rate, Scholz is the last popular, well-known figure (read our 2018 profile of him here.)

He owes this popularity in equal parts to his own talent, his excellent working relationship with Merkel, and the appeal of his sober pragmatism during the coronavirus crisis. Yet as a nominee, he will now be exposed to much closer and more unforgiving attention.

In the Spotlight

The Wirecard scandal—a huge case of fraud in a now-bankrupt German payments system company that should have been uncovered and stopped by financial regulators reporting to the finance minister years earlier—may provide a first taste of the changed atmosphere. Politicians from every other party will now try to lay the blame at Scholz’s door.

Even apart from Wirecard, Scholz will have to perform a multiple balancing act until the 2021 elections. It begins with his own party, a divided and self-destructive organization, where Scholz is respected but not liked. Just nine months ago, Germany’s Social Democrats (SPD) passed him over for the party leadership and chose two relatively unknown politicians from the left wing instead.

In any case, the SPD has been moving much further left as its election results have deteriorated–yet Scholz appeals to voters precisely because he is a moderate. As a candidate, he will need to motivate his party to campaign for him while reassuring centrist voters that they need not fear drastic changes. That may not be easy: the SPD’s most plausible claim to the chancellery means entering a coalition with not only the Greens, but the socialist Left Party.

New Rifts

In the meantime, Scholz will be facing new rifts within the grand coalition with Merkel. Earlier this year, Scholz could rely on the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) to support the enormous spending programs he designed to help the German economy survive the COVID-19 crisis. But what happens if the pandemic continues and the slump gets deeper? Merkel’s conservatives will hesitate to endorse further deficit spending for ideological reasons. But they also won’t want to hand Scholz another victory.

The same is true at the European level, only more so. Scholz is a European integrationist. Even before coronavirus, he broke with some of the taboos set by his predecessor in the finance ministry, Wolfgang Schäuble, by backing, for instance, a European deposit insurance scheme. When the pandemic set in, Scholz worked closely with his French counterpart to push for more generous European support to those member states that were hit hardest by the virus.

As candidate for the chancellery, Scholz said that a European Union based on more solidarity was going to be one of his main concerns. Such a stance is bound to lead to conflict within the current coalition. Merkel did put her considerable political weight behind financial support for weaker EU countries this summer. But many in her party quietly disagreed.

Tensions over Europe

Such tensions are certain to rise to the surface now as the race to succeed Merkel heats up within the conservative bloc. It is lucky for Europe that the EU budget deal was finalized in the early weeks of the German EU presidency; during the remaining four months, the emerging domestic differences are going to be much more of a hindrance.

Just before Scholz’s nomination, the SPD stood at 15 percent in the polls, behind Merkel’s conservatives (38 percent) but also the Greens (18 percent). Scholz does not lack self-confidence; he believes that a good candidate can add 10 percent to the score. But even then, and even if SPD remains united behind Scholz, the math remains uncertain.

Much depends on the future course of the pandemic. Politically, the COVID-19 crisis has boosted both Merkel’s and Scholz’s approval ratings. When Merkel leaves office next year, will German voters turn to her closest political look-alike? It’s possible. But so is the reverse. A German public that is fed up with the pandemic and its effects on everybody’s life may want to opt for change.

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© REUTERS/Annegret Hilse

Seven years ago DIE ZEIT foreign editor Jörg Lau provocatively wrote of the “German love of dictators,” pointing to Germany’s uncritical embrace of autocracies, kleptocracies, and theocracies in the name of smoothly doing business, be it China, Russia, or Iran. Lau criticized the German tendency to value “stability” above all else and to characterize the alternative to dictators like Vladimir Putin always as “chaos, separatism, nationalism or even Communism.” Attempts at criticizing regimes like Putin’s was regularly denounced as “hyper-moralism”—and who are the Germans to play the school master of the world given their history?

Strikingly, this approach remains dominant in the case of Germany’s relationship with China, too. Peter Altmaier, the Economy Minister and close confident of Chancellor Angela Merkel, gave an interview on July 15 to Politico Europe defending Berlin’s refusal to take a hard line over China’s repression of Hong Kong. Altmaier argued that those advocating a more strident approach were ignoring the economic consequences of confronting Beijing. He sounded like many of his Social Democratic (SPD) predecessors, making the case for Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”), stating, “I have always been convinced that change can be achieved through trade.” He argued that this strategy had worked with the former Soviet Union and remained the core of the German approach to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Dangerous Misconception

This answer and approach are mistaken and are quite dangerous in the longer term. The phrase of Wandel durch Handel came out of the earlier formulation of Egon Bahr of Wandel durch Annährung, or “change through rapprochement.”  This was the original concept behind the shift in the West German strategy toward the Soviet Union in the early 1970s under Chancellor Willy Brandt from one of a policy of strength to one of dialogue.

Many Germans, especially Social Democrats, believe to this day that this was the primary factor behind the peaceful reunification of Germany in 1990. It’s true that West Germany’s acceptance of the postwar territorial order and the renunciation of claims for the lost lands in the east were crucial to Mikhail Gorbachev’s acceptance that Germany was no longer a threat to the Soviet Union. Without the support of the United States, however, both with its extended deterrent and diplomacy, German unification would not have happened the way it did.

This way of thinking also downplayed the major political and ideological differences between the West and Communist East to the point that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed with the East German Communist leader, Erich Honecker, that martial law was necessary in Poland in 1981. Stability trumped ideological differences, democracy, and human rights. This was a form of realism to be sure and another example of the German love of stability.

The Primacy of Economics

The reasons behind Germany’s passivity lie in the nature of the its geo-economic approach to foreign policy, which is grounded in its political economy. Germany is the most export driven economy in the world, with close to half of its GDP deriving from exports. It also has the globe’s largest per capita current accounts surplus, is heavily dependent on industry and on the import of energy and other raw materials to fuel its industrial core. The business of Germany is business and despite the importance of Moralpolitik and the need to atone for the crimes of the Third Reich, economics is seen as the foundation of both German democracy and Berlin’s international role.

This approach was adapted to Putin’s Russia from 2008 under the “partnership for modernization” of then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier during the first Merkel Grand Coalition government. This concept argued that change would come through economic interdependence, or Verflechtung. The growing authoritarianism of the Putin regime and the Russian invasion of Ukraine shook, but did not break this illusion. To this day, however, German investment and trade with Russia has done practically nothing to open up the political and judicial system of Russia or to reduce its rampant corruption. Based on data compiled by Transparency International, Russia ranks 137 out of 198 countries in terms of corruption and its score of 28 out of a possible 100 has not changed since 2012. There is little evidence of much Wandel here.

Tough on Trump, Soft on Xi

China is a much more different and more important matter, given its much greater economic weight. Both China and Russia have violated international agreements with impunity, Russia in Ukraine and China in its agreement with the United Kingdom on the “one country, two systems” concept for the status of Hong Kong. Like many other Western corporations, German companies like Volkswagen, Siemens, and BASF are manufacturing in Xinjiang province where Uyghurs and other Muslims are being held in interment and labor camps.

Chancellor Merkel has been silent and Altmaier argues that it might be “too risky to pursue a confrontational course” against China. Yet, there is more risk in dealing with a country which openly violates its international agreements and lies without any attempt at pretending they are doing so. Accommodation conveys weakness and invites further pressure and blackmail, undermining the economic and political objectives of the strategy.

While German leaders have been rightly critical of US President Donald Trump’s disregard for democracy and human rights, they have their own version of value free transactional policies with regard to China, Russia, Hungary, and other illiberal regimes. Merkel’s and Altmaier’s Christian Democrats (CDU) continue to welcome Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz into the European People’s Party caucus in the European Parliament; and the government has no qualms about German car makers continuing to invest in Hungarian plants.

Thus, Berlin is not likely to use its EU presidency in the second half of 2020 to stand up to Orbán and to the consolidation of illiberalism in Poland. The current discussions in the EU about a COVID-19 fiscal stimulus package raised the issue of tying economic support to the rule of law, specifically in regard to Hungary, but this was kept out of the European Council’s final agreement.

Time to Change the Tune

With Germany presently at the EU’s helm, this would be the time to show that the EU stands for more than just economic power. Non-governmental organizations like Transparency International and German foundations have promoted a more values-based approach including support for democratic reforms, but so far Merkel’s government has fallen far short of expectations that Germany can be a leader for liberal values.

This is the more troubling since Germany’s geo-economic position is under threat from both China and Russia. The issue of intellectual property rights, equal and reciprocal access to the Chinese market, and the role of Chinese investment and takeovers of German companies in key sectors is central to Germany’s continued economic power and independence. This was pointed out last year in a major study by the German Confederation of Industry, the BDI. Russian investments, like Nord Stream 2, pose the prospect of Wandel in Germany rather than in Russia with the export of corruption and political influence buying in Germany itself, not to mention the continued waging of hybrid war by Putin in Germany.

As Lau pointed out in his 2013 article, demand for German products, investment, and expertise will survive a more balanced and critical approach. The Chinese will continue to demand German automobiles and German technology even if the chancellor meets with the Dalai Lama or is critical of the suppression of democratic rights in Hong Kong. Putin will continue to pump gas and provide oil to the German market.

Germans need to learn the lessons of their neighbors. The UK spoke of a new “golden decade” of relations with China under David Cameron, but now Boris Johnson’s government has reversed course banning Huawei from the UK 5G network and sharply criticizing China’s violation of the agreement on Hong Kong. The French government under Emmanuel Macron has also taken a tougher line on Beijing (see also “Pariscope: Macron’s Entente Cordiales Against China”).

Germany is in a far stronger position than the UK to exercise its economic power to speak for its values. Along with Paris, Berlin is key to the development of a strong EU position on China, Russia, and on authoritarians in Europe. As Andreas Fulda recently argued in a commentary for the British think tank RUSI, “Europe can no longer afford Germany’s unprincipled and failed China policy of change through trade… While trade clearly matters, European values need to be defended too.”

NB. Noah Ramsey contributed research to this article.

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© REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Some norms are so important for human civilization that they are established erga omnes—owed to humanity as a whole. The underlying concept of universal rights is intuitive as it gets to the heart of what makes human existence dignified. Therefore, any erosion of universal principles threatens the peaceful and rules-based coexistence of nations. The violation of international humanitarian law is one such threat.

While the principle of universality is easy to grasp, its implementation seems close to impossible. The reasons for this are manifold, but I believe that two of the main aspects are quite obvious:

First, for perpetrators to be held accountable, there need to be independent mechanisms in place. These mechanisms, however, can only be as strong and incorruptible as the international community makes them. Second, even in areas where overarching mechanisms do exist on an international level, their scope of action ends where national interests appear to be at stake.

In an ideal world, the International Criminal Court (ICC) would deal with atrocities committed in any war zone. Unfortunately, with regard to Syria, one of the most devastating conflicts of our time, a referral is unlikely to happen, given the gridlocked positions in the UN Security Council.

I have been a Member of Parliament for many years and am now fortunate to experience government work first-hand as minister of state in the German Foreign Office. This job brings with it an enormous responsibility. It feels like much-valued pillars of the multilateral system are crumbling on our watch. Whenever I ask myself whether we have to accept impunity, I believe that this is out of the question. We cannot and we must not do this.

The Syrian Regime’s Dark Record

Throughout almost a decade of conflict, the Syrian regime has literally violated every major principle of international law. Its wide-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity are undeniable. This is why the establishment of the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria and its collection and analysis of information and evidence was an important step toward accountability. The IIIM keeps alive the memory of tens of thousands of civilians tortured and millions tyrannized—by Assad’s forces and non-state actors—for the sake of upholding a brutal system, silencing opposing voices, and gaining territorial control.

In Syria, not even the most sacrosanct principles of humanitarian law have been upheld. Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons and cluster munitions to slaughter the inhabitants of whole cities. He targeted hospitals, schools, and humanitarian convoys. And he withheld humanitarian aid for regions not under the regime’s control. But make no mistake: the perpetrators’ crimes will not be forgotten. Their sense of security and impunity are of a temporary nature only.

Setting an Example

Granted, with the lack of national steps toward accountability in Syria and a blocked ICC, serving justice will not be an easy task. However, the principle of universal jurisdiction gives all states the opportunity—or rather the obligation—to pursue accountability, regardless of the nationality of perpetrators or victims, and irrespective of where the atrocities were committed. This is why the world’s first criminal trial of two former Syrian government intelligence officials charged with perpetrating crimes against humanity currently taking place in Germany is so important.

Most of the time, trials under universal jurisdiction are protracted and difficult and will not lead to universal justice. However, they are still worthwhile because they represent much more than individuals being held to account for their crimes. These trials are an empowering symbol of hope for all those who suffered at the hands of unjust regimes and, in the case of Syria, will begin to expose the structural elements of systematic torture and other atrocities.

With COVID-19 overshadowing international crises and conflicts, the public focus has again shifted away from hotspots such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen. While drastic steps are necessary to get this unprecedented global situation under control, we must keep our eyes firmly fixed on international conflict zones as well.

I am sure the virus will lead to cascade effects. We can already see these emerging, including new security challenges, fresh waves of violence and terrorism, and greatly increased humanitarian needs. Saving lives and easing suffering, especially through enabling the UN coordinated international humanitarian system to continue its tasks, is at the forefront of our efforts. For this system to function properly, we not only need to have sufficient resources, but also an environment that is conducive to humanitarian organizations and their workers doing their job. Humanitarian assistance requires humanitarian space.

Difficult and Dangerous

One of the most memorable moments of my professional life was talking to representatives of the Syrian White Helmets. Seeing so many of them save countless lives while putting their own at risk was a humbling experience. Their humanitarian work has been a small glimmer of hope in otherwise dark and hopeless situations. Aleppo comes to mind, and also Idlib.

In Syria, humanitarian workers have risked their lives time and time again while the humanitarian space shrinks rapidly around them. In 2018, when a number of members of the international community, in a common effort with Israel and Jordan, were able to evacuate hundreds of White Helmets from Syria, it felt like we made a difference. Offering them asylum in several Western countries was the right thing to do, because after years of insecurity and unrest, we had to provide them with a safe haven.

Humanitarian work is difficult and dangerous as it is. However, without respect for the humanitarian principles as the common denominator for humankind, humanitarian assistance becomes nigh on impossible. The denial of humanitarian assistance must not be used as a weapon of war. Humanitarian workers must not be criminalized or targeted. It is the perpetrators of the Syrian regime who are the criminals. And there will be no safe haven for them. Justice will be served in time.

The post Op-Ed: Justice Matters, Impunity Is Unacceptable appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated many of the trends and dynamics underlying recent geopolitical shifts, a new poll conducted by Koerber Stiftung for a special edition of The Berlin Pulse has found. In fact, from a German point of view, the coronavirus crisis has deepened major cracks in each of the three pillars that have underpinned Berlin’s foreign policy almost since World War II: European integration, the transatlantic alliance, and the export-driven economic model.

Each pillar depends on a rules-based order that is increasingly under threat. Recognizing this, Germany has gone to great lengths to promote a renewed commitment to international cooperation: from new initiatives in the UN Security Council, where the country took up its seat as a non-permanent member in January 2019, to the launch of the Alliance for Multilateralism, Berlin has placed multilateralism front and center of its agenda.

But how are these challenges, and the purported solutions, viewed by the German public, particularly in the context of the pandemic?

First off, Germans continue to feel rather comfortable in a deeply interconnected world. A majority of them believe that globalization has benefited their country (59 percent) and them personally (52 percent, compared to 47 and 49 percent, respectively, in the United States, as data gathered by the Pew Research Center shows). In a similar vein, Germans remain staunch supporters of international cooperation: 89 percent favor cooperating with other countries to solve global challenges (there’s been a slight decrease from 96 percent in 2019). When it comes to international challenges, clearly Germans do not like to go it alone.

However, there are limits to the support for global interconnectedness: a strong majority of 85 percent would like to see the production of essential goods and critical infrastructure like 5G technology returned to German soil, even at the risk of higher costs.

So how do these preferences relate to their views on European integration, the transatlantic partnership, and relations with China?

Conflicted on Brussels, Disillusioned with Washington

On Europe, Germans appear rather conflicted: A plurality of 38 percent say that their view of the EU has deteriorated amid the COVID-19 crisis, compared to 33 percent whose view has improved. While nearly three quarters agree that, given its status as a relatively wealthy country, Germany should contribute more than other countries toward solving global problems, it is not clear how this would pan out in Europe: a majority of 59 percent comes down against so-called “coronabonds”, among the most controversial topics over recent weeks.

Support for European integration becomes less ambiguous where tangible benefits are at stake: for instance, an emphatic majority of 85 percent favors a return to the Schengen Agreement, with no border checks among participating states, once the virus is defeated.

German attitudes toward the transatlantic relationship have taken a significant dive. While skepticism predates the pandemic, the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic has clearly accelerated a feeling of estrangement on the German side: 73 percent of Germans say that their opinion of the United States has deteriorated—more than double the number of respondents who feel the same way toward China. And despite the close security cooperation between Washington and Berlin, merely 10 percent of Germans consider the US their closest partner in foreign policy, compared to 19 percent in September 2019.

US out, China in?

The trend of transatlantic estrangement is further underlined by the fact that the number of Germans who prioritize close relations with Washington over close relations with Beijing has decreased significantly, from 50 percent in September 2019 to the current number of 37 percent, almost equal to the number of those who see it the other way around (36 percent).

So out with the US, in with China? Not quite: Yes, the fact that the public is leaning toward a position of equidistance between Washington and Beijing should worry policy-makers. However, this is not to say that Germans are uncritical toward the People’s Republic. Over 70 percent believe that the Chinese government could have mitigated the pandemic by being more transparent in its handling of the coronavirus outbreak. Neither do Chinese propaganda efforts appear to resonate with many Germans. In contrast to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who in March declared that, given a lack of European solidarity, he was putting all his trust in Beijing, 87 percent of Germans believe that the EU is contributing more to the fight against the pandemic than China.

Negative Effects

So, what does all of this mean for the future of German foreign policy? The benefits of EU membership remain popular. However, the results suggest that the pandemic’s net effect on the EU’s image among Germans is negative. Looking west, the Atlantic seems wider than ever. Data from previous surveys suggest that German perceptions of the US closely correlate with their perceptions of the incumbent president and may thus change again. However, the growing gap between public opinion and official German foreign policy provides openings some parties are willing to try and exploit. Some in Germany’s center-left Social Democrats (SPD), Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition partner, recently advocated the removal of US nuclear weapons stored on German soil in the context of the NATO’s nuclear sharing scheme—a policy that is essential to Germany’s role within the alliance. This may just be a taster of similar debates coming up.

And China? A number of German policymakers have repeatedly warned that, wherever democratic states retreat from the international stage, authoritarian states will be quick to fill the gaps. In terms of public opinion, China appears to be on the cusp of filling the vacuum resulting from the waning of US popularity. As experts and politicians alike predict that Germany eventually will be forced to pick a side, Beijing’s growing popularity will undoubtedly complicate such a decision.

As the coronavirus pandemic underlines the urgent need for international cooperation, multilateralism appears to be faltering in both spirit and practice. Germans for one remain staunch optimists about the future of international collaboration, however, with 42 percent believing that the pandemic will lead to an increase in international cooperation. They may be in for a rude awakening.

The post Keeping an Equidistance appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Yves Herman

When you go to Berlin and discuss foreign policy, Angela Merkel’s critics and admirers agree on one thing: the chancellor pursues a typically German foreign policy—pragmatic and without any grand design in mind.

Berlin has no geopolitical culture, the argument goes. The sober “country of engineers” generally distrusts grand strategizing. German politicos like to cite the sociologist Max Weber (“Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards”) or former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (“If you have visions, you should see a doctor.”)

Finally, according to this mainstream view, Germany still feels deeply uncomfortable with power politics. Berlin—very much unlike Paris—always prefers reserve to dominance, and cooperation to conflict.

Twisted Selfie

But in politics, as on Instagram, selfies are always lopsided. First, the narrative of Germany’s post-World War II aversion to thinking big and acting bigger isn’t borne out by history.

The key chancellors of post-1945 Germany—Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, and Helmut Kohl—were all visionaries. They pursued a foreign policy driven by a desire to escape their country’s history and geography. The lesson from the past? If Germany with all its power, its dynamism, and its Mittellage—its central position in the heart of Europe bordering nine nations—behaves like a “normal” country, trouble looms.

Solving the so-called “German question” meant two things for German leaders. First, Bonn should withdraw from the “seesaw politics” that saw Germany pivoting between east and west. Instead, Bonn had to be clearly anchored in the West. And second, Germany should equate national with European interest. Indeed, it should be more pro-European than others. When devising national policy, it should always take into account the consequences for its neighbors.

In practice, Adenauer’s policy of West-integration rested on three pillars: reconciliation with France, European integration, and the transatlantic defense alliance NATO. In close cooperation with Washington, Brandt pursued his Ostpolitik—the double-pronged approach of firmness towards the Soviet Union coupled with a willingness for dialogue. And with reunification spurring fears of renewed German hegemony, Kohl turbo-boosted EU integration through the introduction of the euro.

These were no sober pragmatists! To quote Egon Bahr, the former state secretary to Brandt and mastermind behind Ostpolitik, they were like architects “capable of seeing something that does not yet exist,” but should. And they leveraged all their authority and pathos in order to push through their strategic visions against often heavy domestic opposition.

Mittellage 2.0

This collective memory of Germany’s foreign policy tradition is fading. And maybe that’s no coincidence at a time when Berlin is drifting away from Adenauer’s politics of West-orientation. In an world increasingly orientated to the East, the chancellor’s unconditional support of Germany’s export-industry has been shifting the country into a new geostrategic position: a global Mitellage.

Early on the chancellor realized that China was not only a rising power, but a savior for Germany’s economy. Throughout her 15-year reign, Merkel has invested much in the Beijing relationship and has visited the country every year. It has paid off. China will in a few years be more important economically for the world’s “export champion” than the United States.

In the growing trade and tech war, the Trump administration is pressing Berlin to side with Washington. But Merkel thinks in terms of issues, not geopolitical blocs and therefore is standing by her China strategy. Her economy minister, Peter Altmaier, even argues that companies from authoritarian China are as trustworthy as those from the democratic United States. Merkel feels no need to rein him in.

Instead, the chancellor is taking on her own CDU lawmakers who are threatening a rebellion over Huawei’s role in Germany’s 5G network; it’s likely the last major struggle of her political career.

Life Insurance

And what about Europe’s place in Merkel’s thinking? The chancellor never misses a chance to underline the fact that the EU has brought peace and prosperity to Germany.

Merkel sees the EU as the key instrument to ensuring stability and a multilateral rules-based order on the continent. When revanchist Russia invaded Ukraine, Merkel took the lead and forged the European response. Contrary to Paris, she resists the easy temptation to reset relations with Moscow and champions EU enlargement in the Balkans.

Economically, the EU is Germany’s “life insurance,” as Merkel put it in a recent interview with the Financial Times. The single market and the euro protect Germany’s export industry. Merkel also wants to strengthen the EU, for example by setting global regulatory standards. And she wants to collaborate on industrial policy so that Europe is not left behind in the race for tomorrow’s technology.

Finally, Merkel knows that every insurance comes with a premium. In terms of money, she is willing to increase Germany’s contribution to the EU budget after the UK exit. And in terms of politics, she has tried to accommodate Macron’s zest for action. In 2018 in the so-called “Meseberg Declaration,” Berlin and Paris outlined a European roadmap with some substantial elements.

A “Normal” Country

But contrary to her predecessors, advancing European integration is not an end in itself for Merkel. The country is reunified. The “German question,” many in Berlin believe, is solved. The EU doesn’t need any deepening just for the sake of constraining German hegemony. And contrary to Adenauer or Kohl, Merkel never felt the need to put her career on the line to advance Europe at home.

Like any other “normal” EU member state, Germany is instead free to pursue its national interest within the EU today.  And as nothing in Europe can be done against Berlin’s will, Merkel has the luxury of being able to hesitate, endure conflict, and play power politics at times.

Think of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia to Germany—the chancellor has no problem ignoring the security concerns of her eastern EU and NATO partners. In the euro crisis, Berlin largely got its way and deflected all criticism. And when deciding on exiting nuclear energy or the 2015 refugee crisis, Merkel did not coordinate her position with Paris. Such unilateralism on issues of European importance would have been unthinkable in the Bonner Republic.

Portfolio Manager

Under Merkel, Adenauer’s policy of West-orientation, the cornerstone of German post-war foreign policy, has been fading. Merkel operates like a portfolio manager, masterfully diversifying risks. If you don’t have a clear winning trade, keep all options open. This is causing Berlin to increasingly drift into a position of equidistance between China and the US.

Of course, this is not all Merkel’s doing. Today, Germany’s export economy has outgrown the West. And the global political framework is evolving. Populists are breaking apart the consensus on policies from trade to human rights that used to define the Western camp. The world is not the same as in Adenauer’s times.

But on Europe, nothing has really changed since Adenauer. Germany is still not a “normal country”—it still lies at the heart of the continent and is today more than at any time since 1945 Europe’s most powerful state. And as with General Motors, what is good for Germany is not necessarily good for the EU.

All Change?

The three top candidates for the CDU leadership disagree on many things including China. But they all reminisce about the days when CDU chancellors saw it as their job to convince Germans of the need for “more Europe.” Announcing his candidature, Friedrich Merz said “The CDU has to once again become the leading Europe-party in the Federal Republic.” Armin Laschet argued at the Munich Security Conference “in the time of Kohl, the major EU initiatives all came from Germany … you have to summon that courage today.” Norbert Röttgen even penned an answer to Macron’s vision of a “sovereign Europe.”

History had taught Germany’s post-war chancellors that looking beyond the issues of the day and its short-term interests is the only realistic way to overcome the “German question” and the country’s Mittellage. With Merkel on her way out, this line of thinking may be about to see a revival. But before that happens, Germans should update their selfie.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

On March 21, 1933, the city of Potsdam was decked out in black-white-red, the colors of the German empire that had ended 15 years earlier. Hundreds of thousands of spectators were lining the street. The “Day of Potsdam” was an important moment for Adolf Hitler’s consolidation of power: a demonstration of bonding between the still powerful German aristocracy and the new Nazi regime.

Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, the eldest son of the exiled emperor Wilhelm II, who had abdicated in November 1918, was given the place of honor in Potsdam’s Garrison Church: with his family, the Hohenzollern, he sat behind an empty chair symbolizing the Kaiser’s absence. Hitler, when entering the church, saluted him.

Both men knew and intended to make use of each other: Wilhelm to try and restore the monarchy, Hitler, to pacify the old elites and consolidate his grip on power. Hitler won: Wilhelm’s family, the Hohenzollern, never returned to power.

But how much did the prince actually help the Nazis? That’s no longer just a question for historians. The answer is worth millions of euros in restitution claims—claims that today’s Hohenzollern are making against the federal government as well as the states of Berlin and Brandenburg. Years of secret negotiations have not yielded a settlement. In March, the state government of Brandenburg will decide whether to have the courts rule on the matter.

Compensation Demands

The Hohenzollern are demanding compensation for land expropriated by the Soviets in East Germany in 1946 as well as the return of thousands of artefacts—paintings, pieces of furniture or jewelry, books and other items such as valuable snuff boxes which their ancestors had acquired over the centuries.

At an earlier stage, the family even demanded the right to a free residence in Schloss Cecilienhof in Potsdam, a former Hohenzollern residence that in the summer of 1945 housed the Potsdam Conference. It was there that Truman, Stalin, and Attlee divided up the vanquished Germany.

East Germany, under Stalin’s control, became communist. In 1946, the Soviet occupational forces expropriated large landowners in the region, among them the Hohenzollern. But after German unification in 1990, the law was reversed: moveable property was given back; for land, there was to be compensation. However, the new pan-German government made one major exception: former owners who had “substantially abetted National Socialism” were excluded from making any claims.

There is little doubt that Crown Prince Wilhelm was a Nazi sympathizer who wrote Hitler fawning letters. Yet no court has ever explored the meaning of “substantially abetting.” How far is it a question of intention?  How much evidence is needed to show that the support actually helped Hitler?

Given the legal uncertainties, the Hohenzollern family from 2014 to 2019 secretly negotiated with Germany’s federal government as well as the states of Berlin and Brandenburg for restitution or compensation of their former East German property.

Yet little progress was made until 2019, when the talks were leaked to the public. Then, outrage over the Hohenzollern’s claim to so many artifacts of great historic and cultural importance—currently displayed in nearly 40 museums in and around Berlin—ran high.

“We’re not living in a monarchy anymore,” exclaimed Wolfgang Thierse, former president of the Bundestag. The Greens and the Left Party in the Bundestag called for a hearing on the issue to try and stop a secret deal with the emperor’s heirs.

An Empty Boast?

At the end of January, the committee for cultural affairs invited several lawyers and historians. Yet the hearing was inconclusive: the lawyers were unwilling to commit themselves; the historians invited to the event were divided; and as opposition parties, both the Greens and the Left were powerless to force the issue.

Most German historians actually believe that Wilhelm’s support contributed to Hitler’s rise. But the Hohenzollern family, keen to clear its reputation and regain its property, commissioned its own expert opinions. The well-known Australian historian Christopher Clark, for instance, largely exonerated Wilhelm in a study written in 2011.

Clark later somewhat revised that position. The prince, he now says, was a rightwing extremist and Nazi sympathizer. But Wilhelm was such a twit that nobody took him seriously. His boast of having procured two million votes for Hitler was just that—an empty boast. By that logic, Wilhelm failed to substantially advance the Nazi regime: not for lack of will, but for lack of weight.

Today, the Hohenzollern family is torn between wanting to regain their former property and avoiding further damage to their reputation. That includes not running the risk of having a judge confirm that Wilhelm helped Hitler to power. “I continue to be open to a comprehensive amicable settlement,” Georg Friedrich Prinz von Preussen, the current head of the family, declared in a press release in late January.

Little Public Sympathy

Germany’s public authorities face just as much uncertainty over the legal outcome. In the worst case, Germany’s state museums could lose thousands of historically important Hohenzollern items. And not just from the family’s East German properties: the Hohenzollern have also loaned numerous pieces from their undisputed West German holdings to public collections. If the quarrel escalates, they could take them back.

“When it comes to the issue of the Hohenzollern, I’m interested in sustainable solutions in the interest of the state and not in big headlines,” Brandenburg’s Finance Minister Katrin Lange told reporters in late January.

Yet going back to the negotiating table will not be easy. After the Bundestag hearing and the newspaper headlines, any settlement seen as overly generous to the Hohenzollern will meet with massive public criticism. More than a century after the revolution which established the Weimar Republic, very little sympathy for the former imperial family remains.

The latest snippet of news concerning the Hohenzollern doesn’t help, either. It was just announced that the Hohenzollern crypt in the Berlin Cathedral would be closed off for renovations until 2023. It houses the remains of 84 members of the family, among them the Great Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg.

Yet today’s Hohenzollern will not be contributing a single cent to the 17.4 million euro that the renovations will cost. “That greedy, miserly dynasty,” commented Neues Deutschland, a leftist daily newspaper.

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© REUTERS/Emilie Regnier

In recent months, there has been a steady stream of bad news from the Sahel region of Africa. Kidnappings, terrorist attacks and assaults on military camps keep the population, security forces and governments on high alert. More than 4,000 people were killed last year. International engagement has not been able to prevent a deterioration of the security situation: it’s time for a rethink, and that includes Germany.

At present, international engagement in the Sahel is pursuing several objectives: fighting terrorism, training security forces, supporting the implementation of the peace agreement in Mali, and promoting development, including good governance, transitional justice, and decentralization.

Altering Assumptions

Three important assumptions related to these objectives need to be put to the test. First, there is the focus on counterterrorism and jihadist groups. It is true that attacks on the civilian population as well as on military camps continue to spread and cause high levels of casualties. But jihadism is not the core problem. It is rather a symptom of the dysfunctional relationship between the state and its citizens. In Mali, people are experiencing a state that has received large sums of development aid for decades, but that has invested little of it in schools, hospitals, roads and markets in peripheral regions.

Before the crisis of 2012/13, Mali was considered a “donor darling” that worked well with the donor community. Unfortunately, there was hardly any room for the opposition in Mali’s “facade democracy,” as author Charlotte Weidemann describes in detail. Then as now, donors shy away from demanding structural reforms, worried that they might overburden a weak state.

The second problematic assumption concerns the security sector. It is true that the security forces of the G5 states (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad) are hardly in a position to protect the population from armed groups. But at least as important as having an effective combat force is its acceptance by the population. The training and capacity-building provided by the Bundeswehr in Mali and Niger will have little effect unless it is closely linked to structural reforms of the entire security sector.

This means greater transparency, parliamentary control and representation of the population in all its diversity. There is a reason why German soldiers have been complaining about unsuitable candidates for the courses provided by the EU Training Mission in Mali. With limited training success, course participants are immediately sent to the front unprepared for combat operations from the instructors’ point of view. The result is the high losses suffered by the Malian army, protests by relatives, and a withdrawal of army posts that have become too dangerous to hold.

Third, the armed groups cannot be defeated by military means alone. Yes, there are some ideologically motivated and determined leaders and members of the jihadist groups. But surveys of former fighters show that many young men join these groups not primarily for ideological motives but for a combination of self-protection, opportunism and socio-economic reasons. In some areas, jihadist groups ensure a brutal but better regulated life than before.

Demands for a dialogue between religious leaders have been around at least since a national conference in 2017, and they also resurfaced in the “inclusive national dialogue” in Mali at the end of 2019. France blocked such efforts in 2017, but in 2020 the Malian government has announced that it will take them up again.

Be More Flexible

The current review of the mandates for the international missions of the United Nations and the European Union in Mali and of German contributions to them provides an opportunity to adapt international policy to these changing assumptions.

The donor community must make greater efforts to establish a robust political dialogue with the G5 countries. The traditional conditionalization of development cooperation may have become more difficult because, with the rise of countries like China or Saudi Arabia, there are now more donors that don’t demand structural reforms.

As long as counterterrorism and migration control are the decisive motives for Europeans, authoritarian regimes such as in Chad and Niger or ailing democracies such as in Mali will always be able to resist pressure. In some cases, however, donors will also have to become more creative in order to finance projects more quickly and with more agility under dangerous conditions. The Sahel Alliance’s plans for establishing a special fund are a step in the right direction, as are the civilian stabilization projects funded by Germany’s Foreign Office.

The EU should adapt the EU Training Mission Mali. More extensive and detailed training courses can provide a more solid result. In return, the EU would have to accept that the effective training and reform of the Malian armed forces requires a long-term commitment. Moreover, EU training and bilateral training by the Bundeswehr can be used as leverage to call for greater transparency and to fight corruption in the armed forces. At present, the Malian Ministry of Defense refuses to publish official figures about the size of the army and distribution of ranks. In view of the fact that Europe is considering  the extension of the training mission to Burkina Faso as well, such lessons are particularly important.

Finally, European governments should respect the delicate efforts towards opening a dialogue with jihadist groups in Mali. The UN peace mission MINUSMA also supports consultations with local communities in its areas of operation, particularly across ethnic boundaries. It plans to expand the Mission’s presence. To do so, however, it needs high-value capabilities such as additional helicopters that are difficult to obtain. Germany could help here.

More Confidence with Partners

The course corrections described above require a more active approach by Germany towards its partners both in the region and in Europe. The German government should develop more confidence vis-à-vis France in particular. France’s experience, networks and interests in the Sahel create a structural imbalance in the partnership with Germany.

It was only at the beginning of January 2020 that President Emmanuel Macron surprised Berlin with the Pau Declaration, which speaks of a “Coalition for the Sahel”—one of numerous international initiatives in the region. An additional German contribution to MINUSMA,  the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, could also make it easier for the German government to stand by its “No” to the French “Takuba” initiative for the training of special forces, including mentoring in the field. Good friends must also be able to look each other in the eye when they disagree and, in case of doubt, promote their own position.

Germany continues to enjoy a fairly good reputation in the Sahel region. It is time to use this political capital more effectively.

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© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

Here are three takeaways from the earthquake in German politics:

First, the next leader of Germany’s conservatives will be a man—and politically quite different from Chancellor Angela Merkel and her preferred successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who announced her resignation on Monday. Personally speaking, my money is on Jens Spahn, the current health minister, over the former CDU grandee Friedrich Merz and North Rhine-Westphalia State Premier Armin Laschet.

Second, the Christian Democrats’ new leader will face Herculean task. He will need to reconcile the different political wings and bridge the deep divide between East and West within the party. He also must find an effective way of countering the rise of the extreme-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Otherwise, Merkel’s CDU risks marginalization.

Third, please look at who has, at least for now, survived once again: Angela Merkel and her grand coalition. Both have weathered hard storms. Merkel is still looking cool and unruffled while her SPD coalition partners appear increasingly frazzled, but don’t count either out. Both the chancellor and her government could last until the end of their regular term in the fall of 2021.

Stability and Turmoil

Germany is a strange mixture of stability and turmoil these days. Despite numerous coalition crises, Merkel is well into her 15^th year in office at home and well respected, even admired abroad. A safe pair of hands if ever there was one, she is a safe haven from the rapid, profound changes that have upturned politics in most Western countries.

Germans largely share this view. Angela Merkel continues to be the country’s most popular politician—a truly astonishing feat after such a long time in office. At the same time, a quick survey showed, most Germans do not want her to change her mind about leaving the Chancellery and run for a fifth term in office. Even though they are risk averse, they are conscious of how stagnant the country has become under Merkel.

In late 2018, when she gave up the party leadership, Merkel also promised not to run for chancellor again. With her blessing, the CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a centrist from the western state of Saarland, to lead the party. AKK, as she is known, also seemed likely to become Merkel’s successor in the chancellery.

Having Her Power and Eating It

But all too quickly, the fault lines of Merkel’s succession project became visible: you can’t have your power and eat it. Merkel was determined to hold on to control over her government as well as her legacy, and AKK wasn’t ruthless enough to challenge her. As a result, her authority over the party was weak. Of course, she made mistakes, too, both as party leader and later as defense minister. Kramp-Karrenbauer’s doomed proposal for an international security zone in Syria—made with no prior consultation even within the German government—is just one example.

Nevertheless, AKK might have continued and recovered if not for the political impasse in the small eastern state of Thuringia. Regional elections last autumn resulted in heavy losses for the state’s Christian Democrats, who were then faced with a devilish choice: vote for a government led by the formerly communist Left Party, join votes with the far-right AfD to elect a state premier, or accept that no coalition can be formed and call for new elections.

The face and leader of Thuringia’s AfD is the right-wing extremist Björn Höcke, a wily player who managed to lure the CDU deputies into jointly voting for a Liberal candidate. For the first time, a mainstream politician in Germany gained office due to votes from the AfD. Outrage ran high, and the new state premier resigned after only a day. But for AKK, who proved unable to enforce her ban on fraternizing with the AfD, the damage was done. It didn’t help that Merkel interfered from abroad, calling the vote “unforgivable.” The Thuringia CDU has fallen in the polls since the scandal , while the Left Party is gaining support.

Kramp-Karrenbauer threw in the towel on Monday. In her statement, she included a sharp dig at Merkel. “Separating the chancellery from the party chairmanship, the open question of who will be candidate for the chancellery, this weakens the CDU,” she said.

Not So Quick

Yet AKK did not call for a quick changeover of power. According to the timetable she presented, she plans to remain in office as party leader of the CDU until the next regular congress in December. At that gathering, the CDU would choose a new chair, who would also be nominated as top candidate for the next elections. Merkel and her coalition government could remain in place until the autumn of 2021, according to AKK’s plan.

Can the CDU’s leadership issues wait that long? Possibly not, but Merkel’s would-be successors also recognize the dangers of being nominated too far ahead of an election. On Monday, Spahn, Merz, and Laschet all showed a great deal of restraint in claiming the top job.

Whoever it will be, whenever it happens—the new CDU leader’s job is not going to be easy. After nearly two decades of Merkel’s centrist policy, the party is torn between continuing along her line or moving back to the right. There is no consensus, either, about how to deal with the AfD’s success particularly in eastern Germany. After Thuringia, the next regional elections in the East will take place in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, very possibly leading to similar political impasses.

But after this Monday, one thing at least is clear: whether it takes 18 months or less, for Angela Merkel and the stable state she has come to represent, the countdown has begun. Brace for change in Germany and Europe.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

When more than a million mostly Arab and Muslim refugees poured into Germany in 2015, large groups of smiling Germans gathered at train stations to greet them. They came with multilingual posters, teddy bears, and hot chocolate.

It was an emotional moment in Germany’s postwar history, as if the whole country was breathing a sigh of relief: Maybe we got it right this time? Maybe we can put the past behind us? But the collective exhale was conditional: What now?

It was clear to me at the time that the moment wouldn’t last. I was living in Neukölln, one of Berlin’s largest, poorest, and most ethnically diverse districts. Home to Arab communities, among many others, Neukölln is known for falafel and crime gangs of Arab origin. A walk down Sonnenallee, the neighborhood’s main thoroughfare, often recalls memories of Ramallah—clogged with traffic and lined with shops whose Arabic signage extends as far as the eye can see.

It may look like first-generation immigrant life. Except many here and across Germany, home to an estimated four million Muslims, are going into their third generation—or more. And that’s one way they’re referred to here: die dritte Generation, not as Germans, regardless of birthplace, passport, or language.

Tolerated but Never Accepted

The Jews have had it similar, for longer. Their roots on Germanic land going back to Roman times arguably makes them more German than the “Germans.” Still, Jews were excluded from the concept of German nationhood, which coalesced in the decades leading to Prussian-led unification in 1871. It was the awakening of the European nation-state, making it necessary to compete with, and fend off, rival powers.

Establishing das Volk, the German nation, became a defensive (and economically attractive) bond of language, land, and religion that Germany’s tiny minority of Jews fell outside of. No matter how hard they tried—with military service, contributions to German culture and financial well-being, and even conversion—they could be tolerated as citizens of the German state, but not really accepted as members of the German nation. Like any national project, German nationalists needed to define who was out just as much as who was in.

We all know how this narrow concept of nationalism ended, and that’s where Erinnerungskultur —Germany’s reckoning with its murder of much of Europe’s Jewry and assorted other wartime crimes, now a cornerstone of its postwar sense of self—begins. And stumbles, because Germany’s story doesn’t start in 1933; thus, any effective remembrance culture can’t either.

For Germans and outside observers alike, it can be easy to assume present-day Germany knows what it’s doing. In one form or another, Germany has had centuries of influence on Western culture and global affairs, and it’s credited with the formation of organized public bureaucracy. But in terms of liberal democracy, Germany is comparatively new and untested.

An Installed Program of Remembrance

Born-again Germany derives from American Cold War policy, which converted the defeated Reich from a threat to the West into a tool for the West’s protection. Truer political autonomy can only be traced to around 1990. When West absorbed East, Germany became a new country, one with differing views of its national values. Since then, Germany has been held to the standard of an advanced Western power, with little regard for its eastern identity.

Erinnerungskultur was central to “re-educating” the German nation, starting as early as spring 1945 when US forces compelled German civilians to tour death camps. Though Germany is now widely praised for openly embracing Erinnerungskultur as a national responsibility, it was only after the code had been written and installed that the program could run on its own.

An entire culture of remembrance has since been pursued with zeal: memorials and monuments, commemorations, educational curricula, public programs, and political rhetoric, symbols and structures—all to serve the refrain: nie wieder. Never again.

But it’s far from clear what nie wieder actually means. It might form the basis of a more open and progressive society, but Germany is hardly a leader in extending rights, opportunities, and protections to women, minorities, and other vulnerable groups. Change comes slowly to its conservative culture.

The country is still struggling with what to make of Turkish Gastarbeiter, many of whom went on to defy German assumptions by staying permanently after initially being invited to further boost West Germany booming economy. So, when the massive influx of refugees arrived, uninvited, in 2015, the rapid descent from euphoria to fear came as little surprise. The German nation, by and large, was not prepared to absorb them.

A Matter of Self-Conception

Germany’s problem is not the lack of a liberal state. Its history provides a couple of examples of extending legal rights to unwanted or outside groups, at times more comprehensively than its contemporaries. But without the support of a liberal nation those rights can quickly disappear.

That has been and remains Germany’s problem, which Erinnerungskultur fails to address. The German nation may be quick to criticize its fringe for marching in defense of the so-called Abendland (or Occident), but it’s blind to its mainstream’s own stubborn Abendland assumptions. Germany’s enormous public media system, for example, is a national institution, a reflection of the country it is built to inform. Although funded by a fee every household in Germany is obligated to pay, church services and Christian prayer enjoy a fixed slot in regular programming.

When I enquired why, I was told that Christianity is part of Germany’s Selbstverständnis—a matter of self-conception—and therefore a key component of their public service mission. That is not only factually inaccurate, given the steady stream of Germans leaving the church and the rise in those identifying as non-Christian and non-believers, but it sends a powerful signal about who is, and is not, considered part of the nation.

When Jews, Muslims, and other groups fall victim to far-right violence, the German response is couched in the language of tolerance, not acceptance. State protection is afforded on the basis of human rights, not German rights, because these groups are considered outsiders even though in many cases they are not. The German state may want everyone to feel welcome, but the German nation does not necessarily want everyone to feel included. Having or receiving Staatsangehörigkeit (citizenship, but literally “belonging to the state”), is not the same as having Herkunft (ethnonational descent).

A substantive Erinnerungskultur would naturally foster broad public support for a strong European Union, whose core function is to check the very nationalist hubris Erinnerungskultur warns against. Yet Germany’s embrace of the EU stops largely with perfunctory political rhetoric and positive public opinion polls. Judged by deeds, Germany’s trade imbalance, savings glut, and resistance to the ECB’s loose monetary policy have kept the EU in limbo. It has repeatedly kneecapped reform proposals while failing to make any of its own.

Even if the likes of Chancellor Angela Merkel do privately support more ambition at the European level, she seemingly lacks the political capital. Enough Germans seem content with an EU that is only strong enough to fulfill a very basic prerequisite: avoid war. That may have sufficed in the EU’s infancy when memories of the devastation were fresh, but 75 years later those memories are all but gone. That demands more tangible and more constructive, forward-looking arguments for turning to Brussels.

A Brewing Nativist Sentiment

By the numbers, of course, Germany has profited handsomely from the EU. But nationalism is a beast that feeds off other metrics. Nativist sentiment was already brewing prior to the emergence of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), as economic and currency crises brought out old tropes maligning Germany’s eastern and southern neighbors in the media, and public and political discourse. It’s the inadequacy of Erinnerungskultur that fails to see the cause and effect.

Germany’s far-right has exploited that inadequacy. Making everything about Auschwitz, and thus limiting remembrance to twelve years of moral and physical destruction, has allowed lesser wrongs be trivialized, relativized, or go unseen entirely. Uncertain about the ends, Erinnerungskultur has become a ritualistic end in itself, not unlike a lapsed believer who still attends church because that’s just what you do, even if you no longer know why.

With the Holocaust slipping from lived experience to historical phenomenon, Germany needs to rethink how it remembers—and why it does. It is not enough to say “never again.” Prodding a nation with guilt and shame eventually leads to spite and ambivalence. A more convincing motivation is required, which isn’t trapped in the past but focused on the future.

Much as climate change extends far beyond environmental policy, Erinnerungskultur must be part of every aspect of public policy and civil society. The German state can confront far-right violence with statements, laws, and law enforcement, but the German nation is left to address its broader longing for classification and order, impulses that pre-date the Nazi era and still linger today.

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