© REUTERS/POOL new

“Multilateralism is under fire precisely when we need it most”, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated when accepting the Charlemagne Prize in May. Indeed, in recent years we have seen a revival of great power politics and unilateral action, while support for international institutions has weakened.

The good news: some middle powers have joined forces to reinvigorate collective action and the multilateral order, with Germany and France at the forefront. At the opening of the 74^th United Nations General Assembly, on Thursday a number of countries will officially launch what has been in the air for a while: an Alliance for Multilateralism, bringing together states that share an interest in not only upholding but further developing the current multilateral order.

The launch is timely, coming in the midst of populist and nationalist resurgences. In order for the alliance to succeed, its members will have to consider three key issues: the group’s normative underpinnings, its agenda, and the geopolitical implications.

Germany and Its Partners

The idea of founding a “multilateral club” of like-minded states is more than a year old: German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas first it during his visit to Tokyo in July 2018. He proposed an “alliance of multilateralists” to defend and develop international rules and to fill the vacuum that had emerged following the withdrawal of “others”—read: Donald Trump’s United States—from the world stage.

Canada was presented as another member of the alliance’s core group during the German ambassadors’ conference in August 2018. Finally, France joined as the fourth core group member: in a joint op-ed, Maas and his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian emphasized that an Alliance for Multilateralism was “more necessary than ever” to stabilize the rules-based international order.

Since then, Germany and France have held consultations with various countries, most extensively during the handover of the presidency of the UN Security Council in April 2019. The countries they approached included Argentina, Australia, Chile, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

While Canada and Japan have officially expressed their support for the initiative, others have been more wary. The more hesitant camp comprises states with traditionally very close ties with the United States, toward which the alliance’s proponents have remained rather ambiguous. Minister Maas has repeatedly emphasized that the grouping is not directed against anyone. Yet his assertion that he “wouldn’t slam the door in anyone’s face” if there was an interest in joining was probably not received as a friendly invitation by his colleagues in Washington.

Ambiguity and Lack of Substance

Terminology does not help Maas’ case: at the very core, the term “alliance” invokes associations of the transatlantic alliance or the Allied Powers of World War II. What these alliances had in common at their inception is that they were clearly directed against someone. While the German foreign minister was eager to emphasize the inclusive character of the grouping, he could not forestall doubts on the other side of the Atlantic and among some traditional US allies (see for instance David Ritchie, Alliance for Multilateralism: An Australian View, from the BPJ’s July/August 2019 issue).

Alliances are also usually defined by a settled membership, unlike the idea of flexible geometry that has now been attached to the Alliance for Multilateralism. Rather than consisting of a defined number of members, this alliance, its creators hope, will gather combinations of countries under its umbrella to take the lead on specific international challenges.

In addition, the term “multilateralism” might not have been the best choice for the minister’s signature project. A recent survey has shown that most citizens in Germany have never heard of the concept or are unaware of its meaning. The numbers in other countries are likely similar. This is not a trivial flaw in a time where populists often set the agenda. But among policy-makers, too, interpretations of multilateralism vary. Chinese political leaders, for example, have acted as defenders of the multilateral system even though they do not attach the same meaning to it as many Western powers, who implicitly regard multilateralism as synonymous with (or at least largely congruent with) the rules-based and liberal international order.

Terminology aside, there is yet another, more substantial weakness of the Alliance for Multilateralism, namely its hazy agenda. As multilateralism is, first and foremost, a tool of international politics, the policy issues one seeks to address in a multilateral manner need to be defined. Diplomats have linked the alliance to climate change, trade, international humanitarian law, and migration, among other things. But the topics have varied since the idea was first presented. A clear-cut agenda is not in sight, and the form and substance of the alliance are still to be defined.

Three Suggestions

How to make the alliance a success, i.e. to help it become a tool for reviving collective action in international politics? Here are three suggestions:

Communicate your normative baseline clearly: The first task will be to come up with an “Alliance for Multilateralism in a nutshell”, outlining the core features and objectives of the club. An important component of this would be to work out the normative underpinnings that the Alliance adheres to. Clearly, multilateral cooperation and the liberal international order are not the same thing. However, they must be seen as two sides of the same coin: multilateralism is codified in the United Nations, and the latter’s charter was largely built on liberal-democratic ideals. This also underpins the idea of an Alliance for Multilateralism as pursued by Germany, France, and other partners. These countries would do well to be explicit about their view of the international order and the rules and principles they attach to it. After all, doing so would enable other potential partners to decide whether they want to be part of the club. Nobody likes to buy a pig in a poke.

Be bold when setting the agenda. The issues that have been floated so far—climate action, international humanitarian law, migration, trade—are all crucially important. At the same time, various regimes are already in place for regulating and addressing them (e.g. the Paris Agreement, the Geneva Conventions, the Migration Compact, the World Trade Organization). Living up to the ambitions of these frameworks and institutions—and where needed, reinvigorating them—should be a priority of the alliance. It will be even more important, however, to address the “jungle”, i.e. the areas of international collaboration that are not currently regulated by international organizations or regimes. Cyber security and the digitalization of weapons systems are preeminent areas in this respect; biotechnology and geoengineering would be others. In driving forward global governance where it is needed most, the alliance should not shy back from picking these issues as its core projects.

Take geopolitics seriously and involve the US: With all the emphasis on “soft” matters, one must not forget that the multilateral order of the past decades was built on the convergence of great power politics, especially in the 1945 postwar period and the 1990s. The order flourished when the interests of great powers aligned. In times when this is no longer a given, reviving the international order requires the alliance to also address underlying geopolitical rivalries. To do so, the members could come up with joint policy proposals on the world’s geopolitical focal points, such as Syria or Yemen. The role of Australia and Luxembourg in negotiating humanitarian access to Syria in 2013 has proven that coalitions of small(er) states can make a difference when great powers are caught in a political standoff.

Engaging in geopolitical thinking implies that the alliance will have to come clean regarding its relationship with Washington. Despite all the current transatlantic (and trans-Pacific) quarrels, the United States is certainly the great power that shares most of the norms and values that the prospective members of the alliance adhere to. They should therefore actively search for common ground. A starting point could be to take the American criticism of the current multilateral system and its institutions seriously, and to come up with proposals for how to ramp up its effectiveness.

Multilateralism has to regain the strategic initiative. In order to win the race against nationalist and populist tendencies, the rules-based international order has to produce innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing problems. The Alliance for Multilateralism has the potential to give fresh impetus to this undertaking. But it will need to be clearer, bolder, and not shy away from power politics.

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© REUTERS/Eduardo Munoz

Without a doubt, multilateral cooperation has seen better years than the last. It is true that during the United Nations’ 72nd General Debate in 2017, the overwhelming majority of the 193 member states affirmed their commitment to the values and goals of active multilateralism and signaled their willingness to find joint solutions to global challenges. But the fact that the benefits of multilateralism even needed to be praised in the hall of the UN General Assembly, one of the most well-known symbols of our multilateral order, shows that something has gone wrong.

The termination of the Paris Climate Accord, the withdrawal from UNESCO and the negotiations for a global migration pact, and the violation of binding Security Council resolutions by the United States have noticeably increased uncertainty around the world. These developments show that the United States, the leading power of the western world and key state in the existing multilateral order, is increasingly following sovereignty as its guiding principle for action on the global stage. In his first speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2017, US President Donald Trump mentioned the term “sovereignty” 21 times.

Invoking the principle of sovereignty is nothing new at the UN. But until now, the term was mostly used to fend off unwanted interference in internal affairs, most often in relation to the human rights situation or territorial disputes.

Among such staunch supporters of sovereignty, however, one can also find states that fail to respect the sovereignty of other states when their interests stand opposed. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia gave its assurance that it would recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine’s renunciation of nuclear weapons. This binding obligation was unilaterally violated by Moscow in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and destabilized eastern Ukraine. And China, always a strong defender of sovereignty, does not consider itself bound to this principle when neighboring states assert territorial claims in the South China Sea which have been confirmed under international law.

A World in Crisis

The rising pressure on the familiar international order is happening at a time when the international community faces enormous challenges.

Numerous armed conflicts have remained unsolved for years and create new victims every day. Conflicts rage in Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, and Ukraine, just to name a few. Fear of death and persecution and economic hardship have resulted in the largest number of refugees since 1945: 65 million people are currently displaced internally or abroad.

Climate change will also lead to a long-term increase in refugee populations if people in small island states and coastal regions lose their livelihoods as the sea level rises and natural disasters become more frequent. But even within the interior of continents, droughts and desertification threaten to degrade entire regions, with negative consequences for the economic development of entire countries.

Poverty and hopelessness, especially among the younger generations, are not only a cause of flight and migration: They often provide a breeding ground for extremism and radicalization and drive a steady stream of new recruits into the arms of terrorist groups like ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabab.

Overpopulation, the expansion of people into previously uninhabited regions and the global increase in mobility bear the risk of new transmission routes for rare, highly dangerous pathogens. The Ebola crisis of 2014/2015 dramatically showed us that viruses do not stop at borders in our highly interconnected world. The healthcare systems in the affected countries were hopelessly overwhelmed by the epidemic.

More Important Than Ever

Whether flight and migration, poverty, climate change, terrorism, or pandemics, no organization other than the United Nations has the necessary legitimacy to address these challenges.

Under the umbrella of the United Nations, the heads of state and government of 193 member states adopted the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda in the summer of 2015. Under the UN’s leadership, this agenda will achieve development in the coming years without overburdening our planet’s limited natural resources. Fighting poverty and supporting gender equality, access to schooling, water and sanitation, sustainable urban development, climate protection, and good governance are part of this agenda, which for the first time links social progress and sustainability and is explicitly addressed to all member states, including wealthy industrialized nations.

UN agencies like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP) offer millions of refugees in camps and reception facilities a place where they are safe and receive a minimum of care.

More than 120,000 blue helmets in 16 missions on four continents often form the last remaining buffer between conflict parties and help prevent even worse bloodshed. Often, these armed conflicts are not even picked up in the news cycle.

The World Health Organization (WHO), also a coordinating agency of the United Nations, helps protect lives and prevents the spread of pandemics by harmonizing and financing global vaccination programs.

In light of these numerous crises and conflicts, the United Nations, 72 years after its founding, is more important now than ever before—as a mediator, platform for dialogue, and defender of international law. To put it differently: If the UN did not already exist, we would have to create it. Nevertheless, the UN is often the object of criticism. Its procedures are too inflexible and bureaucratic; its administration is too expensive; and its peace missions are too ineffective and plagued by scandal. It is therefore not surprising that Secretary-General Antonio Guterres made it a top priority to initiate important reform processes with the goal of making the organization fit for purpose. Germany strongly supports the Secretary-General’s reform agenda.

Securing the World

The most fundamental purpose of the United Nations is to preserve international peace and security. The UN body charged with this mission is the UN Security Council. The Council can pass legally binding resolutions, impose sanctions and order military operations. The German government is seeking a seat on the Council for the 2019-20 term and has good reasons for doing so.

Germany’s foreign policy role has grown considerably in recent years. Sustainable development, climate protection, and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda are priorities of our global engagement as are the promotion of crisis prevention, stabilization and post-conflict peacebuilding. As the chair of various international fora like the G7, OSCE, and most recently the G20, Germany was able to shape the global agenda and make its mark. Germany has shown that it is willing and able to do more for conflict resolution in international negotiations such as the talks on the Iranian nuclear program and the Minsk Agreement. We are an increasingly in-demand partner in the multilateral environment, not only in the EU, OSCE, and NATO, but also here at the UN.

With our growing international weight, we want to help the Security Council more effectively fulfill its duty to preserve peace and security in our increasingly complex world. We want to help solve the most pressing crises and conflicts and put the focus on their root causes.

If elected to the Security Council, we will advance issues which require greater attention from the Security Council: crisis prevention and resolution, the link between climate and security, the existential importance of human rights for security, the involvement of women in peace processes, the protection of children in armed conflicts, and issues of global health in relation to peace and security.

Crisis prevention and stabilization are important components of our foreign policy. Our approach overlaps to a large extent with the Secretary-General’s reform agenda, especially on the guiding principle of prevention.

Severe and widespread human rights violations are not only symptoms of conflict. In fact, they are often what triggers conflicts in the first place. Focusing on human rights in security policy is therefore an important part of crisis prevention and response. The Security Council has an important role to play here. It must integrate human rights as a core aspect in its mandates.

Equal participation of women is a key element of sustainable peacekeeping. Germany will therefore place particular emphasis on implementing, expanding, and anchoring the “Women, Peace and Security” agenda on the Security Council.

For many years, Germany has actively promoted the protection of children and their rights in armed conflicts. As we did during our Security Council membership in 2011–12, we would continue this mission to enhance the protection of children around the world.

We are concerned by rising sea levels and by desertification in areas inhabited by millions of people. Such developments are responsible for significant human suffering and lead to resource conflicts and migration movements which have the potential to destabilize entire regions. The Security Council must address these issues.

A lesson from the Ebola and Zika crises is that pandemics cannot be handled by the health sector alone. Health risks and weak health systems can destroy societies, destabilize countries, and significantly deteriorate relations between nations. Different actors and agencies must work together in the response. We understand global health as an integral part of foreign policy, especially with regard to security matters, and want to bring these concerns to the Security Council.

Showdown on the East River

On June 8, 193 UN member states will decide in the General Assembly which five countries will be elected to the Security Council for two-year terms. Germany is competing with Belgium and Israel for one of the two seats allotted to the Western and Others Group (WOEG), which means that one of the competitors will leave empty-handed. A two-thirds majority of present and voting member states is required to be elected to the Security Council. If all states are in attendance, this amounts to 129 votes.

In the summer of 2016, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier officially opened Germany’s campaign for a non-permanent seat. Since then, the German government has sought votes from member states in New York and in capitals around the world on its platform of peace, justice, innovation, and partnership.
Although campaign coordination is in the hands of the German Foreign Office, a successful candidacy is the shared responsibility of the entire German government and needs support from parliament.

Germany will also play a larger role to ensure EU solidarity at the United Nations. The paradigm shift in US foreign policy has consequences on how EU partners in New York will vote. More than ever, the EU must speak with one voice. Germany will be able to play a mediating role more effectively if we are represented on the Security Council starting in 2019. If elected, we would seek closer cooperation with France as one of our main partners.

In our complex world, the United Nations is a tried and true platform to develop solutions to our most pressing problems in dialogue with member states. The United Nations cannot perform miracles, but it is often the last hope we have for peace and security.

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© REUTERS/Carlo Allegri

This trend is especially apparent in the UN Security Council (UNSC), the central organ for the protection of peace and security. In order to effectively carry out its responsibilities, it must have legitimacy and the ability to act. It possesses less and less of both: its legitimacy is threatened by the fact that it mirrors the antiquated postwar order of 1945, which leaves some regions grossly underrepresented while privileging the interests of the five permanent members (P5); and it is less and less capable of acting, particularly when its responsibility to protect peace and stability is needed the most.

The Security Council’s recent track record is mixed at best. Perhaps most indicative of this is the fact that important international agreements are often reached in other formats and are then later endorsed pro forma by the Security Council. Examples include the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program and those reached by the International Syria Support Group. Nevertheless, it is only the UNSC that can grant such agreements the necessary international legitimacy.

The international community acknowledges the need for a reform of the UN system, at least in principle. During a summit in September 2015 in New York, Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with Germany’s closest reform partners – Brazil, India, and Japan – stressed this. But no matter how great the fundamental agreement over the need for reform is, especially when it comes to the UNSC, the way to proceed remains equally unclear. UN membership encompasses 193 states, each with its own national interests. Progress in the UN thus often means embracing the lowest common denominator. A structural reform of the UNSC would require changes to the UN Charter, which itself requires a two-thirds majority of members – meaning the concurrence of 129 member states; and should that be achieved, it could still take years until ratification allows these changes to be put into practice.

A Modernized, Transparent Process

Several reform attempts have clarified the demands. What are the issues now up for discussion? One structural change that is often mentioned is the idea of enlarging the UNSC in order to make it more representative. A majority of UN member states have spoken favorably of enlarging both existing seat categories, creating more permanent and rotating seats.

In terms of UNSC working methods, the rules governing the veto have gathered the most attention. When the veto is used, it becomes impossible for the UNSC to tackle pressing issues. This should not necessarily be interpreted as the UNSC breaking down; it is a feature of its design, meant to encourage peaceful conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the veto limits the UNSC’s ability to act in crises. There is widespread support for the demand that the P5 states – at least in the event of mass atrocities – decline to use their vetoes, allowing the UN to intervene when lives are threatened. The chances of success for this proposal remain, however, uncertain.

The process of selecting the UN Secretary-General is another topic reformers wish to address: the process followed in the past – pre-selection of a few candidates by the P5 in closed-door meetings, followed by pro-forma acclamation of only one nominee in the UN General Assembly – has been rightly criticized as opaque and undemocratic. A modernized, transparent process, especially one that provided for candidate hearings, would allow for improvement.

All three reform plans limit the powers of the P5 in order to strengthen the role of the other UN members. The tendency to eschew the UN completely and instead rely on external adhoc negotiating formats has forced the permanent UNSC members to at least engage in the reform discussion. But the initiative must come from the general UN membership – and that means overcoming individual interests and competitive relationships among the member states. Reform proposals must be drafted that can win majority support in the General Assembly and weather the pressure to maintain the status quo.

Legitimacy Through Enlargement

The urgent need for UNSC reform was recognized at the 2005 World Summit. Heads of state and government vowed to move quickly; so far, however, no progress has been made. Various groups of states have presented different approaches, including the suggestion made by Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan – the G4 – to expand the UNSC by six permanent seats and four to five non-permanent seats.

At the center of the disagreement is the question of how many new members the UNSC should take on, for how long, and with which rights. The controversy surrounding the suggestions made so far is so great as to render all of them impossible. That said, a majority of the member states favor both an expansion of the permanent seats and an expansion of the non-permanent seats. The suggested numbers vary, but result in a total between around 20 to 25, with an upper limit to ensure the efficacy of the body.

The demands for new permanent seats range from basic advocacy for higher numbers to proposals that specific countries should become new permanent members. At the same time, arguments are also levelled against the idea of permanent seats in general.

The question about the veto right divides both the P5 and those aspiring to UNSC membership. The African Group insists on a veto right for new permanent members if there is to be a veto right at all. The G4, meanwhile, suggests that new members decline to use the veto until a 15-year review process following the implementation of reform. While France has not categorically excluded the possibility of broadening veto rights, the UK has spoken out against it; and the three other permanent members – the US, China, and Russia – have little interest in an extension of veto rights.

There are also various intermediate models that raise the possibility of new seat categories. They entail additional long-term – though non-permanent – members, possibly with a chance of re-election.

In order to reconcile these often widely divergent reform positions into a single model, an intergovernmental process has begun; but so far there have not been real negotiations and thus no real progress. With the consensus reached in the General Assembly in September 2015, however, an important step was taken: a majority of members have, for the first time, voiced support for the start of text-based negotiations, taking the officially submitted positions of over 120 member states as the starting point.

However, it is important to be realistic: actual reform is not foreseeable in the near future. The debate has shaken the member states from their torpor and contributed to a more open exchange; the political forces working behind the scenes are enormous, though – both for and against reform of the status quo.

Unblocking the Security Council

The working methods of the UNSC, especially the veto rules, are also on trial. Important decisions have been blocked several times over the past few years, including Russian-Chinese double vetoes, first used in 2011 to prevent the International Criminal Court from addressing Syria, and the Russian veto in the summer of 2015 stopping the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate the shooting down of flight MH17 over Ukraine.

In the UN community, there is increasing opposition to the ability of the P5 to block decisions – decisions that in some cases could save the lives of hundreds of thousands – for reasons of national interest. Two initiatives aim to limit the use of the veto: the first, the French-Mexican veto initiative, calls for the P5 to voluntarily pass on the opportunity to use the veto in the case of mass atrocities. So far, results have been limited – the reluctance of the other P5 members to be restricted is too great.

A political declaration of support by member states for the French-Mexican veto initiative during the opening of the 70th session of the General Assembly found widespread support. We, too, support it emphatically.

The second initiative put forward in 2013 by the ACT (Accountability, Coherence, Transparency) group goes in a different direction. Through its “Code of Conduct on voting in the Security Council,” member states, when in the Security Council, would refrain from voting against any resolution to intervene in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. The voluntary commitment would apply to all 193 member states, not just the P5. The project has the potential to build pressure on the veto powers through the widespread support of member states. Already over 100 countries, among them Germany, have announced their support.

The discussion over UNSC working methods has gone on for many years, and has led to practical improvements even without modifying the UN Charter. An important contribution was achieved by the “Small Five” (Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland) in 2006: they suggested several improvements that have led to more open formats – for example, the so-called “Arria Formula” meetings. Arria is the name of the Venezuelan ambassador to the UN of the time, who introduced this format. The number of such informal meetings, often convened to discuss topics of controversy in the UNSC, has risen significantly in the past few years. These are important improvements, but they cannot replace structural reforms.

A Woman for Secretary-General?

The area of reform that generates the broadest agreement among UN member states – with the exception of the P5 – concerns the process of electing the UN Secretary-General. With every new election there is louder and louder criticism of the process as it stands today, with the five permanent members deciding on a single candidate among themselves who is subsequently appointed, by acclamation, by the plenary of the General Assembly.

This process goes back to Resolution II (I) of the General Assembly from January 24, 1946; on a fundamental level, it will likely remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, UN member states and civil society organizations are strongly engaged in changing this process, which is generally seen as outdated. Thus the “1 for 7 billion” initiative and the aforementioned ACT group demand the nomination of more than one candidate by the UNSC, for a one-time, seven-year term, along with a clear timeline for the election process and open hearings with candidates.

These demands enjoy widespread popularity and support. The five permanent members, however, have made it clear that the core election process – and the power of the P5 in that process – will not be altered. In certain questions of procedure, some of the P5 states have proven to be more amenable to change. some things, however, especially the nomination of more than one candidate, will not change quickly.

That said, in light of the initial resistance from the five permanent members of the UNSC, the steps agreed to by the General Assembly in fall 2015 for more transparency in the election process can be seen as a success for the UN member states. Starting in April, candidates will now be invited to “informal dialogs,” organized by the President of the General Assembly and the UNSC, at which member states can pose questions before the UNSC decides who to recommend. How far the new application process increases transparency will be seen this year.

The P5 will retain the last word in the nomination of the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, changes like the planned open hearings will mean that candidates will have much greater exposure to the public. Their communication abilities can be tested; their political opinions and earlier decisions can be questioned. For the permanent council members, it could become difficult to stick with a candidate who withers under the limelight. Thus the current changes are welcome – they are a small but important step toward more transparency.

Those advocating the selection of a woman for UN Secretary-General are meeting with wider support and less resistance. Germany, too, has joined calls to pave the way for a woman to take the office – high time, considering that all eight Secretaries-General so far have been men.

The road to institutional reform in the UN is a long one, and will require patience and determination – however, it is necessary to ensure the UN’s efficacy in the future. It is not enough to take the UN’s unique global legitimacy for granted: we must actively defend it, preparing the organization for an ever more complex modern world.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – March/April 2016 issue.

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