© REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Some norms are so important for human civilization that they are established erga omnes—owed to humanity as a whole. The underlying concept of universal rights is intuitive as it gets to the heart of what makes human existence dignified. Therefore, any erosion of universal principles threatens the peaceful and rules-based coexistence of nations. The violation of international humanitarian law is one such threat.

While the principle of universality is easy to grasp, its implementation seems close to impossible. The reasons for this are manifold, but I believe that two of the main aspects are quite obvious:

First, for perpetrators to be held accountable, there need to be independent mechanisms in place. These mechanisms, however, can only be as strong and incorruptible as the international community makes them. Second, even in areas where overarching mechanisms do exist on an international level, their scope of action ends where national interests appear to be at stake.

In an ideal world, the International Criminal Court (ICC) would deal with atrocities committed in any war zone. Unfortunately, with regard to Syria, one of the most devastating conflicts of our time, a referral is unlikely to happen, given the gridlocked positions in the UN Security Council.

I have been a Member of Parliament for many years and am now fortunate to experience government work first-hand as minister of state in the German Foreign Office. This job brings with it an enormous responsibility. It feels like much-valued pillars of the multilateral system are crumbling on our watch. Whenever I ask myself whether we have to accept impunity, I believe that this is out of the question. We cannot and we must not do this.

The Syrian Regime’s Dark Record

Throughout almost a decade of conflict, the Syrian regime has literally violated every major principle of international law. Its wide-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity are undeniable. This is why the establishment of the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria and its collection and analysis of information and evidence was an important step toward accountability. The IIIM keeps alive the memory of tens of thousands of civilians tortured and millions tyrannized—by Assad’s forces and non-state actors—for the sake of upholding a brutal system, silencing opposing voices, and gaining territorial control.

In Syria, not even the most sacrosanct principles of humanitarian law have been upheld. Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons and cluster munitions to slaughter the inhabitants of whole cities. He targeted hospitals, schools, and humanitarian convoys. And he withheld humanitarian aid for regions not under the regime’s control. But make no mistake: the perpetrators’ crimes will not be forgotten. Their sense of security and impunity are of a temporary nature only.

Setting an Example

Granted, with the lack of national steps toward accountability in Syria and a blocked ICC, serving justice will not be an easy task. However, the principle of universal jurisdiction gives all states the opportunity—or rather the obligation—to pursue accountability, regardless of the nationality of perpetrators or victims, and irrespective of where the atrocities were committed. This is why the world’s first criminal trial of two former Syrian government intelligence officials charged with perpetrating crimes against humanity currently taking place in Germany is so important.

Most of the time, trials under universal jurisdiction are protracted and difficult and will not lead to universal justice. However, they are still worthwhile because they represent much more than individuals being held to account for their crimes. These trials are an empowering symbol of hope for all those who suffered at the hands of unjust regimes and, in the case of Syria, will begin to expose the structural elements of systematic torture and other atrocities.

With COVID-19 overshadowing international crises and conflicts, the public focus has again shifted away from hotspots such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen. While drastic steps are necessary to get this unprecedented global situation under control, we must keep our eyes firmly fixed on international conflict zones as well.

I am sure the virus will lead to cascade effects. We can already see these emerging, including new security challenges, fresh waves of violence and terrorism, and greatly increased humanitarian needs. Saving lives and easing suffering, especially through enabling the UN coordinated international humanitarian system to continue its tasks, is at the forefront of our efforts. For this system to function properly, we not only need to have sufficient resources, but also an environment that is conducive to humanitarian organizations and their workers doing their job. Humanitarian assistance requires humanitarian space.

Difficult and Dangerous

One of the most memorable moments of my professional life was talking to representatives of the Syrian White Helmets. Seeing so many of them save countless lives while putting their own at risk was a humbling experience. Their humanitarian work has been a small glimmer of hope in otherwise dark and hopeless situations. Aleppo comes to mind, and also Idlib.

In Syria, humanitarian workers have risked their lives time and time again while the humanitarian space shrinks rapidly around them. In 2018, when a number of members of the international community, in a common effort with Israel and Jordan, were able to evacuate hundreds of White Helmets from Syria, it felt like we made a difference. Offering them asylum in several Western countries was the right thing to do, because after years of insecurity and unrest, we had to provide them with a safe haven.

Humanitarian work is difficult and dangerous as it is. However, without respect for the humanitarian principles as the common denominator for humankind, humanitarian assistance becomes nigh on impossible. The denial of humanitarian assistance must not be used as a weapon of war. Humanitarian workers must not be criminalized or targeted. It is the perpetrators of the Syrian regime who are the criminals. And there will be no safe haven for them. Justice will be served in time.

The post Op-Ed: Justice Matters, Impunity Is Unacceptable appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is contributing to the collapse of international cooperation, which in turn is pushing the attempts to end the wars in Afghanistan and Syria into the background. However, the European Union could play a pivotal role in supporting a UN-led peace process in both countries.

In Afghanistan, the February 2020 peace deal between the United States and the Taliban was a remarkable event meant to end 19 years of war. A UN Security Council Resolution in March said the deal presented “significant steps toward ending the war” and offered “sustained support” to achieve peace. However, the proposed peace process does not hold the Taliban accountable, and risks the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan. In Syria, Russia’s diplomatic and military gains stand on bilateral relations with Damascus, lacking appropriate American and EU cooperation.

A threat-based security narrative during the Obama administration failed to separate legitimate threats from the constructive roles Russia and China could play in ending the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria. The Trump administration has experienced growing tensions with both China and Russia as well as fracturing relations with the EU, which has further undermined the development of a global approach toward ending these deadly conflicts.

The War in Afghanistan

For the US and NATO, the war in Afghanistan originated as a military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. For the Afghans and the region at large, the root cause of the conflict was Moscow’s and Washington’s regime-change approach during the Cold War, resulting in the collapse of the Afghan state, the rise of the Taliban, and the establishment of al-Qaeda.

Regime change as an ideological principle in US foreign policy during the 1980s prevented Washington from supporting the formation of a national unity government in Afghanistan. During the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations, the investment in war overwhelmed any possibilities for conflict resolution. Washington justified its support for Pakistan-led Afghan rebel groups with its policy of bringing about regime change in Kabul, even after Mikhail Gorbachev ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the US signed the 1988 Geneva Accord. This action prolonged the war and produced militant leaders including Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, Ibn al-Khateb, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abubaker al Baghdadi. Had the US response to Gorbachev’s actions been different, it might have prevented the collapse of the state, improved regional stability, and spared itself 19 years of war.

Now, Washington and Brussels are looking for a quick end to the prolonged and costly intervention, but entangled regional concerns, particularly from Pakistan, halt progress. In addition, the current US peace deal with the Taliban is limited and contradicts Washington’s Joint Declaration with the Afghan government. A UN-led program within a cooperative regional mechanism could clarify the way forward.

The War in Syria

The US and EU’s lack of a viable political strategy toward Syria was evident from the start of the political unrest. For the US, the objective of Operation “Timber Sycamore” (from approximately 2012) was clear: regime change in Syria by forcing Bashar al-Assad from power. Like in 1980s Afghanistan, the injection of financial and military resources via Timber Sycamore soon caused a growing Islamization of the anti-government resistance forces. Washington’s lack of political strategy dragged regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel deeper into the conflict, opening political and military spaces for Iranian and Russian influence. By mid-2015, Moscow ordered the deployment of troops to avert a US-backed regime change. The preservation of the al-Assad regime was integrated into Russia’s stabilization program, regardless of the brutalities it committed against the Syrian people.

The presence of the US-led military coalition against ISIS alongside the Russian military offered both countries the opportunity to transform a tactical military collaboration into diplomatic cooperation toward ending the conflict. Yet instead, the US insisted on the removal of the al-Assad regime as a prerequisite toward ending the war, further extending the conflict.

Meanwhile, with US assistance, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) became a formidable popular force that drove out the ISIS fighters from strategic areas and brought a physical end of the Islamic State in Syria in October 2017. By December, the SDF controlled around 30 percent of the Syrian territory, including important oil fields and a large population. The success of the SDF offered Washington the needed leverage to press Moscow into supporting the Transition Plan for Syria, which was originally sponsored by the UN in October 2015 and supported by 17 nations, including Russia and Iran. Instead, on January 13, 2018, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced the US intention to transfer 30,000 Kurdish-led SDF fighters into border forces in northern Syria. Two days later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the US move. This unintended Turkish response forced the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to immediately reverse that decision. Ankara capitalized on American backtracking, portraying it as US willingness to throw the Kurdish forces under the bus.

The sudden withdrawal of US forces in October 2019 opened the door once again to the Turkish military and its allied Islamist militant fighters to attack Kurdish forces in the northeastern region of Syria. This chaotic situation forced the SDF to reach out to Russia and the al-Assad government to protect the border towns. The Syrian and Russian military forces entered key towns ahead of the Turkish military. Turkey reached an agreement with Russia to force the SDF to withdraw from a 120-kilometer-long border region. As a result, the US lost the narrative of regime change, and caused escalating regional hostility that opened cleavages for a reemerging ISIS, and continued Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow have all neglected the regional ties and interests. Deconstructing these regional interests requires collective regional cooperation so as to allow pragmatic forces to reconstruct a narrative that fits within a new regional order.

Why Rejuvenate a UN Role?

US peace efforts in Afghanistan and the Russians’ gains in Syria reveal the limits of bilateral approaches toward ending deadly conflicts. In contrast, a UN-led diplomatic framework—with reference to the 1988 Geneva Accord and the 2015 Vienna Peace Talks—could ensure the success of the US-Taliban peace deal and allow the Syrian people a dignified and just peace, while recognizing the shared strategic interests of relevant member states. Now China, with its $23-billion-commitment to the Arab region and hundreds of billions of dollars to Southwest and Central Asia, and its recently expressed strong support for the US-Taliban peace deal, could incentivize stability in both regions. The EU’s commitment to the UN global role and multilateralism is also advantageous for peace, but the absence of active EU-led regional cooperation and fractious relationships between the US, the EU, Russia, and China is the grim reality, which has global consequences.

Given this reality, a UN-led diplomatic effort to capitalize on the peace deal with the Taliban and stabilize efforts in Syria is would be welcome. With a growing level of collaboration among Security Council members, a constructive UN role should allow for comprehensive conflict transformation in Afghanistan and Syria and reignite post-COVID-19 multilateral cooperation.

EU support for a UN-led framework could draw on established relationships with Russia, China, and the US. The EU has ample opportunity to spearhead the construction of this framework; it has been central to the UN-led peace mediations in the Levant and Middle East and the UN mission in Afghanistan. A strong sentiment regarding not leaving the Middle East to “the global power far from [the] region,” expressed last year by the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, adds some important energy toward effective peace-building.

EU-supported, UN-led mediation efforts in Afghanistan and Syria should receive bipartisan support from the US Congress, which should encourage the Trump administration to support the efforts as well. A multilateral approach toward key critical regional and global issues would also allow the EU to redefine its leadership role within a global order that will emerge once the COVID-19 pandemic begins to wane.

The Way Forward

Afghanistan and Syria have both emerged as epicenters for terrorism, threatening regional stability with global consequences; therefore, ending hostility is far beyond the ability of the governments in power. To start, two key challenges must be addressed:

Overcoming Deep Mistrust: The lack of trust between the warring factions, regional stakeholders, and the countries’ populations demands an effective impartial mediating body, such as a UN-led mediation effort. In Afghanistan, the US peace deal with the Taliban suffers from significant credibility gaps but can still be seen as a positive step forward to be incorporated into a regionally oriented, UN-led mediation program. Unlike with the 1988 Geneva Accord, this time the Taliban is party to the negotiation and a signatory to its implementation. The biggest hurdle in the process is an agreement between the Afghan and Pakistani governments to honor the peace deal. This can happen only if Islamabad sees a peaceful Afghanistan as a geo-economic gain in terms of its relations with China and Central Asia rather than as the instrument of hostility against India.

In Syria, there have been extended mediation efforts by the UN, the Arab League, and inter-state programs including the Astana Process, yet these have so far failed to end the war. Like Afghanistan, the Syrian conflict also has complex regional and international characteristics that means it is beyond the ability of the al-Assad government or any armed opposition groups to end it. The key strategic issue preventing any mediation from succeeding up to now is the question of how the war in Syria should end, something that has allowed Syria’s neighbors to support armed political oppositions on the basis of their assumed self-interest. As a result, a new regional trust-building mechanism is needed; a UN-led mediation program would serve as the only impartial, but effective arbiter if it is genuinely backed and resourced by the UN Security Council.

Achieving Regional Integration: The absence of a viable post-war policy for Afghanistan and Syria under the Trump administration opens the window for the EU to play a regionally oriented stabilizing role. To achieve this, the EU should task its Commission for Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with gaining the needed support from the US Congress for a UN-led Transition Plan in Syria and an inclusive partnership in the Afghan peace process. A UN-led 7+1 (the US, China, Russia, the EU, Pakistan, India, Iran plus Afghanistan) cooperative platform could utilize the current international commitment to regional peacemaking and peace-building. Strong support exists for a US/EU strategic partnership among American legislators, as seen in the January 2019 celebration of the re-launch of the bipartisan Congressional European Union Caucus, co-chaired by Congressmen Gregory Meeks, a Democrat representing New York, and Joe Wilson, a Republican from South Carolina.

What makes the EU role more relevant is the geographical proximity, and the need for preventing new waves of migrants and thousands of battle-hardened Islamist militants from making their way to Europe. The EU Delegate to Afghanistan has been active in supporting the peace process; in July 2019, Germany and Qatar co-organized the Intra-Afghan Peace Conference in Doha. Later that year, the EU Special Envoy to Afghanistan offered a broader spectrum in support of a peace plan, strengthening democratic results gained over the last 19 years. The presence of the Russian military in Syria and Central Asia and Chinese influence in both regions are real. A proactive EU role can de-militarize the political and diplomatic spaces and end regime change as an instrument of foreign policy.

A pro-active EU role has already highlighted humanitarian and economic development programs possible in both Afghanistan and Syria. Active cooperation with Russia and China would enable Afghanistan to advance regional integration via economic development, trade and commerce, and Syrians to reconstruct their war-torn country and achieve a fair and just departure from war. This would then encourage millions of refugees from Europe and beyond to repatriate to their homes and rebuild their lives. A global role for the EU as the defender of liberal democracy should uplift the ability of an emerging multi-polar world order to de-militarize international relations, and could produce a blueprint for 21^st-century conflict reduction via regional cooperation. The post-COVID-19 pandemic world demands multinational recovery programs for demilitarizing international relations, boosting regional economic integration, and ending deadly conflicts.

The post An EU Global Moment: Finding a Path to Peace in Afghanistan and Syria appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Ammar Abdullah

In April, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France hit Syria to punish Bashar al-Assad for what French President Emmanuel Macron called clear proof that the Syrian government had wielded chemical weapons in Douma, outside of Damascus.  

While the US-led coalition launched their strikes, German Chancellor Angela Merkel supported her allies but did not join the operation—a decision that reflected Germans’ deep-seated pacifism and aversion to military missions in the post-war era. Still, her decision to publicly support the mission, but not join it, made it look like Berlin did not have the stomach to engage militarily itself.

Since the Syrian conflict began more than seven years ago, Germany has been caught in a conundrum. It is struggling to support fleeing Syrians while navigating a complex political terrain at home. It’s a conflict that has had very real consequences for  Merkel, with some one million Syrian refugees seeking asylum in Germany. It was the chancellor’s open-door policy in the summer of 2015, accepting those refugees stuck on the Balkan route, that led to a significant shift in Germany’s political landscape, reviving the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

And the war is far from over. Assad’s regime has regained control of most of the country, displacing half of the population in the process. Now, another flare-up is looming in Idlib, one of the areas that remains out of the government’s grasp. Syria observers fear another catastrophe is imminent, one that would have further consequences for Berlin.

Opposition Stronghold

Idlib, in the north of the country, is one of the last remaining strongholds for opposition forces. It is home to 2.5 million Syrians. A serious attack on Idlib is a question of when, not if. The war is set to escalate in the province, and Germany may have more Syrians at its doorstep once Assad begins his quest to take it back. Among the thousands of Syrians who were displaced from Ghouta, many told me in phone conversations that they are already trying legal and illegal avenues to reach Germany.

It’s worth looking at the complex situation on the ground. Myriad groups are competing for control of Idlib. The Free Syrian Army, made up of several smaller alliances, is locked in a fierce battle for control with the Islamist extremist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, a group that was previously known as Jabhat al Nusra and was allied with Al Qaeda.

HTS dominates Idlib and has imposed a harsh social code on people living there; it poses a vital threat to civilians who moved there to escape Assad’s clutches and sought safety near Turkey. And Russia, Assad’s ally, will use the presence of HTS in the region, and the group’s former ties to Al Qaeda, to justify an eventual regime offensive in Idlib.

Germany’s Time to Step Up

If Chancellor Merkel does not want to put boots on the ground in Idlib or threaten Assad militarily, what can Germany do to avoid the devastation waiting to unfold in Idlib?

Germany can come in and play an active diplomatic role in encouraging Turkey to rein in the jihadis just across its border, either by using its existing channels of communication or military force. Ankara’s relationship with the jihadis is ambiguous; in the early stages of the Syrian war, Istanbul was accused of supporting the Islamists in Syria, but of late President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who got reelected on Sunday, appears more willing to limit their influence. 

If Turkey fails to reach some sort of agreement with the Islamists, Ankara could opt for pushing the jihadis out with force. It might well have an interest in doing so. The proximity of Idlib to Kurdish-controlled areas on Turkey’s borders makes it an important location for Ankara’s strategic interests. Erdogan is in a position to better manage secessionist Kurds if the Free Syrian Army is in charge rather than the HTS. Without HTS in Idlib, the regime and the Russians wouldn’t have a pretext to bomb the region. Turkish forces are already in Idlib anyway, operating observation posts in rebel areas to assure a stake in region after the war ends.

There are other reasons why bold action might serve Turkish interests. Turkey, already home to three million Syrian refugees, has all but shut its doors to accepting more asylum seekers. In the event of a fresh offensive by Assad’s forces, millions of Syrians would be forced to knock on Turkish doors before they seek entry to Europe. In turn, Berlin can add its voice to calls from Washington and Istanbul to allow Free Syrian Army groups to take control of the province.

Even so, these measures might not be enough to stop Assad. He is quite likely to go ahead with the attack on Idlib in the name of Syrian sovereignty. One man who can stop him is Russian President Vladimir Putin. And the Russians might have a stake in containing Syria’s Islamist forces as well. Moscow believes hundreds of Russians joined ISIS and HTS and fear their return may present dangers back home.

A Constructive Role

What’s more, Berlin has professed its willingness to play a constructive role in the Syrian crisis. Idlib can be a test case for German diplomacy. If the Germans won’t talk to Assad they must talk to Putin. German-Russian relations have been strained by Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and cyber attacks linked to Russian hackers, but Merkel is the Western leader that always kept communications open with the Kremlin and knows Putin best. She should make the case to Russia that Idlib is crucially important as a safe zone for Syrians escaping regime-held areas.

Germany can attempt to save millions by exercising its leverage through tactful foreign policy. In my conversations with Syrians and senior Syrian government officials, Berlin has emerged as a fair player for both pro-regime and anti-regime camps. The rebels have told me they are grateful for the welcome many refugees have received in Germany, while pro-regime Syrians say Berlin has remained a moderate voice in criticizing Assad’s government, at least compared to Paris, London, and Washington.

So far, however, it seems Germany will take a back seat and watch as the regime attacks Idlib. But, with its stature on the international stage, Germany should step up and use its diplomatic might to resolve the crisis. Merkel must move beyond empty statements that do little else than express a desire for peace.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

On February 20, German authorities rounded up 14 Afghan men to return to their home country in spite of protests and the very real threats they would face upon their return. These forced returns of rejected asylum seekers had become an issue in Germany’s elections last September: In part due to the growing political influence of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Angela Merkel’s CDU has embraced a harder line on migration, and celebrated a decision made by the German foreign office in August of 2017 to bolster the deportation process.

In fact, with the AfD now Germany’s largest opposition party, these deportations could well expand to target Syrians as well: Of the 890,000-plus asylum seekers who began arriving in Germany in 2015, the majority were from Syria, and Syrians have become symbolic of the entire refugee debate. According to the country’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Germany has received 476,331 Syrian asylum requests since 2015. Of those, 301,201 were granted refugee status.

As the mood in the country shifted, however, the German state began offering subsidiary protection, a temporary status where an asylum seeker does not qualify for full refugee protection but cannot be sent back immediately. Those who are granted subsidiary protection receive a residence permit that has to be renewed annually. In 2015, only 61 Syrians received subsidiary protection; in 2016 the number jumped to 121,562. Only 300 Syrian asylum seekers have been denied protection entirely, and the deportation of Syrians has been delayed until this year.

Before taking any further steps to deport Syrian asylum seekers, the German government will almost certainly have to make the case that those being deported—whether individuals or whole groups—have had their applications for asylum rejected because they are not personally in danger in their home country. A group of AfD lawmakers made headlines earlier this month after they traveled through Syria to prove the country was indeed safe enough to send refugees back.

Syrian Isn’t Safe

It is crucial to understand, however, that this is not true: Syrians who return, men in particular, are in deadly danger from both the continued military operations of the Assad regime and the vast scale of destruction the country has experienced. The war in Syria is winding down in most areas but heating up in the remaining rebel enclaves. Even if intense bombardment ceases in the next year or two as planned, it will take much longer to rebuild basic infrastructure, not to mention provide education and jobs.

And Syrian men who fled to avoid being drafted into Assad’s army are at risk as long as the regime is in power. These men opted to leave Syria rather than shoot their own countrymen, and now they are caught between a rock and a hard place—they have become a lightning rod in Europe, with right-wing politicians blaming young, male asylum seekers for increases in crime and sexual violence; having left, however, they are unable to return.

In refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey and shelters in Berlin, male refugees between 18 and 34 say they fear the regime will arrest them, or even execute them, if they return. Most of the Afghans deported thus far are men, and activists believe Syrian men would be the first deported as well. Belinda Bartolucci, a legal policy adviser with Pro Asyl, a German non-profit that supports refugees and asylum seekers, echoes these concerns: “It is to be feared that in the future Germany will use this concept again for other countries.”

Pro Asyl is making a legal case against the deportations, reminding authorities that asylum seekers have several recourses available even after their applications are rejected. In fact, they say it is nearly impossible to bypass all of those recourses and deport a Syrian asylum seeker. German law states, for example, that a refugee cannot be deported if that would entail an immediate risk to their safety. In early January, a German-born Salafist who is a Turkish national appealed his deportation, saying that he would be tortured by Turkish authorities if he returned– and Germany’s highest court ruled in his favor. This effectively forces the German government to obtain a guarantee from an asylum seeker’s country of origin that they will not be tortured upon arrival, a high hurdle to clear.

The Assad regime will almost certainly not produce such an assurance for Syrian men. Since it is now expected that Bashar al-Assad will remain in power, European nations will need to make this an issue in international fora if they wish to begin reducing the number of rejected asylum seekers remaining in the EU; some Syrian men may even be willing to return on their own if they know they can safely do so.

Starting Aid

One option may be through a loophole in Syria’s draft law that allows draft dodgers to return if they have lived abroad for four years and can pay a fine of $4,000. Germany’s interior ministry has recently been trying to lure Syrians to return under their own volition in exchange for a payout of €1,000 for individuals and €3,000 for families in a scheme called Starthilfe, or starting aid. If Germany—or other European states—reworked this idea to target the needs of Syrian men who fled army service, it could be promising.

Syrians who fear oppression at the hands of their own government cannot return, and they cannot be sent back either if their lives would be in danger—not just for their own sake, but for the sake of the values that have defined modern Germany in the post-war era. Those who are willing to return if their safety is secured should be supported, with financial means if necessary; those who would not be safe in their home country must not be forced to return to it.

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© Goethe Institute/Bernhard Ludewig

Amer El Akel, a young Syrian artist, reads aloud from the endless official mail he has received since arriving in Germany as a refugee. They are letters concerning his legal status in the country but also from service providers like Deutsche Telekom, containing pages and pages of tiny print. In stilted German, he stumbles over virtually every other word.

His performance piece is both an amusing comment on German bureaucracy and a serious exploration of the sense of alienation experienced by refugees. It featured in a series of events called “Damascus in Exile” staged by the Goethe Institute in a tiny empty shop on Rosa-Luxemburg-Strasse in central Berlin.

The shop is a far cry from the original Goethe Institute in Damascus. Located in the unprepossessing but sizeable former embassy of the German Democratic Republic, it was an important cultural center until it was forced to close in 2012. Though not immune from the censorship of Bashar al-Assad’s draconian regime (programs had to be approved by the Culture Ministry), it was a place of learning with an impressive library and a lively program that attracted many Syrian artists.

In 2012, the German Foreign Office advised German nationals to leave Damascus as the civil war escalated. Goethe Institute staff were let go on full pay for a year in anticipation they would be able to return within months. “We thought we would be back soon,” says Johannes Ebert, Secretary General of the Goethe Institute.

Since then, four years have passed, and there is still no prospect of the war ending. What began as a movement for freedom and democracy has developed into a proxy war with global powers supporting opposing sides. While Germany has taken in an estimated 600,000 Syrian refugees, its role in the region is limited to humanitarian assistance. Though Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that addressing the causes of flight is a central pillar of her refugee policy, Germany is watching the war helplessly from the sidelines.

Among those who have found refuge in Germany are many Syrian artists, writers, musicians, performers, theatre directors, and film-makers.

“Just like Being at Home”

The idea of setting up a “pop-up” site was in a sense outside the mandate of the Goethe Institute, which only receives government funding for its work abroad.

“We thought we could make an exception,” says Pelican Mourad, who was program assistant at the institute in Damascus. Part of her concern was that extremist organizations are trying to recruit newcomers. “We needed to counter that by creating a space for free-thinkers and artists,” she says.

Artists who took part ranged from young talents like Akel to established names such as the clarinetist and composer Kinan Azmeh, who is scheduled to perform at Hamburg’s vast new Elbphilharmonie with Yo-Yo Ma in January. “We worried he would object to the tiny space” in the Berlin shop, where enthusiasts spilled out onto the street during his concert, Mourad says. “But he said it was just like being at home in Syria.”

Many of the works dealt with the civil war. Liwaa Yazji’s harrowing film “Haunted” describes the horrific living conditions faced by those forced to flee their bomb-devastated homes and desperately seeking shelter in war-ruined towns. Others addressed the lot of the refugee: Daniel Carsenty’s film “After Spring Comes Fall” tells the story of a young Kurdish woman who flees Syria and arrives in Berlin illegally, where she is tracked down by the Syrian secret service.

At a podium discussion, participants discussed what culture can achieve for refugees. Theatre director Mohammed Al-Attar described the difficulties of trying to work with people who are cold or hungry. “They have to eat, they have to have shelter,” he says. “Then comes cultural work.”

That is where the Goethe Institute comes in. It brings culture to refugee areas in Lebanon and Jordan with “idea boxes” that can be transported in a container and tour the region with books and films translated into Arabic. Programs have included acrobatics and stilt-walking as well as soccer for traumatized children in Lebanon.

Increasingly, the institute is putting expertise gleaned in the Middle East to good use at home. It has received some large donations, including one from the Japan Art Association, allowing it to operate in Germany even without government funding, Ebert says. Materials that may seem of secondary value in the field, such as an app that teaches basic German in eight weeks, can prove crucial in Germany – as Akel’s struggles with the language of bureaucracy show.

“Part of the refugee experience is boredom,” Ebert says. “Once basic requirements are met, the need for culture and education follows very closely.

The post A Slice of Syrian Culture appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

The future of Syria remains of vital importance to France, both because of the Damascus- Paris relationship itself and because of France’s interests in the region. But for all of its concern, there is little Paris can do.

© REUTERS/Philippe de Poulpiquet/Pool

Six months into France’s intensified military campaign against the so-called Islamic State (IS), the Syrian issue remained a challenge for Paris on multiple levels. France’s relationship with Damascus is a long and thorny one: A French mandate between 1920 and 1946, Syria went through a violent, unstable period after World War II, ending when Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970.

Since then, many an issue has divided France and Syria, starting with the fate of Lebanon. Attacks against French interests were attributed to Damascus, its Iranian ally, and their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah: the assassination of the French ambassador in Lebanon in 1981; the killing of 58 French soldiers in Beirut in 1983; the kidnapping and killing of French researcher Michel Seurat in 1985-86; the 1986 terrorist attacks in France (which killed seven and wounded 55 in Paris), carried out by a member of Hezbollah; and the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a personal friend of President Jacques Chirac. Paris and Washington pushed UN resolution 1559, passed in 2004, to impose the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah. …

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2016 issue.

The post No (Hidden) Agenda appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

The Bundeswehr operation is being undertaken in the framework of an alliance against terror, an alliance that is meant to fight and diminish the so-called Islamic State (IS), but not really to end the civil war. Combatting IS, however, should be only one element – albeit an important one – of a comprehensive strategy to end the war and to establish a post-war order in Syria. And the latter must be approached in steps: it is important that Bashar al-Assad will no longer be the head of a future Syrian government. When that is accomplished, a strategy for the reconstruction and stabilization of Syria must be implemented – otherwise any anti-terror strategy will only be tilting at windmills, as Islamic fundamentalism will continue to feed off ongoing conflicts in the region’s several failed states.

The current military activity is not entirely without logic; but unless this anti-terror operation is paired with a regional peace and rehabilitation strategy, it will not pacify the region or contain terror in the medium- or long-term.

That said, rebuilding Syria will cost a great deal of money. Syria is a devastated country. But we don’t have the luxury to decide if we want to take on another nation-building project post-Afghanistan; there is simply no alternative here. Along with the problems created by Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the war in Syria is yet another fundamental, perhaps even historic threat to the European Unionʼs cohesion and existence.

In the first EU security strategy paper released in 2003, it was stressed that the EU should strive to establish a “ring of well-governed states” to the East and to the South. We have such a ring – but only as long as we are talking about current or near-future EU member states. Even there, we have not yet exactly achieved our goal.

The reality is that the vision of the European Union established 12 years ago – a union that would be surrounded by a cordon of stability, growing prosperity, and cooperation, both with the Mediterranean countries in the South and South East and the post-Soviet countries in the East – has broken down completely. Thus the question of Syria must be tied into a broader review of European security planning. It is time to revise the previous strategy, and to ask what went wrong and why.

If the EU wants to claim and show that it has a common foreign policy, it must do more than provide a selective response to a terrorist attack in Paris. This will be the great task of the EU over the coming years – developing a long-term strategy, for which a great deal of resources and engagement will be required aside from funds needed for military engagements.

Because of the relative withdrawal of the United States, there is a certain vacuum in the MENA region that is being filled by Russia and Iran, whose position have grown even stronger. That may lead to new rivalries in the region, rather than greater stability. Since other actors are not in a position to play the role of regional stabilizers, the EU should help establish a security architecture for the Middle East. We are now dealing with problems that touch on our own security interests rendering a comprehensive European strategy – one that encompasses European financial and development resources, along with military cooperation – absolutely necessary. The EU will also have to be able to act (with others) in certain areas to establish a deterrent capacity, and through it to establish stability.

Which elements might such an approach entail? One, though perhaps not the most decisive, is greater concentration of national security competencies at the EU level.

The December 2013 European Council focused on EU security and defense policy; the resulting paper was titled “Defense Matters”. One does not need to read the rest; it contained very few real commitments to undergird this proclamation. The EU has thus far not considered it necessary to actually pursue its objectives in this area, including the development and completion of a common foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty, which in theory laid the groundwork for this, can serve as the basis for further integration steps – and for strengthening the role and visibility of the pertinent European institutions. This refers to, in particular, the role of the Council President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

What we have experienced – and not just in the financial and Euro crises, but also in foreign policy disputes with Russia and the various crises in the MENA region – is not a common policy, but intergovernmental approaches. And one only rarely sees any inclination to transfer these jobs to EU bodies.

If Berlin is to take on a leading role – a desire expressed both within and outside Germany – it cannot and should not simply provide a direction for the rest of Europe to follow. There are better ways for Germany to play the role of a leader: the Federal Republic could put its foreign policy weight behind strengthening the visibility, credibility, and capability of the European Union as a whole. It is regrettable that, despite four years of failure in the Middle East and several hundred thousand casualties, it required a decision by the United States and Russia to convene the peace conference in Vienna – why were the EU Council President and the President of the Commission not empowered months ago to invite the concerned parties themselves, in the name of 500 million Europeans?

After all, the population of the entire Russian Federation is not even a third that of the European Union – Russia only remains a great power due to its military capacities in certain limited areas.

Germany should therefore throw its weight and its credibility as a non-nuclear weapons power and its credibility of not being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council behind an effort to achieve an EU foreign policy that is more than intergovernmental. This could be Germanyʼs great potential contribution to the future of Europe – and German citizens should also recognize that this is one area in which “more Europe” will not simply mean greater budgetary contribution. Quite the opposite: through a more unified European foreign policy, crises can be managed more effectively, even saving money, as the member states could avoid duplicating expenditures in areas like defense and equipment, among many others.

This does not yet mean taking the leap and forming a European army; it makes more sense to keep more feasible steps in mind, such as more comprehensive pooling and sharing and the avoidance of doubling capacities. The budgetary contributions of the 28 EU members amount to almost half of US defense expenditures – but the EU produces only about 10 percent of the United States’ combat power. What a waste of resources, year after year!

Coming back to Syria, the approach adopted by the Vienna Conference is sound: but the EU should play the leading role in this process, instead of a supporting one.

For the EU, regional stability needs to be one of its key goals – including a balancing arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Russia obviously has its own interests in the process. Regarding this last point, criticism should not be aimed at Russia for defining and defending its own interests, but rather at the means it uses to achieve them. The fact that Russia wants to be directly involved in establishing a post-war order in Syria, rather than being locked out like in the cases of Iraq or Libya, is not unacceptable.

This Vienna Process offers a chance to not just lay the groundwork for peace in Syria specifically, but to go further and develop a shared understanding of how the various actors in the region should deal with one another in the future.

In the long term, this region needs something like a Helsinki Process. The Helsinki principles were controversial in Europe, yet it was possible to codify them in 1975. There is of course no guarantee that such rules will always be observed. In Europe, they were openly violated in the recent Ukrainian crisis. Yet rules of conduct are useful, even if they are occasionally bent or broken.

The development of a rule book in the MENA region should be one of our strategic long-term goals. In light of the continuing wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and other countries, that may seem like a pipe dream at the moment; yet this vision should not be ignored or forgotten as the Vienna process is driven forward.

Read more articles in the Berlin Policy Journal App – January/February 2016 issue.

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Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – January/February 2016 issue.

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When Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani addressed the participants at the October 15 Valdai Club (the topic was “War and Peace”) he was wearing black, as is traditional among Shiites on Ashura in commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali. However, the mere fact that Larijani was invited to share a panel with Russian president Vladimir Putin surely must have cheered up the mood in Tehran – as well as Putin’s statements, which depicted the Islamic Republic as an indispensable partner in the search for a solution to the war in Syria and in the fight against the so-called Islamic State (IS).

But is this Tehran-Moscow axis a tactical marriage of convenience, or does it herald the emergence of a strategic alliance?

On the surface, the two states have several converging policy designs, including the immediate objectives of preventing the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’ath regime in Damascus and the defeat and annihilation of what remains of United States-backed opposition groups in Syria, as well as the long-term total humiliation of the US and its allies in an attempt to roll back the post-Cold War American world order.

And it would seem the two have arrived at a certain division of labor to achieve these objectives. Since September 30, 2015, Russia has been conducting air operations in Syria, both to destroy opposition forces and to provide air support to the Syrian army, and it has intensified its arms deliveries to Damascus. Iran, on the other hand, is providing the boots on the ground, supplementing what remains of the Syrian army with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, and Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and even distant Pakistan.

This arrangement minimizes the risk of Russian and Iranian losses, which is essential for Russia in particular, as it still struggles with the painful “Afghanistan syndrome” and suffered a devastating blow on October 31 when an IS affiliate succeeded in bringing a bomb onto a Russian airliner departing from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, killing 224 vacationers and crew members. But the Iranian authorities are also keen to avoid casualties, which carry the risk of shifting public opinion, and so are happy to leave the heavy lifting to the more willing, and more politically expendable, Shiite militias and irregulars.

Limits of Convergence

The convergence may come to a sudden end, however, as the two sides discuss in greater detail the relative degree of order and stability they hope to achieve in Syria. Iran may want a perpetual low intensity conflict, where it may conveniently use the threat of the IS as a bogeyman in its relations with the US and the Europeans and thus legitimize its continued military presence.

Russia, on the other hand, is more likely to prefer a Syrian regime that is weak enough to be dependent on Moscow for continued support, but also strong enough to be able to effectively exercise its power throughout the entire territory of its state. An estimated 7,000 Russian citizens have reportedly joined the ranks of IS, from which they may turn their attention to the volatile regions of the Northern Caucasus or Central Asia. One therefore expects Putin to aim for nothing less than the total elimination of all pockets of IS resistance in Syria. Indeed, if this was not already his goal, the successful downing of the Russian airliner over the Sinai desert clearly will have made it more difficult to accept, however tacitly, any IS presence anywhere.

This difference in perspective most likely also translates into different views on the possible duration of the two states’ respective engagements in Syria. If Tehran actually prefers a continued low-intensity conflict, it will worry less about when the conflict ends and how it can eventually exit in a coherent way. Moscow, on the other hand, is restricted much more by time, and the Russian public is unlikely to accept a military involvement counted in years and trillions of rubles.

Moreover, the apparent lack of an exit strategy notwithstanding, the Kremlin surely must be thinking long and hard about how to leave Syria gracefully in case the US and its allies refuse to accept Bashar al-Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria. Russia will only be able to provide military life support to Assad as long as Russian public patience lasts, but will find it difficult to leave him alone to be toppled by IS or one of the numerous opposition groups hoping for his downfall.

A related point of contention is that of the fate of Bashar al-Assad himself. While Moscow may be ready to replace him with another leader to save a regime subservient to Moscow, Tehran – the IRGC in particular – considers the preservation of Assad the only guarantee of regime survival in Syria.

Fundamental Distrust

Even more critically, however, the Russian-Iranian relationship is still complicated by a fundamental mutual distrust between the two parties.

By asserting itself in the Syrian theater of war, Russia demonstrates to the Iranians its superior military capabilities, insists that to sidestep it would be a bad decision, and tries to keep Iran within its sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia may also sell out Iranian interests in Syria if it manages to extract concessions from the US. Such a course would be consistent with existing Russian policy of using the Islamic Republic as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the US.

Putin’s claim at the Valdai Club that Moscow had been “deceived by the United States” with regard to Iran’s nuclear program was a crude attempt at covering his government’s support of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, while simultaneously extracting money and political concessions from Tehran in return for not allowing even harsher resolutions.

The political leadership of the Islamic Republic is only too aware of Putin’s scheming. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, however, along with the accompanying removal of the international sanctions regime have made Tehran less dependent on Russia, and seem to provide Tehran with greater maneuverability between Washington and Moscow. Iran’s use of US air support in the spring 2015 seizure of the Iraqi city of Tikrit – and Moscow’s fear of more instances of military cooperation between Tehran and Washington – may have been one of the motives behind Russia’s military engagement in Syria.

Bashar al-Assad, too, has an interest in gaining greater independence. By using his Russian benefactor, the Assad regime hopes to reduce its total dependence on the benevolence of Tehran, which may cause some tension between Iran and Russia, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Putin both competing for the position of master of Damascus and architect of the future order of Syria.

The official speeches in both Tehran and Moscow may celebrate the close ties between the two states and their joint efforts to save the “legitimate” ruler of Syria , thus restoring what they see as a lost international order. But behind the curtain problems abound, and the tactical cooperation which we are seeing now will have a difficult time developing into a fully fledged strategic partnership.

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With the crisis in Ukraine still unresolved, Russia has once again upended Western strategic planning, intervening in the conflict in Syria in ways that complicate European and American efforts to achieve stability in the country. Though Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that the goal of Russian airstrikes is the degradation of the Islamic States’ (IS) capabilities, the strengthening of client Bashar al-Assad seems to be equally, if not more, important – and in doing so, Putin seems intent on both limiting the United States’ options, and furthering Russia’s own model of state sovereignty.

Russian leadership wants to be recognized by the US president as a key player in international relations, one with whom Washington has to interact when attempting to solve global conflicts. Thus Russia’s Syria campaign has two main goals: First, Putin wants to use Syria to show the US – and the world – that it has returned to the stage. Washington can no longer isolate Russia as it did during the Ukraine crisis. Putin is using America’s absence in Syria to force Barack Obama to speak with him; while the US president hesitates, Putin is reshaping the battlefield. Now the US military has to coordinate with Russian leadership if it wants to fly airstrikes in Syria.

The second main goal is connected to the Russian conception of foreign policy and the role of states in international relations. Russian leadership wants to fill the gap the US has left – not only militarily, but ideologically as well. In his Collective Security Treaty Organization speech in mid-September and again at the UN General Assembly two weeks later, Putin promoted a different approach than that of the US to fighting international terrorism. From Russia’s perspective, the US policy of democracy promotion has not only destabilized Ukraine, but also Iraq, Syria, and northern Africa.

When Putin supports Assad, he sends a clear message: from his perspective, only legitimate (authoritarian) regimes can create order and security in the world. Groups that undermine these regimes and the sovereignty of states are terrorists, including all the opposition groups in Syria fighting against the “legitimate” government. Assad is not only Russia’s most important ally in the region, he also stands for the rationale of the Putin regime, which sees its own main challenges as coming from externally inspired social movements (blaming the US in particular).

Stabilizing Assad means stabilizing authoritarian rule in other regions of the world, and the current Russian regime itself, promoting an alternative model for crisis management and international relations than that supported by the US. This is consistent with Russian foreign and security policy, which opposes color revolutions and regime change inside and outside the post-Soviet region and stands for the sovereignty of states and against the concept of responsibility to protect (with the exception of the Russians outside Russia).

A Risky War

So what are the implications of Russia’s actions? For the first time in post-Soviet history, Russia is fighting outside the post-Soviet region in a risky war. Russian leadership is willing to take high risks to gain recognition from the US as an important player and promote its own model of “conflict solution”. Even if Russian is unlikely to deploy ground forces, air strikes have already begun. All this takes place despite the opposition of a majority of Russians, who are against military action in Syria and retain a deep memory of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. According to a recent poll from the Levada Center, only 14 percent of Russians agree with providing Assad with direct military support, while 69 percent are against it. Only 16 percent are in favor of technical military support for Assad. All this makes the Russian action vulnerable should Russia suffer casualties. Russian propaganda may affect this position over the short term, but only until Russian soldiers are killed.

It is indeed impressive that the Russian army is able to prepare and implement airstrikes in Syria, coordinating an entire supply chain. That means that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the Russian military reform started in 2008 after the Russian-Georgian war was successful. The Russian army is not only able to organize a hybrid war in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, but to act in a very difficult environment far away from Russia after a short period of preparation. Russian cruise missile strikes from the Caspian Flotilla were not militarily necessary – the same attacks would have been possible much more cheaply with airstrikes. But they demonstrated the ability of the Russian army to carry out long distance attacks and challenge the US-led NATO missile defense system in Europe. This has consequences for NATO, and was a clear message to the US.

Assad is an important ally in the Middle East, and the Russian military base in the Syrian city of Tartus is important for Russian prestige. Showing that the Russian military is able to carry out a military airstrike in other regions of the world improves Russian global standing, and Putin’s bargaining position with regard to other crises – including Ukraine. Russia promotes itself as a player that cannot be ignored by the US.

At the same time, Moscow will not support Assad at any cost – there are clear domestic limits to its capacity. It is a rationale cost-benefit calculation: if the costs to support Assad become too high, Russian leadership will accept the fall of the regime.

For the Russian leadership, fighters from the Caucasus and Central Asia who have joined IS and other terrorist groups in the Middle East pose a problem. According to various sources, the total number of militants from Russia fighting in Syria might be as high as 5000 fighters. There is a growing threat posed by fighters who return to Russia and other post-Soviet countries, particularly in Central Asia – they might commit acts of terrorism, destabilizing a region with many weak states. One argument being made by the Russian general staff is that Russia needs to kill as many of its own citizens who are fighting in the Middle East as possible before they return home.

Russia has become an unpredictable player, not only in the post-Soviet region, but also in other regions of the world. It is not willing to coordinate or communicate in an adequate way with the West if communication does not suit its own foreign policy goals. If the US and its allies are not willing or able to take responsibility for conflict resolution in a way that Russia finds acceptable, Russia seems to be increasingly willing to fill the gap itself, and not only in the post-Soviet region. This is a clear message to authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, but also in post-Soviet countries: we are willing to support you, and we offer an alternative to the US.

Russian leaders are promoting their own model of the role of state sovereignty and stability in other regions of the world in direct competition with that of the US. The coordination of its actions in Iraq, Syria, and Iran are meant to create an alternative to the Western coalition in the region, one that directly contradicts US foreign policy, but will primarily serve to create more instability and more victims.

Russian propaganda and hybrid methods are also on display in Syria, and form an important part of Russian strategy. From the beginning of its military campaign, Russian leadership provided limited information about its activities. Putin used his speech at the UN General Assembly to offer a coalition against IS, but then only acted to stabilize Assad. All this shows once again that Russian leadership uses tactics to improve its bargaining position, but that it has no serious interest in cooperation with the West. It is an illusion that Russia is part of the solution in Syria. All who argue the opposite only serve to emphasize the West’s lack of ideas to handle instability in the region.

The West has few good options for responding to Russia’s actions. The main problem of Western policy is that it is focused first and foremost on crisis management and short-term solutions, while lacking a strategic perspective. What is needed at the moment is more communication with Moscow – also on topics other than the Middle East –, without compromises made in advance. The Ukrainization of general relations with Russia was a mistake; it is necessary to rebuild channels for regular communication with Russia, especially for emergencies. Stabilizing Syria must not mean accepting the Russian requirement that Assad be involved. At the same time, the US and its allies need to learn that they cannot leave countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya alone after a change in regime. Russian leadership is willing to fill these gaps to promote its own concept of conflict solution, but it is not a serious partner interested in solving problems. It lacks concepts and resources. Putin has its own agenda, which stands increasingly in conflict with the West’s regionally and globally.

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