© REUTERS/Yves Herman

During the last few years, there has been much discussion about “European sovereignty.” In particular, the concept is associated with French President Emmanuel Macron, who, as early as in his 2017 Sorbonne speech, has made it central to his own vision for Europe and its role in the world. Other leading “pro-European” figures have also embraced the concept—in particular after the Trump administration abandoned the nuclear agreement with Iran and imposed new sanctions that would affect European companies that continue to do business in Iran. In 2018 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker even entitled his State of the Union speech “The hour of European sovereignty,” and German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded “greater strategic sovereignty” for the EU as recently as May 13.

However, although the concept is now widely used, it is far from clear what it means. It is often just another term for a strong, united Europe or the vague idea that Europe must “take its destiny into its own hands.” It tends to be used almost interchangeably with “strategic autonomy,” though sometimes with a greater focus on economic power rather than just military power. Given the lack of clarity about what “European sovereignty” means, it is tempting to simply ignore the concept. But the way it has been used in the last few years actually tells us a lot about “pro-European” thinking and illustrates some of the problems with it—in particular in debates about European foreign policy.

Historically, “pro-Europeans” tended to be anti- or post-sovereigntist—that is, they saw “sovereignty” as an anachronistic and dangerous concept—and were always slightly dismissive of other “sovereigntist” powers. In particular, of course, it was national sovereignty that those considered “pro-Europeans” opposed. They have had a tendency to think concepts that are problematic at the national level are somehow unproblematic at the European level. But until recently most “pro-Europeans” would have also seen the idea of “European sovereignty” as problematic—the whole point of the European project was to move not just beyond national sovereignty but also beyond the concept of sovereignty altogether.

Remaking the World in Europe’s Image

What “pro-Europeans” wanted was to transform international politics by moving beyond a world of power politics to one based on the rule of law—and central to this was a rethink of what sovereignty meant. “Until the European Union was created, the idea of statehood, of being ‘sovereign,’ meant independence from external intervention, maintaining your secrecy, keeping other countries at bay,” wrote Mark Leonard in his 2005 book Why Europe will run the 21st Century. But, he went on, after World War II Europeans had embraced interdependence instead of independence. “Instead of jealously guarding their sovereignty from external interference, Europeans have turned mutual interference and surveillance into the basis of their security.”

For “pro-Europeans” like Leonard, the EU was a kind of blueprint for global governance. They believed that the whole world should become like Europe. Reflecting a somewhat deterministic current in “pro-European” thinking, many saw a kind of inevitability in this remaking of the world in the image of Europe. The inexorable logic of interdependence undermined sovereignty and necessitated transnational governance structures like the EU. Thus the rest of world would eventually catch up with the radical post-sovereigntist vision on which the EU was based. The whole world would eventually pool and share sovereignty among themselves just as Europeans had done, and something like the EU would become a kind of world government.

The idea of “European sovereignty” is a manifestation of the way that “pro-Europeans” have essentially given up on this idea—at least for now. After the series of crises the EU has faced over the last decade, beginning with the eurocrisis in 2010, the idea the EU is a model looks much less compelling than it did in the mid-2000s. Meanwhile, in the context of the rise of China, Russian revisionism, and uncertainty about the commitment of the United States to Europe, the continent feels much more alone and threatened than it did back then. Instead of a transformation of international politics, there has been a transformation of “pro-European” thinking. “Pro-Europeans” no longer see the EU as a model, but as a competitor—that is, as a power that has to compete with others. In order to do so, they say, it needs “sovereignty.”

Only Big Is Truly Sovereign

The idea of “European sovereignty” is based on a distinction between two definitions of sovereignty in international politics: a narrow, legal definition and a wider, strategic definition. In the narrow sense—the conventional definition—all states are sovereign. It is in this legal sense that it is a violation of sovereignty when one country invades another without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council—for example, when the United States invaded Iraq, or Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. But when the concept of sovereignty is used in this conventional sense, the secondary impact of US sanctions is hardly a “massive assault” on the sovereignty of Europe, as former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt claimed. It is simply one power using the size of its market to pursue its interests.

However, there has long been a sense in “pro-European” thinking that this kind of sovereignty is a kind of illusion. A state may legally be able to make its own laws, but is in practice unable to resist the pressures of international politics. In particular, “pro-Europeans” have long argued that small states are not really sovereign, even though they may possess sovereignty in the legal sense. The only way to be truly sovereign, they argued, is to be big. Thus European integration did not really undermine the national sovereignty of EU member states. “The choice is not between national and European sovereignty,” wrote Jean Pisani-Ferry, a former advisor to Macron, in December 2019. “It is between European sovereignty and none at all.”

This wider definition clearly reflects an aspiration or even an expectation among many Europeans that they should be as powerful as China and the United States—a kind of third pole in a multipolar world. This is why the concept of “European sovereignty” gained momentum following the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the imposition of sanctions that could impact European companies. The concept expresses the sense that the EU ought to be able to stand up to great powers like China and the US—indeed, that the EU ought to itself be a great power, as opposed to the “normative power” it once aspired to be.

A Question of Power?

However, this wider concept of sovereignty tends to collapse into the concept of power—to be sovereign is simply to be powerful. It also sets a very high threshold for sovereignty. If that threshold lies above the level of power that big European states like Germany, France and the United Kingdom have on their own, as many “pro-Europeans” argue, it means that only a handful of the world’s 195 states are sovereign. Clearly, the US and China are sovereign, and perhaps India and Russia. But it is not even clear whether Japan—a country of 125 million people with one of the biggest economies and most advanced militaries in the world—is sovereign. Is this really a meaningful definition of sovereignty?

Moreover, if sovereignty is a function of size, and Europe is going to become sovereign in this wider sense and will therefore be able to protect itself from “violations” of sovereignty like the secondary impact of US sanctions, then European sovereignty will  “violate” the sovereignty of other smaller states. The EU has long been able to impose its will on states in its neighborhood—for example, it has reshaped accession countries through conditionality. If one understands sovereignty in the narrower sense, this is again just one power using the size of its market to pursue its interests. But if one understands sovereignty in the wider, strategic sense, it must surely be a “violation” of sovereignty analogous to US sanctions.

Of course, few “pro-Europeans” would accept this. Advocates of the idea “European sovereignty” tend to alternate between the two definitions of sovereignty based on what suits them best. When it comes to the EU’s interactions with its neighborhood, in particular accession countries or countries that are part of the European Neighborhood Policy—in other words: weaker powers—they use the narrower, legal definition of sovereignty. But when it comes to the EU’s relations with great powers like China and the United States—in other words: stronger powers—they use the wider, strategic definition of sovereignty. In short, “pro-Europeans” want to have it both ways.

Who’s the Sovereign?

There is also an even deeper problem with the idea of “European sovereignty.” So far we have been discussing the international political dimension of the concept of sovereignty, that is, questions of power in international politics. But there is also a domestic political dimension of the concept of sovereignty, which concerns the question of who has power within states. This dimension is entirely missing from discussions around “European sovereignty.” “Pro-Europeans” want Europe as a whole to be powerful relative to other powers. But the concept of “European sovereignty” says very little about power within Europe. In other words, who exactly is sovereign in a sovereign Europe?

The concept of “European sovereignty” focuses on state sovereignty—or perhaps quasi-state sovereignty, since the EU is not actually a state—rather than popular sovereignty. The concept is being driven by foreign-policy elites who want Europe to be handlungsfähig, or capable of acting, and therefore want to increase the power of a European executive. However, there is little discussion of the legitimacy of this executive power, little discussion of whether it expresses the will of the people of Europe. In fact, the European people are almost completely missing from the debate about “European sovereignty.” Do they actually want “European sovereignty”?

The Lisbon Treaty is a good example of this. It was a major step forward in empowering a European executive to pursue a more coherent, effective foreign policy—to act strategically. In particular, it created a European foreign minister (the “high representative”) and a diplomatic service that “pro-Europeans” hoped would enable the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty was welcomed by the “pro-European” foreign policy establishment. But it was essentially a repackaged form of the European Constitution that was rejected by Dutch and French voters in 2005 and was thus deeply problematic in democratic terms. It remains far from clear that even these steps toward a more strategic—or “sovereign” —Europe had the support of the people of Europe.

Countervailing Pressures

When one compares the debate in continental Europe about “European sovereignty” with the parallel debate in the United Kingdom in the last four years since the June 2016 referendum, this absence of the domestic dimension of sovereignty is particularly striking. The British debate has been almost entirely about popular sovereignty and what it means. Indeed, part of the reason why many “pro-Europeans” and Remainers, particularly among foreign policy elites, are so frustrated about Brexit and the debate around it is that questions around British power in the world have been so marginal to it. In focusing on questions of popular sovereignty, Britain seems to them to have abandoned its traditional strategic thinking.

What the existence of these two debates—one about (quasi-)state sovereignty and the other about popular sovereignty—illustrates is that there are two countervailing pressures on European countries today. There is a top-down pressure, which is pushing Europeans toward forming a bigger unit—and it is this pressure that motivates those who call for “European sovereignty.” But there is also a bottom-up pressure, which is pushing Europeans toward smaller units. Ultimately, Europeans need to reconcile the two. In other words, the questions around European power that foreign policy analysts debate must be linked much more closely to debates about democracy in the EU.

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© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

After a week of watching in dismay as the Iran nuclear deal seemed to come to a final collapse, the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom made a gesture that was as expected as it was futile.

“We have expressed our deep concern at the actions taken by Iran in violation of its commitments since July 2019. These actions must be reversed,” Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Boris Johnson said in a statement on January 12, urging Iran to return to full compliance with its commitments under the 2015 deal in which Tehran agreed to halt development of a nuclear weapon.

The statement was in response to Tehran’s announcement that it will cease to abide by the terms of the agreement following the US assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani earlier this month.

The deal had already been on thin ice since US President Donald Trump pulled out in 2018. Since then, the EU has been left desperately trying to salvage it by trying to continue rewarding Iran, by providing investment and facilitating trade, for the country’s sticking to the terms despite the US pulling out.

Brussels’ Main Focus: The Nuclear Deal

As the week’s dramatic events unfolded—with Tehran launching missiles against US airbases in Iraq in retaliation and accidentally shooting down a Ukrainian passenger plane as a result—the unravelling of the nuclear deal has been something of an afterthought for the rest of the world. But for Brussels, it has been the main focus. It has left observers scratching their heads as to whether this represents a genuine belief in Europe that the nuclear deal’s preservation is the most pressing issue, or whether this focus is simply the result of preserving the nuclear deal being the only thing everyone can agree on.

After initial criticism for her slow response to the unfolding crisis, Ursula von der Leyen, the new European Commission president, gave a statement last week with the new EU High Representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, calling for restraint amid the escalation. But the statement from the Commission and the European Council seemed to go mostly unnoticed. The situation has once again shown how much the EU is left as a bystander during such military incidents.

That Brussels has stayed so focused on the nuclear deal even as the cycle of violence has spun out of control has struck some as odd. Borrell’s first reaction to the assassination of Soleimani was steadfastly neutral, which likely reflects member state divisions on the US decision to carry out the attack. While the UK and some Eastern European countries have expressed some support for the decision, the reaction in core Europe has been very different. Many were concerned by the lack of justification from Washington for why it carried out the strike, and even more were horrified by President Trump’s subsequent threat to bomb Iranian cultural sites.

NATO “Shares the US Concern”

Meanwhile, on the other side of Brussels, the reaction from NATO has been more clearly supportive of the US. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg held a special meeting to deal with the developments, after which he told reporters “the US provided the rationale behind the action against General Soleimani.” While stressing that “this is a US decision” and not a NATO one, he said NATO shares the US concern about Iran’s activities in the region.

Perhaps this is why Trump said after this meeting that he would like to see more NATO involvement in the Middle East, with the alliance even perhaps expanding into the area and being rebranded “NATOME”. The idea has been met with skepticism by Europe’s core powers, who see it as a shield for US withdrawal from its responsibilities in the region.

Meanwhile, an increased role for the EU in the region, in the short or longer term, has not been mentioned.

As protests escalate in Iran in response to the accidental downing of the passenger plane, the EU will continue to try to find its footing. It is a military conflict between two long-time enemies which does not directly involve European countries. But in a world in which the new commission president just two months ago pledged to make the EU a more relevant geopolitical actor, people will be expecting more from Brussels than it has delivered so far.

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© REUTERS/Vasily Fedosenko

When Belarusians went to the polls on November 17, 2019 to elect a new lower house of the bicameral National Assembly, they didn’t elect one single opposition politician among the 110 MPs—a step back compared to previous elections in 2016, when two opposition politicians, Hanna Konopatskaya and Alena Anisim, won seats. And according to the OSCE electoral observation mission, the elections yet again failed to meet several important international standards, just as they have failed to do over the past two decades.

Then again, the presence or otherwise of opposition MPs in the parliament has little real meaning as the parliament plays an extremely limited, largely symbolic role in Belarus. This dates back to 1996, when President Alexander Lukashenko pushed through, via a flawed referendum, a new constitution which effectively replaced the earlier functioning parliament after the Supreme Soviet of Belarus (as it was then called) had refused to extend his presidential powers.

Since then, the new National Assembly has been composed mostly of Lukashenko’s supporters, and has had very limited powers. The president can easily bypass the parliament, and oversight is also very weak, because the government is only accountable to the president. Also, the president can dissolve the parliament at any time, as Lukashenko did when he announced new elections on August 5, cutting the term of the previous parliament by a year.

No Mass Repression

In short: Nothing much has changed with the elections. Of course, the situation of democratic rights and fundamental freedoms must not be ignored, particularly while addressing the situation in Belarus from the European Union’s perspective. The sole, at least partially positive aspect is that election-related political violence remained minor and sporadic, with occasional arrests, but no mass repressions. One may argue, of course, that the Belarusian system has a unique feature of post-electoral repression, meaning that the real suppression of the opposition takes place only some time after the elections, when international attention has subsided. Nevertheless, if compared to the infamous scenes of 2006 and 2010, when security forces attacked opposition demonstrators with brutal force, there has been an improvement, or at least no backsliding since 2016 when things also remained calm.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Belarusian regime was divided on how to handle the opposition, i.e. whether to allow them to possibly win a few seats in the parliament or not. More liberal representatives of the elites argued that providing the opposition with some mandates would do no harm politically, given that the parliament is toothless, but would be highly welcomed by the West. Contrary to this, conservative elites, including the KGB pushed for not allowing the opposition to gain strength in any way, already having the upcoming presidential elections in mind. They argued that negative reactions from the West would remain limited given the overall geopolitical situation. Apparently, the hardline group won the upper hand.

Tough Choices for the EU

This has placed the EU in an inconvenient position. The careful political rapprochement that has been going on between Brussels and Minsk since 2014 has not been conditioned on democratic development at all. There is no valid Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Belarus, since its ratification was suspended in 1997 in reaction to the rapid anti-democratic backsliding of the regime.

As Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei stated during a talk at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin on October 21, 2019, Minsk has long been looking for cooperation opportunities, that do not require a PCA to be in place, such as closer relations with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and visa facilitation. Under such circumstances, motivated also by the fundamentally changed geopolitical environment following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the EU has set no conditions for further developing relations with Belarus, implicit, of course, within the framework of the absent PCA.

Now, given the latest election result, the EU is facing a tough choice. Cutting back the ongoing, limited cooperation projects would harm the EU’s geopolitical interests, because curtailing Minsk’s slow, careful opening to the West would almost automatically result in Belarus turning even more firmly to China, to seek a counterbalance to Russia’s power.

Besides, from a legal perspective it would be somewhat odd to argue for such a move, since the 2019 parliamentary elections were no more anti-democratic than the previous ones. OSCE election observers reported several, and similarly serious concerns in both 2016 and 2019. Why punish Belarus now, if the EU did not do so after the elections three years ago?

Symbolic Cost of Inaction

The problem is the symbolic costs of inaction. Not reacting could be interpreted by some as an indication that the EU in fact cares very little about democratic rights and fundamental freedoms in Belarus. Creating such an impression should be avoided, because it would affect the credibility of the EU not only among the Belarusian population, but also in other Eastern Partnership countries.

However, it is realpolitik that shapes the actual choice. While not giving up on its values, Brussels can have no interest in pushing Minsk even more into China’s open arms, nor would it want to weaken Belarusian efforts to resist the pressure from Russian President Vladimir Putin who has tried to hug Lukashenko as close as possible in the past. Hence, the clearly disappointed, but otherwise mild post-election statement of the European External Action Service is most probably the toughest step the EU is going to take.

This has all proven those in Belarus right who see geopolitics as the all-deciding factor. Weakening the opposition by depriving them of their parliamentary representation will be important in the upcoming 2020 presidential elections. Lukashenko has already announced his candidacy; however, it is not yet known, what to expect from Russia.

What the Kremlin Wants

Full integration of Russia and Belarus—hinted at from time to time by both sides—is highly unlikely, for two reasons. The Kremlin can well do without the political, economic, financial, social, and military burdens that any real integration would entail, and the Belarusian elites will not agree to giving up the sovereignty of their own country.

Hence, the Kremlin will likely want to keep Lukashenko as president and guarantor of Belarus’ stability, but to weaken him to a considerable extent. If successful, this strategy would allow Moscow to further strengthen its political and economic influence over Minsk, but without putting extra strains on Russia’s already overstretched budget. The upcoming months will tell  how will Russia try to realize these objectives.

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© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

Germany’s Green Party has foreign policy built into its DNA. The main impulse that led to its foundation more than 40 years ago was the protection of the environment: the global challenge par excellence. Many core issues of Green politics are global and are treated as such: the pursuit of civil liberties and an open, multicultural society, the struggle for human rights and democracy, which can only succeed if these values are shared by as many people and countries as possible, and, not least, the quest for a more equal distribution of wealth and opportunities on a global scale.

The big question of course is how these goals can be achieved. Countless times the party has discussed the policy consequences of its founding tenets, most ardently how to interpret the principle of nonviolence in the light of international crises and mass atrocities.

An overarching understanding has emerged over the last 20 years: we have defined the European Union as the model and the basis of our foreign policy.  The EU is the most successful attempt yet to move beyond national boundaries, to leave behind years of bitter and often violent enmities, to help create freedom and prosperity, and to forge an albeit imperfect consensus on the shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. German foreign policy must therefore always be conceived as part of a European foreign policy.

Reforming the UN

We aim to strengthen the rules-based international order under the auspices of the United Nations. With the goal of transforming foreign policy into global domestic policy, we want to reform the workings of the UN. To succeed, the UN and other international organizations must ultimately shed structures that perpetuate power balances dating from the post-World War II era. Yet to achieve this reform we must strengthen the UN—despite its many shortcomings. If we want the power of law instead of the law of the powerful, the UN is the only way to move forward.

For example, the idea of the responsibility to protect is one of the steps on the way to protecting the powerless. It demands that the international community shield those whose own governments cannot or will not defend them from the most egregious forms of violence, first and foremost by political means, but in extreme cases also by military force. Of course, we as Greens have to come to terms with the serious blows this idea has suffered for example in Syria, where the UN Security Council, blocked and unable to act, has once again shirked its responsibility to keep the peace.

Peace and Democracy

Green foreign policy assumes that international peace and the strengthening of democratic values go hand in hand. Today, however, we have to deal with challenges to both peace and democracy. Even in Europe, which we once believed to be a safe haven for democracy and the rule of law, authoritarian movements have been on the rise for the past decade. Paradoxically, these nationalist movements that target the universality of human rights and undermine international rules have quite an outreach. Leaders like Matteo Salvini and Vladimir Putin essentially speak the same language, the one funding the other.

These movements cannot be countered by adopting their language and concerns. A clear commitment to international cooperation, to social and ecological justice, and to the principles of human rights are the only way to win the argument. This includes a clear stance on one of the most contentious issues: migration. In an ever more interconnected world, the idea of closing our borders in order to maintain ethnically homogeneous nation states is clearly absurd. A pragmatic migration policy must take economic, political, and humanitarian aspects into account. It must serve each country’s economic interests, but not exclusively so.

Effective Asylum Systems

Migration policy also has to protect European states from blackmail attempts by authoritarian leaders in Africa and the Middle East who play on the fear of mass migration. They offer to stop migration; in return, Europe is meant to close its eyes to their abusive and authoritarian rule. Their politics, however, are not in our interest. And if we are willing to accept a certain number of migrants from their countries, their threats quickly dissipate. Of course, keeping up the principles of the Geneva Convention is another cornerstone of the values-based approach to foreign policy. The tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea, which we have been witnessing for years now, puts European values to shame. We urgently need a coordinated effort for the rescue and distribution of these migrants and refugees as well as an effective asylum system to decide who can benefit from humanitarian protection.

Diplomacy, civil crisis prevention, as well as economic development are some of the most important tools of such a foreign policy. If Germany and Europe want to take more responsibility on the international stage, we must strengthen our capacities in these fields. This particularly regards the German Foreign Office, which is notoriously understaffed and underfunded.

A Common European Defense

Yet as we have painfully learned, peaceful means are often not enough to keep violent conflict at bay and prevent mass atrocities. In some cases, a military intervention by the international community or parts thereof is necessary as a means of last resort to create space for diplomacy and other civilian efforts.

This means maintaining a capable and efficient military force. Yet arbitrary spending goals, such as NATO’s much-discussed two-percent goal, do not constitute reliable benchmarks. It is far more important to combine forces with our European partners to make our common defense more effective. A similar argument applies to arms exports. Selling weapons to states involved in armed conflicts or human rights abuses on a massive scale may contribute to lowering the price for armaments needed in Europe. However, apart from the obvious moral fallacy of this argument, the political and economic costs of the conflicts fuelled by these weapons in the long term far outweigh any minor gain in the short term.

Reducing Global Inequality

The challenges that our planet is facing are immense. Climate change is the most existential and pressing. But it cannot be addressed in isolation. The changes it requires to many of our habits can only be achieved politically if we can achieve a more equitable distribution of global wealth. This is an integral part of foreign policy. It includes an overhaul of the policies of institutions such as the IMF and a rethinking of international trade relations. Global trade must be organized in a way that reduces rather than exacerbates inequality. European agricultural subsidies, for example, distort agricultural markets in Africa and the Middle East and keep these countries from opening their markets in a way that would benefit both sides.

Climate change is not the only development that has a profound impact on international relations. The new era of digital communication has also changed the traditional role of states in foreign policy. This gives renewed importance to an approach we Greens have favored for a long time: a deepened engagement with civil societies all over the world, both digitally and physically, and a commitment to their freedom of action. The ties resulting from such policies are essential to overcoming many an impasse encountered on other levels.

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© REUTERS/Ayman Al-Sahili

In early April, military commander Khalifa Haftar advanced on Tripoli, ordering a “victorious march” into the city. Three months later, with hundreds dead and almost one hundred thousand people displaced, UN Special Representative Ghassan Salame warned that this is ‘‘just the start of a long and bloody war.”

Indeed, the risk of even greater instability and suffering in Libya is very real, and the EU should be greatly concerned. From Libya, instability could spread, strengthening extremist groups across the Sahel, and leading to a new migration crisis. In short, Europe’s security is at stake, but the Europeans once again are uncoordinated, indecisive, and ambiguous.

The roots of the conflict lie in the fragmentation of Libya’s government and institutions in the years following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In December 2015, the UN brokered an agreement to set up a unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, led by Faiez al-Serraj. However, the GNA never managed to assert its authority. It struggled to provide even basic services, existing side by side with numerous militias and a rival government in the east of the country, which was controlled by Haftar, who had returned from US exile.

On the Phone with Trump

International diplomacy continued to focus on crafting a unity government that would have included both Haftar and Serraj. A “national conference” was planned that was to forge a broad consensus. Negotiators were ready to give Haftar a dominant position as head of Libya’s armed forces on the condition that he place himself under civilian authority. Haftar engaged with these efforts while consolidating his power in the east by co-opting local actors and promising stability. He was backed by the UAE and Egypt, who supported him largely because of his strong opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to a degree also by France and Russia.

On April 4, Haftar finally made it clear that he wasn’t interested in a compromise. He launched his offensive on Tripoli only two weeks before the national conference was supposed to convene—and while UN Secretary General António Guterres was in the city.

The fighting in Libya is unlikely to wind down quickly; there has been little movement on the front lines in recent weeks. External powers are increasing their support for both sides, giving them the means to continue fighting and strengthening their resolve. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan are supporting Haftar’s offensive with a mixture of cash and weapons. Meanwhile, there is evidence that Turkey and Qatar have been providing weapons to the GNA, both opportunistically and because many of its supporters are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The United States has taken an ambiguous stance. In mid-April President Donald Trump spoke to Haftar on the phone and expressed support for his efforts to tackle terrorism. The move appeared to reverse the US’s previous backing for the GNA and was interpreted as a green light for Haftar to go ahead.

Passive Europeans

Meanwhile, Europe has essentially limited itself to issuing statements. Its naval operation Sophia, mandated to counter trafficking and implement the UN arms embargo on Libya, no longer has any ships at its disposal after a spat between Italy and other member states. The EU has condemned the assault by Haftar’s forces, identifying it as the origin of the current bout of fighting, and called on “all parties to immediately implement a ceasefire.”

But it has has refrained from supporting the GNA or even identifying it as Libya’s legitimate government. France’s stance has been particularly ambiguous: in April, it stalled a UK-drafted UN resolution condemning Haftar’s offensive. Paris also blocked an EU statement which would have singled out Haftar’s offensive for criticism.

Europe can ill afford to take a backseat role in Libya. Halfhearted calls for a ceasefire won’t stop the fighting. There are few incentives for either side to lay down their weapons: the GNA fears that a ceasefire could strengthen Haftar by allowing him to maintain recent territorial gains. Meanwhile, the commander himself has gone for broke, destroying the peace process and alienating many who were previously open to accommodating him. Haftar appears to believe that accepting a ceasefire would be a sign of weakness that would harm his reputation.

Repercussions

Meanwhile, the conflict in Libya risks triggering a new migration crisis. Over the past years, the EU has managed to essentially halt migration flows from Libya by providing funding to Libya’s coastguard and assorted militias―despite their involvement in abusing migrants. It is not difficult to imagine migration flows to Europe increasing again if the fighting continues, both because militias will be less able to stop migrants from leaving and because more Libyans will try to flee the violence in their country. The conflict will also increase the very high risk of abuse for migrants currently mired in Libya.

The longer fighting goes on, the more destructive it is likely to be, and the harder it will be to achieve any kind of reconciliation between different factions. If Haftar prevails, many Libyans are likely to continue to oppose him, and he is unlikely to gain full control over the country. Moreover, Haftar is 75, so the problem of succession would soon present itself. Yet any fragmentation of Haftar’s forces would also lead to a power vacuum.
Either scenario spells further instability. The risk that extremists will take advantage will increase: despite its defeat in 2016, the so-called Islamic State is still active in Libya and has carried out attacks on government institutions. The situation in Libya will also further destabilize the Sahel region which would have major repercussions for Europe.

Europe Needs to Act

For years, behind a thin veneer of unity, Europeans have failed to agree a coordinated approach to Libya. France and Italy pursued competing and ultimately unsuccessful approaches to stabilizing the country. Tensions between French President Emmanuel Macron and Italy’s euroskeptic government have made it difficult for Paris and Rome to defuse their differences.

But now, with stakes so high, Europeans have a responsibility to halt the escalation of the conflict and prevent further suffering. At a minimum, they should provide Operation Sophia with sufficient assets to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya. Ideally, they should persuade the US that its interest in a stable Libya is best served by getting Haftar to agree a ceasefire. Together, the EU and the US could enforce the arms embargo, perhaps through a NATO operation. This would prevent further escalation and push Haftar and the GNA towards an armistice. A stable and unified Libya would still be a distant prospect, but with a ceasefire in place, diplomacy could restart, giving Libyans a chance to finally build a consensus about the country’s future governance.

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© REUTERS/Vincent Kessler

Sovereignty is like oxygen―you don’t notice it until it’s gone. But then you really miss it.

For Europe, the United States’ withdrawal in 2018 from the Iran nuclear deal was that type of asphyxiating moment. That decision not only undid the signature European foreign policy achievement of the last decade, but also demonstrated that Europeans were virtually powerless to oppose a determined US president even as he trampled all over European preferences and European interests.

In retrospect, it appears that on a host of issues from defense to technology standards to trade, the EU has never been as sovereign as it thought. Even the EU’s vaunted economic power now appears as the result of a relative lack of geopolitical interference and competition. A time of fiercer geopolitical competition and an America more focused on its own narrow interests has exposed the EU’s lack of independence in new ways.

A re-invigorated European sovereignty could limit the damage and help protect European citizens. It would ensure that European leaders have the power to promote European values, to defend a multilateral system that helps protect European interests, and to allow Europeans to trade and invest with whomever they please. In other words, they would regain the capacity to decide their own fate, which is virtually the defining characteristic of any political community.

Transatlantic Dangers

The cost of their current lack of capacity is manifold. Europeans have different interests than other powers in a wide range of areas. Russia, a country that periodically invades its neighbors, presents some obvious challenges for European security. Less obviously, China is buying up European companies that are strategically important for European security and prosperity as well as acquiring political leverage over European member states through its massive investments. It has already used that leverage to pressure European countries to block critical language on its human rights abuses at the United Nations. And most disturbingly, the policies of the Trump administration mean that Europeans need to acknowledge that their interests and values increasingly diverge from the United States.

Of course, the transatlantic alliance remains a pillar of European security and prosperity—breaking it up is worse than unthinkable; it is unwise. But the Trump administration’s opposition to multilateral institutions, its callous disregard of allied concerns, and its willingness to leverage the US economic and financial system for geopolitical purposes all endanger European interests and values.

Europe seeks to secure its troubled periphery while the Trump administration is stoking tensions in the Middle East. The EU would like to defend rules-based international trade, while the Trump administration is actively undermining the WTO and its dispute resolution mechanism. For these and other reasons, the EU and its members states need the ability to negotiate on an equal footing, even with their closest partner. The transatlantic alliance can only survive if it delivers value for both sides of the Atlantic.

A Costly Void

New analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that European non-sovereignty could soon exact an even greater price, both political and monetary. €191 billion worth of EU trade with Russia every year and around €1 billion of EU trade with China every day would be threatened if a great power decided to impose secondary sanctions on it. Europe’s vulnerability in the cyber space could also prove expensive. Often state-directed incidents such as the WannaCry virus or the attack on the UK National Health Service could cost Europe hundreds of billions of euros.

The emerging industry of artificial intelligence has the potential to contribute more than €13 trillion to the global economy in 2030, according to a PWC study. But it remains unclear whether Europe will tap into this potential if it cannot protect its technologies and its economy from great power predations. Other countries such as the US, Russia, or China could also block the EU from using its own resources to stabilize an African country through the United Nations, send an OSCE monitoring mission to Eastern Europe or bail out a third country through the IMF. And, finally, imagine the security costs of non-sovereignty if Russia decided to treat Poland or Latvia in the way they have treated Ukraine.

The EU needs to look more holistically at the current threats to Europe’s capacity to act and embrace a new concept of strategic sovereignty. Strategic sovereignty would seek to marshal all of Europe’s policy tools and create an independent capacity for prospering in the geopolitical competition Europe has reluctantly entered.

Three Areas of Sovereignty

A few concrete examples help demonstrate the concept:

In the economic realm, Europe needs the ability to fight back against secondary sanctions through a stronger, more widely supported INSTEX, a Financial Sanctions Enforcement agency, and a beefed-up blocking regulation. The EU also needs to introduce geopolitical considerations into its competition policy instruments, establish Union-wide foreign investment screening, and expand regulation of state aid beyond just EU companies. For the longer term it needs to bolster the euro’s international role by fostering deep and integrated capital and banking markets, creating a eurozone safe asset, and extending swap lines to partner central banks.

On defense and security, Europe needs to increase its readiness and force posture in eastern Europe to underscore its commitment to the region’s security. It would complement NATO efforts, but also build Europe’s own capacities, in part by introducing a European level of ambition in NATO. The EU could also take over missions in Kosovo and Africa to improve burden-sharing within the alliance. Europe also needs an effective cyber-security institution with centralized functions.

In the political-diplomatic field, Europe should more effectively coordinate its sometimes disparate voices within multilateral institutions, including the UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and the IMF. But it also needs to hedge against blockage of international institutions. First of all, Europeans should agree emergency rules with other multilateralists on how to manage arbitration if the Appellate Body of the WTO is blocked. But they should also prepare their own institutions such as the European Investment Bank and the European Stability Mechanism to engage outside the EU and beyond their current mandates if necessary.

The overall goal is to promote a Europe that can prosper and maintain its independence in a world of geopolitical competition. This requires recognizing that even as Europeans continue to support a rules-based multilateral order and the transatlantic alliance, they also need to respond to the interlinked security and economic challenges that other powerful states present. The values and interests of Europe’s citizens depend upon it.

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© REUTERS/John MacDougall/Pool

Germany, along with France, was the driving force behind the initiatives that have given new momentum to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) since the summer of 2016. With the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), Berlin and Paris have succeeded in bringing new life to a policy area that had been deadlocked for decades and written off by many observers. As a result, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was recently able to, with some justification, underline the progress the EU has made towards a “European Defence Union” and the speed it is demonstrating. Without Germany’s involvement, she noted in the German newspaper Handelsblatt, the way would not be paved for a comprehensive change in the understanding of the EU’s, particularly the Commission’s, role in military security.

Nevertheless, Germany consistently faces criticism for not playing a role commensurate with its political clout and the size of its economy, whether it’s because the government still spends too little on defense—and the current US president is not the first one to lament this—or because it doesn’t do enough to make Europe capable of quick and effective military action, a common complaint in Paris. Not ambitious enough, too hesitant, too inflexible, too dogmatic—Berlin hears it over and over again. How can this German approach be explained? How does the German government think European security and defense should be organized? What does Berlin want to achieve with which instruments and how does it define success? Putting on our “German glasses” to look at the CSDP initiatives, the French-created European Intervention Initiative (EI2), and the consequences of Brexit allows us to take stock.

Holding the EU Together

The CSDP has many functions for Germany. For one, the European framework gives domestic legitimacy to Germany’s defense-policy engagement. For large parts of the population, the idea of Germany going it alone is still unthinkable. More than a few Germans are also wary of NATO. They don’t want increased cooperation with the US, especially since Donald Trump took office; instead they advocate close connections with European partners, above all France. Embedding German defense policy in the EU takes the edge off it. In Germany, the EU Army (or the European Army or Army of Europeans, depending on how the politicians calling for it feel on the day) has for years been a popular rhetorical tool for affirming the commitment to defense in an EU framework—in part because its realization is always just beyond the horizon.

Moreover, by further developing the CSDP, the German government is pursuing the goal of tying another band around the EU to hold it together. After the Brexit vote of June 2016, attention turned to finding a joint future project with France, and both governments saw security and defense policy as having the most potential. The strengthening of the CSDP serves, then, as an additional measure to promote the cohesion of EU member states, which can no longer be taken for granted these days.

But it would be wrong to accuse Berlin of having no ambitions for the CSDP beyond favorable rhetoric and EU integration. Germany wants to substantially and sustainably build up the CSDP with “confidence-building intermediate steps” and not “in a hurry,” as von der Leyen puts it. For example, for Berlin it is not about the ability to send large numbers of soldiers to Africa for military intervention as quickly as possible. Rather, Berlin wants to work to improve Europe’s ability to act in the long term, in the hope that the bloc’s decision-making capabilities will improve along with it in the coming years.

Strategy with a Downside

These considerations absolutely make sense. Trust in the EU as a defense actor still has to grow in many member states. Germany does see itself, along with France, as a driver of the CSDP, but it also tries not to leave any country behind—in Berlin one speaks of an “inclusive” CSDP. One reason PESCO is currently being described as a success is that nearly every EU country is taking part in the format, including countries like Poland that initially took a skeptical view. The downside of the strategy, however, is that Germany must face accusations that it is setting up CSDP institutions in order to register their mere existence as a success, rather than using the CSDP to take concrete action against the threats on Europe’s borders.

One thing is often neglected in the public debate in and about Germany: for most German decision-makers, including in the defense ministry and the Bundeswehr, NATO under US leadership remains the key pillar of German defense. This is true (for now) despite the Trump factor in Washington and the “beer tent” speech in which Chancellor Merkel obliquely questioned the US’s reliability. Germany’s leadership of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and its participation in the Baltic air-policing mission and the NATO Battlegroup in Lithuania are often overlooked in the domestic and international debate. The decision-makers do not consider the CSDP an alternative to NATO but rather a means to expand the European footprint in the alliance with the Americans in the long term.

The French Initiative

For Germany, multilateral institutions are the linchpin of the international order. On the other hand, there is little understanding for “more flexible” or “more pragmatic” formats. Attacks on multilateral institutions—which come from all sides, a particularly clear instance being US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech in Brussels on December 4—are from Berlin’s perspective not to be answered by strengthening ad-hoc coalitions in supranational structures. This explains why Berlin has so far only reluctantly gone along with the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which aims at enabling closer cooperation between the armed forces of European states that are willing and able to carry out military missions. In Berlin’s view, however, the goals of the French initiative remain unclear. Germany fears EI2 may even undermine the CSDP because it has been set up outside of EU structures.

That is why Berlin has clearly spoken in favor of moving the EI2 into the EU framework, and sooner rather than later. In the German understanding of the European security architecture, there is no place for efforts involving only a few select countries. Concerns about fragmentation and the weakening of multilateral organizations in which Germany has invested so much capital, political as well as real, are too great. This is even true for the special relationship with France: While Berlin subscribes to the idea of a Franco-German “motor” in the CSDP, the bilateral Aachen Treaty does not go appreciably beyond the existing multilateral commitments.

However, in their efforts to hold the EU together, many in Berlin overlook the fact that the EI2 can make a strong contribution to Europe’s ability to act—and that it does not necessarily conflict with the CSDP. Admittedly, it was difficult to grasp the ambition and scope of the initiative in the first weeks and months after President Macron announced it. But in its current form, the EI2 is bound by sensible and clear limits: it is not the silver bullet of European defense, but it is well-placed to fill gaps, for example in terms of Europe’s common analysis of threats. What’s more, it includes the United Kingdom.

Brexit and Its Consequences

Berlin’s understanding of the CSDP has an effect on the German approach to security and defense cooperation with Britain after Brexit, both in a European and a bilateral context. The German government understands the CSDP to be inwardly inclusive but outwardly exclusive. As with the entire Brexit process, the feeling is that, with regard to the CSDP, there must be a significant difference between EU member states and third countries. It is a matter of not making mere cooperation with the EU appear as attractive as EU membership. Even though Germany is seeking to create a close and constructive relationship with Britain after Brexit, from Berlin’s point of view the goal cannot be to duplicate the level of cooperation that takes place in the EU framework.

In the Brexit negotiations, the unity of the remaining 27 member states has always been the top priority for Berlin. Therefore the government has avoided undermining the divorce process with bilateral agreements and creating the impression of a “special relationship” between Germany and the UK. Even the “Joint Vision Statement” on closer cooperation on security and defense policy was only released after some hesitation, while a corresponding and nearly-complete declaration on foreign policy is still parked in a desk drawer. In order to limit the space for security cooperation outside of the EU and NATO (and the UN), neither statement has objectives as ambitious as those in the Lancaster House treaties between France and Britain.

On top of that, many in Berlin argue that real progress in the CSDP has only been possible since Britain voted to leave. They see Brexit as more of a liberation than a loss. To prove their point, they point to the obstructionist British stance that for years prevented the CSDP from reaching the agreements it has since the Brexit vote, for example on a European headquarters for EU missions. From this perspective, keeping Britain too close risks allowing a Trojan horse into the EU. The argument that cutting the cord to the greatest military power in Europe could lead to problems in the quest for autonomy is not catching on. Nor does Berlin really fear the frictions that could arise when it comes to cooperation with Britain in the NATO framework.

From a German point of view, Britain should take part in the CSDP within the framework of third-country cooperation, as is already common practice. It’s important for Berlin that political control and decision-making authority remain EU competencies if Britain takes part in PESCO projects on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the European Defense Fund, the approach is that no EU money should flow to third countries and that Britain should participate financially in the fund. There is a long-term interest in keeping in check the Commission’s decision-making authority over European arms policy should the Brussels executive act against German interests.

However, the German position is not yet set in stone on every point, and there are certainly different positions in the relevant ministries. Thus the way Brexit plays out will influence Germany’s position. It is already clear that, in the course of the Brexit process, much of the trust in the British negotiating partner has faded away.

Form Follows Function

The creation of a “European Defense Union” serves in Germany’s eyes to create a connective framework in which as many EU member states as possible can come together and cooperate. Only in the long term is it an instrument for strengthening Europe’s ability to defend itself, which Berlin continues to see as something guaranteed by NATO. The German government has been clear that it doesn’t want any parallel structures or incentives–neither bilaterally nor as “coalitions of the willing”—that could undermine EU institutions.

But since, at the moment, there is no shared understanding among all the EU member states about which EU foreign policy interests are the most important and must be defended, member states will inevitably and increasingly set up ad hoc formats in which smaller groups of EU and NATO countries can act directly. There is of course the danger that the supranational and binding power of CSDP will be subverted. But the risk of creating EU formats incapable of action is even greater.

After all, every format in which Europeans work together on defense policy strengthens Europe’s ability to act, whether through improved interoperability or the harmonization of threat analyses. Berlin should not only support the EI2 but also push harder to expand cooperation between the EU and NATO. The European security situation demands all hands on deck.

If the EU, as a complement to NATO, is indeed to become an organization that “produces” European security, it also needs to offer attractive “docking mechanisms” to those countries that are central to European security, even if they are no longer EU member states. If attractive participation mechanisms for strategic partners—like the British, the Norwegians, in some cases even the Turks—are not created soon, the CSDP won’t be able to live up to its promises. An “inclusive” CSDP is only effective with the inclusion of Britain.

So Germany should get more involved in EU negotiations about third-country participation in the CSDP. With regard to industrial cooperation in the field of defense, Berlin is less dogmatic than, say, Paris. The Brexit negotiations haven’t yet reached the stage of “future relations.” But on the EDF, for example, the EU is already agreeing on directives that stipulate the “strict conditions” under which third countries can take part in EU-promoted defense capabilities projects. In the next few years, member states will have to weigh security and defense interests, economic interests, and the union’s security of supply in a crisis. On this issue, Berlin should join the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries to speak out for the unproblematic participation of like-minded third countries in EU defense capabilities projects.

With regard to British participation in CSDP decision-making and the operational participation of British associations, it is understandable that Berlin has doubts about the sincerity of Britain’s newfound enthusiasm for the CSDP. Berlin should, though, give Britain the opportunity to prove that its offer to become an “ambitious” CSDP partner is a serious one.

At the heart of Berlin’s efforts is the goal of making the EU into an international organization capable of action on defense. This ambition for the distant future does not, however, meet the challenges of the current threat situation. The pressure on Europe is acute. The CSDP has to be able to deliver on its promises if it is to to be effective against the dangers Europe is confronted with—especially in areas where NATO is unwilling or incapable of action.

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© China Daily via REUTERS

You are predicting that Europe will look to Asia in the future. Why? For the last 500 years, Europe has seen itself as the center of the world. Even when the transatlantic community was constructed, it was still seen as a part of European political tradition, of European values, which had been embraced across the Atlantic. My thesis is that we are reaching a point where the idea of European exceptionalism—that we have mastered modernity, modern society, and modern technology, and the rest of the world has not—has come to an end. I think China is the proof. We are now entering a world that is essentially bipolar. There is the West, or the European political tradition, and then we have an Asia that is at least equally powerful. That means that we have two poles: one European-American, and one Asian. The balance, the combination between the two, is what defines our age—no longer the relationship between Europe and America. My thesis is not that the transatlantic community will disappear, but that our world today is not Western anymore, the world is Eurasian.

Isn’t this observation based too much on geographical determinism? It’s based on different facts. The most obvious are infrastructure and global capitalism, which have been creating connections between Europe, the West, and Asia that never existed before. During the imperial age these did not exist because the two sides were in an entirely unbalanced relationship of colonialism and imperialism: Some places in Asia became European, some others became back corners ignored by everyone, and Asia disappeared from history for a few hundred years.
In the 20th century these connections did not exist either. We had the iron curtain and the bamboo curtain, and it was literally impossible to think of Eurasia as a unified space. Now we are in a time that is perhaps bringing the world back to Ghengis Khan—though it’s more likely a completely new world, with new variables.

Beijing refers a lot to the medieval Silk Road, especially with its new Belt and Road Initiative… …which in the way it is thought about today never existed. It is a romantic invention of the 19th century. No one travelled the entire distance from Europe to the Pacific with the notable exception of Marco Polo and a few others. There was very little trade, and what there was had to pass through lots and lots of links in a long chain. So we should have no illusions. When people started to dream about an integrated Eurasia, they invented the Silk Road. When we are building a new world, we always project that new world’s beginning into the past to find some foundations there. Yet often they are imagined rather than real.

What defines that new world? The intensity of trade, the importance of the Chinese economy, and the infrastructure that has been built. Against that backdrop, the competition from China has become more and more important—that’s point number one. Number two—the Russia question. Russia is abandoning Europe. Perhaps for the first time in its history, it seems to me, it is completely abandoning Europe …

… some in Europe may doubt this, especially in Ukraine. The Ukraine intervention was perhaps the last breath of a Russia that wanted to stay in Europe. However, compare the Ukraine intervention, which was a disaster, with what one has to recognize as the success of the Syrian intervention. My impression from different conversations is that this will reinforce Russian authorities’ idea that Russia should turn east: to the Middle East to consolidate its control of energy, to China, and to Southeast Asia and Japan.
Also, and perhaps even more importantly: We now have to deal with a world of deep integration but no convergence. It is a very dangerous world. And it has taken us all by surprise because we always thought that as the world became more integrated, as countries in the rest of the world caught up with the West, they would converge with us. And surprise—what has happened is that they have caught up with the West in terms of technology and economic development, but they have not converged. So now, in the 21st century, we have deep integration with different models—China continues to look successful to lots of countries in the world. .

Isn’t China still infused with Western thinking, though, given that the Communist Party is in power? Or is it in fact a different kind of mindset, a different kind of culture, a different kind of conception of the world? It’s a very different kind of conception of the world, but it’s a modern conception based on technology, on social change, on trying to constantly transform the future. But it is a different kind of modernity from ours. The most obvious difference is a certain definition of the collective, which is present everywhere. It is present even in the new technology they are developing. If you compare Facebook with WeChat, one obvious difference is that WeChat is more collective; at some point, you don’t even distinguish who is saying what, whereas Facebook has profiles with pictures and Western individuals. With WeChat there is a stream of thought, no one knows where it is coming from. So, I think that we going to see different kinds of technology inspired by a different culture, by a different tradition. It is going to be different.
And politically, China is still a mystery to lots of us. I don’t think it is a place where people enjoy a lot of individual freedom, let’s not be naive about that. But on the other hand, I think we make a mistake if we simply project our Western images of authoritarianism or dictatorship on China. It is a different reality, and it takes a lot of time for us to understand it. We are just beginning.

In the West, we used to think that a society like China’s isn’t really inventive. Do you think that the Chinese have cracked that nut by being an unfree society but also a creative one? It’s a society where there are areas you cannot enter, things you cannot talk about. But in the areas you can talk about, there is a very intense exchange of ideas. The inventive attitude is channeled in a particular direction by society and the state. But in those channels, competition and debate are encouraged. So it’s very different from the West, but it’s also not our model of an authoritarian society.
They have a certain taste for breaking the rules, especially when it comes to the economic sphere. We in the West have become addicted to rules and a certain idea of perfection. So if you build something, it has to be in accordance with 200 rules, and we take everything to an extreme. The Chinese move faster and they take those chances. We just have to be aware of that and try to learn what they want.

Where does this mean for Europe? It leaves Europe in a very delicate position. I think we’re going to feel more and more pressure coming from China and from Russia, and our alliance with the United States is not what it used to be. Of course, Europe still has enormous resources of wealth, of creativity, of knowledge. But Europe has to become more involved with the rest of the world, and with Asia in particular. Europe has to exercise its power more. It will have to define what it wants from China and from Russia, and what it doesn’t want. It has to pick its battles. And in the end, Europe has to spend a lot more time thinking about what is happening into the East than it does now. I’m very skeptical about spending the next ten years focusing on building the United States of Europe, because I think the next ten years we should focus at least in part on what is happening to the East.

Wouldn’t Europe be in a better position if it were more united and deeper integrated? I think we already have the resources we need, they are just not being used. We need to have more European foreign policy, but we already have the institutional structures for that. It’s more a problem of awareness and being able to exercise our power. And I think if we are too focused on ourselves, it will be distracting.

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel recently said that the only great power at the moment that has a grand geopolitical strategy is China, whereas the US seems to have lost theirs, and we Europeans never really developed one of our own. That was a fascinating observation. I think China had a very bad year in terms of its foreign policy; it made lots and lots of mistakes. I wonder if it wasn’t even worse than the year the United States had.
As far as China is concerned, we have created this image of everything that is mysterious. That means that we give too much credence to things we don’t understand. But I was also struck by the fact that Gabriel did not say anything about what the strategy should be. It was incredibly empty in this respect. So again, we have the beginning of an intuition that something important is happening and our relationship with China will be a very troubled one and a very intense one. But still there are no clear ideas about what to do.

Your answer is to engage, to exert a lot of effort toward the East, and to reorient our thinking and our attention? Yes. Turn toward those questions more and more, in a spirit that’s half cooperation and half competition. I think that’s also part of the new Eurasian world. It is always a hybrid between cooperation and connectivity on the one hand and conflict and competition on the other. Even the things that bring us together—the internet, information flows, migration—even those things can be weaponized. I think that’s the world we live in now. Half competition, half cooperation.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

Europe is entering 2017 with an acute sense of helplessness. Internal crises and external pressure have driven deep wedges between the European Union’s 28 (or probably soon 27) member states. The rise of populism has stoked new fears, especially with key elections in three major EU countries this year. The era of post-truth politics and the influence of fake news have cast a long shadow, especially over those battling to forge responsible, lasting policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Russia has destabilized the European Union by flexing its muscles at home and abroad. Further crises in Europe and beyond have triggered debates over security and migration, and they are tearing at Europe’s fabric.

Uncertainty and unpredictability have paved the way for new actors who peddle simple solutions: nationalism, a weaker Europe, isolationism. They are threatening to topple the entire Western liberal order – the very foundation of European integration. And their dissent is drowning out the voices of those who dare to defend liberal societies, Western values, and the joint development of European, Western, and global structures. With Donald Trump in the White House, Europe might well lose its most important ally in the democratic liberal order.

Time to Act

Even if President Trump does not carry through all of his campaign promises, Europe will soon have to get used to an America that builds its foreign policy exclusively in its own interest, with little consideration for mutual concerns. The European Union can wait and watch, and run damage control. Or it can take the reins and lead Europe back to a position of strength. Only then might Europe be considered  a valuable counterpart to Washington. But before the EU can begin to forge a cohesive foreign policy, it must first and foremost mend the widening rifts within its own borders.

Without compromising on liberal principles, European policymakers must address the fears and frustration of those citizens who are drawn to populism and extremism. They have little trust in the current system or its elites, and it is crucial that Europe reaches a hand out to them – not least because populists here watched how Trump successfully redefined the boundaries of public discourse by polarizing groups and blurring the truth.

There does not seem to be much that EU countries share in common these days, but they have all witnessed a growing uncertainty, a sense of losing control. Identity has become a bitterly divisive issue in some member states, particularly as migration has taken center stage in the past few years. Other countries are battling deep-seated socioeconomic woes. The two are often intertwined: It is precisely those who struggle to make ends meet that are more likely to feel threatened by foreigners and prefer more borders, not fewer.

Inequality on the Rise

In these uncertain times, the European Union is more often seen as part of the problem than the solution. Brussels is perceived as the shepherd of liberalism, an abstract power that unlatches borders and renders national governments unable to protect their own citizens or economies. The European internal market has been the motor of Germany and the EU’s overall economic success, but it also created systemic inequalities. Germany has exhibited steady and robust growth, but in weaker states, GDP has yet to reach pre-crisis levels. Unemployment has surged in a number of member states, particularly among youth. Millions of young Europeans have no prospect of finding a fair and respectable job. Tax competition within the EU has seen capital and entire labor forces shift from one member state to another. All of these factors only serve to reinforce the sense that Europe is far more a burden to than an advantage for many social groups.

It is no wonder then that a growing number of people are starting to question the social and economic policies of the last few decades. That makes Europe, like the US, prone to protectionism and isolationism; both offer false hope to those who feel left behind. And free trade has become a central target in the debate over Europe’s future. Mass protests hamstrung negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). It is the first time in the postwar era that the exchange of goods and services sparked such hostility.

But the EU failed to look after the growing number of people on the wrong side of Europe’s liberal market policies, and it is now paying the price. There is no longer a consensus that free trade and investment pacts are in the EU’s interest, and the European Commission (Europe’s chief negotiator) is not on equal footing with partners like the US. If this trend continues, Europe will be greatly weakened in its ability to have a say on regulation and global standards on issues from the environment to consumer protection to financial stability.

Some of these problems can be resolved on a national level, but others cannot. If Europe is truly to become more competitive, more balanced, and more resistant to crises, we need a long-term strategy for dealing with debt and deeper reforms on eurozone governance. On social policies, we will need greater participation from some member states to combat rising political and social instability. The complete and utter lack of effective stabilization instruments is yet another argument in favor of overhauling the EU budget. Brexit negotiations provide the perfect opportunity to do so, as the EU will have to recalibrate the budget without Britain’s contribution.

It is not just economy and trade, though: the visa-free Schengen zone and Europe’s liberal asylum policies are also the subject of much debate. Now more than ever, the EU must demonstrate its ability to guarantee strong internal security and effectively fight terrorism, even with open borders. That will mean more systematic cooperation and intelligence sharing. And Brussels will have to demonstrate that it can regain control of immigration, by forging agreements with countries of origin and transit, for example, or by instituting external border controls. The objective formulated at the EU summit in Bratislava of exercising control over external borders is just as important as developing a long-term common immigration policy.

It is neither politically nor legally easy to remedy the weaknesses of an incomplete European system, particularly when it seems near impossible to revisit existing treaties. But that is no excuse not to act.

The EU’s Stress Test  

Issues of economic development and migration have the potential to divide the European Union further. It will be all the harder for Brussels to stem the trend if the US is no longer the force of cohesion in the West that it has been over the last few decades. From Brexit to Russia, the Obama administration worked closely with its European partners (especially Germany) to present a united front over the last eight years, even if Obama’s “pivot to Asia” gave the impression that America was starting to look further afield for new partners.

With a new administration that is at best indifferent to Europe, the task of keeping the European Union together will be left to us and us alone. Washington’s ability to polarize Europe through its foreign policy aims should not be underestimated, either. If the White House chooses to mend ties with Moscow, for example, the consequences for European and German policy on Eastern Europe will be significant. And if Washington decides to drop sanctions, it would completely undermine Brussels’ entire strategy for dealing with Vladimir Putin and Eastern Europe. That would threaten to open up deep chasms within the EU: Some member states would align with Washington while others would not.

The relationship between the US and the UK could prove to be another stress test for the European Union. If Washington and London revive their “special friendship” with a bilateral trade deal or closer defense cooperation, the impact on the EU’s ability to negotiate Brexit would be critical. And it would stoke fears in Brussels that other member states might believe there are far more interesting alternatives to the current union.

It is all the more important that Europe develop its own strategy on how to deal with a changing of the global guard. The transatlantic partnership has been the bedrock of German and European foreign policy since the end of the World War II. Even when there were bitter disagreements over the Iraq war, for example, there was always cooperation in times of crisis. Europe, especially Germany, could always rely on the US’ guarantee of security without contributing much of their own.

Dealing a New Hand

Donald Trump has completely reshuffled the deck, and it is completely unclear how he plans to deal the cards. During the campaign, he vowed to make changes that would threaten to upend global security and global order.

There are two possible scenarios for Europe: in the best case, the Trump administration will continue the current course but pull back from its commitments to the EU and NATO. That means some member countries will have to take on more responsibility, a trend already set in motion after the Wales summit in 2015, where NATO states committed to spending at least two percent of GDP on defense.

The second scenario is far more problematic: The new US government might directly challenge the pillars of international order if it sees a chance for a better deal. That approach could take aim at everything from the World Trade Organization to the United Nations. Trump’s White House might destabilize the nuclear deal with Iran or the Paris Agreement on climate change. If Washington decides to sanction the torture of suspected terrorists, it would demonstrate blatant disregard for international law and seriously undermine its credibility.

If Europe is to gain insight into Trump’s positions and strategies, it must establish as close a connection with his administration as possible in the first few months of his presidency. From the EU’s perspective, Brussels will have to actively work to exert influence on key stakeholders in Washington early on, in order to prevent the global order from breaking down further along the road.

Europe must demonstrate a strong commitment to security and defense policy. Its NATO members have to make clear that they intend to honor their defense obligations, not only by spending more but also by improving cooperation and integration among EU countries. That would serve to remind Washington just how important its alliance with Europe truly is. Above all, Brussels must demand clarity on whether the security guarantees that have existed until now will continue to exist – not least because Russia sees the current political upheaval as a testing ground. At the same time, the EU and Berlin in particular would be wise to remember that military means are only one instrument; stabilization and development policies are also central pillars of foreign policy.

As for the importance of international order and regulation, the Europeans would do well to warn the US against undermining existing structures. If not, regional competition could gain the upper hand. If more organizations like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) begin to crop up, Western-oriented institutions, like the World Bank, begin to lose their effectiveness – and their ability to ensure good governance. The US, too, would stand to lose influence.
Defending Open Societies

As the US considers retreating from its role as a global policeman and regulator, other world powers are already filling the vacuum. As soon as Trump vowed to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China positioned itself as the engine for trade in the Asia-Pacific region. The concept of spheres of influence, which both China and Russia strongly defend, is on the rise. Europe can only be effective if it creates a common policy for both countries, but efforts to do so have been disrupted by Moscow and Beijing seeking bilateral deals and cooperation with individual member states.

It is up to Europe to stand up for its values and ideals of freedom, and it should continue to uphold them as the basis for transatlantic cooperation. Defending liberal democracy both at home and abroad has become Europe’s most important commitment. In order to maintain its credibility abroad, Europe first of all needs to overcome its own internal struggles. This will require more decisive European policies on issues like economic and social policy for euro area members, and, for other countries, the possibility of looser integration than our current standard. The challenge for the EU will be to master differentiation without allowing it to turn into accelerated disintegration.

Externally, on foreign, security, and defense policy, Europe has to take more responsibility in this increasingly volatile world where Western global structures are being targeted. Germany and France should work closely with Poland and other partners. This should include engaging the UK on this issue parallel to Brexit negotiations.

The current state of the EU is proof that incomplete integration is dangerous. In the beginning, the European Union enjoyed an unprecedented period of expansion and cooperation, but Brussels didn’t keep up the pace on political integration. The temptation to withdraw now is great. If the EU allows that to happen, it will come at a great price.

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© REUTERS/Brendan Smialowski/Pool

A truly joint European foreign policy – in contrast to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) presently pursued by Brussels – offers the chance to strengthen not only the framework in which individual states operate, but also to multiply their weight, allowing each member state to punch far above its weight in the international arena. The tasks such a foreign policy would be charged with are no less clear: first, stabilizing Europe’s neighborhood; second, strengthening the partnership with the United States; and third, helping to shape the future of globalization.

Stabilization of the Neighborhood

The post-Soviet space has not developed a stable, prosperous order. Russiaʼs view of other post-Soviet countries as its sphere of control is as challenging as the weakness of state structures in the region. Where there is no widely legitimized government delivering public goods, where Mafia-like clans dominate the heights of economic and political power, states will remain fragile and borders unsafe. And as long as Russia systematically inhibits the construction of more solid state structures, the economies will remain weak, the societies will remain fragmented, and policy will generally be structured autocratically.

Here Europe has a double task. First, it must limit Russian aggression, meaning discouraging Moscow from implementing its designs through violence. That will make room for the second task: stabilizing state institutions and strengthening their orientation toward liberal democracy.

If Europe ignores these tasks, instability will grow – and that means more conflicts, more war, more refugees and displacements, and more crime. Europe cannot permanently screen itself off from the East; it must invest in the construction and expansion of order. A prosperous eastern neighborhood offers more than just new markets – the region can also serve as a connection between Europe, Russia, and China.

The ongoing crisis in Syria proves that Europe cannot shield itself from instability in its neighborhood, and that any attempt to do so will carry enormous costs. Just as in the eastern neighborhood, in Europe’s south the construction and expansion of more solid, legitimate, and competent state structures is the core task.

In the Middle East, at least two crises are currently overlapping. The old social contract entailed the acceptance of autocratic elites as long as these elites safeguarded order and a certain prosperity. However, as the population has grown and the income from oil and gas dropped, more and more young, well-qualified people feel cheated. The potential for revolution is ever-present, as the so-called Arab Spring demonstrated.

In addition, there is the battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia over dominance of the region. Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Tehran’s expansive regional politics and is working to expand its activity to limit Iranian influence in the neighborhood, while the US is barely present to maintain order – as it has shown in its hesitant, half-hearted engagement in Syria.

Terror and massive refugee flows coming from Europe’s southern neighborhood have the potential to destabilize the continent itself. In the next few years, Europe will have to finally develop a serious policy for the South. That will necessitate the development of economic options through cooperation, the promotion of zones of stability, the struggle against instability, and cooperation with both regional and global powers to push back against civil war and violence.

The US as Key Partner

The US will, for the foreseeable future, remain the most important global power. With Washington, Europe has a partner that is not only the most powerful country in the world, but one with which it shares significant values and principles – which a comparison with Russia and China makes ever more apparent. Together with their partners, in particular in Asia, Europe and the US keep having sufficient critical mass to decisively shape world politics.

America remains essential for the defense of Europe in the framework of NATO. However, this engagement requires constant care. It is already difficult for American politicians to explain to their constituents why the US must help carry the burden of Europe’s security; Europeans can by no means assume that America will be prepared to do so indefinitely. In order to continue the military partnership, Europe must do more. The stronger the European pillar within NATO, the more ready the US will be to invest further in NATO. At the same time, growing European defensive capabilities mean that Europe can, if necessary, take up its own defense should Washington take an isolationist course.

For a European foreign policy, the connection with the US will remain essential, too. The combined weight of the two powers in normative, economic, military, and political respects remains unmatched, especially when the two are strengthened by sustained cooperation with heavyweights like Japan, Indonesia, India, or Brazil.

Even in its own neighborhood, Europe will not be able to establish order without – or against the wishes of – the US for the foreseeable future. European relationships with Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt must to be tightly coordinated with Washington for the next few years, because in these relationships the US carries such significant weight.

At the same time, it is no longer sufficient to wait for Washington to make the first move. America is no longer prepared to be the strategic leader in and on behalf of Europe. Even if it is not yet clear to what degree the US is permanently reducing its international engagement, it can be assumed that its national interests will be significantly more narrowly defined in the future.

Europe will need to take on leadership itself, developing its own strategies and then working to gain Washington’s support.

Shaping Globalization

The streams of information, people, and goods crossing borders keep increasing, a process that on balance furthers security, freedom, and prosperity of its participants. Globalization is, however, not a natural process – it requires several prerequisites that must be established and secured.

First off, globalization relies on physical infrastructure: transportation routes for planes, ships, cars, and trains, along with internet cable. This physical infrastructure must be built, expanded, and protected. Second, globalization relies on the rule of law: complex contracts and norms that cross borders and allow the mobility of people, goods, services, and information.

Third, globalization relies on a broader political order favorable to openess which supports connectivity and network-building and prevents interruptions. This framework was developed and guaranteed predominantly by the US over decades, and includes both the influence of sovereign states and the structures of global institutions like the UN and WTO.

At the same time globalization is not politically neutral. It is driven by certain liberal principles such as individual freedom in the economy, in society, and in politics; a willingness to limit the role of the state mainly to the task of a guardian of freedom; and the optimistic assumption that crossborder interaction strengthens these liberal principles.

Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has become more widespread and intense. At the same time, however, there is a growing tendency on the part of autocratically governed states to push back against the political ramifications of globalization while profiting from the economic aspects. For those in power in Russia and China, political globalization, with its principles of freedom, is a threat; at the same time they rely on the economic benefits of globalization to keep their regimes in power.

Both use their weight in global organizations to weaken political globalization, while setting up regional orders in their neighborhoods following autocratic principles. In Moscow and Beijing’s view, weaker neighbors have no rights and are at the mercy of their stronger neighbors. For both, imperialistic foreign policy is an important pillar of their respective regimes; both see the US as a rival because it stands in the way of their imperial designs.
Europe, on the other hand, has an interest in strengthening the liberal international order. Political and economic globalization are both expressions of this order; both are two sides of the same coin.

In the past, globalization has been predominantly designed and secured by the US. America’s relative weight, however, has declined, and so has its readiness to invest resources in the global order. Without the preparedness of states to invest in globalization, it cannot be maintained. When even the major liberal democracies only consume global governance without producing it themselves, the fragile structure supporting globalization is in danger of collapse.

It is within both Europe’s interests and abilities to play a stronger role than in the past as a second plank of the liberal world order, in partnership with the US and other liberal democracies, in particular in Asia. The future of globalization depends on Europe and America’s preparedness to play this role.

Launchpad Brussels

In order to be an effective partner to the US in this endeavor, European states need to work together closely. In theory this means that Brussels must play a leading role. With the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states indeed have built the infrastructure necessary for such a foreign policy: a diplomatic service and a high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy.

As a matter of fact, cooperation and coordination between the member states have intensified over the past years. However, foreign policy remains overwhelmingly nationally defined, especially in the areas that are important for the most powerful member states. In these areas the EU only enters the picture when member states want to strengthen their national policies by building coalitions and using joint resources. Brussels plays the role of a broker between states. It provides expertise and helps with the execution of joint policies.

The key to a truly common European foreign policy thus lies in the member states. It is their job to develop strategies, build coalitions, and guide common policies. Whether there will be a European foreign policy depends above all on the big capitals.

How such an unorthodox European foreign policy could work is shown by the example of the European response to the Ukraine conflict. Berlin developed the strategy that formed the coalition and managed its implementation, and Paris was there as a key partner; but without the unity of the 28 member states, the actions taken would have been ineffective. Only the inclusion of their EU partners gave the larger powers the necessary efficiency and legitimacy.

The Ukraine conflict showed at the same time how important US support continues to be for European foreign policy. Washington played not only a key role in ensuring the stability of NATO; close cooperation between the White House and Chancellor Angela Merkelʼs office also presented a united transatlantic front when it came to sanctions.

This Western unity surprised and irritated the Kremlin, which had relied on division and weakness. Along with the resistance in Ukraine itself, this Berlin-led policy stopped Russiaʼs advance in eastern Ukraine, and it helped transferring the conflict from the military to the diplomatic level.

The Ukraine example shows that Europe can act efficiently in times of crisis. By contrast, the example of Syria shows the consequences of the absence of such a joint European policy.
Paris, which has the potential to play a leading role in Europeʼs southern neighborhood, did not push hard to a joint approach to Syria. Instead, the French government tried to achieve its goals as a junior partner of the US. But instead of ending the civil war, or even tamp it down, Paris has only been able to watch from the sidelines as the conflict has exploded into wildfire.

Both Paris and Berlin have failed to build a common European Syrian policy. To what extent such a joint approach would have made a difference is hard to say. But it is clear that no massive engagement in the region can be expected from Washington and that the consequences of war and chaos in the Middle East will not be felt primarily in the US but in Europe. The price for inaction in Syria will be much higher than the European capitals have anticipated.

Stabilize or Become Destabilized

In order to advance their foreign policy interests, European states can either go it alone or work together. The Ukraine conflict shows how great the potential for a joint approach is, while the example of the Syria conflict shows how problematic its absence can be.

Europeʼs southern and eastern neighborhoods are both zones of instability from which Europe cannot simply quarantine itself. European states have the choice either to be active as stabilizing powers or accept that Europe itself will increasingly be destabilized.

Without a unified foreign policy, Europe will increasingly become part of the zones of influence of countries with more ambitious foreign policies, especially Russia and China. Both want to make sure that Europe is not becoming a powerful player, and both are trying to separate Europe and the US in order to “divide and conquer.”

As a plaything of larger powers, the European states will no longer be in a position to safeguard and strengthen the global order in which they are embedded. The US no longer wants to – or can – play the role of global stabilizing power alone; it depends on the EU to become a powerful second pillar.

Together with other liberal democracies, the US and Europe must confront attempts on the part of autocratic regimes to weaken and undermine globalization. The global order is grounded on liberal principles; without the validity of these principles, even economic globalization will not last.

Foreign policy has often seemed like a luxury to Europeans over the past few decades, one that can be done without – but with growing instability it should have become clear that regional and global engagement are absolute necessities. Security, prosperity, and freedom in Europe depend on stability in the neighborhood and on a liberal world order. An investment in foreign policy is an investment in Europe’s own future.

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