© Charlotte Graham/Pool via REUTERS

Can a leader be incompetent and lacking in ideas—while at the same time be convinced that he is a revolutionary? In the case of Boris Johnson, the answer seemingly is “yes.”

Britain’s prime minister, courtesy of Eton College and Oxford University, makes for an unlikely agitator against the Establishment. But this master of reinvention and marketing is determined to go down in history as one of the greats who will change his country – and the world. Like his lodestar, Winston Churchill, Johnson thinks he is battling to save his nation from the enemy.

It is, of course, all nonsense, a figment of his ever-fertile brain. But it matters because he believes it, and a worrying proportion of voters believe him too.

What therefore is the grand plan? Johnson doesn’t do detail—his chaotic handling of the coronavirus pandemic attests to that. But he does have a sharp eye for the popular (and populist) and has spent a career constructing a persona around that. He identified from early on, from the mid-late 1980s, the benefits he would accrue from euroskepticism. He then pursued it relentlessly. Many interlocutors attest to the fact that he didn’t actually believe it. But that wasn’t the point.

His entire identity has been artfully constructed—his shambolic appearance, his unfortunate turns of phrase, his ostentatious unpunctuality. It has allowed him to stand out from the crowd, to build a base. Like US President Donald Trump, he turned conventional wisdom on its head. Personality traits that mainstream members of public life regard as weaknesses, he saw as a strength. Like Trump, he has not trimmed these back since taking office, defying those who predicted that he would.

Hitting Easily Identifiable Targets

Like Trump, Johnson has not learnt gravitas in the face of the biggest global crisis for 75 years. He stumbles around, suggesting laws, changing his mind, blithely indifferent to the effect the shambolic leadership style is having on ordinary lives. What is remarkable, however, is how his opinion poll ratings have dropped only slightly—and in line with a normal first year in office for a leader.

He must therefore be doing something right. I scratch my head to see what exactly it is. But I will attempt to deconstruct the underpinnings of an agenda for the Johnson premiership.

First of all, he is good at hitting easily identifiable targets. He said he would “get Brexit done,” come what may, and unlike his predecessor, the dithering Theresa May, he did just that. He had no idea what would follow, but he deduced that decisiveness was, in voters’ minds, more important than content. Even as the negotiations floundered over the spring and summer, he declared that he would not delay the deadline for transition —deal or no deal—whatever the consequences.

Throwing Money Around

COVID-19 may have diverted him from his post-Brexit reveries; it may have exposed his failings, but, bizarrely for a crisis as existential as this one, it has also allowed him to luxuriate in his customary optimism—and to invite the Great British Public to do the same. How so? As with other countries, the economic exigencies have required the Treasury to throw the rule book into the bin. He can now throw money around with abandon, giving expression to his preferences and his prejudices. It did not go unnoticed around the world that pubs in Britain opened earlier than schools.

Like the British children’s television character, Bob the Builder, he has allowed himself to be termed Boris the Builder. “Build, build, build” was the slogan pinned to the lectern when he gave a speech in the English Midlands recently. Not content with being compared to Churchill, Johnson now likens himself to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Promising a “New Deal” to “rebuild Britain,” and blaming his predecessors for Britain’s woes, he vowed to use the coronavirus crisis “to tackle this country’s great unresolved challenges of the last three decades.” He continued: “To build the homes, to fix the National Health Service, to tackle the skills crisis, to mend the indefensible gap in opportunity and productivity and connectivity between the regions of the UK. To unite and level up.”

Much of the money will be spent in the North of England, which he is right to say has been starved of investment for decades. Johnson recognizes that many people in poorer, non-metropolitan parts of the country, the so-called “Red Wall” of traditional Labour voters, enabled his big majority in December’s general election by “lending” him their support. They did so because of Brexit, antipathy towards the then Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn—and his promises to “level up” the country. At the same time, Johnson’s people believe that they can keep a portion of the younger, more environmentalist, voters on side by pushing ahead with a green agenda. This could include incentives towards jobs and projects that help meet or even accelerate the country’s net zero carbon targets.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak—the only member of the cabinet to have emerged from coronavirus crisis with his standing enhanced—will announce a National Infrastructure Strategy as part of his budget in October. By then, unemployment in the UK will have soared as the well-received salary deferral scheme comes to a close. And most likely a second wave of the pandemic will have led to either a second national lockdown or more selected local ones. The atmosphere will be one of frustration and anxiety.

Taxes or Spending

Longer term, Johnson faces two interlinked dilemmas. With the UK having spent the best part of a decade under David Cameron paying down the deficit, he will have accrued one that dwarfs all previous challenges. Public opinion and economic thinking have long since moved away from ultra-austerity, but this current government will, within a few years, have to start addressing the problem. If Johnson refuses to cut spending, he will have to raise taxes. Which brings me to his underlying philosophical dilemma—if that isn’t too fancy a term to give it. How does he reconcile the dreams of many Brexiteer ideologues of creating a low-tax, low-regulation Singapore on the Thames, with his high-spending, earthy, nostalgic view of Britain? Could he create both? Could he have his cake and eat it. It is highly unlikely, but not impossible. He will try.

He has a certain amount of wriggle room. The Conservatives’ standing on the economy remains considerably above that of Labour, a traditional advantage they have almost always enjoyed over the years. Yet the steely and forensic approach of the still-new Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, is beginning to unnerve Downing Street.

Even if Johnson’s ratings for economic competence begin to suffer, he has something else to fall back on. Again, in a mirror of Trump, he plays the culture war whenever he feels he is having a bad week.     

His agitator-in-chief, Dominic Cummings, having ignored the condemnation of his breaking lockdown rules and driving 400 kilometers from London to his parents’ home in the city of Durham, is back at his voracious best (or worst). Johnson’s right hand man loves to be noticed. This Rasputin-meets-Richelieu is even creating a new fashion, of dress-down tracksuit with shepherd’s walking stick. His call at the start of 2020 for “misfits and weirdos” to apply to work with the new government attracted the attention that was no doubt intended.

English Exceptionalism 2.0

Cummings likes to identify enemies and then remove them. He has already got rid of the government’s most senior civil servant, the Cabinet Secretary, and his equivalent in the Foreign Office. He wants wholesale reform of Whitehall and has also set his sights on the defense sector and the intelligence agencies. The assault on the BBC is incessant.

The plans have two aims. One is to create greater efficiency, which is to be applauded. Many a prime minister, not least Tony Blair, lamented the bureaucracy’s ability to stop fresh thinking. Alongside this is a more pervasive idea to create an English Exceptionalism 2.0. This borrows from nostalgic notions of an island nation, freed from the shackles of unprincipled Europeans, a nation of true-born and free Englishmen where liberties are uppermost. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has recently taken to attacking Russia and China for their human rights records, gliding over the fact that a parliamentary report into Russian influence, which Johnson refused to publish for nearly a year, revealed the extent to which the government deliberately failed to investigate Kremlin involvement in the Brexit referendum or the 2019 election.

Just as COVID-19 has turned all governments’ plans on their heads, so other events will also intervene. Two are easy to predict. Scottish parliamentary elections in May 2021 could produce a further uptick in support for the Scottish National Party. That will encourage Nicola Sturgeon to push hard for a second independence referendum. Johnson will seek to refuse it, leading to an epic struggle.

The single most important event will be the US presidential elections. If Trump wins (God forbid), Johnson’s role as the president’s best buddy will be enhanced. A trade deal with the US will be easier to negotiate (albeit more on the Americans’ terms). Yet it will cement a US-UK relationship that will be seen by much of the world as dangerously toxic. If Biden prevails, Johnson will have lost his prop. He will have to operate in a world that may, just may, be returning to the mainstream. How would he operate then? Would he be capable of another reincarnation? Such is his hubris, he would certainly try, suggesting all along that he was never the nationalist-populist that he was so “unfairly” accused of being.

John Kampfner’s new book Why the Germans Do It Better (Altantic Books) is out now.

The post The Master of Reinvention appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© Frank Augstein/Pool via REUTERS

After the Brexit negotiations is before the Brexit negotiations. The first phase was difficult enough. The major difficulties stemmed from the UK’s side: Theresa May suffered more parliamentary defeats than her five predecessors together, and Boris Johnson also lost his theoretical majority within a few weeks. Only the snap elections at the end of 2019 provided clarity, after which the United Kingdom was able to leave in an orderly fashion after all on January 31, 2020.

The EU-27, on the other hand, were characterized by unusual unity. The Withdrawal Agreement secured the rights of EU citizens in the UK and the British commitments to the EU budget, and set a transition period until the end of 2020 and how to deal with the special situation in Northern Ireland. However, only the divorce issues of this complex separation are sorted out, with the exception of Northern Ireland. Now the real question of the Brexit needs to be answered: under what conditions should the EU cooperate with this ex-member, Europe’s second largest economy and a close NATO partner?

The political context for the next negotiations has changed significantly. First, Brexit has become irreversible, at least in the medium term. Until the end of January, remaining within the EU was still a possible outcome for the UK. According to the ruling of the European Court of Justice, London could have withdrawn the withdrawal notice at any time before the country had formally left the EU. The opponents of Brexit therefore focused on a second referendum: time and again, MPs in the House of Commons fought over whether Brexit should happen at all, and less about what should happen afterwards. This political struggle has now been decided.

Second, the negotiations are taking place under even greater time pressure than before. Article 50 set a two-year deadline for the withdrawal negotiations, which because of the internal political blockade in London had to be extended three times in order to prevent a no-deal Brexit. Partly because of these extensions, the transition phase set for the end of 2020 shrank to just eleven months, during which the future relationship is now to be negotiated. This is very ambitious compared to the average duration of about five years in EU free trade negotiations.

Moreover, the post-Brexit agreement is intended to regulate many more complex areas: economic cooperation in all its facets (goods, capital, services including financial ones, data, energy, mobility of persons, transport, aviation, fisheries), internal security (operational cooperation, data exchange), external security (foreign policy coordination, sanctions, CSDP operations) and a common institutional framework. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Johnson has publicly rejected the legally available option of extending the transition period and had it anchored in law that the UK shall not use it.

Danger of a No-Trade-Deal Brexit

The negotiators will thus have to finish a new accord within the remaining few months. At the end of the transition period, however, the threat is no longer a chaotic “no-deal Brexit”—after all, the UK has already left the EU in an orderly fashion. Instead, “only” a no-trade-deal Brexit looms, i.e. the UK leaving the EU single market and customs union without a trade agreement in place. It would be possible to avoid major chaos, but the economic consequences of the reintroduction of customs and border controls between the EU and the UK would be significant, in particular for the UK. However, London is playing down concerns about this outcome: Johnson now speaks of an “Australia model” as an alternative to a trade agreement. Australia does not have a fully-fledged trade agreement with the EU, but it does have arrangements for regulated dealings, for example regarding aviation. The political conclusion is paradoxical: precisely because the consequences of a no-trade-deal Brexit are less than those of a no-deal Brexit, political inhibitions are lower so the scenario has become more probable

Last but not least, the domestic political conditions in London are completely changed. Until December 2019, the British government, parliament, and society were deeply divided on Brexit and could not agree on a clear negotiating position. Compromises agreed by the UK government in Brussels rarely survived the infighting in the Conservative Party. The House of Commons in particular rejected a no-deal Brexit, but also voted down the Withdrawal Agreement, a second referendum, or any other Brexit option.

No Tory Rebels Left in Power

Although British society is still divided—a narrow majority now views Brexit as a mistake—the Brexiteers have achieved a resounding domestic success. With the slogan “Get Brexit Done,” Johnson captured the mood of the British electorate and won a clear majority in parliament. The much-contested ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement became a formality. At the same time, Johnson decisively triumphed in the Conservatives’ internal power struggle over their European policy, which has lasted for over 30 years. All members of the government and Tory deputies have had to subscribe to a policy of hard Brexit. Since the latest reshuffle, all major ministerial offices in cabinet were given to politicians who supported Brexit before the 2016 referendum.

It is symbolically important that none of the Tory rebels who pushed through the anti-no-deal legislation against the will of the government in autumn 2019 made it back into the House of Commons. Domestically, Johnson now has a largely free hand to set his Brexit policy. The only restraint may come from Northern Ireland and Scotland, as a hard Brexit would exacerbate the pressure on the union of the British state. Nevertheless, the direction for the UK government seems clear—a full break with the EU, with a regular free trade agreement but no conditions that would prevent the UK from setting its own standards, laws, or autonomous trade policy.

The EU and the United Kingdom are thus facing a different round of very critical negotiations. Unlike before, the line of conflict will no longer run through the British Parliament, but between London and Brussels. Although many structural factors are similar, this different political dynamic will fundamentally change the next phase of the Brexit negotiations. Therefore, the EU should not make the mistake of uncritically maintaining its—so far successful—approach. In the short time available for the negotiations, the EU-27 face four strategic challenges.

Developing a UK Model

The overarching challenge is to find a new model for cooperation with a large European third country that does not want to integrate into the EU. Until February 2020, the EU has avoided defining this model and retreated to the position that future relations with the United Kingdom could only be negotiated after the United Kingdom has withdrawn. Politically, the chaos in London and the possibility of a second referendum contributed to the fact that the EU-27 did not have to answer this question. In consequence, the most crucial matters of Brexit remained ambiguous in the first phase of negotiations, with the legally non-binding “political declaration” only sketching in what areas the UK and the EU want to cooperate in the future.

Now Johnson has clearly expressed a preference for a model with the greatest possible distance from the EU. He has also distanced himself from May’s ambitions to negotiate at least frictionless trade in goods, if not services. All the “soft” models of Brexit, from a customs union to deeper access to the internal market, are thus politically off the table. The EU member states, in their mandate for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations, are also aiming for a regular free trade agreement.

Viewed positively, there is thus common ground to start from. However, due to the UK’s geographic proximity, its economic size, and its close economic links to the EU after almost 50 years of joint membership, the EU and its member states want stricter provisions in terms of a level playing field than in other comparable trade agreements. Within the short time frame, the negotiators will therefore have to develop a new “UK model” of partnership―a new balance between close partnership, British and EU sovereignty, more limited access to the common market and to EU programs, and corresponding obligations.

Expanding the Barnier Method

Closely related to this is the second strategic task: to preserve the unity of the EU-27. In the first phase, the EU-27 succeeded in asserting their interests in part because they were more united than ever before. This unity was based on two factors.

On the one hand, the EU institutionally developed a clear, consistent negotiating line with the “Barnier method.” The European Commission and its chief negotiator Michel Barnier were given sole responsibility for the negotiations, and national governments did not conduct their own bilateral negotiations with London. At the same time, Barnier kept everyone on board with high transparency, a lot of technical coordination at the working and political level as well as very regular reassurances of support from the national capitals. On the other hand, the EU-27 also benefited from the political framework of the Article 50 negotiations, in which they were able to agree on a common objective—to protect the integrity of the EU and the internal market—with solidarity toward the special concerns of individual member states (Ireland in regards to its border to Northern Ireland, Central and Eastern Europeans in relation to their citizens in the UK, and so on).

In the negotiations now to come, the Commission will continue with the same method, as Barnier has been re-appointed and given a new mandate. Technically, the EU-27 are again very well prepared. However, it will become more difficult to maintain political unity. The EU-27 will have to make a dual strategic choice— both in terms of the trade-offs outlined above, but also of the priorities to be negotiated in the short transition period. The mandate that the EU states have given to the Commission is extensive, partly because they have not yet been able to decide between different priorities of the member states. Should the focus be on fisheries (important for North Sea countries), the level playing field (important for EU countries with strong economic ties to the UK) or security cooperation (important for Central and Eastern Europe)? Confronted with a British government that is strengthened at home and prepared to play off and promote differences between EU member states, the EU-27 therefore needs, in addition to good technical preparation and negotiation management by Barnier, stronger political coordination of the national governments.

Triangular negotiations

The third strategic challenge lies in a potential struggle with the United States over Britain’s trade, but also foreign and security policy anchoring. With Brexit, the UK is losing its already weakened role as a “transatlantic bridge.” Instead, London needs to reposition itself. From a European perspective, it is important to prevent London from turning fully toward the US.

In trade policy, triangular negotiations are on the agenda for 2020—the UK wants to negotiate simultaneously with Washington and Brussels, and the EU and the US government have also begun talks on a (less ambitious) trade agreement. Although the UK trades much more with the EU than the US, a quick agreement with Washington is of the utmost political importance for the Brexit proponents. US President Donald Trump also has an interest in a success before the US elections in November 2020. Publicly known US negotiating goals include opening up the UK markets for US products that would not be admissible under current EU regulatory standards. Similarly, the EU wants to establish level playing field provisions to ensure that existing European standards are maintained in the UK, if not—as demanded by some national governments—a “dynamic” alignment to EU standards. London wants to use these triangular negotiations to its advantage. The EU will thus also have to consider the global dimension in the negotiations with the British government. Protecting existing standards, for example, may be more in the European interest than a very hard negotiation stance insisting on dynamic alignment, and thus driving London into the arms of Washington.

Albeit under different circumstances, this also applies to foreign and security policy. Remarkably, since 2016, the British government has taken a stronger European stance on foreign policy issues where the Trump government and the majority of Europeans differ. This applies, for example, to dealing with Iran, the Paris Climate Accords or, most recently, Huawei in 5G infrastructure. So far it has also been possible to separate tensions in the Brexit negotiations from foreign policy cooperation. Even after Brexit, the EU states, above all Germany and France, have an interest in involving London in foreign and security policy. This will not, or only to a very limited extent, be achieved through the EU institutions, where the UK as a third country cannot have a seat. What is needed here is close bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as the E3 group on Iran, without undermining the EU framework.

Forging a New Partnership

The forthcoming negotiations with London will be difficult and again tie up a lot of political energy and attention in the EU. The pressure on the unity of EU-27 will increase. The changed political dynamic in London also means that the risk of a domino effect is returning. Until now, the chaos in London encouraged a perception of Brexit as a deterrent in other EU countries. Now Johnson is the political winner, at least domestically, whereas negative economic consequences have not (yet) materialized to such a large extent. In the medium to long term, the UK can become a close partner, but also an economic and political counter-model to EU integration. Even now, hard-core Brexit supporters argue that London should support euroskeptics across Europe.

The EU’s response to this challenge cannot be to “punish” Britain by making negotiations as tough as possible. While the EU should draw a clear dividing line between membership and partnership, it has a vested interest in placing the partnership with London on a lasting and successful footing. The fourth strategic task is therefore ultimately the most important one for the EU: strengthening itself and increasing the attractiveness of EU membership. After all, the best response to the challenges posed by the Brexit would be to demonstrate the advantages of the successful model of European integration.          

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By winning 365 of the 650 parliamentary seats, Boris Johnson’s Conservatives have changed Britain’s political landscape for the next five years, possibly for the next decade. After the last three to four years of knife-edge votes and parliamentary paralysis, the coast will be clear for them to introduce whatever legislation they wish.

The 80-seat majority at the December 12 election was at the very top end of predictions, indeed beyond the expectations of most Tory strategists.

Johnson will move quickly. He will have learnt the lessons of Tony Blair, who failed to capitalize on his landslide in 1997. Brexit will take place on January 31, this time without any last-minute hiccups. A budget will be introduced in March that is likely to include spending commitments on the National Health Service and infrastructure, particularly to reward his new-found voters in the North of England and the Midlands. Expect also early decisions on a series of ideologically driven challenges to the civil service and the BBC, two right-wing pet hates.

A detailed analysis of the results suggests, however, that overall support for the Conservatives is by no means as comprehensive as may initially have seemed.

Leave United, Remain Divided

Their big margin of victory can be attributed to three factors—the demographic particularities of Brexit, the electoral system, and clever strategizing.

Brexit: the Conservatives were clear winners in constituencies that voted Leave in the 2016 EU referendum. They won almost three quarters of all these seats. The writing was on the wall for pro-Remain groups when Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party announced at the start of the campaign that it would not compete in constituencies that the Tories were defending.

The Leave caucus found itself united. By contrast, the Remain one was not. Some small-scale alliances were formed involving the Liberal Democrats, Welsh nationalists, and Greens; but these were marginal and had very little effect. The fact that the Lib Dems (who had advocated revoking the original Article 50 decision) and Labour (who couldn’t quite work out what its position was) fought furiously against each other was a gift to Johnson.

As a result, the Remain vote was split, with a crowded field of parties sharing the seats between them.

The Conservatives won an impressive 294 of the 410 seats that had opted to get out of the EU. Labour secured only 106, in spite of Jeremy Corbyn’s refusal to accede to the demands of most of his parliamentary party to endorse a second referendum.

Corbyn Trumped Brexit

His equivocation on the issue didn’t do him an enormous amount of good on the other side of the divide either. Of the 240 seats that had a majority opting to remain in 2016, Labour won only 96. The Conservatives trailed, but not by much, with 71, confirming the assertion that Johnson’s role in securing Brexit was regarded as less of a threat to voters than the prospect of a Corbyn government. In heavily pro-Remain Scotland, the SNP pro-independence and pro-EU party won a hugely impressive 48 of the 59 seats available.

The constitution: Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system was designed to ensure “strong” government. This is in direct contrast to, say, Germany or other countries, where consensus is regarded as the goal. That is why the UK has had so few coalitions. Even though the one it had between 2010 and 2015 involving the Conservatives and Lib Dems was stable, conventional wisdom has been hostile to any change in the way votes are distributed.

One can understand why any governing party would be resistant. The winner has a disproportionate amount of power. On a purely proportional system, the UK would have had a hung parliament, and the Tories’ 43.6 percent share of the vote would have required them to try to create an alliance with another party. The Lib Dems and Greens have long been the biggest losers in the present system. This time was no different.

The message: Conservative strategists realized long before Johnson called the election that they did not need to be popular. They needed merely to emphasize the unpopularity of Corbyn. The plan worked perfectly. Labour had their worst return of seats in any general election since 1935. They fell backwards in every region of the UK, declining by an average of 8 percentage points. In the northeast of England, their previous heartland, they shed 13 points—almost all of the swing going to the Tories. Even in the most affluent London and the southeast, they lost over 6 percentage points—mainly to the Lib Dems.

The following figures perfectly demonstrate the unfairness of the system. The Lib Dems gained an extra 4 percent of voters, yet lost one seat, ending up with a paltry 11. The Greens and the SNP went up too. The Tory vote only increased by 2 percent overall, but in spite of that small rise, they are seen to have triumphed.

Thanks therefore to a skewed voting system, an unpopular Labour leader, smart Tory strategy, and the failure of pro-EU parties to unite, the UK faces a long period of hegemony by a right-wing populist-nationalist party voted in by less than half of the population. That is the depressing state of Britain’s constitution and political culture.

A More Diverse Parliament

Yet some other data suggest that long term trends may be different. Northern Ireland, on the front line of the Brexit battle, now has for the first time more nationalist than unionist MPs. Parliament will have a record 63 members who come from an ethnic minority, an increase of 11 from two years ago. And a total of 220 women have been elected. This is 12 more than the previous high of 208 in 2017 and constitutes just over a third of the total number. Labour and the Lib Dems have more female than male MPs.

A more diverse parliament, just like a more diverse corporate boardroom, is a good thing in itself. Whether it produces a different mindset is much harder to say.

What is clear from these results is that the United Kingdom is a patchwork of voters with very different backgrounds and priorities. That one party and prime minister have acquired unbridled power, in effect able to do whatever they like for a minimum of five years, is the most dangerous of the many quirks in the British system.

The post Europe by Numbers: A Very British Election appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Dylan Martinez

When he became prime minister in late July, Boris Johnson reassured anxious Britons that leaving the European Union without an exit agreement was “a million-to-one shot.” An divorce deal, which would be the preface to negotiations on the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU, could be reached easily. Yet at the G7 summit in Biarritz in late August, Johnson declared that although the prospects for reaching such a deal were improving, it remained “touch and go” as to whether or not such an agreement could be reached.

What had been a million-to-one shot is now the short-priced favorite. Like life, politics comes at you fast.

If Britain crashes out of the EU without an agreement, Johnson is clear where the blame for this must lie: with the EU itself. Britain, he says, is willing to start afresh, and it is only the EU’s intransigence that stands in the way of a successful, mutually satisfactory deal.

This plainly is a message aimed at Johnson’s domestic audience rather than his counterparts in Berlin, Paris, and elsewhere. The UK, he claims, can easily cope with a no-deal Brexit. This despite the fact that the British government’s own forecasts (“Operation Yellowhammer”) anticipate significant difficulties in the short to medium term if Britain simply walks away from the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by Johnson’s predecessor Theresa May.

Wishful Thinking

These difficulties include, but are not limited to, large-scale disruption to food supplies, a possible shortage of vital medicines, and a reduction of trade flows at major ports such as Dover that may, at least in the short-term, reduce traffic flows by more than 50 percent. If the government’s own private appraisal is correct, Britain is not ready for a no-deal Brexit even if the government, in public, declares it is.

After Johnson visited Berlin last month, pro-Brexit parts of the British press leapt upon German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s suggestion the UK had 30 days to come up with alternatives to the current agreement as though this proved Johnson’s strategy of defiance was already paying dividends.

This seems a hopeful analysis based more on wishful thinking than anything of true substance. French President Emmanuel Macron made this very clear. Yes, the agreement could be reopened and yes, the UK could propose workable alternatives to the problem of the Irish backstop that has become the totemic issue of contention but, be in no doubt about this, any new agreement would look very much like the agreement that has three times been rejected by the House of Commons. If there is wiggle room here, it is only very limited wiggle room.

Johnson may demand changes but the most likely one remains shifting the de facto UK-EU border from the frontier with the Republic of Ireland to the Irish sea, leaving Northern Ireland in close alignment with the EU while permitting the rest of the UK to go its own way. A Northern Ireland-only backstop, however, was previously rejected by the British government as an intolerable infringement upon UK sovereignty.

“Do or Die”

One thing is clear, however, and that is that one way or another, things can’t carry on like this indefinitely. As matters stand, Britain will leave the EU on October 31. It is, as Johnson says, a “do or die” matter for his government.

However, the prospect of a no-deal Brexit, complete with all its risks and unknown consequences, horrifies many British parliamentarians. Since Johnson’s government enjoys the slenderest of majorities, its long-term survival is very much in doubt. For all his bluster, the new prime minister leads a very weak government.

Johnson’s most senior aide, Dominic Cummings, who masterminded the successful Leave campaign in 2016, says Brexit will be achieved by any means necessary. If that requires parliamentary maneuvers that would, in more ordinary times, be considered a sensational and provocative misuse of power, then so be it. To that end, the possibility of forcing a so-called “people vs. parliament” election has been mooted.

That would allow Johnson to present himself as a kind of people’s champion whose determination to deliver Brexit—as mandated by the people themselves three long years ago—was being thwarted by an alliance of anti-democratic politicians in Westminster, hellbent on frustrating the people’s will. In this scenario, Johnson could, indeed would, present himself as a populist hero taking the fight to an out-of-touch and unaccountable elite who dare to think they know better than the people themselves.

Fear of Farage

If Johnson, a scion of Eton and Oxford, seems an unlikely populist, he remains all too aware that he must defend his right flank first before turning his attention to the center-ground. The threat of the Brexit Party founded by the veteran euroskeptic, Nigel Farage, cannot be ignored. At the European Parliament elections earlier this summer Johnson’s Conservative Party was beaten into fourth place. Estimates suggest more Tory members voted for the Brexit Party than for their own party.

Farage argues that Johnson cannot be trusted to deliver Brexit. He fears a sell-out. Even cast-iron commitments to leave on October 31 are, to switch metallurgical metaphors, fool’s gold. Fear of Farage, more than anything else, helped persuade Tory MPs and members to put aside their reservations about Johnson and elect him leader. Of the available candidates, he was both best-placed to ensure Brexit happened and to then win an election.

Forcing an election, however, is less easy than it used to be. British prime ministers can no longer call a poll whenever they choose. The Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, passed in 2011, means an election cannot be called without the agreement of two thirds of MPs. The only exception to this is if a government loses a vote of confidence. In those circumstances, there are 14 days in which to cobble together a new government under a prime minister who can command the support of a majority of MPs. Only then, if no such government can be found, would a new election be called.

No Easy Way Out

Some MPs cling to the idea that a so-called “Government of National Unity” could be formed in the event of the House of Commons toppling Johnson. This seems optimistic, to put it mildly, not least since Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the opposition Labour Party, has little to no interest in such a maneuver.

A no confidence vote this month, then, is a high-risk strategy. Even if the votes can be found to sink Johnson, it is not clear an alternative government could be found. That would mean an election that would probably not be held until early November during which time Britain would gently slide out of the EU, deal or no deal.

That latter scenario looks increasingly likely, not least since any agreed exit in the present climate would look less like compromise than capitulation. Britain finds itself in a corner of its own construction and from which there are no attractive exits.

If this is the beginning of the end of this phase of the Brexit process, it is far from the end of this drama, as shown by the government’s progrurement of parliament —effectively cutting short MPs’ time to block a no deal. An election beckons.

The post The Johnson Maneuver appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

Just hours after the result of the United Kingdom’s June 2016 Brexit referendum had been confirmed, Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s first minister, declared that the differential result—in which Scotland voted Remain but the UK as a whole opted for Leave—meant all options were once again, as she put it, “on the table.” That included, predictably, independence for Scotland.

It has been the defining issue of Sturgeon’s life. Her politics and her being are inextricable. She joined the Scottish National Party when she was just 16 years old and first stood as a candidate for election when she was 22. She was elected to the first Scottish parliament upon its establishment in 1999 and has served in government ever since the SNP came to power in 2007. She is not yet 50—she turns 49 in July—but has been a fixture in Scottish public life for so long, she seems improbably young.

When she joined the party, activists were in the habit of celebrating opinion polls suggesting one in ten Scottish voters backed the SNP. The party, which exists to promote the cause of independence, celebrated occasional by-election victories but seemed an impossible distance from real power. Few careerists joined the SNP in the 1980s.

Thirty years later, the SNP is the dominant political power in Scotland. It has run Scotland’s devolved government for the last twelve years, and Sturgeon, having previously served as health minister and deputy to Alex Salmond, the party’s former leader, will in November celebrate the fifth anniversary of her becoming first minister. Since supplanting the Labour Party which had dominated Scottish politics for the previous half century, the SNP has become Scotland’s natural party of government: a social democratic party that recognizes few, if any, boundaries of class or geography.

“Normal” Nicola

Sturgeon herself is a figure with whom many Scots can identify. She is as “normal” as any leading politician is likely to be. A product of the aspirational working class, she was born in Ayrshire in 1970. Her parents were the first in her family to own their own house and she and her sister the first to attend university. Sturgeon read law at Glasgow University.

“I was quite an introverted child,” she told one interviewer, recalling that, “At my fifth birthday, I hid under the table reading a book while all the other kids played.” But she was always driven, always aware that she had “something” inside her that would commit her to a life in politics and a career of public service.

“[Margaret] Thatcher was the motivation for my entire political career,” she has said. “I hated everything she stood for. This was the genesis of my nationalism. I hated the fact she was able to do what she was doing and yet nobody I knew in my entire life had voted for her.” At a time when most politically-aware Scots her age joined Labour, Sturgeon opted for the SNP, determining that only independence could satisfy Scotland’s political and social aspirations.

A Return to the Family of Nation

At her selection as an SNP candidate in 1991, she was introduced as the lady who “will be the first female leader of the SNP one day,” a prediction which embarrassed Sturgeon at the time but proved unusually accurate. In the aftermath of the 1992 general election, Sturgeon reminded her compatriots of her party’s mission: “We will turn Scotland from the invisible nation of Europe into a nation which plays a full part in Europe and contributes to the great international issues.”

Some things in politics are constant, and this is one of them. Returning Scotland to the international “family of nations” remains Sturgeon’s ambition and the purpose of her political life. Brexit has convulsed British politics these last three years but, viewed from Scotland, it is part of a much larger question: should Scotland be an independent country or not?

When that question was asked in 2014, the answer was a clear, but hardly resounding “No”—with 55 percent of Scots opting to remain a part of the United Kingdom while 45 percent voted to leave. The issue remained unsettled, and there was, regardless of individual preference, an awareness of this being an argument only half-completed. The national question had been asked but not settled or answered in a decisive matter.

Even so, there seemed little plausible prospect of it being asked again any time soon. Sturgeon herself had argued the 2014 referendum was a “once in a generation” opportunity to strike out in a new direction. Outside events, determined elsewhere, would be required to revive the independence question.

Lifeboats for Scotland

Enter Brexit. Even if Sturgeon had wished to avoid reopening the national issue, there would have been no way of avoiding it. Even so, Sturgeon finds herself caught in a particular paradox: Brexit is a disaster for the UK, but an opportunity for Scotland. Leaving the EU—especially, as seems increasingly plausible, without an agreement that would pave the way for an orderly transition period—risks all but incalculable damage to the UK, and the Scottish, economy. It is, Sturgeon believes, an act of self-harm, promoted by “charlatans” whose chutzpah is as great as their lack of credibility.

But it is also an opportunity. Britain might be sinking, but there are still lifeboats available to Scotland. The fact that Scotland’s preference to Remain in the EU is trumped by the weight of numbers for Leaving elsewhere in the UK creates a powerful political narrative for Sturgeon: the only way to secure Scotland’s future is to put that future in Scotland’s hands. Time and again, she has despaired that Scotland faces “being dragged out” of the EU against its will, and this constitutes the “material change in circumstances” she believes justifies revisiting the independence question that was answered, but not settled, five years ago.

A new referendum, however, requires the agreement of the UK government in London, and hitherto that agreement has not been forthcoming. Sturgeon, as a consequence, is reduced to being a spectator as Britain’s great Brexit tragicomedy is played out. Suggestions for a “compromise” approach made by her government—which would, in essence, have seen the UK remain a member of the single market—were ignored in London. That in turn has prompted Sturgeon to harden her position: she now favors a second Brexit referendum that must include the option of remaining in, or rejoining, the EU.

The Paradox of Independence

Stubbornly, however, the opinion polls have barely shifted since 2014. Brexit may make the political argument for independence more intuitively plausible and even appealing, but it also complicates the practical meaning of independence. What currency would an independent Scotland use? (Sturgeon favors using sterling before moving to a distinct Scottish currency; the euro is not considered a viable option). How would the Anglo-Scottish frontier be managed? (A question which makes the arrangements reached between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic a matter of singular, exemplary, concern for Scotland). Would Scotland enjoy an easy admission process to the EU, and if so, on what terms? (Probably, but not all the terms would be easily met.)

There is this, too: if, as Sturgeon insists, it is a ruinous mistake for the UK to leave a political union with its largest trading partner, how could it not be—as an economic matter—a self-inflicted error for Scotland to do likewise, given that 60 percent of all Scottish exports go to the rest of the UK (and just 18 percent to the rest of the EU). Moreover, if Brexit is difficult and complicated, how much more difficult and complex might negotiating the break-up of Britain be?

Those are hard—and live—concerns. The shape of independence cannot be ascertained until there is some clarity on the shape, and meaning, of Britain’s EU exit. It may simplify Sturgeon’s message but it unavoidably complicates the practicalities of independence. Which is one reason why Sturgeon sincerely wishes it had never happened. It also means that her demands for a second referendum now have been rebuffed by the UK government. No fresh plebiscite is likely until after the next Scottish parliament elections in 2021.

Trials and Tribulations

Another cloud looms, too. Later this year, Alex Salmond, Sturgeon’s predecessor as party leader and first minister, will appear in an Edinburgh court room to face more than a dozen charges of sexual assault, including two of attempted rape. It is difficult to estimate in advance the likely fallout but equally impossible to avoid the fact the trial will have major ramifications for Sturgeon, the SNP and, indeed, Scotland itself. Salmond was for years Sturgeon’s mentor; the figure to whom, more than any other, she owes her career. Unavoidably, his trial has the potential to more seriously threaten her political future than anything her opponents have hitherto been able to muster against her.

Such is the state of British politics at present, however—simultaneously in flux and stuck in the Brexit doldrums—that anything and everything seems possible. Brexit may yet be the end of the United Kingdom: the catalyst for a break-up that would once have seemed unthinkable and yet to many Scots now seems the most natural thing in the world.

Nicola Sturgeon has been waiting her whole life for that moment; if she needs to wait a little longer, past experience suggests she can.

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© REUTERS/Toby Melville

The European Council summit resumed on Friday morning in Brussels with a plethora of subjects on the table: relations with China, industrial policy and climate change among them. The agenda had become so overloaded after the Brexit talks the previous night dragged on so long that all other business was delayed.

EU leaders are not happy about it. They are tired of having Brexit hijack these summits, held just four times a year. Frustrations boiled over last night after the British prime minister, Theresa May, was unable, after 90 minutes of questioning, to explain to the other 27 leaders how she could possibly find a way out of the Brexit impasse.

The EU27 had been set to approve a draft text that would have granted the UK an extension until 22 May, on the condition that the British Parliament approves Theresa May’s withdrawal deal next week. By the time May left the room, there wasn’t a single leader who had any confidence that she could get her deal passed, according to EU sources. Desperate to avoid a last-minute emergency summit in Brussels next week, they had to move to Plan B.

After hours of talks that dragged on to midnight, they decided to grant the UK an unconditional extension to April 12—the date by which the UK would have to start preparing for EU elections in May. Should the UK Parliament approve the withdrawal deal next week, the UK can get a further extension to May 22 (the day before the EU elections) to complete the legislation.

If Parliament cannot or will not vote to approve the deal, Council President Donald Tusk said at a press conference at the end of the night, then the UK has only three options to avoid a disorderly Brexit on April 12.

How to Avoid No-Deal

“What this means in practice is that, until that date, all options will remain open. The cliff-edge date will be delayed. The UK government will still have a choice of a deal, no-deal, a long extension or revoking Article 50.”

EU diplomats were at pains to emphasize that this timeline envisions no further discussions on the EU side. Journalists will not be summoned to Brussels once again on April 11 for an emergency last-minute summit. All EU countries will finalize preparations for no deal and will be ready on April 12. This is it—Brexit is banished from the Council meeting room.

It remains unlikely that the UK would actively choose a no-deal Brexit should the deal fail next week, given the UK Parliament has already voted to rule out such an outcome. But it could still happen if they cannot come up with any other solution. And the EU27 have said they will not intervene if they see the UK accidentally stumbling toward the cliff edge. Whether they would actually stick to this threat is open for debate. Never say never to an emergency summit.

The UK government could, as Tusk mentioned, choose to avoid the cliff by revoking Article 50 and cancelling Brexit. The European Court of Justice has ruled that this can be done unilaterally and cannot be vetoed the EU27. This would not necessarily mean Brexit doesn’t happen—the UK could choose to trigger Article 50 again at a future date, once the government has a clearer idea of what it wants.

The other option is to ask for a long extension. EU leaders have said this would only be possible should circumstances materially change. This would most likely come in the form of a new general election and government change, or a second referendum.

In order to get this long-term extension, the UK must commit to holding an election to the European Parliament in the week of May 23—something Theresa May has said she cannot countenance doing as prime minister. The concern is that if the UK is still a member when the new European Parliament takes its seats on July 2, and Britain hasn’t run elections in May, it would mean that this EU Parliament is illegally constituted. This would leave both the European Parliament and the Commission open to legal challenges.

However, even if the UK commits to run the European Parliament election and plans a new national election, the EU27 could still reject a long-term extension. French President Emmanuel Macron has said he is opposed to a long-term extension in almost all circumstances. He does not want a situation where the UK continues to be inside the EU and voting while it still intends to leave.

However Macron could be convinced to soften his stance if the UK commits to abstain from voting in the EU unless and until it decides to remain.

What’s Next?

Eager to be rid of the Brexit mess, the EU27 leaders were at pains last night to stress that the ball is now in London’s court. John Bercow, the speaker of the House of Commons, must first decide if he will allow Theresa May to bring back the same deal for a third vote.

Should the vote go ahead, Theresa May will have to convince more MPs to approve her deal. Given how much she alienated MPs in her televised address to the public on Wednesday night, this seems unlikely. Indeed, her attacks on the Parliament as thwarting the will of the people so incensed some members of her own Conservative Party that they have said they would vote against her deal on the third try, even though they had supported it on the second try.

It is quite possible that Theresa May would respond to a third rejection by calling a general election—or could be forced to do so by a no-confidence vote triggered by opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn. Such an election would obviously take longer than two weeks to organize, and so the UK would say this is enough reason to grant a long-term extension.

It is possible, some have theorized, that the general election could happen on the same day as the European Parliament election—maximizing turnout and providing a clearer gage of whether the public wants a second referendum to overturn the first one.

The other option, calling a second referendum without a new general election, remains a distinct possibility. The Labour Party officially supports it, even though everyone knows that party leader Corbyn secretly opposes it. Parliament rejected the idea of a second referendum last week in a procedural vote, but that is assumed to have failed because MPs who support the so-called “People’s Vote” thought it was not the right time to ask for one. It does not mean that Parliament has definitively ruled it out.

How things play out in the coming week may depend on what kind of turnout a “People’s Vote March” attracts in the UK this weekend. If the turnout is lackluster, MPs may not be convinced that there is the public will for anything but a no-deal Brexit. If the turnout is equal or greater to the last march, they may well be convinced.

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© REUTERS TV via REUTERS

Who is writing the script for Brexit? Because this drama seems to have no end in sight. No sooner had we journalists written our pieces about what to expect this week than we had to consign them to the bin. The story moved from when would British Prime Minister Theresa May bring her twice rejected Brexit deal back to Parliament to wondering whether she could legally bring it back at all.

The latest twist in this never-ending saga centers around the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow. He is in effect the chief official in Parliament and therefore oversees procedure. He also has a habit of causing political upset to one side of the House or the other. His latest ruling can only be described as a bombshell and draws on parliamentary convention dating back to 1604.

Unless the proposition for passing May’s twice-defeated Withdrawal Agreement is “substantially” changed, Bercow has said she cannot present it again to Parliament. So, all the talk about whether she may finally have won over the hardcore Brexiteers in her own party or even those awkward 10 Northern Irish DUP MPs who prop up her government in Westminster, appears to be irrelevant. No-one really knows what happens next. The United Kingdom may not have a written constitution, but there’s talk that it’s now in constitutional crisis.

On Thursday and Friday there’s another EU Summit of the leaders of the member states. Originally it was supposed to be a rubber-stamping exercise, a few days before the UK officially leaves the EU. Since last week we’ve known that Theresa May would be forced to ask for a delay to Brexit. That delay now looks endless as she and her team try to work out what on earth they do next.

Major Headache for Brussels

In Parliament, John Bercow suggested a complete renegotiation at EU level would be needed in order to justify the government’s Brexit deal again being presented to Parliament. It had been assumed that clarifying the legal advice on the so-called Irish backstop would be enough to warrant another vote on May’s Withdrawal Agreement. Many Brexiteers are delighted with the Speaker’s latest ruling, believing that yet again a no-deal Brexit must be back on the table—even if Parliament ruled it out last week. Remember, until there’s a change in British law, the UK is still due to leave the EU next Friday.

All of this creates a major headache for Brussels. EU chiefs don’t want to see a chaotic, no-deal Brexit. But neither do they want to consider a complete renegotiation with London. They’ve always maintained that the Withdrawal Agreement cannot be reopened. They’ve also made it very clear that extending Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty for no clear purpose is not something they can support. So, what will they do now? How can they maintain a united front for all 27 EU members when no one is quite sure what it is they are actually uniting around?

An Opening for a Softer Brexit?

Another significant problem is that a delay to Brexit of anything more than a couple of months will mean the UK is forced to take part in the European Elections which will be held in May. Those who see themselves as defending the EU project will not want a pro-Brexit populist party, probably fronted by Euroskeptic MEP, Nigel Farage, trying to hijack an election that’s already looking difficult to stage manage. None of this was part of the script.

There have been suggestions that the current Parliamentary session in Westminster could be cut short. But that would surely lead to another British general election. Perhaps instead, focus will now turn to the short document that accompanies the Withdrawal Agreement—namely the Political Declaration. This focuses on what type of future relationship the UK and EU will have post Brexit. Could a majority in Parliament agree to a softer Brexit—one that, say, keeps the UK in a Customs Union and perhaps even the Single Market. The very idea will be hated by Euroskeptics, but there are many MPs across the House of Commons who would prefer this to a hard Brexit.

Waiting for the Brexit Finale

No-one can really predict what happens next. Which reminds me of something that happened last Thursday night. Just after a majority of British lawmakers had voted to delay Brexit, I was at Berlin’s Mercedez Benz Arena watching one of my favorite bands play. The members of Florence and the Machine are proud South Londoners. But it quickly became apparent that they, like other British artists who find themselves touring Europe, are acutely embarrassed about what’s going on back home.

In front of more than 17,000 people, singer-song writer, Florence Welch, summed up the state of Brexit in three words. “It’s a mess!” she declared, before asking us all to hold hands to show that we were all united. As a Brit it was rather touching—if a little uncomfortable. But it just goes to show how much Brexit is dominating not just British life, but European life too.

At some point, this excruciating British drama will have to reach its climax. Despite all the extraordinary twists and turns, there’s still some way to go before we reach the finale.

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© REUTERS/ Toby Melville

If you were to describe Brexit as a farce, you wouldn’t have to look much further than the latest debacle to hit the British government. £33 million is the sum the Department for Transport has been forced to pay Eurotunnel to settle a legal case over “secretive” ferry contracts. The scramble to secure extra ferry capacity came about because of fears that a no-deal Brexit could affect the supply of medicines. One of those multi-million pound contracts was awarded to a company that had—wait for it—no ships at all. That contract with Seaborne Freight was eventually withdrawn.

These stories, along with the political crisis engulfing Westminster, sum up the state of play in Brexit Britain. Yet the country has somehow to get its act together if it really is to leave the European Union on Friday, March 29 with some kind of agreement.

For this to be even remotely possible, Prime Minister Theresa May still has to get her deal through Parliament. Having lost a vote on her Brexit deal back in January by an historic margin (she was beaten by a majority of 230 votes), May has been doing all she can to run down the clock. This is to force British MPs to accept her deal or face a chaotic Brexit.

Brexit Delayed?

But thanks to resignation threats from several government ministers who oppose a no-deal Brexit, Theresa May has had to offer something she really didn’t want to—a possible delay to Brexit. It looks as though she will present her latest deal to Parliament next Tuesday, March 12. If it’s again defeated, MPs will vote the following day on whether they would accept a no-deal Brexit. When that’s defeated (which it surely will be because a majority of MPs do not support leaving the EU without an agreement), they will be asked on the Thursday whether the government should seek an extension to Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. If that result is yes and if the EU agrees, Brexit will be delayed. For how long will become the next battle.

The Labour Party, the main opposition, has also been forced to change its position. After months of procrastination its euroskeptic leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is grudgingly backing a second referendum, though it’s not clear exactly what would be on the ballot. This turnaround is in part down to the decision by eight of his own MPs, all of whom support a “People’s Vote,” to jump ship and form a breakaway formation, The Independent Group. As soon as the referendum pledge was confirmed, one of those MPs told me, “With Corbyn, always read the small print: terms and conditions most probably apply.”

Those eight Labour MPs have since been joined by three Conservatives, making Theresa May’s minority government a little smaller. In fact, even though The Independent Group isn’t yet a political party, one recent poll had it on 18 percent. Over these hectic past few weeks, Brexit has been changing the political dynamic in Westminster even more dramatically than usual.

May’s Chances Rising

But before you start to think a delay to Brexit and a second referendum are all but inevitable, think again. While nobody can predict with any certainty what the final outcome will be, there is an increasing chance that Theresa May could yet get her revised Withdrawal Agreement through Parliament. Why? Because the threat of a delay to Brexit, coupled with Labour’s move toward backing some kind of referendum, may well focus minds.

Some of the hard Brexiteer Tories in the European Research Group, including its leader Jacob Rees-Mogg, seem to be softening their resistance to May’s deal. Their main source of contention is over the so-called Irish backstop—an insurance policy included in the agreement to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Pro-Brexit MPs hate it because it could place the whole of the UK in a Customs Union with the EU, while also forcing Northern Ireland to abide by stricter rules.

They want legally binding changes to the text that would either remove the backstop or at least give it a time limit. So far, Brussels has refused to reopen the agreement. But there is talk among Brexiteers—including those 10 Northern Irish DUP MPs who prop up May’s government—that they would consider accepting another form of mechanism to ensure the backstop is temporary.

But even if the government’s chief legal adviser, Geoffrey Cox, can persuade Brussels to add a codicil or appendix to the agreement, what could it possibly say that would keep all sides happy? Nobody there wants to threaten the Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland more than 20 years ago. And Brussels’ allegiance must lie with Dublin, not London.

Despite the Brexiteers’ warmer words, the British prime minister must surely know by now that she can’t rely on them. Some would be quite happy to leave the EU with no deal in place. So in the time that’s left, May will continue to reach out to the more moderate members of her party, as well as those Labour MPs who support Brexit or at least feel they must honor the 2016 referendum result.

Corbyn’s Calculations

Jeremy Corbyn could probably live with some of his Labour MPs backing the deal. For him, that would at least reduce the likelihood of a second referendum, which he has been forced to back reluctantly. There is still a possibility that the party could support May’s deal, or at least abstain, allowing it to pass in exchange for a new referendum that would include the option to remain. But helping May get her deal through would not be the euroskeptic leader’s preferred option: if Labour’s top command can ensure the Brexit mess is laid at the door of a right-wing Tory government, so much the better.

There’s also talk of the PM offering Parliament two “meaningful” votes this month on her agreement with Brussels, in order to get her deal over the line by March 29. But time is running out, and even if May does get it through, the British Parliament will still need to put the necessary legislation in place before B-Day.

Each day lost to indecision and political paralysis makes a delay to Brexit ever more likely. Former British Ambassador to the EU Sir Ivan Rogers recently told Der Spiegel that he has been surprised at “the extent of the mess.” Few can disagree with that.

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© REUTERS/John MacDougall/Pool

This week, the difficult negotiations over the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union began in earnest in Brussels. David Davis, the UK’s chief negotiator, squared off against Michel Barnier, his EU counterpart.

Davis called for both sides to “get down to business.” He then promptly went back to London, less than sixty minutes later. He gave no explanation for his own swift departure, which left the EU negotiators perplexed. Just days earlier, Barnier had warned the UK that it is running out of time to negotiate its exit, which must be completed by March 2019. “All I hear is a clock ticking,” he said sternly.

Meanwhile, across the street at the European Council, the daily business of negotiating EU legislation continued on this week as normal. And as representatives of the 28 member states craft new EU laws, the UK has shown no signs of taking a back seat – even on legislation that will not kick in until after they will, theoretically, leave the bloc.

Davis may be insisting that Brexit is happening, but down the hall his own civil servants are behaving as if it is not. It has raised more than a few eyebrows.

While the UK announced this month that it intends to leave Euratom, the European treaty dealing with nuclear energy, London has taken particular interest in a mammoth energy proposal put forward this year by the European Commission, which would reshape the bloc’s energy and climate rules after 2020.

Last month, during a meeting of national energy ministers discussing new energy efficiency rules – one part of the package – the UK pushed aggressively to water down the proposed energy savings goals for the 2020 to 2030 period. As reported by Politico this week, it left other energy ministers exasperated, because if Brexit goes ahead as planned, the UK will never be subject to these new rules.

“The UK civil servants are somehow behaving like nothing’s changed,” commented Jonathan Gaventa from the E3G think tank. The behavior has many convinced that these civil servants, and perhaps some ministers, don’t think the UK will leave the EU at all – or at least that it will still be beholden to EU rules.

They’ll Always Have Paris

Meanwhile, over in the former West German capital of Bonn, civil servants at the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) are feeling much the same as their counterparts in Brussels. But their frustration is with Washington rather than London.

The UNFCCC administers the international Paris accords on climate change, agreed in 2015, which US President Donald Trump announced last month he will remove the US from, joining Syria and Nicaragua as the only countries in the world which are not part of the framework.

And yet, US diplomats are still behaving as if Trump never made the announcement. According to EU sources, US officials are continuing to behave as signatories for the purposes of negotiating the rules of the accord, which still have to be worked out over the next several years. They intend to take a seat at the table when the signatories next meet, at a UN summit in Bonn in November.

Like the UK in the EU, for the moment the US still has every right to sit at that table. That’s because rather that choose one of the routes for leaving the Paris agreement which would have meant an immediate exit, Trump chose the more complicated route of a submitted notification of withdrawal. That requires a process of several years which, by coincidence, means the US cannot actually leave the accord until mid-November 2020 – one week after the next US presidential election.

This has led some to speculate that the US doesn’t intend to pull out of Paris at all. Because he promised a withdrawal during the election campaign, Trump had to announce an intention to leave. But by doing it in the most drawn-out way possible, it means the US swill still technically be in the framework over the next three years – a crucial period for shaping the rules of the accord.

There were two possible scenarios that could have unfolded after Trump’s announcement last month. If China had followed the US in pulling out of the agreement, following the pattern that killed the Kyoto Protocol in 2000, Paris would have been dead. But China doubled down on its commitment, and in Hamburg this month all of the G20 members except the US strongly affirmed the agreement and said it was non-negotiable.

Trump’s hope of killing or renegotiating Paris has failed, and that means the agreement will be the main framework for regulating global energy governance over the coming decades. That’s not a framework that the US can afford to be absent from.

The fear is that if the US were to be shut out from the negotiations shaping the Paris rules over the next few years, the rules could be written (at the urging of Beijing and others) in a way that disadvantages the US. This could be disastrous for Washington should the US end up re-entering Paris, or never leaving at all, under a future president. And so for the moment, the US is refusing to give up its seat at the table.

Not Taken Seriously Anymore

One can empathize with these Anglo-Saxon civil servants in Brussels and Bonn. They naturally want to exert as much influence as possible on international governance. But they are hindered by recent decisions by their electorates which necessitate leaving institutions that make the international rules.

Logically there are only two possible motivations for the British and American insistence on being part of crafting future rules they theoretically will not be a party to. The first is that these civil servants and ministers are hedging their bets. They know that Brexit and the US departure from the Paris agreement may not happen, and as long as they are still members they need to negotiate rules under the assumption that those rules will in fact apply to them in the future – a “just in case” strategy.

But there is a more nefarious explanation. If the UK really is leaving, then British civil servants would have a very reasonable motivation to sabotage EU rules and work to craft them in a way which benefits the UK as a future competitor. Likewise, the US now has every interest in making the Paris climate accords fail, particularly to make sure they do not become the world’s global energy regulatory framework.

The reality is that it’s probably a mixture of these two motivations that is keeping the Anglo-Saxons at the table. But the question is whether the rest of the world is going to let them get away with it.

An EU source told me last week that there is some disagreement about whether to allow the Americans to take an active role in Bonn in November. “They can make a lot of noise but we don’t have to take them seriously anymore,” he told me. But given that many battles in the UNFCCC are fought on developed versus developing lines (i.e. EU/US vs. China/India), some want to allow the US to keep having a sway, fearful of losing an important ally.

The same debates are being had in Brussels. There is increasing frustration that the UK should be allowed to influence EU laws that won’t kick in till after 2020, and increasing suspicion about their motivations. But on the other hand, more free market-oriented countries like Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands still see the UK as an important ally in these EU Council votes. They are perhaps as hopeful as the British civil servants that Britain won’t actually leave the EU in the end.

But given that there are still 21 months to go before the UK leaves the EU, some sort of understanding will have to be reached about what the UK can and cannot influence. Otherwise, the anger being felt by continental Europeans is going to bubble over – much like it did in the days immediately after the Brexit referendum last year.

Speaking in the European Parliament days after the vote, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told MEPs that he would respect the outcome – which was greeted by a smattering of applause from UK Independence Party MEPs. “That’s the last time you are applauding here,” Juncker said to UKIP leader Nigel Farage. “And to some extent I’m really surprised that you are here. You were fighting for the exit, the British people voted in favor of the exit. Why are you still here?”

One year on, Farage is still there. So are the British civil servants and ministers in the European Council, voting on EU legislation. And there will also be US civil servants and ministers in Bonn in November. To both of them, Juncker’s question can reasonably be asked. Why are you still here?

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© REUTERS/Chris Radburn/Pool

It’s been a difficult few months for Theresa May. The British prime minister has been rebuffed at every turn by her European counterparts as she has sought to secure special rights for the UK after Brexit. And while the other Europeans have presented a united front, she has appeared to be speaking for a divided Britain.

But though she faces obstacles abroad, May is riding high at home. Her Conservative party has been hovering at a 20-point lead above the opposition Labor Party, which is in a shambles. The proportion of the British public supporting Brexit has slightly increased, up to 55 percent support for May’s handling of the talks, compared to the referendum result of 52 percent last year.

With the polls at her back, it’s no wonder May decided this week to call a general election in about six weeks’ time. The most likely result of the election will be a landslide victory, which pundits predict could bring the Conservatives’ current 17-seat majority to something well over 100. The Tories could steal as many as 56 seats from Labor. Bookies are putting the odds of the Conservatives winning the most seats at 1/20.

This is not so much an indication of May’s strength – her personal likability polling numbers are not very high – but a reflection of the scorched-earth state of British politics. Labor leader Jeremy Corbyn has been a disaster for the party, and does not command the loyalty of a majority of his own MPs. And although they are going up in the polls, the Liberal Democrats are still reeling from their past decision to form a governing coalition with the Tories. In a political landscape with only three significant parties, that makes the result of June 8 pre-ordained without some kind of political earthquake.

An Easy Mandate

What May wants from this election was clear from her speech last Tuesday: she believes an election victory will give her greater negotiating power, because she will then be acting on behalf of a personal mandate from the people.

At the moment she has never been elected to govern, taking the reins after David Cameron resigned in wake of the Brexit vote, and commanding a governing party with a slim majority has diminished her credibility with her European negotiating partners. They suspect she will not have the political capital to sell a Brexit deal at home. She has been so worried about this that she commanded MPs vote for their own sidelining last month, writing into legislation that they will not get a vote on the final Brexit deal.

European leaders seem to agree with May’s assessment of the potential for an election. Germany’s foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel said through his spokesman that the election should lead to more “predictability and reliability.”

“We want to get this process [the UK leaving the EU by March 2019] done in the prescribed period of time and above all because we don’t need upheaval in this negotiating process – either at the beginning or the end,” he said.

May’s European partners have so far been frustrated by sometimes confusing and contradictory demands, as well as her abrupt shifts in policy, as seen with her sudden embrace of “hard” Brexit in January. There is some hope that an electoral mandate will result in more coherence.

At the same time, European leaders know that a landslide win for May will not mean that the UK is united behind Brexit. It will have much more to do with the disastrous state of the Labor Party. Many anti-Brexit voters were left wondering this week who they should vote for: Labor is split on the Brexit issue, with Corbyn backing the process even though two-thirds of Labor supporters voted against Brexit. The Liberal Democrats are the most pro-European party, campaigning for the UK to remain a member of the EU’s single market, but they face an uphill battle.

With such a broken political spectrum, a landslide win for the Conservatives will not say very much about how the public actually feels about Brexit.

There are other reasons the election boost could help May. As the talks progress she is going to have to make concessions – the kinds of compromises that are often not popular with voters. She knows that if she holds the vote now she will not have to worry about any challenge from the UK Independence Party, which under its new leader Paul Nuttall has collapsed. (Former leader Nigel Farage, who failed seven times to become an MP, said he’d rather keep his seat in the European Parliament than try for the House of Commons for an eighth time.) That may not be true in two years’ time.

With a large majority she can also be more certain of having the loyalty of her own MPs if they must approve a new free trade deal with the EU in two years.

At the same time, in the past some European leaders have learned that holding a vote at home doesn’t always give you a mandate to negotiate in Brussels. Alexis Tsipras also won a mandate from the Greek people in a bailout referendum in 2015, but it got him nothing from his EU partners.

Could It Backfire?

May looks like she has the wind at her back, but some are pointing out that she should be cautious.

A Conservative prime minister before her also decided to call an early election based around a single issue – Edward Heath in 1974. He was hoping to get a mandate to crush the ongoing miner strikes in the UK and assumed he could get one easily because he was well ahead in the polls. But things didn’t go according to plan, and the election ended in a hung parliament in which Labor gained four more seats than the Conservatives.

Could something similar happen to May, though? It would require something to drastically change with the current situation.

The election result depends on whether Labor can come up with a cohesive message on Brexit quickly. May has cast this vote as a sort of second Brexit referendum, because she knows that the current political situation would give a false impression of unity behind Brexit. A vote for the Conservatives is meant to be a vote for Brexit. A vote for the Liberal Democrats or Scottish National Party is meant to be against it. But what does a vote for Labor mean? It is still unclear.

If Corbyn were to come out strongly against the “hard Brexit” that May is planning, it might attract not only those who voted to remain, but also Leave voters who do not like the way the post-referendum developments are going. Corbyn could, for instance, promise to instead negotiate for the UK to leave the EU but reach a Norway-like deal to remain in the single market. This would offer voters a real choice.

All eyes will be on Corbyn in the coming weeks to see if he adopts an abrupt shift of tone on the Brexit question. If not, May could be walking into the start of Brexit talks in June with a strengthened mandate.

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