© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is contributing to the collapse of international cooperation, which in turn is pushing the attempts to end the wars in Afghanistan and Syria into the background. However, the European Union could play a pivotal role in supporting a UN-led peace process in both countries.

In Afghanistan, the February 2020 peace deal between the United States and the Taliban was a remarkable event meant to end 19 years of war. A UN Security Council Resolution in March said the deal presented “significant steps toward ending the war” and offered “sustained support” to achieve peace. However, the proposed peace process does not hold the Taliban accountable, and risks the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan. In Syria, Russia’s diplomatic and military gains stand on bilateral relations with Damascus, lacking appropriate American and EU cooperation.

A threat-based security narrative during the Obama administration failed to separate legitimate threats from the constructive roles Russia and China could play in ending the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria. The Trump administration has experienced growing tensions with both China and Russia as well as fracturing relations with the EU, which has further undermined the development of a global approach toward ending these deadly conflicts.

The War in Afghanistan

For the US and NATO, the war in Afghanistan originated as a military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. For the Afghans and the region at large, the root cause of the conflict was Moscow’s and Washington’s regime-change approach during the Cold War, resulting in the collapse of the Afghan state, the rise of the Taliban, and the establishment of al-Qaeda.

Regime change as an ideological principle in US foreign policy during the 1980s prevented Washington from supporting the formation of a national unity government in Afghanistan. During the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations, the investment in war overwhelmed any possibilities for conflict resolution. Washington justified its support for Pakistan-led Afghan rebel groups with its policy of bringing about regime change in Kabul, even after Mikhail Gorbachev ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the US signed the 1988 Geneva Accord. This action prolonged the war and produced militant leaders including Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, Ibn al-Khateb, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abubaker al Baghdadi. Had the US response to Gorbachev’s actions been different, it might have prevented the collapse of the state, improved regional stability, and spared itself 19 years of war.

Now, Washington and Brussels are looking for a quick end to the prolonged and costly intervention, but entangled regional concerns, particularly from Pakistan, halt progress. In addition, the current US peace deal with the Taliban is limited and contradicts Washington’s Joint Declaration with the Afghan government. A UN-led program within a cooperative regional mechanism could clarify the way forward.

The War in Syria

The US and EU’s lack of a viable political strategy toward Syria was evident from the start of the political unrest. For the US, the objective of Operation “Timber Sycamore” (from approximately 2012) was clear: regime change in Syria by forcing Bashar al-Assad from power. Like in 1980s Afghanistan, the injection of financial and military resources via Timber Sycamore soon caused a growing Islamization of the anti-government resistance forces. Washington’s lack of political strategy dragged regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel deeper into the conflict, opening political and military spaces for Iranian and Russian influence. By mid-2015, Moscow ordered the deployment of troops to avert a US-backed regime change. The preservation of the al-Assad regime was integrated into Russia’s stabilization program, regardless of the brutalities it committed against the Syrian people.

The presence of the US-led military coalition against ISIS alongside the Russian military offered both countries the opportunity to transform a tactical military collaboration into diplomatic cooperation toward ending the conflict. Yet instead, the US insisted on the removal of the al-Assad regime as a prerequisite toward ending the war, further extending the conflict.

Meanwhile, with US assistance, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) became a formidable popular force that drove out the ISIS fighters from strategic areas and brought a physical end of the Islamic State in Syria in October 2017. By December, the SDF controlled around 30 percent of the Syrian territory, including important oil fields and a large population. The success of the SDF offered Washington the needed leverage to press Moscow into supporting the Transition Plan for Syria, which was originally sponsored by the UN in October 2015 and supported by 17 nations, including Russia and Iran. Instead, on January 13, 2018, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced the US intention to transfer 30,000 Kurdish-led SDF fighters into border forces in northern Syria. Two days later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the US move. This unintended Turkish response forced the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to immediately reverse that decision. Ankara capitalized on American backtracking, portraying it as US willingness to throw the Kurdish forces under the bus.

The sudden withdrawal of US forces in October 2019 opened the door once again to the Turkish military and its allied Islamist militant fighters to attack Kurdish forces in the northeastern region of Syria. This chaotic situation forced the SDF to reach out to Russia and the al-Assad government to protect the border towns. The Syrian and Russian military forces entered key towns ahead of the Turkish military. Turkey reached an agreement with Russia to force the SDF to withdraw from a 120-kilometer-long border region. As a result, the US lost the narrative of regime change, and caused escalating regional hostility that opened cleavages for a reemerging ISIS, and continued Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow have all neglected the regional ties and interests. Deconstructing these regional interests requires collective regional cooperation so as to allow pragmatic forces to reconstruct a narrative that fits within a new regional order.

Why Rejuvenate a UN Role?

US peace efforts in Afghanistan and the Russians’ gains in Syria reveal the limits of bilateral approaches toward ending deadly conflicts. In contrast, a UN-led diplomatic framework—with reference to the 1988 Geneva Accord and the 2015 Vienna Peace Talks—could ensure the success of the US-Taliban peace deal and allow the Syrian people a dignified and just peace, while recognizing the shared strategic interests of relevant member states. Now China, with its $23-billion-commitment to the Arab region and hundreds of billions of dollars to Southwest and Central Asia, and its recently expressed strong support for the US-Taliban peace deal, could incentivize stability in both regions. The EU’s commitment to the UN global role and multilateralism is also advantageous for peace, but the absence of active EU-led regional cooperation and fractious relationships between the US, the EU, Russia, and China is the grim reality, which has global consequences.

Given this reality, a UN-led diplomatic effort to capitalize on the peace deal with the Taliban and stabilize efforts in Syria is would be welcome. With a growing level of collaboration among Security Council members, a constructive UN role should allow for comprehensive conflict transformation in Afghanistan and Syria and reignite post-COVID-19 multilateral cooperation.

EU support for a UN-led framework could draw on established relationships with Russia, China, and the US. The EU has ample opportunity to spearhead the construction of this framework; it has been central to the UN-led peace mediations in the Levant and Middle East and the UN mission in Afghanistan. A strong sentiment regarding not leaving the Middle East to “the global power far from [the] region,” expressed last year by the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, adds some important energy toward effective peace-building.

EU-supported, UN-led mediation efforts in Afghanistan and Syria should receive bipartisan support from the US Congress, which should encourage the Trump administration to support the efforts as well. A multilateral approach toward key critical regional and global issues would also allow the EU to redefine its leadership role within a global order that will emerge once the COVID-19 pandemic begins to wane.

The Way Forward

Afghanistan and Syria have both emerged as epicenters for terrorism, threatening regional stability with global consequences; therefore, ending hostility is far beyond the ability of the governments in power. To start, two key challenges must be addressed:

Overcoming Deep Mistrust: The lack of trust between the warring factions, regional stakeholders, and the countries’ populations demands an effective impartial mediating body, such as a UN-led mediation effort. In Afghanistan, the US peace deal with the Taliban suffers from significant credibility gaps but can still be seen as a positive step forward to be incorporated into a regionally oriented, UN-led mediation program. Unlike with the 1988 Geneva Accord, this time the Taliban is party to the negotiation and a signatory to its implementation. The biggest hurdle in the process is an agreement between the Afghan and Pakistani governments to honor the peace deal. This can happen only if Islamabad sees a peaceful Afghanistan as a geo-economic gain in terms of its relations with China and Central Asia rather than as the instrument of hostility against India.

In Syria, there have been extended mediation efforts by the UN, the Arab League, and inter-state programs including the Astana Process, yet these have so far failed to end the war. Like Afghanistan, the Syrian conflict also has complex regional and international characteristics that means it is beyond the ability of the al-Assad government or any armed opposition groups to end it. The key strategic issue preventing any mediation from succeeding up to now is the question of how the war in Syria should end, something that has allowed Syria’s neighbors to support armed political oppositions on the basis of their assumed self-interest. As a result, a new regional trust-building mechanism is needed; a UN-led mediation program would serve as the only impartial, but effective arbiter if it is genuinely backed and resourced by the UN Security Council.

Achieving Regional Integration: The absence of a viable post-war policy for Afghanistan and Syria under the Trump administration opens the window for the EU to play a regionally oriented stabilizing role. To achieve this, the EU should task its Commission for Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with gaining the needed support from the US Congress for a UN-led Transition Plan in Syria and an inclusive partnership in the Afghan peace process. A UN-led 7+1 (the US, China, Russia, the EU, Pakistan, India, Iran plus Afghanistan) cooperative platform could utilize the current international commitment to regional peacemaking and peace-building. Strong support exists for a US/EU strategic partnership among American legislators, as seen in the January 2019 celebration of the re-launch of the bipartisan Congressional European Union Caucus, co-chaired by Congressmen Gregory Meeks, a Democrat representing New York, and Joe Wilson, a Republican from South Carolina.

What makes the EU role more relevant is the geographical proximity, and the need for preventing new waves of migrants and thousands of battle-hardened Islamist militants from making their way to Europe. The EU Delegate to Afghanistan has been active in supporting the peace process; in July 2019, Germany and Qatar co-organized the Intra-Afghan Peace Conference in Doha. Later that year, the EU Special Envoy to Afghanistan offered a broader spectrum in support of a peace plan, strengthening democratic results gained over the last 19 years. The presence of the Russian military in Syria and Central Asia and Chinese influence in both regions are real. A proactive EU role can de-militarize the political and diplomatic spaces and end regime change as an instrument of foreign policy.

A pro-active EU role has already highlighted humanitarian and economic development programs possible in both Afghanistan and Syria. Active cooperation with Russia and China would enable Afghanistan to advance regional integration via economic development, trade and commerce, and Syrians to reconstruct their war-torn country and achieve a fair and just departure from war. This would then encourage millions of refugees from Europe and beyond to repatriate to their homes and rebuild their lives. A global role for the EU as the defender of liberal democracy should uplift the ability of an emerging multi-polar world order to de-militarize international relations, and could produce a blueprint for 21^st-century conflict reduction via regional cooperation. The post-COVID-19 pandemic world demands multinational recovery programs for demilitarizing international relations, boosting regional economic integration, and ending deadly conflicts.

The post An EU Global Moment: Finding a Path to Peace in Afghanistan and Syria appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Sergio Perez

“As the only vegetarian … we’ll have a damned tough time of it in a carnivore’s world.” Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time, reached for a metaphor from the jungle at the 2018 Munich Security Conference to describe the EU’s future in the world. He then called on the Europeans to develop a common understanding of their foreign policy interests and to more vigorously project the EU’s power in the world—including by military means, if necessary. Otherwise, Gabriel hinted ominously, the EU would not be able to safeguard a free, secure, prosperous, and socially just Europe. It would struggle in a world of growing rivalry between major powers.

Gabriel was right. The conditions for European foreign policy have changed rapidly in recent years. The EU currently finds itself in a world of great power rivalry and zero-sum thinking, with a rising and ever more vigorous China, a revisionist Russia, and a United States whose president sees the EU as a “foe” rather than a partner. In their tussle for international influence and supremacy, those great power “carnivores” resort to methods and instruments that put the EU under tremendous pressure. They also challenge European thinking about the very nature of international cooperation. Because the EU has always perceived other powers as—at least potential—“strategic partners,” it now struggles to get used to also having adversaries.

Europe Encroached

Take China. Only a few years ago there was great hope in the EU that China would continue to open up and ultimately become a more democratic, Western-style market economy. With this expectation upended, Europeans are now slowly waking up to the pitfalls of their huge dependence on China. Beijing actively seeks to influence European politics through initiatives like the 17+1 format (a group of EU and non-EU Eastern European countries from Estonia to Greece plus China) and the acquisition of critical infrastructure in EU member states. On several occasions, it has successfully applied a strategy of “divide and conquer,” splitting the Europeans on issues like human rights in the United Nations. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and economic investments in the Western Balkans as well as a “no strings attached” development policy in Africa, it has gained a much bigger footprint in the EU’s neighborhood.

The EU has also had to change its view of Russia. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Kremlin’s ongoing political, economic, and military support of the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine ended all illusions about an EU-Russia “modernization partnership.” What is more, Russia’s leaders have deployed instruments of hybrid warfare on a scale completely unexpected by the West. These instruments include not only propaganda and putting “little green men” or GRU assassination teams on the ground in Europe, but also supporting euroskeptic parties and politicians within EU member states.

Swamped by a New Reality

But the biggest shock of all for the Europeans was the change in the White House. Since Donald Trump took office, the EU has been getting very different signals from Europe’s closest partner and protective power, the United States of America. While other US presidents have previously taken European allies to task for underinvesting in their security or have been wary of the EU as an institution, Trump is the first one to see the EU as a hostile project set up to take advantage of the US. He values American allies only to the extent that they “deliver” for the US in a simplistic transactional sense, and he does not shy away from bullying or threatening them.

Add to this mix Turkey’s alienation from the EU and European values as well as its increased focus on Turkish nationalism, and it becomes obvious that the EU no longer serves as a role model for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As Turkey launches its military offensive in northeast Syria against Kurdish forces, the EU remains a helpless bystander, calling “upon Turkey to immediately stop its unilateral military action,” without any leverage or political will to play a meaningful role. The recent initiative for a UN protection zone put forward by German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has shown that even within the German government, there is no consensus. Europeans have to face the erosion of multilateralism, democracy, and the rules-based international order—in other words the very foundations of their foreign policy.

The EU is swamped by this new reality. It is indeed a herbivore among meat eaters, reluctant to use military means. Instead, it is emphasizing soft power, international cooperation, and legal solutions. It was never designed to pursue great power politics, quite the contrary. It now must adapt to things it thought would never happen. Therefore, it urgently needs to develop a strategy to defend its interests more robustly. Also, it needs to become more resilient if it wants to avoid turning into an anachronism.

Not in Its Nature

However, becoming a fully-fledged carnivore is simply not an option. The EU lacks not only the mindset, but also the necessary tools and instruments—first and foremost, military capabilities. It is true that the Europeans have made progress in common defense policy lately, with initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defense Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD)—big steps when compared to the snail-like advances of previous decades. But given the actual challenges and the existing gaps in capabilities, this is still much too little and too late.

In fact, Europeans must admit to themselves that because they have comfortably outsourced most of their security and defense policy to the US, they are now hugely dependent on American security guarantees, at least in the short to medium term. This dependency hampers their readiness to rally around the European flag in order to counter Trump’s foreign policy since they often don’t want to endanger their bilateral relationship with the US. But even in cases where the Europeans have the necessary capabilities, they often lack political will and consensus, as the recent fruitless discussion about a European military mission in the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated.

The lack of military capabilities is one thing. More crucial is the fact that in order to turn into a fully-fledged carnivore, the EU would have to change its very nature. The EU was built as a counter-model to the great power politics that plunged the European continent into two devastating world wars. The EU’s founding concept is the idea that the results of international cooperation are divisible, that international politics is not about who benefits the most, but about cooperation making everyone better off. In other words, its founding idea is the exact opposite of zero-sum thinking. The EU builds its foreign policy on the concept of liberal norms and values, not on increasing its military, economic, and political power at the cost of its adversaries. That is why the EU must succeed in the art of surviving in a world of carnivores without losing its very identity by starting to become one itself.

Difficult to Devour and Digest

Of course, this does not mean it should stop pushing for the further development of European military capabilities and greater convergence of strategic cultures in order to enhance the Europeans’ ability to defend themselves. The EU can no longer afford to be a civilian power only. With America pulling back and expecting more from its allies, a more militarily capable EU is no longer “nice to have,” but a question of survival. Surely Europeans must adapt to the circumstances and change their mindsets. This means they have to become better at pursuing their interests in a more competitive world and at projecting the power they have, including making better use of their heavy economic weapons and their regulatory power. The EU needs to understand how to better leverage this power by linking up internal policies and assets to external instruments and objectives. Above all, the EU must stop seeing the aggressive meat eaters around it only as “liberal democracies in the making” and recognize their power political calculations in order to become more resilient against them.

But adaptation to the carnivores’ world has its limits. The Europeans can neither start bullying their allies nor annex foreign territory; nor can they simply bribe African and Middle Eastern dictators. If the EU gets involved in a transactional approach to difficult partners, as with the EU-Turkey deal on migration, this has severe consequences for its credibility, especially at home. For if the EU betrays its core values and abandons its basic principles, nothing much will remain of it—its very foundation will evaporate. To stay with Gabriel’s prehistoric analogy, the EU cannot allow itself to become the meat eaters’ fast food of choice. Instead, it must focus on becoming difficult to devour and digest. It must turn itself into the most resilient herbivore possible.

An Anticyclical Approach

Therefore, the EU and its member states have to find their own way to play the power game and shape international developments rather than being shaped by them. One attempt to do this is Ursula von der Leyen’s attempt to form a “geopolitical” European Commission, one that seeks to reinforce Europe’s international footprint in those areas where the EU is strongest and has a real edge: trade, competition, and regulation. In her mission letter to Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, von der Leyen explicitly tasked him with making Europe more resilient to extraterritorial sanctions by third countries and to ensure that sanctions imposed by the EU are properly enforced, notably throughout its financial system. It is too early to assess whether this reorientation of the commission will actually have the desired effect or what role Europe’s common foreign and security policy and the EU’s diplomatic service will play in this. But it is a sign that awareness of the new international challenges is growing in the EU institutions.

As unsettling and threatening as the global shift toward nationalism and unilateralism is, the EU needs to turn its supposed weakness into a strength and adopt an anticyclical approach. The US turning toward protectionism has made the EU an even more attractive partner for like-minded states including Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea, as well as others who feel the need to maintain the multilateral system and seek predictable and stable cooperation. The recent trade agreements between the EU and Japan and between the EU and Mercosur are proof of this. In meetings at multilateral institutions, Europeans should push for more cooperation that is in the interest of many other countries—for example, the free use of the global commons, trade, and climate. The EU’s core strength is its regulatory power. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the EU’s third energy package illustrate the writ of the EU’s regulatory authority. In the future, the EU needs to understand how to better leverage this power by linking internal policies and assets to external instruments and objectives.

Speak with One Voice

The EU’s power of attraction stems from the freedom and democracy as well as peace and prosperity it has provided for its citizens. If the EU is no longer able to guarantee those, citizens will turn their backs on it—as some are already doing. The quest for more resilience vis-à-vis external threats begins at home. In order to credibly support democracy and a rules-based order, the EU has to ensure its domestic continuity. This includes finding more effective ways to sanction violations of the rule of law and democratic principles by member states. And if Europeans want to strengthen the international role of their currency to reduce their dependency on the dollar and to become more independent, they would do well to complete the institutional architecture of the eurozone and to maintain its credibility as a currency union.

Most importantly, Europeans should speak with one voice and stand together. This reads like a platitude, but that doesn’t make it any less true. The greatest threat to the EU comes from the Europeans themselves. At a time when—more than ever—the EU needs to act as a united international player if it does not want to become a pawn in the hands of major powers, its member states are struggling to find the determination and political will to set aside their disagreements and focus on the European common interest. After the plethora of crises for more than a decade, Europeans are deeply divided on essential political questions. There is little agreement about which goals they want to pursue through European integration.

As a consequence, the EU has often had no adequate answers to foreign policy crises, and its influence on the international system as a whole has declined. Europe’s common foreign and security policy was rarely more than an expression of the “lowest common denominator” of diverging interests. Europeans can no longer afford this. If they continue to speak with 27 (or 28) individual voices in foreign policy, they will soon find that no one hears them.

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© REUTERS/ Olivier Matthys/Pool

Policy-making is often like the dreaded writing of to-do lists: one tedious problem after another needs to be sorted, tackled, and—rarely—crossed off. This is particularly true when it comes to foreign policy: crisis management is its heart and soul. Most of the time, foreign policy has to deal with urgent developments ranging from armed conflicts to diplomatic incidents, and forward planning rarely goes beyond the horizon of one year. It is very much a “firefighting and avoiding the worst” portfolio.

The foreign policy to-do list of Ursula von der Leyen’s “geopolitical” commission is no different: relations with Russia and the United States need to be improved one way or other, but as fast as possible; those with China need to be redefined; an entire continent (Africa) has to be lifted out of poverty to prevent mass migration, and wars in the Middle East and North Africa need to be ended before new ones break out, in that region or elsewhere.

In short, one rarely gets the chance to write a foreign policy bucket list filled with positive things to be achieved as one races from problem to problem. But let’s try it here.

Take the Middle East and North Africa, a region that carries “bad news” as its byword. The nine ongoing, frozen, ending, or emerging conflicts in the region are all playing out against a dirty background of raging youth unemployment, militarization, and human rights violations. Discouragingly, efforts to improve the situation have not led to the desired results of forging a more prosperous and peaceful region.

A Solar Powerhouse at Europe’s Doorstep

But this does not mean that the new European Commission should simply continue as the old one has done, or worse, give up on the region altogether. In fact, beyond the rubble and the drama lies an opportunity that should be on the foreign policy bucket list: turning the region into a solar energy powerhouse.

Granted, this will involve an effort that goes beyond the commission’s five-year term, but the transition needs to start now. By 2035 at the latest, the region could be waving goodbye to rentierism and celebrate having become climate-neutral; it then could help Europe do the same, cooperate in a trans-continental electricity grid, create jobs, and meet exploding energy needs.

Turning to green energy on a massive scale would also help mitigate instability in states that are not ready for the end of oil, such as Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria. This in turn would save the EU from more trouble down the line. It would require climate financing for those states that have already requested it (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia), but also some climate diplomacy—reaching out to those states that do not require financing but a political nudge in the right direction, such as Saudi Arabia or Iraq. If all goes well, lessons learned here can very well be applied to sub-Saharan Africa, too.

Another cluster of issues on the EU’s foreign policy to-do list involve the United States and China. Beyond the troubled bilateral status of affairs lurks a populist new world order in which, or so it seems, Europe and the multilateral, liberal old world have evaporated.

Take the Lead on Climate Change

Here, too, the EU’s usual foreign policy tools have failed to deliver: diplomacy and sticking to European values have not stopped Donald Trump’s US from breaking diplomatic norms, or China from becoming the first digital dictatorship. With a bit of luck, some say, a new American president will take us straight back to 2009, but this is wishful thinking: Obama did not care that much more about us Europeans than his successor; he just spoke more elegantly.

Instead, Europe has to come up with a plan for what it wants to be in 2030, and the basis for it needs to be created now. And if the future is to be European, we need to take the lead on climate change and related technology.

In the future, carbon neutrality and related technologies will not be merely environmental assets— they will be strategic assets, too. The vacuum the US has left by disengaging from the fight against climate change is one that Europe can easily fill—and be greatly rewarded for doing so. States that lead in this field will have more allies and friends, sell their technology, and be aspirational leaders. The Chinese leadership has understood this, which is why China is leading in this field, not us. Being a climate leader will also mean relying on renewable energy (also coming from the Middle East and North Africa) and therefore being less energy dependent (hint: from Russia).

Develop a Strategic Capacity to Act

Speaking of Russia: no matter what one thinks of Moscow, it knows how to talk “military”—a language the EU is still learning to speak as a collective. But while some of us still think that this is a language made up of neat and snappy acronyms and abbreviations, its most important component is the will to act. As the annexation of Crimea and the Syrian war have shown, Russia will not be deterred by diplomatic or economic language only. Indeed, in the past five years Russia only changed track when it had to fear a military confrontation, with Turkey and with the United States.

Make no mistake, though: the case made here is for a robust posture, not for military action. But this is precisely where Europe struggles the most: with addressing violence and conflict generally, and specifically dealing with military matters. Most EU missions abroad are civilian in nature.

What is needed on the bucket list in this connection is therefore not to create a Europe-only NATO, or to push more energetically for PESCO, CARD, or EDF. Rather, the EU needs to develop the strategic capacity to act. The current debate about Europe achieving strategic sovereignty is far too focused on assets. It misses the point of what sovereignty is: a mind-set, a self-awareness, an attitude that uses these assets.

Therefore, achieving European strategic sovereignty is not about purchases or procedures; it is a process whereby European states understand what they want to achieve in the world, and by what means. For the EU, this means less bureaucracy and more inner-European diplomacy. The exchange on foreign policy needs to be revitalized, common ground needs to be found, the different bodies need to be integrated, and honest conversations need to be had.

Speak an Authentic Language

Last but not least, a revolution in foreign policy communication, perhaps not in itself a foreign policy objective, is key to all of the above. European—and international—audiences today understand our bureaucratic and anodyne language even less than before; emotion, authenticity, and humanity will have to become part and parcel of how we Europeans speak about what we do in the world, or we will continue to lose credibility very quickly.

With these key points, the EU’s foreign policy bucket list is short yet aspirational. It will never replace short-term to-do lists, but it would help us maintain a positive momentum as we manage one crisis after the next—and lead to concrete achievements by 2024.

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© REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw

According to Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Union needs to be “Weltpolitikfähig.” In other words, if the EU wants to defend its “way of life” it must develop the capacity to play a role in shaping global affairs, the outgoing Commission President argued in his State of the Union speech last year.

Time and time again, from the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the current Venezuelan crisis, the EU has failed to influence events to its liking. Even worse, the EU struggles to uphold its ability to decide for itself in a new international environment dominated by geopolitical rivalry.

Washington wants Brussels to join its stand-off with Beijing, while squeezing the EU with secondary sanctions against Iran. China, for its part, buys into the European economy, thereby also hoping to influence policy-making on the continent. This development has prompted the European Council on Foreign Relations to put forward a series of proposals to reinforce the EU’s strategic sovereignty.

Some progress has already been made. In an attempt to limit US secondary sanctions, Germany, France and the UK have set up the special-purpose vehicle INSTEX enabling European companies to continue to trade with Iran at least in food and medical products. Brussels has also put in place a first EU-wide mechanism to screen investments from foreign countries, such as China.

Unanimity and Asymmetry

These are defensive instruments. But Europeans also need to be able to react and proactively influence international events to defend their interests.

The EU cannot rely on the law of might—it lacks not only a joint military capacity, but also a common view of how to use it. Instead, the EU must use its economic weight to muscle its positions. The 28 member states that make up the EU together constitute the world’s largest single market, and the union is also one of the world’s biggest arms exporters.

As a result, when Europeans want to show their teeth, Brussels resorts to sanctions or other restrictive measures. The repertoire stretches from classic arms embargoes to sanctions targeting specific individuals. Most far-reaching are economic sanctions suspending trade in goods and financial flows.

But the biggest hurdle to their rapid and effective use is that sanctions require unanimity among the EU members. Hence, every country has a veto-power on EU foreign policy measures.

History is rife with examples of a countries using their veto to block, delay or water down resolutions and sanctions. Most recently, the populist government in Rome impeded a statement recognizing Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s interim president.

This frustration has led many to reconsider the unanimity criteria. Germany and France agreed in the June 2018 Meeseberg Declaration to explore the introduction of qualified majority voting for the EU’s foreign and security policy. The European Commission has jumped on the band-wagon and advanced its own proposal. And in her recent speech to the European Parliament, the incoming Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, also spoke in favor EU positions on external affairs being decided by a qualified majority vote instead of unanimously.

Putting an end to unanimity in foreign policy is a sensitive subject. EU members still have differing views on many third countries, such as Russia. Foreign affairs sometimes also play an important role in the domestic political discourse. EU members are not only reluctant to give up national sovereignty for political reasons. Ultimately, they also want to be able to safeguard their economic interests.

Control and Liability

Most of the time the negative economic consequences of EU sanctions and retaliatory measures are asymmetric, and are borne by some member states more than others. The trade sanctions on Russia, for example, hit Finland and Poland the hardest, but had a much smaller effect on the German and French economies. Any move towards overcoming unanimity must recognize this reality.

One way of dealing with this is to devise a burden-sharing mechanism. A dedicated fund could, for example, compensate individual member states or their companies for losses resulting from EU sanctions.

Many questions would need to be answered about the design of such a mechanism, most notably how to calculate compensation. But you don’t have to start from scratch. The EU already has the European Solidarity Fund (EUSF), which distributes money to member states struck by natural disasters. Aid is disbursed based on how wealthy an affected region is and how large the damage is.

Such a fund would not have unlimited resources and would certainly be an imperfect tool to even out costs. The EUSF currently has an annual allocation of €500 million. But as the EU’s new multi-annual framework 2021-2027 is being decided in the coming months, the groundwork for such a burden-sharing mechanism could be laid.

If the EU truly wants to become a powerful actor on the international stage, it must shoulder the consequence of its policies together. In the debate about the reform of the euro, Germany has argued that it can only allow for further EU integration if control and liability are aligned. The same argument is also valid when it comes to foreign policy.

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© REUTERS/Allessandro Garofalo

At the European Council in Sibiu, Romania, this week, European Union leaders will discuss the strategic agenda for the next five years. At last, discussing how to reform EU foreign policy is squarely on their agenda. The return of power politics has shaken the very foundations of the EU and must provide the impetus for leaders to think about how to make the EU more assertive and effective in defending its interests on the global stage.

The challenges to EU foreign policy are not just external. Internally, the EU is chronically divided on foreign policy issues. France recently blocked the EU from condemning Khalifa Haftar’s offensive in Libya, while Italy vetoed a common statement on the crisis in Venezuela. The EU also has no collective policy towards China, Russia, and the Middle East.

Some of these divisions stem from conflicting national interests and a lack of strategic thinking about common European interests. Creating a European Security Council, as recently proposed by Ulrich Speck in a Berlin Policy Journal article, could help. But in many other cases, the unanimity requirements make it very difficult to agree on a common foreign policy. The European Commission therefore proposed, and France and Germany committed to exploring, moving from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Unanimity Principle

In most policy fields, the EU makes decisions by QMV: 55 percent of member states representing at least 65 percent of the total EU population must vote in favor of a proposal in order for it to pass. However, there are several important policy fields where unanimity is required, including EU membership, EU tax law, the EU budget, and foreign policy. When it comes to CFSP, every member state has a veto and consequently the power to water down agreements, delay decision-making, or thwart a common policy altogether. The veto power also makes the EU’s foreign policy vulnerable to rival powers, as they know they only need to sway one member state to undermine the entire bloc.

If QMV were to be introduced, it is likely that CFSP would follow the trajectory of other policy areas where QMV already applies: in fact, voting rarely takes place as most decisions are still made unanimously. The crucial difference is that decisions would then be reached in the shadow of the vote rather than of the veto. In other words, member states who hold the minority view on an issue would have an incentive to intensify their negotiation efforts, build alliances, and contribute to achieving an agreement that takes their concerns into account—rather than simply blocking progress. Decision-making would be quicker and more ambitious as a result. Extending QMV would also help shield the EU’s foreign policy from the pressures of third parties. Foreign powers like China would have to win over at least four states to form a blocking minority.

However, changing the incentive structure to encourage unity will only work if the differences in national interests are moderate and outvoted member states can, reluctantly, accept the decision. In those cases, QMV would help overcome the narcissism of small differences in national interests that has hitherto too often undermined the EU’s global sway. Yet if differences in national interests were substantial, decisions under QMV would be divisive, contested, and ultimately ineffective.  (In these cases, the treaties allow a member state to prevent a vote if a critical national interest is at stake.) The challenges to the multilateral order, however, ought to serve as a unifying force among member states. As the world outside of Europe is diverging from the European model of a rules-based international order composed of liberal democracies, we can expect the foreign-policy interests of European states to converge.

Small States’ Concerns

Still, some argue that foreign policy is too sensitive to be integrated any further by moving decisions to QMV. Of course, it would be unimaginable (and illegal in the current treaty framework) to decide to deploy combat troops by QMV. The most important decisions within the remit of CFSP involve sanctions. But voting on sanctions would not be more consequential than other policies, such as trade negotiations or selecting the President of the European Commission, that are already subject to QMV.

Others also rightly point out that unanimity requirements have not prevented the EU from imposing sanctions on, say, Russia. But that does not refute the argument. For one, sanctions regimes would likely be stronger under QMV than under unanimity requirements. For another, China’s and Russia’s pursuits of divide-and-rule tactics are likely to intensify as they become ever more assertive on the global stage, increasing the need for QMV.

Smaller member states might also be opposed for fear that QMV could be used by the larger states to impose their will, because QMV translates population size into voting power. To assuage these legitimate concerns, larger member states should demonstrate that they will seek common EU positions. Germany, in particular, has not been practicing what it preaches. Its unilateral decision to suspend arms exports to Saudi Arabia (at the expense of other European states, whose suppliers rely on German components), its obstinate defense of Nord Stream 2, and its bilateral government consultations with China do not match the constant calls for EU unity.

Other member states that are reliant on Chinese and Russian funding may also be unwilling to cede their veto. The emphasis on fiscal consolidation within the eurozone over the recent decade has led to chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, driving Greece and Portugal into China’s arms. If the EU wants to create greater cohesion, it should revise the fiscal rules to encourage, not inhibit, investment.

The fiercest opposition is likely to come from a group of member states governed by euroskeptic parties, which oppose granting the EU greater control over foreign policy decisions. But euroskeptic governments are divided on foreign policy issues like Russia, suggesting that opposition towards extending QMV may be fragile. And even euroskeptic governments are subject to realpolitik: situations may occur when their dependence on other member-states will be sufficient for them to support extending QMV to foreign policy. It is conceivable, for instance, that Italy would prioritize expending its political capital on the budgetary conflict with the European Commission and tolerate the extension of QMV (just like it has never blocked EU sanctions against Russia despite repeatedly signaling its opposition towards them).

QMV is still a relatively high threshold for getting a consensus on foreign policy, albeit a lower one than unanimity. By encouraging compromise when differences are moderate and acting as a firewall shielding the EU from divide-and-rule tactics of rival powers, extending QMV would help the EU to become a more effective foreign policy actor.

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© REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

After an extended absence, the Western Balkans finally returned to the European agenda at the March 9 EU summit. Traditionally, the region is discussed primarily in terms of its slow progress toward EU accession. This time, however, geopolitical and ethnic tensions are raising alarms about the stability of Europe’s “inner courtyard.” As the region grapples with new sources of instability, Serbia will be electing a president on April 2 – and though polls predict a smooth victory for Aleksandar Vucic, it could be a watershed event for the whole region.

European Council President Donald Tusk warned that some of the ethnic divisions in the region have been exacerbated by destabilizing external influences, a veiled reference to Russia, which has been waging wider disinformation campaigns in Serbia and elsewhere. Tusk also called for EU institutions to take more action. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, meanwhile, reported on her recent tour of all six Western Balkan countries, undertaken to reassure the region it had not been forgotten. She returned with “profound concerns” about destabilizing external factors. “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played,” Mogherini said. These warnings were echoed by the chairman of the European parliament’s foreign affairs committee, David McAllister, who thinks that the EU must be much more visible and engaged in Balkan countries to counter Russian attempts to destabilize them even further.

It was a timely wake-up call for Brussels and Berlin, which have been preoccupied by other pressing issues. “The 21^st century in the Balkans is starting to look dangerously like 19^th,” Ivan Krastev observed in the Financial Times. However, he noted one important difference. In the 19^th century, Russia and Turkey were rivals in the struggle for regional influence, while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Britain played Russo-Turkish divisions to their commercial and political advantage. Today it is the other way around: Moscow and Ankara are united in their efforts to reduce the EU’s influence.

The Moscow-Ankara Axis

Both Moscow and Ankara are thought to be weaponizing renewed Balkan ethnic tensions to play them against the West. So far, Turkish efforts have been subtler and less disruptive, but that is beginning to change. In addition to promoting historic ties and Ottoman cultural heritage throughout the region, Ankara has recently moved into the business of funding (and perhaps also organizing) new political movements among Muslim minorities in several Balkan countries to create its own “zone of influence”. One example is the new anti-establishment ethnic Albanian party Besa in Macedonia, which inflicted heavy losses on traditional Albanian parties in the December 2016 elections.

However, Russia stands out as the most systematic, disruptive and dangerous external factor, and its behavior has raised multiple alarms over the last few months. The real game changer was an attempted coup in Montenegro during parliamentary elections in October 2016. A group of Serbian ultra-nationalists and paramilitaries fresh from fighting in the Donbass was prepared to storm the parliament, cause riots on the streets of Podgorica, and help the pro-Russian, mostly ethnically Serb opposition seize power. This would have meant a dramatic turn in Montenegro’s foreign policy, halting its accession to NATO and withdrawing its recognition of Kosovo’s independence, with huge repercussions within the region.

In February 2017, a special prosecutor in Podgorica overseeing the investigation accused “organs of the Russian state” of taking an active part in the attempted coup. Pro-Russian opposition parties still bitterly contest the entire claim, as well as the implication that two of its leaders were in contact with the perpetrators. The result is a political stalemate in the country – the opposition is boycotting the new parliament. There is hope, however, that things will calm down since the US senate ratified Montenegro’s NATO membership with a nearly unanimous vote on March 28, sending a strong signal of continuity.

Still, of more immediate concern is the deep, prolonged constitutional crisis gripping Macedonia, now the most explosive Balkan country. Macedonia’s troubles have been simmering ever since its EU and NATO candidacies were put on hold due to a dispute with Greece over the country’s name, Moscow was not very active there until last year, when the Russian Foreign Ministry began issuing regular statements on Macedonia. Pro-Kremlin media began to focus on the country, too, and the Russian embassy in Skopje significantly increased its staff. Moscow now openly supports the weakened autocrat Nikola Gruevski, who is trying to remain in power no matter what. It is also challenging coordinated EU-US efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated way to transfer power to a diverse coalition of democratic parties, which pledged to further enhance the status of Macedonia’s large Albanian minority. At critical moments, when Gruevski called for protests on the streets of Skopje, Moscow poured oil on the fire by accusing the EU of trying to create a Greater Albania, and promoted this narrative through its media network across the Balkans.

And as part of a long-term game in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia is backing another controversial strongman: Milorad Dodik, the nationalist president of the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS). Dodik is again pushing for a referendum on RS independence, which would alter the Dayton peace agreement – another keystone of the Western liberal order in the region built after the ethnic wars of the 1990s.

The Return of Geopolitics

This return of geopolitics has in turn benefited Balkan autocrats, according to the latest policy brief by the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). It has allowed them to pander to various geopolitical players and investors, expanding their own informal power structures, patronage networks, and control of the media at home.

In this context, as stability is given priority over democracy, Balkan strongmen have become even stronger, less accountable, and more contemptuous of democratic standards. The result of this new paradox – with countries moving closer to the EU but further away from democracy and the rule of law – is growing dissatisfaction among citizens, accompanied by a loss of trust in the EU and further alienation from domestic politics.

Nowhere is this seeming contradiction more clearly displayed than in Serbia, the largest Balkan country and the lynch pin of stability for the whole region. While current president Tomislav Nikolic is a key Russian ally in Belgrade, Prime Minister Vucic represents a younger, pragmatic, and less Moscow-friendly generation in Serbian politics – but not necessarily a shift toward European values. The recent events in Montenegro apparently spurred Vucic to action: In February, following a long period of rumors and speculation, he announced his decision to run in the upcoming presidential elections, and arranged to move the date up to April 2.

Vucic has come a long way since joining the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), headed by the notorious Vojislav Seselj, serving as its minister of information during the Milosevic era. A decade later, in 2008, Vucic followed Nikolic, resigning from the SRS over its resistance to Serbia’s EU integration and switching to the latter’s new Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). SNS subscribed to the pro-EU, pro-Western course that has since dominated Belgrade’s geostrategic orientation since the end of the Milosevic regime.

In 2012, when Nikolic became president, Vucic took over the SNS party and led it to form the next government. He became popular for his vigorous drive against corruption, which resulted in several high-profile investigations and arrests, including that of the country’s main oligarch. He also focused on starting EU membership talks and did not shy away from the tough decisions they required. In particular, he proved to be more willing to compromise on Kosovo than the pro-EU liberals before him. In economic policy, he helped the country manage its public debt, which is now under 70 percent of GDP. He also pledged to increase pensions, privatize state companies, and expand the private sector, though so far that has been more talk than action. In the meantime, his governing style has also become increasingly authoritarian, in tune with his shady control of the country’s tabloid media.

Despite the fact that Serbia’s opposition has never been weaker or more fragmented, Vucic now presents himself as a lone fighter against a united front of traitors and crooks, financed by Serbia’s enemies.

He is the undisputed front-runner in the presidential election; the only open question is whether he will be forced into a run-off or win an outright majority in the first round. Forcing Vucic into a second round would be a healthy development for Serbia’s embattled democracy, opening more space for liberal opposition and alternative political actors, including authentic anti-corruption social movements that now target and mock Vucic himself.

To keep his power base in Belgrade intact, Vucic needs to win a convincing victory. In order to mobilize his nationalist core constituency, he even traveled to Moscow on March 27 for a photo opportunity with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In a delicate balancing act which went unreported in domestic media, his minister of defense, Zoran Djordjevic, called for joint Serbian-US military exercises. This comes on top of another development:  so far, Vucic has refused to grant personnel at the joint Russian-Serbian humanitarian center in Niš diplomatic status. Insiders say that such move would turn it into a Russian spy outpost for the whole region.

In spite of these setbacks, Russian influence in Serbia is greater than in any other Balkan country. On top of historic ties between the two Slavic and Eastern Orthodox nations, Moscow has been able to play on Serbia’s national sentiment as a humiliated regional power that was forced to accept the Pax Americana. Belgrade lost a series of brutal wars after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and was bombed by NATO during the war over Kosovo (1999). Revisionist, anti-Western rhetoric has thus been very popular in Serbian politics and media.

And Moscow skillfully played this card a decade ago to privatize part of Serbia’s energy industry, which is now owned by Gazprom. Since then, the Kremlin has established a significant presence in the country’s disgruntled media. The local branch of Sputnik, established three years ago, has become the leading news agency in the country, and about 20 other media outlets spread distinctly Russian spin on domestic and foreign developments.

Business as Usual Won’t Work

So, what should the EU do? First, it should build up on the momentum from the last few weeks to demonstrate more attention and reassurance. Several EU foreign ministers could work together on a series of high-profile visits to the region. This might be a good opportunity for new German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel to provide some leadership and initiative for Europe’s political re-engagement in the Balkans. The status quo there is no longer sustainable, and carries considerable risks.

EU foreign policy chief Mogherini and her European External Action Services (EEAS) should be given a new mandate to expand their work in the Balkans, now limited only to Bosnia and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. Other dangerous situations, like the one in Macedonia, have become urgent security challenges and cannot be left to the EU Commission’s technocratic approach alone. Instead of playing geopolitics with Balkan leaders, EU Enlargement Commissioner Hahn should return to his task of helping candidate countries prepare for EU membership. He could also improve the way EU funding and other support is promoted among Balkan societies and counter widespread perceptions that Russia is doing more for them.

Once Brussels get its act together, Berlin and a few other EU capitals that still pay attention to the region (a diminishing number!) could reach out to Washington to come up with joint transatlantic effort to calm the Balkan waters. This is a good moment to engage with the new US administration to support a vital interest of Europe’s, one that is closely related to the future of NATO and also fits into American global strategy.

The belated wake-up call at the EU summit a few weeks ago was a reminder that the fates of Europe, NATO, and the Balkans are inextricably tied together. If it is followed by diplomatic action and sustained political engagement, not everything about the EU will look so gloomy in 2017.

The post Balkan Troubles appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Yves Herman

At 1.20 pm Brussels time on March 29, the clock started ticking on the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Britain’s EU ambassador Sir Tim Barrow hand-delivered the divorce letter to EU Council President Donald Tusk, who said he was saddened to receive the document. Under EU rules, the UK must leave the bloc no later than March 29, 2019.

If British Prime Minister Theresa May, who had signed the letter the previous night, had any illusions left about the likelihood of being handed a smooth and easy exit agreement by the EU, they should have been put to rest today. While expressing disappointment, the remaining 27 EU members repeated their determination that the UK will not get special privileges as a result of these two-year negotiations.

Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, tweeted a picture of himself and his negotiating team, saying they are “ready.” “We will work for #EU27 member states, EU institutions and citizens,” he said, very clearly leaving out the 28th member state – Britain. The European Parliament’s chief negotiator, Guy Verhofstadt, issued a statement reiterating that there can be no special treatment for the UK, no cherry-picking of EU market access, and no sectoral agreements. Manfred Weber, the leader of Europe’s center-right caucus and Angela Merkel’s point man in the European Parliament, said that from now on, only “real” EU citizens concerned him.

Across Europe, national leaders issued statements in the same vein – expressing sadness at the UK’s departure but determination to protect the remaining citizens of Europe from an unfair deal that advantages London. EU countries may still disagree on many things, but on Brexit they are united as never before.

Even BusinessEurope, one of the most conservative industry associations in Brussels which represents businesses from across the continent, issued a statement today demanding that any deal must “preserve the integrity of the single market based on its four freedoms” (one of which is freedom of movement, anathema to the British government).

Mission Impossible?

May will step into this lion’s den on April 29, at the first summit of national leaders convened to deal with the Brexit question. From the start, the odds are stacked against her.

Despite repeated British requests to start informal negotiations early, the EU refused to begin talks with the UK about its future relationship with the bloc until today’s letter was delivered. The insistence, made in a united front by all 27 national leaders, was an early warning sign that this would not be an amicable divorce.

May has signaled that she has no intention of accepting continued adherence to EU rules or EU court jurisdiction. In a sudden policy reversal, she announced in January that rather than trying to negotiate access to the EU’s single market, she would be pursuing a so-called “hard” Brexit. This will mean a clean break with the European Union – the UK will leave the single market as well as the customs union. Unless the UK can reach a free trade deal with the EU within two years, it will suddenly be forced to do business with its largest trading partner on World Trade Organization terms – enjoying the same privileges as Sri Lanka or Malaysia.

In reality May didn’t have much of a choice. The June 23 referendum had been tipped by anti-immigrant feeling, and there was no way she could accept an arrangement with the EU that maintained free movement – the right of EU citizens to live in the UK (and vice versa) if they can find a job. Even the countries in the single market that are not in the EU – Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland – must accept the principle of free movement as well as the jurisdiction of EU courts.

Now the UK must negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU in two years – something that has takes seven years on average in the past. Even if an agreement is reached in this short period, it must then be approved by the parliaments of all 27 remaining EU countries – while the UK parliament has opted to reduce its own role to that of a bystander.

The likelihood of May’s plan working out is slim, to say the least. And EU leaders are in no mood to cut her any slack.

Anarchy in the UK

Saddened, but unified in determination – that was the mood in Brussels today. Across the channel, the mood was anything but.

As the letter was delivered, May was being jeered in the House of Commons as she spelled out her vision of negotiations. And the light ribbing she took from her enfeebled opposition was nothing compared to what is happening outside the chamber’s walls. On Saturday tens of thousands of British people swamped the streets of London as they demonstrated against Brexit, on the occasion of the EU’s 60th birthday. It is estimated to have been one of the largest public demonstrations in British history, rivaling the Iraq War protests of 2003. The sentiment that the British government was doing something fundamentally wrong and dishonest would eventually bring down Prime Minister Tony Blair a few years later.

May’s biggest headache now is a specific subset of the British population – the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland. The previous evening the Scottish Parliament had voted to back First Minister Nicola Sturgeon’s call for a new referendum on Scottish independence. The timing was no accident. Sturgeon’s original announcement of the new referendum push earlier this month occurred one day before had May planned to submit her divorce letter to the EU, upstaging May and forcing her to delay the delivery until March 29. Scotland is remaining one step ahead of Westminster.

Sturgeon’s central argument is that the Scottish people deserve a second referendum, just four years after the last one rejected independence by a 55-45 margin, because they are about to be taken out of the EU without their consent. Only 38 percent of Scots voted to leave the EU, but the national result of 52-48 means that the entire United Kingdom is being dragged out of the bloc. So far May has said she will refuse to allow this referendum, certainly before Brexit is completed, but many predict this will be a politically difficult position to hold.

Scotland’s anger is being felt also across the Irish Sea, where 56 percent of Northern Irish voters opted for remaining in the EU. But in this part of the UK the dilemma is even more serious than in Scotland. Brexit will mean that checks will have to be reintroduced along the presently invisible border separating the territory from the Republic of Ireland to the South – a prospect that has driven increasingly loud calls for a referendum on unification between the North and the South of Ireland. The situation is evolving rapidly, with more and more politicians on both sides of the border calling for such a unification plebiscite.

And extraordinarily, there seems to be a creeping acceptance by the British government that even if they will not accept a Scottish secession, the possible loss of Northern Ireland is now in play. On Tuesday David Davis, the UK’s Secretary for Brexit, said in a letter to an MP that if the North wants to remain in the EU, the best way to do so would be to unite with the Republic.

These are the conditions in which May will begin negotiations. She may have succeeded in hobbling opposition within the British parliament, but her real problems lie outside of Westminster. Meanwhile there are almost no voices left in continental Europe calling for lending her a hand.

The post United They Stand appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Brexit aside, Europe faces crises to the south and east, with instability threatening to spill over into all EU member states. Addressing these trouble spots will require long-term planning and sustained commitment.

© REUTERS/Edmund Blair

Stabilizing the southern neighborhood is imperative for the EU. The Arab Spring, a regional power vacuum, and international intervention – particularly in Iraq and Libya – have all contributed to the emergence of a ring of instability, a zone of failed states reaching from Libya to Iraq and from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. Now this instability is fueling crises within Europe: the arrival of massive waves of refugees, the horrors of domestic terrorism, and growing radicalization within Europe’s population are all putting Europe’s unity and ability to shape its environment to the test.

What can we do about it? Long-term, durable solutions can only be found if we address the problems at their roots and build local capacities that are sustainable. This requires us first and foremost to tackle the region’s key security and economic problems comprehensively. Here there are no easy fixes: progress will require clarity of purpose, the concentration of resources, and, clearly, time. And any steps taken must be taken with full political buy-in from the regional states; we cannot simply impose change.

First, we have to revisit our approach to economic development. Last year the EU spent €80 billion on development assistance. For that assistance to be truly effective, it is essential to continue monitoring how it is spent, making sure it is used in a way that builds sustainable local capacities in critical areas, reinforces governance, creates knowledge and jobs, and helps align our development objectives more closely with our security needs, including those related to migration control.

Second, we need to concentrate more on how to make countries and their societies more resilient to threats posed by terrorist groups and radical ideologies. The EU is unlikely to wage war against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria or Iraq itself; it is not the right instrument for that. But it has a wide toolbox to help contain the spread of the plague that ISIS represents by stabilizing the adjoining neighborhood and helping countries like Lebanon and Jordan become more resilient. And when territory is liberated from ISIS in countries like Iraq, we need to provide assistance and help build local capacities so that the local population can take care of its own security and improve its own economic situation. Instability and bad governance create fertile ground for radical groups and terrorism.

Third, we need to support regional initiatives aimed at addressing key security concerns. This is what we are trying to do, for instance, in the Sahel. The Sahel-G5 countries’ initiative, which creates a framework for Mauritius, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad to start working together more on common threats – including terrorism, radicalization, and organized crime – is something we need to support.

And fourth, we have to make sure that we are using all the tools available within the EU toolbox, which among other things include development assistance, humanitarian assistance, trade, and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The EU’s unique strength lies in what we call the “comprehensive approach” – a great concept, but one yet to be fully implemented. Working collaboratively to minimize the presence of “silos” and remove the walls that separate these instruments requires a true change of mindset, which, as experience shows, is no easy task.

Security and Development

A concrete case in point is the nexus between security and development. It is a bond that everybody agrees exists: a state cannot function properly if it cannot provide security to its citizens. A lack of core capacities in defense may also put our investments in other sectors in jeopardy, including education, health care, and infrastructure, as the state itself may collapse. Despite this obvious link, defense capacity-building projects are currently not eligible to receive support from the European budget – even if they are limited in scope to civilian or dual-use equipment, such as boots, tents, radios, and generators. Keeping our security and development goals entirely independent of one another as if they belonged to completely different universes is hardly sustainable and does not help us achieve our overall objectives. To implement the nexus between security and development and to make real headway in what the German government used to call “enable and enhance” requires a change not merely on the European level, but on the national level as well.

There are a number of things still to be thought through. If we do not want to put boots on the ground to combat ISIS, we have to work through partners in the region. But how can this be done effectively? Or take migration and the need to work with countries of origin and transit: For them, stemming migration flows is not a priority – but it is for us. How can we convince the governments concerned to tackle this problem?

An example of the first dilemma is Jordan, which is willing to play a bigger role in the war against ISIS but has quite serious problems of its own – sheltering 1.8 million refugees, servicing a considerable foreign debt, and so on. One way the EU could help is through infrastructural investments and debt relief to enable the Jordanian government to redirect its resources to mobilize moderate groups and step up its efforts to fight ISIS more aggressively – which would serve both regional and EU interests.

This will require substantial funds (though it is worth mentioning that the Valletta Fund, the EU’s emergency trust fund to tackle the root causes of irregular migration in Africa set up last November, is worth €1.8 billion by itself), yet we lack the capacity to spend that money in a way that really changes the reality on the ground. That feeds into a general problem of European politics: How can we move away from our reactive mindset, which is geared more toward putting out fires after they have started rather than getting rid of kindling beforehand? How can we plan ahead more, and thus shape the environment proactively before crises develop?

As for migration, let us take the example of Niger, a major transit country for migrants making their way to Europe. We know that migrants are coming in large numbers from western Sahara and that there is a major trafficking group at work. Human smuggling generated a revenue of €4 billion last year. Why would Niger be willing to tighten controls on migrants crossing its territory and heading north when the migrant stream has become part of the nation’s business model? And why would the authorities stop the flow, which would entail keeping more migrants in the country instead of simply letting them pass through as quickly as possible? The question is how to change the business model, how to come up with offers that are more attractive – and at the same time ensure tighter control of the flow.

First, we need to listen to what the needs of the countries in question are, then put together packages that include both robust incentives in areas that are important for them and measures that are important for us. Such packages, with clear conditions for support, would have a better chance of producing the desired effects.

Broad Strategies

We need broad regional strategies, coupled with country-specific implementation. If we treat the region as a monolith, we will not arrive at the right solutions; implementation should always be tailored to the specifics of each country. But it is just as important to have strategies that take into account the larger regional context – the Middle East and North Africa cannot be understood without taking into account the complex network of interests, various proxy wars, and the roles played by key regional leaders, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unless we look at the wider region and understand its dynamics, we cannot get the answers right.

Diagnosis is one step, and treatment is another. A core question is: How can the EU help establish better governance at the local level? The EU is probably best placed among international actors to build democratically accountable institutions and ensure that there are proper mechanisms in place linking these institutions with the wider public – this is, after all, the EU’s bread and butter.

Of course, this is easier said than done. Take Somalia, which splintered into entities that have acted more or less autonomously. There is a federal structure and a federal government that the international community supports, but it lacks real power. So the big question is: How do we help build proper government structures that will function at the local level and cooperate at the federal level? How do we incentivize the traditional Somali clan structures and clan-based militias to work toward empowering federal structures? How do we ensure that the development of the Somali National Army and Police reinforces multi-clan arrangements and not a clan-based separation? The key is to understand what the local capacities and needs are and provide assistance in a way that builds on local ownership, promotes the strengthening of federal structures, and takes into account a multitude of other bilateral and multilateral support programs. This presents a daunting challenge.

However, we should avoid raising the bar too high when we discuss governance. Any improvement will be incremental, requiring patience and the acceptance that deeply rooted traditions may not change overnight. This does not mean abandoning European values, but it does mean calibrating our expectations.

We need patience, a resource in short supply after so many missed opportunities. During the Arab Spring, many thought that democratic change would unfold quickly across the entire region, comparing it to the wave of revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe. Today, the picture is different. However, though our high hopes have not been fulfilled, we should not turn away – we simply need to adjust our strategies.

And we should not forget: We in Europe have also committed mistakes in the south, from which we should learn. Iraq and Libya are cases in point. There are and there will be situations when, after all other options having been exhausted, the use of military force against hostile regimes becomes inevitable. But if we go down that road, we must stay the course, investing in rebuilding societies and states that can properly function afterwards. It is not enough to use force to remove a regime that we find threatening and then turn around and leave without giving much thought to what is left behind. It is not enough to achieve military victory, disband local security forces – and only then consider the repercussions of failing states, large ungoverned spaces, and the emergence of radical, armed groups. The brunt of the job comes after the military intervention.

Long-Term Commitment

Engagement in security and defense almost always requires long-term commitment. Take the example of the security sector reform the EU is increasingly engaged in, both on the civilian and the military side. Such reforms cannot be completed within two or three years. Once we make a decision to commit, we cannot simply turn away; we must stay and ensure that the reforms indeed get implemented. The often-heard argument that, despite advice given and heavy investment made, actual implementation does not follow and there is no proper local ownership in the process is simply not convincing. Local ownership is something that in most places we have to work for and not take as a given. Ukraine is one example.

There is a great deal of talk of the EU being under heavy pressure today, with some speaking of an existential crisis for the union itself. I prefer to look at the current situation optimistically: this pressure may also be seen as an opportunity, an opportunity to lean in and, after a great deal of hesitation, finally commit to doing the right thing, as in so many other instances in the history of the European integration process. If we wait much longer, we may soon be overwhelmed with our present and future problems. We need clear leadership in Europe, and the countries that have acted as the engines of European integration have a special responsibility to take the European process forward.

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The Bundeswehr operation is being undertaken in the framework of an alliance against terror, an alliance that is meant to fight and diminish the so-called Islamic State (IS), but not really to end the civil war. Combatting IS, however, should be only one element – albeit an important one – of a comprehensive strategy to end the war and to establish a post-war order in Syria. And the latter must be approached in steps: it is important that Bashar al-Assad will no longer be the head of a future Syrian government. When that is accomplished, a strategy for the reconstruction and stabilization of Syria must be implemented – otherwise any anti-terror strategy will only be tilting at windmills, as Islamic fundamentalism will continue to feed off ongoing conflicts in the region’s several failed states.

The current military activity is not entirely without logic; but unless this anti-terror operation is paired with a regional peace and rehabilitation strategy, it will not pacify the region or contain terror in the medium- or long-term.

That said, rebuilding Syria will cost a great deal of money. Syria is a devastated country. But we don’t have the luxury to decide if we want to take on another nation-building project post-Afghanistan; there is simply no alternative here. Along with the problems created by Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the war in Syria is yet another fundamental, perhaps even historic threat to the European Unionʼs cohesion and existence.

In the first EU security strategy paper released in 2003, it was stressed that the EU should strive to establish a “ring of well-governed states” to the East and to the South. We have such a ring – but only as long as we are talking about current or near-future EU member states. Even there, we have not yet exactly achieved our goal.

The reality is that the vision of the European Union established 12 years ago – a union that would be surrounded by a cordon of stability, growing prosperity, and cooperation, both with the Mediterranean countries in the South and South East and the post-Soviet countries in the East – has broken down completely. Thus the question of Syria must be tied into a broader review of European security planning. It is time to revise the previous strategy, and to ask what went wrong and why.

If the EU wants to claim and show that it has a common foreign policy, it must do more than provide a selective response to a terrorist attack in Paris. This will be the great task of the EU over the coming years – developing a long-term strategy, for which a great deal of resources and engagement will be required aside from funds needed for military engagements.

Because of the relative withdrawal of the United States, there is a certain vacuum in the MENA region that is being filled by Russia and Iran, whose position have grown even stronger. That may lead to new rivalries in the region, rather than greater stability. Since other actors are not in a position to play the role of regional stabilizers, the EU should help establish a security architecture for the Middle East. We are now dealing with problems that touch on our own security interests rendering a comprehensive European strategy – one that encompasses European financial and development resources, along with military cooperation – absolutely necessary. The EU will also have to be able to act (with others) in certain areas to establish a deterrent capacity, and through it to establish stability.

Which elements might such an approach entail? One, though perhaps not the most decisive, is greater concentration of national security competencies at the EU level.

The December 2013 European Council focused on EU security and defense policy; the resulting paper was titled “Defense Matters”. One does not need to read the rest; it contained very few real commitments to undergird this proclamation. The EU has thus far not considered it necessary to actually pursue its objectives in this area, including the development and completion of a common foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty, which in theory laid the groundwork for this, can serve as the basis for further integration steps – and for strengthening the role and visibility of the pertinent European institutions. This refers to, in particular, the role of the Council President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

What we have experienced – and not just in the financial and Euro crises, but also in foreign policy disputes with Russia and the various crises in the MENA region – is not a common policy, but intergovernmental approaches. And one only rarely sees any inclination to transfer these jobs to EU bodies.

If Berlin is to take on a leading role – a desire expressed both within and outside Germany – it cannot and should not simply provide a direction for the rest of Europe to follow. There are better ways for Germany to play the role of a leader: the Federal Republic could put its foreign policy weight behind strengthening the visibility, credibility, and capability of the European Union as a whole. It is regrettable that, despite four years of failure in the Middle East and several hundred thousand casualties, it required a decision by the United States and Russia to convene the peace conference in Vienna – why were the EU Council President and the President of the Commission not empowered months ago to invite the concerned parties themselves, in the name of 500 million Europeans?

After all, the population of the entire Russian Federation is not even a third that of the European Union – Russia only remains a great power due to its military capacities in certain limited areas.

Germany should therefore throw its weight and its credibility as a non-nuclear weapons power and its credibility of not being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council behind an effort to achieve an EU foreign policy that is more than intergovernmental. This could be Germanyʼs great potential contribution to the future of Europe – and German citizens should also recognize that this is one area in which “more Europe” will not simply mean greater budgetary contribution. Quite the opposite: through a more unified European foreign policy, crises can be managed more effectively, even saving money, as the member states could avoid duplicating expenditures in areas like defense and equipment, among many others.

This does not yet mean taking the leap and forming a European army; it makes more sense to keep more feasible steps in mind, such as more comprehensive pooling and sharing and the avoidance of doubling capacities. The budgetary contributions of the 28 EU members amount to almost half of US defense expenditures – but the EU produces only about 10 percent of the United States’ combat power. What a waste of resources, year after year!

Coming back to Syria, the approach adopted by the Vienna Conference is sound: but the EU should play the leading role in this process, instead of a supporting one.

For the EU, regional stability needs to be one of its key goals – including a balancing arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Russia obviously has its own interests in the process. Regarding this last point, criticism should not be aimed at Russia for defining and defending its own interests, but rather at the means it uses to achieve them. The fact that Russia wants to be directly involved in establishing a post-war order in Syria, rather than being locked out like in the cases of Iraq or Libya, is not unacceptable.

This Vienna Process offers a chance to not just lay the groundwork for peace in Syria specifically, but to go further and develop a shared understanding of how the various actors in the region should deal with one another in the future.

In the long term, this region needs something like a Helsinki Process. The Helsinki principles were controversial in Europe, yet it was possible to codify them in 1975. There is of course no guarantee that such rules will always be observed. In Europe, they were openly violated in the recent Ukrainian crisis. Yet rules of conduct are useful, even if they are occasionally bent or broken.

The development of a rule book in the MENA region should be one of our strategic long-term goals. In light of the continuing wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and other countries, that may seem like a pipe dream at the moment; yet this vision should not be ignored or forgotten as the Vienna process is driven forward.

Read more articles in the Berlin Policy Journal App – January/February 2016 issue.

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