© REUTERS/Pedro Nunes

The parallels have been all too easy to draw. The center-left leaders of Spain and Portugal were both facing general elections and both were expecting their parties to emerge the strongest, thus looking to hold talks with parties to their left in order to be able to form new administrations.

But the similarities end there. In the wake of his electoral win on October 6, the Portuguese prime minister and leader of the Socialist Party (PS), António Costa, now dominates a political arena characterized by moderation and consensus. By contrast, Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s acting prime minister and leader of the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), finds himself in a much more polarized and unstable landscape going into the country’s November 10 election, the fourth national vote in as many years.

Although Costa fell 10 seats short of the parliamentary majority he would have liked, his victory was nonetheless a resounding endorsement by Portuguese voters of the geringonça, or “contraption”, the nickname for the three-way leftist partnership he has led since 2015. His government has kept the country’s economic recovery on track while reversing much of the austerity introduced by his predecessors.

In the October 5 election, his PS strengthened its presence in parliament. Forming a new administration looks more straightforward than it was four years ago. He could attempt to repeat a deal with either of his previous partners, the Left Bloc (BE) and the Communist Party, or involve other, smaller, forces on the left.

Five Months of Impasse

In Spain, the upcoming election and its fallout promise to be more heavily fraught with dilemmas and difficulties for Sánchez.

The 47-year-old already won a general election in April, with his party emerging as the largest share of votes but still falling short of a majority. After five months of impasse he was unable to gain the support he needed from other parties in order to form a government, triggering this repeat ballot.

The PSOE’s most natural ally in the wake of the April election appeared to be Podemos, to its left, which leads the Unidas Podemos coalition. But the two parties clashed over the format of a potential new government, with the PSOE wanting a Portugal-style governing partnership and Podemos preferring a formal coalition which would give it control of several cabinet portfolios.

With policy detail barely discussed, the talks descended into a public, and increasingly personal, spat between Sánchez and Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias.

“What people are seeing is the left losing—once again,” said Gabriel Rufián, a member of parliament representing the Catalan Republican Left (ERC), as the clock ran down on an agreement. He was invoking the Spanish left’s repeated and well-documented failure to unite when under pressure. He also warned that it might be more difficult for Sánchez to form a government after a new election, as political storm clouds threatened to gather throughout the autumn.

A Stalled Progressive Vision

Since taking office as prime minister in June 2018, Sánchez has been touted as a standard bearer for the Europe’s center-left. Young, internationally minded, and outspoken on issues such as the importance of a strong EU, climate change, and feminism, he has been seen as an ideal counterweight to the right-wing populism sweeping Europe.

Yet the recent political paralysis has stalled the implementation of his progressive vision for Spain and put his more internationalist ambitions on hold.

Initially, polls had suggested Sánchez’ Socialists would benefit from a repeat election, gaining seats and making them less reliant on other parties to govern. But the political fragmentation which began in Spain half a decade ago, with the arrival of Podemos and then Ciudadanos further to the right, continues. A new party, Más País, led by the young former deputy leader of Podemos, Íñigo Errejón, has emerged in recent weeks and is expected to take votes from both of the other main parties on the left.

Also complicating the panorama is the issue of Catalonia, which has been dominating the political agenda in recent years. As the territorial crisis has refused to fade, it has polarized and often poisoned the national political debate.

Sánchez’s PSOE positions itself as a moderate unionist force, opposed to Catalan independence and the right to self-determination but seeking to calm tensions by finding common ground with those in the north-eastern region wanting to break away from Spain.

Discord over Catalonia

The parties to Sánchez’s right have cast him as weak on the issue, or even a willing participant in the Catalan independence project. The conservative Popular Party (PP) used this message in the April election, as did Ciudadanos, while the far-right Vox owes much of its recent rise to its extreme brand of unionism.

Such discord on this highly emotive issue has added to the lack of post-electoral consensus. Ciudadanos, which has lurched to the right since beginning as a centrist party, refused to consider talks with the PSOE to form a new government after the last election. More recently, the party’s leader, Albert Rivera, appears to have softened his stance but remains wedded to an uncompromising approach to Catalonia which makes any deal with Sánchez difficult, particularly if he should also need the support of Catalan or Basque nationalists.

Angering Franco Nostalgists

Moreover, the Catalan crisis is expected to flare up again with the imminent announcement of the verdict on the case of 12 pro-independence leaders who went on trial earlier this year for their role in the region’s controversial and unsuccessful bid for secession in 2017. The election campaign is therefore likely to take place amid turmoil in Catalonia and renewed tensions with Madrid.

However, Spain’s current polarization is fueled by history as well as geography. Ever since taking office, Sánchez has been trying to exhume the remains of the dictator Francisco Franco from his huge mausoleum outside Madrid and bury them somewhere more appropriate for such a divisive figure. The plan has been repeatedly delayed by legal and bureaucratic hurdles. With the supreme court recently ruling in favor of the exhumation, it is possible that Franco’s body will be transferred before the November 10 election.

The idea of the exhumation is popular among left-leaning Spaniards. However, Franco nostalgists, who are a minority, angrily oppose the move and the political right deems it an unnecessary stirring up of the past. If and when it happens, it promises to add yet another element of animosity to Spain’s riven politics.

The post The Iberian Divide appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

The life of Josep Borrell Fontelles, the next high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Vice-president of the European Commission, is extraordinary, as is the man himself. The son of a baker, he was born in 1947 in the small town of La Pobla de Segur, in the Catalan Pyrenees, near Andorra.

After attaining several degrees in aeronautical engineering and economics (including a masters in oil industry economics and technology in Paris) he had a doctorate by the age of 29 and was a full professor in economics at Madrid’s Universidad Complutense by the age of 35. He then turned to politics, becoming secretary of state for the Treasury at 37 and then minister of public works and the environment under the Socialist PSOE government of Felipe González at 44.

He became president of the European Parliament at 57, president of the European University Institute at 63, and then returned to Spanish politics to serve as minister of foreign affairs under Pedro Sánchez. Now at the age of 72 he is to become the chief diplomat for 500 million Europeans, with 4,000 civil servants under his command––quite an intense journey even for such a brilliant mind.

Intensity is actually one of Borrell’s defining character traits. His drive and single-mindedness have brought him great success. He was responsible, for example, for the modernization of the Spanish tax system, including the introduction of VAT, necessary to finance the welfare system when Spain entered the EU in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s he also played a key role in the decision to start building much of the infrastructure that today makes Spain the envy of the world. No small feat.

A Loner, Not a Team Player

However, his strong character and occasional irascibility have sometimes worked against him. At the core, Borrell is a mathematician, and an exceptional one. Not many Spaniards would have been able to get a Fulbright scholarship in the 1970s, still under the Franco dictatorship, to study Applied Mathematics at Stanford University. Yet he did. This outstanding mathematical mind allows him to be Cartesian in his approach to problem-solving but also means that he can easily become impatient when things don’t work out. This is reflected in his favorite hobby: hiking. Having been born in the mountains, wherever he goes he is immediately looking around for the highest mountain to climb.

Hiking, though, is more an individual than a group effort, and that is also one of Borrell’s traits. He is more of a loner than a team player. His intellectual mind is somewhat allergic to social conventions. In a country obsessed with football, he does not like the sport. He also hates networking (maybe the reason he never led the PSOE, although he was close in 1998 when he won the support of the party base). This does not mean, however, that he does not have a full book of contacts. Even after he left power, people would call him to pick his mind. This is a sign of his strong personality and independent thinking.

Recently a senior official at the German Foreign Office told me that Borrell needed to be brave. He must help unite the Europeans internally (starting with the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen) and project European power externally. If courage is required, Borrell has tons of it. Keen on rafting and other extreme mountain sports, he does not shy away from a good fight if he is convinced it is for a good cause. Already as a junior civil servant he fought his bosses, voicing his opposition to the first fiscal amnesty of the González era, and more recently he stood by Pedro Sánchez when the PSOE apparatus wanted to get rid of the leader and very few thought he had any chance to become the Spanish prime minister. Yet another example of Borrell’s determination paying off.

What You See Is What You Get

People who work under him highlight that Borrell is extremely demanding, and that this also extends to himself. Slightly workaholic, he prepares the dossiers in-depth and tries to look at the problems from different angles. He has a critical mind and is always looking for improvement. And above all, he is sincere. He does not suffer fools gladly. What you see is what to get with Borrell. This makes him come across as blunt but has also given him the courage to criticize obvious misbehavior.

In 2006, as president of the European Parliament he told Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face in a summit in Lahti, Finland, that he was a human rights offender. Later, in 2010, when, in the middle of the euro crisis, he became the president of the European University Institute in Florence he also dared to tell the faculty that they should climb down from their ivory tower and do more policy-oriented research.

This brought positive changes, like the introduction of the now well-established “state of the union” conference, the Migration Policy Center, and the Global Governance Program, as well as the chairs on the “Governance of EMU” and “Energy and Climate Change.” However, it also led to a conflict of interests for being on the board of the energy firm Abengoa and his ultimate resignation. This was not the last time his involvement in Abengoa would give him headaches. In 2015 he sold €9,000 worth of shares belonging to his wife with insider knowledge and was later fined. But overall it is clear that Borrell has never used his power to get rich. His austere lifestyle proves that.

Hatred of Catalan Separatism

The biggest fight of his political life has been with the Catalan separatists. Influenced by the French state culture, which earned him the reputation for being something of a “Jacobin,” he has never understood the obsession of so many of his fellow Catalans with the creation of an independent state. Borrell is proud to be Catalan, speaks Catalan, but has always hated Catalan nationalism. This has been a thorn in the side of secessionists. His successful career has been a vivid example that Catalans are not oppressed by the Spanish state.

He has also sought to counter the idea of the “economics of independence” by publishing a book entitled Las Cuentas y los Cuentos de la Independencia (“The numbers and fairy tales of independence”) where he contests the myth that Catalonia pays annually €16 billion into the coffers of the Spanish state. And he also gave a significant speech on October 8, 2017 (one week after the referendum which Spain declared illegal) in Barcelona in front of 1 million people calling for the unity of Spain. His speech showed that he is a convinced Catalan, Spaniard and European, who is adamantly opposed to any form of ethno-nativist nationalism.

This open Weltanschauung—already as a young student he left Spain to work on a farm in Denmark and in the construction sector in Germany, and he even spent some time in an Israeli kibbutz—will be useful for his job as high representative for the EU. In a time when US foreign policy has become much more nationalistic and reemerging powers like China have become more assertive, the chief European diplomat needs to be a tough negotiator, but also someone convinced that the multilateralist path is the right one.

Dealing with China

A lot of his attention over the next five years will no doubt be devoted to problems in the Middle East and North Africa, including issues like migration and Iran. The future of Africa will be a big dossier too. But hiker Borrell needs to look for higher peaks. Dealing with the Chinese challenge is one of them. Strategically it might be the most defining issue during his mandate. And here, he is convinced that only engagement and cooperation are viable routes.

In short, Borrell will be different to his predecessors. He will not try to find the lowest common denominator in foreign policy. After thinking hard about the problem at hand, he will present his vision and negotiate his way through in order to find a consensus for it. He is determined to make the EU a heavyweight in foreign affairs, expanding today’s G2 into tomorrow’s G3. His experience and determination will be his main advantages. As a convinced European, I wish him luck.

Editor’s note: Watch out for our November/December issue which will focus on European foreign policy.

The post Close-Up: Josep Borrell appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Sergio Perez

Spain’s general election has redrawn the country’s political landscape, restoring the center-left Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) as the country’s primary force. And although it has given the far right a foothold in parliament, the result suggests a rejection by Spaniards of the radicalism that the country’s Catalan crisis has generated.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s PSOE made substantial gains from their previous 85 seats to score a clear victory on April 28, although with 123 seats in the 350-seat Congress it fell well short of a majority.

The collapse of their long-time rival, the conservative Popular Party (PP), underlined the Socialists’ win. The PP lost more than half of its seats and is now only just ahead of the center-right Ciudadanos party, which made gains.

To the left of the Socialists, the Unidas Podemos coalition suffered losses, although it hopes to play a key role in the formation of a new government.

The newest force in parliament is Vox, a radical right-wing party which has further polarized an already divided political arena. The fact that it won 24 seats means that for the first time in the democratic era, a far-right party has parliamentary representation.

Remarkable Turnaround

This result marks Sánchez’s first election victory in three attempts and completes a remarkable turnaround for the 47-year-old. His relationship with his own party has at times been strained and after leading it to record defeats in the 2015 and 2016 general elections he was eventually removed as leader. Yet the following year, he defied the PSOE old guard to run in the party primary and reclaim the leadership. Last May, he launched a parliamentary no-confidence motion against the then-prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, whose PP was beset by corruption scandals. On winning the motion, Sánchez became Spanish leader, leading a fragile minority government for 10 months before calling this election.

The gains he made on April 28 mean that he now has a political credibility that many critics, casting him as a lightweight, believed he lacked. The result also offers him a stronger foundation on which to build a new administration.

However, that will not be easy. The Socialists’ most natural ally is Podemos, which appears willing to enter a coalition, although Sánchez would prefer a less formal confidence-and-supply arrangement. To govern they would still need more support, which could come from smaller regional parties and, more controversially, Basque and Catalan nationalists. However, Spain’s investiture system means that such support could include abstentions.

Another possible alliance, offering a less complicated majority, would be between the PSOE and Ciudadanos. However, relations are poor between the two parties and Ciudadanos has already ruled out helping Sánchez govern.

Inter-party talks are unlikely to get under way in earnest until after May 26, the date of European, regional and municipal elections. Even then they could be lengthy, a reflection of the new Spanish political landscape which in recent years has seen the dominance of the PSOE and the PP challenged by the arrival of Podemos, Ciudadanos and, more recently, Vox. Spain’s two-party politics are a thing of the past and a new era of governing partnerships, coalitions—and instability—is now under way.

Sweet Victory

But with the Spanish economy growing faster than most of its European neighbors and the enthusiastically pro-EU Sánchez running on a moderate platform, his win will reassure Brussels amid the turmoil of Brexit and populism.

The Socialists’ victory is their first since 2008 and it tastes all the sweeter because of the performance of the PP, which was its worst ever. Although he has only been the PP’s leader since last summer, the future of 38-year-old Pablo Casado is now in some doubt, possibly depending somewhat on the party’s performance in the European elections in May. His decision to lead it further to the right has contributed to the recent polarization of Spanish politics and turned out to be a serious electoral miscalculation.

The PP, like Ciudadanos and Vox, have sought to place Spain’s ongoing territorial crisis at the heart of the national agenda, ensuring a constant tension with the left. The legacy of Catalonia’s failed bid for independence in 2017 continues to cast a large shadow over national politics. Several independence leaders are living in self-imposed exile abroad, while others are in prison. Twelve are currently on trial at the supreme court for charges that include violent rebellion, sedition, and misuse of public funds.

The north-eastern region’s current government, led by Quim Torra, still advocates independence although its strategy in recent months has been erratic. It and the Catalan independence movement as a whole have labelled the supreme court trial a politically motivated sham which, they say, reflects worrying deficiencies in Spanish democracy as a whole.

In such a context, it has been difficult for Sánchez to govern. Last summer, his Socialists needed the support of an array of parties, including Catalan and Basque nationalists, in order for the no-confidence motion against Rajoy to be passed. Throughout his ensuing tenure, the political right used the support of pro-independence parties for his government as ammunition against him.

Rejection of Belligerence

Casado, for example, described Sánchez as a “villain” and “the greatest traitor of our democracy” because the prime minister had engaged in talks with the Catalan government. The PP leader accused him of making secret deals with Catalan nationalists on issues of sovereignty in exchange for their parliamentary support. No evidence of any such deal has emerged and Catalan nationalists have also attacked Sánchez for not going further in his discussions with them. His refusal to discuss the holding of a Scotland-style binding independence referendum ultimately caused Catalan parties to withdraw their support for his government in February, triggering the election.

Although Ciudadanos, which performed well, has also taken a tough line against Sánchez over Catalonia, the rejection by voters of the PP’s particularly belligerent stance is telling.

In Catalonia itself a similar picture emerged. For the first time, the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) won an election in the region. Although it has a long pro-independence history and its leader Oriol Junqueras is one of those currently on trial, ERC has restrained its rhetoric in recent months, still advocating secession but on the back of dialogue with Spain rather than unilateral action. Such moderation contrasts with the stance of the Together for Catalonia (JxCat) party led by former Catalan president Carles Puigdemont, who is living in Belgium. After the election he warned that “independence shouldn’t rely on Madrid,” but his party’s poor result shows that many Catalan nationalists disagree.

On the unionist side, there was also a swing towards moderation in Catalonia. The tough-talking anti-independence stance of the right fell flat, with the Socialists making gains.

And yet, despite the surge in support for the progressive policies of Sánchez’s PSOE and the shift away from radicalism in Catalonia, this election saw the arrival of a far-right party in parliament for the first time since the democratic transition four decades ago.

Gender, not Europe, as Fault Line

Vox’s 24 seats represent a modest haul, at only 10 percent of the vote—less than the vote share that far-right parties enjoy in countries such as France, Germany, Sweden, or Austria. But the result is still significant, reflecting an appetite among a small minority of Spaniards for policies that combine some elements of European populism with other more uniquely Spanish ingredients.

Vox has called for a clampdown on immigration, while offering conservative social policies that include restricting abortion, rolling back gay marriage legislation, reintroducing military service and lifting restrictions on the possession of firearms. In particular, it has had a big impact on the gender debate, countering a cross-party national consensus on measures to fight violence against women, claiming they were part of a wave of radical feminism sweeping the country.

But unlike its counterparts, such as France’s Rassemblement National and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Vox rarely broaches the issue of Europe. Since joining the EU in 1986, Spain has been one of the bloc’s keenest members, benefiting enormously from both the financing and the democratic cachet afforded by membership. As a result, euroskepticism is virtually absent from Spanish politics.

Instead, Vox has used the Catalan crisis to drive its support, presenting itself as the most uncompromising of all the unionist parties on the issue. As one of the plaintiffs in the supreme court trial of independence leaders, Vox has maintained a high profile on this question and its proposals—which include introducing direct rule in Catalonia indefinitely and recentralizing the Spanish state—has dragged the parties on the right towards it. In March, President’s Trump’s former advisor Steve Bannon was quoted as saying admiringly of Vox that it was “clear proof, more than any other party, of how you can go from having zero influence to playing an important role in a country.”

A left-leaning, Sánchez-led government is likely to form eventually and Vox’s presence in the Spanish parliament may be small but it will now have an institutional platform from which to deliver its radical message.

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© REUTERS/Pierre-Philippe Marcou

 “Sometimes it’s good if you move, sometimes it isn’t. Sometimes not moving is good, sometimes it isn’t.”

Spain’s former leader, Mariano Rajoy, uttered that convoluted sentence in February 2014, during a Senate debate over Catalonia’s grave (and ongoing) political crisis. The then-prime minister’s words entered into a pantheon of confounding expressions and phrases that have left their mark on Spain’s political conscience.

Understanding Rajoy’s penchant for taking decisions only when it appears inevitable is fundamental to understanding Rajoy himself: Some see the work of a great political strategist; others see unequivocal incompetence and futility in the leader of the conservative Partido Popular (PP).

Either way, Rajoy appears to be history. On June 1, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), Pedro Sánchez, managed to do what only a few weeks earlier seemed impossible – to oust Rajoy from government through a no-confidence vote. The social democrats only have 84 seats in parliament after suffering their worst result in the December 2015 elections since Spain’s transition to democracy, but they still managed to drum up broad support for the motion in record time, cobbling together an unlikely alliance of the left-wing alternative Unidos Podemos, the Basque nationalists, Catalan separatists, and other, smaller groups in parliament. In doing so, Sánchez achieved an historic feat: It was the first time a prime minister was toppled by a no-confidence motion in Spain.

The trigger was the so-called “Gürtel case”—a high-profile corruption scandal that uncovered a nebulous web of criminal activity funneling money to the conservative party. Senior PP figures organized a kickback scheme that granted public contracts to businesses in exchange for illegal donations. In late May, a court slapped the PP’s former treasurer and other figures close to the party with lengthy prison sentences and fines; it also pointed to the civic liability of the PP itself and even cast doubt upon the “credibility” of Rajoy’s testimony given in court last summer. It was the straw that broke the camel’s back, elevating the motion of censure that had appeared doomed to failure. The last chapter of the Gürtel case, meanwhile, is still open and will likely generate more uncomfortable headlines for the conservatives.

In a way, Rajoy fell victim to one of his own tactics: He waited for his rivals to move before he did. But this time, he paid the price for not moving. The politician from the northern region of Galicia has always trusted in the PP’s ability to win elections; the party has, after all, amassed the most power and members across 40 years of democracy in Spain. But with only 134 seats in parliament, added to the liberal conservative Ciudadanos party’s 32 seats, the PP simply did not have the numbers to save the government.

Rajoy exited the office with the same attitude he entered more than six years ago—without the slightest will to do anything off-script, not even to prevent political rival Sánchez from becoming Spain’s new leader. Rajoy could have called new elections and then resigned from his post, but he chose, once again, to stand still. Now, his political career appears to be finished as well. After losing the no-confidence motion, he announced he would step down as leader of the PP.

And that is indeed significant. Since entering politics in 1981, Rajoy has served in every possible position there is in the Partido Popular: regional deputy, council president, secretary general, minister, vice president, and president of the government. Despite his four decades of power and experience, his sole defense against corruption accusations was that he knew nothing—a version of events that is impossible to believe.

The leaders of other European countries such as Germany, France, or the UK would have resigned long ago if faced with similar scandals. Spain, however, remains a country where corruption in politics does not seem to wield the same damage—perhaps because Spanish citizens (sadly) have grown accustomed to it.

Anything Could Happen

The new government under Pedro Sánchez is not only historic because it was created on the back of a no-confidence motion, but also because of its make-up: 11 of the 17 ministries are headed by women. Never before has a Spanish executive been so female. And the cabinet choices have been quite the coup for the new government as well, catapulting the PSOE to top of the polls. After more than six years of a colorless, authoritarian style of government under Rajoy, Sánchez has breathed fresh life into Spain’s institutions and sparked euphoria among center-left voters.

But the PSOE’s honeymoon could be as short-lived as the two years until the next general elections. The new government faces major challenges: The crisis in Catalonia is far from being resolved, with elected Catalan politicians still behind bars or in exile for holding a referendum on self-determination that the constitutional court deemed illegal; the country’s much-celebrated macroeconomic recovery is deeply flawed and has generated massive insecurity in the labor market; and the current constitution, approved in 1978, is no longer capable of addressing fundamental questions, such as delineating Spain’s territorial organization or redefining the role of head of state—an increasingly controversial debate over a possible transition from a constitutional monarchy to a republic.

Add to that the fact that Sánchez’s new government only has 84 of 350 seats in Spain’s Congress of Deputies—far short of the majority needed to push through reforms and legislate comfortably. Parliament is deeply fractured, and it seems institutional instability will be a given.

If the Catalonia crisis or the country’s fragile economic recovery takes a turn for the worse, the PSOE could pay a heavy price in the next elections. As Enric Juliana, Madrid correspondent and deputy director of the Catalan newspaper La Vanguardia (and one of the best analysts of Spanish politics) pointed out, after years of vertigo, nobody is truly down for the count in Spain’s political arena—and above all, anything can happen.

The post The Price of Not Moving appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Albert Gea

It began like an Asterix and Obelix story. In 2009 a tiny village – not Gallic, but Catalan – rose up against the central authority, in this case Madrid.

In the Catalan Arenys de Munt community, a network of pipes drains the water that flows under the Rambla and its sycamore trees. However, the pipes cannot handle the massive amount of rain the region experiences in the fall, and the Rambla is often flooded, with the magnificent sycamore trees in danger of drowning. The community of barely 9,000 inhabitants has long debated what to do to address the situation.

In December 2009, as autumn threatened to submerge the community once again, a new idea was proposed: rather than Arenys de Munt, Madrid would be responsible for the problem in the future. After all, the financial means to renovate the piping was only lacking, according to then-Mayor Carles Morà, because “we send much more money to Madrid than we get back.” The mayor called for a referendum to determine whether the community would manage its own affairs in the future, and a significant part of the population enthusiastically supported the proposal – independence seemed at the time to be the town’s philosopher’s stone, an alchemical miracle that would address economic problems and ensure lasting financial stability.

The referendum took place on September 13, 2009. Only 41 percent of eligible voters decided to take part, with 96 percent of those voting for independence. In other words, only 39 percent of eligible voters voted to separate from Madrid. However, the fight for independence continued. In 2013, the community cut its ties to the central state and declared itself the “free and sovereign territory of Catalonia.”

That might sound a little overblown, even unintentionally funny. But Catalonia was not satisfied with symbolic gestures. Other cities and villages followed the Arenys de Munt community, and eventually the whole Catalan regional government under Carles Puigdemont declared its intention to break free from the Spanish state. Though Catalonia’s efforts to achieve more autonomy, even full state sovereignty, have a long history, European publics and elites were caught entirely by surprise by what seemed like a sudden outbreak of nationalism – especially because the Catalan conflict feels so out of place in the current tableaux of European crises.

Secession and nationalism have a bad reputation: they are atavistic, backward, and xenophobic. That applies just as much to the separatists in the Donetsk as it does to the rebellious governments in Poland and Hungary, and to the Lega Nord in Italy, a party that works aggressively to safeguard the wealth of its own region against the country’s poorer southern regions. Just recently, more than 90 percent of voters in Veneto and Lombardy voted in (non-binding) referenda for significantly more autonomy, above all in financial matters. This separatism is at its core aggressive, angry, and anti-cosmopolitan.

For quite a while, Catalan nationalism did not seem like a threat to Europe; like the Scottish independence movement, it seemed friendly, cosmopolitan, and explicitly pro-European. In short, it seemed like there was nothing to worry about. So when the Catalans intentionally plunged Spain into a veritable state crisis it came as a shock.

Centuries’-Old Problems

Nations are still just “imagined communities,” in the words of political scientist Benedict Anderson. And today, by invoking imagined ancient traditions, a wave of nationalism aimed at the breakup of the EU is gaining steam. Enlightened contemporary thinkers consider this use of the past illegitimate; they maintain that the conflicts of the present must be solved in the present. However, they miss the fallacy in the word “past:” once a thing has happened, it can never really pass. The conflict in Catalonia today is just the latest manifestation of the centuries’-old problem of the Iberian Peninsula.

Long before there was a Spain ruled from Madrid, Catalonia was a significant power in its own right. From 1137 on Catalonia led a community of states that would become one of the leading powers of the Mediterranean through its dynastic connections, a power that even issued its own currency. As a trading state it was externally oriented, self-confident, and open to the world. When the power of the Castilians later expanded outwards from the center, bringing with it a strictly enforced state unity and the Castellano language, there was resistance along the entire periphery of the peninsula, though only Portugal managed to return to independent statehood in 1640.

In the Basque country, this resistance was and still is ethnically motivated, which is one reason that it has turned hostile and xenophobic – and why in the second half of the 20th century it committed acts of barbaric atrocity. For the Catalans, however, secession was never a goal to be won at any price. Furthermore, their sense of self was never based on ethnicity, but rather on their nation’s culture: they wanted their right to self-governance back.

In the Spanish War of Succession at the beginning of the 18th century the majority of the Catalans found themselves on the losing side. The victorious Philipp V marched into Barcelona on September 11, 1714, and with one stroke did away with all the remaining institutions of Catalan self-governance. It was an event that was etched deeply into Catalan national memory: September 11 is an ecstatically celebrated national holiday, the Diada Nacional de Catalunya. As is often the case with history, the day of their greatest defeat has become a day for new beginnings.

After the end of an eight-year-long dictatorship under General Prima de Rivera, Catalonia’s hour struck in 1931. Spain had become a republic, and Catalonia got its full self-determination back. The entirety of its institutions of governance, the Generalitat de Catalunya, was recreated. But it lasted only a moment: When Francisco Franco and his Falange won the civil war in 1939, all rights to autonomy were eliminated in Catalonia, which had – like many other regions – fought for the Republic until the bitter end. Until Franco’s death in 1975, the Catalan language remained forbidden.

Even today, when many Catalans think of Madrid, the capital of a democratic state, they think back to Franco. Franco’s excessive push for Spanish unity has given it an ugly reputation – especially in Catalonia, it stands for Madrid’s attempts to play the center of the country against the rest, and the suppression of Spain’s diversity.

Ruling from on High

As soon as the dictator was dead, cries arose from all over the country for more autonomy. As though from nowhere, the September 11, 1977 Diada saw more than 1.5 million participants demonstrating, one of the largest demonstrations in Spanish history. That certainly made an impression: a process of regionalization was introduced, which seemed to be the only way to avoid violence. Catalan was allowed once more, there was suddenly Catalan TV, and the Teatro Lliure, the first theater in Catalan, opened in Barcelona. When King Juan Carlos visited Catalonia and spoke a sentence in Catalan during a public speech, the excitement was enormous. Everything seemed to be turning out well.

But when discussions switched from software to hardware – that is, from the language and culture to politics and the economy – things became more difficult. The government in Madrid slowed things down wherever it could, dragging its feet for years in talks over a statute governing the region’s autonomy. The Catalan draft read simply: “Catalonia is a nation.” In the final draft, however, an agonizingly awkward formulation was used to dodge the difficult questions: “Catalonia, as a nationality, exercises its self-governance as an autonomous community in agreement with the constitution and the present statute, which presents its fundamental identity norms.”

Madrid was simply not ready to transform the senate into some kind of body for regional representation. That would have bound the centrifugal forces of the autonomy movements back to the central state. Instead, Madrid dealt with the autonomous communities in an almost feudal way. It allowed them different levels of autonomy – in the case of Catalonia, for example, it allowed the creation of a Catalan police force and made moves, albeit limited ones, on the question of more tax autonomy for the region. Catalonia became autonomous in several areas. The process was not a dialogue, but rather a declaration from on high. At its core, the central government was only ready to present the autonomous communities with a sort of chaperoned self-governance.

Now the stubbornness on both sides has allowed the situation to escalate to a point that was only recently unthinkable in a democratic Europe. Without showing the slightest interest in the appearance of legitimacy, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has stuck to a legalistic position, constantly returning to the provisions of the Spanish constitution. In one interview, he said, “The only plan that we have is to make sure that the future Catalan government abides by the law. (…) Everyone can have their own political opinion, whatever that might be. But everyone must respect the law, otherwise we live in the Wild West.” His party, the Partido Popular, can trace its roots back to the Franco regime; for this reason alone, he would have been better off behaving less dictatorially.

In a situation of such high tension, when the government is nearly at the point of using force to assert its authority, references to the letter of the law cannot suffice alone. The Spanish government needs to behave in a way that builds a relationship with the opposition; brinkmanship will only guarantee that the conflict is prolonged.

Revolutionary Folly

But Madrid’s stubbornness in no way justifies the behavior of the Catalan nationalists. The region, especially Barcelona, is prospering, and the money it transfers to the central government is hardly leaving it impoverished. It has already achieved cultural and linguistic autonomy, and further steps toward self-determination will be difficult to achieve with an unfriendly central government. Spain has also given the region more weight in the EU – the EU documents concerning Catalonia are now translated into Catalan in Brussels, and in questions concerning their interests, Catalonia and the Basque Country can take part in the EU’s Council of Ministers meetings. The EU promotes the Catalan cultural scene, and one of the few EU Commission representatives sits in Barcelona. In several European capitals, including Berlin, Catalonia has its own representative, who the Catalans hope to someday turn into a full ambassador.

In light of all this, the secessionist furor seems slightly crazy. Full sovereignty has become an obsession, and those who buy into it cannot be swayed by arguments or facts. It hardly matters that only a minority – albeit a significant one – has taken part in the referenda so far, or that the region’s desire to leave Spain and immediately be admitted to the EU is unlikely to pan out. If one is being charitable to the Catalans, one could say that they are indulging in romantic revolutionary play acting. The separatists are dusting off an ancient, almost mythical conception of a people – and one that historically has often led to violence. Absolutely no one wants to get involved in the difficult work of compromise and real policy-making.

The fact that the Catalan secessionists dream of a peaceful state makes them no less foolish. This nationalism will contribute to the destruction of the political world, whether it wants to or not. Already, all other Catalan political priorities have been displaced by the independence question. But nationhood is not everything, and not even the most important thing. The strong minority pushing for Catalonia to break off from Spain is preventing the region from addressing its larger everyday problems: work, social issues, infrastructure, education, digitalization, and in general the question of how the region can succeed in a changing world.

History has shown us clearly that whenever the nation trumps all other issues – whether for ethnic or cultural reasons – the end is never good. Europe does not need another nation. It is telling that Russia’s disinformation campaigns have been active in Catalonia: Russia hopes that powerful secessionist tendencies in Catalonia will make its own annexation of Crimea look slightly better – and if the Catalan conflict destabilizes a Spain that has just recently emerged from an economic crisis, so much the better for Moscow.

The EU’s Dangerous Discretion

The EU is under incredible pressure. This new wave of nationalism, which sometimes aims to create entirely new states and sometimes aims to renationalize existing states, is hardly helping. Catalonia has shown that nationalist folly can also be peaceful and cosmopolitan. Does that mean that the EU’s existence is being questioned from both the left and the right, from the know-nothings and the elite? Does that threaten the EU’s basic existence?

The EU has decided to come down decisively on the side of the central government in Madrid. As the Spanish constitution does not allow a region to break away, the Commission is correct here – as it is when it points to the “Prodi Doctrine,” which specifies that a breakaway region will not be considered a member of the union until it completes a regular application process. Nevertheless, it was not smart to stick to these stances alone. To ridicule the secessionists, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said that the EU comprised 27 member states, not 98, and he has argued that a Catalan state would be too small for membership in the EU. But this is coming from a man who was once prime minister of a state that did not even have 600,000 citizens (i.e. Luxembourg); Catalonia has nearly three times the inhabitants, more than 13 existing EU member states.

The European institutions are not wrong in their fear that support from Brussels for the separatists, even ambivalent support, could trigger secessionist movements all over Europe. Nevertheless, in supporting Madrid unequivocally they have overlooked something important: since its foundation, the European Community has never been a traditional organization in which states alone cooperate towards common goals.

The EU is a community of laws and norms based directly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals. In 1963 the European Court of Justice established that the functions of the common market affected “the community of affiliated individuals directly” because the treaty establishing the European Common Market is “more than an agreement based on the reciprocal duties between the states that are party to the treaty.”

Since the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht there has been the idea of European citizenship: every citizen of the EU is not only a citizen of their own state, but also a direct citizen of the EU. For the EU, the interests of the individual citizens count just as much as the interests of the member states. In this sense, the European Community – a supranational body from its very beginnings – should serve as a preview of new forms of association that are possible. The EU cannot risk losing this element without also losing its substance, its soul, and its historical uniqueness.

Losing Its Soul

And that is exactly what it is doing in the case of Catalonia. In the words of legal scholar Bardo Fassbender, the EU is behaving like an old-school international organization, defending the position of Spain, its member state, without compromise. In doing so, it is hurting itself.

At the moment, the Spanish-Catalan conflict seems intractable, and it is unlikely the autonomist energy will simply dissipate. The EU should become involved without fear of an autonomist chain reaction, and become what is has long been on paper: a mediator with authority that will address both the justified concerns of the Madrid government and the equally justified concerns of the Catalan nationalists. The EU has to take the concerns of its separatist citizens seriously. Here the EU could actually prove it has the authority that its founding treaties have long established. Nationalism could then become the catalyst that pushes European unification a step further.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

In the days leading up to Catalonia’s October 1 independence referendum, one single word summed up the determination of pro-independence Catalans to make their voices heard: votarem (we will vote). In Barcelona, the region’s capital, the call to vote was raised everywhere, from posters plastered onto bus stops to billboards designed by passionate students who held a sit-in to demand the right to cast their ballots.

With votarem, Catalonians expressed a discontent that had been simmering for seven years. The modern independence movement saw a huge rise in popular support in 2010, when the Spanish Constitutional Court decided to revoke several articles of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia that granted new powers of self-rule to the region.

Catalans felt their hard-won freedoms were being curtailed and took to the streets in anger. Their regional president of the time, Artur Mas, announced a referendum on independence. In November 2014, Catalans went to the polls in a non-binding vote, and around 80 percent voted for independence. Yet turnout was low. No official figure was given, but the newspaper El País estimated voter participantion at only 37 percent. Mas stepped down.

In 2017, he was banned from holding public office for two years and fined €36,500 for holding the vote in defiance of an order by the Spanish Constitutional Court. The country’s constitution does not allow for any region to split off; it is based on “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards.”

“Silent Majority”

Carles Puigdemont, who took over as president of Catalonia after Mas, has followed in his predecessor’s footsteps – perhaps more closely than he might have wished, for he, too, now faces charges related to an illegal independence referendum. It was Puigdemont who decided to go ahead with the vote on October 1, reflecting the disdain that many pro-independence Catalans feel for Spain’s central authorities. Their continued protests are a gesture of defiance toward the national powers that be.

It is also no coincidence that protestors have been holding posters and signs in Catalan, not Spanish. The Catalan language is strongly tied to the question of history and identity. Older Catalans can still remember when their language was repressed under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. Speaking Catalan and, in some cases, refusing to speak Spanish, can be a political statement in itself.

Pro-independence Catalans have been vocal and present on the streets and in the international media coverage of the political crisis. Catalans against independence, who have often been dubbed “the silent majority,” for the longest time made no similar organized effort to unite. They were a disparate group of people who, on the whole, prefer to stay at home rather than take to the streets in support of remaining with Spain. It was only at the end of October that 300,000 unionists took to the streets of Barcelona to demonstrate their support for the central government.

The October 1 referendum ended with 90 percent voting for independence. At around 43 percent, turnout was higher this time, but still did not make for a majroity. allow the was followed a couple of weeks of tense back-and-forth between Puigdemont and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. Eventually, Rajoy announced that the Spanish government would invoke Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution and assume power over Catalonia. That included sacking Puigdemont and his ministers and calling new regional elections. Madrid argued it was forced to protect its territorial sovereignty from a rogue group of separatists. Pro-independence activists claimed the central government was flexing the iron fist of authoritarianism.

A Secret Vote, A Flight

In defiance of Madrid’s orders, Puigdemont declared independence after a secret vote that was boycotted by most of the opposition parties in the Catalan parliament. He then fled to Belgium via France with a handful of his associates. Eight ministers who stayed behind were removed from office, arrested, and jailed pending charges over the independence declaration.

In the latest twist in Spain’s worst political crisis in decades, a European arrest warrant was issued for Puigdemont on November 3 after he failed to appear in court in Spain on possible charges of sedition, rebellion, and misuse of public funds. He handed himself in to the Belgian police on November 5. It remains unclear if and when he will be extradited back to Spain.

For pro-independence Catalans, it is a bitter irony that in only one day, Catalonia was declared an independent republic and had its autonomy stripped. New regional elections will take place on December 21, but this time, the vote. will be very different. It remains to be seen whether those who demanded the right to vote in the run up to October 1 will even recognize the December poll, especially after Puigdemont declared the region a “new republic.”

According to recent surveys, pro-independence parties look set to win the election but fall short of the majority of seats they need to restart their independence campaign. In other words, even if they unite, Catalonia’s separatists may well fall short in December’s vote – dealing a blow to their hopes for independence.

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© REUTERS/Susana Vera

Last week, Catalans awoke to news that Spain’s national military police had raided the regional government’s facilities, from the economy department to that responsible for external affairs and even the presidency’s offices. They combed the Generalitat, the political institution that governs the autonomous region, detaining the regional junior economy minister and 13 other officials on charges of disobedience and embezzlement – all for organizing the independence referendum to be held in Catalonia on Sunday.

The Civil Guard also confiscated ten million paper ballots, shuttered websites promoting or facilitating the vote, and seized control of the region’s finances, effectively decimating Catalonia’s logistical capacity to organize the referendum. Yet if the Spanish government intended to quell dissent, it has done just the opposite: for more than a week, protesters have taken to the streets of Barcelona, waving Catalonian flags and demanding the release of government officials and an end to what they deem a “state of exception.”

The Spanish government, led by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and his conservative People’s Party (PP), argue the “in” or “out” vote is illegal because it challenges the country’s constitution, which clearly protects Spain’s territorial unity. Catalan President Carles Puigdemont, however, ready to defy Madrid, has repeatedly said that there will be a “legitimate vote” on Sunday, even if the requirements needed to make the result binding – a public campaign for both yes and no votes, registered electoral polling stations, a reliable census – are not in place. The standoff is increasingly turning into a high-stakes game of chess, with both sides gunning for checkmate.

The Road to Referendum

Catalonia is not simply a self-governing region, with its own culture, language, and a deep-rooted pride. It is also one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, generating around 20 percent of the country’s GDP and around 25 percent of foreign trade. If Catalonia were to break away, it would leave a gaping hole in the Spanish economy.

The drive for independence was a fringe movement in the 1990s. But it gained steam over the following decade, inflamed by the conservative People’s Party (PP) and its attempts to tighten the screws on autonomy. In 2005, Catalan nationalists in the Generalitat parliament drafted and approved the Estatut, a new charter that expanded upon Catalonia’s self-governance. Voters approved the new framework in a referendum.

But the PP appealed, arguing that Catalonia was being granted too much privilege. That set the stage for 2010, when the constitutional court – responding to the PP’s appeal – rejected parts of the charter that outlined greater autonomy.

Meanwhile the eurozone debt crisis fanned the flames. The Catalan nationalist party, forced to implement spending cuts, blamed the Spanish government for crippling the wealthy region, pointing to the staggering taxes it had to pay to the Spanish government to keep Spain’s struggling economy afloat. That bolstered independence fervor in the region, and in the next Catalan elections, three separatist parties won 47 percent of the vote – and more than half the seats in parliament. With their majority, they adopted a declaration of sovereignty, setting the course for a referendum. The constitutional court ruled it unconstitutional.

Going to Court

Spain’s government has long turned to its courts to achieve what it has been unable to politically. After the eurozone debt crisis, for example, Catalonia implemented measures to protect families from foreclosure and maintain their basic services like electricity and gas. The constitutional court rejected those mechanisms. It repealed elements of the Catalan Equality Law that granted more rights to trade unions and women, and overturned an initiative blocking fracking in Catalonia. These were cases, according to the court, where the Generalitat had overstepped its boundaries as a self-governing region. But the rulings only served to whip up more anger in Catalonia.

“These types of reactions have shown that there are many state structures that did not really modernize after the transition to democracy” [from the Fascist Franco dictatorship in 1978], said Xavier Giró, a professor of political journalism at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), adding that both the People’s Party and the judiciary were exhibiting undemocratic behavior. “The fact that 80 percent of Catalans say they want a referendum is a demand for political self-determination, regardless if the vote is yes or no, and you cannot ignore it,” he said.

On a national level, the left-wing Podemos party and a coalition of smaller nationalist parties that together make up a third of the Spanish parliament favor a referendum in Catalonia that would mirror the independence votes in Scotland and Quebec. They have urged the PSOE, the social democrats, to join forces, but poor election results and internal squabbles have rendered the PSOE silent. The European Union, too, has remained largely quiet on what it considers an internal question facing one of its member states.

Even though a large majority of Catalans supports a referendum, the polls show that the independence vote would actually lose. Even so, tensions are running high. If Spanish police block polling stations this coming Sunday, the voices of the #Notenimpor (“We’re not scared”) and #Votarem (“We will vote”) will only be magnified.

The post The Catalan Cliff appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Jon Nazca

The European Commission’s daily press briefing in Brussels is ordinarily a pretty staid affair. But early this week, things got a little weird.

“In London this weekend there has been talk of war with Spain over Gibraltar – so I would like to ask, which side would the European Commission take?” asked a journalist.

“The European Commission takes the side of dialogue and cooperation, which is our way of doing things,” the Commission spokesperson answered pointedly.

The question came after a weekend in which British newspapers ran headlines talking of a war with Spain over the British territory of Gibraltar, a rock at Spain’s Southern tip which Britain has held since it won the territory in the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713.

On Sunday, former Conservative Party leader Lord Howard said that war with Spain was a possibility if the UK had to use armed conflict to maintain control of the territory. He was infuriated that the 27 other EU countries had mentioned the territory in draft Brexit negotiating guidelines after Prime Minister Theresa May formally triggered the process of leaving the bloc last week.

Howard believes Gibraltar could be lost in the course of the negotiations, and he said May would defend the territory in the same way that the country’s previous female prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, defended the Falkland Islands in the war with Argentina in 1982.

“It’s a remarkable coincidence that it was 35 years ago this week that another woman prime minister sent a task force halfway across the world to protect another small group of British people against another Spanish-speaking country,” he said. “Our prime minister will show the same resolve in looking after the interests of Gibraltar as Margaret Thatcher did looking after the interests of the Falkland Islanders.”

Spain’s foreign minister lashed back, saying his government was “surprised by the tone of comments coming out of Britain.” “It seems someone is losing their cool,” he told a conference in Madrid.

Border Problems

Brexit has thrown Gibraltar’s status into question, given that the territory’s relationship with Spain, which disputes Britain’s claim, is governed by an EU treaty. Once the UK leaves the EU, that treaty will no longer be valid. Suddenly, the open-border agreement with Spain on which the territory depends could come to a crashing halt.

Because of this, Gibraltar’s government pleaded with people ahead of last year’s referendum to vote to remain in the EU, and the vast majority of Gibraltarians did so. Gibraltar’s First Minister Fabian Ricardo warned ahead of the vote that a leave vote would result in strict border controls with Spain and that anti-EU voters would have “a lot to answer for” if Britain voted to leave the bloc.

The territory needs Spanish imports, and it needs Spanish workers. 12,000 Spanish people commute into Gibraltar every day to work. Without them, the economy would collapse.

From the EU’s perspective, it was felt that Gibraltar had to be mentioned in the negotiating guidelines because the frontier between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the other thorny border issue thrown up by Brexit, was mentioned, too. Just like in Gibraltar, a Brexit will require at least a customs barrier and probably an immigration barrier across the island of Ireland, something not seen since the violent “troubles” ended in the late 1990s. The guidelines specified that any new border regime, which would have to allow for “flexibility”, would need to be directly agreed between the UK and Ireland. The same applies to Gibraltar.

“After the UK leaves the Union, no agreement between the EU and the UK may apply to the territory of Gibraltar without the agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom,” the guidelines state.

Given that Spain believes the territory should be returned to it, this opened the possibility that the UK could lose Gibraltar in the course of the negotiations – because any arrangement will need Spanish approval. “Gibraltar is not a bargaining chip in these negotiations”, Picardo said this weekend. “Gibraltar belongs to the Gibraltarians and we want to stay British.”

The reality is that Gibraltar has in fact become a bargaining chip, and this was inevitable. As Picardo warned before the vote, the UK is now in a very weak position vis-a-vis Gibraltar, and the EU27 know that. Refusing to allow a special border exception for Gibraltar will cripple the territory’s economy, but it will cause no harm to Spain. The only way the UK can get a special border regime agreed for them is to give up on something else in the negotiations.

That will be the real test of Britain’s love for the rock – not whether they will go to war to defend it, but whether they will agree to something which could hurt all of Britain automatically in order to keep the territory. Those threatening war now know it is an empty gesture. On Monday Prime Minister May downplayed the war talk.

Imperial Hubris

Still there was a lot of embarrassment among the British in Brussels, and exasperation among other Europeans. But there was little in the way of surprise. The Brexiteer argument has been jingoistic on the subject of economics for so long, it was perhaps only a matter of time until this extended into the military sphere.

Britain is so powerful and mighty that it can surely negotiate on equal footing with a bloc that is seven times its size, Theresa May’s government has insisted. “Threats” by the EU27 to lock the UK out in the cold and leave it with no trading arrangement with the EU were surely bluster, they have said, because the EU needs the UK more than the UK needs the EU.

So when the Brexiteers sought to remind Europeans of their disproportionately large military power (the only EU country that has anything close to the same military power is France), it seemed a logical progression. It isn’t the first time they have done so. May’s Brexit letter triggering Article 50 also sought to remind the EU of the UK’s military power.

“In security terms, a failure to reach agreement would mean our cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism would be weakened,” she wrote. Her EU partners interpreted this as a threat. Perhaps more importantly, it looks desperate.

While few think that it’s actually going to come to war between the UK and Spain, the comments over the weekend reinforced an impression of a UK government completely detached from reality.

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© Artwort: Dominik Herrmann

A year ago, it seemed a most unlikely outcome. But after ten months of wrangling, Mariano Rajoy’s trademark patience has paid off once again: He was confirmed as prime minister of Spain for a second term on October 29. After two general elections ended in deadlock, the opposition Socialist party abstained on a vote of confidence, allowing Rajoy to form a minority government and begin four more years as prime minister.

Rajoy is the antithesis of the showy politician. Bearded and soft-spoken with a slight lisp, Spain’s prime minister is a survivor. He survives by waiting it out, by battening down the hatches until the tempest passes. In this way, he has weathered many a political storm, from losing two back-to-back general elections to facing myriad corruption scandals within his own party. He is a survivor in his private life, too, walking away from a helicopter crash in 2013 with nothing more than a broken finger. That perseverance has been put to the test in office.

Spain had been without a government since December 2015, when Rajoy’s center-right People’s Party (PP) won the general election but failed to reach an absolute majority. The rise of upstart parties Podemos (We Can) and Ciudadanos (Citizens) split the vote between four parties rather than the traditional two. And Socialist leader Pedro Sánchez rejected Rajoy’s plan to form a German-style “grand coalition” between right and left, forcing a second general election in June 2016. The results were no different, leaving Spain trapped in a political stalemate.

Rising through the Ranks

Mariano Rajoy Brey was born in the rainy northwestern region of Galicia in 1955 and, after studying law, quickly became the youngest Spanish property notary at 23. A car accident in the same year left him with serious injuries to his face; he grew his now signature beard to cover the scars. He left Galicia for Madrid and the world of politics and soon rose through the political ranks of Spain’s center-right PP, serving as minister of education and culture, minister of the interior, and deputy prime minister before he was handpicked by Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar to succeed him after the 2004 election.

But the party suffered a shock defeat, widely blamed on its handling of the 2004 Madrid bombings just three days before the election. Aznar and many in the PP, including Rajoy, immediately blamed the bombings on the Basque separatist group ETA. But Al Qaida was behind the attack, and voters punished the PP at the polls, ushering in the Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and condemning Rajoy to two terms as leader of the opposition.

When Rajoy finally swept to victory in 2011, Spain’s economy was in shambles. The country’s housing bubble had burst and unemployment was at 23 percent and rising. A new protest movement was forming in response to the crisis, the Indignados (the indignant), an anti-austerity platform that would give rise to Podemos.

Rajoy’s first year in office was beset by one economic woe after another: unemployment climbing over 27 percent, an imploding banking sector and a crisis in public finances. He implemented a series of measures to boost the economy including freezing the minimum wage, cutting public sector jobs, and – going against a campaign promise – raising taxes. “For me raising taxes was a difficult and painful decision,” he told Spanish news agency EFE on breaking the election pledge. “We didn’t like doing it but it was absolutely necessary to stop the spiral.” His nightmare year got worse when he was forced to ask the EU for €100 billion to shore up the country’s ailing banks.

Then a number of corruption scandals hit the PP, seriously eroding Spaniards’ trust in the party. Rajoy himself was named in papers released in 2013: He was linked to a slush fund run by ex-PP treasurer Luis Bárcenas. Rajoy denied all involvement and, despite a petition signed by over a million Spaniards calling for his resignation, never came close to stepping down.
His survival might be attributed to the fact that corruption is far from a one party problem in Spain. Scandals have hit the opposition Socialists and even the royal family: King Felipe’s sister, Cristina, became the first royal to take the stand when she and her husband went on trial on corruption charges in early 2016.

The economy undoubtedly dominated Rajoy’s first term as prime minister but there was another significant challenge: Catalonia. The economic crisis and the conservative government’s absolute refusal to negotiate on a Scotland-style referendum spurred fresh calls for independence in the wealthy region. “No one is going to break up Spain in any way. No one is going to turn citizens of Catalonia into foreigners in their own country,” Rajoy said during a press conference in 2015. Rajoy even warned that Scotland would have to reapply for EU membership and claimed the country’s independence would worsen the EU’s economic slump.

Safe Pair of Hands

Rajoy is stereotypically Galician – he is closed off and cautious, and even his closest allies admit he lacks charisma. Despite regularly attending EU meetings, he has been quiet on the international stage. Some chalk that up to language issues. His poor English skills have been the butt of many jokes in Spain; eagle-eyed observers spotted rudimentary English homework on his desk during one televised interview.

Rajoy declined to take part in a debate with other party leaders ahead of the December 2015 election arguing he had been invited to over thirty debates and couldn’t honor them all. Spanish newspaper El País left a symbolic empty lectern in his place. He sent his deputy prime minister in his place to a second debate, fueling criticism of his lack of engagement with the public. He is the most unpopular among young Spaniards, who, according to a 2015 poll, hate Rajoy more than Spain’s former dictator, Francisco Franco.

On a political scene peppered with new parties offering a departure from the norm, Rajoy has sold himself as a safe pair of hands, someone Spaniards need to finish the job of fixing the economy – which continues to grow despite current political uncertainty. It’s true that Spain’s economy expanded by 3.2 percent in 2015 and is expected to do so at the same rate in 2016. Unemployment is the lowest it’s been in nearly seven years as Spain has become a rare bright spot in an otherwise stagnant eurozone. Brussels has praised Madrid’s austerity measures and structural reforms – but the recovery is far from complete, and EU officials are concerned the political instability will derail economic progress.

In October, Madrid admitted it would miss EU budget deficit targets, blaming the recent turmoil. In August, Spain narrowly avoided a fine for repeated breaches of budget rules.
And tightening the national belt has affected some of the most vulnerable. Spain has seen unprecedented numbers of home evictions as well as a rise in short-term contracts that offer little job security.

Four More Years

For his next four-year term, Rajoy is promising to create two million jobs as well as provide tax cuts and overhaul the public sector. But with a minority government, he could find it much more difficult to push through his desired changes.

And, as usual, corruption scandals are never far away; the latest one threatens to embarrass and fracture the PP. In early October Spain’s national court played host to 37 defendants – many high-profile figures within the PP – charged of fixing public tenders worth over €350 million. The case is so big it’s been split in two and will last for months. It will shine a light on the corruption that flourished during Spain’s boom years, leading to the real estate crisis and soaring unemployment. The case will be a daily reminder to Spaniards of the PP’s reputation for corruption and the part it played in causing Spain’s economic crisis – not an ideal start to Rajoy’s next premiership.

Rajoy is pro-European and in his next term will continue to oppose any talks between Scotland and the EU, fearing that Catalonia might be inspired to follow suit. Rajoy has also warned that once the UK leaves the single market and abandons free movement, the inhabitants of Gibraltar, the British enclave on the southern tip of Spain, will have to do so too – unless they approve shared sovereignty with Spain. Rajoy could see Brexit as a chance to finally push for shared sovereignty of Gibraltar, whose citizens voted almost unanimously to remain in the EU.
Rajoy champions his style of governing as calm and patient; his critics see a lack of action.

They point to his weak record during the eight years he spent in the opposition before becoming prime minister and to his “do nothing” approach on the Catalonia issue. Despite calls for him to stand down during the last ten months of political deadlock, he has stood firm. And his famous waiting game looks like it has paid off yet again.

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