© REUTERS/Yves Herman

In the days leading up to Catalonia’s October 1 independence referendum, one single word summed up the determination of pro-independence Catalans to make their voices heard: votarem (we will vote). In Barcelona, the region’s capital, the call to vote was raised everywhere, from posters plastered onto bus stops to billboards designed by passionate students who held a sit-in to demand the right to cast their ballots.

With votarem, Catalonians expressed a discontent that had been simmering for seven years. The modern independence movement saw a huge rise in popular support in 2010, when the Spanish Constitutional Court decided to revoke several articles of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia that granted new powers of self-rule to the region.

Catalans felt their hard-won freedoms were being curtailed and took to the streets in anger. Their regional president of the time, Artur Mas, announced a referendum on independence. In November 2014, Catalans went to the polls in a non-binding vote, and around 80 percent voted for independence. Yet turnout was low. No official figure was given, but the newspaper El País estimated voter participantion at only 37 percent. Mas stepped down.

In 2017, he was banned from holding public office for two years and fined €36,500 for holding the vote in defiance of an order by the Spanish Constitutional Court. The country’s constitution does not allow for any region to split off; it is based on “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards.”

“Silent Majority”

Carles Puigdemont, who took over as president of Catalonia after Mas, has followed in his predecessor’s footsteps – perhaps more closely than he might have wished, for he, too, now faces charges related to an illegal independence referendum. It was Puigdemont who decided to go ahead with the vote on October 1, reflecting the disdain that many pro-independence Catalans feel for Spain’s central authorities. Their continued protests are a gesture of defiance toward the national powers that be.

It is also no coincidence that protestors have been holding posters and signs in Catalan, not Spanish. The Catalan language is strongly tied to the question of history and identity. Older Catalans can still remember when their language was repressed under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. Speaking Catalan and, in some cases, refusing to speak Spanish, can be a political statement in itself.

Pro-independence Catalans have been vocal and present on the streets and in the international media coverage of the political crisis. Catalans against independence, who have often been dubbed “the silent majority,” for the longest time made no similar organized effort to unite. They were a disparate group of people who, on the whole, prefer to stay at home rather than take to the streets in support of remaining with Spain. It was only at the end of October that 300,000 unionists took to the streets of Barcelona to demonstrate their support for the central government.

The October 1 referendum ended with 90 percent voting for independence. At around 43 percent, turnout was higher this time, but still did not make for a majroity. allow the was followed a couple of weeks of tense back-and-forth between Puigdemont and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. Eventually, Rajoy announced that the Spanish government would invoke Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution and assume power over Catalonia. That included sacking Puigdemont and his ministers and calling new regional elections. Madrid argued it was forced to protect its territorial sovereignty from a rogue group of separatists. Pro-independence activists claimed the central government was flexing the iron fist of authoritarianism.

A Secret Vote, A Flight

In defiance of Madrid’s orders, Puigdemont declared independence after a secret vote that was boycotted by most of the opposition parties in the Catalan parliament. He then fled to Belgium via France with a handful of his associates. Eight ministers who stayed behind were removed from office, arrested, and jailed pending charges over the independence declaration.

In the latest twist in Spain’s worst political crisis in decades, a European arrest warrant was issued for Puigdemont on November 3 after he failed to appear in court in Spain on possible charges of sedition, rebellion, and misuse of public funds. He handed himself in to the Belgian police on November 5. It remains unclear if and when he will be extradited back to Spain.

For pro-independence Catalans, it is a bitter irony that in only one day, Catalonia was declared an independent republic and had its autonomy stripped. New regional elections will take place on December 21, but this time, the vote. will be very different. It remains to be seen whether those who demanded the right to vote in the run up to October 1 will even recognize the December poll, especially after Puigdemont declared the region a “new republic.”

According to recent surveys, pro-independence parties look set to win the election but fall short of the majority of seats they need to restart their independence campaign. In other words, even if they unite, Catalonia’s separatists may well fall short in December’s vote – dealing a blow to their hopes for independence.

The post Catalonia’s Blunder appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© Dominik Herrmann

Ksenia Sobchak is so convinced of her protiv vsekh motto that she’s even thought of changing her last name to Protivvsekh. And this, mind you, is the daughter of Anatoly Sobchak – the first elected governor of Saint Petersburg, a famous politician and, not least, Putin’s political godfather who died in 2000.

The young Sobchak is anything but a typical Russian political activist. She used to host a popular TV show that resembled Big Brother, but with far more explicit language and sex scenes. That earned her a reputation as the Russian Paris Hilton. She is quick on the trigger, whether in her current job as a journalist at the opposition online site TV Rain, as the editor-in-chief of the fashion magazine L’Officiel Russia, or in response to her many online detractors who brand her as ugly and dumb.

Russian liberals don’t think she is dumb, however, but rather a dummy candidate chosen by the Kremlin to legitimize Vladimir Putin’s victory. As the chances are low that anti-corruption activist and Putin challenger Alexei Navalny will be registered (due to his conviction on trumped up embezzlement charges), Sobchak remains a token opposition candidate, whom Putin will beat handily.

It is once again an example of the vicious dichotomy of how the Russians view politics: if one is stopped from running against Putin, that’s because one really is a threat to him (Navalny); if one is allowed to challenge Putin, that means one is already part of his grand plan (Sobchak). Hashtag Protivvsekh, hashtag Russia.

Another problem facing Sobchak is that she is not an alpha male, which means she is already a lost case in Russian politics. No wonder her presidential bid was followed by a mocking array of female journalists, media personalities, and even an ex-porn star announcing their candidacies (the last is still too young to run). There is a joke currently making rounds that older Russians are nostalgic for the times when Clinton and Sobchak used to be two men.

A Team Player

Ksenia Sobchak, like Navalny, became politically active during the wave of mass protests in the winter of 2011-12. Since then, she has been a staunch critic of Putin’s regime and a vocal proponent of change and reform. She is very straightforward about Stalin’s legacy (“a butcher and a criminal”) and – unlike Navalny – unequivocal on the Crimea question (“according to international accords, it is Ukrainian territory”). Plus, she is ready to be a team player: she has promised to set her own interests aside and withdraw her candidacy if Navalny gets registered.

At the same time, Sobchak has never been liked, and her disapproval rating, currently at 16 percent, is the highest among Russian public figures. According to a poll by the Moscow-based survey institute Levada Center at the end of October, Sobchak is less popular than the very unpopular Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (13 percent) or Navalny himself (12 percent). Putin’s disapproval rating is just six percent.

The chances of a liberal candidate gaining ground in Russia are slim in any case: according to the same Levada Center poll, only one percent say they would vote for Sobchak.To put that in perspective, Putin would get 53 percent of votes; Navalny 1.8 percent. Interestingly enough, however, nine percent of those who said they might vote for Sobchak are Putin supporters, the undecided, or traditional non-voters.

It is difficult to judge if Sobchak is being manipulated by the Kremlin. She is clearly not easy to control. Her statement on Crimea was radical, even for Russia’s liberals. Sobchak knows that no one can successfully run against Putin. So, as an experienced show business professional, she has vowed to mobilize disillusioned voters, even if that means they do not vote for her. Basically, she wants to put the “against all” option back on the ballot.

Last year’s parliamentary elections had a record low voter turnout – in some cities, only 28 percent of those eligible took part. Perhaps #protivvsekh best describes the general attitude of Russian society to politics and politicians these days.

The post Words Don’t Come Easy: “protiv vsekh” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

September 24 marked a watershed moment in German politics: a right-wing populist party entered the Bundestag for the first time in post-war history. There was much soul searching and hand wringing in the lead-up to the first joint parliamentary session, but the AfD’s 92 newly minted lawmakers (not including its leader, Frauke Petry, who abandoned ship because the party had moved too far to the right) managed to build a parliamentary group, appear in the Bundestag chambers, and deliver a speech without sparking controversy. That, by AfD standards, is news in itself.

It was the AfD, after all, that continuously employed highly controversial and divisive rhetoric on the campaign trail, denigrating Germany’s justice minister by claiming he was the result of “inbreeding” in his home state of Saarland, and branding Chancellor Angela Merkel an “old shrew.” The party also hired an American creative agency to design an aggressive online campaign strategy, including an ad that depicted a bloody set of tire tracks, referring to the series of Islamist terror attacks carried out with vehicles. The slogan: “The global chancellor’s tracks across Europe.”

That crude, populist behavior was noticeably absent in the Bundestag’s first session on October 24. Most of the AfD’s lawmakers appeared to blend seamlessly into the parliament’s tapestry, difficult to distinguish from their counterparts from the mainstream parties. Only their pride in being MPs set them apart from veteran politicians: AfD lawmakers posed for pictures and exalted their success on Twitter and Facebook. But they were not disruptive – certainly not in the way the other groups had feared.

What was striking, however, was the AfD’s reticence in moments where the rest of the Bundestag applauded – when Holocaust survivor Inge Deutschkron was welcomed from the podium, for example, or when MPs congratulated the newly elected president of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Schäuble.

It highlighted how the AfD perceives itself as the true underdog – a systematically oppressed group that successfully fought for a spot at the table against a powerful establishment. While the majority of German society is outraged over the populist party’s treatment of minorities, the AfD is in turn outraged by that very reaction. When Hermann Otto Solms, an MP from the liberal Free Democrats, warned in a speech against rules that “stigmatize and exclude,” AfD lawmakers applauded vociferously because they see themselves as the victims of such exclusion. Solms’ appeal to take a stand against hate speech and propaganda, however, did not garner a reaction: the AfD does not identify itself as a propagator of either.

Provocations and Half-Truths

In its first motion in the new Bundestag, the party demanded that the Alterspräsident, or chairman by seniority, be elected by age. The oldest member of parliament traditionally makes the first speech in a new session. But Germany’s mainstream parties had hastily changed the election process after realizing the oldest MP would be an AfD lawmaker who has publically trivialized the Holocaust.

That prompted AfD parliamentary group leader Bernd Baumann to hold a speech that once again revealed the AfD’s character as not a party of reason, but one of provocation and half-truths. Baumann claimed that the mainstream parties’ barring of an AfD parliamentarian from the seniority post could be compared to the time when Nazi leader Hermann Göring banished Marxist Clara Zetkin from the Bundestag and prevented her from speaking. It was an erroneous comparison as many German media pointed out: Göring had indeed gotten rid of the chairman by seniority position, but he did not prevent Zetkin from speaking. By then, she was not even a member of parliament anymore. Instead, Göring actually blocked a member of his own group from taking the post.

The incident is an important reminder that parliamentarians will have to remain vigilant and alert during AfD speeches to check facts and react quickly. They did not do so during Baumann’s speech, allowing his half-truth to stand. He will certainly not be alone in pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable. According to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, 15 AfD parliamentarians created a closed Facebook group that has already become a platform for vicious racism and vile hate speech. One member posted a picture of a pizza box with the image of Anne Frank on the cover; the caption, reportedly, read “Oven-fresh, light, and crispy.” Some 50 AfD lawmakers from state and federal levels are part of the closed group, yet when news of its existence came to light, there was no outcry. The lack of outrage has become commonplace.

The AfD’s eerie silence in the Bundestag does not mean other parties can let down their guard. In the coming months, the government will be formed; the committees will take up their work; debates on content will begin – and AfD lawmakers will undoubtedly reveal their true colors. In his speech, Bernd Baumann claimed his party would usher in a “new era in the Bundestag” where mainstream political groups would no longer “decide everything among themselves.” The same holds true for the AfD as well. The public will be watching their words and actions closely.

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© Dominik Herrmann

Poland’s first openly gay city mayor, Robert Biedroń, is a fresh face on Poland’s political scene. He is well-traveled, multi-lingual, and secular, with human rights and sustainability as favorite subjects. While Poland has shifted to the right in recent years, Biedroń has been emerging as an icon of the liberal left. For the last three years, he has headed the administration of Słupsk, a city of 90,000 inhabitants on the Baltic coast of Poland. Now, the 41-year-old is tipped as a possible presidential candidate in the next election in 2020.

Biedroń’s popularity comes amid rising disillusionment among Polish liberals. Halfway through its parliamentary term, the governing Law and Justice Party (PiS) remains in the lead. One poll in October put support for the right-wing populist party at a record 47 percent, compared to 22 percent for the two main opposition parties combined. Meanwhile, many Polish liberals feel frustrated by the opposition’s lack of a convincing leader. Some hope that a “Polish Macron” will emerge to save Poland from the populist right. If Biedroń manages to capture those hopes, he could play a major role in Polish politics in the years ahead.

For all his urban image, Biedroń knows small-town Poland well. He was born in 1976 near Krosno, in the country’s rural, conservative southeast – now a PiS stronghold. As a gay teenager in the 1990s, he initially hid his sexual orientation, including at home. Visiting Berlin in 1995, he sought out Mann-O-Meter, an organization that provides help and advice for gay men. That trip spurred a lasting commitment to LGBT rights. In 2001, Biedroń founded his own organization, Campaign Against Homophobia. It now has branches in cities across Poland. Over the years, he has held a range of related roles in Poland and internationally, including general rapporteur on the rights of LGBT people at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

His Heart Beats on the Left

Politically, Biedroń says his heart beats on the left, a bold admission in today’s Poland, where “leftist-liberal” is a common insult on the right. He first got involved with the social democratic party while studying political science at university. His breakthrough came in 2011, when he was elected to parliament through a left-wing party led by eccentric businessman Janusz Palikot. Three years later he ran for mayor of Słupsk, now as an independent. He won 58 percent of the vote in the second round, beating the candidate from the Civic Platform, one of Poland’s main opposition parties. His campaign centered on local issues; his private life did not play a role.

These days, many Poles’ primary association with Słupsk is Biedroń. As mayor, he has cultivated his image as a progressive by focusing on sustainable development: One of his advisers is a former leader of the Polish Green party. His development strategy envisions Słupsk as a “green city of the new generation.” Biedroń has made headlines with a series of animal-friendly gestures as well, for example preventing a circus with animals from performing in town. He is also known for cycling to work. Biedroń admits this kind of behavior might not raise eyebrows in a country like Sweden; in Poland, though, it still makes news.

From Słupsk, Biedroń has been a firm critic of the PiS government. The governing party is locked in a protracted dispute with the European Union, which is accusing Warsaw of undermining the rule of law. For Biedroń, the antidote to PiS’s power grab is to bolster civil society. “Whatever happens in public life ought to interest us, because that public life – politics – will sooner or later knock on our door,” he said at a popular music festival this summer. While he remains upbeat about Poland’s political future, he is aware that PiS’s controversial changes will not be reversed overnight. “Poles need to be told that normality will not return at once,” he warned in an in-depth interview published last year, suitably entitled Pod Prąd (Against the Current). “What has been damaged over the years cannot be rebuilt in a few months.”

On the Fringes, for Now

Meanwhile, he has kept his distance from Poland’s centrist opposition, which remains split between two main parties – the Civic Platform (PO), Donald Tusk’s former party, and Nowoczesna, a more liberal party founded in 2015. In Pod Prąd, Biedroń did not mince words about Poland’s previous PO-led government: During its eight years in power, PO “invested in cement, but did not crush mental cement,” he said. This reflects political differences between Biedroń and the two opposition parties, including their reluctance to stand up for LGBT rights. There is a tactical element as well: By guarding his independence, Biedroń remains untarnished by the opposition’s shortcomings. In a recent radio interview, he urged the leaders of PO and Nowoczesna to get their acts together and present an attractive alternative to PiS. “I invite them to Słupsk – I’ll show them how it’s done,” he quipped.

For now, Biedroń has remained on the fringes of Polish national politics, focusing on tangible changes in Słupsk. Yet many hope that he will take a stand when the right time comes. When Andrzej Duda, the PiS candidate, was elected president in 2015, Biedroń posted on Facebook: “Today modern Poland lost. […] The president of the future will be chosen in five years’ time. We’ll manage!” More than 50,000 people liked the post; Biedroń’s supporters urged him to run in 2020.

A Presidential Hopeful?

Polls already place him among the top three favorites for president after Duda and Tusk. A poll this summer put Biedroń in third place, with 16 percent, behind current president Andrzej Duda, who had 36 percent, and Tusk with 21 percent. With Duda just halfway through his term, many questions remain. The biggest is whether Tusk will run for president, as his supporters hope. His second term as president of the European Council ends in November 2019, too late to lead PO in the parliamentary elections due that autumn, but in time to launch a presidential campaign.

For now, Poland is gearing up for local elections in late 2018. Biedroń says he wants to win a second term in Słupsk, despite earlier speculation on the left that he might be a good candidate for the mayor of Warsaw. Biedroń has not yet committed to running for the presidency either. Yet polls like the one that put him clearly ahead of Poland’s struggling left-wing parties indicate that he does have broader appeal.

Following the presidential election in France this summer, Biedroń posted a meme on Facebook featuring photos of Macron and himself on their bikes side by side. “Supposedly similar,” his caption read. Again, the comments below the post were enthusiastic.

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© Agencja Gazeta/Slawomir KaminskI via REUTERS

For years, the mantra of Polish transformation was Europeanization. The idea that Poland should emulate the Western European model in politics, economic policy, and values has informed the country’s domestic policy and determined the horizon of its foreign policy aspirations. Law and Justice (PiS), the national populist party led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski that has governed since November 2015, represents a departure from this philosophy. The party’s illiberal tendencies are evident. It has changed the constitutional tribunal, introduced judicial reforms ceding power to the executive branch, and centralized public funding for NGOs (which will direct funds to PiS-friendly organizations). This all represents more than a grab for power by a new elite: These steps are a conscious rejection of Europeanization, stemming from widespread criticism of the Western European model and the EU.

To be clear, this “de-Europeanization” does not go hand in hand with opposition to EU membership. Indeed, the latest polls show that 88 percent of Poles support EU membership, and only 5 percent want a “Polexit.” Not even the euroskeptic PiS party questions Poland’s EU membership. Rather, PiS desires emancipation from the influence of Western European partners and wants a greater sense of sovereignty.

The backlash against Europeanization is most apparent on the cultural front. PiS’s party leaders and chief ideologists have disparaged Poland’s westward outlook as a policy of imitation, one that involves submission to Western or German thought. Some have even claimed that Western liberal ideals are not compatible with Polish traditions and identity. In the view of PiS’s leading politicians and intellectuals, the EU is a project that abandoned its Christian conservative and economic roots long ago; for them, it was commandeered by a generation of left-wingers empowered by the protests of May 1968, and has turned into an ideologically driven instrument designed to socially and culturally homogenize Europe. PiS’s rhetoric often falls back upon the theme of left-wing social engineering, which it claims has pushed Western societies toward secularization, ecology, and glorification of minorities, cosmopolitanism, and multiculturalism.

The refugee crisis has fueled this anti-Western propaganda in a massive way. PiS, and those who support its manifesto, often believe that Poland represents the “real West,” whereas Western Europe has betrayed Western values. Since this transformation of European societies has been consciously driven, PiS believes it can be consciously rolled back, too. It should come as no surprise that de-Europeanization has resulted in a redefinition of the country’s relationship with Germany, previously its number one partner and the “gate to Europe,” as it was framed in Polish discourse during the 1990s.

Brexit Error

Poland was once seen as part of the union’s core bloc, and Polish policymakers believed that membership in this core – even with certain compromises – would be the best long-term investment for the country’s security and stability. The PiS government has rejected this course, calling it a “policy on the knees” and claiming that the desire to be part of the EU mainstream has not benefited Poland. The earlier Kaczynski government (2005-07) placed much emphasis on the “battle for memory” which is the Polish term for the fight against alleged German historical revisionism. In the current government, other grievances have featured more prominently. The refugee issue has become the key driver of Warsaw’s criticism of Berlin.

Warsaw’s shift to the United Kingdom as its key partner in Europe in the beginning of 2016 was not just steered by anti-German prejudices, however. This shift of alliances also reflected the PiS government’s ambition to push the integration process in a different direction. When the party came into power in the fall of 2015, the concept of strengthening the nation state and re-nationalizing the economy, along with opposition to deeper EU integration and criticism of liberal democracy, were on the rise across Europe. The populist revolt against the establishment seemed to validate PiS’s claim that popular sentiment across the EU was on its – and Britain’s – side.

But the UK’s decision to leave the EU, Emmanuel Macron’s success in France, and the stability of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship (despite the electoral gains of the Alternative for Germany) proved this calculus wrong. Without the UK, the position of all non-euro countries (including Poland) will be much weaker. And the future shape of the EU will most probably be determined not by Poland or Hungary’s visions, but rather the renewed Franco-German axis.
Warsaw’s miscalculation led to a severe deterioration in Poland’s relations with the European Commission, Germany, and France, and it might prove costly.

Picking Fights

The Polish dilemma is not new; it has to do with the peculiarities of Poland’s position within the EU. Poland is in many respects a special (and sometimes awkward) partner, due to its size, ambitions, and specific national interests. It is a large country that has lofty political aspirations but relatively few resources with which to pursue them. That means Poland occupies an uneasy space between European superpowers and smaller states – between the policy-makers and the policy-takers, in other words.

Poland is also a country with very specific interests that are not widely shared within Europe. Not even the other Eastern European countries agree with, say, how Poland perceives the security threat posed by Russia, or sympathize with its energy policy, which is shaped by its particularly large coal industry. Poland is not a big player in the defense industry, but it still has meaningful interests at stake. It is ethnically homogeneous and wants to remain that way, but large enough to be expected to take more responsibility for the refugee problem.

To achieve its goals, Poland needs to navigate carefully in Europe, be willing to compromise, and yet be tough when its most vital interests are at stake. It needs to demonstrate diplomacy and tact rather than irk its neighbors. Otherwise, Poland will inevitably end up on a collision course with other partners and institutions.

Yet it is already picking fights. In August 2017 the Polish government took the unprecedented step of ignoring a decision by the European Court of Justice that required Warsaw to temporarily stop logging in the Białowieża forest, which is under environmental protection until a final ruling can be issued. Poland also refused to fulfill its obligation to take in its quota of refugees in accordance with the EU’s refugee relocation mechanism. Then there is the European Commission’s infringement procedure to sanction Poland over its plans to exert more power over the judiciary. Together, these three cases have become highly politicized and have damaged Poland’s relations with the EU.

Strategic Challenge

The risks that Poland is facing with its course towards de-Europeanization go beyond sector-specific issues. The way Poland’s interests are defined today may prevent the country from joining the integration and cooperation frameworks that will shape the EU in the future. Eurozone accession, for example, is a non-issue for the current government, and the opposition has an ambiguous attitude to that question.

Meanwhile, the country’s ambition to build a strong national defense industry, and its belief that stronger European defense cooperation runs counter to the interests of NATO, make Warsaw suspicious about plans for a defense union. The government is unwilling to consider steps that would unify European migration or social policy, or ambitious targets in climate policy. Polish national interests in those areas may explain some of its reservations, but the national populist camp’s distrust of further Europeanization plays just as large a role.

Whatever weighs heavier, a de-Europeanization – even a relative one, should the rest of the European Union integrate further while Poland looks on from the sidelines – is likely. Brexit weakens its position even further. Thus, Poland’s strategic challenge today is to find compromises that will allow it to benefit from the EU integration process, or – in some areas – at least not bear negative consequences of policies undertaken at the EU level.

A Vicious Circle

This dilemma is reflected in the Polish approach to differentiated integration. Initially, the reaction in Poland was quite positive. In fact, Warsaw maintained that the EU could not function according to a one-size-fits-all model: the EU needed instead to allow member states to integrate as much as they wanted, while allowing those who did not want to integrate further the chance to preserve the full benefits of integration. Therefore, the Polish idea of flexible opt-out mechanisms resembles a “Europe à la carte” in which each country can pick and choose cooperation formats that best suit their interests.

For most other EU countries, this has never been a viable option; for them, flexible integration is an instrument to achieve more integration, not less. Poland’s reaction to that is negative, with foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski commenting that putting flexible integration on the table was “a recipe for failure, division, and separation,” and that such proposals may give rise to “hegemonic” solutions that would leave behind any countries that do not fully integrate.

Polexit is not to be expected, neither today nor tomorrow. It is rather the EU which is likely to “leave” Poland – not by formally excluding it, but through further steps towards integration and cooperation that will hollow out Poland’s membership in the bloc. If Warsaw continues to de-Europeanize, it could enter a vicious circle: because of its relative disengagement, it would benefit less from the EU than in the past. The populists could then instrumentalize this relative loss of power and benefit to oppose the EU and its largest member states even more.

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© REUTERS/Laszlo Balogh

In 1956, Western European countries took in anti-Soviet refugees from Hungary. Six decades later, Budapest seems less than inclined to react in kind. To keep refugees and migrants out, Hungary has erected barbed wire fences along its southern border. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, nationalism is surging. In a speech last month, he commemorated the 1956 revolution by warning Hungarians that the European Union was intent on making their country part of a homogeneous mass, void of identity. “Hungary’s everyday life is threatened,” said Orbán. “The forces of globalism are trying to bash open our door, trying to make us become ‘Homo Brusselicus’ instead of Hungarians.”

Orbán’s polemic comes at a time when ties with Brussels are more strained than ever. A number of thorny issues have burdened the relationship, from Russia’s ties with ex-Soviet satellite states, to George Soros’ influence in the region. But no issue has roiled the waters more than migration. Hungary closed off its southern borders in 2015, building a double layer of fences to effectively – and visibly – protect its status as what Orbán calls Europe’s last “migrant-free zone.” Any migrants who approach the border and apply for asylum status are immediately detained in a prison camp along the border region.

Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party have also refused to comply with the EU’s compulsory quota system to distribute migrants among member states. Budapest (along with Slovakia) appealed to the European Court of Justice to avoid participating in the system and lost, but continues to defy the court’s ruling.

Children Not Welcome

The recent case of Öcsény, a village in southwestern Hungary, highlights how fraught the debate over migration has become. In September, a private hotel owner offered to host a group of refugee children at his hotel for a free holiday. Though the children had already been granted refugee status, Zoltán Fenyvesi’s proposal sparked fury among villagers, triggering clashes and stoking anti-migrant sentiment. Fenyvesi was threatened several times, and his car tires were slashed. The local mayor resigned over the issue, blaming himself for having entered into the fray in the first place. Prime Minister Orbán failed to condemn the violence that swept the town. He told Hungarian journalists at the recent EU summit in Tallinn, “there have been so many lies regarding the migrant issue that if anybody says there will be children coming, then the Hungarians’ answer is: first the children, then parents, then the family, and then we’re all in trouble.”

A few days later the mayor of Cserdi publicly offered to host the children for a long weekend in his hamlet. He faced abuse almost immediately: a villager spat in his face, and a car tried to hit him on the crosswalk near his home. The government again failed to address the violence. Instead, Budapest keeps pointing the finger at the man they see as responsible for the influx of migrants: billionaire businessman and financier George Soros.

The Soros Question

George Soros is hard to miss in Hungary these days. The government has funded a massive billboard campaign featuring his face and the message: “Let’s not let Soros have the last laugh.” Fidesz and state media accuse the Hungarian-born philanthropist of orchestrating the “Soros Plan,” a strategy that will supposedly bring millions of migrants to Europe and advance left-wing politics. Orbán’s government has also threatened to shut down the Soros-funded Central European University in Budapest; a bitter battle to keep it open is ongoing.

Soros and his Open Society Foundation say Orbán’s accusations of a nefarious left-wing conspiracy have no merit. The billionaire, who backs pro-democracy and human rights initiatives, has urged Europe to screen and resettle refugees safely in order to help developing countries that are shouldering an unfair burden. As a Hungarian-born Jew who survived Nazi occupation, Soros has said Budapest’s billboard campaign recalled “Europe’s darkest hours.”
“It is horrifying to see journalists [and] media workers being listed and labeled by the government media as Soros henchmen,” said Tamas Vitray, a prominent Hungarian journalist and talk show host. “I’m outraged and I think we’re playing with fire.”

The European Union does not share the Hungarian government’s views of George Soros. At the latest EU summit, Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group (ALDE) and MEP, called on Orbán to approve a permit to keep the Central European University open. Verhofstadt pointed out that the Open Society Foundation sponsored several Fidesz politicians’ studies in the early 1990s as well, including Viktor Orbán’s semesters abroad. EU leaders have also called Hungary’s refusal to resettle its share of migrants unacceptable.

Eroding Support

Yet Fidesz is not backing down. It has launched what it calls a national consultation on the EU’s resettlement plan, sending out surveys to millions of voters to ask whether they agree with Orbán’s position. Officials have already begun delivering the surveys and setting up stands across the country where government-paid advocates stop passersby. One such booth at Budapest’s Corvin metro station on a late October morning read “Say no to Soros’ devious plan!”

It remains to be seen how much support the government’s consultation will actually garner. The far-right radical opposition party Jobbik recently financed a survey by the Compass Institute, a Budapest-based conservative nationalist think tank. Less than half of those surveyed actually agree with the government’s views on migration. Only 39 percent believed that the Soros Plan exists, while 43 percent say they don’t think so. Also, 57 percent of Hungarians deemed the national consultation a bad idea – including 29 percent of Fidesz’s own supporters.

Jobbik, for its part, has been highly critical of Soros’ alleged interference. But it has also questioned why the government is not sounding the alarm over a “Merkel Plan” or a “Juncker Plan,” arguing that the German leader and European Commission President have championed the rights of migrants far more than Soros. Now the State Accounting Office has launched an investigation into Jobbik’s own party finances. Gabor Vona, Jobbik’s leader, claims the probe is a government attempt to demoralize its critics.

New Friends

As opposition appears to be slowly gaining ground at home, Viktor Orbán is seeking friends abroad. His government has steadily been building closer ties to Vladimir Putin, and Hungary has enlisted Moscow’s help to refurbish and expand its Paks nuclear power plant, which was built under Soviet rule in 1982. The EU is examining the legality of the power plant expansion.

Putin visits Hungary regularly. During his last visit in August, he said: “Our Hungarian partners are eager to have our projects completed.” Peter Szijjarto, Hungary’s minister of foreign affairs, has told the press that the Paks project will “start to materialize as soon as next January.”

Still, the majority of Hungary’s large construction projects are made possible by the bloc’s funding. According to the European Commission’s own website, EU investment generates 6.3 percent of Hungary’s Gross National Income (GNI), making it “one of the countries that benefits most from EU funding.” More than 95 percent of all public investments are co-financed by the EU, according to the site. Various EU leaders have warned that Budapest could face financial consequences if it continues to defy the court’s ruling on the migrant quota. It is unclear, however, what legal means they can actually exercise to withhold funding.

Balázs Bodacz from the center-left Democratic Coalition party says even Fidesz and Viktor Orbán are concerned about the prospect of losing EU financial support. “There is no Hungarian economy without the EU’s markets or companies. Leaving the EU therefore would mean bankruptcy for the country, which none of the political powers could want,” he said.

Even so, some of Orbán’s opponents are worried about what will happen if Fidesz holds onto power in next spring’s parliamentary elections. “If Orbán and his government get another four-year term – and right now it very much looks like they will – we can bid farewell to our future. We have only six months to either lay the foundations or to give up our children’s and grandchildren’s future,” Gergely Lazar, an opposition analyst, wrote in an open letter. “It is not the Hungarians that have a problem with Europe, but it is Viktor Orbán himself who has a problem with Europe.”

Lazar also criticized opposition parties for not doing enough to hold Orbán’s government responsible for its actions and represent the voice of Hungarians who want to remain in the European Union. He is calling on them to unite, particularly as parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place in spring 2018, draw closer. Orbán and Fidesz have already begun their efforts to drum up support.

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Yet here we are again. Italy is set to hold an election no later than May 20, and opinion polls show the center-right in the lead, with the populist Five Star Movement not far behind. If the election were held today, the center-right coalition would take 34 percent of the vote, the center-left would take 33.1 percent, and the Five Star movement would take 25.4 percent.

Europe should prepare for a more difficult relationship with Rome, whether the country leaves the union or not. The Five Star movement, founded by stand-up comedian Beppe Grillo, is explicitly euroskeptic and demands that Italy leave the euro. It has also advocated the country’s withdrawal from the passport-free Schengen travel area, the expulsion of immigrants, and turning away refugees who arrive by sea.

Meanwhile, the center-right is led by Silvio Berlusconi – yes, that Silvio Berlusconi. The 81-year old four-time former prime minister (his last stint was 2008-11) has recently made pro-European noises – even expressing his support for the deeper economic and defense integration suggested by Macron – but his party, Forza Italia, would govern with the far-right, anti-European Lega Nord and the nationalist Brothers of Italy.

There is one thing might save the EU from having to deal with a populist party in control of one of its largest economies: a law passed this year called the “Rosatellum”. Designed to finish the electoral overhaul begun by Matteo Renzi before he resigned last December, the Rosatellum awards 36 percent of legislative seats on a first-past-the-post system, and the remaining 64 percent proportionally. In theory, this would reward established parties that are able to form large coalitions by giving them a supermajority, while punishing smaller fringe parties. Understandably, the Five Star movement has protested bitterly against this change, calling the law the “anti-Five-Star-ellum.”

One thing is certain: With a former prime minister, media mogul, and convicted bunga bunga connoisseur on the center-right, and 31-year-old waiter Luigi Di Maio at the head of the Five Star movement, Europe is in for an exciting campaign season.

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© REUTERS/Ludovic Marin/Pool

It might be one of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s greatest challenges yet. After nearly two months of wrangling, her conservatives still have not yet managed to form a coalition government with the Greens and Free Democrats. It is a tricky marriage indeed: the three parties remain miles apart on fundamental issues like climate policy, immigration, and eurozone reforms.

Yet Berlin can hardly afford to waste any more time. Governments across Europe are looking to Germany to take charge on a host of pressing internal and foreign policy issues, but also to lead the push to reshape the EU itself. One man in particular is watching closely to see what emerges from Berlin’s contentious coalition talks. Just two days after the German elections, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a sweeping speech at the Sorbonne where he fundamentally raised the stakes in the EU reform debate.

In an almost one-hundred-minute long speech, Macron laid out a comprehensive and ambitious vision for a new Europe, underlined by a strong emphasis on institutional innovation. In the field of security and defense for example, Macron pitched for a common intervention force, which – at least in principle – is a more ambitious version of the already existing but never used EU battle groups. On domestic security, he called for boosting the responsibilities of the newly established European Public Prosecutor’s Office and for establishing a European Intelligence Academy that would foster closer cooperation among member states’ intelligence services. On migration and asylum, he repeated the Commission’s proposal to create a European Asylum Office and suggested the gradual establishment of a European border police force.

No Revolution

The timing and vast scope of Macron’s speech garnered much attention: His drive and ambition come at a time when the EU seems to be looking more optimistically to the future. But his proposals are far from revolutionary; in fact, most of them have been on the table for a long time. However, Macron’s European drive and ambition have given those ideas new visibility – rearranged, bundled, and well-timed at a moment when the EU seems to be looking more optimistically into the future.

Despite being concrete and assertive about most of his proposals, Macron was careful not to draw red lines for the French position to avoid overpromising with his reform agenda or overburdening his European partners with too much too soon. Indeed, he depicted his vision for change as a plan that needs further debate, leaving enough room for maneuver in future negotiations.

On the most contentious issue – the strengthening of the eurozone – Macron climbed down from his initial, ambitious plan. Keenly aware that the coalition-building process in Germany could be complex and protracted, Macron constrained himself to attributing only a small part of his speech to eurozone governance. He repeated the need for a sizeable common eurozone budget but avoided any concrete figures, and suggested a particularly generous timetable for implementation that would allow eurozone members critical of his proposals ample time to work through their disagreements.

This strategy could help avoid conflict with a future German government. Macron recognizes the importance of Paris and Berlin jointly leading the EU reform agenda, and Berlin’s endorsement of his overall approach to reforming the European project in the long run is more significant to him than his eurozone reform plans in the short term. Indeed, Macron consulted Chancellor Merkel twice in the process of drafting his speech.

Discouraging Signals

But will it help? The French president has already been forced to postpone his initial plan. Now, as German coalition talks have ground to a halt, Macron is condemned to wait for a German response, and the signals he has received along the way have not been particularly encouraging. While Chancellor Merkel welcomed Macron’s proposals as a “good impetus” and the Greens’ leader Cem Özdemir urged taking “Macron’s outstretched hand,” the liberal FDP and the more conservative wing of Merkel’s CDU/CSU have been lukewarm at best. There is strong resistance to any kind of common eurozone budget, a banking union, or the establishment of a European Monetary Fund. That does not leave much scope for changing the status quo on eurozone politics.

Still, there is overlap on defense and security, corporate tax alignment, and a common asylum policy. An agreement in these fields could be packaged together with more contentious issues to at least push things forward. This, however, would presuppose the formation of a stable government and a coalition agreement vague enough to leave space for negotiations between Paris and Berlin – a lengthy and tedious process in itself.

Even if a German response comes soon and Paris and Berlin are able to get their rusty tandem back on the road by developing a series of reform measures, discontent may grow among other member states and hamper urgently needed consensus on reform. Thus, openness to other European heavyweights eager to shape the EU reform agenda, particularly Italy and Spain, will be key.

Advancing or Preserving?

The largest stumbling block will be the idea of deeper integration, or moving toward a more political union in general. Macron champions the concept of differentiated integration, a “multispeed EU” in which a small group of member states moves ahead on issues where closer cooperation triggers a strong backlash. But Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague, in particular, are not interested in cementing their positions outside the inner circle of EU decision-making – especially as the position on the margins has been weakened considerably with the British vote to leave the EU. At the same time, the appetite to deepen EU integration among member states like the Netherlands or Austria might also be waning after recent election results.

Against this backdrop, and with Brexit negotiations sputtering, it is no wonder that European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s overriding concern is preserving the unity of the EU’s remaining 27 member states. Chancellor Merkel, too, has made it a priority to prevent the rift between core and periphery from deepening further. That only leaves room for functional and pragmatic forms of differentiated integration, like the flexible cooperation we have seen in security and defense.

President Macron has tried to push the EU reform debate squarely into the spotlight and spur his European partners to act; by making EU reform the central project of his presidency, he is taking a significant political risk at home. His proposals are concrete and serious, yet the response across the bloc has been largely skeptical. It is not surprising to see criticism from Central European countries, but Macron may well have been hoping for a warmer reception in Berlin.

Yet Germany, mired in intricate coalition negotiations, might be too paralyzed to act at a time when a rare window of opportunity to reform the European project seems to have opened. Nevertheless, in Macron’s rich menu of proposals it is at least likely that EU partners will find some aspects to pick up, even if the drive to reform is off to a slow start.

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© REUTERS/Fabian Bimmer

In his State of the European Union address on September 13, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called strengthening European trade his top priority. Following his speech, the Commission presented a package of new trade measures called “A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalization.” The proposal lays forth a comprehensive negotiating agenda for the EU on a multilateral and bilateral level.

The EU depends on open markets and a rules-based international trading system. According to the World Trade Organization, the EU is the second largest exporter and importer of merchandize goods worldwide (excluding intra-EU trade), accounting for 15.4 percent of global merchandize exports and 14.8 percent of merchandize imports in 2016. Regarding commercial services, the EU is the number one exporter and importer, with approximately 25 and 21 percent respectively.

The EU is not only a global player in trade but also the world’s biggest investor. According to Eurostat, in 2015 the EU accounted for 48 percent of global foreign direct investment stocks (outward FDI) totaling €6.89 trillion. It was also a major recipient of FDI, drawing in upwards of €5.74 trillion that same year.

So Juncker’s emphasis on open markets makes a lot of sense – even more so considering that the open, rules-based trading system is under attack. Protectionism has been on the rise since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. From October 2009 until May 2017, according to the WTO, the number of new trade-restrictive measures skyrocketed from 140 to 1,392.

Through May 2010, G20 countries had implemented 73 protectionist measures; by May 2017 that number had skyrocketed to 723. The G20 is struggling to find common ground on the future of the multilateral trading order, open markets, and the fight against protectionism. US President Donald Trump’s “America first” policy has left a void of uncertainty on the global stage. The EU could fill that void, but it will only succeed by doing the requisite homework. Only an internally strong and unified EU can be a strong actor globally.

In Search of New Partners

The EU’s efforts to pursue deep and competitive free trade agreements (FTA) with various partners are not new. The European Commission unveiled its “Global Europe: Competing in the World” strategy already in 2006. However, the EU’s most recent blueprint, a 2015 package called Trade for All, is a marked shift from its predecessors. The strategy was clearly inspired by the popular backlash against the perceived pitfalls of globalization; it aims to align the benefits of free trade with safeguards to protect norms and regulations as well as underlying values. Trade for All is intended to be a holistic free trade concept benefiting a whole range of actors, from producers to consumers, workers, citizens, and small- and medium-sized companies.

The EU sees free trade deals as a complement to the multilateral trading system and the WTO, not an alternative. FTAs can provide access to new markets but they also shape globalization by introducing new rules and regulations to meet current needs in trade. It would be a mistake, however, to think that FTAs are an easy route – the EU-India negotiations launched in 2007 are a case in point.

In the last four years, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) emerged as the EU’s top priority. Negotiations began with great enthusiasm in the summer of 2013. But by January 2017, when President Barack Obama’s second term drew to a close, the deal was still far from finished. In fact, TTIP had run aground well before President Trump moved into the White House. Negotiations stalled last year because the partners could not find common ground over a wide range of issues, including investment protection, government procurement, and trade in services. While TTIP has faced stark opposition in many EU member states and in Germany in particular, the Trump administration has not rejected the agreement outright. In late May 2017, a few days after his first visit to the EU, US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said he was open to talks about TTIP. However, given President Trump’s “America first” agenda, the EU says it needs more time to assess the transatlantic agreement’s future.

While TTIP is still in a deep freeze, the EU has been busy negotiating other trade deals. Last month, the majority of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada entered into force. The European Parliament ratified the treaty in February 2017, but the chapter on investment protection still needs to be approved by more than 40 national and regional parliaments. Nonetheless, even provisional application is a huge success for the EU, especially considering the major protests that erupted around TTIP and CETA.

Next Stops Asia and Latin America

Following the successful (partial) ratification of CETA, the EU is now looking further afield, aiming to improve market access and deepen economic ties with fast-growing Asia and Latin America. In its communication about a “balanced and progressive” trade policy, the European Commission has emphasized that it wants to pursue deeper economic ties with the Asia-Pacific region, and to expand the alliance of partners committed to progressive rules for global trade.

The EU is negotiating a free trade agreement with Japan, its second largest trading partner in Asia. Just prior to the G20 summit in Hamburg earlier this year, the EU and Japan reached an agreement in principle on the main elements of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. They signed a symbolic framework that is supposed to pave the way for a more comprehensive accord at the end of this year. However, many difficult issues remain. Among them is the EU’s new permanent Investment Court system that is to resolve disputes between investors and member states. Japan opposes such a court.

The EU is also negotiating with India (launched in 2007) and several ASEAN countries like Malaysia (launched in 2010), Thailand (launched in 2013, stopped due to military takeover in 2014), Philippines (launched in 2015), and Indonesia (launched in 2016). The agreements with Singapore and Vietnam were signed in October 2014 and December 2016 respectively and are awaiting ratification in the EU.

The other potential growth region is Latin America. In May 2016, the EU and Mexico started negotiations to modernize their trade agreement that has been in place since 1997. In addition, negotiations between the EU and the four founding members of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) relaunched in 2010 gained fresh momentum in May 2016 after four years of stagnation.

Moreover, in his speech, Juncker announced new negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, as well, to be concluded as an EU-only agreement by 2019. The EU is aiming to wrap up negotiations with Japan, Mexico, and Mercosur by the end of this year.

The Right Strategy

All of these efforts raise the question: Is this the right strategy? Large parts of the European public were highly skeptical of the negotiations on CETA and TTIP. A poll by the Pew Research Center from June 2017 revealed that a majority of Greeks (63 percent), French (56 percent), and Hungarians (55 percent) as well as about half of Poles, Spanish, and Italians wanted their national governments to negotiate trade deals instead of the EU. Only Germans (60 percent) wanted the EU to retain trade agreement authority. The survey highlights a deep distrust in the European Commission’s negotiating capacity and strategy.

Nonetheless, the answer is yes. The EU must try to fill the void and negotiate FTAs with strategic countries and regions. Trade and investment mean jobs and growth in the EU. Exports provide jobs for 31 million Europeans; in other words, one in seven jobs in the EU depends on exports – jobs that pay on average better than other sectors. Ensuring market access abroad is key to prosperity in Europe. Even so, the EU needs to carry out internal reforms and pursue both bilateral and multilateral initiatives:

Forging consensus among EU members: The European Commission represents 28 member countries in negotiating trade policy, and it is precisely that large, unified common market that makes the bloc attractive on the global stage. At the same time, the interests and sensitivities of each and every member country must be taken into account during negotiations, and this is not always easy. Still, the answer cannot be the lowest common denominator. In October 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron threw a wrench into the EU-Mercosur talks because of concerns over beef and ethanol market access to Europe. The EU’s trade policy is clearly at a crossroads: Either it risks being held hostage by competing interests or it can prosper and shape globalization in the absence of US leadership in trade. Germany and France in particular share a responsibility for forging consensus among all EU member countries. They should not fall for the concept of reciprocity, as has become a central part of Washington’s new trade strategy. It is a dangerous idea and should not be adopted by the EU as reciprocity underestimates the importance of imports for the competitiveness of a country.

Making trade work for all: Despite the overall benefits of trade flows, not everybody has reaped the promised rewards of globalization. A growing part of Western societies feel left behind. The EU needs to address that discontent, not by abandoning trade deals but by engaging the public. This should be done through more transparency about the goals and limitations of trade negotiations; engaging advisory councils that include all relevant stakeholders; and conducting thorough studies on the winners and losers of a trade deal, along with possible social measures to counteract imbalances. At the same time, EU member states need to ensure that the benefits of trade are widely shared.

Fighting for an effective WTO: Its economic and political weight lends the EU a special responsibility for the world trade order. The WTO is still the most important guardian of rules-based world trade, but the organization is facing severe challenges. Its rules need to be updated and its dispute settlement procedure protected against political influence. The upcoming ministerial conference (MC11) should be used to agree on roadmaps for discussing important issues such as digital trade and investment facilitation within the WTO. The EU can play the important role of facilitator in this regard.

FTAs as stepping stones, not stumbling blocks: FTAs are not without risk for the multilateral trading order. They may remove barriers to trade and investment among members, but they contradict a central WTO principle by granting partners certain benefits that are denied to others. Accordingly, they are permitted only as an intermediate step in the multilateral liberalization process and are subject to (albeit rather vague) rules. The EU therefore needs to take extra care that its FTAs are compatible with the WTO and ensure that any new rules do not exacerbate global regulatory chaos or discriminate against non-members.

Choose your partners wisely: President Trump has pulled the US out of the Transpacific Partnership agreement (TPP), but the other eleven countries in the Pacific Rim are pushing ahead with the agreement, including Japan, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, there has been an increasing number of bilateral deals in the Asia Pacific region (e.g. Australia-China). The EU needs to stay in the game to remain competitive, but its negotiation capacities are not endless (especially with Brexit weighing on Brussels). The EU should therefore clearly prioritize its negotiations with strategic partners such as Japan, Mexico, and Mercosur. TTIP should not be abandoned, but before reopening negotiations, the EU has to ensure that talks have a realistic chance of succeeding.

Update trade rules for the 21st century: The EU needs to modernize existing trade rules to reflect current realities. Trade has changed (e.g. global value chains) and new rules are crucial to adapting to these changes. European FTAs should therefore integrate new rules on issues like small- and medium-sized businesses, digital trade, energy, competition and state-owned enterprises as well as investment facilitation. This will be no easy task, in particular with partners like India. However, “old school” FTAs would not be worth the paper they are written on. Then again, investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement may be best negotiated in separate (investment) agreements – which was the norm before the EU’s Lisbon Treaty came into force – as they fall into the shared competence of the EU and its members. Thus the ratification of trade agreements would become much easier.

Fostering open markets and sustainable trade: The EU is right to promote its values and standards through trade agreements in order to shape globalization. This means maintaining high environmental, social, and labor standards. The Commission has recently drafted a paper on the effective implementation and enforcement of sustainable development in its FTAs; the hope is to engage with EU members, but also the wider public. At the same time, these accords cannot be a panacea for the world’s problems. They are first and foremost agreements on how to govern trade. Therefore, they should not substitute existing labor and environmental accords and organizations but work in harmony with them.

In short, the EU has right strategy, but it needs to do its homework.

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© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

The EU faces a disintegration threat that is much more dangerous than Brexit. The attempts by the Hungarian and Polish governments to capture core state institutions and close civil society space threaten not only democracy in their own countries, but also the community of law that underpins European integration. The European Commission and the European Parliament have tackled the threat through legal action and political pressure. But member governments are still sitting on the fence. They need to take decisive action in the Council now that the German elections are over.

The sovereignty reflex is deeply ingrained: under the EU’s treaties, every country decides its own constitutional arrangements. As a result, EU governments’ default reaction to undemocratic moves in a fellow member is first to ignore the offensive behavior. If it continues, they outsource monitoring and criticism to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe. The next move is to sit out the problematic government’s term in the hope that the party will be voted out by its own electorate. But those procrastination strategies are now running out as the Polish and Hungarian governments continue to push back.

Undermining the Entire EU

The EU’s role is not to get involved in domestic political fights. But it has to ensure that its members stick to the rules and commitments they agreed to, which allow citizens and businesses to operate across borders without discrimination. If two members get away with reneging on core commitments, the contagion effect is huge. More governments, both in the EU but also in the surrounding region, will be tempted to override constitutional checks and balances, to intimidate journalists, to stifle critical voices by controlling universities and NGOs, and to defy common rules and agreements that they don’t like.

The first problem is the corruption of the rule of law within member states. From the single market to justice and home affairs cooperation, European integration depends on well-functioning, independent public institutions at the national level. If Poland’s justice minister can control every level of the court system, as the government’s proposed laws would allow, judicial rulings would be politicized, but judges in other countries would still be bound to abide by them under the principle of mutual recognition. The single market would no longer be a level playing field, as businesses could not be sure of fair treatment in that country. Political influence over the judiciary also makes other members reluctant to send their citizens for trial in that country under the common arrest warrant, so it also affects police cooperation and the Schengen area of passport-free travel.

Now there is a second challenge to EU law: reneging on an EU-level agreement. Budapest is defying a decision by the Council – in which its own minister participated – to establish a scheme to relocate asylum-seekers to other member-states in order to relieve the burden on the countries of first entry, principally Italy and Greece. The European Court of Justice ruled in September that the Council agreement has the force of law, and that the effectiveness of the relocation scheme was undermined by the failure of Hungary, Slovakia and Poland to implement it. Now the Hungarian government has pledged to continue its defiance of the agreement despite the ruling, something that previous awkward partners never did. Although the United Kingdom often fought to block agreements in the Council on measures that its public did not like, London could be relied upon to implement them once they were agreed under the common rules.

What Can the EU Do?

The Commission has done well at setting out why the measures contravene EU laws and values. Its legal approach has been consistent. Now the legal procedures need political backup from the Council.

Governments should intensify their bilateral diplomacy at two levels: in private, they must leave no doubt as to their support for the Commission’s actions. Membership of the European People’s Party still matters to Fidesz, the ruling party in Hungary since 2010. This party group has long given the Hungarian government protection, so its members bear a special responsibility.

In public, European leaders should issue unequivocal statements. They should not let US President Donald Trump have the last word in Warsaw. Ministers need to speak out, especially when the Hungarian and Polish governments make misleading comparisons to claim that their proposed legislation is similar to practices in other countries. The member states’ embassies should more actively raise rule of law concerns bilaterally.

If PiS and Fidesz do not back down, the Commission and European Parliament will have to decide whether to go through with their threats to launch Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union. This provision was designed to ensure all member states respect the EU’s common values and includes two measures: Article 7.1 allows the Council to issue a warning to any country in violation of those values; if the violation continues for a prolonged period, Article 7.2 introduces sanctions and strips the country of its voting rights in the Council.

In considering Article 7, the Commission and Parliament must put forward reasoned proposals. The attitudes of the other 26 member countries will be decisive. If the Commission puts forward a reasoned proposal and fails to gain the sufficient majority in the Council, the EU as a whole will lose face and probably any hope of using Article 7 in the future. But if the Commission holds off only because it is not confident of gaining the member-states’ backing, PiS could also claim victory.

However, if Article 7.1 is successfully launched, meaning that all of the EU institutions agree that there is a clear risk of a serious breach, that would send a powerful political signal. This would be true even if mutual protection between Warsaw and Budapest makes it impossible to gain unanimity in the European Council to activate any sanctions.

Money Matters

All EU-level action must be well framed and communicated to avoid fueling nationalism and deepening the sense of an East-West divide; this rift has widened also because of the debate over the future budget of the EU and the potential of “variable geometry,” or differentiated integration for member states when there are irreconcilable differences. The Polish and Hungarian governments are using every opportunity to claim they are being unfairly targeted by the members that joined before 2004. All EU actors must therefore communicate clearly that this is about protecting core standards, and that similar steps will be taken against any offending government. Strong statements from other Central European governments would be particularly helpful. The EU can also counter claims of double standards by getting tougher on bad behavior by member states across the board, particularly on corruption and misuse of public funds.

The year 2018 will see new initiatives for EU institutional and policy reform, as well as negotiations on the next financial framework, which will open opportunities to introduce new instruments to protect the rule of law. There are plenty of options to consider. Most pertinent to the cases of Hungary and Poland are greater possibilities for judicial review by the Court of Justice to capture the cumulative effect of a series of infringements that create a systemic challenge.

Money matters, too. Germany and other countries are debating whether to introduce new conditions that would tie access to EU funds to a country’s performance on governance and rule of law. Legally and politically, this will be complicated to introduce, but it would have a powerful deterrent effect. In the meantime, more rigorous enforcement of existing rules on misuse of funds would strengthen popular support for EU action against abuse of power in all its members.

The EU has to get more active in countering false claims. Two-thirds of Hungarians have a favorable view of the EU, as do three-quarters of Poles. To try to reduce this level of support, the Hungarian government this year funded a huge campaign of anti-EU slogans and false claims about the EU’s role in deciding energy prices, taxes, and migration, among other things. To counter this propaganda, the EU’s representatives need to better communicate the facts about EU laws and policies, as the Commission did for the first time this year in a rebuttal fact-sheet. This kind of engagement helps Hungarian and Polish civil society hold their own governments to account and uphold their own constitutions – and shows that criticism of governments does not mean rejection of the people.

Showdown Time

As unwelcome as divisions are in the EU while Brexit is underway, member governments cannot run away from a showdown now. More heads of state and government must speak up, privately and publicly, and explore new ways of ensuring high standards of political and legal governance to complement the ones on economic governance. They need to make it clear that they will exact a high price from any member – present or future, East or West, North or South – that undermines the EU’s foundations as a community of law and its soul as a community of values. They should back the warnings from Commission and Parliament to Poland and Hungary that there is a serious breach of values.

If 22 of the member governments (a four-fifths majority) agree that values are breached, that formal EU position under Article 7 of the Treaty would in itself be a strong political signal from the whole Union that it is prepared to defend its values – even if the eventual sanctions foreseen under the Treaty are out of reach because Hungary and Poland protect one another in the Council.

Even so, there is only so much that any external actor can do to rescue democracy and the rule of law in another country. The ultimate remedy lies with the tens of thousands of Hungarians and Poles who have been protesting against the attempts to capture their states. The vast majority of the people in these two countries want to stay part of the European mainstream, so they need to hear other Europeans expressing support for the rule of law that serves everyone.

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