© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

After a week of watching in dismay as the Iran nuclear deal seemed to come to a final collapse, the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom made a gesture that was as expected as it was futile.

“We have expressed our deep concern at the actions taken by Iran in violation of its commitments since July 2019. These actions must be reversed,” Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Boris Johnson said in a statement on January 12, urging Iran to return to full compliance with its commitments under the 2015 deal in which Tehran agreed to halt development of a nuclear weapon.

The statement was in response to Tehran’s announcement that it will cease to abide by the terms of the agreement following the US assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani earlier this month.

The deal had already been on thin ice since US President Donald Trump pulled out in 2018. Since then, the EU has been left desperately trying to salvage it by trying to continue rewarding Iran, by providing investment and facilitating trade, for the country’s sticking to the terms despite the US pulling out.

Brussels’ Main Focus: The Nuclear Deal

As the week’s dramatic events unfolded—with Tehran launching missiles against US airbases in Iraq in retaliation and accidentally shooting down a Ukrainian passenger plane as a result—the unravelling of the nuclear deal has been something of an afterthought for the rest of the world. But for Brussels, it has been the main focus. It has left observers scratching their heads as to whether this represents a genuine belief in Europe that the nuclear deal’s preservation is the most pressing issue, or whether this focus is simply the result of preserving the nuclear deal being the only thing everyone can agree on.

After initial criticism for her slow response to the unfolding crisis, Ursula von der Leyen, the new European Commission president, gave a statement last week with the new EU High Representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, calling for restraint amid the escalation. But the statement from the Commission and the European Council seemed to go mostly unnoticed. The situation has once again shown how much the EU is left as a bystander during such military incidents.

That Brussels has stayed so focused on the nuclear deal even as the cycle of violence has spun out of control has struck some as odd. Borrell’s first reaction to the assassination of Soleimani was steadfastly neutral, which likely reflects member state divisions on the US decision to carry out the attack. While the UK and some Eastern European countries have expressed some support for the decision, the reaction in core Europe has been very different. Many were concerned by the lack of justification from Washington for why it carried out the strike, and even more were horrified by President Trump’s subsequent threat to bomb Iranian cultural sites.

NATO “Shares the US Concern”

Meanwhile, on the other side of Brussels, the reaction from NATO has been more clearly supportive of the US. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg held a special meeting to deal with the developments, after which he told reporters “the US provided the rationale behind the action against General Soleimani.” While stressing that “this is a US decision” and not a NATO one, he said NATO shares the US concern about Iran’s activities in the region.

Perhaps this is why Trump said after this meeting that he would like to see more NATO involvement in the Middle East, with the alliance even perhaps expanding into the area and being rebranded “NATOME”. The idea has been met with skepticism by Europe’s core powers, who see it as a shield for US withdrawal from its responsibilities in the region.

Meanwhile, an increased role for the EU in the region, in the short or longer term, has not been mentioned.

As protests escalate in Iran in response to the accidental downing of the passenger plane, the EU will continue to try to find its footing. It is a military conflict between two long-time enemies which does not directly involve European countries. But in a world in which the new commission president just two months ago pledged to make the EU a more relevant geopolitical actor, people will be expecting more from Brussels than it has delivered so far.

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© REUTERS/ Pool

The German government has just decided not to back a US-led mission to protect the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. It will now find it harder to work for its interests in the region.

To be sure, de-escalating the conflict between the United States and Iran is the key to lowering risks in the Gulf. But it would help to have an international mission in place that could keep Iran from meddling with the shipping in the Gulf, reliably monitor the movements in the Gulf, offer dispute settlement, and work toward regional stability.

Yet Germany, which is critical of the Trump administration’s strategy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, has opted to withhold support from a Washington-led naval mission in Persian Gulf. Although this dissatisfaction with the US Iran strategy is widely shared in Europe, refusing to participate will weaken Germany’s position vis-à-vis Tehran and Washington, thus playing into the hands of both. Therefore, it is now crucial for Europe to engage in a way that is complementary and not in competition with the US-led effort.

Competing Plans among Allies

A fifth of all oil shipments worldwide—an average of 14 tankers per day—run through the Strait of Hormuz. The escalation of the US-Iran conflict has put free passage through the Strait in jeopardy. Shipping companies run the risk that Iran or Iranian-backed groups will attack or seize their vessels, as happened twice in July. Germany has an interest in upholding free passage through the Strait of Hormuz for reasons of global economic stability and of regional order, including the protection of Israel.

There have been intense debates about the character of a potential maritime mission in the Strait, with questions about its optimal size or duration. European navies have experience with anti-piracy missions, but this time the mission would have to deter attacks from a state actor equipped not only with speedboats but also helicopters, drones, and air defense. To what extent should the mission rely on coercion and deterrence? Participants would also have to credibly threaten retaliation against targets in Iran. What legal basis would the mission have?

By the end of July, two competing initiatives were on the table. The US government circulated a proposal, first in NATO, for participating nations to provide joint surveillance and protect ships running under their own flag. The Americans did not get more than lukewarm support for the initiative. Their allies in Europe and Asia feared being dragged into escalation, in line with Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy.

After the seizure of a British tanker by Iranian forces on July 20, the outgoing British Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt proposed a European naval mission, detached from America’s disruptive strategy, with the objective of lowering tensions. There was some support in France and Germany for such a format, but the change of the British government changed the tone as well. The new foreign minister, Dominic Raab, made clear that the mission should not take place without US support. On July 31, US and UK representatives met at a Gulf Maritime Security Conference in Bahrain to sound out the options.

Three Dilemmas for Berlin

It was then that Germany announced that it would not to take part in a US-led mission. The US had made its request for support public, and the German reflexes were not surprising. “Out of the question,” said Nils Schmid, foreign policy spokesperson of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag—the frail SPD, junior partner in Angela Merkel’s governing coalition, does not want to alienate its peace-oriented electoral base.

But this question is not dividing the government. While Merkel’s CDU/CSU had promised to look into the US request, it was never inclined to follow America’s lead into escalation either. The German position remains to opt for strategies of diplomacy and de-escalation, albeit without specifying how that should work and without testing the theory that an international presence on the Gulf might help make these viable. Germany is not alone; other Europeans, notably the French, hold this view as well. But the seemingly reasonable “no” creates unintended consequences that Germany should avoid.

That is dilemma number one: The Europeans cannot cooperate with their strongest ally in a crisis situation that is very relevant for Europe. They do not trust the US government to not escalate tensions—and not utilize the international support for the mission in order to coerce Iran militarily. Europe and the US have been at odds over the right Iran strategy ever since the Americans withdrew from the nuclear agreement in May 2018 and heightened economic pressure against Iran. This division will be present for quite a while, and it will get even deeper now that most Europeans are staying out of the naval mission.

Dilemma number two is that the transatlantic struggle makes Iran happy. It is hard to judge whether Tehran is applying these needling tactics to raise attention, to get compensation for the tougher sanctions, or to deter the US from further escalating the conflict. The attacks could be an indication of a helpless government under pressure, with an economy in free fall. In any case, it will serve the Iranians if the rift between the transatlantic rift becomes deeper. The US president has forgotten this, but it was Western unity that brought Iran to the negotiation table.

What’s more, Germany’s “no” does not punish the US, rather the opposite, which forms dilemma number three. The Trump administration believes it has time on its side to force Iran to the negotiation table, without being drawn into a war. If tensions increase, the US can act without the Europeans.

In fact, Trump wins whether the Europeans participate or not. If international support comes together, it adds legitimacy and lowers the financial burden. If not, America can still protect her own ships. Yes, many will complain about the erosion of American benevolent hegemony, but helping others for free is not part of Trump’s electoral appeal. If Europe abstains from the mission, it will be easier for Trump to snub allies who fail to stand up for their own interests and pressure them to increase defense spending in accordance with their obligations in NATO. Germany will now find it harder to work around the Trump administration when negotiating with Washington about burden-sharing.

Few Good Outcomes for Germany

At the moment, the possible outcomes of the Gulf crisis do not look desirable for Germany. If the US patrols alone or with the British, this might induce Iran to test the mission’s vigilance. Provocations and misunderstandings could lead to military exchanges—with German ships unprotected. In assessing what has happened in crisis situations, Germany would have to rely on the reporting of others. And uncontrolled escalation and use of force would affect German interests, but there would be few ways it could involve itself in conflict management.

Even if the mission and the sanctions successfully force Iran to the negotiation table, Germany and the EU might no longer be the players they were when the nuclear agreement was crafted back in 2015. It will look bad that Germany opted out and let others do the job.

Instead of giving a flat “no,” Germany should lead the debate about how the Europeans could stage their own mission with a friendlier face and more elements than patrolling. Admittedly, such duplication might require a lot of energy for coordination and add the burden of sorting out who does what and when. Running two separate missions would also deprive European navies of the support they could receive when cooperating with the Americans, such as in reconnaissance or re-fueling. Nevertheless, a European mission to secure the Persian Gulf could bring in elements that are complementary to the US-UK mission. Germany should work in this direction.

Monitoring will be key, to make sure that Iranian activities against German ships cannot go undetected. Germany, France, the UK, and Belgium could bring the question of an international monitoring mission to the UN Security Council. Even without producing a UN mandate for a EU mission, such a debate might pave the way for a wider internationalization of crisis management.

Moreover, Berlin could turn to the EU to set up a framework in which the regional partners and Iran as well as the UK and the US would be tied in. Consultation among the littoral states of the Persian Gulf already exists, but a new format could accompany the growing international presence there. Its objective should be to design confidence-building measures, such as consultation and clearing mechanisms, and produce schedules for on-site visits or overflights. This would make a mission conducive to the goal of de-escalation. The EU has hosted negotiations about the nuclear agreement, so it is a natural player here. If the UK and the EU can be tied into that mission package, it will also show how close London and the continent still are.

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© REUTERS/Morteza Nikoubazl

It was billed as an “art sensation” by Hermann Parzinger, the president of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation. Instead, it turned into a messy illustration of the potential pitfalls of cultural diplomacy: It became clear just after Christmas that the much-anticipated exhibition of the collection of the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art would fail to materialize.

The Tehran collection was assembled under the auspices of the last empress, Farah Pahlavi. It includes paintings by Pablo Picasso, Francis Bacon, Mark Rothko, Paul Gauguin, Jackson Pollock, Max Ernst, Wassily Kandinsky, and Robert Motherwell that never been exhibited together in the West before. After Pahlavi and her husband the Shah fled Iran in 1979, museum staff hid the treasures in a basement vault to save them from the revolutionary mob. They lay undisturbed for decades, and have only been shown again in the museum since 1999.

Berlin was among many Western cities vying to be the first to exhibit the collection after the nuclear deal in 2015 and the ensuing lifting of sanctions. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier hailed the exhibition agreement as “a signal of a new cultural and social openness that we want to use to broaden our dialogue with Iranian society.” The plan was to show thirty masterpieces by Western painters alongside works by Iranian artists such as Parviz Tanavoli, Farideh Lashai, and Jalil Ziapour – first at the Gemäldegalerie in Berlin, then at the Maxxi museum in Rome.

The exhibition was originally scheduled to open on December 4, 2016, but it was postponed because of complications after Iranian Culture Minister Ali Jannati resigned in October. The Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation then set Iran a deadline for the end of December to issue the necessary export permits for the art. A last-ditch mission to Tehran in mid-December by Joachim Jäger, one of the curators, and Andreas Görgen, director-general for culture and communication at the German Foreign Ministry, failed to yield the necessary paperwork. The Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation regretfully cancelled its agreement with Iran on December 27, saying it couldn’t hold up its exhibition calendar any longer.

Disapproving of Art

The reasons why Tehran withheld approval appear to be varied and numerous. Some Iranian hardliners, disapproving of art in general, were opposed to the exhibition on principle. “This is not a presentation of Iranian culture,” said Bahman Nirumand, an expert on Iran at the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. “That is one reason why the conservatives might have a problem.” Others argued that the show risked taking on the appearance of a homage to the ousted imperial regime, despised by Iran’s current rulers.

Iranian newspapers also speculated that if the paintings traveled to Germany, they might never return. What if Pahlavi – who had expressed an interest in visiting the exhibition – tried to seize and claim them, despite the fact that she purchased the art with state money?

“It was of course clear from the beginning that this is a complicated project,” Parzinger said in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper on December 6 – a comment that now looks like quite an understatement. In a November article for The Art Newspaper, Görgen conceded that “there are some who may question if the time is right to move forward with this type of co-operation.”

The preparations were fraught with difficulties. One of those who questioned the project was German Culture Minister Monika Grütters, according to the weekly newspaper DIE ZEIT. An exhibition featuring a competition of cartoons about the Holocaust – many of which entailed Holocaust denial – had opened in Tehran in May 2016. The director of the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art, Majid Mollanoroozi, was present at the prize-giving ceremony. In a letter quoted by DIE ZEIT, Grütters warned Parzinger in summer 2016 that the incident might reflect badly on the Berlin exhibition, and she distanced herself from the plans. Mollanoroozi was relieved of his responsibilities for coordinating the show.

Deeper questions were also raised. Should Germany be cooperating on major cultural projects with a regime that frequently imprisons its artists? A recent victim is filmmaker Keywan Karimi, whose production company said he began serving a year-long sentence in November on charges of “insulting sanctities.” Iranian artists also wondered aloud how the exhibition of the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art’s collection would help them, and accused the German government of colluding secretively with the Iranian authorities.

A Setback

The exhibition’s collapse is a setback to German-Iranian relations. Before the revolution and for some years after, Germany was Iran’s biggest trading partner and German businesses are anxious to revitalize economic ties in the wake of the nuclear deal. Companies active in the country include BASF, BMW, and Siemens, which announced a deal to upgrade the country’s aging rail network in October.

The lifting of sanctions unleashed “some euphoria in Germany and lots of companies started to set about securing a foothold in Iran,” whose crumbling industrial infrastructure is of particular interest to German machinery makers, Nirumand said. Now, “that euphoria has subsided,” in part because companies are concerned they may be subject to fines from the United States, which still imposes some sanctions against Iran.

Relations between Berlin and Tehran have already come under strain in recent months. On a visit in October 2016, Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel was snubbed by the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, after he warned that friendly ties between the two countries would only be possible once Iran accepted Israel’s right to exist. Larijani cancelled a scheduled meeting with Gabriel without giving a reason.

“Of Existential Significance”

In his article in The Art Newspaper, Görgen wrote that Germany’s rise to prominence on the world stage has led to “a push for a better delineated cultural strategy,” with more funds available and more global cooperation. “Art has to be protected as an open, free space where different views can be expressed… and through which dialogue can be held with all partners, even those who do not share our values and world view,” he wrote.

Those who do not share Germany’s values and world view may feel threatened by such a policy. Paul von Maltzahn, German ambassador in Tehran from 2003 to 2006, points out that cultural policy is “of existential significance” to the Iranian regime as it seeks to shield the country from foreign influences. It also presents a conundrum. “Without opening itself to the West, Iran cannot develop economically,” he said. “If it opens economically, then investors will arrive and bring Western culture with them.”

In the end Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, a self-described moderate elected in 2013, withheld the final signature required to let the art travel to Germany. With presidential elections looming in May, he may have decided that the battle over a Berlin exhibition was one he could concede to his more conservative rivals.

The German media was derisive about the art no-show. “What a fiasco!” said Deutschlandradio.  “A political disaster,” commented the Berlin public broadcaster RBB. But Germany is unlikely to give up attempts to nurture cultural links with Iran, despite the negative headlines and current sense of frustration. The potential long-term gains – both economic and political – are too great. As an archaeologist with extensive experience of working in Iran, Parzinger says the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation, for one, “remains committed to cultural exchange, even with Iran, and will continue to promote this dialogue with suitable measures.”

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© REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger

Much remains uncertain about President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy. But the future of the multilateral nuclear accord with Iran is in grave doubt given his campaign rhetoric and the enthusiasm of his first appointees for regime change in Tehran. It might now be up to the co-signatories – China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom – to take action to save it.

The agreement has been a success so far. More than a year after going into force, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated between Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK, plus China, Russia, and the United States) has effectively and verifiably blocked all potential pathways for Tehran to race toward nuclear weapons. In return, it has opened the door to the country’s international and economic rehabilitation, even if the pace of recovery in the aftermath of sanctions relief has been more sluggish than anticipated. All the E3+3 members are highly satisfied with the agreement’s implementation so far, and have no appetite for re-designating Iran as a threat to international peace and security.

As will be argued below, they have several mechanisms to shape the incoming US administration’s thinking, and should prepare contingency plans for the worst if the US pulls out.

Unambiguous Condemnation

The newly elected US president has been unambiguous in his condemnation of the JCPOA as fundamentally flawed. Opposition to the JCPOA appears to stem less from its implementation record than from its narrow nature: an arms-control agreement that allows an arch-adversary to come in from the cold without altering its policies more broadly. For such critics, the question of whether derailing the accord would actually strengthen the US’s ability to press for such policy changes appears to be merely an afterthought.

As president, Trump will have a number of options to scuttle the JCPOA. At the extreme, he can repudiate it as a whole or reject key parts of it, like the waivers that suspend nuclear-related US sanctions on Iran. The agreement is designed in a way that allows one party to unilaterally snapback the UN sanctions, notwithstanding the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism.

But the next occupant of the White House could undermine the deal with a lighter touch, or even with no touch at all, since lackluster implementation would doom it as well. Sustaining the JCPOA requires Washington’s constant good-faith management: the president must grant licenses in a timely fashion to allow legitimate business with Iran, issue guidelines to clarify sanctions-relief ambiguities, and shield the accord from political pressures, particularly attempts by Congress to obstruct implementation.

It is entirely too early to predict the consequences of subverting the JCPOA through any of these means. Still, several observations can be made.

First, scuttling the agreement – while Iran complies with it – will almost certainly erode, if not unravel, the international coalition that was critical in enforcing the sanctions that provided leverage during years of negotiations. This implies that the US will be in a weaker, not stronger, position to renegotiate a more favorable deal and/or reshape Iran’s regional or domestic policies.

Second, in such a case, Iran would almost certainly retaliate by resuscitating its nuclear program. The Iranian parliament has mandated its government to rapidly ramp up its uranium enrichment and ratchet down its cooperation with UN inspectors should the US renege on its end of the bargain.

Third, exacerbating tensions could push Iran to double down on policies it presents as essential to its national security, including a ballistic missile program as conventional deterrence and its “forward defense policy” of bolstering regional partners and proxies beyond its borders in the Middle East, in Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and elsewhere.

By destabilizing the JCPOA, the incoming US administration could thus usher in what it purportedly seeks to prevent: greater Iranian assertiveness, more regional instability, and lower odds of resolving the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – places where Iran is part of the problem and thus must be part of the solution.

Salvaging the Agreement

While the new Trump administration determines its eventual policy, the other E3+3 members have an opportunity to discourage and even deter it from undermining the JCPOA. They should also prepare contingency plans for salvaging the agreement if the E3+3 loses its first among equals.

The EU should go beyond expressing its strong support for the JCPOA and revive its so-called “Blocking Regulation” that forbids compliance with US extraterritorial sanctions that lack the consent of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission (comprising the seven negotiating parties and coordinated by the EU). The establishment of this pre-emptive measure would send a strong signal to Washington that if it walks away from the deal, it will do so alone.

China, Russia, France, Germany, and the UK should formally announce that new unilateral US sanctions they deem unjustified by Iran’s behavior and interfere with its full realization of the benefits of promised sanctions relief will be taken as cause to initiate disputes against the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international courts and institutions. In the late 1990s, the EU successfully challenged US sanctions with a similar approach. At the same time, these countries should continue to support Iran’s admission to the WTO.

The above initiatives should be conditioned on Iran continuing to honor its JCPOA obligations, as well as refraining from any non-nuclear provocations. Reinvigorating its nuclear activities and severing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s access in retaliation for Washington’s efforts at gutting the deal will make it difficult for others to stand up to the US. By the same token, a firm commitment by other world powers to stand by Iran as long as it upholds the deal could bolster those in Tehran who would advocate continuing to do so.

The E3+3 and Iran should convene another meeting of the Joint Commission before the US transition occurs to draw lessons from the deal’s implementation so far and clarify remaining ambiguities, especially in areas where the accord’s language is insufficient specific (for example, determining what forms of low-enriched uranium should or should not be counted towards the 300-kilogram cap).

The UN’s second report on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in 2015, provides a timely opportunity for the incoming UN secretary-general to reinforce the message to the US and the world that the agreement plays a key role in global peace and security by reinforcing international nonproliferation norms.

The same calculus that brought Iran and the E3+3 to compromise after thirteen years of standoff and two years of negotiations still holds: the alternatives to an agreement – a sanctions-versus-centrifuges race that could culminate in Iran obtaining the bomb or being bombed – would be much worse. Regardless of whether the incoming US administration arrives at this conclusion, the countries that negotiated the deal should do their utmost to preserve it.

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© REUTERS/Alexander Zemlianichenko/Pool

When Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani addressed the participants at the October 15 Valdai Club (the topic was “War and Peace”) he was wearing black, as is traditional among Shiites on Ashura in commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali. However, the mere fact that Larijani was invited to share a panel with Russian president Vladimir Putin surely must have cheered up the mood in Tehran – as well as Putin’s statements, which depicted the Islamic Republic as an indispensable partner in the search for a solution to the war in Syria and in the fight against the so-called Islamic State (IS).

But is this Tehran-Moscow axis a tactical marriage of convenience, or does it herald the emergence of a strategic alliance?

On the surface, the two states have several converging policy designs, including the immediate objectives of preventing the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’ath regime in Damascus and the defeat and annihilation of what remains of United States-backed opposition groups in Syria, as well as the long-term total humiliation of the US and its allies in an attempt to roll back the post-Cold War American world order.

And it would seem the two have arrived at a certain division of labor to achieve these objectives. Since September 30, 2015, Russia has been conducting air operations in Syria, both to destroy opposition forces and to provide air support to the Syrian army, and it has intensified its arms deliveries to Damascus. Iran, on the other hand, is providing the boots on the ground, supplementing what remains of the Syrian army with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, and Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and even distant Pakistan.

This arrangement minimizes the risk of Russian and Iranian losses, which is essential for Russia in particular, as it still struggles with the painful “Afghanistan syndrome” and suffered a devastating blow on October 31 when an IS affiliate succeeded in bringing a bomb onto a Russian airliner departing from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, killing 224 vacationers and crew members. But the Iranian authorities are also keen to avoid casualties, which carry the risk of shifting public opinion, and so are happy to leave the heavy lifting to the more willing, and more politically expendable, Shiite militias and irregulars.

Limits of Convergence

The convergence may come to a sudden end, however, as the two sides discuss in greater detail the relative degree of order and stability they hope to achieve in Syria. Iran may want a perpetual low intensity conflict, where it may conveniently use the threat of the IS as a bogeyman in its relations with the US and the Europeans and thus legitimize its continued military presence.

Russia, on the other hand, is more likely to prefer a Syrian regime that is weak enough to be dependent on Moscow for continued support, but also strong enough to be able to effectively exercise its power throughout the entire territory of its state. An estimated 7,000 Russian citizens have reportedly joined the ranks of IS, from which they may turn their attention to the volatile regions of the Northern Caucasus or Central Asia. One therefore expects Putin to aim for nothing less than the total elimination of all pockets of IS resistance in Syria. Indeed, if this was not already his goal, the successful downing of the Russian airliner over the Sinai desert clearly will have made it more difficult to accept, however tacitly, any IS presence anywhere.

This difference in perspective most likely also translates into different views on the possible duration of the two states’ respective engagements in Syria. If Tehran actually prefers a continued low-intensity conflict, it will worry less about when the conflict ends and how it can eventually exit in a coherent way. Moscow, on the other hand, is restricted much more by time, and the Russian public is unlikely to accept a military involvement counted in years and trillions of rubles.

Moreover, the apparent lack of an exit strategy notwithstanding, the Kremlin surely must be thinking long and hard about how to leave Syria gracefully in case the US and its allies refuse to accept Bashar al-Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria. Russia will only be able to provide military life support to Assad as long as Russian public patience lasts, but will find it difficult to leave him alone to be toppled by IS or one of the numerous opposition groups hoping for his downfall.

A related point of contention is that of the fate of Bashar al-Assad himself. While Moscow may be ready to replace him with another leader to save a regime subservient to Moscow, Tehran – the IRGC in particular – considers the preservation of Assad the only guarantee of regime survival in Syria.

Fundamental Distrust

Even more critically, however, the Russian-Iranian relationship is still complicated by a fundamental mutual distrust between the two parties.

By asserting itself in the Syrian theater of war, Russia demonstrates to the Iranians its superior military capabilities, insists that to sidestep it would be a bad decision, and tries to keep Iran within its sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia may also sell out Iranian interests in Syria if it manages to extract concessions from the US. Such a course would be consistent with existing Russian policy of using the Islamic Republic as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the US.

Putin’s claim at the Valdai Club that Moscow had been “deceived by the United States” with regard to Iran’s nuclear program was a crude attempt at covering his government’s support of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, while simultaneously extracting money and political concessions from Tehran in return for not allowing even harsher resolutions.

The political leadership of the Islamic Republic is only too aware of Putin’s scheming. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, however, along with the accompanying removal of the international sanctions regime have made Tehran less dependent on Russia, and seem to provide Tehran with greater maneuverability between Washington and Moscow. Iran’s use of US air support in the spring 2015 seizure of the Iraqi city of Tikrit – and Moscow’s fear of more instances of military cooperation between Tehran and Washington – may have been one of the motives behind Russia’s military engagement in Syria.

Bashar al-Assad, too, has an interest in gaining greater independence. By using his Russian benefactor, the Assad regime hopes to reduce its total dependence on the benevolence of Tehran, which may cause some tension between Iran and Russia, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Putin both competing for the position of master of Damascus and architect of the future order of Syria.

The official speeches in both Tehran and Moscow may celebrate the close ties between the two states and their joint efforts to save the “legitimate” ruler of Syria , thus restoring what they see as a lost international order. But behind the curtain problems abound, and the tactical cooperation which we are seeing now will have a difficult time developing into a fully fledged strategic partnership.

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©REUTERS/Umit Bektas

Theoretically speaking, such an achievement should give Rouhani more leverage in Iranian politics. But realistically, that’s unlikely.

In fact, Rouhani could end up politically weaker. For one thing, in post-revolution Iran the government operates one level below the revolutionary institutions created after the 1979 overthrow of the shah, making it weaker in terms of power and institutional influence. The constitution was designed to keep the government weaker than the post-revolution institutions to ensure that it could never challenge the supreme leader and the revolution itself; many current government institutions existed under the shah, and there was concern that any structure that remained from his regime could one day challenge the revolution. There were similar concerns regarding Iran’s armed forces, called the Artesh, which had served the shah. These concerns were later proven to be well founded: on at least one occasion in July 1980 members of the armed forces were revealed to be planning to overthrow the new regime.

Just as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was created after the revolution to make sure the Artesh could never pose a serious threat, other “revolutionary” institutions, most notably the Guardian Council, were created after 1979 to ensure that the government could never challenge the revolution or the supreme leader. This is why the Guardian Council is more powerful than the government, and why one of its jobs is to keep the government in check, albeit indirectly, by qualifying or rejecting candidates who can run for parliamentary elections. By qualifying the majority of the opposition factions to run for parliamentary elections (thus guaranteeing their success), the Guardian Council limits the government’s power.

Meanwhile, the IRGC can also make life difficult for the government, even though – constitutionally speaking – it is not supposed to become involved in politics. Today, the IRGC is a major player in Iran’s economy, with a presence in many important sectors, including energy, construction, telecommunications, automotive, banking, and finance, where it plays a dominant role. This makes it very difficult for the government to open up the economy to competition or investment, and, as events at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini airport in May 2004 demonstrated, when armed IRGC men simply took the airport by force from the Austrian-Turkish consortium supposed to run it, the Guardian Council is not shy about using its military arm to push out foreign investment firms it does not approve of. …

Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – November/December 2015 issue.

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There are two points to this story. The first is that Iran has changed significantly since the dismal days of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Then, a European visitor to a provincial town like Ardebil – particularly a Persian-speaker like myself – would not have been approached by a local entrepreneur. He would have been shadowed by the plainclothes security forces and shunned by ordinary people; business would have been the last thing on his mind. That this is no longer the case is down to the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani and his policies of economic stability and foreign détente. The respect that Rouhani, a tough-minded moderate, commands both inside and outside the country has lessened fears of war and domestic political meltdown, but Iran’s relative serenity has also heightened expectations. Iranians are not content with a diminution of tensions. They want work and prosperity.

This is where the second point comes in. Iranians’ fond belief that Rouhani would usher in a flood of investment has been disabused. Even the recent nuclear deal that Iran and the world powers signed in July in Vienna was a damp squib; red-faced portfolio managers who had predicted a 15 percent surge in stock values on the news had to explain to their investors why the main index of the Tehran stock exchange dropped 5 percent. There is huge Western interest in Iran as an investment opportunity – hardly a surprise, given Iran’s massive hydrocarbon resources, solid infrastructure, and young, educated, upwardly mobile population – but for all the myriad foreign delegations trooping into Tehran these days, sizing up opportunities and testing markets, Iran is still waiting.

A Basket Case

The economy that Rouhani inherited in 2013 was a basket case. Thanks to sanctions, oil revenues had collapsed the previous year and the rial had halved in value; the economy contracted 6.8 percent, and inflation soared toward its mid-2013 peak of 42 percent. Unable to import parts or machinery, factories closed and unemployment rose to an estimated five million. Corruption and populist largesse (billions of dollars were being handed out to compensate families for reductions in energy subsidies) did the rest. The country was close to exploding.

Since then Rouhani has steadied things through fiscal discipline and a diplomatic dividend that was reaped under the interim nuclear agreement of November 2013, which provided for limited sanctions relief and committed the global powers to refraining from additional sanctions. The government’s economic managers and private companies were now able to make plans with the knowledge that outside pressure on the economy would not get worse.

The rial duly stabilized, inflation came down to 14.5 percent in the first quarter of 2015, and growth reached 3.8 percent in the second half of last year. But the economy remained stuck in second gear, with oil exports down from 2.8 million barrels per day (in July 2011) to less than half that amount, and earnings further hit by the drop in oil prices. …

Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – November/December 2015 issue.

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“Today is a historical day,” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif said as the Islamic Republic and the P5+1 nations – the UN Security Council and Germany – agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015. Within an hour, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared: “God has listened to the prayers of the great Iranian nation!”

The triumphal tone of both men was understandable – after all, negotiating an agreement to govern the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program in exchange for an end to the international sanctions regime and improved economic prospects for the average Iranian was the election promise that paved their way to office.

However, while Rouhani and Zarif were busy celebrating their recent negotiating triumph, their opponents in Tehran, chief among them Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), were engaged in a fierce political struggle against the dynamic duo. The outcome will not only affect the political career of Rouhani and his team, but also the fate of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group, along with the future of the Islamic Republic after Khamenei.

With the nuclear agreement in hand, Khamenei no longer needs Rouhani or Zarif. While he shielded them from domestic criticism during their first two years in office, he is not likely to continue to do so; in fact, fearing their popularity, Khamenei may actively encourage the Revolutionary Guards to attack the president and his allies politically.

Not that the Revolutionary Guards need Khamenei’s active encouragement: as the engine of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and the most likely custodian of the bomb, the Revolutionary Guards would doubtlessly benefit most if Iran were to resume its pursuit of a nuclear bomb. This goes a long way towards explaining the Revolutionary Guards’ opposition to Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy: Rouhani has attempted to politically marginalize the Revolutionary Guards, pushing them out of economic activities.

Rouhani, however, has no intention of surrendering to his enemies in Tehran, and is perhaps in a better position to defend himself than his “pragmatic” forerunners. Rouhani’s team is not a one-man operation that emerged from nowhere, but the product of the large “technocratic” and clerical network built by his mentor, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

And Rouhani has been mobilizing the Iranian public to his cause. As demonstrated by the spontaneous street parties in Tehran and other major urban centers after the nuclear agreement was reached, there is significant public support for Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy.

Rouhani has also come close to eliminating the international sanctions regime, providing brighter prospects for economic improvement for the average Iranian voter – who in turn may vote Rouhani’s allies into the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan-e Rahbari), the eighty-six-member body that formally elects the next Supreme Leader, as well as the parliament on February 16, 2016, eventually re-electing Rouhani himself in presidential elections the following year.

That scenario, however, is optimistic.

Facing adversity, Rouhani, Rafsanjani, and the hapless Zarif may find themselves deserted by their network. In the past, Rafsanjani and Rouhani seldom reciprocated the loyalty of their protégés, and can therefore not expect their former allies’ support in return. They did not move to save their friends when opponents, which sometimes included Khamenei, began to attack Rafsanjani’s too-powerful network during his presidency in the 1990s. When Gholamhossein Karbaschi, a reformist mayor of Tehran and a Rafsanjani ally, was targeted by a politically-motivated judiciary in 1998, Rafsanjani and Rouhani, who then served as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, remained silent. If Khamenei unleashes the Revolutionary Guards against the president, Rouhani’s network of friends is vastly smaller and weaker than Rafsanjani’s was a decade earlier, and would likely scatter in the face of adversity.

At the street level, the nuclear deal remains immensely popular. But the Islamic Republic isn’t a democracy, and Khamenei fears competition from the Rouhani-Rafsanjani camp. He has successfully curtailed the political power of Rafsanjani before, occasionally even persecuting his children to remind the cleric of his place: in March 2015, Khamenei frustrated Rafsanjani’s bid for chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts, and Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani, the son of the former president, was summoned to Evin Prison shortly after Rafsanjani declared his intention to once again run for chairmanship of the Assembly.

Apart from weakening Rafsanjani, the Supreme Leader will likely ensure that the Guardian Council (Showra-ye Negahban), which approves candidates for public office, disqualifies candidates favored by the president and his allies. The purging of candidates would be done with the goal of keeping Rouhani’s supporters home and allowing anti-Rouhani forces to score huge electoral triumphs, checking the popular power of the executive branch.

Even in the unlikely event that Rouhani’s supporters pass through the filter of the Guardian Council, they will face the hurdle of rising expectations among the Iranian public: Rouhani’s critics are already fanning the flames of discontent with team Rouhani’s economic performance. Having lost the nationalist discourse over Iran’s nuclear program to Rouhani, they are shifting their attention to the gap between Rouhani’s pre-election promises and the grim economic realities of Iran today in an attempt to regain the political upper hand. This tactic resonates among the Iranian public, which chose to believe Rouhani’s pre-election explanation that the sanctions regime along with Ahmadinejad-era economic mismanagement caused their poverty. With both villains gone, the Iranian public understandably expects improvement in their living standards. Rouhani cannot possibly deliver this prior to the February 2016 parliamentary elections. Thus, the president’s diplomatic victory may turn into a resounding electoral defeat in the short term.

Even in the medium term there is no guarantee that Rouhani will be able to capitalize on sanctions relief to liberalize Iran’s economy and improve living standards for the average Iranian. To date, Rouhani has already repeatedly tried, and failed, to push the Revolutionary Guards out of the economy: Khatam al-Anbia Construction Base, which is the Revolutionary Guard Corps of Engineers, remains the largest contractor in Iran, operating as a “private” company, and is still awarded most major infrastructure development plans despite the government’s dissatisfaction with its performance. “We were no match for Khatam al-Anbia,” explained Akbar Torkan, presidential adviser.

The Revolutionary Guards probably received the tacit support of Khamenei, who cannot afford to lose his praetorians’ support – after all, it was the Revolutionary Guards that brutally suppressed the pro-democracy Green Movement in the wake of the fraudulent 2009 presidential elections. The money from sanctions relief is more likely to find its way to the companies owned by the IRGC and the semi-public foundations controlled by Khamenei than to state coffers and the ordinary citizen.

At the same time, ever more belligerent statements from Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards are beginning to drown out Rouhani and Zarif’s charm offensive towards the United States. “Our policy toward the arrogant US government won’t change at all,” Khamenei assured the Iranian pubic in his July 18, 2015 address marking the end of Ramadan, specifically mentioning the regime’s support of “the innocent nations of Palestine and Yemen, the nation and governments of Syria and Iraq, the innocent people of Bahrain, and the sincere holy warriors of The Resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, who will continuously enjoy our support.” Major General Mohammad-Ali (Aziz) Jafari, Revolutionary Guard chief commander, used his first commentary on the nuclear agreement to condemn the United Nations Security Council Resolution endorsing the deal: “Some elements in the draft are specifically contrary and opposed to the major red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular concerning arms capabilities, and we will never accept it.”

The cumulative impact of these efforts could be disastrous for Rouhani and his team. Deserted by their network, possibly abandoned by the voters who – either out of frustrated expectations or because of the manipulations of the Guardian Council – choose to stay home rather than vote for the government, and facing the Revolutionary Guards, Rouhani may face a disaster: his own political career, the nuclear agreement, succession after Khamenei, and ultimately control over the Islamic Republic may be slipping from his hands.

In Washington and European capitals, the nuclear agreement is being sold in part as an effort to bolster Rouhani against more hard-line forces. The opposite, however, may well play out. The nuclear deal with Iran may in fact be an investment in a sinking ship.

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Let us be clear: even though it represents a clear step backwards from what the EU3+3 hoped for only two years ago, the Lausanne agreement is, on its surface, a decent framework. For the first time ever, a comprehensive settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue is on the table, with provisions covering all the problematic issues. That is why even the cautious French government fully supported it. (In fact, the only negotiating parties in Lausanne were the Iranians, the Americans, and the French, along with a contingent of Germans who contributed technical expertise on uranium enrichment.)

However, the roadblocks on the path to a satisfying final agreement – one that would put the issue to rest in the eyes of the international community – are so high that the issue is almost certain to remain on the agenda beyond the end of June 2015.

To begin with, it is far from certain that there will be a final deal in the foreseeable future.

The only officially agreed document that resulted from the Lausanne talks is a joint EU-Iran statement, one that is rather vague. A much more detailed draft document exists – a form of rolling text drafted at the suggestion of France – but was not made public. Any interpretation of this document is thus the responsibility of the parties.

And this is where the fun begins. For there are significant discrepancies between the US fact sheet and the Iranian “quasi-fact sheet” published by the ministry of foreign affairs. A third document, a French fact sheet distributed to EU partners, also differs from both the US and Iranian fact sheets on certain points.

The differences reflect the absence of a clear agreement on many issues. The joint statement remains vague on the duration of limits to the enrichment program (a “specified” duration), on the exact nature of verification measures (“provisional” application of the Additional Protocol and “agreed procedures” on enhanced access to “clarify past and present issues”), on the timeline of sanction relief (“simultaneously” with implementation of “key” commitments), and on the duration of remaining restrictions (an “agreed” period of time).

Anyone familiar with the Iranian nuclear issue already knows that the forthcoming negotiation is likely to stumble on at least three key issues: the timeframe of sanction lifting, the exact nature of the verification regime, and the so-called “Possible Military Dimensions.” These are three core issues, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has made it clear since Lausanne that he does not want to compromise on the first two. (Iran has always stonewalled on the third one.) Pretending that we are close to a deal is thus tantamount to saying that a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is at hand because the “Clinton Parameters” are considered a good basis of discussions by the parties.

In addition, even though Iran suffers under the sanctions, Tehran may believe that it now has the upper hand, and that maintaining a hard line will play in its favor. From its point of view (and not mistakenly), the Obama administration is very eager for a deal, while few of the Supreme Leader’s publicly stated “red lines,” if any, have been crossed. Moreover, Iran may believe that the West needs it to fight the Islamic State.

All this does not bode well for the coming months. And that is even without factoring in possible additional difficulties posed by opponents to a deal in the US Congress.

If there is a final deal, it is not certain that it will be faithfully implemented.

But let us assume that there is a final deal that preserves the essential interests of the EU3+3 and the international community at large. It may very well be that Iran just wants to buy time and maintain its ambition to be capable of building the Bomb in a short period of time. Given that some past (and possibly present) weaponization activities will presumably remain undiscovered – even with stringent verification procedures in place – Iran may be betting that the international community will lose interest, and that the sanctions would be difficult to re-impose. The US would presumably not engage in future sabotage operations, and its threats to use force may ring hollow to the ears of the Iranian leadership.

In this scenario, Tehran would test the West with minor breaches, then with more important ones if we do not react (maybe arguing publicly that “conditions have changed”), and get ready for breakout (or sneakout) after a few years.

What would happen then? Who would determine what a significant, material breach of the deal is? Would Moscow play along? Would it even be conceivable to re-impose sanctions if foreign trade and investment have returned en masse in Iran?

If not, or if Iran is undeterred, then two outcomes would be possible. The first would be to tacitly allow Tehran to arrive at the nuclear threshold, and perhaps cross it. This “North Korean” scenario (with an “Indian” variant where it would conduct an allegedly “peaceful” test) is not the only bad one. We could also have an “Iraqi” scenario, where a US president is determined to use force without the explicit agreement of the United Nations Security Council.

If there is a final deal and it is faithfully implemented, it will still leave Iran with significant breakout capability.

Let us now assume that Iran faithfully implements the agreement and has decided to give up its military nuclear ambitions. We will have recognized and legitimized Tehran as a “hedger,” which in 12-15 years will be able to build the Bomb in an even shorter period of time than now. (Today, Iran could produce a significant quantity of fissile material in 2-3 months – and actually less than 2 months according to some French government estimates.) Would it not be tempting for a future Iranian leadership to resume military-related activities? Of course, we can still hope that the regime will have changed by then (a liberal democracy would be infinitely less likely to go down that path). But let us not hope too much: that would be making the same mistake the US negotiators of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea made, unwilling to believe that the regime would still be the same in 2004 …

We would then have gained time – arguably a precious commodity in diplomacy – but nothing more.

This is the price of having given up on restricting Iran to a uranium enrichment capability “consistent with practical needs,” which is what the November 2013 “parameters for a final agreement” aimed at – at some point in 2013, the EU3+3, under US pressure, gave up “roll-back” in favor of mere “containment.”

Another issue is that a decade-old Western effort to limit the spread of uranium enrichment technology would have failed. It is likely that several countries in the region (and beyond) would consider it now entirely legitimate to build large-scale enrichment programs without a clear industrial rationale. We would then have created a world of “nuclear hedgers.”

Finally, even if Iran completely gives up its military option, there is little evidence that this will be a political game-changer.

Europe and the United States should not entertain any illusions about what a deal would mean for their relationship with Iran. A deal might in fact reinforce conservative trends in Tehran. Supreme Leader Khamenei might want to show that he is still in charge and avoid allowing the more pragmatic elements of the Iranian leadership to become political competitors. Remember also that demonization of the US and Israel is at the core of the Islamic Republic’s political “DNA.” Washington will want to show its friends and allies in the region that it will not compromise further with a regime that has been, since 1979, one of the world’s most important sponsors of terrorism and a destabilizing element throughout the Middle East and beyond. Remember that Saudi Arabia fears a US–Iran rapprochement as much as it fears an Iranian bomb, and that, as events in Yemen demonstrate, Washington has no intention of “shifting sides.”

Lausanne is not a “Munich.” But going back to the Middle East metaphors, it is definitely not a “Camp David.” After the “Oslo” of November 2013, it is at best a “Roadmap.”

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The Lausanne draft agreement has the foundations necessary to work.

First, one of the points agreed upon by all sides is that if there is a deal, the core of the heavy water reactor at Arak will be removed and replaced with a new one built in conjunction with the EU3+3. The plutonium that could be extracted from the heavy water of the new reactor core would not be sufficient to make a nuclear weapon.

There is also the question of centrifuges. Another point on which both sides agreed in the Lausanne is that Iran will reduce the number of its working centrifuges from 19,000 to 5,060 for 10 years, meaning a reduction of 66 percent. All functioning centrifuges will be IR1 centrifuges, the oldest and slowest centrifuges Iran has in its possession.

Even more important than that, according to the new draft agreement more than 99 percent of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) stock will be removed or neutralized for 15 years. This is a larger quantity than was addressed in the 2009 Vienna deal, which the U.S offered to Iran but Iran rejected. That deal would have shipped out 75 percent of Iran’s LEU, with 25 percent of its LEU staying on its territory. (The Vienna deal also did not address the Arak reactor.) If the Lausanne agreement turns into a deal, Iran will not have sufficient LEU to make a bomb.

There is also the question of inspections. Another point agreed on in the draft framework agreement is that “Iran will be required to grant access to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellow cake production facility anywhere in the country.” In other words, if it is suspected that Iran is secretly enriching uranium, inspectors will be able to inspect sites of interest.

The obstruction of Iran’s path to a bomb via the enrichment and plutonium routes and the inspection of any suspected enrichment sites provide the foundations of what could eventually be a good deal. And there’s something else: the draft agreement leaves both sides with something to walk away with.

If the two sides reach a deal, Iran will keep its enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordo open despite the fact that both were being built in secret and violated Iran’s commitments to the IAEA to inform the organization “as soon as a decision to build a nuclear plant is made.” And the Arak reactor remains a heavy water reactor. This means that Iran can say that it did not have to shut down any of its nuclear sites, saving face with its public.

However, foundations are not enough. More work needs to be done to make this a deal which would secure the interests of the EU3+3 and the state of Israel. These include clarification of issues such as the “Possible Military Dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, and whether or not sanctions will remain in place until that is accomplished.

In short, a good start. But more important work needs to be done to ensure that such a draft agreement, if it turns into a deal, does not enable Iran to produce a nuclear weapon.

But could a deal lead to a more moderate Iran that is more willing to work alongside Europe and the US to achieve common goals?

It has always been the case that when Iran gets what it wants from the West it is more willing to cooperate. In 2001, it worked with the US against the Taliban in Afghanistan after the Clinton administration apologized for the U.S role in overthrowing Musadiq in 1953 and removed some of the sanctions against Iranian products such as caviar and rugs.

If Iran and the P5+1 reach a deal over Iran’s nuclear program, then it’s possible that the US and western European countries will find Iran more willing to cooperate in other areas of shared interest. This is likely to include sharing intelligence, and perhaps even coordinating attacks against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

We could also see the two sides cooperating again against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran will try to make sure that such cooperation is secret and limited – any visible signs of a thaw would encourage the Iranian public to demand more improvements in relations with the US. After all, it is no secret that the majority of the Iranian public would love to see a US embassy in Tehran, and to see relations restored between their country and America. However, the hardliners don’t: they see such a scenario as a direct threat to the stability of their rule. Without open animosity towards the US, they would find it much more difficult to divert attention away from the massive corruption inside the regime, as well as the abuse of human rights. The last thing they’d want is to have a US embassy in Tehran, with diplomats preaching about human rights and the advantages of an independent judiciary and open press.

Therefore, if there is a deal we could see an improvement in relations, but it would be limited in scope and scale to security cooperation. If you are thinking that after such a deal EU diplomats would have more access to human rights issues inside Iran, you are likely to be disappointed. And it should also be noted that even if there is a deal, if the US imposes new sanctions against Iran to address other issues, including human rights, we are likely to see Iran become hostile again, despite the initial goodwill shown soon after reaching an agreement.

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