© REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Some norms are so important for human civilization that they are established erga omnes—owed to humanity as a whole. The underlying concept of universal rights is intuitive as it gets to the heart of what makes human existence dignified. Therefore, any erosion of universal principles threatens the peaceful and rules-based coexistence of nations. The violation of international humanitarian law is one such threat.

While the principle of universality is easy to grasp, its implementation seems close to impossible. The reasons for this are manifold, but I believe that two of the main aspects are quite obvious:

First, for perpetrators to be held accountable, there need to be independent mechanisms in place. These mechanisms, however, can only be as strong and incorruptible as the international community makes them. Second, even in areas where overarching mechanisms do exist on an international level, their scope of action ends where national interests appear to be at stake.

In an ideal world, the International Criminal Court (ICC) would deal with atrocities committed in any war zone. Unfortunately, with regard to Syria, one of the most devastating conflicts of our time, a referral is unlikely to happen, given the gridlocked positions in the UN Security Council.

I have been a Member of Parliament for many years and am now fortunate to experience government work first-hand as minister of state in the German Foreign Office. This job brings with it an enormous responsibility. It feels like much-valued pillars of the multilateral system are crumbling on our watch. Whenever I ask myself whether we have to accept impunity, I believe that this is out of the question. We cannot and we must not do this.

The Syrian Regime’s Dark Record

Throughout almost a decade of conflict, the Syrian regime has literally violated every major principle of international law. Its wide-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity are undeniable. This is why the establishment of the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria and its collection and analysis of information and evidence was an important step toward accountability. The IIIM keeps alive the memory of tens of thousands of civilians tortured and millions tyrannized—by Assad’s forces and non-state actors—for the sake of upholding a brutal system, silencing opposing voices, and gaining territorial control.

In Syria, not even the most sacrosanct principles of humanitarian law have been upheld. Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons and cluster munitions to slaughter the inhabitants of whole cities. He targeted hospitals, schools, and humanitarian convoys. And he withheld humanitarian aid for regions not under the regime’s control. But make no mistake: the perpetrators’ crimes will not be forgotten. Their sense of security and impunity are of a temporary nature only.

Setting an Example

Granted, with the lack of national steps toward accountability in Syria and a blocked ICC, serving justice will not be an easy task. However, the principle of universal jurisdiction gives all states the opportunity—or rather the obligation—to pursue accountability, regardless of the nationality of perpetrators or victims, and irrespective of where the atrocities were committed. This is why the world’s first criminal trial of two former Syrian government intelligence officials charged with perpetrating crimes against humanity currently taking place in Germany is so important.

Most of the time, trials under universal jurisdiction are protracted and difficult and will not lead to universal justice. However, they are still worthwhile because they represent much more than individuals being held to account for their crimes. These trials are an empowering symbol of hope for all those who suffered at the hands of unjust regimes and, in the case of Syria, will begin to expose the structural elements of systematic torture and other atrocities.

With COVID-19 overshadowing international crises and conflicts, the public focus has again shifted away from hotspots such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen. While drastic steps are necessary to get this unprecedented global situation under control, we must keep our eyes firmly fixed on international conflict zones as well.

I am sure the virus will lead to cascade effects. We can already see these emerging, including new security challenges, fresh waves of violence and terrorism, and greatly increased humanitarian needs. Saving lives and easing suffering, especially through enabling the UN coordinated international humanitarian system to continue its tasks, is at the forefront of our efforts. For this system to function properly, we not only need to have sufficient resources, but also an environment that is conducive to humanitarian organizations and their workers doing their job. Humanitarian assistance requires humanitarian space.

Difficult and Dangerous

One of the most memorable moments of my professional life was talking to representatives of the Syrian White Helmets. Seeing so many of them save countless lives while putting their own at risk was a humbling experience. Their humanitarian work has been a small glimmer of hope in otherwise dark and hopeless situations. Aleppo comes to mind, and also Idlib.

In Syria, humanitarian workers have risked their lives time and time again while the humanitarian space shrinks rapidly around them. In 2018, when a number of members of the international community, in a common effort with Israel and Jordan, were able to evacuate hundreds of White Helmets from Syria, it felt like we made a difference. Offering them asylum in several Western countries was the right thing to do, because after years of insecurity and unrest, we had to provide them with a safe haven.

Humanitarian work is difficult and dangerous as it is. However, without respect for the humanitarian principles as the common denominator for humankind, humanitarian assistance becomes nigh on impossible. The denial of humanitarian assistance must not be used as a weapon of war. Humanitarian workers must not be criminalized or targeted. It is the perpetrators of the Syrian regime who are the criminals. And there will be no safe haven for them. Justice will be served in time.

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© REUTERS/US Navy Handout

In April 2018, one of China’s most visible military diplomats, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, gave a speech at Kings College London. He was asked about the vexed issue of “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea. A year before the colonel’s talk, three Chinese naval warships had transited through the English Channel en route to exercises with Russia in the Baltic Sea. They had passed through British territorial waters without interference. How then would China respond toward Royal Navy warships passing through Chinese-claimed territorial waters in the South China Sea?

Colonel Zhou’s answer was succinct but disturbing: China obeys British rules in British waters, so the United Kingdom should obey Chinese rules in Chinese waters.

If this is truly a reflection of Chinese attitudes to international law, then the implications are alarming. It would mean that China doesn’t really believe in the concept of universal principles governing the law of the sea everywhere on the planet. The Chinese military will make use of freedom of navigation in other parts of the world but deny that it applies in its own claimed waters, where it says Chinese rather than international rules are in effect . Both the UK and China have signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the document is clear. It is entirely legal for naval ships from any country to sail through even the most hotly disputed regions of the South China Sea.

Threats to Freedom of Navigation

Nevertheless, it appears that China is attempting to reverse centuries of international consensus and close off access to the sea for military vessels. We saw an ominous example of this on September 29, 2018 when a Chinese destroyer, the Lanzhou, deliberately sailed in front of a transiting American warship, the USS Decatur, and threatened it with the warning, “If you don’t change course you will suffer consequences.”

If actions such as these go unchallenged, the world will be reverting to an era when navies had to fight their way through blockades and when seaborne trade, the lifeblood of the global economy, was subject to the whims of coastal states. If the UK and France adopted the same legal position as China, they could have blocked the Chinese navy from passing through the English Channel. In Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore could use the same argument to block the Strait of Malacca to Chinese vessels. Is this the world that China wants to create—where states can unilaterally close waterways? The consequences for international peace would be dire.

This is a key reason why the disputes in the South China Sea should concern the wider world. While they may appear to be a fight over nothing—tiny, economically useless islands—they are also a fight about everything: whose rules will run the 21^st-century world?

Paracels, Spratlys, & Co.

Each of the major claimants argues that it is the sole rightful owner of entire groups of rocks and reefs in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam both claim the Paracels and Spratlys in their entirety; the Philippines claims a subset of the Spratlys, which it calls the Kalaayan Island Group. Malaysia occupies five reefs close to Borneo. Brunei claims one reef in the same area. None is willing to give ground to the others, and the result has been a long period of diplomatic stalemate punctuated by periodic crises.

China began the construction of artificial islands in the Spratlys, in the southern part of the South China Sea, in September 2013. They are now almost ready. Beijing has insisted that these are civilian installations, but satellite imagery has clearly revealed the presence of military facilities, including hangars for surface-to-air missiles, barracks, and weapons systems. US military sources say China has also deployed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems to the new bases.

Three of the new islands feature  three kilometer-long runways, easily usable by military aircraft. At the time of writing, only civilian aircraft and unarmed transport planes have actually used these runways, but it is likely that China has the ambition to deploy fast attack jets to the bases at some point. If past behavior is anything to go by, then it will wait for a pretext—some perceived “provocation” by the US, for example—before it does so.

Beefed-Up Chinese Naval Presence

More importantly for China’s Southeast Asian neighbors and other states with an interest in peace and security in the region, the artificial islands give China the capacity to maintain a large-scale presence of naval and coastguard ships in disputed areas. China has the ability to monitor other countries’ activities and intervene at short notice.

This presence has given China also the ability to prevent the other coastal states from developing resources in the South China Sea. One tactic is explicit threats of military force: in 2017 and 2018, we saw China intimidate Vietnam into blocking the Spanish energy company Repsol from developing gas fields in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claimed by Vietnam but desired by China.

Events took a similar course in the Philippines, which faces a looming and critical energy shortage because of the depletion of its existing offshore gas field, Malampaya. It currently generates over a fifth of the Philippines national electricity output. One potential solution is for the country to develop the large gas resources under the Reed Bank, not far from Malampaya. An International Arbitration Tribunal ruled in 2016 that these resources are within the Philippines’ EEZ. However, President Rudigro Duterte of the Philippines said in May 2017 that his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, had told him there would be “war” if Manila tried to exploit that gas.

In short, China’s actions in the South China Sea present a threat to the rule of law globally and to the security of Southeast Asian states. The overlap of territorial disputes between the rival claimants and the maritime disputes that involve powers from outside the region creates the potential for a local incident to turn into a serious conflict.

Resolving the Disputes

For many observers, the territorial disputes over the islets have appeared too complex to be resolved. That impression has been reinforced by the claimants’ deployment of pieces of purported historical evidence dating back centuries. My own conclusions from examinations of this evidence is that most of it can be discarded since it consists of vague mentions of undefined locations.

Under contemporary understandings of international law, what is required to prove ownership of an uninhabited feature (i.e. piece of land) is evidence of practical administration (in legal language, à titre de souverain). Moreover, as the 2008 judgment by the International Court of Justice concerning features disputed between Malaysia and Singapore demonstrates, a legitimate claim to one specific feature does not necessarily apply to other features in its vicinity.

There is, on paper, a simple solution to the disputes in the South China Sea: all the competing claimants agree to maintain their current positions on the various rocks and reefs, recognize the other claimants’ current occupations, and commit to occupying no further features. They would then divide up the resources of the sea according to the rules laid down in UNCLOS and cooperate to manage them sustainably.

The governments of the rival claimant states would still need to persuade their own populations that this is a reasonable course of action. They would, in effect, need to tackle the “emotional” claims to the rocks and reefs that have built up over recent decades. The best way to do this is through the presentation of evidence. This is unlikely to be a simple process. However, both China and Vietnam are “propaganda states”: their one-party systems have been very successful at persuading their populations to accept changes in ideology over the years. This would be just another iteration of national belief.

Europe’s Contribution

At present, there are three likely outcomes to the disputes in the South China Sea: First, the current situation continues with periodic rises in tension and the risk of military escalation. Second, the Southeast Asian claimants submit to Chinese pressure and abandon their territorial and maritime claims. Third, some kind of recognition of the status quo as an equitable solution.

The first option carries the constant risk of war. China would prefer the second option, but the cost to its reputation and relations with the other states would be simmering resentment. In fact, I would argue that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are a major obstacle to its overall strategic interests in Asia, which require the peaceful development of cooperative relations with its neighbors. A key reason why those neighbors seek to engage the US and other powers in regional security is because of their concerns about China’s territorial agenda. If China were to resolve the disputes, it would reduce its neighbors’ desires to seek alternative security relationships. The third option is difficult but has the best chance of generating a lasting peace.

This difficult road is worth taking because it preserves the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and the primacy of international law. It is based upon a belief, well understood in Europe, that states must settle rival claims on the basis of right rather than might.

How, then, could Europe contribute? It would require two separate interventions: one aimed at resolving the underlying territorial disputes and the other at the defense of UNCLOS.

There are many experts within European universities and think-tanks with the expertise to collate, translate, and assess the evidence put forward for the various territorial claims. Recent academic research suggests that, in most cases, it would be clear there has only ever been one effective occupant of each feature. An “academic taskforce” could be assembled to evaluate the evidence and disseminate it to the claimant governments as well as the experts and academics in those countries, together with associated media campaigns in the relevant languages to inform the wider publics. It would provide an empirical basis for compromise.

The defense and promotion of UNCLOS requires a different approach. The EU and its member states need to maintain clear support for the convention in all their public statements on maritime affairs and communicate this frequently to the South China Sea claimants. The next step would be an investigation of which claims in the sea are compliant with UNCLOS and which are not. This would be followed by public statements and diplomatic representations to defend the UNCLOS regime. In particular, suggestions that China enjoys “historic rights” that supersede UNCLOS must be challenged and refuted.

Those EU states with the capacity to do so should be encouraged to demonstrate their continuing interest in the peaceful international order by deploying naval vessels into the South China Sea to demonstrate that Europe regards a threat to the international order in one part of the world to be a threat to it everywhere.

European states have other levers, too. They could refuse Chinese naval ships permission to make port visits and reduce other forms of military cooperation. They could help Southeast Asian states to build up the capacity to monitor and control their legitimate EEZ claims and increase military cooperation with them. They could sanction Chinese companies that are engaged in predatory behavior within other countries’ legitimate EEZs. They could add stipulations about respecting legitimate EEZ claims to all maritime agreements with the claimant states and insist that fish catches, for example, are traceable to domestic EEZs. These, and other relevant and targeted, countermeasures could be adopted to deter rule-breaking in the South China Sea.

This is clearly an idealistic strategy. It would demand funding and time and carries diplomatic risk. The alternative, however, is worse.

This year’s Munich Security Conference will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

The post How Europe Can Make a Difference in the South China Sea appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

What would you consider as the greatest challenge in international politics in 2019? The world seems to be losing its sense of direction and purpose as conflicts of interest between major countries surge to the surface. The changes that emerged in 2018 will continue to evolve this year. We may use “choices” to define what’s confronting us. Among the many choices we need to make, the following two are most prominent:

Firstly, will China and the United States choose to escalate tensions in their relationship and “decouple”—the direction some in the US are pushing for—leading the world into division and ultimately all-out confrontation? Or will they seek coexistence within the unified world economic system by making adjustments and returning to the track of cooperation?

The choices that China and the US will affect not only their respective economies but also where the world will be heading. I believe it’s also the hope of the rest of the world that China and the US choose wisely and responsibly. The recent tensions between China and the US have been escalating faster than many expected, and the frictions are spilling over from trade to other areas. The outcome will be one of the determining factors for the future direction of the world.

Secondly, will the world continue to “advance” toward or “retreat” from economic globalization and multilateralism? Countries are pondering this big question, wondering if closer cooperation can lead to improved global governance and fairer benefits. Will we have a better future if we choose to “retreat”? The answer is most likely to be negative, as “retreat” will lead to vicious competition, making the world fall back into division and isolation. As one of the long-standing driving forces for multilateralism, Europe’s choice will be of critical importance.

In an evermore complex world, do you think every country should rely upon itself–or do you see a better future in more international cooperation? And do we need new institutions? In a globalized world, self-reliance and openness/inclusiveness cannot be absolute and should not be mutually-exclusive. Rather, they should be complementary to each other. It’s natural that countries and enterprises build their own research and development capabilities, but it should be an open, rather than isolated, effort. In today’s world, scientific and technological advances are built on previous progress. And this should be furthered through open cooperation and be confined by commonly accepted norms and ethical standards.

As for China, one critical condition that allowed the country to embark on reform and opening-up forty years ago was that the world had entered the era of peace and development. Today, this remains the main trend, as does China’s commitment to reform and opening-up. Now China and the US are each other’s most important trading and business partners, it is unrealistic for them to “decouple”. Global resources, industries, and markets have become so integrated and interdependent that it would be unimaginable to sever the bonds among countries. As a case in point, the design, manufacturing, assembly, and sales of an American iPhone is a journey that best reflects “globalization.” In the field of security, “decoupling” may also have serious consequences. Many global problems will have to be addressed by a concerted effort of the international community. If major countries insist on seeking exclusive security, new security dilemmas will ensue, pushing mankind into the shadow of Cold War or even hot war again.

Indeed, international cooperation faces some difficulties. But cooperation remains the better choice. On one hand, this is the inevitable path for coping with global challenges such as climate change, pollution, and security threats; on the other, the coming technological revolution will create more synergies for international cooperation. The international institutions and rules established after World War II, such as World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), are still broadly accepted and supported, but adjustments and reforms are also necessary. It is neither feasible nor necessary to scrap the existing institutions and start all over again. But new reinforcement is needed, i.e., new rules to regulate competition and cooperation in new areas, such as deep sea, deep space, polar region, cyber and artificial intelligence.

Do you agree that we’re living in times of groundbreaking change, and what‘s driving it?
 Among the most important ground-breaking changes in the world today are the industrial transformation brought about by scientific and technological innovations that are changing the ways people live and communicate. By the end of 2016, 140 million Chinese were connected through the Mobile Internet of Things. The number of M2M (machine-to-machine) application terminals in China had reached 100 million, accounting for 31 percent of the world’s total.

Driven by internet, big data, blockchain, and Artificial Intelligence, the new, ever-ongoing, and unpredictable transformation can erupt at any time–and it’s hard to know which new technology will break through, or whether they will do so individually or at the same time. All of them are constantly changing our understandings about the world, and hopefully for the better.

The fundamental driving force for such change is “mankind”—its aspiration for better lives. Infinite aspiration inspires infinite creativity. Admittedly, there will always be times when some can’t suppress the urge to apply new technologies for war. Therefore, the rapid progress of modern technologies has set higher requirements for mankind’s self-discipline and moral constraint. There is no doubt that the majority of the young generation who grew up in the internet era do not want to see war. The questions is whether and how human creativity can be used to maximize the prospects of world peace and the benefits for the widest possible population, rather than to cause inequality and even war.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping explained, “the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved. What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.” To some extent, this is also true about the world. While the new technologies have been greatly improving our lives, they are also bringing about risks in security, privacy, and other unpredictable areas. Only by strengthening cooperation can countries achieve compatibility between technology and growth and, through consultations, jointly address the challenges caused by unbalanced and inadequate development. Only in this way can we march toward a community of shared future for mankind.

This year’s MSC will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

The post “Are the US and China ‘Decoupling’?” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

What are the greatest challenges in international politics in 2019? It’s very tempting to point to the current US administration as the greatest international challenge today. Indeed, Washington has been very active in challenging the foundations of the contemporary world order. Pursuing its immediate goals, the United States does not seem to care much about international law or about multilateral institutions. It unilaterally withdraws from critically important agreements and tries to impose its unilateral decisions on other countries and on international organizations. The White House does not hesitate to bluntly pressure its partners, which leads to less stability, greater risks, and less predictability at the global and regional levels.

However, in my view, it would be a dangerous oversimplification to blame all the world’s problems on Donald Trump and the United States. The reality is much more complicated. These days, the world is going through a profound technological, economic, social, and cultural transformation—and our final destination is unclear. The increased pace of change calls for a new level of global governance, but old political habits still prevent us from moving to this level. I would venture to say that the greatest challenge of our times is a deficit of solidarity between nation states, including those entrusted by the United Nations Charter with a special responsibility to maintain global peace and security. Until these states can put their disagreements on specific matters aside and stand up to the common challenge, the world will not be a safe place.

What is driving the changes you’re describing? It would be difficult to single out just one factor that drives the profound changes in the world that we all observe today. In most cases, we focus our attention on new problems rather than on new opportunities. For instance, we talk a lot about the growing tensions between US and China are much talked about, about how there are implications for the whole world, including a global recession and a new geopolitical bipolarity. It’s unclear where the Middle East is heading socially and politically, but it’s apparent that what is happening there is likely to affect all of us.  We should also not underestimate the danger of a US-Iran or a Saudi-Iran clash. Regretfully, the Ukrainian crisis remains unresolved, and the limited progress on North Korea’s nuclear program is still very fragile and reversible.

Each of these conflicts, threats, and challenges has its own roots, participants, trajectory, and dynamics. They might look completely unrelated to one another. However, this is not the case. All of them feed into each other, destroy trust among major international players, paralyze international organizations, and complicate cooperation at various levels. I think that a “perfect storm”–the cumulative impact of several crises taking place simultaneously –is the greatest challenge of 2019 and the years to come.  We may end up completely destroying the old international system before we’ve even got started building a new one.

In an evermore complex world, do you think every country should rely upon itself, or would you see a better future in more international cooperation? And do we need new institutions? In the 21st century, states remain the most important international players. That means that we should keep states strong and efficient; they have to be indispensable building blocks in the emerging world order. Nevertheless, there are certain limits on what even the most powerful states can accomplish unilaterally. In times of accelerated globalization, these limits become more and more apparent–both in the area of social and economic development and in the area of international and even domestic security. Unfortunately, today we see many powerful countries creating more problems than offering solutions. The US is arguably the most graphic example of a state taking explicitly unilateralist, shortsighted, egotistic foreign policy decisions.   Given the US’s unique role in the modern international system, this obsession with unilateralism in Washington appears particularly dangerous.

However, let me underscore once again: this is not about the United States only. All states – big and small, rich and poor, in the West and in the East–have to work together in the very condensed, crowded, and interdependent world of today and of tomorrow. So far, none of us can convincingly claim that his or her country has fully mastered the difficult art of multilateralism. We now see that even in the European Union–the recognized leader of multilateral diplomacy–multilateralism faces serious and diverse challenges. It would be better for all of us to study the art of multilateralism jointly, not separately. This might sound unrealistic under the current dire political circumstances, but I see no other way–neither for Europe, nor for the world at large. In the world of today, security is indivisible, and so is prosperity.

This year’s MSC will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

The post “A Perfect Storm Is the Greatest Danger” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Michaela Rehle

What do you see as the greatest international political challenge of 2019? It’s not a single issue but a general problem: the world lacks an anchor of stability. Rules are being broken, institutions ignored or maligned. That creates instability and unpredictability, and it’s dangerous. I’m not sure whether we would really be capable of keeping a real crisis in check. On what–and on who–could we rely on in an emergency?

Do you agree that we live in a time of great upheaval? And what is driving this development? Yes, one day people will look back on this time as an epochal watershed. Many foreign policy certainties are all of a sudden in question. That has partly to do with global, strategic power-political shifts, but partly also with domestic political developments in important countries.

In an ever more complex world, should every country reflect on itself, or is more cooperation the future? Do we need new institutions? Efforts to find our salvation in a new nationalism will lead to a dead end. I hope that we don’t have to learn this lesson over again. But unfortunately, at present, the principle of multilateralism is well and truly under pressure. New institutions won’t solve this problem, though. We need to make better use of existing institutions.

Which three issues are a special focus for the 2019 conference? The future of transatlantic relations, the self-assertion of the EU, and the danger of escalating great power rivalries.

Do you have a favorite memory from a Munich Security Conference, a greatest moment? Joe Biden’s 2009 appearance at the first security conference where I was chairman is a special memory for me. Biden gave the first important foreign policy speech of the new Obama administration and generated a feeling of optimism about a reset–not just with Russia but also in the transatlantic relationship. One result of that was the New START treaty.

What have you found especially unpleasant? The increasing tendency of top politicians from the EU to refuse to sit on the same stage as certain colleagues. In the past that only happened when countries had been enemies for decades. That massively upsets me¾and makes me sad.

Which result of a conference were you particularly pleased about? One of the principles of the MSC is that we don’t produce any communiqués. We try to offer the best possible platform for an exchange, thereby creating or keeping open possible courses of political action. That frequently works, but it often takes years before we see the results. The American-Russian disarmament negotiations or the rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia are good examples. If it all culminates in something years later, it makes me really happy.

When the world is doing badly, it’s good for the MSC, right? The attention over the past few years has certainly increased even further. But we would love to be able to have a conference totally dedicated to long-term challenges rather than dominated by the many crises roiling daily politics.

What’s the one thing an MSC can’t go without? The big names!

What is never allowed to happen there? If we are in danger of stirring up tensions around an issue rather than having a positive influence, then our sense of responsibility demands that we don’t even spark such a debate.

Is there a guest still missing from your “collection”? The Pope! So far, though, we haven’t had a US or Chinese president as a guest. I’m really pleased about the huge interest we get from every part of the world–from Australia to Iceland, from Rwanda to Mongolia.

John McCain will really be missed at the MSC–do you see anyone as a potential successor? John McCain was the best friend the MSC had in the US Congress. He leaves a big gap behind. But Senators Lindsey Graham and Sheldon Whitehouse have been coming for many years. They will–and I’m very confident about this–continue to bring a strong “co-delegation” to Munich in the coming years, fully in the spirit of John McCain!

This year’s MSC will take place on February 15-17. Berlin Policy Journal and its sister publication Internationale Politik are again the MSC’s media partners.

Click here for an overview of our reporting from the MSC.

The post “The World Lacks an Anchor of Stability” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

Stefan Zweig once wrote that people are often “denied recognition of the early beginnings of the great moments which determine their times.” If you were wandering the halls of the Munich Security Conference last weekend, you would have inevitably been confronted by the search for that recognition. The question— “What keeps you up at night?“—was, in some ways, the organizing logic of MSC 2018. Some answered nuclear proliferation. Others cyber. Some spoke dutifully about China and One-Belt-One-Road. A handful of mostly American internationalists raised alarm bells about Putin and his phalanx of trolls, bots, cyber spooks, and rotten money.

Generally, world leaders offered up crises of the day: Iran’s growing malevolence in the Middle East; the evolving proxy war in Syria; North Korea; a ghosting US administration; and Ukraine’s continued struggle for territorial integrity. Some tried to cut through the cacophony of immediate hotspots pointing to climate change and the coming tech revolution in war.

But all noted that the classic set of instruments—treaties, international institutions, effective deterrence, contact groups—are not fit for purpose to address these challenges. If political systems, the instruments, and the elites that manage them are no longer able to address, it begs the real question: to what extent is all this still useful?

That was the real question that kept MSC goers up at night. The poignancy of MSC 2018 was seeing some of the world’s most creative, dogged institution-builders grapple with the sense that the operating system that they and their forbearers created to tackle the world’s problems is on the brink of collapse.

They are not the only ones asking this question. The loaned legitimacy that MSC established – diplomats, experts, party leaders, the press and defense planners – had benefited from for decades is receding. People in Wiesbaden, St. Louis, and Manchester no longer see this class of rarefied thinkers worthy of esteem. They have their own opinions about North Korea, Russia, and international trade. The Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki brought this sentiment into Bayerischer Hof, the conference hotel, with his scripted line that the West should invest more in armored tanks and less in think tanks.

Lazy Thinking

It is not a coincidence that in an unscripted moment, Morawiecki made the stunning equivalence that there were “Polish perpetrators as there were Jewish perpetrators” of the Holocaust. The audience was taken aback by his remarks. But the ooze of such lazy thinking is making its way into many of Europe’s illiberal parties, including Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), likely soon to be the country’s second largest party.

It is a reality that many do not know how to confront. One instinct is to retreat into the past, into their own version of Stefan Zweig’s “golden age of security.” They pine for the world of yesterday with Atlanticist heroes like Joe Biden, Sam Nunn, and Wolfgang Ischinger. One bright spot was the strong Congressional turnout. But it was the unique force of McCain’s personality kept the MSC spirit alive. Will his successors, even if they are well-meaning, be as charitable with their time for the liberal world order?

At its core, the Munich Security Conference has really been a German-American affair. As one conference veteran wryly observed, the MSC is most electric when the transatlantic relationship is bad. When it is good, the gathering is listless. But then, the participant noted darkly, Munich 2018 seemed to be both listless against the backdrop of a deteriorating Atlantic alliance and a world on fire.

The Trump administration has ghosted from so many world fronts. The reality of Trumpism has set in with its nativism, vulgarity, ethno-nationalism, transactionalism, endemic corruption, and indifference to democracy, human rights, institutions, and notions of international community that US hegemony has provided from Europe to Asia, even Latin America. The administration’s Orwellian talking point—that the world should pay no attention to the president’s words but rather US. actions – received well-deserved derision from a professional class who recognize that rhetoric is primer for action.

But a new source of unease was Germany, itself. The German delegation led by a troika of future past, Sigmar Gabriel, Ursula von der Leyen, and Thomas de Maziere, the foreign, defense, and interior ministers respectively. They did their best to present the brave face of the status quo and even gave accents of policy change on the margins—Franco-German cooperation in joint European security for example. But the growing gap between the status quo they represent and the popular frustration with the establishment hit a boiling point, even in Germany—the world’s premiere status quo power. It is plausible that all three—and the political outlook they represent—could be gone in a year’s time.

In fact, the German political establishment looks a bit like an Antarctic ice shelf. Seemingly stolid, imposing, even magisterial, all at once it crashes into the ocean never to return. This could be the fate of the leaders, the Volksparteien, or people’s parties, and the consensus values they carry with them.  If it does not collapse, it will be owed to the rank-and-file of the Social Democrats (SPD), who are casting their ballots on whether to enter into another government with Chancellor Merkel’s conservatives. The SPD base—whose largest age bloc is between 71-80—dutifully remembers.

Zweig wrote about moments where the world history departs from its iterative plodding and changes forever, what evolutionary theorists call punctuated equilibria. The entire MSC class knows this. They just don’t know how to respond.

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Leave it to Benjamin Netanyahu to save the drama for the last day of the Munich Security Conference. Netanyahu, taking the stage for the first time at the MSC, brandished a long, rusted piece of metal in the middle of his speech to participants—a piece, he said, of a drone that entered Israel from Syrian airspace last week, sent by Iran.

“Mr. Zarif,” he called, referring to the Iranian foreign minister, not in the room but due to speak later in the day. “Do you recognize this? You should—it’s yours,” he challenged. “Do not test Israel’s resolve.”

Netanyahu appealed to participants to see Iran as the nefarious threat to global security he believes it really is; he denounced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement with Tehran, as dangerous appeasement, drawing a parallel to the 1938 Munich agreement that gave Hitler free rein (noting that there were indeed many differences between Iran and Nazi Germany). He pulled out a second prop as well—a map to show participants his perspective of Iran’s steady march of domination across the Middle East.

In a clear shot at the conference participants, European delegations in particular, the Israeli leader added that if Washington does not certify the nuclear deal, countries must choose who they want to do business with—Iran or Israel.

A stony-faced John Kerry, one of the chief architects of the JCPOA, struck back in the following session on the stage, saying the deal was working and calling Netanyahu’s assessment “fundamentally inaccurate;” if your house is on fire, he asked, would you put it out in 15 years or put it out now and ensure it doesn’t catch fire again?

Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who shared the stage with Kerry on a panel on the Middle East, blasted Washington’s support of Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria with training and weapons: “Supporting one terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization is a big mistake,” he said. “This is outrageous.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif later denied any desire on Tehran’s part to become the hegemonic power of the region. Rather, he proposed a step-by-step approach to build an “inclusive” security architecture for the Gulf region—but not inclusive of Israel, though. Zarif sidestepped an opportunity to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist in a response to a question. Immediately after Zarif’s speech, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir called upon the world “to extract a price from Iran for its behavior.”

These sessions wrapped up an otherwise muted weekend in Munich, with world leaders, ministers, and dignitaries grappling with questions that resembled the previous gathering on European and global security—with little focus on the main stage on the opportunities and risks technology will pose in those very challenges.

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© MSC/Kuhlmann

Ask Sergey Lavrov what he thinks of the news that 13 Russians were indicted in the US Friday for election meddling in America’s election and his answer, as might be expected, is unequivocally dismissive: It’s “just blabber,” he said, until the facts are presented (the documentation supporting the indictments doesn’t count, apparently).

Lavrov took the stage on Day Two of the conference to deliver a speech very much reminiscent of those he has given at previous MSC gatherings, accusing the West of peddling anti-Russian propaganda and lamenting its inability to accept a resurgent Russia. He referred to the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine as an internal battle, one where the Kremlin was a force of good in trying to find a resolution, adding that Ukrainians had been given a “false choice” between the EU and Russia.

Fittingly, Lavrov was followed directly by US National Security Advisor HR McMaster, who said there was no “incontrovertible proof” of Moscow’s meddling in the US election. When asked if Washington would be ready for cyber dialogue with Russia, he quipped “I’m surprised there are any Russian cyber experts available, based on how active they have been in undermining our democracies across the West.”

McMaster also sought to reassure Europeans that Washington was not turning its back on the transatlantic alliance and its commitment to global security, despite numerous signals from the current president last year indicating the opposite. He highlighted the shared values, freedom, and rule of law that bound Europe and the US but reserved harsh words for Iran and what he sees as a deeply flawed nuclear agreement.

Curiously, when asked how his support for European partnership squared with his very own Wall Street Journal op-ed last May, where he and Gary Cohn described the global community as a dog-eat-dog, zero-sum world, he insisted the dogs on either side of the line were democratic and non-democratic countries, not Western allies.

Steel Tanks, Not Think Tanks

The second day, devoted to “the future of Europe,” as MSC Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger said, launched a marathon of nine speeches from leaders and ministers – and it was thorny at times, revealing the rifts and departures in the European and global community. Here are some of the highlights:

– Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, who took the stage after the news Friday that German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel had been released from custody after being held for a year without trial in Turkey, bristled at questions over Ankara’s crackdown on journalists. He argued that Turkey is “a state of law just like Germany and the US,” adding: “Nobody has the right to question the state of law in another country (sic).”

– Sebastian Kurz, Austria’s new chancellor, expressed the need to reform and improve the EU while making a clear overture his far-right partners in government, speaking of strengthening “Europe’s Judeo-Christian traditions” (an interesting preview of this summer when Austria assumes the presidency of the EU Council).

– Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki triggered consternation when he defended his country’s deeply controversial Holocaust bill (which made it illegal to accuse Poland of complicity in the Holocaust) by arguing that there were “Polish perpetrators as there were Jewish perpetrators.” On defense, his quip that Europe needs “steel tanks, not think tanks” is also not likely to go down particularly well among a crowd comprised of quite a few think tankers.

– Theresa May arrived at the conference after having met with Chancellor Merkel for what appeared to be polite yet not particularly fruitful talks in Berlin. May doubled down on the UK’s deep commitment to European and global security, but also her government’s commitment to honoring the Brexit decision. She proposed a EU-UK security treaty that ensured close cooperation on security and intelligence after Brexit, adding, somewhat ominously, that a failure to nail down a bespoke deal would have “damaging effects for both sides.”

– Germany’s foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel opened the day’s roundup of speeches pointing to China as one of the largest challenges facing the West, warning: “China is developing a comprehensive alternative system unlike ours that is not based on freedom, democracy, and human rights.” While emphasizing the irrefutable importance of US partnership in forging a stable global community, he added: “Nobody should try to divide the EU – not China, not Russia, but also not the US.”

Looping the US in with Russia and China is a telling indication of how wary Germany and indeed Europe are of Washington’s true objectives. It’s interesting to note that Gabriel might well have been re-applying, in a way, to keep his job, or paying farewell. The post of foreign minister in the next German government is very much up in the air.

We’ll have a wrap up of the final day of the MSC tomorrow.

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© MSC/Kuhlmann

If the previous year’s Munich Security Conference was a sober reckoning after the election of US President Donald Trump, Brexit, and populist challenges across Europe, this year’s conference is nothing short of an alarm bell.

“The warning signs are flashing in bright red,” said MSC Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger in his opening remarks, adding that there have never been as many serious international challenges facing the world—and that the risk of conflict between great powers is very real.

It was his question posed to the audience—nearly two dozen heads of state, more than 70 defense ministers, hundreds of advisors, dignitaries, and strategists—that underpinned a central focus of the gathering: “Are we proud enough as Europeans to make sure Europe will be able to contribute to shaping the future of the international order instead of being shaped by it?” asked Ischinger.

Franco-German Lockstep

The symbolism of the French and German defense ministers opening the conference was no accident—last year, it was the American and German heads of defense, after all. Germany’s Ursula von der Leyen and France’s Florence Parly both waved the banner for deeper Franco-German, but also pan-European integration on defense, pointing to the recent EU defense pact PESCO as a milestone and blueprint.

“I believe we also need a PESCO in foreign policy – and a common strategic culture. There is no military short-cut to a sustainable order of peace,” said von der Leyen.

But the German defense minister, while thanking US defense secretary Jim Mattis for America’s partnership and the strength of the transatlantic alliance, sent a shot across the bow as well, saying: “We observe with great concern that some of our partners are systematically cutting back funding for diplomacy,” especially the United Nations. Von der Leyen emphasized the fundamental importance of pairing more military capability with development, adding all of Europe “is responsible for this.”

Parly, meanwhile, praised the Franco-German lockstep on defense, values, and vision for the future; she made an urgent appeal for the need to “wake up” and defend Europe at home, adding “Europe is not a luxury, it is a must.”

Harmony and Divergence

Despite the show of harmony, there remain small points of divergence between Berlin and Paris on the controversial question of regulating national weapons exports (made apparent after a question from the audience) and readiness to engage in military missions (Germany, as one participant pointed out, still requires parliamentary approval for Bundeswehr missions).

Still, the ability and willingness of Europe—and therefore the Franco-German tandem—to take charge on the global stage looks set to be a touch point at this year’s MSC. It is interesting to mark the notably absent (no Chancellor Angela Merkel and no President Donald Trump, though the latter was highly unlikely from the beginning) and, perhaps more importantly, no weighty focus on the emergence of China as a partner or challenger to Europe’s influence and security. Indeed, the MSC curtain-raiser report pointed out “China has increasingly presented its mix of autocratic leadership and capitalism as an appealing alternative to the Western model and cleverly stepped in where the US made room.”

There was little mention of the myriad political and defensive challenges the EU has failed to surmount in eastern Ukraine, where the conflict with Russian-backed separatists continues. But with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko speaking tonight, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also attending, there could well be movement in bilateral talks over the weekend.

There was audible relief across German circles to the news that German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel, who had been held without trial in Turkey for a year, would be released—perhaps a sign that Berlin’s all-out diplomatic campaign in recent days, including Chancellor Merkel’s talks with Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim on Thursday, might have worked. And that German-Turkish relations could just be on the mend.

Stay tuned for a round-up of Day Two on Saturday.

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© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

Rarely in its 70-year history has the North Atlantic Alliance faced uncertainties as complex and varied as in the beginning of 2017: a Russia that has violated fundamental principles of the European security order and made unpredictability its trademark, a southern neighborhood in turmoil from Libya to Syria and Iraq and without clear prospects of achieving sustainable stability in the foreseeable future, and new complex threats such as hybrid warfare and cyberwar. Uncertainties also characterize the situation within the Alliance. There is a constant threat of terrorist attacks, and migrant flows from the South might surge again. Turkey as a key ally faces tremendous internal and external challenges. Finally, a new US administration led by President Donald Trump will have to define its position vis-à-vis NATO as well as the old and new issues of European security. How it will do this throughout 2017 will be of the utmost importance for America’s allies and beyond.

Old Alliance – unchanged relevance vis-à-vis new challenges

Against the backdrop of manifold uncertainties and divisive trends, it is important to recall the unique value of the North Atlantic Alliance for both the North American democracies and Europe – the fact that it is an organization in which 28, and with the accession of Montenegro soon 29 nations, have pledged to protect each other in a 360 degrees perspective and on the basis of common values. For almost seven decades, NATO has been – beyond Article 5 – a unique institutional framework for daily transatlantic coordination on a wide range of security policy issues, joint defense planning and military cooperation. It has been the bedrock of European security – despite all the differences which can always occur between allies.

Since the foundation of NATO, the US has benefited from assuming its role as a “European” power by investing both politically and militarily in the Alliance and by fostering European unity. Maintaining a close network of allies in NATO has paid off for the US in many respects. Not least, uniting most of Europe’s democracies in a military alliance has made a crucial contribution to stability on America’s opposite Atlantic shores – unlike the period after World War I when the US withdrew from Europe. The political, economic and human costs associated with that withdrawal were enormous.

NATO’s value has become particularly clear again since 2014, when Russia called the European security order into question by annexing Crimea and destabilizing eastern Ukraine. At its summits in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016), the Alliance gave firm answers to this challenge and to growing instability in its southern neighborhood. Both summits sent clear messages of transatlantic unity and solidarity. Warsaw set out a comprehensive agenda, which will have to be implemented in 2017, on adapting the Alliance to a changing security situation and demonstrating that it is able and willing to deliver on its commitments. Any major backtracking on the agenda agreed in Warsaw would raise questions in this respect.

Swift implementation is also required, as the next NATO summit planned for 2017 will provide not only an opportunity for a first meeting between allied leaders and the new US President, but will also be a vital occasion to take stock and discuss the way ahead. In times when commentators are lamenting the demise of the West and established institutions of the democratic liberal order seem to be weakening, it is all the more important that the Alliance demonstrate unity, resolve and the capacity to act – as a key pillar of the political West.

That remains true first and foremost with regard to European security. At the Warsaw summit, the Alliance decided to move from reassurance (the key topic of the 2014 Wales summit) to strengthening deterrence and defense. While maintaining its defensive character and its readiness to conduct dialogue with Russia, enhanced Forward Presence (deployment of four battalion-sized, multi-national battle groups on a rotational basis to Poland and the Baltic states) and tailored Forward Presence in south-eastern Europe will be key deliverables for the first semester of 2017. The Alliance attached great importance to making sure that the scope and scale of this new military presence is in line with NATO’s defensive nature and does not contradict the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It represents a credible deterrent and shows that in case of crisis the Alliance as a whole will be engaged. Implementation by host nations, framework nations – the US, UK, Canada, and Germany – and other contributing allies is well under way. Furthermore, in the context of its European Reassurance Initiative, the US decided to deploy additional units to Europe, thus underlining its unwavering commitment to European security. Germany is playing a key role in the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan decided in Wales and will assume the role of the framework nation for the battle group to be stationed in Lithuania. Germany is thus showing that it is serious about its commitment to assume responsibility and, where necessary, leadership, as expressed in the new 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy.

However, strengthening deterrence and defense is not only limited to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence. After years of expeditionary operations, national forces are being modernized and restructured to ensure that follow-on forces are also available when needed. In addition, and with a view to challenges emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance will also develop its Ballistic Missile Defense system throughout 2017.

A dual-track approach vis-à-vis Russia – dialogue is necessary

At the Warsaw summit, NATO not only decided to strengthen deterrence and defense, but also pledged to complement them by undertaking periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with Russia in the framework of a dual-track approach. While the Alliance decided in 2014 to suspend practical political and military cooperation with Russia and insists on the implementation of the Minsk agreements, dialogue and consultation on key security questions remains important. Although there will not be a return to business as usual for the time being, necessary business needs to be done with Russia in order to avoid dangerous misperceptions and misunderstandings. This is in the Alliance’s own best interest. The NATO-Russia Council, which met three times in 2016, is a key forum for pursuing this necessary dialogue. It would be important to breathe more life into the dialogue track with Russia over the course of 2017.

There is no lack of urgent questions to be discussed, such as the conflict in and around Ukraine as the main reason for the deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia since 2014. Beyond this conflict, NATO and Russia share a common interest in avoiding unintended military incidents that could lead to serious escalation, in particular as both sides have significantly increased their military activities, e.g. through military exercises. Risk reduction and transparency are thus also important topics for the NATO-Russia Council. Air safety in the Baltic Sea region is one concrete example in this field. NATO and Russia should also continue to inform each other about their respective military posture, their (threat) perceptions and their exercises. Both sides should use their military lines of communication. However, Russia has been reluctant to take up proposals by NATO in this regard so far. It is well understood that a dialogue on these and other issues cannot replace the implementation of obligations in the context of the OSCE, in particular with regard to the Vienna Document.

NATO’s future role in the Southern periphery and in the fight against terrorism – an ongoing debate

Unlike in the past, the Alliance is now confronted with a historically new, double strategic challenge: besides the challenges in the East, it is now facing an arc of crises, violence and instability, ranging from Libya to Afghanistan. At the Warsaw summit, the Alliance made clear that as part of the core tasks laid down in its Strategic Concept, it is willing to help bring about greater stability in its southern neighborhood. It will do so mainly in the context of efforts aimed at projecting stability, in particular by building defense capacity and advising and training partners’ local forces. This approach is based on the assumption that it is better to enable partners in the region to cope with security challenges themselves than to put boots on the ground. Projecting stability also implies that NATO complements, but does not duplicate, ongoing efforts by the Global Coalition to counter the so-called Islamic State, as well as by the UN and the EU. As of January 2017, NATO will start training Iraqi forces in Iraq in specific areas, and will also do more with regard to Jordan and Tunisia. A new maritime security operation called Operation Sea Guardian was launched in October 2016 to improve situational awareness in the Mediterranean and to assist countries in capacity building. NATO has also offered support to Libya in the field of institution building, if the latter so wishes.

Undoubtedly, terrorism is a key threat to allied nations, as recent terrorist attacks in Turkey, Germany, France and Belgium have shown in a dramatic way. NATO is already making significant contributions when it comes to fighting terrorism. While NATO as such, unlike all NATO member countries, is not a member of the Global Coalition against IS, NATO AWACS have been operating in support of the Coalition since October 2016. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, aimed at training and advising Afghan security forces, remains NATO’s most important military operation. It too contributes directly to the fight against terrorism. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that it was after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US that NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history.

Nevertheless, 2017 will see further discussions within the Alliance regarding the right level of ambition when it comes to projecting stability in the South and fighting terrorism. This difficult question, of strategic importance for the future of the Alliance, will certainly be one of the key topics to be discussed at the NATO summit in 2017. It will be all the more important to have developed a realistic framework for NATO’s role in the South by then. More clarity is required regarding the question of which tools NATO can effectively use in this difficult region with its very complex threats requiring not only military answers. In any case, the Alliance should try to generate value added, but not duplicate what others are already doing. Ownership of measures by partners in the region is another important prerequisite for successful engagement in the South.

The indispensable partnership between NATO and the EU – high time to take it to a new level

NATO will not be able to cope with the complex challenges in the South alone – nor can it play the role of a first responder as it undoubtedly does in the framework of collective defense. As complex threats necessitate joint answers in a truly comprehensive approach, NATO needs to cooperate closely with other partners – above all with the EU and UN. A closer partnership between NATO and the EU makes sense as 22 EU member states are members of the Alliance – with only one single set of forces at their disposal. NATO already supports the EU Operation Sophia in the central Mediterranean. NATO’s activity in the Aegean Sea to cut the lines of illegal trafficking and illegal migration in close cooperation with Greek and Turkish coastguards and Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, is another example of what NATO can do to support other actors. Substantial progress in NATO-EU cooperation throughout 2017 is necessary, as both organizations need to implement a comprehensive set of more than 40 proposals for increased cooperation endorsed by NATO and EU Foreign Ministers, as well as by the European Council, in December 2016. These proposals define a comprehensive agenda for more coordinated action, including on cybersecurity, hybrid threats, strategic communication, defense capacity building, early warning and coordinated exercises.

If the EU and NATO manage to take their partnership to a new level, they will be in a much better position to provide security for their nations. Increased cooperation between these two pillars of the political West is also necessary to demonstrate that there is no unhealthy competition between them. That is why the EU made very clear that ongoing efforts to enhance EU capabilities in the field of defense and crisis management are by no means aimed at replacing NATO in the field of collective defense or at creating a European army. US military presence and the unconditioned US nuclear guarantee will remain indispensable to European security for the foreseeable future. In the same vein, the ambition to establish a planning and conduct capability for missions within the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy does not aim to create structures like SHAPE, NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, within the EU. However, the EU needs to be able to tackle security challenges that are not or not sufficiently covered by NATO or the US – in particular in North Africa. In this respect, a stronger European Union can help to bring about a stronger North Atlantic Alliance. Strengthening European defense capabilities fosters more balanced transatlantic burden-sharing and is both in European and US interests.

Transatlantic burden sharing and European defense expenditure: turning around the downward trend, but more “bang for the buck” needed

European defense expenditure will undoubtedly play an even more important role with the incoming US administration. The demand for a greater European share in transatlantic burden-sharing is not new, but with a dramatically changing security environment, it has become more urgent. At the NATO summit in Wales, allies undertook to turn around the downward trend in defense spending and to aim to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense by 2024 as well as increase their annual investments to 20 percent or more of total defense expenditures. Moreover, it was agreed to increase the overall turnout for NATO.

Allies reaffirmed this commitment at the Warsaw summit, where they were able to show that 24 allies had already turned around the downward trend and started to increase their defense budgets. This is also true for Germany, which in 2017 will increase its defense budget by 7.9 percent (to €37 billion) compared to 2016. In many allied countries there is a clear understanding that defense spending will have to be further increased in the future. This will be necessary in order to fill existing capability gaps, but also to ensure continued support among the US public for US engagement in and with NATO.

At the same time, one should not belittle current European defense efforts: on an annual basis (2015), European allies (apart from the US and Canada) spend around 250 billion US dollars on defense – almost matching the official Russian and Chinese defense budgets combined. And unlike the US, which commits a large portion of its defense spending to non-NATO defense (e.g. in Asia-Pacific), all European allies (with the exception of France and the UK) commit almost their entire defense spending and military capabilities to NATO. It should also not be forgotten that Europeans made and make major contributions to military operations in the Western Balkans (and continue to do so in Kosovo and Bosnia), in Afghanistan and North Africa. Insofar, the frequently heard view that the US provides approximately 70 percent of NATO’s defense spending is misleading.

Increasing European defense budgets, however, can only be one answer to the debate on transatlantic burden-sharing. Budget figures are certainly significant – but what ultimately count are capabilities within a truly comprehensive strategic approach. In that respect, Europeans have to do more – in particular when it comes to using resources more effectively. There are many reasons to doubt whether Europeans really need 19 types of infantry fighting vehicles or 29 types of naval frigates and helicopters. With rising security challenges on the one hand and limited defense budgets on the other, the current fragmentation of European defense industries does not seem to be sustainable. Europeans should get more “bang for the buck” by creating synergies and using their resources more effectively. Germany has brought 16 European nations together in the Framework Nations Concept in order to jointly develop capabilities in well-defined areas including larger formations needed for reinforcements. This NATO-endorsed concept provides a good opportunity to develop European capability clusters in line with the NATO Defense Planning Process. In the end, it could lead to European capabilities being used by either NATO or – if necessary – also by the EU.

Finally, 2017 will be a year in which NATO will have to continue to adapt to new challenges such as cybersecurity. 2016 showed that the cyber dimension of security is becoming more and more relevant and that nations will have to deliver on the Cyber Defense Pledge they adopted at the Warsaw summit – first and foremost by making sure that NATO’s networks are well protected and by making their own national cyber infrastructure more resilient against attacks.

In this age of uncertainties only one thing seems certain: There will be no lack of huge challenges in the years ahead – challenges which will affect both sides of the Atlantic. Neither the US nor Europe will be able to meet them successfully alone; in the end, the only successful answers will be joint answers. As in the past, this will require the political will of nations and their leaders to use the Alliance as a prime institutional framework to safeguard their common transatlantic security interests in a complex, volatile and dangerous world. If they manage to do so and to demonstrate unity – the source of strength of any alliance – NATO will remain highly relevant both for the US and Europe, as a cornerstone of stability and reliability. As the designated US Defense Secretary General James Mattis said: “Nations with strong allies thrive and those without them wither.”

NB. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

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