© REUTERS/Murad Sezer

The brutal murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Istanbul consulate has prompted swift condemnation around the world, but the West’s political response has been mixed so far. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has suspended arms exports to Saudi Arabia, while French President Emmanuel Macron has remained non-committal and has decried immediate arms embargoes as “demagoguery.” US President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has been taking a “wait and see” approach, and that has frustrated many in the United States, including Republican senators.

Despite the polarized political atmosphere in the run-up to the midterm elections, there has been surprisingly strong bipartisan agreement that Washington should take a tough stance on Riyadh. And expectations are that Congress will continue to put pressure on the Trump administration. Indeed, if congressional leaders decided to block American weapons sales and military aid to Riyadh, this could fundamentally alter the US-Saudi relationship.

In the past weeks, President Trump has been reluctant to come down hard on the Saudis. Early on, it became clear that his main concern is preserving “his” $110 billion arms deal (in fact, negotiations started under President Barack Obama), arguing that halting the deal could risk other Saudi non-military investments in the US worth $450 billion and endanger a million American jobs (the numbers are exaggerated).

Trump’s advisers have pointed out that the US-Saudi relationship is too important, both commercially and strategically, to be damaged because of the death of a journalist. Indeed, the Trump administration considers Saudi Arabia–next to Israel–its key ally in the Middle East and an important partner to curb Iran’s influence in the region. However, Trump made a drastic shift last week when he said that “the cover-up [of Khashoggi’s murder] was the worst in the history of cover-ups.” It’s questionable, however, whether the White House is willing to take rigorous measures to punish Saudi Arabia’s leadership.

Senators on both sides of the aisle, however, don’t want to sit on their hands. They were suspicious of the Saudi explanations for Khashoggi’s disappearance from the start. One of the most vocal Republican senators has been Lindsey Graham, a Trump ally, who urged the administration to “sanction the hell” out of Saudi Arabia. Republican Senator Rand Paul, who has supported Trump on many issues, even argued in favor of cancelling the arms deal. To urge Trump to take the allegations against Riyadh seriously, 22 senators from both parties wrote a letter calling upon the administration to launch a government investigation into the Khashoggi murder, which could trigger US sanctions against Saudi individuals.

Congress Is Watching

There are several reasons for the senators’ strong reaction. First, the fact that Khashoggi was a US resident and a contributor to The Washington Post certainly helped to bring his murder to congressional attention–in contrast to the many other human rights violations occurring in Saudi Arabia. Second, the case enabled senators to demonstrate that Congress is an independent branch of government that has the power to challenge Trump’s positions. Senators feared that the Trump administration might get “back to business” with Riyadh once the case had dropped off the political agenda. The senators wanted to show that Congress will speak out against human rights violations even when the administration is unwilling to do so. Third, most of the Republican senators who signed the request do not seek re-election in the upcoming midterms and are thus under no pressure to align with Trump’s position. Finally, some lawmakers may well fear a debate about Saudi influence campaigns in Washington that also addressed congressmen–a debate that has started already.

When it became clear last week that the Trump administration had to more resolutely condemn the murder, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced sanctions on those individuals found responsible. But Pompeo also stressed that America’s “shared strategic interest with Saudi Arabia will remain.” Therefore, it seems unlikely that the administration will take more drastic steps, such as cutting US military aid. Still, on Wednesday Pompeo called on the Saudi leadership to negotiate a ceasefire in war-torn Yemen.

If the Democrats win back the House of Representatives (not an unlikely scenario), they will likely push the administration to harden their line further still and may even derail Trump’s Middle East policy. For example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee has the power to stop foreign arms sales. However, congressmen from both parties will also fear repercussions for the US defense industry, which maintains a strong lobby on Capitol Hill and employs many Americans. A complete overhaul of US-Saudi defense cooperation is therefore unrealistic, and expectations that the Khashoggi murder will fundamentally alter US-Saudi relations premature at best.

Meanwhile, European governments and lawmakers will pay close attention to the US response. The situation in Europe is similar: while members of the European Parliament and national parliamentarians have requested a Europe-wide arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, several heads of government are reluctant to take such a fundamental step, including Macron. If the Trump administration ends up letting off Riyadh lightly, some European governments might follow suit.

But Europe should be brave. Taking a principled stand in response to the Khashoggi murder is a chance to show that–in contrast to Donald Trump’s foreign policy–the Europeans are willing to speak out clearly against human rights violations and take rigorous measures, even at the expense of economic benefits.

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© REUTERS / Kevin Lamarque

It has become a weekly ritual. In the midst of desperate attempts by American diplomats to assuage the concerns of counterparts in Europe, President Donald Trump unleashes a volley of tweets that further destabilize a transatlantic alliance that has been crucial in sustaining the global dominance of the United States. In the past few weeks the pace of Trump’s malevolent bumbling has accelerated, with the bullying of European allies at the NATO summit in Brussels and his courting of Vladimir Putin at their summit in Helsinki leading many European policymakers to question the future of an alliance that has endured for over seventy years.

For many observers, the disruptive impact Trump has had on a global order that entrenched the preeminence of the United States seemed to mark a sudden break from established American foreign policy traditions. Disoriented policymakers in the United States often interpret this system shock in near revolutionary terms. The willingness of Donald Trump to undermine America’s alliances is often depicted as a sudden moment where a relatively stable liberal order was overturned by a small faction of Trump loyalists that reject the global role American institutions have played since 1945. Indeed, the idea that the current turmoil engulfing the transatlantic alliance is the product of a unique electoral aberration is comforting to those who hope for its swift restoration after Trump falls.

Yet a closer look at the evolution of relations between the United States and members of the EU since 1992 indicates that there are long term structural factors at play that have been causing tensions within the transatlantic alliance for quite some time. Many of the resentments that Donald Trump’s wildly provocative rhetoric plays upon reflect frustration over supposed free-riding on American generosity. This issue has repeatedly flashed up under previous presidents. In the 1990s, the inability of European states to head off the Yugoslav wars of secession caused frustration among US policymakers who had hoped that the collapse of the Soviet Union could lead to a shift of strategic focus to the Asia/Pacific theater. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to deep tensions with key EU states, though British, Spanish, and Polish support for the US war effort balanced rhetoric from those US conservatives, such as John Bolton, who were already beginning to define the EU as a potential strategic adversary.

For many Europeans, the subsequent election victory of Barack Obama in 2008 fueled hopes that the transatlantic alliance could overcome such challenges. But despite initial emphasis on renewed cooperation, the inability of European states involved in the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 to sustain targeted airstrikes without American assistance brought to the surface frustration with what many US officials believed was a lack of equitable burden-sharing when it came to defense spending. In his final years as president, Barack Obama expressed frustration with a perceived imbalance between high levels of US defense spending and budget cuts in EU member states that were increasingly hampering the operational effectiveness of European militaries.

An Emerging Europe

A paradox of these growing tensions between the US and its European allies is that they were also a product of the EU’s increasingly powerful global role in other key policy areas. While the end of the Cold War led to cuts in European defense budgets that exacerbated the military imbalance with the United States, it also intensified a process of European integration that would lead to an vast concentration of collective trade and regulatory power in a restructured EU. When the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 consolidated economic and monetary integration and deepened political union, the ability of the EU’s institutions to influence trade and regulation on a global scale expanded rapidly in ways that clashed with the interests of key American business sectors.

Though there are still many unresolved aspects of economic and monetary integration despite the waning of the Eurozone crisis, it is notable that Europeans have repeatedly resisted American pressure over the past decade—for example, Europe has brushed off American calls to change course over such issues as debt relief for Greece or Brexit. The divergence of European strategic priorities from American attempts to shape the global economy has been a source of tension since at least a decade before Trump’s election. As the EU intensifies integration and puts pressure on trading partners to adopt its own regulatory framework, that tension will only grow.

In the context of a transnational system that is increasingly developing its own state-like structures, the EU’s internal institutional dynamic was also creating pressures for greater defense coordination before Donald Trump took power. The dawning realization of the extent of military weakness in the period between the Libyan War and the Russian annexation of Ukraine fueled concerns within Europe about the extent of its reliance on US security guarantees.

The increasingly unpredictable behavior of the US has accelerated these efforts, as even many Europeans who are strongly committed to the transatlantic alliance have swung to the view that American unreliability may well make the effort needed for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy a matter of existential necessity. In what can be described as a belated victory for the Gaullist view of geopolitics, there is now an emerging consensus across the EU that its interests can no longer be made reliant on an American political system that is vulnerable to violent electoral swings between belligerence and paralysis. As ever with shifts in EU policy, this is still likely to be an incremental process. But the emergence of an EU able to project collective power in all areas of policy would diminish US leverage and influence in Europe and geopolitical flashpoints surrounding it.

So rather than just assuming that Donald Trump is the primary factor behind the crisis threatening the transatlantic alliance, it is worth looking at how he has been able to use this long term divergence in institutional approaches and strategic interests between the US and the EU to his advantage. Even in an alternative scenario in which Trump had lost in 2016, a more benign US president would have still have faced tensions between the EU and the United States. These would have needed to be managed in a way that acknowledged the divergence of interests while still retaining the benefits of continued cooperation in security and defense. If Trump leaves office soon, it could still be possible to have such an honest dialogue. Both sides could discuss the implications of a strategic rebalancing process in which the EU expands its military strength to lighten the load on an overstretched United States while American political elites accept the strategic implications of a truly equal partnership.

Yet if Donald Trump continues to sabotage any attempts to explore such a managed rebalancing, the accelerating strategic divergence could quickly become unbridgeable. The differences in opinion between Europe and America would then fuel strategic rivalry. If one takes the potential global implications of such a breakdown in the alliance between the US and the EU into account, then those American policymakers should be careful what they wish for in demanding a massive expansion of European military power.

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© dpa / Gregor Fischer

In our attention-deficit era, when a Trump tweet can collapse a G7 meeting, is there any place for—or interest in—stirring speeches on the future of Europe?

That was the challenge Heiko Maas, Germany’s foreign minister, set himself on Wednesday in Berlin: To present arguments, ideas, and proposals to ensure that European integration won’t head down the same defunct route as the old industrial hall in which he spoke. He didn’t beat around the bush, turning his first sentence into a question: How can Europe assert itself in a world increasingly radicalized by nationalism, populism, and chauvinism?

Some 5,000 words later, his answer had become clear: By activating a passive European patriotism slumbering in the continent’s silent majority. Squeezed between Donald Trump’s America-first politics, Russian attacks on international law, and Chinese expansion, he warned, seven decades of certainty in Europe have come to an end.

“The world order we knew, which we got used to, and in which we sometimes made ourselves a little too comfortable—that no longer exists,” he said. “Under President Trump the Atlantic has grown wider and Trump’s isolationist politics have left behind a massive vacuum.”

Maas also suggested unfurling the Europe flag “as a banner for the free world, just as the stars and stripes once was.” There is no shortage of analysis of the continent’s problems, he conceded—digitalization, climate change, migration, and the social cost of globalization—but what Europe needs is solutions. The Social Democrat (SPD) minister’s answer to America first: Europe united. Echoing iconic SPD leader Willy Brandt, Maas urged his audience—in Berlin and beyond—to show more courage for Europe.

“Courage to present our own ideas for Europe that don’t exhaust themselves in purely technocratic concerns or empty slogans,” he said, adding: “Courage to also throw over board our own orthodoxies if it serves the greater good, because only then will we remain able to act.”

As a native of Germany’s southwestern Saarland region—near France and Luxembourg—Europe’s rising nationalism “hurt his soul.” But visits to the sprawling soldiers’ graveyards of Verdun—while still a powerful antidote to nationalist intolerance—were no longer enough to stave it off.

Reforming Europe was in Germany’s interest most of all, he said, and work should start in Germany’s own backyard. He urged his country to realize that “the line between fidelity to principles and stubbornness is sometimes a thin one, particularly here in Germany.” Those are welcome words to those who feared Berlin’s currency orthodoxy came close to ensuring that the euro rulebook would survive the recent crisis, and not the currency.

“We must also learn to see Europe more through the eyes of other Europeans in order to understand the European idea,” he said. “Know-it-all finger-pointing on the part of Berlin certainly achieves less than intelligent policies geared towards balancing of interests.”

Stronger Together

In 20 years, when Europe is forecast to comprise just five per cent of world population—and even big member-states less than one per cent—he said it was worthwhile to recall the words of ex-Belgian prime minister Paul Henri Spaak: “There are only two kinds of states in Europe: small states, and small states that have not yet realized they are small.”

Working together means moving ahead, not standing still in Europe, and Maas backed French president Emmanuel Macron’s call for a more flexible union with a pragmatic avant-garde, willing to move ahead on projects without excluding anyone who wanted to join later.

“Surrendering sovereignty to the EU enables us to win back the political influence we have long since lost as nations,” he said. “Nationalism does not in fact mean ‘taking back control,’ as the Brexiteers claimed, but, in reality, ‘giving up control’.”

Pooling greater sovereignty was crucial in today’s three burning priorities, he said: economic and financial policy, migration policy, and foreign policy. On the first, he took on Germany’s toxic EU debate that sees the cost of everything in Europe and not the value. He broke down the benefit of Germany’s single market membership—as calculated by the Bertelsmann Foundation—to some 450 euros of annual income gain per person.

“Thrift is a virtue, but avarice threatens what we want to preserve and enhance—namely the unity and strength of Europe,” he said. “Each and every cent invested here is money well spent because we will all stand to benefit in the end.”

The foreign minister welcomed Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first answer to Macron’s reform proposals but called for more—and backed a weekend call by finance minister Olaf Scholz to finally get to work on the long-discussed financial transaction tax.

There was no point expecting national concepts to solve social disparity or youth unemployment that have laid waste to whole swatches of Europe, the minister suggested. Instead he called for European solutions: a European minimum wage or a European reinsurance system for national unemployment insurance schemes.

He suggested Europe pool its venture capital to face down the growing Chinese innovation challenge or Silicon Valley’s artificial intelligence push. On the second major challenge, migration, he warned German politicians to get off the moral high ground and warned that “finger wagging and moral arrogance” words towards central and eastern European partners
would only increase divisions.

Finally on foreign policy, he urged Europe to adjust to new transatlantic realities by concentrating on areas where both sides’ “values and interests are balanced” and forming an “assertive European counterweight when the US crosses a red line.” Given growing world crises from Syria to Ukraine and the Middle East, he urged greater readiness to draft and implement a common foreign policy. He suggested the European Council define areas where co-operation can be decided, by majority vote if necessary.

As a show of goodwill, Maas promised that when Germany takes its seat next year as a rotating UN Security Council member, “we also want to speak on behalf of all EU member states.”

He backed calls for greater military spending as well, “not at President Trump’s behest” but because a readiness to act militarily is an essential component of a European foreign policy geared to peace and security. Only by uniting Europeans, he said, can there be any hope for his #europeunited campaign.

“Europe is about more than harmony and friendship between nations,” he said. “It is also about politics, which means debating opinions democratically and across borders.”

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© REUTERS/Miguel Vidal

In the wake of Chancellor Merkel’s interview last Sunday, most commentators have focused on her plans for the eurozone, with the European Council meeting at the end of June to discuss the issue and French President Emmanuel Macron in need of German support for his ambitious eurozone reform proposals. The hostility of Italy’s new government toward EU spending rules has only increased debate about the future of the common currency.

Merkel acknowledged that the EU needs to do something to bring “long-lasting stability” to the euro. She insisted that Europe needs “the banking union and the capital markets union,” though she failed to discuss the concrete steps required to get there, such as European deposit insurance. She said that Europe should transform the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area’s bailout fund, into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) that could make both long-term loans conditional on structural reforms and shorter loans to member-states that “get into difficulties because of external factors.”

Control of this fund, Merkel envisions, would remain at least in part with national parliaments. It would have “instruments that could, if necessary, restore [a member-state’s] ability to carry its debts.” The main such instrument is automatic debt restructuring, whereby receiving an EMF loan would be conditional on the borrowing member-state paying its bondholders back either more slowly or only partially. For a heavily indebted member-state like Italy, the prospect of restructuring would make sovereign bonds appear less safe and thus raise borrowing costs.

She also repeated her support for a eurozone investment budget in the “low double digits of billions” (for context, eurozone GDP in 2017 was €11.2 trillion) with the aim of helping member-states that need to “catch up” in areas like artificial intelligence, to take Merkel’s example.

While these are all constructive ideas, there is a lot that Merkel didn’t mention. She said nothing about a large eurozone budget worth several points of eurozone GDP or a eurozone finance minister—both proposals Macron backs. What’s more, France would resist her plans for automatic debt restructuring. Germany’s preference for strict rules clashes with France’s desire for greater fiscal firepower.

Playing to the Home Crowd

So what will the French president think of all this? The Élysée Palace called this all a “positive step,” but an editorial in the newspaper Le Monde better captured the mood in Paris: Merkel’s “caution isn’t suitable given what’s at stake.”

Merkel’s proposals, then, are a mixed bag. But it’s important to keep her domestic political situation in mind. She only became chancellor after her initial bid to build a coalition government fell apart, and the CDU/CSU and SPD agreed to keep the grand coalition going with a reduced majority. With the right-wing populist AfD entering parliament for the first time, she has a deeply euroskeptic party heading the opposition—not to mention one with neo-Nazi tendencies.

The mainstream German debate is a minefield too. Though the SPD party leader Andrea Nahles backed Merkel’s proposals, and the Greens lamented that the chancellor had not gone further to accommodate Macron, FDP party chief Christian Lindner worried that the EMF could become “a type of overdraft facility” for struggling member-states. According to a recent survey from German public broadcaster ARD, most Germans are satisfied that Macron wants to reform the EU, but 48 percent of those polled also think his proposals for financial integration “go too far.”

The liberal weekly DER SPIEGEL, meanwhile, has responded to Italy’s turn to populism with a cover that stereotypes and an editorial that lambasts the pasta-eating “moochers from Rome.” Then there is the faction of conservatives in Merkel’s own party who tend to think first of protecting German wealth from greedy neighbors. Merkel’s pledge to the FAS that “solidarity among European partners may never lead to a debt union” was directed primarily at them.

Finally, there is the minor problem that the other member-states would have to agree to Macron’s proposals as well.  The Franco-German motor is important, but Europe also needs the rest of the car. Merkel’s pragmatism might drag some reluctant reformers along.

Merkel did in fact push for change on some significant non-eurozone issues. She came out in favor of Macron’s European Intervention Force for rapid military action outside the EU framework. She backed a system of common EU asylum standards and a proper border security agency. And she confirmed that Germany is ready to pay more into the EU budget—an area where other net payers like Austria and the Netherlands are more protective of their money.

It is true that Merkel’s EU reform proposals leave something to be desired; they certainly understate the need for a more integrated eurozone with more risk sharing.  But they are also reasonable negotiating positions restrained by domestic politics—far enough from Macron’s preferences that there will almost certainly be no agreement at the summit at the end of the month, but constructive enough that the debate can move forward.

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© REUTERS/US Navy/Greg Messier

US President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy describe a contested global landscape challenged by China and Russia as well as rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea. While the degree to which to the US will adhere to this strategy is unclear, these two documents accurately reflect the strategic reorientation that is currently underway in US security and defense policy. The Trump administration’s focus on inter-state competition may be a continuation of trends initiated years ago, but it sits awkwardly with the outlook and priorities of Washington’s European allies.

For reasons ranging from internal tensions to a fervent belief in a justice-bound “arc of history,” most Europeans have been reluctant to embrace the notion of great power competition. The zero-sum view of international affairs reflected in the NSS and NDS therefore clashes with the worldview that has been promoted in Europe for the last 70 years.

Of course, this is not to suggest Europeans are naïve. If anything, Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has ended Europe’s strategic slumber, bringing about a strengthening of the continent’s defense posture. Several European strategic documents—including, notably, the 2017 French Review of Defence and National Security—also offer clear-eyed assessments on the consequences of global strategic competition.

The US and Europe do share an over-arching interest in rolling back the influence of authoritarian powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Yet they differ in their respective threat perceptions and prioritizations. Concepts such as the Trump administration’s “peace through strength” mantra worry European leaders, most of whom are more accustomed to soft power and diplomatic tools. In this regard, while the NSS and NDS enjoy broad support with European decision-makers for their view of Russia as a revisionist power, the potential for further deterioration in US-Russian relations, such as over nuclear issues, and the effects this would have on European security are nevertheless a cause for concern.

Meanwhile, few European capitals share the Trump administration’s view of China as a revisionist power actively challenging the international order. Although the European view on China is hardening, this is so far mostly confined to the economic sphere. Some European leaders even see Beijing as a potentially useful partner when it comes to upholding multilateralism or combating climate change in the age of Trump. Few European states have either the presence (only France and the UK have overseas territories in the Asia-Pacific) or the necessary capabilities to approach China as a strategic military challenge.

North Korea is viewed in Europe as a serious threat to regional order in Asia and to the non-proliferation regime, but is far from the highest priority in most European capitals. Similarly, most European countries do not share the Trump administration’s adversarial view of Iran, preferring instead to insist on strict adherence to the JCPOA nuclear deal and seeking a deepening of political and economic ties with Tehran.

In contrast to these seemingly remote threats, European leaders have to contend with several serious crises closer to home: Brexit will deprive the bloc of one of its foremost economic and military powers; tension between Brussels and some Central and Eastern European capitals is only getting worse as nationalistic movements threaten to cripple the EU’s internal cohesion; and a revanchist Russia is now seeking to restore its sphere of influence in the East, aggressively subverting national democratic institutions through disinformation, cyber-warfare, and economic coercion.

In a sense, while the NSS and NDS offer a strategic long-term vision of the evolving international system, Europe is mired in short-term challenges that cloud its field of vision. Rather than great power competition and rogue regimes, Europe is fixated on curbing migration and terrorism stemming from disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East and from instability in North Africa, the Sahel, and sub-Saharan Africa. In the east, the potential for renewed instability in the Western Balkans and Russia’s destabilizing actions occupy what is left of the bloc’s strategic attention. On top of this, addressing climate change remains a top EU foreign policy objective.

Reconcilable Priorities

Yet the diverging priorities of the US and Europe are far from irreconcilable. Countering Russian interference and revisionism is key to securing the EU’s eastern flank, and also fits into the Trump administration’s strategy. Stabilizing the bloc’s southern neighborhood aligns with Washington’s interests, and also coincides with the aims of US allies in the Middle East. And, as the world’s largest trading bloc, the EU has every interest in working with Washington to ensure that intellectual property rights and freedom of navigation are respected by its second largest trading partner, China.

That being said, the divergence is real, and some significant introspection is required on both sides of the Atlantic lest the gap between Washington and Brussels become a chasm. Europe has to be prepared to show courage and resolve. Courage because European leaders have for too long relied on an “end of history” narrative to justify their continued reliance on the American military. In order to effectively protect democracy and the global liberal order, Europe will have to take the lead on certain operations, for instance on stabilization and counter-terrorism efforts in the southern neighborhood, especially as the US shifts its focus to great power competition. In addition, Europe must develop its own strategic culture, sharpen its understanding of what inter-state strategic competition means for itself, and invest in emerging capabilities such as artificial intelligence, cyber countermeasures, and drone swarm technology. Europeans must also show resolve: they must be prepared to sustain commitment to their own security in the face of severe budgetary constraints and possibly even the loss of life.

On the other hand, the US must play a supporting and encouraging role in Europe. If the Trump administration intends to keep with its predecessor’s “leading from behind” approach on many matters pertaining to European security, it must at the very least tolerate a more independent European defense posture. More importantly, the US must support European efforts such as PESCO and EDF. American capabilities will remain crucial to European security for decades to come, especially with regard to military deterrence against Russia. In this regard, the Trump administration’s reassurances on NATO are most welcome. But American benevolence should also extend to the EU. Supporting actors that seek to weaken or dismantle the bloc undermine transatlantic trust and do not further US interests.

The NSS and NDS show that Washington, for one, is already giving serious thought to how the world will develop in the coming decades. However, the US is misguided when it comes to non-military responses to security challenges. From its gutting of aid programs to its downsizing of the State Department, the Trump administration seems loath to think outside of the military toolbox. Be it revisionist powers’ insidious sapping of the global informational space, state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, or the already-observable consequences of climate change, some of the challenges to US power and prosperity in the 21^st century will not be solved by military means alone.

Above all, Europe and the United States need a joint vision. The security architecture that binds the two continents is founded upon shared political and strategic concerns. The NSS and NDS highlight the challenges that democratic societies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean will have to grapple with in the coming decades. Whether the EU can muster the determination to power through its current crises and accept a larger share of the global security burden remains to be seen. Similarly, it is uncertain whether Washington is willing to accept a more militarily autonomous Europe and whether US global leadership can be preserved in the absence of investing in soft power tools. Absent this major course correction on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe and the United States seem condemned to move, ever so slightly, further apart.

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© REUTERS/Mike Sager

Taking the Reins

Europe will need to pick up where the United States leaves off.

European leaders and policy makers were confounded, like so many Americans, by Donald Trump’s election as the 45th president of the United States. As so many others, they are now scrambling to make sense of the consequences. So what will it likely mean?

A Trump presidency will lead to profound changes in America’s engagement with the world. At its base, it will represent a transition back from the highly internationalized and engaged America that we have known since the beginning of the 20th century.

This should, in fact, come as no great surprise to Europe. This transition is exactly what America has been speaking of for decades now – the desire to step back from being the world’s policeman. The translation of this sentiment into fact has also been an underlying trend during the Obama administration.

However, it will without question be different than it was under President Barack Obama. It is likely to take a different hue and accelerate at a far quicker pace.

Trump has said bluntly that America’s allies are not pulling their weight and that under his leadership they will have to start doing so if they want American support. That differs little from the position (stated rather more politely) of the last four

US defense secretaries – Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Chuck Hegel, and Ashton Carter. But unlike them, Trump expects quick action from allies in response.

So this may not be news. But there is another, more profound consequence that will now underlie this trend, one that is far more damaging. This election has fundamentally and perhaps irreparably damaged America’s soft power. The appeal of American (and Western) democracy has been greatly weakened. The Western ideal no longer holds the same glow.

Brexit Distraction

With Europe distracted by Brexit and its own internal concerns, and the US led by Trump, Western leadership is now absent. The consequences of this will be grave for Europe and the US. The institutions that have provided the basis for the current global architecture will be diminished, and the norms that many have relied upon have been cast in doubt. Others, notably China and Russia, will take advantage of this (as they have already been doing).

It is in this highly uncertain and unstable environment that Trump will insert his foreign policy objectives.

It is worth noting that his foreign policy positions are very unclear. Few candidates for president actually speak honestly and candidly about their foreign (and domestic) policy objectives; they swing to the extremes in the primaries, move more toward the middle during the election itself, and then, upon gaining office, discover that the facts are not what they had thought: Governing is far more difficult, and compromises must be made.

Thus, some of Trump’s more extreme positions, such as pulling out of NATO, can likely be put aside.

There are, however, some positions we can take seriously. TTIP will not progress during his tenure (although a trade agreement with the UK could), and Trump could presage a global move toward greater protectionism, with significant global consequences. US-Russia relations could well undergo the long anticipated “reset”, where Trump could well sacrifice things for which he has little interest (Crimea, for example) for the chance to announce he’s “made a great deal.” And Obama’s positive environmental agenda will be quickly reversed.

Still, the greatest fears of many around the world are unlikely to become reality. Trump will be constrained by his bureaucracy, by the judiciary, by Congress (there is little consensus today among Republicans, and the current conciliatory tone is unlikely to last), and finally by his cabinet (who will have far more experience governing than he does).

The world today is a more dangerous place. Trump’s enthusiasm for unpredictability will make it worse. But the steps required to mitigate the worst are clear (albeit difficult): Europe will need to step forward, to take more leadership, and to bear more burdens.  – BY XENIA WICKETT

Make Him Look Good!

Europeans should play to Donald Trump’s penchant for power – against their own instincts.

How should Europe deal with Donald Trump? According to the flood of initial reactions, Europe is now facing a massive challenge and a great deal of unpredictability.

Not necessarily. Dealing and even working cooperatively with Trump might be easier than anticipated if Europeans get the basics right from the start. Here’s an example of how to get it wrong, how to get it right, and a few ideas for Europeans trying to wrap their minds around the challenge the election poses to transatlantic relations.

The presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, addressed the newly elected president in a joint letter on November 9. “We would take this opportunity to invite you to visit Europe for an EU-US Summit at your earliest convenience. This conversation would allow for us to chart the course of our relations for the next four years.”

There was nothing wrong in writing that letter, but I doubt it was the best way to woo Trump to Europe. To begin with, his instincts certainly don’t lead him to embrace the European Union as an institution or as a partner. Trump is interested in power, and the EU has given him ample opportunity to associate it with powerlessness, and, perhaps worse, with the impression of a “rigged system” that he so fervently attacked in his own country during the campaign.

Trump’s attitude suggests that he believes power lies in the hands of strong men rather than with institutions, and the course of history has been shaped by deals from strong leaders, as Jeremy Shapiro argued in a recent ECFR paper. There is no reason to believe that Trump will have an interest in or even understand the post-World War II logic of various nations sharing power under the EU umbrella.

Early Mistakes

So the first mistake Tusk and Juncker made was to suggest the initial contact point should take the form of an EU-US summit. For us Europeans, this is the way we operate. We believe in having everyone around the table, regardless of size and prowess. But this certainly won’t impress Trump. The second mistake the presidents made was to leave the timing to President Trump: “at your earliest convenience.” It gives the impression that Europeans are fawning and needy, keen for the US president to give them a bit of his precious time.

So how can Europe do better in piquing Trump’s interest and making his cooperation more likely? Fundamentally, Europeans should play to his penchant for power, even if it goes against their own instincts, and they should clearly be the ones to set the agenda and timing. Furthermore, Trump is a newcomer in the world of international politics, and being the narcissist he is, he wants to succeed.

So Europeans should help introduce him to the international arena and make him look good in the club, as long as it doesn’t hurt them. The most important thing is for Europeans to impress President Trump with how they work and cooperate as Europeans, and with others, around one table. Europeans should therefore orchestrate the best opportunities to show their own strengths. They should utilize the various resources they have in playing old-fashioned power politics, which has seen a resurgence in Europe and the world. We can play this game of power by putting our strongest leaders out front, but we must also show the added value of the union’s institutional machinery.

A prime example is the EU3+3 in negotiations with Iran: The High Representative and the EU’s most influential countries played a pivotal role in shaping those talks. President-elect Trump will push Europeans to perform better in other areas where they can marry the strength of member states and EU institutions.

Two events will be important benchmarks in that process. As of December 1, Germany will take over the G20 presidency from China. In the run-up to the summit in Hamburg in July 2017, there will be a host of meetings between officials on various levels. European members of the G20, including EU representatives, should use these talks as an opportunity to coordinate and liaise with their US counterparts in the new Trump administration so they can build alliances at working levels. At the summit itself, Europeans should make an extra effort to show unity, and the German presidency can help a great deal in portraying a Europe in motion.

Italy will hold the G7 presidency in 2017, and this will present another important opportunity. The next meeting will be held in Sicily next May (though it’s a bit ironic to imagine President Trump in this setting). The overall subject is migration, a topic that has been hugely divisive in Europe (this will also be Theresa May’s first G7 appearance), and will likely also be a major point of discord with Trump, going by his campaign rhetoric. However, this is not necessarily an impediment to a successful display of European unity and strength, precisely because we have got to know so well each other’s domestic limitations. There is a strong interest in the EU to internationalize the challenge of migration, and Europeans should naturally be looking for points of convergence. This might be the chance.

Yes, Europeans are facing a great deal of unpredictability with President Trump. But if they manage to get the fundamentals right, they might be able to turn it into an opportunity for Europe itself. – BY ALMUT MÖLLER

Honor Your Commitments

A staunch ally like Poland shouldn’t be left in the cold.

Poland has been a staunch ally of the United States, both within NATO as well as bilaterally. It is participating in the US-led anti-ISIL Operation Inherent Resolve, spends the requested two percent of GDP on defense, and has joined the US and other allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fate of both countries is deeply intertwined, and the policies of the next US president will have profound implication on the security and prosperity of Poland.

These are uncertain times in Poland. Brexit only added to the sense of fragility of the European project and anxiety over the future of the West, both of which have been the guiding stars of Poland’s foreign policy over the past 25 years. During this time of instability, the US has become Poland’s predominant security partner. Together we face the main challenger to a stable, values-based European security order, Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine set off alarms in every NATO capital, but particularly in Warsaw.

Russia’s determination to undermine the European security order based on the principles of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 means the region has entered a new era of dangerous competition. Russia’s aggression was met with NATO’s move from reassurance to deterrence, codified by the Warsaw NATO summit declaration in July. Security will remain the key concern for Warsaw, and security policy will remain the key pillar of Polish-American relations.

America is committed to placing 5000 soldiers on Polish soil over the coming months. An armored brigade (ABCT) is scheduled to arrive in February 2017. This is a clear commitment to NATO and European security that the next president should embrace. The troops deployments already in the pipeline are a message of resolve, and there is no need to modify military planning. The next administration should focus early on providing resources for the beefed-up US presence on NATO’s eastern flank by quickly working with the new Congress on the next cycle of the European Reassurance Initiative. Any delay or change in the pace of implementing NATO summit commitments would send the wrong signal to both the allies as well as Russia.

No Quick Deal with Moscow

In the past, every new president since the end of the Cold War made the mistake of trying to fix relations with Russia in one quick move. Under President Barack Obama this led to the infamous “reset” that many in Warsaw saw as sacrificing the interests of Central Europe on the altar of closer (but in the end unsuccessful) cooperation with Russia.

Even if an exact repeat of this situation is unlikely, there is certainly a worry in Warsaw about the next administration attempting to fix America’s relations with Russia without addressing the issues that led to the breakdown of ties in the first place. It would be a mistake to go back to business as usual without resolving the conflict in Ukraine. This would be seen by Moscow as confirmation that it can trample on Western values and interests whenever it chooses. Such a step would further embolden Moscow in its aggressive policies, which would eventually lead to a renewed clash with the US. Russia’s behavior will change only if Kremlin elites understand that Western pressure transcends US administrations.

Whenever the US disengaged from Europe in the 20th century, it always led to conflicts that required American reengagement with great loss of blood and wealth. The 21st century is no different. Poland, as well as many other front line US allies, needs an America that is engaged in the world and focused on the maintenance of an alliance system that has benefited the US so much over the past seventy years. The US remains a key European power. Post-Brexit Europe should be one of the key focal points for the next administration.

European allies need to contribute more, sharing the burden more equally – especially when it comes to spending on security and defense. Much of the work should be done behind the scenes, but the next president needs to make it clear that the US wants a strong, united EU both as a global partner and a key player in its own neighborhood. – BY MICHAL BARANOWSKI

A New Order?

The US will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe.

President Donald Trump will be leading a country that is more preoccupied with itself and its domestic divisions than usual. He enters the White House as the most divisive first-term president since Abraham Lincoln. This bruising election campaign has cast a shadow over his judgment and suitability for office.  He will, however, have Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and an energized base of voters behind him. The Democrats will be demoralized and leaderless for some time to come.

Presidents matter on foreign policy; that is where they have the most independence from Congress. And the world is not going to allow Trump to focus solely on domestic priorities.
A Trump presidency will be a complicated one for Europe. President Trump stands for almost everything both European and German leaders have opposed: denial of climate change; an America First version of unilateral nationalism; an open admiration for illiberal regimes and leaders, most importantly Russia and Putin.

Just as President Obama came in as a correction to the nationalistic policies of the George W. Bush administration, Trump sees himself as a correction to the multilateralism and soft power approach of Obama. He will inherit the mantle from a president who many in both parties believe has been too reactive and passive, especially regarding Putin and Russia. He is likely to take a much softer line on Russia than Obama. He knows that Putin tried to influence the election in his favor and will be open to another reset in Russia policy. He views Russia and Putin as an ally in the war against Islamic extremism. He will be much more open to recognizing a Russian sphere of influence and will see Ukraine as a needless drain on American attention and resources. He will be open to lifting the sanctions regime on Russia in return for a bigger deal with Putin.

Not Merkel’s Preferred Partner

Hillary Clinton was clearly Angela Merkel’s preferred partner, but with Clinton there was a real danger of division over Russia policy given Clinton’s harder line on Moscow. Now, Merkel faces the opposite problem of Trump accommodating Russia. That would undermine Western unity built upon close ties between Washington and Berlin. Trump is also more open to giving Putin free rein in Syria as part of the larger fight against Islamist extremists.

As Robert Zoellick put it recently in the Financial Times, “Europe’s problems will probably be left to the Europeans.” Given the challenges and choices any American administration faces in the Middle East and Asia, Europe will be expected to offer more leadership and partnership. Both Clinton and Trump agreed that European allies have to boost defense spending to shoulder a growing burden with the United States, but Trump went much further and linked American security guarantees to levels of European burden sharing.

Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to expand defense spending significantly and move toward the NATO target of two percent of GDP is an important step in meeting these expectations, but it will have to be followed up with substantial improvements in German and European defense capabilities. What’s more, expectations of stronger German-American partnership in leadership in the wake of Brexit are now on life support. Hopes for a reliable European partner were already in doubt given the current disarray in the EU – not to mention next year’s elections in a number of key countries, including France and Germany.  The American election has now accelerated this fragmentation.

Trade and the future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be another important policy challenge. Trump ran on a clear anti-free trade platform and has rejected both NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). His views reflect the substantial domestic opposition to more free trade agreements among American voters. It seems highly probable that not only TPP but also TTIP are now dead.  The transatlantic partners may need to find another way to enhance economic cooperation.

Great Discontinuity

A Clinton presidency would have come as a relief to Europe. It would have signaled continuity with Obama on the Iran nuclear deal, better ties to Cuba, and the close relationship with Germany. Instead Europe faces the greatest discontinuity it has faced since at least 1989.  Something significant is going on in the West that would seem to auger an unstable and dangerous period, both at home and internationally.  America will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe, as it will be consumed with its “civil war” at home. As Charles Lane put it recently, “Today’s Republicans and Democrats are so divided that they no longer seem like citizens of the same nation or acknowledge even the same factual reality.”

And as Zoellick points out, “The next president will need to start by deciding if the US should perpetuate the seventy-year-old order.” The American election has now put that order into serious question. – BY STEPHEN S. SZABO

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