© Cover Artwork: Lo Cole

Our November/December issue on Europe in the wake of Donald Trump’s victory is out now – available at Google Play

and the Apple App Store

Here’s the table of contents:

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Back in October – another geological era in American politics – FiveThirtyEight, a polling aggregator headed by Nate Silver, published a breakdown of the presidential race by gender. The conventional wisdom then was that if only women voters decided the presidency, Hillary Clinton would cruise to victory with a margin of 33 percent. According to one poll, it would have been the most decisive win since the widespread adoption of the popular vote in 1824, and would grant her 458 of 538 electoral votes. Meanwhile, if the election were decided entirely by men, Donald Trump would have claimed an 11 percent margin of victory, and 350 electoral votes. To paraphrase the president-elect himself, when American men choose their leaders, they’re not choosing their best.

That is not, however, how the election played out. Women did prefer Clinton, but by a narrower margin than expected: FiveThirtyEight reported a difference of 12 percentage points. And white women actually chose Trump – he received 53 percent of the white female vote overall, and 62 percent of the vote from white women who were not college graduates.

In fact, the election appeared to be a referendum on gender equality – pitting the first female candidate from a major party against a man who seemed to revel in degrading women – but the real deciding factors seem to have been race and age.

According to the Washington Post, Trump took 58 percent of the white vote overall, while losing the Black, Latino, and Asian votes by margins ranging from 36 to 80 percentage points. And while Americans 44 years old and younger voted more for Clinton, Trump was the favorite among older Americans.

The latter trend is something we’ve seen elsewhere. When Britain voted to leave the European Union, age was the key fault line: while three in four Britons between 18 and 24 voted to remain, along with half of voters between 25 and 49, the day was carried by voters over 50, a strong majority of whom voted to leave.

Level of education, meanwhile, unites Trump voters with supporters of France’s Front National. According to the same Post analysis, Trump won narrow majorities among people who had not completed university. A slim plurality of voters with college degrees picked Clinton, and voters with graduate degrees picked her almost two to one. In France, 36 percent of voters with a high school education – and 45 percent without – voted for Front National in 2015, compared to only 19 percent with some college education and 15 percent with more.

And a final point unites all three: Trump, Brexit, and Front National are all, in a sense, rural uprisings against the cities. According to the Post, Trump won voters in small cities and rural areas 62 to 34 percent. He eked out a narrow win in the suburbs, but lost urban voters (defined as people living in cities with 50,000 people or more) 59 to 35 percent. In Britain, meanwhile, the Remain camp was strongest in London and the other major cities (along with Scotland), while the countryside tended to vote to leave the EU. And in France, as of 2015 support for Front National was twice as high in towns with under 2000 people (30 percent) as it was in the Paris region (16 percent).

In each of these cases, gender has actually played a smaller role than one might expect. In the case of Brexit, men and women voted almost identically; in the case of Front National, there was a small gap between the two in 2015, with 33 percent of men and 26 percent of women supporting the party, and that gap has grown: in 2012, the difference was 1.5 percentage points.

This doesn’t mean that women don’t have a distinct set of interests that these movements often fail to address. However, their central appeal is always their claim to defend a vanishing culture, whether they’re promising to eject immigrants from France, save England from Europe, or make America great again. And when it comes to culture, to paraphrase a number of post-mortem analyses of the American results, white women are white before they’re women.

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© REUTERS/Neil Hall

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States is a watershed moment for transatlantic relations. This was by no means the preferred outcome for most Europeans, and it poses paramount challenges for the transatlantic partnership. Europe is in a state of shock – a shock that feels all too familiar. Many here have been reminded of the Brexit vote, when they went to bed with spirits high and woke up to a new reality. They aren’t ready to accept that the seemingly unthinkable has happened once again. Most Europeans find it difficult to believe that almost half of the American electorate opted for a candidate who bragged about sexually assaulting women, threatened to imprison his opponent, disparaged Latinos and African-Americans, called waterboarding “peanuts,” and vowed to build a “big, beautiful, powerful wall” on the US southern border. Now, Europe’s worst nightmare has come true.

It’s a particularly rude awakening. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy program resonated well with European foreign policy elites, especially Germans. He forged a robust working relationship with Chancellor Angela Merkel – strong enough to weather the storms that battered German-American ties during his tenure, including Guantanamo, Washington’s drone war, and the NSA listening in on Merkel’s cell phone. On Russia, Obama understood the need for transatlantic as well as European unity. On Iran, the US lined up with Europe. And while Obama was pushing European leaders to do more, both in terms of soft power and defense spending, it was always clear that the US was deeply committed to its European partners.

Unknown Knowns

There is little doubt the Trump administration will be different. Nobody knows exactly what the president-elect will do because most of his policies are inscrutable: He has adopted and then abandoned his positions on NATO, Russia, nuclear weapons, Libya, Iraq, Syria, climate change, refugees, and the Iran nuclear deal. If the new president implements only half of his campaign promises, Europe is in deep trouble.

Still, three core principles have emerged as a consistent narrative behind Trump’s candidacy: America is doing too much to try to solve the world’s problems, trade agreements are damaging the country, and immigrants are destructive.

Trump is, in that sense, Merkel’s ideological opposite. She champions globalism, open borders, and dialogue. Trump is skeptical of the very international organizations that Germany sees as linchpins of global diplomacy, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization and even the European Union itself (Trump welcomed the Brexit vote and referred to his own victory as “Brexit plus plus plus”). At a rally in swing state Ohio, Trump even likened his rival Hillary Clinton, who had explicitly praised Merkel’s leadership style, to the German chancellor: “In short, Hillary Clinton wants to be America’s Angela Merkel, and you know what a disaster this massive immigration has been to Germany and the people of Germany.”

His conciliatory acceptance speech notwithstanding, Trump appears to be a populist nationalist who doesn’t consider Europe’s security or prosperity part of his business. The idea that President Trump will walk back everything candidate Trump said during a bitter, vitriolic campaign is highly doubtful. Some compare him to Ronald Reagan, but it’s very unlikely that he’ll govern in the tradition of internationalist Republicans, from Richard Nixon to George H.W. Bush.

Instead, Europe should gear up for huge challenges. NATO is no longer the safety net it was. Trump has been relentless about Europe’s defense contributions. “They’re not paying us what we need,” he said in his debate with Clinton on September 28, adding, “NATO could be obsolete.” This raises serious questions about Trump’s readiness to uphold America’s Article 5 commitments and its security guarantees in Europe.

This comes at a time when European security is already under threat. The rift between Russia and the West is growing ever deeper, and a series of crises from Morocco to the Caspian Sea have tested Europe’s limits. American disengagement at this point would hit Europe hard. While Hillary Clinton would have almost certainly pushed ahead with the initiatives NATO agreed to at the Warsaw summit last July, that roadmap is now in limbo. Even if America doesn’t withdraw from NATO, Europeans will no longer be able to outsource their foreign, and especially military, responsibilities primarily to Washington. They have to “do more,” with larger contributions not just in terms of soft power but also hard, military capabilities. If Europeans do not step up defense, there might be nobody left to come to their rescue.

Another looming challenge for Europeans will be Trump’s relations with Russia. His apparent admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin might win him some points with Putin’s remaining friends in Europe, but it could undermine Merkel’s investment in a tough European line on Ukraine. Transatlantic unity was a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s approach and a key tool in deterring Russia. Now it could fray in the process. The Middle East, Turkey, and transatlantic trade are also set to become points of friction.

The Last Wake-Up Call

The postwar world order, built upon seventy years of great power peace and cooperation, is on the brink. And Germany is more crucial than ever. Brexit had already increased the importance of Berlin; the outcome of the American election means Germany’s global responsibility has taken on completely new dimensions.

All eyes are now turning to Berlin to uphold liberal democracy. Meaningful German leadership will be expected not only within Europe, but also on issues like Syria, Iraq, and Russia. It’s entirely unclear whether Germany is ready for the task that lies ahead.

It’s not that Trump has no friends in Europe. Right-wing populists like France’s Marine Le Pen and her Front National, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders and his Party of Freedom, and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) voiced support for Trump during the campaign, and they are celebrating his victory. “Their world sets, ours rises,” Florian Philippot, an adviser to Le Pen, wrote ominously on Twitter. If Obama was “Europe’s President,” Trump may become the president of Europe’s populist far-right. With elections due in Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, there is a real danger that the new US president aligns with these anti-globalism and anti-immigration European forces, further destabilizing the EU.

At the same time, it’s very possible that Trump will trigger anti-American sentiment in Europe and cloud the country’s image abroad, complicating transatlantic relations. However, European leaders will need to try and make it work somehow.

Germany’s chancellor struck the right note when she stressed: “Germany and America are bound by values – democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, regardless of their origin, skin color, creed, gender, sexual orientation, or political views”, adding “On the basis of these values, I offer close cooperation to the future president of the United States, Donald Trump.”

In addition to standing up for Western principles, Europe has to get its act together. This is the latest and the loudest in a series of wake-up calls, and no other should be needed. Europe has a large stake in a liberal, rules-based order. It should use every leverage it has to influence decision-making in Washington.

But it would be foolish not to acknowledge that transatlantic relations face an existential threat. The Trump presidency will likely breed mistrust and antagonism on both sides of the Atlantic. Still, four years may feel an eternity, but they are not. Transatlantic relations are simply too important to give up without a good fight.

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© REUTERS/Mike Sager

Taking the Reins

Europe will need to pick up where the United States leaves off.

European leaders and policy makers were confounded, like so many Americans, by Donald Trump’s election as the 45th president of the United States. As so many others, they are now scrambling to make sense of the consequences. So what will it likely mean?

A Trump presidency will lead to profound changes in America’s engagement with the world. At its base, it will represent a transition back from the highly internationalized and engaged America that we have known since the beginning of the 20th century.

This should, in fact, come as no great surprise to Europe. This transition is exactly what America has been speaking of for decades now – the desire to step back from being the world’s policeman. The translation of this sentiment into fact has also been an underlying trend during the Obama administration.

However, it will without question be different than it was under President Barack Obama. It is likely to take a different hue and accelerate at a far quicker pace.

Trump has said bluntly that America’s allies are not pulling their weight and that under his leadership they will have to start doing so if they want American support. That differs little from the position (stated rather more politely) of the last four

US defense secretaries – Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Chuck Hegel, and Ashton Carter. But unlike them, Trump expects quick action from allies in response.

So this may not be news. But there is another, more profound consequence that will now underlie this trend, one that is far more damaging. This election has fundamentally and perhaps irreparably damaged America’s soft power. The appeal of American (and Western) democracy has been greatly weakened. The Western ideal no longer holds the same glow.

Brexit Distraction

With Europe distracted by Brexit and its own internal concerns, and the US led by Trump, Western leadership is now absent. The consequences of this will be grave for Europe and the US. The institutions that have provided the basis for the current global architecture will be diminished, and the norms that many have relied upon have been cast in doubt. Others, notably China and Russia, will take advantage of this (as they have already been doing).

It is in this highly uncertain and unstable environment that Trump will insert his foreign policy objectives.

It is worth noting that his foreign policy positions are very unclear. Few candidates for president actually speak honestly and candidly about their foreign (and domestic) policy objectives; they swing to the extremes in the primaries, move more toward the middle during the election itself, and then, upon gaining office, discover that the facts are not what they had thought: Governing is far more difficult, and compromises must be made.

Thus, some of Trump’s more extreme positions, such as pulling out of NATO, can likely be put aside.

There are, however, some positions we can take seriously. TTIP will not progress during his tenure (although a trade agreement with the UK could), and Trump could presage a global move toward greater protectionism, with significant global consequences. US-Russia relations could well undergo the long anticipated “reset”, where Trump could well sacrifice things for which he has little interest (Crimea, for example) for the chance to announce he’s “made a great deal.” And Obama’s positive environmental agenda will be quickly reversed.

Still, the greatest fears of many around the world are unlikely to become reality. Trump will be constrained by his bureaucracy, by the judiciary, by Congress (there is little consensus today among Republicans, and the current conciliatory tone is unlikely to last), and finally by his cabinet (who will have far more experience governing than he does).

The world today is a more dangerous place. Trump’s enthusiasm for unpredictability will make it worse. But the steps required to mitigate the worst are clear (albeit difficult): Europe will need to step forward, to take more leadership, and to bear more burdens.  – BY XENIA WICKETT

Make Him Look Good!

Europeans should play to Donald Trump’s penchant for power – against their own instincts.

How should Europe deal with Donald Trump? According to the flood of initial reactions, Europe is now facing a massive challenge and a great deal of unpredictability.

Not necessarily. Dealing and even working cooperatively with Trump might be easier than anticipated if Europeans get the basics right from the start. Here’s an example of how to get it wrong, how to get it right, and a few ideas for Europeans trying to wrap their minds around the challenge the election poses to transatlantic relations.

The presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, addressed the newly elected president in a joint letter on November 9. “We would take this opportunity to invite you to visit Europe for an EU-US Summit at your earliest convenience. This conversation would allow for us to chart the course of our relations for the next four years.”

There was nothing wrong in writing that letter, but I doubt it was the best way to woo Trump to Europe. To begin with, his instincts certainly don’t lead him to embrace the European Union as an institution or as a partner. Trump is interested in power, and the EU has given him ample opportunity to associate it with powerlessness, and, perhaps worse, with the impression of a “rigged system” that he so fervently attacked in his own country during the campaign.

Trump’s attitude suggests that he believes power lies in the hands of strong men rather than with institutions, and the course of history has been shaped by deals from strong leaders, as Jeremy Shapiro argued in a recent ECFR paper. There is no reason to believe that Trump will have an interest in or even understand the post-World War II logic of various nations sharing power under the EU umbrella.

Early Mistakes

So the first mistake Tusk and Juncker made was to suggest the initial contact point should take the form of an EU-US summit. For us Europeans, this is the way we operate. We believe in having everyone around the table, regardless of size and prowess. But this certainly won’t impress Trump. The second mistake the presidents made was to leave the timing to President Trump: “at your earliest convenience.” It gives the impression that Europeans are fawning and needy, keen for the US president to give them a bit of his precious time.

So how can Europe do better in piquing Trump’s interest and making his cooperation more likely? Fundamentally, Europeans should play to his penchant for power, even if it goes against their own instincts, and they should clearly be the ones to set the agenda and timing. Furthermore, Trump is a newcomer in the world of international politics, and being the narcissist he is, he wants to succeed.

So Europeans should help introduce him to the international arena and make him look good in the club, as long as it doesn’t hurt them. The most important thing is for Europeans to impress President Trump with how they work and cooperate as Europeans, and with others, around one table. Europeans should therefore orchestrate the best opportunities to show their own strengths. They should utilize the various resources they have in playing old-fashioned power politics, which has seen a resurgence in Europe and the world. We can play this game of power by putting our strongest leaders out front, but we must also show the added value of the union’s institutional machinery.

A prime example is the EU3+3 in negotiations with Iran: The High Representative and the EU’s most influential countries played a pivotal role in shaping those talks. President-elect Trump will push Europeans to perform better in other areas where they can marry the strength of member states and EU institutions.

Two events will be important benchmarks in that process. As of December 1, Germany will take over the G20 presidency from China. In the run-up to the summit in Hamburg in July 2017, there will be a host of meetings between officials on various levels. European members of the G20, including EU representatives, should use these talks as an opportunity to coordinate and liaise with their US counterparts in the new Trump administration so they can build alliances at working levels. At the summit itself, Europeans should make an extra effort to show unity, and the German presidency can help a great deal in portraying a Europe in motion.

Italy will hold the G7 presidency in 2017, and this will present another important opportunity. The next meeting will be held in Sicily next May (though it’s a bit ironic to imagine President Trump in this setting). The overall subject is migration, a topic that has been hugely divisive in Europe (this will also be Theresa May’s first G7 appearance), and will likely also be a major point of discord with Trump, going by his campaign rhetoric. However, this is not necessarily an impediment to a successful display of European unity and strength, precisely because we have got to know so well each other’s domestic limitations. There is a strong interest in the EU to internationalize the challenge of migration, and Europeans should naturally be looking for points of convergence. This might be the chance.

Yes, Europeans are facing a great deal of unpredictability with President Trump. But if they manage to get the fundamentals right, they might be able to turn it into an opportunity for Europe itself. – BY ALMUT MÖLLER

Honor Your Commitments

A staunch ally like Poland shouldn’t be left in the cold.

Poland has been a staunch ally of the United States, both within NATO as well as bilaterally. It is participating in the US-led anti-ISIL Operation Inherent Resolve, spends the requested two percent of GDP on defense, and has joined the US and other allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fate of both countries is deeply intertwined, and the policies of the next US president will have profound implication on the security and prosperity of Poland.

These are uncertain times in Poland. Brexit only added to the sense of fragility of the European project and anxiety over the future of the West, both of which have been the guiding stars of Poland’s foreign policy over the past 25 years. During this time of instability, the US has become Poland’s predominant security partner. Together we face the main challenger to a stable, values-based European security order, Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine set off alarms in every NATO capital, but particularly in Warsaw.

Russia’s determination to undermine the European security order based on the principles of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 means the region has entered a new era of dangerous competition. Russia’s aggression was met with NATO’s move from reassurance to deterrence, codified by the Warsaw NATO summit declaration in July. Security will remain the key concern for Warsaw, and security policy will remain the key pillar of Polish-American relations.

America is committed to placing 5000 soldiers on Polish soil over the coming months. An armored brigade (ABCT) is scheduled to arrive in February 2017. This is a clear commitment to NATO and European security that the next president should embrace. The troops deployments already in the pipeline are a message of resolve, and there is no need to modify military planning. The next administration should focus early on providing resources for the beefed-up US presence on NATO’s eastern flank by quickly working with the new Congress on the next cycle of the European Reassurance Initiative. Any delay or change in the pace of implementing NATO summit commitments would send the wrong signal to both the allies as well as Russia.

No Quick Deal with Moscow

In the past, every new president since the end of the Cold War made the mistake of trying to fix relations with Russia in one quick move. Under President Barack Obama this led to the infamous “reset” that many in Warsaw saw as sacrificing the interests of Central Europe on the altar of closer (but in the end unsuccessful) cooperation with Russia.

Even if an exact repeat of this situation is unlikely, there is certainly a worry in Warsaw about the next administration attempting to fix America’s relations with Russia without addressing the issues that led to the breakdown of ties in the first place. It would be a mistake to go back to business as usual without resolving the conflict in Ukraine. This would be seen by Moscow as confirmation that it can trample on Western values and interests whenever it chooses. Such a step would further embolden Moscow in its aggressive policies, which would eventually lead to a renewed clash with the US. Russia’s behavior will change only if Kremlin elites understand that Western pressure transcends US administrations.

Whenever the US disengaged from Europe in the 20th century, it always led to conflicts that required American reengagement with great loss of blood and wealth. The 21st century is no different. Poland, as well as many other front line US allies, needs an America that is engaged in the world and focused on the maintenance of an alliance system that has benefited the US so much over the past seventy years. The US remains a key European power. Post-Brexit Europe should be one of the key focal points for the next administration.

European allies need to contribute more, sharing the burden more equally – especially when it comes to spending on security and defense. Much of the work should be done behind the scenes, but the next president needs to make it clear that the US wants a strong, united EU both as a global partner and a key player in its own neighborhood. – BY MICHAL BARANOWSKI

A New Order?

The US will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe.

President Donald Trump will be leading a country that is more preoccupied with itself and its domestic divisions than usual. He enters the White House as the most divisive first-term president since Abraham Lincoln. This bruising election campaign has cast a shadow over his judgment and suitability for office.  He will, however, have Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and an energized base of voters behind him. The Democrats will be demoralized and leaderless for some time to come.

Presidents matter on foreign policy; that is where they have the most independence from Congress. And the world is not going to allow Trump to focus solely on domestic priorities.
A Trump presidency will be a complicated one for Europe. President Trump stands for almost everything both European and German leaders have opposed: denial of climate change; an America First version of unilateral nationalism; an open admiration for illiberal regimes and leaders, most importantly Russia and Putin.

Just as President Obama came in as a correction to the nationalistic policies of the George W. Bush administration, Trump sees himself as a correction to the multilateralism and soft power approach of Obama. He will inherit the mantle from a president who many in both parties believe has been too reactive and passive, especially regarding Putin and Russia. He is likely to take a much softer line on Russia than Obama. He knows that Putin tried to influence the election in his favor and will be open to another reset in Russia policy. He views Russia and Putin as an ally in the war against Islamic extremism. He will be much more open to recognizing a Russian sphere of influence and will see Ukraine as a needless drain on American attention and resources. He will be open to lifting the sanctions regime on Russia in return for a bigger deal with Putin.

Not Merkel’s Preferred Partner

Hillary Clinton was clearly Angela Merkel’s preferred partner, but with Clinton there was a real danger of division over Russia policy given Clinton’s harder line on Moscow. Now, Merkel faces the opposite problem of Trump accommodating Russia. That would undermine Western unity built upon close ties between Washington and Berlin. Trump is also more open to giving Putin free rein in Syria as part of the larger fight against Islamist extremists.

As Robert Zoellick put it recently in the Financial Times, “Europe’s problems will probably be left to the Europeans.” Given the challenges and choices any American administration faces in the Middle East and Asia, Europe will be expected to offer more leadership and partnership. Both Clinton and Trump agreed that European allies have to boost defense spending to shoulder a growing burden with the United States, but Trump went much further and linked American security guarantees to levels of European burden sharing.

Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to expand defense spending significantly and move toward the NATO target of two percent of GDP is an important step in meeting these expectations, but it will have to be followed up with substantial improvements in German and European defense capabilities. What’s more, expectations of stronger German-American partnership in leadership in the wake of Brexit are now on life support. Hopes for a reliable European partner were already in doubt given the current disarray in the EU – not to mention next year’s elections in a number of key countries, including France and Germany.  The American election has now accelerated this fragmentation.

Trade and the future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be another important policy challenge. Trump ran on a clear anti-free trade platform and has rejected both NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). His views reflect the substantial domestic opposition to more free trade agreements among American voters. It seems highly probable that not only TPP but also TTIP are now dead.  The transatlantic partners may need to find another way to enhance economic cooperation.

Great Discontinuity

A Clinton presidency would have come as a relief to Europe. It would have signaled continuity with Obama on the Iran nuclear deal, better ties to Cuba, and the close relationship with Germany. Instead Europe faces the greatest discontinuity it has faced since at least 1989.  Something significant is going on in the West that would seem to auger an unstable and dangerous period, both at home and internationally.  America will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe, as it will be consumed with its “civil war” at home. As Charles Lane put it recently, “Today’s Republicans and Democrats are so divided that they no longer seem like citizens of the same nation or acknowledge even the same factual reality.”

And as Zoellick points out, “The next president will need to start by deciding if the US should perpetuate the seventy-year-old order.” The American election has now put that order into serious question. – BY STEPHEN S. SZABO

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© REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

For the past sixty years, Europe has relied on Washington for its defense. But America’s bruising election campaign and the victory of Donald Trump have made one thing clear: Europe can’t count on the US to be its defender forever. The war of words with Vladimir Putin is only a sideshow in a larger and more important battle – the liberal world order is shifting its focus toward China. President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia was a clear move to recalibrate America’s foreign policy, and more such pivots will follow, sooner or later.

In the halls of Brussels, fears of geopolitical marginalization are driving new discussions about Europe’s defense capabilities. Britain was the biggest opponent of greater integration on defense, so the Brexit vote has cast a new light on the debate. Still, talk of a European army is premature.

Establishing such an army would involve changing the union’s treaties, and – in an age of growing populism and nationalism – that’s a risk nobody is willing to take. Come what may, any changes to Europe’s defense policy must be consistent with the current set of treaties and arrangements, but that will be tricky. Even without the UK, Europe’s lack of strategic coherence is a major stumbling block.

Permanent Structured Cooperation?

One of the benefits of the Treaty of Lisbon was that it enabled permanent, structured defense cooperation.

In theory, like-minded EU member states could put permanent cooperation structures in place – and once Lisbon went into effect, we did see myriad papers, proposals, and articles on the possibilities of common security and defense, termed “Schengen defense” or “defense cores.” But these ambitions never amounted to much. Political mistrust, lack of strategic coherence, and sovereignism got in the way.

Mistrust is especially pronounced between the large member states. The Brits are suspicious of everyone. To the Germans, the French mean France whenever they say Europe. And as far as Paris is concerned, a common European defense means rallying Europe behind French interests in Africa. The EU’s most powerful states try to strike deals with their smaller neighbors instead; the German framework nations concept targets closer cooperation with its immediate neighbors, including the Netherlands and Poland, while France is working with Spain in the Sahel region.

Europe’s lack of strategic coherence is no secret. There is a clear East-West divide on what defense actually means. Western European states share three strategic priorities: fighting terrorism, containing migration, and stabilizing the Sahel and North Africa. They invest therefore in fighting asymmetric wars and supporting stabilization initiatives. In the East, however, defense is far more concerned with Russia. These member states invest in conventional skills to prepare for a high-intensity war at home or on their doorstep. These two strategies demand entirely different sets of force structures, including equipment, training, and logistics.

Then, of course, there is the Central European circle of of “free riders.” With Ukraine insulating Central Europe from Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, and Slovenia have de-facto dismantled their armed forces and cashed in on the peace dividend. They are capable neither of expeditionary warfare nor collective defense. Any permanent structured cooperation would only make sense amongst like-minded states with similar strategic vision and capabilities. Right now, it would do more to widen the gaps in European defense policy than bridge them. And as regional cooperation is already in place here and there – among the Nordic countries, for example – it remains questionable whether permanent structured cooperation is even necessary.

Sovereignism is a third obstacle to overcome. States and national parliaments want to decide when and how their soldiers go to war. And in an era of surging populism and euroskepticism, the notion of sovereignty is on the rise. It is virtually inconceivable that any parliament in Europe would surrender this right to Brussels anytime soon. In Germany, the Bundeswehr is regarded as the “Bundestag’s army.” The Central European free riders in particular see their veto right as a last-ditch option to save themselves from having contribute to defense.

This sovereignism has made effective defense planning essentially impossible. In the case of a war or international mission, it’s entirely unclear who would answer the call. Most contributions to international missions are more symbolic than effective, designed to minimize risk to personnel. France has experienced firsthand the lesson Washington learned years ago: You have to do the dirty work yourself. This essentially means all multilateral formations and troop arrangements are useless, because they will never actually be used in combat.

A Bumpy Ride Ahead

Europe’s defense industry as a whole struggles to keep up with progress on a global stage; there are 19 countries producing small arms, six producing submarines, five producing major surface combatants, and two producing combat aircraft – each independently of the other. Manufacturing is small and expensive compared to the mass-produced American and Chinese competition, and that means European countries lack the funds to drive developments in critical future weapons systems, such as space assets, missile defense, robotics, and drones.

In theory, the EU could use the European Defense Agency to assess capability needs, coordinate new R&D and acquisition programs, and facilitate common defense projects. In practice, though, the EDA is chronically understaffed and underfunded. It is more focused on the number of body armor kits than common research on future key capabilities. This is not due to the deficiencies of the EDA, but to the European capitals themselves, which are reluctant to commit to anything that would substitute their national programs.

Defense cooperation in Europe has always been a bumpy ride. Even though the continent has produced flagship projects in the past, bringing them to life was never easy. Airbus, for example, is a European enterprise, but Germany and France are constantly squabbling over the national shares of production lines, R&D, subcontracts, and quotas. Competing interests have rendered common projects like the Tiger attack helicopter, the NH-90, and the common frigate unmanageable. Frankly, it is far cheaper and quicker to buy an off-the-shelf American product than to engage in European cooperation.

National capitals are largely to blame. The big states, particularly France, try to use the defense cooperation argument as a pretext to squeeze out other competitors and keep the defense industry in their own hands. Other EU member states have adopted a predatory attitude toward offset contracts to boost their own national industries, demanding offsets that would render defense deals impossible commercially. Small states in particular have perhaps the most backward attitude of all: They want to protect and preserve their (generally uncompetitive) national champions. Some of these states abuse the national defense exemption to single-market rules to protect all sorts of domestic industries. Regarding European cooperation, they would rather safeguard their own small arms manufacturers than contribute to a European missile project.

Incremental Improvements

Much of the talk about a European army and defense integration is intended more as a jab at London than a realistic initiative. Nonetheless, European defense integration will progress – although very slowly, and away from the headlines.

The German and French ideas for increased defense cooperation are in essence an extension of the “Guttenberg” initiative launched by the former German defense minister, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg. He wanted to increase cooperation and sharing in all non-mission-critical areas to increase efficiency: acquisition, defense education, training, logistics, and so on. States could pool and share those bureaucratic and non-combat functions without binding their national armed forces to any kind of commitment. Nothing in this proposal would overstep current EU treaties or take away competences from national parliaments.

Despite budget cuts and shrinking armed forces, even this seemingly modest approach to defense integration gained little traction. The reason is politics once again: all defense bureaucracies cherish their own defense academies, study centers, acquisition bureaus, and planning staffs. because they provide well-paid armchair jobs away from harsh duties in the field. Still, political flexibility might yet overcome bureaucratic resistance at some point and gradually open up opportunities to cooperate. There are already common logistics structures for systems used in many member states, such as the Leopard 2 tank and the Eurofighter jet. Further collaboration on training and education might follow.

In terms of structural change, the most likely scenario would involve increasing the EU’s military staff and creating a common headquarters to expand the staff’s responsibilities in planning, mission command, and control. But this would be a gradual evolution of current policies.

British defense policy might have been highly problematic for the EU, but British industrial policy was often very pragmatic. The UK participated in various common European defense projects since the 1960s and is more immune to protectionist tendencies than many of its European counterparts. Brexit complicates things further – and even if Europe’s defense problems are easier to tackle without London, 27 equally obstructive capitals remain.

The post Europe on Its Own? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Andrew Kelly

There is much about American politics that is unusual to people in Europe, and this year’s bizarre presidential election is no exception. Europeans frequently criticize America’s two-party system, which gives a stranglehold on political office to only Democrats and Republicans.

There is only one country in Europe with a similar situation – Malta, where the intense political tribalism of its 450,000 citizens makes American political division look like child’s play. Every other European country has at least three major parties. Why should a nation as large and diverse as the United States have only two?

In reality, there are various strains of political thought in America. Both parties are made up of ideological coalitions, and tensions within them have been brought to the boiling point by the 2016 election.

Donald Trump’s win shocked Democrats and Republicans alike. Both party establishments are looking weaker than ever before. The Democrats are leaderless and adrift, completely shut out of power. The Republicans may now control every lever of government, but the party establishment appears to be primed for an inevitable conflict with their President Trump that could tear the party apart.

Not since the mid-19th century has America been so ripe for a fundamental shake-up of its political landscape.

Shotgun Wedding

The Republican leadership – embodied in House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell – has embraced Trump since his shock win in the early hours of November 9. But they weren’t always singing this tune. Just a week earlier, it appeared that both men had abandoned Trump, with Ryan even refusing to talk about him publicly. Neither Trump nor his voters will forget that.

In the final weeks of the campaign, the Republican establishment was vilified by Trump at his rallies, and audiences booed when they heard the party mentioned. Meanwhile, the party leadership’s on-again, off-again support for the candidate and their fawning overtures after he won have disgusted moderate Republicans. In short, the brand is now toxic to both moderates and populists within the party.

So how long will the uneasy embrace between the more moderate congressional Republicans and the president last? It’s not just about optics. There are now fundamental and irreconcilable policy differences within the party. Republicans have traditionally been pro-free trade and hawkish US involvement in foreign interventions. Trump has said he wants to scrap global trade agreements and end America’s role as the world’s policeman. Despite winning the overwhelming support of evangelicals, Trump does not share their obsession with social issues like abortion or gay marriage. His vice president, Mike Pence, does.

If and when the Republican congressional leadership has to block President Trump on an issue, the traditional and populist wings of the party may be pitted against on another.

A logical outcome might be for two parties to emerge from the ashes of internal Republican conflict, with two new names: a center-right party in the mold of Angela Merkel’s CDU in Germany, and a far-right party in the mold of Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France.

The new center-right party would attract about half of sitting Republican lawmakers, but it would probably attract only about twenty percent of Republican voters. For 25 years now, the party has pursued a policy of bolstering its socially conservative and populist base while alienating its fiscally conservative wing.

There are few moderate voters left in the Republican Party at this point, as became evident in voting during the Republican primary. Over the past 15 years many of the former Republican moderates have become independents, and others have become Democratic voters.

Democrats in Disarray

The Democratic Party, pulled to the right by Bill Clinton’s New Democrats movement in the 1990s, has provided a natural home for many of these fiscal conservatives. But they are now in an uncomfortable union with the party’s progressives.

Bill Clinton remade the Democrats into a center-right party and he passed the mantle on to Barack Obama, who has also governed as a largely center to center-right president. Today’s Democratic politicians have more in common with British Conservatives than British Labour, for example. If Democrats joined the European Parliament, they might sit with the European People’s Party, or possibly the ALDE group of European Liberals. They certainly wouldn’t comfortably align with Europe’s center-left Socialists & Democrats group.

Bill Clinton’s Democratic makeover left a lot of people on the left of the party feeling unrepresented and taken for granted. This year, that wing flocked to Bernie Sanders, and they flocked with a vengeance. There couldn’t have been a more perfect foe against which to vent their rage – the wife of the man who transformed the Democrats into a centrist party. This explains the incredible level of vitriol against Hillary Clinton during the primary and beyond. It is the American left’s residual rage against a family that has robbed them of a political home.

A Democratic Tea Party?

Clinton’s loss has led to inevitable finger-pointing from Sanders supporters, who insist their candidate would have been able to defeat Trump. Both Clinton and Sanders supporters have been left angry and confused. The anti-Trump protests seen across the US in the days after the election united these two camps. But soon it will be time to decide how to mount an effective opposition to the president.

There are two options: to repeat the Democrats’ response to the 2000 defeat, or to mirror the Republican response to their defeat in 2008. In the former model, Democrats would work with the new president as much as possible and try to move to the right to win over the alienated white working class.

In the latter model, the party members would take to the streets in protest – not just for a few days but for months and years. They would pressure Democrats in Congress to try to block everything put forward by the President – a strategy that could be used to actual effect if Democrats can win control of the Congress in the 2018 midterm elections.

Disagreement on which strategy to pursue seems inevitable, and it is likely to split leftist and moderate Democrats. If that split coincides with a split within the GOP, we could be entering unchartered territory.

If moderate Republicans come into conflict with the new president and are plotting ways to form a viable third party, it would make sense to look to moderate Democrats who haven’t gone along with a Tea Party resistance strategy.

Any new moderate GOP party would need to build its voter base quickly and cannot rely on attracting many registered Republican voters. They would have to go first to former Republicans who left the party after it drifted to the far-right. Next they could turn to independents. And finally, they could turn to moderate Democrats.

The result would be a three-party system that is more recognizable to Europeans: A center-left “Socialist” party (the rump Democrats), a center-right “Christian Democratic” party (former Republicans and Democrats joined together) and a far-right “nationalist” party (Tea Partiers/Trumpeters).

American Exceptionalism

All of this assumes that the American political system behaves rationally. But the world’s oldest democracy behaves in no such way. A three-party system would require coalition building to attain a majority in the Senate and House, something we haven’t seen in America in 180 years.

Such coalitions would have to be worked out not only at the federal level, but also in all fifty state legislatures. It would be a very new phenomenon for the US and could also bring about great political uncertainty. Expect entrenched interests to resist such a development at all costs.

Political scientists also point out that the two-party system arose in the US because of its winner-take-all electoral system. They say this situation is unlikely to change unless the voting system is changed. But this doesn’t necessarily have to be the case. A winner-take-all system hasn’t stopped the UK from developing a three-party system, for instance.

The forces of stasis in America’s archaic governing institutions are strong, but they are under immense strain. Remaking the American political spectrum along a more European model would be nothing less than an earthquake – one that would likely have ramifications for the rest of the world as well.

It’s now or never. If America’s strange two-party system doesn’t buckle under the unprecedented chaos of this year’s election, it likely never will. For Europeans who are hoping for an American political spectrum that’s easier to understand and navigate, now is the time to hope for a change – and maybe even offer some advice.

The post Political Earthquake appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Michaela Rehle

It’s no secret that trouble has been brewing within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) ranks for months. But the rumble of discontent in Berlin, Munich, and Brussels has grown to a loud chorus. And party members are asking themselves a fundamental question: Do we still believe in our chancellor? Even those in Merkel’s closest circles have sensed a paramount shift. Trust, it seems, is evaporating.

At the same time, Merkel’s sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), has been gradually tightening the screws on Chancellor Merkel. They have consistently shifted the focus away from single-issue politics toward a broader, more fundamental conflict.

Bavarian Minister President and CSU chairman Horst Seehofer made clear the rift has long since ceased to be about the refugee crisis. Instead, he says, average voters are no longer willing to play along with Berlin’s politics. Cancelling a trip to Russia and the opening of an Oktoberfest celebration in Berlin, he fueled the impression that Germany is in a state of emergency.

For Merkel, on the other hand, everything that she says or does is under the microscope and will likely be turned against her in the run-up to next year’s federal elections. Her trips abroad, the meetings with the world’s rich and powerful – all that had bolstered her image at home in the past. Now it serves as proof that she is out of touch with Germany’s problems.

A chancellor’s popularity does naturally slump during the course of his or her time in office. And given the state of events, an approval rating of 34 percent is still surprisingly high. Crises of confidence are a familiar phenomenon as well. Yet this time, something is fundamentally different: With her handling of the refugee crisis, Merkel herself has become a problem in the eyes of many.

She was always a force of cohesion in the CDU; now, she has divided her party and politics across the country.

The recent state elections in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Berlin were catastrophes for the CDU. Germany’s capital will soon be governed by a coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Left Party, and the Greens. There is much to suggest that the debate around this particular constellation (which could create an alternative to Merkel on the federal level) will intensify in the near future. And the dangers for Merkel are considerable. For the first time, criticism of her and her policies has called into question her chances of staying in power.

Slow and Steady Wins the Race?

Still, it seems Merkel has decided to fight. She wants to turn the tables and defend the very political dominance that she has helped to build. Indeed, Merkel offered an olive branch to her critics shortly after the Berlin election by publicly admitting mistakes in her approach to the refugee crisis.

Merkel is not known for swift reactions. Her wait-and-see policy is her trademark. Some call it patience, borne out of her temperament and the lessons she has learned along the way to the top. And mostly, waiting has paid off for Merkel. But with the CSU and her SPD coalition partners, the Social Democrats (SPD), attacking from both sides, many Germans feel frustrated and misled, and the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has deftly filled the gap.

Merkel long believed the grand coalition she had built with the SPD was always a sure bet, with her squarely in the driver’s seat. Even the AfD seemed like a bargaining chip. The party was too small to be a real threat but large enough to make other small alliances impossible. The Berlin elections revealed that dynamic might be coming to an end.

There are, of course, a good number of CDU members, if not the majority, who still stand with Merkel. But they are uncomfortably quiet, and for good reason: How do you address a power struggle within your own party? One lawmaker admitted soberly that the CDU has “lost its ability to run campaigns because it’s been so damn comfortable over the past few years.” Merkel was there, and all was well.

That is no longer the case. Bavarian parliamentarians say the atmosphere among the party’s base is disastrous. Even those who had long been sympathetic to Merkel have distanced themselves from her on the refugee crisis.

CSU lawmakers seem to make new demands of the chancellor everyday, ranging from the political to the absurd: Merkel should announce an upper limit on the number of refugees allowed into the country; Merkel should openly admit she was wrong; Merkel should promise it will never happen again; Merkel should rejoice in the fact that fewer refugees are arriving.

Merkel has already addressed many of these points. She admitted, for example, that every country has its limits and that 2015 would not be repeated. Yet no one seems to be listening. This lack of receptiveness is polarizing in itself. To Merkel, it’s proof that her critics don’t actually pay attention to what she says. To them, it’s proof the chancellor doesn’t mean what she says.

Battle at Home

Above all, Merkel must take care of Germany. She likes to shine on the global stage alongside Putin and Obama, but she hasn’t once visited Passau. The party’s base isn’t necessarily frustrated with her coin phrase “Wir schaffen das,” or, “We can handle this.” They took exception to her statement, “If we have to apologize for showing a friendly face in emergencies, then this is not my country.”

To many, it sounded like the chancellor was picking and choosing her country, and not the country picking her. The old suspicion in the CDU – that Merkel was not “one of us” after all – resurfaced. Her calm and rational approach has appeared brittle and inept in the face of rising nationalist emotions.

Merkel has always had good sense when things get really tough, and the current situation is no exception. She has distanced herself from “we can handle this.” She does not want to appear stubborn, but also doesn’t want to backpedal. After striking the refugee deal with Turkey, she and her cabinet have worked quietly to draw up similar agreements with countries like Egypt to stem the flow of refugees. She continues to bet on facts, not emotions.

“If we start to escalate our language, only those win who express things even more clearly and simply,” she said in a speech to the Bundestag. “And if we start to play their game, if we push aside or even ignore facts, responsible and constructive answers become impossible.”

Seehofer is right when he says that the dispute between the CDU and the CSU has moved beyond the refugee crisis. It’s about the big picture, about trying to find German or even European answers to global questions. The CSU was seriously considering going its own way in next year’s general election, putting forth its own program and candidate. At the latest CSU congress, however, Seehofer reconsidered. “There are differences of opinion, but let’s be a voice of reason,” he said. “After all, it’s about winning the election and fighting the specter of a left-wing coalition.”

And Merkel? She seems to be determined to take up the struggle – the struggle over the future of what used to be Europe’s most successful popular party.

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© Artwort: Dominik Herrmann

A year ago, it seemed a most unlikely outcome. But after ten months of wrangling, Mariano Rajoy’s trademark patience has paid off once again: He was confirmed as prime minister of Spain for a second term on October 29. After two general elections ended in deadlock, the opposition Socialist party abstained on a vote of confidence, allowing Rajoy to form a minority government and begin four more years as prime minister.

Rajoy is the antithesis of the showy politician. Bearded and soft-spoken with a slight lisp, Spain’s prime minister is a survivor. He survives by waiting it out, by battening down the hatches until the tempest passes. In this way, he has weathered many a political storm, from losing two back-to-back general elections to facing myriad corruption scandals within his own party. He is a survivor in his private life, too, walking away from a helicopter crash in 2013 with nothing more than a broken finger. That perseverance has been put to the test in office.

Spain had been without a government since December 2015, when Rajoy’s center-right People’s Party (PP) won the general election but failed to reach an absolute majority. The rise of upstart parties Podemos (We Can) and Ciudadanos (Citizens) split the vote between four parties rather than the traditional two. And Socialist leader Pedro Sánchez rejected Rajoy’s plan to form a German-style “grand coalition” between right and left, forcing a second general election in June 2016. The results were no different, leaving Spain trapped in a political stalemate.

Rising through the Ranks

Mariano Rajoy Brey was born in the rainy northwestern region of Galicia in 1955 and, after studying law, quickly became the youngest Spanish property notary at 23. A car accident in the same year left him with serious injuries to his face; he grew his now signature beard to cover the scars. He left Galicia for Madrid and the world of politics and soon rose through the political ranks of Spain’s center-right PP, serving as minister of education and culture, minister of the interior, and deputy prime minister before he was handpicked by Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar to succeed him after the 2004 election.

But the party suffered a shock defeat, widely blamed on its handling of the 2004 Madrid bombings just three days before the election. Aznar and many in the PP, including Rajoy, immediately blamed the bombings on the Basque separatist group ETA. But Al Qaida was behind the attack, and voters punished the PP at the polls, ushering in the Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and condemning Rajoy to two terms as leader of the opposition.

When Rajoy finally swept to victory in 2011, Spain’s economy was in shambles. The country’s housing bubble had burst and unemployment was at 23 percent and rising. A new protest movement was forming in response to the crisis, the Indignados (the indignant), an anti-austerity platform that would give rise to Podemos.

Rajoy’s first year in office was beset by one economic woe after another: unemployment climbing over 27 percent, an imploding banking sector and a crisis in public finances. He implemented a series of measures to boost the economy including freezing the minimum wage, cutting public sector jobs, and – going against a campaign promise – raising taxes. “For me raising taxes was a difficult and painful decision,” he told Spanish news agency EFE on breaking the election pledge. “We didn’t like doing it but it was absolutely necessary to stop the spiral.” His nightmare year got worse when he was forced to ask the EU for €100 billion to shore up the country’s ailing banks.

Then a number of corruption scandals hit the PP, seriously eroding Spaniards’ trust in the party. Rajoy himself was named in papers released in 2013: He was linked to a slush fund run by ex-PP treasurer Luis Bárcenas. Rajoy denied all involvement and, despite a petition signed by over a million Spaniards calling for his resignation, never came close to stepping down.
His survival might be attributed to the fact that corruption is far from a one party problem in Spain. Scandals have hit the opposition Socialists and even the royal family: King Felipe’s sister, Cristina, became the first royal to take the stand when she and her husband went on trial on corruption charges in early 2016.

The economy undoubtedly dominated Rajoy’s first term as prime minister but there was another significant challenge: Catalonia. The economic crisis and the conservative government’s absolute refusal to negotiate on a Scotland-style referendum spurred fresh calls for independence in the wealthy region. “No one is going to break up Spain in any way. No one is going to turn citizens of Catalonia into foreigners in their own country,” Rajoy said during a press conference in 2015. Rajoy even warned that Scotland would have to reapply for EU membership and claimed the country’s independence would worsen the EU’s economic slump.

Safe Pair of Hands

Rajoy is stereotypically Galician – he is closed off and cautious, and even his closest allies admit he lacks charisma. Despite regularly attending EU meetings, he has been quiet on the international stage. Some chalk that up to language issues. His poor English skills have been the butt of many jokes in Spain; eagle-eyed observers spotted rudimentary English homework on his desk during one televised interview.

Rajoy declined to take part in a debate with other party leaders ahead of the December 2015 election arguing he had been invited to over thirty debates and couldn’t honor them all. Spanish newspaper El País left a symbolic empty lectern in his place. He sent his deputy prime minister in his place to a second debate, fueling criticism of his lack of engagement with the public. He is the most unpopular among young Spaniards, who, according to a 2015 poll, hate Rajoy more than Spain’s former dictator, Francisco Franco.

On a political scene peppered with new parties offering a departure from the norm, Rajoy has sold himself as a safe pair of hands, someone Spaniards need to finish the job of fixing the economy – which continues to grow despite current political uncertainty. It’s true that Spain’s economy expanded by 3.2 percent in 2015 and is expected to do so at the same rate in 2016. Unemployment is the lowest it’s been in nearly seven years as Spain has become a rare bright spot in an otherwise stagnant eurozone. Brussels has praised Madrid’s austerity measures and structural reforms – but the recovery is far from complete, and EU officials are concerned the political instability will derail economic progress.

In October, Madrid admitted it would miss EU budget deficit targets, blaming the recent turmoil. In August, Spain narrowly avoided a fine for repeated breaches of budget rules.
And tightening the national belt has affected some of the most vulnerable. Spain has seen unprecedented numbers of home evictions as well as a rise in short-term contracts that offer little job security.

Four More Years

For his next four-year term, Rajoy is promising to create two million jobs as well as provide tax cuts and overhaul the public sector. But with a minority government, he could find it much more difficult to push through his desired changes.

And, as usual, corruption scandals are never far away; the latest one threatens to embarrass and fracture the PP. In early October Spain’s national court played host to 37 defendants – many high-profile figures within the PP – charged of fixing public tenders worth over €350 million. The case is so big it’s been split in two and will last for months. It will shine a light on the corruption that flourished during Spain’s boom years, leading to the real estate crisis and soaring unemployment. The case will be a daily reminder to Spaniards of the PP’s reputation for corruption and the part it played in causing Spain’s economic crisis – not an ideal start to Rajoy’s next premiership.

Rajoy is pro-European and in his next term will continue to oppose any talks between Scotland and the EU, fearing that Catalonia might be inspired to follow suit. Rajoy has also warned that once the UK leaves the single market and abandons free movement, the inhabitants of Gibraltar, the British enclave on the southern tip of Spain, will have to do so too – unless they approve shared sovereignty with Spain. Rajoy could see Brexit as a chance to finally push for shared sovereignty of Gibraltar, whose citizens voted almost unanimously to remain in the EU.
Rajoy champions his style of governing as calm and patient; his critics see a lack of action.

They point to his weak record during the eight years he spent in the opposition before becoming prime minister and to his “do nothing” approach on the Catalonia issue. Despite calls for him to stand down during the last ten months of political deadlock, he has stood firm. And his famous waiting game looks like it has paid off yet again.

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© REUTERS/Radovan Stoklasa

The result of the Brexit referendum sent shock waves from London across the globe, but also thrust the European continent into the spotlight. It wasn’t just the future of the United Kingdom hanging in the balance, but that of Europe as a whole. The EU’s second largest economy – a military and diplomatic power with roughly an eighth of the union’s population – had decided to leave. The internal equilibrium of the union was upset, ostensibly in Germany’s favor, and populists from France to the Netherlands were emboldened to call for referenda of their own.

For the EU, the British exit represents an amputation, not a mortal blow – assuming the politicians responsible can rein in the forces Brexit has unleashed. They must resist the temptation to blame UK insularity or the lies of a vile campaign for the outcome and look the unsettling truth in the eye. The referendum result directly contradicts the Brussels doctrine, the ancient adage of European politics that dates back to the coal and steel days of Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer: Mutual economic interests will cement ties between grateful European peoples. British voters turned this axiom on its head. Their aversion to immigration was stronger than their fear of the economic consequences of leaving. Identity politics trumped economic interests. The tidal wave they unleashed has also upended the commonly held belief in Brussels that integration is a one-way street. Indeed, even more countries might wish to leave the union, and ceding EU powers back to the national level is no longer unthinkable. Simply put, Europe has until now marched confidently toward an ever closer union. The certainty of that course has now shown itself to be an illusion. Europe feels its historic fragility. Turning this into a strength will mean embracing public debate and accepting that controversy and conflict are the stuff politics is made of – not a threat but rather a sign of life.

In the aftermath of the British referendum, three fundamental questions have come to the surface: How can Europe create a relationship with its people? Is the union even equipped to react to major upheavals? Who leads in times of uncertainty? Put more starkly: how to deal with European voters, Brussels regulations, and German dominance?

Angry Rumblings

On the first question: It isn’t just British voters who are unhappy. Angry rumblings are growing louder across France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark as well. Trust in EU institutions is at an all-time low. The eurocrisis left deep scars, both in countries forced to implement austerity measures and in those that had to pitch in with their own taxpayer money. The union lost credibility once again on the refugee crisis – first, by ordering reluctant member states to take in asylum seekers, then by attempting to stem the flow of people with a controversial deal with Turkey.

The EU is stuck with a fundamental dilemma: Its mission is primarily concerned with expanding the freedoms and opportunities of its citizens, and less so their protection. The union has been dismantling borders since it was established. It champions the freedom of movement to study or sell goods across borders, to travel or work. It makes Europe – in the words of Michel de Certeau – a space and not a place. It has equipped the well-educated, the young, and entrepreneurial with mobility.

But it has also disrupted a broad and underserved part of the population along the way. For them, the EU is one more piece of a rapidly globalizing world that moves in endless streams of goods and people, and they feel they are powerless to fight back – the sentiment that swung the British vote to “leave.” As long as there is no better balance between the freedoms the union creates and the protections it provides, voters elsewhere will continue to look to their own state for shielding them from Europe, too.

Disillusionment with centrist politics has also given way to political extremism on the fringes. In many member states, a well-organized nationalist sentiment has turned against the EU in the name of sovereignty and identity. This centrifugal force has stepped up pressure on Germany, the traditional “power in the middle” (Herfried Münkler), to hold the European center together. Of course, a glance at the US elections and the rise of Donald Trump shows Europe is not alone in facing populist nationalism. And yet it has a specific problem. For many voters, Brussels has transformed into a sort of foreign occupying power.

That lies in stark contrast to national politics. Every day a national government – take the one in Poland, for example – makes decisions that can be contested by opposition parties and even trigger protests or strikes. As a general rule, however, even the fiercest demonstrators accept the legitimacy of the Polish government itself. They may call on the Polish prime minister to step down tomorrow, but they would still consider him “our (infuriating) prime minister” or speak of “our (bad) laws.” This “our” is Europe’s Achilles’ heel. Few people consider European decisions “our” choices, or European politicians “our” representatives. This feeling of ownership – incredibly difficult to grasp, let alone to create – is essential to conferring legitimacy on joint decisions.

If the aim is to forge a real bond with citizens, an indispensable first step is to acknowledge that the European game is not taking place primarily on Brussels’ turf. European politics are played out between the governments, parliaments, judiciaries, and citizens of all the member states. Europe cannot be reduced to a few acres of office space in Brussels. Europe can only be built with its people, not without.

Reacting to Surprises

The second fundamental question the Brexit vote raises is this: Is Europe, hemmed in by Brussels’ rules and regulations, in a position to react to surprises? Here, a fascinating metamorphosis has taken place in recent years. After spending decades working to construct a common market and a developing a system of regulatory politics, member states have been forced to take on a new role since the financial and geopolitical drama of 2008: they are now also practicing a “politics of events.” They have saved a currency, engaged Russia in a battle of wills, taken on hundreds of thousands of refugees and now, they must wrestle with the demons of Brexit. This transformation started with the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, when the Maastricht Treaty built a new “union” alongside the old “community;” the structures created then are being put to the test now.

The politics of events is qualitatively different from the regulatory politics that dominated Europe for much of the postwar period. For member states, it’s no longer only about regulating business and market behavior of other economic actors. Now they also must face the myriad challenges to the common order as a union, and act themselves. Up until this point, individual member states have been tasked with preserving external and internal security. Only member states have armies, diplomats, and security services at their disposal to preserve external and internal security; only they have enough taxpayers’ money to save big banks. This new practice of the union (which Chancellor Angela Merkel briefly called “union method”) has unsettled institutional interests and routines in Brussels (and the locally cherished “community method”). Another unsettling feature: The power asymmetry between EU states – long a taboo subject – is becoming ever more significant, especially when it comes to responsibility for action. Yet there is no practical alternative. In light of the dramatic acceleration of world history since 2008, in light of turmoil in the wider region, developing a common ability to act is a question of Europe’s basic survival, no matter how difficult the path.

The founding idea behind the European Union was to create a system of rules that would both encourage ties between member states and make them more predictable after the “Second Thirty Years’ War” that raged from 1914 to 1945. But when disruptive new events force member states to act together to confront new challenges, the limitations of the original strategy surface quickly. How should they respond when one member state suddenly goes broke, when a neighboring state invades another, when hundreds of thousands of refugees pour across the borders? No project, no treaty can anticipate the capriciousness of history, let alone provide an adequate response.

None of this should come as a surprise. Anyone who regularly reads their country’s newspapers will know that national politics involve a constant stream surprises, setbacks, and scandals, often with utterly unexpected outcomes. In a democratic setting, very little goes to plan. And Europe, a club of volatile democracies, is no exception. Momentum originates from a series of decisions, many of which are made on the national level, where leaders only grudgingly accept that certain problems are better managed together. This political interplay offers a more plausible explanation than either the pseudo-logic of integration theory and federalist teleology or the euroskeptic worldview of evil Brussels conspiracies. Events will continue to offer new surprises, and, against all odds, Europe is preparing for precisely that.

One indication is the influence that heads of state and government wield in the European Council. This forum was set up in 1974 as a counterweight to the Brussels rule factory, and it has stood at the forefront of the politics of events since 1993. The circle of presidents, prime ministers, and chancellors takes up the task of conquering the storms that beset Europe; in the eurocrisis, for example, the central institutions of the union had neither the financial means nor the legitimacy to overhaul the rules that lay at the foundation of their very existence. Between 2010 and 2012, Chancellor Merkel, President Nicolas Sarkozy, and their 25 colleagues drew up the decisions that saved the euro.

Influential European voices like Jacques Delors and Jürgen Habermas sharply criticized the role of those heads of government, decrying a “renationalization of European politics.” But the results can be interpreted instead as an “Europeanization of national politics,” a development that would in fact strengthen the European club as a whole.

Another important aspect of this metamorphosis: while the old, regulatory politics were a matter for experts and interest groups quietly operating under the radar, the new politics of events are squarely in the public spotlight. Europe and its institutions now make headlines; they are the theme of election campaigns and fodder for passionate debate. That adversity is really the other side of the coin: the Europe of markets and trade had to contend with apathy, even mockery, over stipulations regarding the curvature of cucumbers (an indifference political scientists referred to a “permissive consensus”); the Europe of the currency, common borders, and influence abroad summons powerful forces and counter-forces, higher expectations, and deeper mistrust.

The Conundrum of German Power

Brexit has also thrown a harsh light on German power in Europe. The union is not only based on rules and treaties, but also on an internal balance of powers. Yet we are now moving from a union that was dominated by a Paris-Berlin-London triangle to one that is oriented toward Berlin alone. Even before Brexit the equilibrium between Paris and Berlin had been growing increasingly unbalanced, but until recently, Paris could use its political weight to compensate for its economic lag. As the old saying went, France used Europe as a lever to hide its weaknesses while Germany used Europe as a mantle to hide its strength. The eurocrisis signaled a dramatic shift in that dynamic. The German chancellor has become the focus of international attention since 2010; she is the key protagonist in Europe’s drama, even if she is underestimated at home.

Germany’s power is tangible in the most important political institutions – the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European Commission. The European Parliament has always been a bastion of German power; as the most populous member state, the country has the most parliamentarians (96 out of 751) and controls the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic party groups. The European Council, meanwhile, has long been dominated by France and Germany, in that order. In terms of protocol, a president outranks a chancellor – the French like to ensure that the Germans know their place. But during the eurocrisis, it became evident who really wielded power as Merkel first took the upper role in her duet with Nicolas Sarkozy (“Merkozy”) and then encountered dwindling resistance from a hesitant François Hollande. Finally, the commission took a decisive turn in 2014, when Juncker took office as president. Commissioners used to have a French, a British, and a German adviser to maintain connections to all three major capitals; now, with 31 Germans (among whom are five chefs de cabinet), 21 French, and 18 British, there was a clear tilt toward Berlin.

Germany’s moment has come, and that carries significant risks for the country and for the union. Some of these risks have been acknowledged; others have been underestimated.

The burden of German history, for one thing, has been acknowledged. Even seventy years after Hitler, foreign caricaturists and political opponents instrumentalize the shadow of Germany’s past. On the other hand, Berlin underestimates how often its European policies are perceived as naked self-interest, even if they weren’t intended to be. The German finance minister in particular fell into this trap during the eurocrisis. “Dr Schäuble” (as his Greek counterpart Yanis Varoufakis always called him) argued from a moral high ground, while the outside world perceived him as a merciless, political power player who wanted to eject the Greeks from the eurozone. The refugee crisis has spurred a similar trend. Germany’s Willkommenskultur, or welcome culture, might have been a noble sentiment, but in Paris and elsewhere it was observed that Germany also has a rapidly aging population and a dwindling birthrate – and thus a use for the well-educated Syrian middle class. That makes the choice no less moral, but it has made the European debate more difficult. It is important that this “hegemonic self-righteousness” (Wolfgang Streeck) is also discussed within Germany.

Nevertheless, German power is not omnipotent. Germany is not a hegemon but rather a semi-hegemon. Even Merkel has often run up against barriers that date back to the times of Bismarck: Germany is too strong to be forced aside but not strong enough to get its way all the time. The Germans are themselves not always aware of this fact. During the eurozone’s darkest days, many Germans had the distinct feeling that they were being left to grapple with the crisis on their own. That was never the case. As the president of the European Council reminded a Berlin audience in 2012: “One quarter from the German purse implies that three quarters come from the purses of other euro countries!”

There is also a further reason why Germany cannot do the work alone, and certainly not without France. German and French attitudes toward certain political concepts are fundamentally different. Their misunderstandings shape European politics. Take the concept of rules as an example. In Germany, rules stand for justice, order, and honesty. In France, they stand for limitation and lack of freedom. In the European context, this has led to mutual mistrust. Paris constantly requests more flexibility, for other countries or for itself (to exceed the debt limit, for example); in Berlin that is perceived as opportunism and a breach of trust. Conversely, the Germans, who see themselves as applying the rules strictly but fairly, often find themselves accused of rigidity, stubbornness, and even of playing power games because they prescribe solutions to the whole without understanding individual needs.

Eventful Times Ahead

Events are the counterpoint to rules, and this is where France excels. In France, an event, even a dramatic one, is a sign of life and renewal; for a French political leader à la Sarkozy, a crisis offers the opportunity to show his or her mettle. In Germany, on the other hand, crises undermine order – they are destabilizing and dangerous. The German public values heads of government who can absorb shocks and still navigate the country through storms, like Chancellor Merkel.

Now the country that prefers to bind itself and its partners with rules will have to take the lead in the new crisis – driving a politics of events. And it will be one of Germany’s most difficult tasks ahead. The paradox is that Paris has worked steadily over the past sixty years to prepare the European club of member states for a role as geopolitical actor, but is no longer in a position to lead now that this decisive historical moment has come. Germany has to provide the necessary leadership – it can “no longer practice a well-tended culture of waiting and seeing” (Münkler), but must be ready to make swift decisions and turn improvisation into an art form. The burden of Germany’s past makes this a tall order indeed.

The year 2017 will be a decisive one. Voters in France, Germany, and the Netherlands will go to the polls, and the results will bear consequences for all of Europe. National politicians in these three key countries will have to convince voters that the EU is strong and capable of acting together. Only then will Europe have a real chance to shape its future.

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© REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

It hasn’t exactly been an easy year for Europe. The Brexit vote dealt the EU a shocking blow. Nationalist movements are on the rise. And the refugee crisis has driven deep rifts across the bloc. Now, a looming referendum in Italy is threatening to become the EU’s next big headache – and the outcome is still very much uncertain.

On December 4, Italians will decide whether they are for or against reshaping the country’s constitution, and nerves are on edge. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has dubbed this the mother of all reforms – landmark changes that will chart a new course for Italy in the coming decades. Renzi has argued that constitutional reforms are necessary to make Italy more modern and efficient, more compatible with the EU, and better equipped to face the challenges of a rapidly globalizing world.

The prime minister even staked his own political future on the plebiscite, initially vowing to step down if the country voted “no.” Renzi’s gamble looked like it would pay off earlier this year, when he was still seen as a powerful reformer. But confidence in him has eroded and his position now looks increasingly uncertain. The very referendum that was supposed to stabilize Italian politics might be derailed by political instability, with Renzi’s Democratic Party (PD) deeply divided heading into the vote.

The prime minister’s planned reforms would overhaul Italy’s current bicameral system, where two equally powerful chambers are constantly wrangling for power, making it near impossible to legislate. In the new system, the Chamber of Deputies would be tasked with votes of confidence and passing laws. The Senate, on the other hand, would be slimmed down considerably from 315 to 95 lawmakers. It would be responsible for constitutional amendments and for laws directly affecting Italy’s twenty regions, and it would be made up of regional and city representatives, though whether those representatives should be directly elected or selected by regional parliaments is still a point of contention.

Double the Trouble

Renzi’s troubles started back in April, when fifty lawyers and constitutional experts publicly rejected the prime minister’s plans. It wasn’t the constitutional reforms they were against, though – they were protesting the new, overhauled electoral law that Renzi’s government already pushed through in 2015. Italicum, as the electoral law is called, is a central part of the prime minister’s reform agenda and is meant to stabilize the coalition building process.

Under the law, if a winning party manages to get more than 40 percent of the vote, it automatically receives 55 percent of seats. If no party reaches forty percent, the two biggest parties face off in a runoff. Smaller parties are still represented in parliament as long as they get three percent of the vote, but they no longer wield the power to block governments from forming. Also, national party leaders now handpick the candidates they prefer to serve.

The law went into effect this July despite strong opposition, and is seen very much in tandem with the upcoming constitutional referendum. For many lawmakers, the twin reforms are a blow to democracy because they chip away at important checks and balances put in place after World War II, concentrating too much power in the hands of the prime minister.

Opposition to the constitutional reform has since grown steadily and, as Luciano Fontana, editor of the daily Corriere della Sera, pointed out, it has forged unlikely alliances: well-known lawmakers from Silvio Berlusconi’s fold, members of the former Christian Democrats (DC), representatives from the right-wing Lega Nord, neo-fascist parties like the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and Tricolour Flame, and the socialist Left Ecology Freedom (SEL) party are all in the fray. And then there are the members of the prime minister’s own PD, threatening to split the party down the middle.

Renzi is seen as arrogant and out of touch, driven by a constant need to intervene. Those qualities have rubbed many the wrong way in Rome, and the prime minister has built a healthy list of political enemies during his time in office.

The EU’s Next Problem Child?

The December 4 vote has thus turned into a plebiscite on Renzi rather than on constitutional reforms. The government has scrambled to refocus the discourse, but to little avail. Current polls indicate the vote will come down to the wire. Eugenio Scalfari, co-founder of the daily La Repubblica, believes Renzi’s political career both as head of the PD and of the government will be over if the “no” vote prevails.

Italy’s defense minister, Paolo Gentiloni, is already sounding the alarm over the possible fallout. If the “no” camp wins, he warns, the country would fast become the European Union’s next problem child. And this is coming at a time when Brussels sorely needs a stable and functioning Italy: Both France and Germany will be holding key general elections next year, with National Front leader Marine Le Pen in play for the French presidency and the populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) likely to secure enough votes to be represented in the Bundestag.

Culture minister Dario Franceschini (also of the PD) is urging voters to make Italy a beacon of light in troubled times. In a year when the Dutch (on a very low turnout) rejected an EU association deal with Ukraine, when Britain voted to leave the union, and when Hungary dismissed Europe’s refugee quota system, Franceschini argues that Italy is voting on a referendum that would make it a reliable partner abroad.

When in Doubt, Call Renzi

Italians love to play a leading role on the global stage, so they are particularly sensitive when left out in the cold. After Renzi publicly voiced frustration over the lack of progress at the EU summit in Bratislava, he was excluded from a post-summit powwow with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, France’s President François Hollande, and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. It was seen as a rebuke in Rome.

So Renzi was all the more pleased to accept Barack Obama’s invitation to a state dinner at the White House. The president made a point of praising Renzi’s reforms and his economic policies – the very same policies that have defied Brussels and Berlin.

Obama’s endorsement didn’t go down well with the “no” camp in Italy. In a talk show, former leftist Prime Minister – and Renzi-foe – Massimo D’Alema called on Washington and Brussels to worry about their own affairs instead of Italian politics. But Italian politicians across the board have championed closer ties with partners abroad in recent years – even if that meant abiding by Brussels’ rules and norms.

In the run-up to the referendum however, says Danilo Taino, Corriere della Sera’s Germany correspondent, that very same perspective has fallen out of favor. The EU is seen as undemocratic and hostile. That, argues Taino, is a danger: Indulging in nationalist and opportunistic arguments means Italy is turning its back on the chance to play a big role in shaping Europe’s future.

The Day After

In Brussels and across Europe, there is growing speculation over the consequences of a “no” vote on December 4. Rumors are brewing of an emergency government and new elections. Whatever the outcome, Renzi has sealed his fate. It’s likely he realized the gravity of his decision after watching David Cameron’s post-Brexit vote demise – and that might be why he has started to backtrack on the question of his resignation in recent weeks. “We’ll continue to govern as we have until now, with the same numbers in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies,” he was quoted as saying.

But if the “no” vote prevails, there will be no going back to the way things were, either for Renzi or the EU.

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