© REUTERS/Kacper Pempel

The political relationship between the United States and the European Union is fractious. From trade to foreign policy, both sides are taking increasingly divergent, and sometimes contradictory, perspectives.

So much so that the US ambassador to the European Union, Gordon Sondland, called for a reset in the relationship, believing that the new cohort of senior EU Commission and Council leaders, due to take office in December, will “make impasses go away.” Developing closer working relationships with these new leaders can help to an extent, but the US should also look within the Trump administration to reset its own policies. Only then can the US foster a more productive defense relationship with the EU.

State of Play

The defense relationship between the US and the EU already exists, including at the operational level. In 2011, both signed a framework agreement that enables Washington to contribute civilian personnel to “crisis management operations.” More recently, US military forces have worked alongside their EU counterparts, primarily through United States Africa Command and the EU Military Staff, in places like Mali and Somalia. Both the US and the EU have also strengthened joint situational awareness and coordinated activities in the Sahel more broadly.

Despite this practical cooperation at the operational level, there is greater friction at the strategic level. The US has long been skeptical of efforts by some EU member states, like France, to allocate a greater role in defense to the EU. Washington, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has feared that an EU with defense responsibilities could harm the cornerstone of European and transatlantic security: NATO.

The “Three D’s” of “no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication,” as outlined by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright back in 1998, encapsulates this sentiment. Yet this skepticism does not mean US policymakers do not want Europe, as a whole, to shoulder greater responsibility, whether by increasing defense spending to invest in certain capabilities or deploying troops and equipment. Instead, US policymakers want European countries, the EU member states and NATO allies among them, to become more capable partners.

EU member states, many of which are also NATO allies, view Washington’s behavior as schizophrenic. On the one hand, they argue, the US asks its European counterparts to shoulder more of a burden. On the other, when Europeans do take concrete steps to invest further in defense, the US criticizes the approach. EU member states, according to an EU official, lament the “mixed messages from the American side,” viewing the 2016 EU Global Strategy as the response to the longstanding US request.

Although the Global Strategy’s “ambition of strategic autonomy” should be taken with a grain of salt—particularly because, in practice, it does not enjoy support from all member states—there is an important sentiment that EU member states should take on more responsibility. To the majority of member states, Brussels’ role in defense should complement that of NATO and, according to the same EU official, enable the EU to become a “reliable and effective partner.”

The Right Way Forward?

Against the backdrop of achieving strategic autonomy, EU member states are moving forward with their own initiatives, primarily the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The EDF provides a financial incentive for member states to develop capabilities jointly. It is particularly noteworthy that the European Commission is co-funding this effort—at €13 billion over the course of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The actual development of the joint capabilities will occur through PESCO, a political commitment among 25 member states to deepen defense cooperation. There are currently 34 projects that cut across all domains, from maritime to land. The EDF and PESCO, according to a French official, are a “direct response to [the] call by Americans on burden-sharing.”

Although there are more nuanced positions both among and within member states on these two initiatives, there is broad agreement that the EU should take greater responsibility in defense. This belief stems from an understanding that the European security environment is growing more challenging, but also from two dynamics internal to the European security architecture.

EU member states not only recognize that America is becoming a less reliable partner, due to President Donald Trump’s seeming ambivalence toward European security, but also that the United Kingdom is leaving the EU. Certainly London will remain actively involved in European defense policy, primarily through NATO and its bilateral defense relationships, but British officials, post-Brexit, will no longer be “in the room” to share expertise when member states debate whether and how to launch, for example, a Common Security and Defense Policy mission. It is therefore imperative that the EU develops a stronger defense capability for its member states to rely more closely on each other.

The US, however, has significant reservations regarding the EDF and PESCO. These concerns relate chiefly to the way in which a third country can participate in the new EU defense initiatives. As a non-member state, the US is interested in securing flexible terms that enable it, and primarily its defense industry, to participate. President Trump’s link between trade and security is driving ambition for US defense firms to compete for contracts and encourage Europeans to “buy American.” A joint letter from senior Defense and State Department officials is among the latest effort by the Trump administration to secure such access—this time including a veiled threat to consider “similar reciprocally imposed US restrictions.” Without access for its firms, Washington will remain opposed to the EU defense initiatives.

A Constructive Role

 The divergences between the US and the EU will not disappear overnight. Nonetheless, as the US administration embarks on its reset, it should take two steps to shift its position and strengthen the US-EU defense relationship.

First, it should both acknowledge that the EU has a role to play in this field and support certain EU defense initiatives. Although NATO is and should remain the central pillar of European security, member states are pursuing some promising initiatives within the EU context. Certain PESCO projects, like Military Mobility, whose goal is to ensure the smooth movement of defense equipment across Europe in the event of a conflict, has a positive impact for NATO. In fact, the EU—unlike NATO—can regulate and provide assistance with infrastructure funding to ensure platforms are not “stuck at customs.”

Likewise, the EDF can bolster member states’ defense capabilities. According to a French official, the EDF is the “key initiative within the EU,” providing an incentive to develop capabilities jointly. The Franco-German Main Ground Combat System and Future Combat Air System projects are two that could develop through the EDF with other countries, as demonstrated by Spain’s recent inclusion in the latter.

The European Pillar in NATO

Overall, “one possible scenario” for the EU, from the perspective of Julian Ostendorf, an adviser to German MP Roderich Kiesewetter, foreign affairs spokesman for his CDU/CSU caucus, is to serve “only as the sous chef of NATO.” Accordingly, Ostendorf argues, the challenge for France, Germany, and “other core EU member states” is to work toward a consensus regarding “what strategic autonomy really means in practical military terms,” without contradicting NATO’s defense planning. It is the role for the EU defense initiatives, to support and strengthen the European pillar within NATO, that the US should recognize and promote.

Second, as the US develops its own defense relationship with the EU, Washington should prioritize in which of the defense initiatives it is interested in participating. As it stands, according to Rachel Ellehuus of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, American officials tend to state their blanket interest in joining the EU defense initiatives, notably the EDF and PESCO, based less on a desire to be part of specific projects and more on the general principle that third countries should be included.

Instead, the US should prioritize and explain to the EU institutions and member states in which projects it could contribute most. Engaging more selectively and making a stronger case for certain projects might lead Brussels to consider how Washington can plug into initiatives and bring niche expertise. Without a more considered approach, EU member states could grow increasingly unwilling for the US to play any role related to the EU.

Toward a New Relationship

Despite its checkered past in developing a greater EU role in defense, member states are moving forward with new initiatives. By rejecting the manner in which Brussels develops into a defense actor, however, Washington risks losing its ability to shape that discussion—one that is crucial for the future of NATO. The US should encourage member states to sustain their momentum in order to become more capable partners. To do so, Washington should not only pursue a reset that engages the new European Commission and European Council leaders, but also alters its defense policy toward the EU. Only then can the US develop a stronger defense relationship with the EU and, ultimately, Europe as a whole.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

In his speech to the UN General Assembly at the end of September, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas promised more “sustainability” in foreign policy. Crisis prevention would play an essential role in this, he said. On the same day, the German government presented three new policies on crucial areas of preventive action: security sector reform (SSR), rule of law support, and transitional justice. They represent a welcome step forward but need to be developed further to be effective.

Since 2014, the German government has significantly increased its involvement in fragile states. The German Foreign Office’s project funds for crisis prevention, stabilization, and peace-building alone have quadrupled since then—to €396 million in the current budget. These funds are in addition to Germany’s development aid, the majority of which is spent in fragile states as well. Iraq, Mali, Afghanistan, and Niger are some of the countries where the Auswaertiges Amt uses the stabilization funds to support humanitarian mine clearing, police training, or peace mediation.

Three Sectors Shaping Transition Processes

Security sector reform, transitional justice, and rule of law shape social transformation processes in fragile states. What sounds quite technical actually has real-life consequences for millions of people in countries undergoing transition periods after war and authoritarian rule. Germany’s new strategies recognize the most important challenges related to these concepts.

For authoritarian leaders, the police, armed forces, and government-aligned militia are key instruments to secure their rule. Retraining forces, demobilizing militias, and reducing the military’s control of the economy are crucial for conflict transformation. International support for security sector reform needs to be finely calibrated. There may be considerable resistance to giving up power and access to resources. Moreover, training and equipping government forces may deepen distrust among parts of the population that see them as representatives of a deeply discriminatory state.

After war and tyranny, smoldering grievances can trigger new conflicts if left unaddressed. Truth commissions, special tribunals or compensation mechanisms can make an important contribution to reconciliation and help prevent renewed violence. There has been considerable international experience since the Nuremberg trials in the 1940s and the truth commissions in South Africa and South America in the 1990s. One of these lessons is that there is never a straightforward path toward transitional justice, and that the expectations for truth, justice, reparations, and healing may differ widely between national and international actors, as well as among different victim groups.

In countries marked by repression, violence, and weak state capacity, the justice system is often deeply dysfunctional. In Sri Lanka, a relatively wealthy and capable state, it still takes 10 years for a serious criminal offence to reach an indictment at the High Court, and an additional seven years for the appeals process. Moreover, powerful politicians or business people have substantial resources to delay or evade judicial proceedings altogether. Authoritarian regimes stuff courts with biased judges or adopt discriminatory laws. Reforming the justice system is thus not just a technical task but touches on politically sensitive areas as well. Lastly, informal, traditional and religious mechanisms may offer complimentary sources of justice, but international actors like the German government are right to insist on their alignment with the protection of fundamental rights, including those concerning minorities and women.

Focus, Details, and Embassies

There is strong conceptual thinking in the document that are going to underpin the German government’s work on prevention and stabilization. At the same time, Berlin needs to develop them further to ensure they are not just policies, but strategies worthy of that name. Three areas stand out.

First, focus. The three strategies differ widely in their discussion of the value-added that Germany can provide. The transitional justice strategy shows the greatest coherence. It identifies four priorities and allocates individual measures to them. The German government wants to embed transitional justice in a “prevention agenda” of political reforms, empower victim groups, promote gender equality and make use of Germany’s specific experience in dealing with its Nazi and communist past.

In the area of promoting the rule of law, the strategy mentions that the focus should be on binding administrations to the rule of law. However, this is not further explained or used as an ordering principle. The SSR strategy even manages to not set any priorities. This is surprising in so far as Germany’s system of parliamentary control of the armed forces and the leadership concept in the Bundeswehr (“Innere Führung”) could provide valuable lessons for its SSR support.

Second, details. Monitoring and evaluation are important, and they are mentioned in all three strategies. On SSR, the government commits itself to conflict-sensitivity, the “do no harm” principle and “more exchange” between the ministries. Except for such generic commitments, it remains unclear, however, to what extent the government will vet individual participants in SSR programs and trace their deployment after their training. On rule of law, the strategy mentions the rule of law dialogues with China and Vietnam as examples of long-term engagement. Here it is important to reflect more on the ambition of such dialogues: While individual legislative proposals may be defused, the overall one-party-system remains in place. On transitional justice, it is baffling that the strategy doesn’t mention the on-going practice of German law enforcement to pursue mass atrocity crimes under the principle of universality, for example in Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Third, embassies. All three strategies emphasize the importance of political dialogue accompanying programmatic efforts. Significant portions of this political dialogue will fall on German embassies in fragile countries, which are frequently ill-equipped for the growing demands placed on them. With often less than a handful of staff, German diplomats not only need to provide country analyses, but also spot opportunities for programmatic efforts, monitoring their progress and ensuring continued political buy-in with national stakeholders. In addition, the more projects there are in fragile countries, the more likely are visits by German policymakers, which absorb significant bureaucratic resources. Embassies will also need to replicate the growing cooperation between government ministries and non-governmental organizations in Germany at an operational level in their respective country. Only if embassies have enough qualified staff can they adequately fulfill these tasks, and remind their counterparts of their political commitments, if necessary.

Overall, the strategies are a demonstration of Germany’s growing investment in prevention and stabilization. They are testament to a new way of doing business marked by growing transparency, agility, and cooperation with outside experts. This is not enough though. Credibility and larger issues matter, too. Global trade, economic, climate and arms export policies can be structural drivers of conflict. A sustainable foreign policy worthy of the name needs not only verifiable strategies, but also a holistic approach.

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With the European Union facing an increasingly unstable world of hybrid threats, military interventions, terrorism, and organized crime, many politicians across Europe have repeatedly called for closer intelligence cooperation and even for the establishment of an EU intelligence service.
In fact, the EU Global Strategy in 2016 already emphasized the necessity of timely information sharing for security policy decisions being taken at the EU level: “European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats,” it states. “This requires investing in intelligence… We must feed and coordinate intelligence extracted from European databases.”

Furthermore, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, which was published the same year, confirms that a “European hub for strategic information, early warning and comprehensive analysis” is a necessary security policy instrument. Yet with Britain leaving, the EU is losing a very powerful intelligence partner. As a result, the remaining member states should certainly think about cooperating even more closely.

The Limits of EU Law

So, why not shoot for the moon and establish an EU intelligence service? Since intelligence services are regarded as the heart of a nation state, the EU member states traditionally have been highly reluctant about institutionalized forms of cooperation and set themselves clear legal boundaries.

Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty states that national security falls under the “sole responsibility of the individual member states.” The relevant regulatory areas “Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice” and “General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy” do not refer to intelligence cooperation at all. However, Article 73 states that member states are free to set up—on their own responsibility—forms of individual cooperation and coordination between their national security authorities. That means that, while a European intelligence service is not an option right now, closer cooperation is legally possible, politically necessary, and practically useful.

In fact, within the clear limits of EU law, two different forms of intelligence cooperation at EU level have developed: on the one hand, there are rather informal bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation. For instance, the Club de Berne is a forum between the domestic intelligence services of all member states (plus Switzerland and Norway), based on a voluntary exchange of information, experiences, and point of views. Given the high level of trust, flexibility, and independence, those informal intelligence coalitions are probably regarded as the most effective ones.

On the other hand, there are two important institutionalized forms of cooperation within the EU structures. First, the EU maintains a military intelligence unit with the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff (EUMS INT), which is part of the EU’s foreign and diplomatic body, the European External Action Service (EEAS). It provides military analysis/assessment for the decision making and planning of civilian missions and military operations under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Second, there is the EU Intelligence and Analysis Centre (INTCEN), established in 1999 with the CSDP, and another intelligence body of the EEAS. Its mission is to provide intelligence analysis and “situational awareness” to the High Representative, to various EU decision making levels as well as to the EU member states. Neither EUMS INT nor INTCEN generate its own intelligence; rather, they are dependent on information delivered by national foreign and domestic services of the member states and by internal EU bodies.

INTCEN and EUMS INT are linked in the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). This is a purely virtual hub within the EEAS but one that works very well. Its products provide significant added value to the member states and to the EU itself. The Implementation Plan on Security and Defense defined SIAC as a central hub for the generation of strategic information and threat assessments: “Improving CSDP responsiveness requires enhanced civil/military intelligence…, through the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) as the main European hub for strategic information, early warning, and comprehensive analysis.”

Rocket-Fueling SIAC

By shooting for the moon, the EU will land among the stars. The establishment of a supranational intelligence service would require a substantial change of the EU treaties. Given the results of the European elections and the rising euroskepticism in some of the member states, this, however, seems light years away.

But with the EEAS and the integrated SIAC, the EU actually already has a strengthened role in the analysis of internal and external security threats. The SIAC could be used more efficiently by the member states and optimized by investing in a higher number of staff and in the quantity and quality standard of intelligence products delivered. That would eventually make its added value more visible and would further build trust among member states, encouraging them to cooperate even closer.

But that’s not all. In times of increased global insecurity, two members of the Five Eyes and the EU’s most trustworthy intelligence allies are going down an unforeseeable political path. Both the United States and United Kingdom will surely remain partners in security policy, but in the long term, their respective political isolation might also affect the sharing of confidential information with the EU member states.

What Germany Should Do

Altogether, it is an undeniable fact that in foreign and security terms, the EU will increasingly have to rely on itself. This has already triggered ambitious reactions from 25 member states that committed themselves to “permanent structured cooperation” (PESCO) in defense policy. PESCO could serve as a model for strengthening intelligence cooperation. Closer cooperation would continue to take place in coalitions of small numbers of those member states willing and, more importantly, able to share confidential information with selected partners. Although Article 42 of the EU treaties does not provide a legal basis for a permanent structured cooperation of the intelligence services, Articles 328/329 generally provide a legal basis for enhanced cooperation and maybe for the future creation of Five (preferably six, seven or even more) Eyes of the European Union.

As Germany is taking over the Presidency of the European Council in 2020, the government in Berlin should start focusing now on how flexible cooperative solutions between EU member states could be advanced, leading to deeper integration and toward a real Security Union. This is actually a unique chance for Germany to demonstrate its ability to put innovative policy priorities on the agenda—including a better exchange of intelligence information and coordination at the EU level.

In the end, that might also give a fresh impetus to the concept of a European intelligence service, and make it not quite so many light years away after all.

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REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El Ghany

The end of any hope for liberal convergence; the tougher tone in international affairs; the United States’ focus on competition with China, and also with Russia; Donald Trump’s ruthlessness toward Europeans; and not least Brexit—all these developments have shaken Europe’s decades-old “business model.”

Europeans increasingly realize that to leave defense and strategic leadership largely to the US and to focus mainly on domestic affairs isn’t going to work anymore—with a US president who often refuses to define US interests in a broad sense, one that includes the interests of allies and partners.

Europeans are now faced with the question of how to articulate and assert their common interests and ideas, and how to deal with old and new threats. Can they become, together, a relevant player in regional and global power politics? Are they able to collective unite behind the free and open international order that is essential for Europe’s security, freedom, and prosperity?

In a new global strategic environment in which rough power politics increasingly dominates, Europe must become more powerful itself, in order to be able to co-shape the international order according to its principles and interests. But the existing institutions and platforms aren’t really up to this task. The European External Action Service, headed by a High Representative with extended responsibilities since 2009, is not in a position to forcefully push for joint European interests.

When it comes to relations with major powers—the US, China, Russia—or the use of considerable resources and especially military means, Brussels only plays a minor role. Wherever Paris or Rome, Berlin or Warsaw see important national interests at play, they act unilaterally where necessary and at best try to get other capitals and EU institutions on board to support them afterwards.

Yet even France or Germany on their own are relatively powerless against a player like China. European cooperation has thus become vital for the geopolitics even of the bigger European states. Of course, ad hoc formats can be used and have often been used: the EU3 that negotiates with Iran, or the recent meeting of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel plus Commission President Jean Claude Juncker with the Chinese state and party leader Xi Jinping.

A New Institution

Such formats, however, lack consistency and coherence, and the legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of Europe. Therefore, it makes sense to think about a new institution, the prospect of which has already mentioned by Macron and Merkel: a European Security Council (ESC).

An ESC would have to combine two main features: it would have to be efficient, and it would have to be legitimate, i.e. rely on broad approval. That means that not everyone can be at the table, but to have critical mass is indispensable.

With 28 heads of government, there would be maximum legitimacy, but little efficiency. The 28 would either agree to not deal with a matter that is delicate or too controversial, or paper over differences and come out with a minimal consensus that achieves little. The big member states who still have, in some areas, a foreign policy of broader relevance—particularly France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—would still act largely unilaterally according to their particular interests and views.

An ESC would have to take into account this reality of power and bring together those who do matter because of their size and capabilities. Yet in order to marry power with legitimacy, it should also offer the smaller countries the opportunity to occasionally take part in the negotiation. Thirdly, the EU institutions, which dispose over some resources and some legitimacy, should also be involved. And fourthly, in order to speak for the whole of Europe, the UK would have to be there, whether Brexit happens or not.

Such an ESC, which could meet twice a year at the level of heads of government and have a coordinating, non-executive role, could be composed of the three biggest states: France, the UK, Germany and the next three big ones: Italy, Spain, Poland. It would also include the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council as well as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs. In addition, there would be rotating seats for two or three smaller states. The task would be to provide a space for open and frank debate and for tentative agreement—perhaps published in a short document—about the big strategic questions in a world more and more shaped by great power competition.

The advantage of an ESC would be that twice a year it would draw Europe’s attention to major strategic issues and force leaders to come up with some kind of consensus. It could become one building block for a strategy of European self-assertion in a dramatically changing geopolitical environment.

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© Bundeswehr

How would you define artificial intelligence and why is it such an important topic for security? That’s a difficult question because we don’t even have a clear and broadly accepted definition for human intelligence. But I would say artificial intelligence is the attempt to recreate human intelligence—the ability to read, recognize patterns, answer questions, and so on—with machines. It’s an old dream in the history of mankind—think of golem in Jewish mythology, for example. In technical terms, AI means computer programs based on so-called deep learning algorithms. They mimic the structure of the brain in the form of neural networks which then are fed with large amounts of data. They are able to learn and adapt on their own…

…in order to replace humans? In some tasks and functions, yes, but completely? No. The type of AI we have now is called “weak AI,” a tool that can carry out specific tasks—for example, anticipating when a specific machine component fails (predictive maintenance), or running the voice control function on your cell phone. You can teach a machine to play the game “Go,” but it’s a long way from being able to play chess.
When you ask a machine a complex question, you might get “42” as a response—just like in the novel The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy by Douglas Adams, when the computer is asked the “ultimate question of life, the universe, and everything.” Yet if someday the development of so-called strong AI succeeds and machines achieve abilities equal to or even superior to the intelligence of man, it would create a completely new reality that would affect all areas of life.
We are witnessing various developments coming together. When we talk about AI, we are essentially talking about four components: the algorithms or programs, the computing power, data, and then the people steering it—programmers and app developers. Looking at the latest in algorithms and AI, there haven’t been any revolutionary developments. I did my PhD on neural networks in the late 90s; the mathematic models are far better today and the networks are more complex, but innovations in methodology alone do not indicate a quantum leap.

So what would be a quantum leap? In addition to the development of strong AI that I already mentioned, quantum computing would be another non-linear leap. In terms of cryptology, quantum computers would change everything overnight. Take encryption that we’d currently need a million years to crack—a quantum computer could crack it in a millisecond. Everything will happen at unprecedented speed.

And that would affect security policy as well? Yes, in a fundamental way! Image what would happen if all encryption is suddenly insecure. But back to AI: there is significantly more data now because we have sensors everywhere. Everything is connected—there are chips in our cell phones, our cars, our cameras, and soon even our clothes. At the same time, there is plenty of low-cost computing power to process these huge amounts of data.
AI lives on data to learn and adapt. That is what an AI does – it processes and matches vast amounts of data, getting better and better at solving specific problems in the process. New applications emerge almost daily, including in the military sector with corresponding security policy implications. AI is a central component of the “digital battlefield” or, to put it in more dramatic terms, AI can be used as a weapon.

And that brings us to the controversy over “killer robots,” as they’ve been called… It’s important to be clear here: what are killer robots? Ultimately we’re talking about autonomous weapons systems. And of course, the automation of individual weapon system functions is already happening today, from temperature regulation to flight stabilization. The Eurofighter jet has more than 80 built-in computers, and few people have a problem with that. What’s really at stake in this debate is the autonomous use of kinetic force against humans. And again it is important to be clear in the definition here. The air defense systems on naval ships, called Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), also shoot automatically and adjust to their targets autonomously. But those targets are not humans—they are other missiles approaching at high speed, and RAMs are far superior to humans in their precise ability to respond. The majority doesn’t consider that problematic, either.
The key question is whether kinetic violence against humans can be decided autonomously. The German government has clearly said no—there always needs to be a person is involved in such a decision. What other countries do is unfortunately not under our control. But Germany has ruled it out and is calling, rightly so, for more international regulation, as difficult as that may be. The rapid pace of technological development is constantly generating new questions and gray areas.

What developments do you expect to see on the digital battlefield or with AI used as a weapon? There are more and more sensors on the battlefield, but also satellite images, internet data, mobile data, and so on. By digitizing, processing, and presenting all that data, one can gain a competitive advantage. Those who have better information, who manage to put all that information together, win. They have a perspective on who the attacker is, how the attacker is equipped, and so on.
But conversely, the more interconnected or digital a system is—whether it’s the Eurofighter or the Puma armored car—the more vulnerable it is. Digitalization means everything is connected digitally, and the downside is the existence of cyber threats: everything can be hacked. That’s why cyber security—protecting against attacks on computers and programs—is so important. That brings us to the question of what role AI plays in cyberspace. AI can be used as a tool to fend off cyber attacks, and it can detect attack patterns. Whoever manages to develop the best AI will have an advantage in defending and attacking. As with any technology, it’s all about supremacy. We find ourselves in the middle of a global competition, particularly between the US and China. Beijing published its AI strategy about a year ago. It is a very ambitious plan that aims to make China a world leader by 2025.

Google’s AlphaGo program beat Ke Jei, one of the world’s best players, at a game of Go in May 2017. That was considered a sort of wake-up call for the Chinese, wasn’t it, on par with the Sputnik shock of 1957? Yes, I think it was. There is a glut of data in China; people there appear to be more willing to relinquish their data. China has a different relationship to privacy and data protection. And highly-developed sensors and processors are everywhere, in cell phones, cameras, computers, etc. There are around 1.5 billion people in China, and many are very tech savvy—early adopters who take every new innovation on board. The West needs to reconsider its attitude towards China. The theory has been that the Chinese can only copy, not innovate. But that image needs an urgent overhaul. The focus in AI right now is on implementation, and China can do that in a big way. When the Chinese want to achieve something—well, just look at the Belt and Road initiative.

Who is actually driving development in AI—is it governments, or is it multinationals like Google or Apple? That lies at the core of many AI debates, in particular the question of what Germany and Europe’s path should be compared to the US, where primarily companies drive innovation, or China, where the state steers developments. It is important to design how we want to deal with data, from regulating access to data for instance in the public sector to data science in schools. This needs to be done with transparency and with a balanced perspective on both the opportunities and risks.
Besides the US and China, are there other leading AI countries? Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said recently that whoever leads on AI will rule the world… I’m afraid that’s true. I can’t adequately assess Russia’s skills. But it’s clear that we have a state actor that is very active in information and cyberspace.

Can the development of AI be compared to the invention of the nuclear bomb? AI definitely has the potential to change the dynamics in cyberspace and the balance of power. This goes to the very core of security, especially because we have not yet been able to establish international regulations or controls. And there are other aspects that could further shape security policy and also need to be considered: AI is changing the economy as well. What happens when a country is economically superior or even has a monopoly because of AI? What are the implications for global value chains?

Historically speaking, technological innovations often change all aspects of society. What is special about AI? That’s correct, every industrial revolution has also had an impact on security. But today, things are moving much faster. When the assembly line was created, for example, there was a clear impact on the defense sector as well – you could produce weapons much faster. Or when airplanes were invented, airspace took on a military dimension as well.
But AI’s technological development has a far more immediate and broader impact globally. It’s as if you replaced your bow and arrow with a state-of-the-art fighter jet that doesn’t cost much and easily goes unnoticed. That is why AI worries me so much—especially because a terrorist group could hijack these technologies. The potential for abuse is enormous. Abusing AI costs nothing, and it isn’t immediately clear when someone develops or steals AI. You don’t see, hear, or smell anything, and you can’t see it on a satellite image.

Are you talking about physical attacks, on infrastructure? Or psy-ops that influence public opinion? Everything. You have to look at the whole range. Policymakers in security have to be ready for all sorts of scenarios. I’m most concerned by the real, physical impact we’ll see when encryption or security systems are cracked. An opponent could derail trains or control medical devices or, as was saw in Ukraine’s energy grid, simply turn the lights off. The scenarios are endless and potentially devastating.

Is the German government taking the problem seriously enough? Yes, it is. Look at what we saw happen in the Bundeswehr over the last parliamentary period. Cyber has been established as an independent military branch, with the build-up of a cyber command center; there were innovative experiments like the Cyber Innovation Hub and the cyber degree programs at the Bundeswehr University in Munich as well.

Will that be enough? That’s hard to tell. But ultimately it’s just like developing a new European fighter jet. The Chinese and Americans are doing things on a completely different level. But does that mean we shouldn’t develop our own? No—we should.

Do we in the West need to reconsider our privacy policies? I think we need to discuss how we deal with data and especially algorithms. The crucial question is: how do we make sure we know what the algorithms are doing? Who controls the algorithms? This requires a broad discussion, and it’s also a security issue. Take the example of early crisis detection—if an algorithm tells us: “There is 35 percent chance that a crisis will erupt in country in eight months’ time.” What do we do with that information?
We ultimately need more social debates. At the moment there are often undifferentiated perspectives—sometimes ignorance or even flat refusal to deal with the issues at hand. But there is no way around digitalization. We have to talk about data and algorithms, about the future of work, and education. And how we want to live together, in a world full of AI.

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© REUTERS/Nigel Roddis

The United Kingdom’s exit negotiations with the European Union have not yet officially begun, but it is already becoming clear that no policy area will remain unaffected by the breach between the EU and the UK – not even security and defense policy cooperation.

In fact, Prime Minister Theresa May considers British contributions to European security one of her strongest cards in the Brexit negotiations – but she is walking a tightrope between fostering goodwill in Europe and alienating Europeans by issuing hollow threats. For their part, many European governments are too quick to dismiss British security capabilities, prioritizing principles over pragmatism instead of looking for ways to keep Britain close.

The UK is one of only two credible military powers in Europe and has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. London commands extremely effective intelligence services with substantial skill and know-how in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. And while the British military has been subjected to budget cuts in recent years, the global outlook of the British, their diplomatic network, and the professionalism and training of their military personnel all contribute to European security.

So how could the UK use its defense and security capabilities to win a favorable Brexit deal from the EU? Crude blackmail would not work and thankfully seems unlikely in any case. It is true that some Brexiteers are asking, in private and in public, why British troops should risk their lives for EU member states that want to impose a “punitive” Brexit deal.  But May knows that any open threat for example, to withdraw troops from NATO rotations in Central and Eastern Europe if the Baltics block a tariff-free trade agreement between Britain and the EU-27 would not just be unhelpful, but would also lack credibility.

The Trump Card

Britain, unlike newly elected US President Donald Trump, knows that the value of collective defense and security is greater than the sum of its parts. During the EU referendum campaign, Brexiteers and Remainers alike stressed the enduring value of NATO as the bedrock of British security. And the UK government has a continuing interest in investing time and resources in Europe’s defense, not only to protect its own national interests but also to generate goodwill abroad – especially as Brexit negotiations unfold and demonstrate to other allies (not least the US) Britain’s enduring or ambition to be a global player. Almost immediately after the Brexit vote, Britain signaled its continuing international engagement at the July Warsaw summit, when it announced the deployment of 650 British troops to Estonia and Poland as part of a new deterrent force on NATO’s eastern flank.

Still, the UK government is well aware of the value of its military capabilities.  In her Brexit speech at Lancaster House in January, May said she was optimistic that Britain and the EU would come to “the right agreement,” because the EU needed the UK as a partner in matters of security and defense. She stressed that Britain had led Europe “on the measures needed to keep our continent secure,” on implementing sanctions against Russia, working for peace and stability in the Balkans, and securing Europe’s external border. She reminded all EU countries that British intelligence services were “unique in Europe” and had saved countless lives, thwarting “very many terrorist plots” in countries across Europe.

May is right. The EU needs the UK’s capabilities – and Trump’s election has the potential to further strengthen the British negotiating position. Notwithstanding recent attempts by new US Secretary of Defense General James Mattis and others to reassure European allies, Trump’s “America First” nationalism and his skepticism of multilateral organizations calls into question the American security guarantees that Europe has been relying on for decades.

May wants to leverage the UK’s special relationship with the United States in conversations with other European leaders, by offering to act as a bridge between the US and the EU. On a visit to Washington, DC she managed to wrest a commitment to NATO from Trump, whereas in Brussels she conveyed Trump’s message that Europeans need to invest more in defense spending through NATO.

Most EU leaders agree with May’s message but disapprove of the messenger: They know that the Trump administration’s erratic approach to Europe and NATO is a real concern, but they find it difficult to accept May and her Brexit government’s help. They want to spend more money on defense for the EU’s sake, not because Trump or May request it. To make her offer more acceptable to Europeans, May should coordinate her next meeting with Trump and other EU leaders together.

Walking the Tightrope

With its embrace of the Trump administration, the UK government is attempting a difficult balancing act: Britain will appear more alien to the EU-27 the more it fails to criticize Trump on his most egregious policies. But if Britain uses its special relationship to promote European security and the crucial role the EU has played in consolidating a troublesome continent, it can earn European goodwill for the upcoming negotiations.

Trump’s election, and, more importantly, Europe’s unstable neighborhoods to the east and the south have spurred EU leaders to boost their support for European defense. France and Germany in particular have thrown their political weight behind a reform of the union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This presents a potential European vulnerability during Brexit negotiations: As long as the UK is still officially a member of the European Union, London also retains its veto on EU defense policy initiatives that require unanimity. For now, it seems unlikely that the UK would block the CSDP ambitions of the EU-27; the British government is well aware of how badly the EU would take such obstructionist behavior.

But many Britons are worried about the potential of EU defense policy duplicating and undermining NATO. In the months before the EU referendum, the old bogeyman of the EU army became a favored trope of Brexit campaigners. If the mood worsens significantly between the UK and the EU-27 over the course of Brexit negotiations, these concerns could take center stage once more, and May’s government could find itself pressured to disrupt EU defense initiatives.

Yet doing so would not be in Britain’s long-term interest. Once the UK’s exit has been negotiated, London will want to strike some form of association agreement on EU defense. The less obstructive Britain is now, the more it can ask for voting and operational planning privileges in the future.

Turning its contributions to the European security architecture into a bargaining chip, London risks undermining European goodwill. Playing the security card as an open threat would backfire, as it would be considered an assault on a core common interest and European values. Instead, London should make clearer how it aims to contribute to European security, prosperity, and stability once it has left the EU.

However, it is not just Britain that needs cordial post-Brexit relations. Some EU governments would be well-advised to take a more pragmatic stance on security and defense policy cooperation with the UK. The EU’s negotiating strategy is currently guided by one basic principle: Britain cannot be better off outside the EU than as a member. This is aimed at undermining euroskeptic movements in other member states. Following this rationale, many EU countries are quick to dismiss privileged association formats for the UK post-Brexit, for example on CSDP operational planning or European Defense Agency projects.

But Europe cannot afford to lose British capabilities at a time when the European security situation has deteriorated significantly. Close cooperation between Britain and the EU in the area of ​​security and defense, guided strictly by shared interests, would be a good thing for both sides.

N.B. This article draws on the findings of an extensive Center for European Reform (CER) study conducted
with Christian Odendahl: “Berlin to the Rescue – A Closer Look at Germany’s Position on Brexit”

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© REUTERS/China Daily

China’s military has left no doubt that it intends to expand its international presence beyond the Asia-Pacific region. In August, during a visit to Damascus, Rear Admiral Guan Youfei confirmed that Chinese troops would step up military training and humanitarian aid to President Bashir al-Assad’s Syrian government; only a few days later, Defense Minister Chang Wanquan said that China would strengthen military relations with Saudi Arabia. Earlier in 2016, Beijing announced that China would build its first overseas military base in Djibouti.

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing involvement in international security affairs reflects a shift in China’s national security outlook. The rapid expansion of China’s commercial and political activities around the globe is exposing Chinese citizens and assets to the threats of transnational terrorism, civil unrest, and anti-Chinese sentiment. Domestic expectations that Beijing will act to protect these citizens and assets, together with the government’s ambitions to shape global norms, are forcing a departure from the long-established doctrine of non-interference and pushing China to embrace military force projection abroad. For evidence of Beijing’s expanded ambitions, look no further than the recent expansion of the Ministry of National Defense’s Office for International Military Cooperation, which has reportedly added about seventy people since the PLA’s structural reform was announced in late 2015.

Going Global

While it is unclear how exactly the PLA is going to operationalize its new mission, current developments hint at what kind of operations and trends we can expect to see in the future. China is contributing greater troop contingents to UN peacekeeping operations, and Beijing announced in August that China’s first ever standing UN peacekeeping force would enter into service by the end of the year. This, along with plans for the PLA to join counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, seem to signify a clear trend toward growing Chinese involvement in expeditionary military operations other than war.

China’s new antiterrorism law, which allows for direct PLA involvement in counterterrorism operations overseas, also suggests that China is laying the ground for PLA participation in this kind of operation. Future PLA counterterrorism operations are especially likely in areas of Central and South Asia and the Middle East, which are of strategic concern to Beijing not only because of the potential for terrorist attacks against Chinese interests but also due to their location along Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, the protection of the Maritime Silk Road will require the PLA to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean and focus on conducting counterpiracy and counterterrorism operations along the route. To facilitate this, we are likely to see China build or acquire additional supply points in the region, possibly by expanding its current arrangements in Colombo, Sri Lanka, or Gwadar, Pakistan. China is currently financing the construction of a $1.4 billion port project in Colombo, and the state-owned China Overseas Ports Holding Company is operating the newly expanded deepwater port in Gwadar.

The PLA does not yet have the capabilities necessary for China to become a fully-fledged global security player, but the military’s modernization drive is narrowing this gap. Meanwhile, its current global activities, although limited, are enhancing Chinese troops’ operational experience and capabilities.

Rethink Needed

Traditionally, European thinking on China-related security issues has focused on the Asia-Pacific region. The picture is more complex today as the PLA’s force projection activities expand and Beijing’s military activism and defense diplomacy move closer to the European neighborhood. If European governments wish to protect their own interests, they must assess how their interests interact with China’s.

The PLA’s growing international activism is likely to have limited short-term impact on Europe. In fact, today China and Europe share certain interests when it comes to security in the European neighborhood, which creates opportunities for cooperation. Both sides feel the need to preserve the stability of the wider European neighborhood, which is understood to encompass the whole of Europe, plus Middle Eastern and North African countries along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. On the European side, this notion has been reinforced by the ongoing refugee crisis and the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Berlin. The expansion of Chinese assets and interests in the region, along with reports that Syria-based Uyghur militants were behind a suicide bomb attack on the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan in August, are driving Beijing’s growing regional involvement. Building upon these overlapping interests, China’s increasingly prominent role in UN peacekeeping operations and stepped-up security diplomacy efforts in the wider European neighborhood could be a good starting point to deepen Sino-European cooperation, particularly on non-traditional security threats of mutual concern.

The longer-term implications of China’s growing international security activism are less clear. Judging from current trends, however, it seems likely that the PLA’s activities in the wider European neighborhood will continue to expand. Despite Beijing’s strong preference for operating within the framework of the UN, China is likely to start conducting bilateral and even unilateral operations in the region. This could increase the potential for conflict between Chinese and European interests in several areas – for example, it is already becoming difficult for Europe to ignore China’s support for Assad’s regime in Syria. Chinese interference in the country will further complicate the situation, possibly creating negative security spillovers for European countries.

The growing Sino-Russian alignment could act as another point of friction. China and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to cooperate at the UN, where Beijing has backed Moscow by vetoing four resolutions on Syria and abstaining on another two that dealt with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The annual military exercises conducted by the Russian and Chinese navies are also moving into the European neighborhood – in 2015 they were held in the Mediterranean – demonstrating the strategic importance of this region to both sides and allowing them to project power very close to Europe’s southern border. This is unsurprising for Russia, but it is a new development for China.

Potential PLA counterterrorism operations in the neighborhood could also cause problems for Europe. While there is some alignment between Chinese and European goals, the differences in approaches and priorities could cause friction. Independent, direct PLA intervention in unstable areas of the Middle East or Central Asia could lead to growing volatility in the region, negatively affecting European political and commercial interests. PLA operations, especially if not coordinated with other regional players, could drive terrorists underground, help bolster repressive governments, or cause civilian casualties, for example; in a worst-case scenario, a counterterrorism operation gone wrong could escalate existing conflicts. While these consequences are in no way exclusive to Chinese-led counter-terrorism operations, the proximity of the potential target area to Europe makes it an issue of concern for European governments, not least because they would suffer the harshest consequences.

Europe should strive to make the most of the current opportunities for cooperation with China to preserve the stability of the neighborhood. However, European nations should not lose sight of the potential for conflict in the longer-term. It is important to prepare for potential scenarios in which Chinese and European interests clash.

Message to EU: Engage Beijing

Given the uncertainty that still surrounds the PLA’s growing international involvement and its future prospects, European governments should focus first on building a knowledge base on China’s new security outlook and expanding force projection activities. Seizing the current momentum in support for more European coordination on security issues, member states should promote the joint monitoring of the PLA’s global activities, along with better information sharing, particularly regarding bilateral military-to-military dealings with Beijing. If adequately staffed and resourced, the European External Action Service could play an important role in promoting this kind of cooperation among member states, potentially through its affiliated EU Intelligence Analysis Center.

It would also be in Europe’s best interests to start engaging Beijing on the issues of security and stability in the wider European neighborhood as a way to establish communication channels that could pre-empt future conflicts. Though the EU is well-positioned to promote security cooperation in certain areas and issues, however, it is not the most appropriate institution to engage China on the security of the neighborhood; many relevant regional players are not members, and would thus be excluded from the institutional framework for conversations, an especially relevant concern following the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote. Europe should instead leverage other existing frameworks that include non-EU regional players. One such framework could be the OSCE, since it gathers all relevant actors around the table, including most European and Central-Asian states, as well as a number of North African and Middle Eastern nations. The OSCE could engage China on non-traditional security threats of mutual concern, such as the protection of critical infrastructure and the fight against transnational terrorism.

The expansion of China’s global security interests and the PLA’s growing international involvement, backed by improving expeditionary capabilities, are unlikely to stop. Europe and China have so far been able to avoid friction in the security arena due to their very distinct and separate spheres of influence. This, however, is bound to change as the PLA continues expanding its area of operations and begins projecting power closer to the European neighborhood.

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© REUTERS/US Navy/Handout

“It would be wonderful if we had good relationships with Russia so that we don’t have to go through all of the drama,” then-candidate Donald Trump said in July. In principle, many Europeans would agree – but with some important caveats: as desirable as a new joint US-Russian effort at detente may be, it must not come at the expense of NATO allies and other US partners in Europe, including Ukraine and Georgia.

Still, better relations are highly desirable. The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria will only be resolved if Washington and Moscow manage to see eye to eye, at least on the basics. How to make progress on these conflicts will play a role on any future US-Russian agenda.

But there is an additional, less obvious issue that should also have a prominent place on the agenda: conventional and nuclear arms control.

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture, its arms control components included, has been slowly unravelling. During the last few years, serious Euro-Atlantic tensions and mutual mistrust have surged. Risks of miscalculation and military accidents, and thus escalation, have become unacceptably high. From the skies over Syria and northeastern Europe to the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, Western and Russian ships and airplanes operate in tight quarters, and there have already been a number of close calls. All it takes for a full-blown crisis to materialize is one wrong push of a button, one airplane shot down. Rhetoric would escalate quickly, exacerbated by poor or non-existent crisis communication, and national security decision-making would be put under enormous pressure. Such a crisis could even make the risk of escalation to the nuclear level – unthinkable, we used to believe – something to reckon with.

In addition to these short-term military risks, important arms control agreements – including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – may be falling apart. After the earlier US decision to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) treaty, and with serious disagreements over missile defense, such trends are extremely worrisome.

The current situation is more dangerous than at any time since the end of the Cold War. This is why there is great urgency to enhance transparency and reduce the risk of accidents and miscalculations. That is what arms control is meant to do. In the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit declaration, NATO members were right to stress that “Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernize conventional arms control in Europe.”

Steps to Take

So what steps should be taken, considering the current climate?

First, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric needs to be curbed. Bandying about the possibility of deploying nukes is reckless, nothing else.

Second, in addition to renewed political dialogue, it is essential for military-to-military contacts to resume on all levels. This should include exchanges on doctrine and strategy. The NATO-Russia Council, for example, has been reconvened and could offer significant additional opportunities for a far deeper exchange.

Third, immediate steps should be taken to prevent accidents and confrontations involving aircraft or naval vessels. As work by the Nuclear Threat Initiative shows,  requiring all military aircraft to fly with transponders turned on and establishing a distance limitation on US and Russian aircraft and ships in international airspace and waters would make a significant difference. Such steps could also serve as useful confidence and security building measures in the current climate of mutual mistrust.

Fourth, there is an urgent need to strengthen and update existing multilateral agreements. Russia suspended implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in 2007. More recently, questions have arisen regarding the effective application of the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document – regimes that increase transparency in military capabilities and exercises conducted in the Euro-Atlantic space. The Russian government could, for example, send a clear signal by committing to the resolution of compliance issues and engaging in the current modernization process of the Vienna Document – and lowering the notification and observation thresholds for military exercises in particular would go a long way.

Fifth, we should relaunch a broader dialogue on ways to improve arms control, with the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a key forum. Such a dialogue might include discussions of regional ceilings, minimum distances, new weapons systems (drones, for example) and better verification. We need to make arms control fit for the future.

To promote such ideas, a group of like-minded countries from the Euro-Atlantic area has come together to initiate a structured dialogue on conventional arms control. Hopefully others, including the US, will join.

Missing the Point

Critics or skeptics will find many reasons to disagree with an arms control initiative. Aren’t there far more pressing priorities, they will ask. It would not lead to meaningful results in the current climate, they will argue, and Moscow could not be trusted to honor new agreements anyway as they are violating existing ones. It would wrongly reward bad Russian behavior with offers of renewed cooperation, they will say, and argue that the Russian government would just drag its feet while pretending to cooperate constructively for the sake of influencing Western public opinion.

These arguments are not unreasonable, but they still miss the point. In the Cold War, would we have gotten anywhere on such a basis? It’s important to remember that even during the worst period of the Cold War, political and military leaders from NATO and the Warsaw Pact actively discussed and agreed on proposals to promote security, stability, and arms reductions.

Moreover, reviving the arms control debate would not relieve any party of its responsibilities to honor and implement existing agreements, including Russia.

But the US and Europe should not conclude that this isn’t the right time for new initiatives. Arms control has never been a fair-weather instrument; it has always been at the core of Euro-Atlantic security. Given the current level of uncertainties and risks, it is high time to revive a proven security-building instrument.

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Germany’s new security white paper is a big step for a country still largely averse to strategic thinking. Reception bodes well for the future process of shaping policy, argue two members of the White Paper Project Group.

© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

The media have presented a variety of perspectives on the federal government’s new white paper on security policy. Much of the attention so far has been directed at topics that reveal actual or alleged differences between the ministries, such as the future role of the Federal Security Council, domestic deployment of the military, the significance of ad-hoc coalitions, and whether in the future EU defense ministers should meet in their own council configuration. These were the catchphrases that many commentators used when writing about what they considered to be marked differences.

To be sure, not everyone was in perfect agreement at all times; there were differing opinions within the administration, and it should not come as a surprise that reporters in the capital knew about these different positions given their extensive networks in the political sphere. Nor is it any surprise that an alleged “coalition scuffle” was easier to sell than news about the ministries working sincerely and cordially with one another.

But is that really the whole story? Is a lack of consensus on specific details the most important takeaway to report on the new White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr?

We don’t think so. Or to be more precise, we don’t think it should be. If you’re too focused on certain single aspects, you lose sight of the big picture. And if the new white paper is to have real efficacy as “the principal guideline for the security policy decisions and measures of our country,” a holistic approach is imperative when reading the document. This requires bearing in mind the causal interrelationships between individual chapters as well as the numerous and far-reaching proposals for further developing German security policy still to be implemented.

In short: The white paper is more than the sum of its parts.

If one only concentrates on specific aspects during the upcoming implementation phase, it won’t be long before Germany’s key security policy document gets put on the shelf to gather dust. Its only conceivable purpose then would be to serve as a tool for specific and particular interests trying to support their respective arguments by referencing selective parts, arguing “Well, it’s in the white paper.”

Leading from the Center

What are the key characteristics of the new white paper? In what aspects does it differ from its predecessors? What aspects have been developed further? And how significant a role does it play in the current debate on German domestic and security policy?

Let us begin with the last question. The white paper is impossible to understand without the context of the Munich Consensus and the principle of “leading from the center.” At the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014, Germany’s president, foreign minister, and defense minister declared Germany’s willingness to take on greater international responsibility.

This “Munich Consensus” represents a change in Germany’s understanding of itself and its role, and it indeed marks a “critical turning point,” to paraphrase political science professor Gunther Hellmann. At the same conference one year later, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced that Germany was ready to lead in tandem with partners and contribute the best resources and skills to alliances and partnerships. In 2016 the white paper was released to provide a strategic rationale for Germany’s willingness to play a more active, substantive, and responsible role in international security policy, identifying areas where both German security policy as a whole and the Bundeswehr as one of its instruments will have to evolve further.

This means the white paper is neither a starting point nor an end point, but more of a marker or milestone on the path establishing Germany’s growing international responsibility, recognizing the duties this role requires, and further developing the corresponding toolbox.

The upcoming implementation phase will be critically important to the white paper’s success. As Duke University professor Hal Brands said in his comparative analysis of developments in US strategy since 1945, “conception is only half the battle” – and here the white paper is no exception. After all, as Volker Perthes of Germany’s Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) correctly noted, the white paper is not a planning document. Instead, it is a document that articulates and justifies Germany’s willingness as well as its capability to play an ever more substantive role. Bringing these capabilities to bear – that is where the planning stage comes into play. Whether the white paper will have its intended effect is therefore largely dependent on how vigorously its priorities are pursued and its measures implemented in the various national and international areas of engagement.

Consensus as Opportunity

Let us return to the points on which there were diverging opinions between the ministries involved.

Depending on the granularity of the analysis, the white paper includes 100 to 200 individual topics. Having four aspects that merit clarification in the federal government can hardly be taken as proof of allegedly deep fissures within the administration. On the contrary, this is more an illustration of just how solid the foundation of an ever more active and responsible German security policy is at present. This broad consensus was indeed one of the defining characteristics of the entire white paper process. Consensus about the broad strokes, not the lack of agreement on specific details, is what has characterized the inter-ministerial collaboration over the past one and a half years.

This fundamental consensus is a great opportunity for the post-white paper era, because it represents a promising starting point for shaping policy in a sustainable, comprehensive way – nationally and internationally, in the Ministry of Defense and in the Bundeswehr, as well as in all other ministries and agencies. 
At the same time, it is of considerable importance to continue the debate over security policy. Integrating security policy experts and interested members of the public in this is not part of an “educational campaign” (as Hellmann put it), but follows from acknowledging that there are limits to our own understanding.

As extensive as the communication surrounding the new white paper has been – comprising more than 6,500 participants in different formats – it would be a significant mistake to assume that this approach could be enough to sway the opinion of the majority of people in our country in one direction or another. Instead, special emphasis has been put on lowering the threshold for engagement in the security policy discourse in order to further this discussion, bring in additional perspectives, and gain new momentum and suggestions. At a time when the international order is undergoing profound change and Germany is simultaneously prepared to commit itself to preserving the international order, there has never been a greater need for new ideas.

Setting Priorities, Remaining Flexible 


Although it is tempting to maximize freedom of action by having no explicit strategy, the costs of such an approach considerably outweigh the benefits. Without strategy one sacrifices a considerable amount of capacity to exert international influence and safeguard interests.

At the same time, however, our strategic approach has to reflect the characteristics of the current and future security environment. Germany operates in a complex, volatile and dynamic world – and these traits are here to stay for the foreseeable future. It is one of the key tasks of coherent strategies that they help to reduce complexity, thereby increasing the capacity for reasonable decision-making.

At the moment, there is a considerable and ever-increasing amount of uncertainty in the security environment that limits our ability to anticipate future events. Under these circumstances, it is in Germany’s interest to invest in strategic flexibility instead of opting for narrowly defined priorities. It is one of the hallmarks of the 2016 white paper that the prescribed degree of flexibility is derived from strategic analysis and not announced simply by political acclaim.

Let’s take a closer look at the structure of the new white paper to find out how this was done. First of all, the white paper opted to identify the key characteristics of Germany’s identity, its values, and its interests as an actor in international security affairs instead of starting with an analysis of our security environment. The centerpiece of this strategic narrative is Germany’s willingness to assume greater international responsibility, employing its considerable resources to uphold the international order and safeguard its interests.

It would be unwise, however, not to appreciate the limits of Germany’s power or to ignore our own vulnerabilities. Accordingly, these three variables – Germany’s willingness to actively and responsibly engage in matters of international security, along with an account of the limits of its own influence to shape events and an appreciation of its own vulnerabilities – form the backbone of the introductory part of the new white paper.

True to the idea that defining one’s identity is a crucial enabler for recognizing those developments that are relevant to our security and hence require our commitment, the analysis of the international security environment follows as the second element. This approach helps to reduce complexity further. Having defined both our values and interests and those challenges that either have the potential to put our security at risk or already are doing so means that there is a sound basis for formulating strategic priorities as cornerstones for Germany’s international engagement in the years ahead.

Some would certainly argue against giving equal status to all strategic priorities; pointing out that by refusing to establish a hierarchy among them one dodges a crucial decision. Yet taking a closer look, there are two noteworthy things here: First, although the priorities laid out in the white paper are far-reaching, they are still limited in both scope and content. Choices have indeed been made. Reducing further either the number or the reach of these priorities would not be a sound decision in light of the global reach of Germany’s security policy and the complexities of our security environment. Setting the bar as high as possible – and developing our capabilities further to meet these goals – is only a pragmatic response to the prevailing conditions.

The key areas of engagement at both the national and international level can be seen as a security policy “coupling” that offers all of the ministries options for further spelling out German security policy in subsequent strategies in their respective area of responsibility. The white paper’s first part, therefore, is more than just an introduction to an operating manual for the Bundeswehr. Instead it is a commitment to a whole-of-government approach to security that could hardly have been spelled out more clearly. That it was enacted by the cabinet – not just acknowledged – only underscores this fact.

Those who see nothing more than the “usual hazy, diplomatic prose of politics” (in the words of German journalist Christian Thiels) obviously look at strategic documents through different eyes. This kind of document is not concerned with the details of acute crisis management or organizational charts. It is about the broad strokes and about developing ideas of how to advance Germany’s interests. In this way, plausible strategies help us reach decisions, not forestall them. They are milestones, not end points.

NB. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the German Ministry of Defense or the German government.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2016 issue.

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Germany’s white paper has added significance in a future EU without the UK. There are a number of issues which still need clarification before the Franco-German couple works hand-in-glove on defense.

© REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

Published a few weeks after the Brexit vote, the German security white paper has acquired a broader meaning than intended. Faced with multiple crises and rising euroskepticism across Europe, Europeans are under great pressure to show credible leadership and action. The EU Global Strategy and the mini-summits taking place in preparation for the Bratislava EU summit in September have all expressed support for enhanced defense cooperation, improved intelligence-sharing, and beefed-up border defenses, following the terrorist attacks in France that shook Europeans’ sense of security. In a recent Weimar Triangle meeting, France, Germany, and Poland committed to “reinforce the European Union and the foundations of European integration by demonstrating that the EU is able to act.”

Major crises are driving this push for a revitalized European project and a strategically responsible Europe. However, defense and security cooperation has been hampered for years by the Big Three’s diverging strategic mindsets, with the United Kingdom’s historical rejection of an independent EU military force outside NATO, France’s tradition of strategic autonomy, and post-World War II Germany’s posture as a European economic power reluctant to use military force in global conflicts. With the UK – which has the largest military budget in Europe – heading for the exit, Germany and France are now relaunching closer European military cooperation. The challenge will be to define a project that combines France’s historical role in developing the EU’s defense with Germany’s new active role in shaping it.

In the 2016 security white paper, Germany sees itself gradually assuming a larger defense role within the frameworks of NATO and the EU: “Germany is increasingly seen as a key player in Europe,” and is ready to “assume responsibility” and “help meet current and future security and humanitarian challenges,” the white paper notes. In summary, it states: “The country has a responsibility to actively help shape the world order.” This is a major shift for Germany, signaling a necessary normalization of the German strategic mindset to better match a changing international security environment. The combination of Russia’s resurgence, the spillover effects of the crises of the Middle East and North Africa into Europe (refugee flows, terrorism, Islamist radicalization, etc.), and the Brexit vote are eroding the EU’s – and also the United States’ – capability to project soft and hard power, and changing the way Germans think about the challenges of the world around them.

At the same time, the 2016 white paper can be read as a response to the concerns of Germany’s allies (notably the US and France, but also Poland), who have been nudging Germany to take on more political and military responsibilities. In fact, the white paper aims at showing that Germany has taken their concerns into account. Since the Libyan fiasco of 2011, when Germany abstained in the UN Security Council vote establishing a no-fly zone over Libya rather than voting with its allies, France has been seeking a change in the German position regarding deployment in multilateral formats.

Berlin now recognizes that coalitions of the willing like the one fighting the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq will only grow more numerous in the future. Germany also wishes to be considered a more attractive and reliable military partner – a partner capable of achieving objectives across the entire spectrum of military operations. Paris will closely follow the implementation of these advancements, keeping pressure on Berlin to significantly improve its force projection capabilities and deliver on the idea that the Bundeswehr should broaden its spectrum of capabilities and actions.

The white paper also envisions a future European Security and Defense Union and the establishment of a permanent civil-military operational headquarters in the medium term. Shortcomings in the French- and UK-led 2011 Libyan air campaign and aging equipment used in African missions have convinced French officials of that necessity. France still sees strategic autonomy as critical, but wants to move ahead with ideas long blocked by Britain – for example a joint EU command headquarters and shared military assets. Germany is emerging as a clear leader in this field, and is showing that it means business when it comes to building up a more integrated European force with initiatives including Dutch-German defense cooperation, preparations for similar arrangements with Poland, and a proposal that, in the future, foreign EU nationals will be able to serve in the German armed forces. In the post-Brexit context, Germany is shaping up as the top nation France will turn to on defense matters.

Rebalancing Defense Leadership

This new French-German configuration will most probably benefit Germany and partially weaken French leadership on defense matters. The French are of course reluctant to give Germany too much power when it comes to defense; historically, EU defense was a French concept which benefited from German support and British cooperation (which is quite wide-ranging, as the agreements of Saint-Malo and Lancaster House testify). These days Paris is more interested in a stronger EU defense policy than in the integrationist project per se, seeing the EU as a way to share the burden of counterterrorism and diminish dependence on the US.

A European army could potentially jeopardize French strategic autonomy, though. Hard questions, like who will pay for an EU military headquarters, how it will be structured, who will be in command, and what the European army would be used for, still need to be addressed. The German project for European defense needs to be clarified and based on a French-German plan, with an inclusive approach vis-à-vis other EU member states like Italy, Poland, and other Central European countries. The idea put forward by the Weimar Triangle of an annual European Security Council where strategic issues relating to internal and external security would be addressed by EU leaders is a first, important, and easily-implementable step.

In the short run, however, Germany will not be able to replace the UK as France’s closest military partner. The Franco-German couple combines a budgetarily weakened but internationally active France with an economically strong but strategically restrained Germany, and this can only change slowly, one step at a time. In addition, Paris and Berlin have different strategic cultures and priorities. France has a special sense of responsibility for global security and does not hesitate to act unilaterally if necessary.

From a French perspective, it would be desirable for Germany to take over more responsibilities in areas where France is engaged, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. The French defense minister recently proposed that the EU should send military ships to ensure open waterways in the territorially disputed South China Sea, but Germany is not willing to initiate military operations yet, let alone in East Asia. These differences may be an obstacle to French-German efforts to develop stronger EU defenses. Paradoxically, it currently seems easier for Berlin and Paris to agree on the central strategic importance of NATO for their defense.

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