© REUTERS/Sergio Perez

“As the only vegetarian … we’ll have a damned tough time of it in a carnivore’s world.” Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time, reached for a metaphor from the jungle at the 2018 Munich Security Conference to describe the EU’s future in the world. He then called on the Europeans to develop a common understanding of their foreign policy interests and to more vigorously project the EU’s power in the world—including by military means, if necessary. Otherwise, Gabriel hinted ominously, the EU would not be able to safeguard a free, secure, prosperous, and socially just Europe. It would struggle in a world of growing rivalry between major powers.

Gabriel was right. The conditions for European foreign policy have changed rapidly in recent years. The EU currently finds itself in a world of great power rivalry and zero-sum thinking, with a rising and ever more vigorous China, a revisionist Russia, and a United States whose president sees the EU as a “foe” rather than a partner. In their tussle for international influence and supremacy, those great power “carnivores” resort to methods and instruments that put the EU under tremendous pressure. They also challenge European thinking about the very nature of international cooperation. Because the EU has always perceived other powers as—at least potential—“strategic partners,” it now struggles to get used to also having adversaries.

Europe Encroached

Take China. Only a few years ago there was great hope in the EU that China would continue to open up and ultimately become a more democratic, Western-style market economy. With this expectation upended, Europeans are now slowly waking up to the pitfalls of their huge dependence on China. Beijing actively seeks to influence European politics through initiatives like the 17+1 format (a group of EU and non-EU Eastern European countries from Estonia to Greece plus China) and the acquisition of critical infrastructure in EU member states. On several occasions, it has successfully applied a strategy of “divide and conquer,” splitting the Europeans on issues like human rights in the United Nations. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and economic investments in the Western Balkans as well as a “no strings attached” development policy in Africa, it has gained a much bigger footprint in the EU’s neighborhood.

The EU has also had to change its view of Russia. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Kremlin’s ongoing political, economic, and military support of the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine ended all illusions about an EU-Russia “modernization partnership.” What is more, Russia’s leaders have deployed instruments of hybrid warfare on a scale completely unexpected by the West. These instruments include not only propaganda and putting “little green men” or GRU assassination teams on the ground in Europe, but also supporting euroskeptic parties and politicians within EU member states.

Swamped by a New Reality

But the biggest shock of all for the Europeans was the change in the White House. Since Donald Trump took office, the EU has been getting very different signals from Europe’s closest partner and protective power, the United States of America. While other US presidents have previously taken European allies to task for underinvesting in their security or have been wary of the EU as an institution, Trump is the first one to see the EU as a hostile project set up to take advantage of the US. He values American allies only to the extent that they “deliver” for the US in a simplistic transactional sense, and he does not shy away from bullying or threatening them.

Add to this mix Turkey’s alienation from the EU and European values as well as its increased focus on Turkish nationalism, and it becomes obvious that the EU no longer serves as a role model for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As Turkey launches its military offensive in northeast Syria against Kurdish forces, the EU remains a helpless bystander, calling “upon Turkey to immediately stop its unilateral military action,” without any leverage or political will to play a meaningful role. The recent initiative for a UN protection zone put forward by German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has shown that even within the German government, there is no consensus. Europeans have to face the erosion of multilateralism, democracy, and the rules-based international order—in other words the very foundations of their foreign policy.

The EU is swamped by this new reality. It is indeed a herbivore among meat eaters, reluctant to use military means. Instead, it is emphasizing soft power, international cooperation, and legal solutions. It was never designed to pursue great power politics, quite the contrary. It now must adapt to things it thought would never happen. Therefore, it urgently needs to develop a strategy to defend its interests more robustly. Also, it needs to become more resilient if it wants to avoid turning into an anachronism.

Not in Its Nature

However, becoming a fully-fledged carnivore is simply not an option. The EU lacks not only the mindset, but also the necessary tools and instruments—first and foremost, military capabilities. It is true that the Europeans have made progress in common defense policy lately, with initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defense Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD)—big steps when compared to the snail-like advances of previous decades. But given the actual challenges and the existing gaps in capabilities, this is still much too little and too late.

In fact, Europeans must admit to themselves that because they have comfortably outsourced most of their security and defense policy to the US, they are now hugely dependent on American security guarantees, at least in the short to medium term. This dependency hampers their readiness to rally around the European flag in order to counter Trump’s foreign policy since they often don’t want to endanger their bilateral relationship with the US. But even in cases where the Europeans have the necessary capabilities, they often lack political will and consensus, as the recent fruitless discussion about a European military mission in the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated.

The lack of military capabilities is one thing. More crucial is the fact that in order to turn into a fully-fledged carnivore, the EU would have to change its very nature. The EU was built as a counter-model to the great power politics that plunged the European continent into two devastating world wars. The EU’s founding concept is the idea that the results of international cooperation are divisible, that international politics is not about who benefits the most, but about cooperation making everyone better off. In other words, its founding idea is the exact opposite of zero-sum thinking. The EU builds its foreign policy on the concept of liberal norms and values, not on increasing its military, economic, and political power at the cost of its adversaries. That is why the EU must succeed in the art of surviving in a world of carnivores without losing its very identity by starting to become one itself.

Difficult to Devour and Digest

Of course, this does not mean it should stop pushing for the further development of European military capabilities and greater convergence of strategic cultures in order to enhance the Europeans’ ability to defend themselves. The EU can no longer afford to be a civilian power only. With America pulling back and expecting more from its allies, a more militarily capable EU is no longer “nice to have,” but a question of survival. Surely Europeans must adapt to the circumstances and change their mindsets. This means they have to become better at pursuing their interests in a more competitive world and at projecting the power they have, including making better use of their heavy economic weapons and their regulatory power. The EU needs to understand how to better leverage this power by linking up internal policies and assets to external instruments and objectives. Above all, the EU must stop seeing the aggressive meat eaters around it only as “liberal democracies in the making” and recognize their power political calculations in order to become more resilient against them.

But adaptation to the carnivores’ world has its limits. The Europeans can neither start bullying their allies nor annex foreign territory; nor can they simply bribe African and Middle Eastern dictators. If the EU gets involved in a transactional approach to difficult partners, as with the EU-Turkey deal on migration, this has severe consequences for its credibility, especially at home. For if the EU betrays its core values and abandons its basic principles, nothing much will remain of it—its very foundation will evaporate. To stay with Gabriel’s prehistoric analogy, the EU cannot allow itself to become the meat eaters’ fast food of choice. Instead, it must focus on becoming difficult to devour and digest. It must turn itself into the most resilient herbivore possible.

An Anticyclical Approach

Therefore, the EU and its member states have to find their own way to play the power game and shape international developments rather than being shaped by them. One attempt to do this is Ursula von der Leyen’s attempt to form a “geopolitical” European Commission, one that seeks to reinforce Europe’s international footprint in those areas where the EU is strongest and has a real edge: trade, competition, and regulation. In her mission letter to Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, von der Leyen explicitly tasked him with making Europe more resilient to extraterritorial sanctions by third countries and to ensure that sanctions imposed by the EU are properly enforced, notably throughout its financial system. It is too early to assess whether this reorientation of the commission will actually have the desired effect or what role Europe’s common foreign and security policy and the EU’s diplomatic service will play in this. But it is a sign that awareness of the new international challenges is growing in the EU institutions.

As unsettling and threatening as the global shift toward nationalism and unilateralism is, the EU needs to turn its supposed weakness into a strength and adopt an anticyclical approach. The US turning toward protectionism has made the EU an even more attractive partner for like-minded states including Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea, as well as others who feel the need to maintain the multilateral system and seek predictable and stable cooperation. The recent trade agreements between the EU and Japan and between the EU and Mercosur are proof of this. In meetings at multilateral institutions, Europeans should push for more cooperation that is in the interest of many other countries—for example, the free use of the global commons, trade, and climate. The EU’s core strength is its regulatory power. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the EU’s third energy package illustrate the writ of the EU’s regulatory authority. In the future, the EU needs to understand how to better leverage this power by linking internal policies and assets to external instruments and objectives.

Speak with One Voice

The EU’s power of attraction stems from the freedom and democracy as well as peace and prosperity it has provided for its citizens. If the EU is no longer able to guarantee those, citizens will turn their backs on it—as some are already doing. The quest for more resilience vis-à-vis external threats begins at home. In order to credibly support democracy and a rules-based order, the EU has to ensure its domestic continuity. This includes finding more effective ways to sanction violations of the rule of law and democratic principles by member states. And if Europeans want to strengthen the international role of their currency to reduce their dependency on the dollar and to become more independent, they would do well to complete the institutional architecture of the eurozone and to maintain its credibility as a currency union.

Most importantly, Europeans should speak with one voice and stand together. This reads like a platitude, but that doesn’t make it any less true. The greatest threat to the EU comes from the Europeans themselves. At a time when—more than ever—the EU needs to act as a united international player if it does not want to become a pawn in the hands of major powers, its member states are struggling to find the determination and political will to set aside their disagreements and focus on the European common interest. After the plethora of crises for more than a decade, Europeans are deeply divided on essential political questions. There is little agreement about which goals they want to pursue through European integration.

As a consequence, the EU has often had no adequate answers to foreign policy crises, and its influence on the international system as a whole has declined. Europe’s common foreign and security policy was rarely more than an expression of the “lowest common denominator” of diverging interests. Europeans can no longer afford this. If they continue to speak with 27 (or 28) individual voices in foreign policy, they will soon find that no one hears them.

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© REUTERS/Vincent Kessler

One of Ursula von der Leyen’s top priorities is to preside over what she calls a “geopolitical” European Commission, one not afraid to stand up for EU’s interest in a competitive world. While the objective is certainly right, the label is wrong. Based on the set-up and plans for her team, her commission will be primarily a “geo-economic” one—an executive laser-focused on the EU’s economic power.

Instead of strengthening traditional foreign policy and EU diplomacy, the next Commission is setting out to reinforce Europe’s international footprint in those areas where the EU is strongest and has a real competitive edge. A former German defense minister, von der Leyen knows that the EU is still a military dwarf and the much-heralded Common Foreign and Security Policy often little more than a cacophony of diverging interests. She is now steering clear of these EU foreign policy black holes and focusing on trade, competition, and regulation.

The push for global relevance is based on the accurate assessment that Europe has fallen behind in an increasingly dog-eats-dog world. Whereas the United States and China embrace global competition and don’t shy away from using economic instruments to bring allies and competitors in line, the EU tends to bank on the power of international agreements and diplomacy. However, the Commission has often overlooked the heavy economic weapons that can make a difference.

Sharpening the EU’s Weapons

Take sanctions policy. The power to cut off trade or financial flows is one of the EU’s most potent and often-used weapons. For the past few years, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini has been in charge of the unit in the European Commission that oversaw the member states’ implementation of the embargoes.

But in the von der Leyen commission, the sanctions officials will get a new boss and a new mission. Under the auspices of executive Vice-President Vladis Dombrovskis for the economy, they will now be fighting for EU’s “economic sovereignty” and are supposed to make sure that Europe is more resilient to the threat of extraterritorial sanctions. The recent US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, which forced European businesses to comply with Washington’s sanctions, has clearly pushed the EU to rethink its priorities.

A similar pivot to the EU’s economic strengths is taking place in the area of defense. While EU civilian and military missions demonstrated little ambition in recent years, the commission did become more active in propping up Europe’s defense industries. And now the new  Directorate-General for Defense Industry and Space will be responsible for both funding Europe-wide defense capability projects and encouraging cross-border military mobility. Indeed, thanks to the €13 billion European Defense Fund, the Commission will be the third-largest defense investor in the post-Brexit EU.

Von der Leyen is also adjusting the executive’s working methods and streamlining its geo-economic agenda. A new group for external cooperation—naturally with its own acronym, EXCO—will tie together the outward work of the large bureaucracy and prepare the leadership meetings. Given that von der Leyen’s diplomatic advisor is co-chairing the group, together with Borrell’s deputy head of cabinet, one expects the new commission president to have a big influence on how this body wields external power. Moreover, her three executive vice-presidents received additional powers over the commission machine rooms to direct EU action on climate action, digitalization, and economic potency.

Changing the Face of EU Foreign Policy

Von der Leyen’s geo-economic commission aims to change the face the EU presents to the world. Previously, pushing for “global Europe” often meant upgrading the post of EU High Representative, which the Spanish Socialist Josep Borrell is scheduled to take over. Since the Lisbon treaty, the EU foreign policy chief has also been tasked with coordinating the commission’s external relations as one of its vice-presidents—with mixed success in the past.

Instead of empowering the high rep, von der Leyen plans to relegate Borrell and his European External Actions Service to a more supporting role. In her letter to Borrell, von der Leyen made it unmistakably clear that he will work “under her guidance” and “support” her in coordinating the commission’s external work. This is very different from the “pragmatic partnership” and “full” role in ensuring the effectiveness of EU’s external action that outgoing Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker offered Mogherini back in 2014.

Borrell will not have an executive position in the commission that could draw on its economic resources. He will be in charge neither of implementing EU sanctions nor of coordinating the commission’s work on defense industries, which is one element in his mission to build a European Defense Union. The Spaniard will chair the commissioners group on “A Stronger Europe in the World”, but with von der Leyen and her three executive vice-presidents now coordinating the big economic-related portfolios, it’s not clear how much influence he will have on the commission’s geo-economic agenda.

And while Mogherini had a green light to tap into commission resources on climate action, energy, transport, migration, and home affairs, Borrell is left with the vague instruction to “work closely” with his peers. It remains to be seen whether, under these conditions, he will be able to exert greater influence on European foreign policy than his predecessors could.

The New Game

The meager results of EU diplomacy in recent years have left their mark. The EU cannot escape the trend of increased global competition; it needs to sharpen its economic sword. Borrell’s post as the EU’s chief diplomat is not the top priority anymore in the new game of geo-economics.

The focus on geo-economics could pay off. But everything will depend on whether von der Leyen succeeds in getting on board the member states that have played the greatest role in European foreign policy in the past. She would be well advised to establish good cooperation with the European Council and Charles Michel—and to leave Borrell enough room for maneuver.

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© REUTERS/John MacDougall/Pool

Germany, along with France, was the driving force behind the initiatives that have given new momentum to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) since the summer of 2016. With the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), Berlin and Paris have succeeded in bringing new life to a policy area that had been deadlocked for decades and written off by many observers. As a result, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was recently able to, with some justification, underline the progress the EU has made towards a “European Defence Union” and the speed it is demonstrating. Without Germany’s involvement, she noted in the German newspaper Handelsblatt, the way would not be paved for a comprehensive change in the understanding of the EU’s, particularly the Commission’s, role in military security.

Nevertheless, Germany consistently faces criticism for not playing a role commensurate with its political clout and the size of its economy, whether it’s because the government still spends too little on defense—and the current US president is not the first one to lament this—or because it doesn’t do enough to make Europe capable of quick and effective military action, a common complaint in Paris. Not ambitious enough, too hesitant, too inflexible, too dogmatic—Berlin hears it over and over again. How can this German approach be explained? How does the German government think European security and defense should be organized? What does Berlin want to achieve with which instruments and how does it define success? Putting on our “German glasses” to look at the CSDP initiatives, the French-created European Intervention Initiative (EI2), and the consequences of Brexit allows us to take stock.

Holding the EU Together

The CSDP has many functions for Germany. For one, the European framework gives domestic legitimacy to Germany’s defense-policy engagement. For large parts of the population, the idea of Germany going it alone is still unthinkable. More than a few Germans are also wary of NATO. They don’t want increased cooperation with the US, especially since Donald Trump took office; instead they advocate close connections with European partners, above all France. Embedding German defense policy in the EU takes the edge off it. In Germany, the EU Army (or the European Army or Army of Europeans, depending on how the politicians calling for it feel on the day) has for years been a popular rhetorical tool for affirming the commitment to defense in an EU framework—in part because its realization is always just beyond the horizon.

Moreover, by further developing the CSDP, the German government is pursuing the goal of tying another band around the EU to hold it together. After the Brexit vote of June 2016, attention turned to finding a joint future project with France, and both governments saw security and defense policy as having the most potential. The strengthening of the CSDP serves, then, as an additional measure to promote the cohesion of EU member states, which can no longer be taken for granted these days.

But it would be wrong to accuse Berlin of having no ambitions for the CSDP beyond favorable rhetoric and EU integration. Germany wants to substantially and sustainably build up the CSDP with “confidence-building intermediate steps” and not “in a hurry,” as von der Leyen puts it. For example, for Berlin it is not about the ability to send large numbers of soldiers to Africa for military intervention as quickly as possible. Rather, Berlin wants to work to improve Europe’s ability to act in the long term, in the hope that the bloc’s decision-making capabilities will improve along with it in the coming years.

Strategy with a Downside

These considerations absolutely make sense. Trust in the EU as a defense actor still has to grow in many member states. Germany does see itself, along with France, as a driver of the CSDP, but it also tries not to leave any country behind—in Berlin one speaks of an “inclusive” CSDP. One reason PESCO is currently being described as a success is that nearly every EU country is taking part in the format, including countries like Poland that initially took a skeptical view. The downside of the strategy, however, is that Germany must face accusations that it is setting up CSDP institutions in order to register their mere existence as a success, rather than using the CSDP to take concrete action against the threats on Europe’s borders.

One thing is often neglected in the public debate in and about Germany: for most German decision-makers, including in the defense ministry and the Bundeswehr, NATO under US leadership remains the key pillar of German defense. This is true (for now) despite the Trump factor in Washington and the “beer tent” speech in which Chancellor Merkel obliquely questioned the US’s reliability. Germany’s leadership of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and its participation in the Baltic air-policing mission and the NATO Battlegroup in Lithuania are often overlooked in the domestic and international debate. The decision-makers do not consider the CSDP an alternative to NATO but rather a means to expand the European footprint in the alliance with the Americans in the long term.

The French Initiative

For Germany, multilateral institutions are the linchpin of the international order. On the other hand, there is little understanding for “more flexible” or “more pragmatic” formats. Attacks on multilateral institutions—which come from all sides, a particularly clear instance being US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech in Brussels on December 4—are from Berlin’s perspective not to be answered by strengthening ad-hoc coalitions in supranational structures. This explains why Berlin has so far only reluctantly gone along with the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which aims at enabling closer cooperation between the armed forces of European states that are willing and able to carry out military missions. In Berlin’s view, however, the goals of the French initiative remain unclear. Germany fears EI2 may even undermine the CSDP because it has been set up outside of EU structures.

That is why Berlin has clearly spoken in favor of moving the EI2 into the EU framework, and sooner rather than later. In the German understanding of the European security architecture, there is no place for efforts involving only a few select countries. Concerns about fragmentation and the weakening of multilateral organizations in which Germany has invested so much capital, political as well as real, are too great. This is even true for the special relationship with France: While Berlin subscribes to the idea of a Franco-German “motor” in the CSDP, the bilateral Aachen Treaty does not go appreciably beyond the existing multilateral commitments.

However, in their efforts to hold the EU together, many in Berlin overlook the fact that the EI2 can make a strong contribution to Europe’s ability to act—and that it does not necessarily conflict with the CSDP. Admittedly, it was difficult to grasp the ambition and scope of the initiative in the first weeks and months after President Macron announced it. But in its current form, the EI2 is bound by sensible and clear limits: it is not the silver bullet of European defense, but it is well-placed to fill gaps, for example in terms of Europe’s common analysis of threats. What’s more, it includes the United Kingdom.

Brexit and Its Consequences

Berlin’s understanding of the CSDP has an effect on the German approach to security and defense cooperation with Britain after Brexit, both in a European and a bilateral context. The German government understands the CSDP to be inwardly inclusive but outwardly exclusive. As with the entire Brexit process, the feeling is that, with regard to the CSDP, there must be a significant difference between EU member states and third countries. It is a matter of not making mere cooperation with the EU appear as attractive as EU membership. Even though Germany is seeking to create a close and constructive relationship with Britain after Brexit, from Berlin’s point of view the goal cannot be to duplicate the level of cooperation that takes place in the EU framework.

In the Brexit negotiations, the unity of the remaining 27 member states has always been the top priority for Berlin. Therefore the government has avoided undermining the divorce process with bilateral agreements and creating the impression of a “special relationship” between Germany and the UK. Even the “Joint Vision Statement” on closer cooperation on security and defense policy was only released after some hesitation, while a corresponding and nearly-complete declaration on foreign policy is still parked in a desk drawer. In order to limit the space for security cooperation outside of the EU and NATO (and the UN), neither statement has objectives as ambitious as those in the Lancaster House treaties between France and Britain.

On top of that, many in Berlin argue that real progress in the CSDP has only been possible since Britain voted to leave. They see Brexit as more of a liberation than a loss. To prove their point, they point to the obstructionist British stance that for years prevented the CSDP from reaching the agreements it has since the Brexit vote, for example on a European headquarters for EU missions. From this perspective, keeping Britain too close risks allowing a Trojan horse into the EU. The argument that cutting the cord to the greatest military power in Europe could lead to problems in the quest for autonomy is not catching on. Nor does Berlin really fear the frictions that could arise when it comes to cooperation with Britain in the NATO framework.

From a German point of view, Britain should take part in the CSDP within the framework of third-country cooperation, as is already common practice. It’s important for Berlin that political control and decision-making authority remain EU competencies if Britain takes part in PESCO projects on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the European Defense Fund, the approach is that no EU money should flow to third countries and that Britain should participate financially in the fund. There is a long-term interest in keeping in check the Commission’s decision-making authority over European arms policy should the Brussels executive act against German interests.

However, the German position is not yet set in stone on every point, and there are certainly different positions in the relevant ministries. Thus the way Brexit plays out will influence Germany’s position. It is already clear that, in the course of the Brexit process, much of the trust in the British negotiating partner has faded away.

Form Follows Function

The creation of a “European Defense Union” serves in Germany’s eyes to create a connective framework in which as many EU member states as possible can come together and cooperate. Only in the long term is it an instrument for strengthening Europe’s ability to defend itself, which Berlin continues to see as something guaranteed by NATO. The German government has been clear that it doesn’t want any parallel structures or incentives–neither bilaterally nor as “coalitions of the willing”—that could undermine EU institutions.

But since, at the moment, there is no shared understanding among all the EU member states about which EU foreign policy interests are the most important and must be defended, member states will inevitably and increasingly set up ad hoc formats in which smaller groups of EU and NATO countries can act directly. There is of course the danger that the supranational and binding power of CSDP will be subverted. But the risk of creating EU formats incapable of action is even greater.

After all, every format in which Europeans work together on defense policy strengthens Europe’s ability to act, whether through improved interoperability or the harmonization of threat analyses. Berlin should not only support the EI2 but also push harder to expand cooperation between the EU and NATO. The European security situation demands all hands on deck.

If the EU, as a complement to NATO, is indeed to become an organization that “produces” European security, it also needs to offer attractive “docking mechanisms” to those countries that are central to European security, even if they are no longer EU member states. If attractive participation mechanisms for strategic partners—like the British, the Norwegians, in some cases even the Turks—are not created soon, the CSDP won’t be able to live up to its promises. An “inclusive” CSDP is only effective with the inclusion of Britain.

So Germany should get more involved in EU negotiations about third-country participation in the CSDP. With regard to industrial cooperation in the field of defense, Berlin is less dogmatic than, say, Paris. The Brexit negotiations haven’t yet reached the stage of “future relations.” But on the EDF, for example, the EU is already agreeing on directives that stipulate the “strict conditions” under which third countries can take part in EU-promoted defense capabilities projects. In the next few years, member states will have to weigh security and defense interests, economic interests, and the union’s security of supply in a crisis. On this issue, Berlin should join the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries to speak out for the unproblematic participation of like-minded third countries in EU defense capabilities projects.

With regard to British participation in CSDP decision-making and the operational participation of British associations, it is understandable that Berlin has doubts about the sincerity of Britain’s newfound enthusiasm for the CSDP. Berlin should, though, give Britain the opportunity to prove that its offer to become an “ambitious” CSDP partner is a serious one.

At the heart of Berlin’s efforts is the goal of making the EU into an international organization capable of action on defense. This ambition for the distant future does not, however, meet the challenges of the current threat situation. The pressure on Europe is acute. The CSDP has to be able to deliver on its promises if it is to to be effective against the dangers Europe is confronted with—especially in areas where NATO is unwilling or incapable of action.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has reacted to US President Donald Trump going it alone with an initiative to “build a strong and sovereign Europe.” Europe, Maas has demanded, should put its weight on the scales “where America is pulling back” and act as a “counterweight” when the US “crosses the line.”

His initiative picks up where Chancellor Angela Merkel left off with her May 2017 “beer tent speech” in the Munich district of Trudering. In that notable speech, Merkel questioned for the first time the reliability of the transatlantic alliance. Maas is now drawing conclusions from Merkel’s declaration there, which she has since often repeated, that Europeans need to take greater control of their own destiny. And the idea that Europe should aim for greater autonomy seems very plausible at first glance. If Europe were, in foreign policy terms, more unified and more capable of action, it would in fact be able to make a significant difference on the world stage.

However, the past years have shown that the EU finds it very difficult to make progress toward a common foreign and security policy. Of course, there have been isolated successes, like the common front Europe presented to Vladimir Putin’s Russia after the annexation of Crimea. But in general, there are hardly any areas of EU policy in which aspiration and reality are so far apart as in foreign and security policy. The EU member-states’ foreign-policy interests and strategic cultures are too varied, their perceptions of threats too different.

A Europe That Doesn’t Yet Exist

This also applies to relations with the United States. When the German foreign minister says, as he did recently in Bucharest, that “our answer” to Trump’s “America First” must be an energetic “Europe United”—and by saying “us” includes the rest of Europe as a matter of course—he is talking about a Europe that in reality does not exist, at least not yet. For the 28 (for now) members of the EU perceive the Trump administration quite differently.

Whereas French President Emmanuel Macron’s interpretation of the developments in America is similar to that of the German government—he speaks of a “gradual and inevitable withdrawal of the United States”—countries like Poland or the Baltic States point to the Americans’ strong commitment to their region: indeed, the Trump administration has not merely continued America’s efforts to reassure NATO states in central and eastern Europe, but rather stepped them up considerably.

Whereas Maas and Macron’s reading of the situation is that Europeans need to become more autonomous in terms of security and defense policy, the central and eastern European countries continue to see the US as the most important and irreplaceable guarantee of their security, as the partner they do not want to alienate under any circumstances. Just recently, Sweden and Finland also massively expanded their bilateral security cooperation with Washington.

In sum: in some parts of Europe, the readiness to step up as a “counterweight” to the US is not very pronounced, to put it mildly. On the contrary, many countries are coming to terms with the situation and strengthening their bilateral relationships. The national-conservative government in Poland never grew tired of highlighting the extent to which both sides share interests and values during Trump’s visit to Warsaw.

No Automatic Answer

Maas’s “Europe United” answer to “America First”, then, is not automatically the answer of many other Europeans. That’s why the German government needs more than a close alliance with France. In order to be able to credibly act as Europe’s advocate, and get the highly transatlantic-oriented countries on board, Germany needs to do three things.

First, the German government should play a more active role in European security and defense policy—one that corresponds with the actual economic and political importance of the country. It should ensure that financial commitments made within the EU and NATO are backed up. Rejecting the NATO 2 percent goal with the justification that Germany has to “stand against any subjugation to the militarization of foreign policy led by Donald Trump” (then-Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, 2017), does not go over well in some European countries, especially those that view the US as the irreplaceable guarantor of their security.

Second, Berlin should think beyond the EU framework when it comes to the advancement of European security and defense policy. Germany’s support for the French “European Intervention Initiative” should be welcomed for that reason and proactively developed. Germany should also advocate for the maintenance of close security policy ties to Britain after Brexit, and think of ways to open up EU initiatives to the British.

Third, the German government should look for ways to close the gaps between a common European foreign policy that is progressing sluggishly and the current EU initiatives in security and defense policy. In the past months the EU has directed all its energy toward the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and achieved a great deal of success. But the overarching foreign policy framework is still missing. Here Germany has already put forward some proposals, such as taking decisions by majority voting rather than unanimously, but it needs to launch more initiatives.

In doing all of this, though, Germany has to keep one thing in mind: even if the EU were to rapidly change tack and found a proper European “defense union” in the near future, its security policy would still be dependent on the United States for a long time to come. Good transatlantic relations continue to be, for that reason, indispensable for Europe. The converse is not necessarily true.

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© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” goes the French saying: the more things change, the more they stay the same. Anyone looking at the current debate on Germany security and defense policy would come to a similar conclusion. While Germany’s security environment has fundamentally changed over the past years, the main features of German security policy have not. On the decisive questions, the German debate is going in circles.

At first glance, this diagnosis may be irritating. After all, for years Germany’s partners had urged the country to get more involved in security policy, and in early 2014 their efforts paid off. At that year’s Munich Security Conference, the new grand coalition and the federal President sent out a clear signal: Germany’s participation had to “come earlier, be more decisive, and be more substantial” in order to maintain and shape international security. “Assuming more international responsibility” was also supposed to mean a German defense policy that was more effective and more capable of action.

And indeed, the promises of reorientation proved to be more than warm words. In reaction to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war Russia launched in eastern Ukraine, Germany showed great commitment. In the wake of Russian aggression, the German republic took on, for the first time in a post-war security crisis, the diplomatic leadership of the West. At the same time, it confirmed its dedication to NATO. The rise of Islamic terror in the Middle East and Africa also brought resolute action. In 2014, the German government was prepared, without great debate, to support the Kurdish Peshmerga with weapons and ammunition for their fight against the Islamic State. In doing so it said goodbye to the decades-old principle of not delivering weapons to warzones.

After the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 and France’s activation of the EU’s mutual defense clause, the German government took less than a week to secure parliament’s approval to take action. It made available up to 1,200 soldiers, six Tornado jets for reconnaissance, and a German frigate. And within the framework of the UN’s MINUSMA Stabilization Mission in Mali, Berlin expanded the previous German engagement into the north of the country, thereby taking on a bigger security policy risk than in any previous Bundeswehr training and observation mission in Africa.

This gradual increase in engagement did not, however, suddenly catapult the Bundeswehr into the top league of European military powers occupied by France and Britain. For it immediately became clear just how quickly the Bundeswehr, because of serious deficiencies in its equipment, reached the limits of its ability to deploy and operate. Sending reconnaissance planes to Syria showed that the government continued to feel more comfortable photographing enemy positions than launching air strikes. That was a job for the friends and partners. Moreover, the new German security policy was primarily reactive and often the result of an external logic of necessity. As in the past, the government never tired, in every new crisis, of emphasizing that there was “no military solution.”

Never Again “Free Riders?”

Nevertheless, Germany’s allies welcomed Germany’s greater engagement, taking it as a sign of an increased political will to militarily bear a level of responsibility for world peace and international security commensurate to Germany’s position as the biggest and most powerful country in Europe, a burden consistent with the benefits (not least economic) that the Federal Republic has received from the military operations of other countries in the past.

It seemed as if Germany—if only hesitantly and well below its defense policy potential—had begun to develop a new understanding of itself. Slowly but definitively, it was saying goodbye to its role as a “free rider” and “net importer” of security. Germany even came to the unpleasant realization that the Bundeswehr’s equipment problems couldn’t be solved through “pooling and sharing” with partners alone. After years of cuts and stagnation, in 2016 the grand coalition signaled a turnaround in defense spending.

However, by the time the campaign for the 2017 federal elections began, if not earlier, it was evident that the incipient security policy adjustment process was already over. At least that’s what current developments suggest.

Although the numerous crises in Germany’s neighborhood had dominated German security and defense policy for years and even, with the refugee crisis of 2015, made their way into German gyms and schools, the reassertion or even rediscovery of Germany’s security policy aspirations played almost no role in the 2017 campaign. Instead the debate was reduced to a competition over which German party could most forcefully stand up for peace and “against armament.” Apart from that, the country cast its gaze inwards. No matter how often the US president used Twitter to question NATO, the backbone of German security and defense policy; no matter how often Vladimir Putin tried to reinstate the foreign policy rules of the 19th century; no matter how much the liberal international order on which Germany depends teetered and tottered: in the Federal Republic people put up campaign posters saying “Kindergartens, not tanks.”

Rather than discussing how and at what price Europeans could provide their own security in the future if the United States was no longer fully available as the continent’s guarantor, Germans focused on the supposed “Trump edict” that NATO members must spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. No one wanted an objective analysis of the new threat environment and the new tasks it required of Germany’s armed forces. Little attention was paid to the Bundeswehr’s miserable equipment and catastrophic administrative failures, or to the defense spending commitments that the grand coalition had made to allies at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.

Pacifism as a Campaign Strategy

Motivated by ever worsening polls, the Social Democrats were the quickest to identify pacifism as a campaign issue with which they could distinguish themselves from the conservative Union. With this in mind, the SPD candidate for chancellor, Martin Schulz, rejected a “logic of armament demanded by the United States.” And Sigmar Gabriel, at the time the German Foreign Minister, wrote an article in the Rheinische Post with the title “Weapons Don’t Create Security.” Germany had to “remain a power for peace, not become a military arms machine.” It was necessary to “stand against any subjugation to the militarization of foreign policy led by Donald Trump.” The Greens and the Left party, too, rejected the NATO 2 percent goal or indeed any spending increase for the Bundeswehr.

This controversy over the defense budget was no campaign-related flash in the pan. No, it endured and found its way into the third iteration of the grand coalition and its budget negotiations. But instead of using the opportunity to have a sensible, wide-ranging argument about which security policy goals Germany should pursue in light of the new threats, about which commitments it has already made and which resources it needs to make available, German politicians these days prefer to fight against the “arms race in the defense budget” (SPD leader Andrea Nahles). It feels as if they are dragging the German debate 20 years into the past.

Yet now is the time to present to the German public what it means for security and defense policy if—as the chancellor says—“the times in which we could completely rely on others” are “somewhat over”, and “we Europeans have to take our fate in our own hands.” Yet the Bundeswehr cannot even meet the demands currently made of it. Since the Chancellor made her “beer tent speech” at Trudering, where she made those comments about Europe’s need to defend itself, no one has heard anything concrete from her office apart from a reference to progress in the area of Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

France’s Frustration

It is not just the vexing debate about money that shows that the new German policy regarding security and responsibility is again—or rather still—dominated by old reflexes. In the area of CSDP in particular, the government has recently pushed forward with a number of initiatives. But at the same time, these demonstrate that Germany is focusing less on defense as such and more on EU integration. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a good example of this: France wanted to raise Europe’s strike power; the goal was greater strategic autonomy. Germany wanted to get as many member-states on board as possible and to create connecting structures and processes. Thus for Germany, to France’s frustration, operational ambitions were secondary. It was only with great hesitation that the German government joined the French-initiated European Intervention Initiative.

That the Germans have an inconsistent relationship to using the military as a political tool became clear again earlier this year. When the Assad Regime once more turned to poison gas as a weapon, the United States, Britain, and France responded with airstrikes. Without even being asked to participate in the bombing, the German government ruled out any involvement in the military operation. Yet at the same time, the chancellor explained “everything possible is being done in order to demonstrate that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable,” and guaranteed to Germany’s allies her government’s full solidarity.

This all illustrates how much the Federal Republic continues to struggle to find its way in a world that no longer plays by the rules of the 1990s, in which power is replacing international law, and conflicts are once more being resolved more violently. To limit the German contribution to international politics to “diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and development cooperation” (Martin Schulz’s Twitter suggestion of July 13) is not at all a convincing strategy given the world situation.

Watershed Moments

If the world gets the impression that Germany, in security policy terms, would rather go backwards than take the next step forward—for example if a lack of funding forces the cancellation of already agreed joint armament projects with France and Norway, or the reversal of commitments made to EU and NATO partners—Berlin risks losing an immense of amount of trustworthiness and credibility.

Allies and partners have been burned before regarding predictability and reliability. The 2014 “Munich consensus,” the reorientation of security and defense policy, was not the federal government’s first attempt to adapt Germany’s understanding of its role to the new political conditions. Germany already had a watershed moment once before, when it took part in NATO operations during the war in Kosovo and in Afghanistan after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Back then the government was already invoking its duty to take on more responsibility. In 2001 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared in the Bundestag: “the readiness to use military means to provide security is an important commitment to Germany’s allies and partners. But it’s more than that: the readiness to live up to our increased responsibility for international security also means a more developed self-understanding of German foreign policy.”

But those words were followed by Germany’s unilateral “No” to the Iraq war; the rebirth of a “culture of military restraint” (Guido Westerwelle); and an abstention in the UN Security Council when it came time to vote on whether to live up to the “responsibility to protect” in Libya, paired with a total rejection of any German participation in the following NATO military intervention. However justified any of these individual decisions may have been, the allies got the impression that the primary motivation for the Germans was to win elections and avoid alienating the voting public.

Where is the Strategic Debate?

A sustainable adjustment of the German strategic culture to political reality will be imposible until decisive questions are openly discussed and honestly answered by politicians. Such a strategic debate, one that doesn’t avoid uncomfortable questions, has not so far taken place, at least not beyond a few circles of experts. There is still nothing like a common understanding of what “new responsibility” is supposed to mean in concrete terms for Germany’s security policy ambitions, not among politicians and their parties, nor among the ministers, and certainly not among the wider public.

That is why self-descriptions like “supportive power” (Anlehnungsmacht), “shaping power” (Gestaltungsmacht), or “reflective power” (nachdenkliche Macht) are mainly feel-good terms without substance. They will remain so as long as it remains unclear what Germany would like to use its military power for. Anyone who argues that this question was cleared up by the Defense Ministry’s 2016 White Paper or the July 2018 “Bundeswehr Concept” has clearly forgotten to tell the relevant politicians and the public. A gap still gapes between which security policy actions Germany finds necessary and supports (not infrequently the military engagement of friends and partners) and what we Germans are prepared to do ourselves. We have to talk about this.

This summer again, the Federal Republic has ignored this discussion in favor of phony debates about the reintroduction of mandatory military service or a German nuclear bomb. The former debate was above all about how great it would be if every German made a contribution to society, while no attention was paid to whether mandatory service is necessary or evven sensible in terms of security. And as important as it is to talk about a German nuclear strategy, it would be better for people to talk about what’s on the agenda for this legislative period: Germany’s nuclear participation in NATO. After all, the outdated German Tornados, which Berlin keeps ready to transport American nuclear weapons, will be taken out of service in 2025. Meanwhile the plane foreseen as their successor, the Eurofighter, is not yet nuclear-capable, and the fighter jet Germany is planning to build with France won’t be ready until at least 2040. There’s plenty of material for an honest discussion about Germany’s position on nuclear weapons—if we actually wanted to have it.

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© Agencja Gazeta/Slawomir Kaminski via REUTERS

On Friday, February 16, German Chancellor Angela Merkel will host new Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. In her own words, it will be an occasion to open “a new chapter in German-Polish relations.” However, she acknowledged “divergent views on some issues,” though in her weekly podcast she declined to comment on a new Polish law that makes it illegal to accuse the country of complicity in Nazi atrocities, saying she did not want to wade into Poland’s internal affairs.

Such reticence from the German chancellor is understandable considering how important it is for her to set relations with Poland on the right track. And in the person of new Prime Minister Morawiecki, appointed only two months ago, Merkel might have the best partner she could hope for from the current ruling camp in Warsaw. In fact, the recent government reshuffle in Poland and Morawiecki’s promotion to the office of prime minister indicate two things:

First, on the domestic front, the traditional conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party is focused on moving the party toward the political center—at least in terms of its image—and winning over new voters, and its efforts are already paying off: the ruling party’s approval numbers have recently been over 45 percent. It seems as though the PiS is trying to avoid rocking the boat in the hopes of winning another convincing mandate in the 2019 elections.

Second, PiS leader Jaroslav Kaczynski wanted to improve Poland’s position in Europe. In light of the sanctions procedure initiated under Article 7 of the EU Treaty in December 2017 and the upcoming negotiations concerning the next EU budget, Warsaw has been using a much friendlier and more constructive tone with Brussels and Berlin. Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz paid a fence-mending visit to Berlin in mid-January. When he stated that the debate concerning war reparations that PiS hard-liners started last year should not undermine bilateral ties, it was widely noted, even sparking criticism back home.

Reviving the Dialogue

And while the PiS government is visibly trying to revive its dialogue with Berlin, it is still not clear how much space to maneuver Prime Minister Morawiecki and his Foreign Minister will get from Chairman Kaczynski; after all, Poland’s ruling party is sticking firm to its own political priorities as well.

Warsaw and Berlin have different expectations of the relationship. We initiated a series of commentaries on the state of play of German–Polish relations in the Tagesspiegel and Rzeczpospolita to set the agenda for a possible rapprochement. Poland’s expectations were expressed very clearly by Marek Cichocki, a professor at the Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and former EU advisor to the late Polish President Lech Kaczynski (brother of the PiS Chairman): rather than find fault with Polish policy, he appealed to the Germans to recognize and respect Poland’s economic significance and its security concerns and come off their normative high horses. Cichocki complained above all about the lack of a “common European agenda” between the two countries, which remains absent many years after the the EU expanded eastward.

From the German perspective, however, this “common European agenda” of both countries was already a reality. Until the the center-right, pro-European Civic Platform (PO) party lost power to the PiS in autumn of 2015, the German-Polish relationship was considered better than ever before, including in the European context. From Berlin’s point of view, Poland left the pro-European course when it chose the PiS government, and its recent judicial reform was merely the most recent outrage in a series of measures that call European values and the rule of law into question, principles Poland committed to when it joined the union.

From Berlin’s point of view, any rapprochement between Warsaw and Berlin must include Polish concessions and cooperation at the EU level, and go beyond mere rhetoric. Warsaw, on the other hand, wants more acceptance, recognition, and understanding for Poland’s interests, especially where the upcoming EU reforms initiated by France are concerned, which it fears might leave Warsaw and other Eastern member states even more marginalized than before.

Confrontation Having Paid Off

While both sides have a clear interest in improving the relationship, each expects the other to make the first move. At the same time, neither country has much political maneuvering room. Poland’s strategic focus is on its national agenda and bilateral relationships, while Berlin is looking at the EU level. These dynamics will only get worse under the new Polish government; so far, Warsaw’s confrontational stance toward Germany and Brussels has paid off politically.

For the new German government, this will be an extremely difficult situation to manage. On the one hand, Merkel has made it clear that “holding together by surrendering liberal values” would mean that the EU was “no longer the European Union.” On the other hand, Berlin has absolutely no interest in an even deeper rift between the EU’s East and West. Especially for Germany, an EU without Poland and the Central and Eastern European states is unthinkable.

In the current draft of the new government’s coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU, and SPD, the value of the German-Polish relationship in the current chapter of the European project is made clear: “The German-Polish partnership is particularly significant for us,” it reads. The new government wants to increase cooperation with Poland, especially with Polish civil society. Furthermore, “We will intensify our cooperation with France and Poland in the so-called Weimar Triangle.”

Securing Cohesion

It will be Berlin’s task to secure EU cohesion and keep the Central and Eastern European states on board during the upcoming European reform process. Poland can play a key role in this, and the German government should use every opportunity for more dialogue and cooperation with Warsaw, taking the new government’s outstretched hand—if for no other reason than because it is not likely to find a better partner in Poland for the foreseeable future.

Berlin should signal to the new Polish government that playing a constructive role in the EU could open many doors in the future. Both sides should try to isolate the sanctions issue and prevent it from escalating in a way that would prevent any future rapprochement. At the moment, Poland’s potential as an important partner to not just Germany but also to non-euro countries like Sweden and the Czech Republic is going to waste. Once the UK leaves the EU, the largest member state outside of the eurozone will be Poland, which gives Warsaw a chance to become a leader of the non-euro club, not to mention its capacity to act as an advocate for countries on the EU’s eastern borders.

If the Morawiecki government wants to influence the next German government’s EU policy, it should try to see Berlin as a potential partner once again, one that could be won over to ideas and projects. The Polish prime minister’s visit on February 16 offers a perfect opportunity. The same goes for the EU level—a country that wants to be part of determining the next phase of EU reform has to work productively in Brussels, and cannot simply retreat behind its national hedge. The keys are thus in both Berlin and Warsaw.

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Cover artwork: © Mitch Blunt

Dear new Chancellor,

Your predecessor – to whom you may well bear a striking resemblance – recently said, “We Europeans have to take our fate in our own hands.” She was quite right. Now that the election is won, it’s time to add the next logical part: “Now.” Yes, the EU has been making quite a comeback of late. But now, it’s mostly up to you to make sure that the European project not only survives but thrives.

Tradition has it that once coalition negotiations have concluded and you and your government have been sworn in, your first foreign engagement will take you to Paris – usually on that very same evening.

But when you touch down at Charles de Gaulle, please make sure you have a detailed reform plan for the EU and the eurozone in your Longchamp handbag – and a number of proposals likely to please your counterpart, President Emmanuel Macron. He will be weathering a substantial dip in his approval ratings as he’s started implementing the changes France urgently needs. For him, Christmas really needs to come early.

However, meeting Macron at least halfway has a wider purpose than simply putting a smile back on the young president’s face. For Europe’s hour to come in earnest, the Franco-German tandem needs to get back in gear – something it can only do when Paris is no longer treated as a junior partner, or used for mere window dressing (as was wont to happen during former president François Hollande’s time in office). The French need to regain their self confidence, and you are up to the job.

Why not look up “Frankreich” in Helmut Kohl’s memoirs? Or even Konrad Adenauer’s? Before the French elections in May, Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, not daring to voice his “love” for France, professed “great admiration” (“großen Respekt”), though that sentiment had not been much in evidence for quite some time.

Meeting Macron as freshly-minted chancellor would be a good time to echo such feelings and demonstrate your own conviction that the nation is becoming truly grande again, in an even more grande EU. In other words, under your leadership, Berlin’s attitude is ripe for a change – less Oberlehrer (schoolmarm),  more trusted friend.

Working together with Macron, a reform of the eurozone, an overhaul of European foreign and security policy, and an ambitious EU-wide immigration policy are all key. While this will require loosening the purse-strings, just remember that every euro spent on consolidating the common currency and improving the EU’s infrastructure is a euro well spent. It is also in Germany’s interest to let France take the lead, and not only in security as has traditionally been the case.

That said, don’t forget that the European project is more than just a Franco-German love story. It is essential that you also strengthen the overall cohesion among the remaining 27 EU member states. Germany needs to become everyone’s good friend again – and mean it. To share leadership would help, even if it implies giving up some control yourself.

This will be easier said than done, of course, once the EU progresses at different speeds. Again, striking a new, humbler tone will help, as will more generosity – even where it may not be strictly deserved.

This doesn’t mean that Germany’s role will be solely moderation and mediation. No, Berlin also needs to become a capital of ideas. Germany’s political class, led by your good self, needs to think “European” – and creatively – first and foremost. To strengthen the EU, your government now needs to come up with new projects palatable to all EU member states. Please always be open-minded about initiatives from others for the improvement of the lives of all 510 million EU citizens.

How about that for a legacy?

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© REUTERS/Laszlo Balogh

Donald Trump’s recent visit to Poland and the G20 summit went better than expected. In Warsaw, Trump finally made the long-awaited and clear commitment to NATO’s mutual defense clause. There was no Russian reset, not to mention any great bargains between Russia and the United States. The US president actually urged Russia “to cease its destabilizing activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, and its support for hostile regimes.” Unlike on earlier occasions, he refrained from explicitly criticizing the EU. He even called the G20 summit “a wonderful success […] carried out beautifully by Chancellor Angela Merkel.” – no Germany-bashing via Twitter and no refused handshakes this time. The G20 leaders were even able to agree on a joint final communiqué, as vague as it may be, despite significant differences on climate change and trade policy. The worst did not come to the worst.

That this came as a great relief is in itself telling. Trump’s leadership has turned the US into a source of unprecedented uncertainty – and the American presidency into a loose cannon. Although Trump’s visit to Europe did not create any sort of actual transatlantic crisis, it has underlined that the German chancellor and the American president do not share a common view of international relations – or of what “the West” is.

In fact, their worldviews could not be further apart. Merkel champions multilateralism, free trade, and environmental protection (though she herself has been accused of a kind of “mercantilism”, particularly in the context of eurozone). Trump, whose slogan is “America First,” sees the world as “an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors, and businesses engage and compete for advantage” and has already withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement. Whereas Merkel believes that international cooperation leads to mutual benefits and win-win-situations for all participants, Trump sees it as a zero-sum game where only relative gains matter. For Berlin, international institutions are linchpins of global diplomacy, for the Trump White House, they merely serve as tools for power projection.

Yes, Trump promised to preserve America’s post-Cold War alliances and promised that “the West will never, ever be broken.” He mentioned the rule of law and the right to free speech and free expression as defining Western values. But while President Barack Obama had expressed his concern vis-à-vis the PiS government’s crackdown on the independence of the judiciary and on journalists, President Trump had nothing but praise for the current Polish administration.

Trump’s understanding of the West is actually very Polish – or rather, PiS-ish. The PiS, like Trump, came to power by promising to fight the liberal, globalist ruling classes who are supposedly aiming at transforming their societies “toward a mixture of cultures and races, a world of cyclists and vegetarians, who only use renewable energy sources and combat all forms of religion” – as the Polish foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski put it in an interview with the German tabloid Bild in January 2016. “Making America great again” sounds like the PiS promises of “Rising from one’s knees.” Both Trump and the PiS leadership are convinced that the Western civilization is at risk of decline, under threat from “radical Islamic terrorism” and the “steady creep of government bureaucracy,” as the US president declared in Warsaw. And, most importantly, both think that at the heart of the Western civilization lay “the bonds of culture, faith, and tradition that make us who we are.”

Herein lies the major difference between Trump’s and Merkel’s concepts of the West: when Trump speaks of the “Western civilization” he implicitly means the “culture, faith, and tradition” of white people in Europe and North America. When Merkel states that “Germany and America are bound by values – democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, regardless of their origin, skin color, creed, gender, sexual orientation, or political views”, she understands the West not in cultural, religious, or historical, not to mention ethno-nationalist terms. Merkel’s understanding is universal. Her West is a place where people share certain fundamental political beliefs, including liberal democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and gender equality. While Trump (and the PiS) define the West geographically and want to pull up the drawbridges, Merkel’s West knows no geographical, only political bounds.

Trump’s Warsaw speech might have been meant as “an apologia for the West,” as the Wall Street Journal’s editorial page put it, where the president took “a clear stand against the kind of gauzy globalism and vague multiculturalism represented by the worldview of, say, Barack Obama and most contemporary Western intellectuals.” If so, he also took a clear stand against Merkel – and much of what the West has been standing for.

NB. This article was originally published by the WiseEurope blog.

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© REUTERS/Eric Vidal

An audible sigh of relief emerged from Berlin when Emmanuel Macron triumphed in France’s presidential elections, overcoming right-wing populist Marine Le Pen and her Front National. Germany’s two main parties, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) led by Martin Schulz, made no secret of their support for Macron and his unabashedly pro-EU stance. From the beginning, Macron vowed to reform his country and to deepen its ties with Germany in particular, eliciting the much-quoted retort from Le Pen: “France will be led by a woman: either me or Ms. Merkel.”

Both the CDU and the SPD are looking to Macron as the European Union’s new hope, reviving the Franco-German tandem, particularly as the EU continues to face various crises: Brexit, populism, the rising threat of terror, refugees, migration, as well as increasing friction among the member states, which had led the EU to the brink of collapse. In Berlin a great deal of hope has been placed on the political newcomer, and for good reason: Macron’s victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections could be the last chance to stabilize and restore the EU’s legitimacy. If his presidency fails, it cannot be ruled out that anti-European and anti-German forces will surge to power in France in five years’ time. Regardless of which party wins the German election in September, it is in Berlin’s own interest that Macron’s presidency will be a success.

It remains to be seen whether the couple franco-allemand will finally be Europe’s integration engine again. In Germany, most signs point to a victory for Chancellor Angela Merkel in September’s elections, but even were Martin Schulz to pull off a dramatic upset, both candidates are strong champions of the European project and closer ties with France.

Still, in some areas, cooperation could be easier said than done.

The Future of the EU

The debate about the EU’s future is playing out against different backdrops on both sides of the Rhine. In France some 40 percent of the electorate chose anti-EU candidates in the first round of voting on the far left and far right of the spectrum. In fact, Macron emerged as the only unequivocally pro-EU candidate in the running.

In Germany, meanwhile, commitment to the EU is part of the political mainstream. Even if the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has successfully thrust euroskeptic views into the spotlight, those have not reached the center of political or public discourse. Consequently, Berlin still enjoys greater room for maneuver in European affairs.

Still, crises have battered and destabilized the European Union, and both Germany and France are well aware that the argument for an ever closer union is starting to ring hollow. Macron is therefore championing a differentiated approach to integration – an approach that grants member states willing to integrate deeper more scope to push ahead, particularly in the eurozone and within the realm of Common Security and Defense Policy, but also in energy and digital policies. In these areas, Berlin and Paris are in step.

But Macron is also in favor of a smaller core circle of member states led by the two countries that would function as an avant-garde. Merkel’s government is hesitant to support such an idea, conscious of the criticism that Germany has grown too powerful in Europe. Berlin has sought to protect the interests of less powerful EU countries that are suspicious of a stronger German-French duo.

Neither the CDU nor the SPD has taken up one of Macron’s campaign proposals to establish conventions in each member state in order to enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Since all member states’ governments would need to get behind this idea, it is likely to fall flat.

The Eurozone and Europe’s Economy

The eurozone and economic integration have always been among the points of real friction between Germany and France. The two governments have wrangled over economic policies often in recent years.

Macron’s views on European economic policy took form during his time as economy minister under François Hollande. Today Macron is pushing to overhaul the ailing French economy by reforming the labor market and welfare regulations and consolidating the budget, thereby restoring France’s credibility on the European stage. In Germany, his approach has been well received across party lines.

But Macron’s ambitions do not stop at France’s borders: He is bidding to reshape European policy as well, finding ways to deepen integration and cultivate greater solidarity among member states. He has advocated for a European economics and finance minister for the eurozone, complete with their own budget to finance mutual investment projects, help member states in need, and offer backing in crisis situations.

Such proposals have met with positive response from Schulz and the SPD: They have thrown their support behind Macron’s bid for common European investment projects, and are calling for binding minimum wages across the EU. Chancellor Merkel’s conservatives, meanwhile, have distanced themselves from such initiatives thus far, although Merkel has not ruled them out entirely.

Moreover, the new French president welcomes global free trade but has urged Europe to extend anti-dumping regulations, sharpen laws on foreign investment, and integrate environmental and social standards into the EU’s trade agreements. Macron has also called for a Buy European Act that would ensure that public tenders are only awarded to companies that produce at least half their goods in the EU.

Protectionism does not serve Germany well; it has profited from global trade more than any other European country. That is why Germany’s main parties have largely rejected linking environmental and social standards to any trade agreements. After all, such demands could deal a blow to Germany’s powerful export industry.

Common Defense and Security

There is far more common ground on common defense and security policy (CSDP). Even before the vote, Germany’s Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and her French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian (now Macron’s foreign minister) released a joint policy paper on expanding the EU’s CSDP.

The policy paper links this deepening cooperation to PESCO, short for Permanent Structured Cooperation, an article in the Lisbon Treaty allowing a core group of member states to integrate security and defense policy without dividing the European Union. The defense ministers also called for a permanent EU headquarters for civilian and military defense and security operations, closer cooperation on logistics, and coordinated training. A revised Athena mechanism for financing common EU military costs would provide a framework for funding CSDP initiatives. The SPD has already signalled its approval of many of these proposals.

Macron aims not to build a European army, but rather to better coordinate member states’ existing resources and create a path toward a European defense union. The French-German partnership stands at the core of that policy. Merkel and Schulz are well aware that common defense and security would grant France a platform to appear bold and strong, on equal footing with Germany (and thus make Germany look less dominant).

France suffered a series of major terror attacks in 2015-16 that reshaped its security and counterterrorism policy. Like his predecessor, Macron sees military missions abroad as a key element of counterterrorism and has vowed to carry forward the military’s current engagements along with its partners. That is why Paris is likely to demand more military engagement from Berlin. In Germany, however, opposition toward military missions abroad remains significant.

Merkel and Macron believe military cooperation with the US is still a core element of European defense. Schulz, however, has positioned himself as the anti-Trump, and would seek to untangle defense and security cooperation with Washington. While Merkel and Macron have pledged to ramp up defense spending and meet the two percent GDP target for NATO members, Schulz has argued he will not bow to Trump’s ambitious weapons aims.

The Refugee Debate and Schengen

The refugee crisis of 2015 tested ties between Germany and France: Paris and Berlin strove for common solutions but were driven apart by their different interests. Asylum policy will remain a core issue that will require them to work together constructively – especially because the EU has yet to come up with a sustainable solution to the influx of refugees and migrants.

Macron has advocated defensive measures and called for a reform of the Dublin asylum system. He has proposed the fast-tracking of asylum and deportation procedures and checkpoints in the refugees’ countries of origin and transit areas.

His proposals are in line with Chancellor Merkel’s strategy. The German leader has launched a campaign to strike deals with countries of origin and transit countries, like Turkey and Afghanistan, in order to stem the flow of migration. Macron has pledged more development aid as well to help create opportunities there and battle smuggling operations – proposals welcomed by both the CDU and the SPD.

Although Macron was the only candidate to praise Germany’s refugee policy during the presidential campaign in France, he has not indicated that his government would be willing to take in more asylum seekers. Instead, he is seeking a fair distribution of refugees across Europe and sanctions levied against member states that refuse to honor their obligation.

More “solidarity” in the fair distribution of refugees and migrants has also been championed by Schulz. He has avoided speaking of sanctions but has indicated that he would try to link refugee policy with the distribution of funding for agriculture and infrastructure. Merkel, on the other hand, has positioned herself against any initiatives to punish uncooperative member states with fines.

Macron has also argued for the need to strengthen the EU’s external borders; he has suggested making Frontex more robust, adding 5,000 new positions and additional resources and responsibilities. Both the CDU and the SPD have made the securing of external borders a focus as well. At the same time, Macron has made clear he stands behind the Schengen agreement, championing the free movement of people. This does not prevent him from striving to reform the guidelines for foreign (“posted”) workers, though.

Europe in Paris

The new French president is a crucial partner for Germany in the attempt to reform the European Union. He is the most EU- and Germany-friendly leader France has seen in years, if not in history. On the campaign trail and now in office, he has strived to both show French voters the benefits of European integration and make Paris a powerful player in Brussels. The strengthening of the Franco-German tandem is at the core of this: His cabinet includes several policymakers with close ties to Germany, like Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire (see our Close-Up of him in this issue), and Philippe Etienne, ambassador to Germany 2015-17, who now serves as one of the president’s top foreign policy advisers.

Both Merkel and Schulz have already emphasized that they are ready to work closely with the French president. “Mercron” has the potential for advances in the defense and security field and with regard to migration policy, whereas eurozone reform and implementing a “social Europe” would be easier with “Schucron.”

However, the next German chancellor and the French president are likely to face major structural hurdles in further strengthening Paris-Berlin ties. Many French voters are still skeptical of an overly powerful EU – and of Germany, the most dominant member, in particular. Macron’s proposals for eurozone reforms are highly unpopular among Germans who are wary of carrying the financial burden while other member states continue to pile up debt.

Paris and Berlin will need to strike clear agreements to show their own citizens the will to compromise goes both ways – the first steps in deepening trust and cooperation for the path forward.

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© REUTERS/Neil Hall

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States is a watershed moment for transatlantic relations. This was by no means the preferred outcome for most Europeans, and it poses paramount challenges for the transatlantic partnership. Europe is in a state of shock – a shock that feels all too familiar. Many here have been reminded of the Brexit vote, when they went to bed with spirits high and woke up to a new reality. They aren’t ready to accept that the seemingly unthinkable has happened once again. Most Europeans find it difficult to believe that almost half of the American electorate opted for a candidate who bragged about sexually assaulting women, threatened to imprison his opponent, disparaged Latinos and African-Americans, called waterboarding “peanuts,” and vowed to build a “big, beautiful, powerful wall” on the US southern border. Now, Europe’s worst nightmare has come true.

It’s a particularly rude awakening. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy program resonated well with European foreign policy elites, especially Germans. He forged a robust working relationship with Chancellor Angela Merkel – strong enough to weather the storms that battered German-American ties during his tenure, including Guantanamo, Washington’s drone war, and the NSA listening in on Merkel’s cell phone. On Russia, Obama understood the need for transatlantic as well as European unity. On Iran, the US lined up with Europe. And while Obama was pushing European leaders to do more, both in terms of soft power and defense spending, it was always clear that the US was deeply committed to its European partners.

Unknown Knowns

There is little doubt the Trump administration will be different. Nobody knows exactly what the president-elect will do because most of his policies are inscrutable: He has adopted and then abandoned his positions on NATO, Russia, nuclear weapons, Libya, Iraq, Syria, climate change, refugees, and the Iran nuclear deal. If the new president implements only half of his campaign promises, Europe is in deep trouble.

Still, three core principles have emerged as a consistent narrative behind Trump’s candidacy: America is doing too much to try to solve the world’s problems, trade agreements are damaging the country, and immigrants are destructive.

Trump is, in that sense, Merkel’s ideological opposite. She champions globalism, open borders, and dialogue. Trump is skeptical of the very international organizations that Germany sees as linchpins of global diplomacy, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization and even the European Union itself (Trump welcomed the Brexit vote and referred to his own victory as “Brexit plus plus plus”). At a rally in swing state Ohio, Trump even likened his rival Hillary Clinton, who had explicitly praised Merkel’s leadership style, to the German chancellor: “In short, Hillary Clinton wants to be America’s Angela Merkel, and you know what a disaster this massive immigration has been to Germany and the people of Germany.”

His conciliatory acceptance speech notwithstanding, Trump appears to be a populist nationalist who doesn’t consider Europe’s security or prosperity part of his business. The idea that President Trump will walk back everything candidate Trump said during a bitter, vitriolic campaign is highly doubtful. Some compare him to Ronald Reagan, but it’s very unlikely that he’ll govern in the tradition of internationalist Republicans, from Richard Nixon to George H.W. Bush.

Instead, Europe should gear up for huge challenges. NATO is no longer the safety net it was. Trump has been relentless about Europe’s defense contributions. “They’re not paying us what we need,” he said in his debate with Clinton on September 28, adding, “NATO could be obsolete.” This raises serious questions about Trump’s readiness to uphold America’s Article 5 commitments and its security guarantees in Europe.

This comes at a time when European security is already under threat. The rift between Russia and the West is growing ever deeper, and a series of crises from Morocco to the Caspian Sea have tested Europe’s limits. American disengagement at this point would hit Europe hard. While Hillary Clinton would have almost certainly pushed ahead with the initiatives NATO agreed to at the Warsaw summit last July, that roadmap is now in limbo. Even if America doesn’t withdraw from NATO, Europeans will no longer be able to outsource their foreign, and especially military, responsibilities primarily to Washington. They have to “do more,” with larger contributions not just in terms of soft power but also hard, military capabilities. If Europeans do not step up defense, there might be nobody left to come to their rescue.

Another looming challenge for Europeans will be Trump’s relations with Russia. His apparent admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin might win him some points with Putin’s remaining friends in Europe, but it could undermine Merkel’s investment in a tough European line on Ukraine. Transatlantic unity was a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s approach and a key tool in deterring Russia. Now it could fray in the process. The Middle East, Turkey, and transatlantic trade are also set to become points of friction.

The Last Wake-Up Call

The postwar world order, built upon seventy years of great power peace and cooperation, is on the brink. And Germany is more crucial than ever. Brexit had already increased the importance of Berlin; the outcome of the American election means Germany’s global responsibility has taken on completely new dimensions.

All eyes are now turning to Berlin to uphold liberal democracy. Meaningful German leadership will be expected not only within Europe, but also on issues like Syria, Iraq, and Russia. It’s entirely unclear whether Germany is ready for the task that lies ahead.

It’s not that Trump has no friends in Europe. Right-wing populists like France’s Marine Le Pen and her Front National, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders and his Party of Freedom, and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) voiced support for Trump during the campaign, and they are celebrating his victory. “Their world sets, ours rises,” Florian Philippot, an adviser to Le Pen, wrote ominously on Twitter. If Obama was “Europe’s President,” Trump may become the president of Europe’s populist far-right. With elections due in Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, there is a real danger that the new US president aligns with these anti-globalism and anti-immigration European forces, further destabilizing the EU.

At the same time, it’s very possible that Trump will trigger anti-American sentiment in Europe and cloud the country’s image abroad, complicating transatlantic relations. However, European leaders will need to try and make it work somehow.

Germany’s chancellor struck the right note when she stressed: “Germany and America are bound by values – democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, regardless of their origin, skin color, creed, gender, sexual orientation, or political views”, adding “On the basis of these values, I offer close cooperation to the future president of the United States, Donald Trump.”

In addition to standing up for Western principles, Europe has to get its act together. This is the latest and the loudest in a series of wake-up calls, and no other should be needed. Europe has a large stake in a liberal, rules-based order. It should use every leverage it has to influence decision-making in Washington.

But it would be foolish not to acknowledge that transatlantic relations face an existential threat. The Trump presidency will likely breed mistrust and antagonism on both sides of the Atlantic. Still, four years may feel an eternity, but they are not. Transatlantic relations are simply too important to give up without a good fight.

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