Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

The life of Josep Borrell Fontelles, the next high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Vice-president of the European Commission, is extraordinary, as is the man himself. The son of a baker, he was born in 1947 in the small town of La Pobla de Segur, in the Catalan Pyrenees, near Andorra.

After attaining several degrees in aeronautical engineering and economics (including a masters in oil industry economics and technology in Paris) he had a doctorate by the age of 29 and was a full professor in economics at Madrid’s Universidad Complutense by the age of 35. He then turned to politics, becoming secretary of state for the Treasury at 37 and then minister of public works and the environment under the Socialist PSOE government of Felipe González at 44.

He became president of the European Parliament at 57, president of the European University Institute at 63, and then returned to Spanish politics to serve as minister of foreign affairs under Pedro Sánchez. Now at the age of 72 he is to become the chief diplomat for 500 million Europeans, with 4,000 civil servants under his command––quite an intense journey even for such a brilliant mind.

Intensity is actually one of Borrell’s defining character traits. His drive and single-mindedness have brought him great success. He was responsible, for example, for the modernization of the Spanish tax system, including the introduction of VAT, necessary to finance the welfare system when Spain entered the EU in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s he also played a key role in the decision to start building much of the infrastructure that today makes Spain the envy of the world. No small feat.

A Loner, Not a Team Player

However, his strong character and occasional irascibility have sometimes worked against him. At the core, Borrell is a mathematician, and an exceptional one. Not many Spaniards would have been able to get a Fulbright scholarship in the 1970s, still under the Franco dictatorship, to study Applied Mathematics at Stanford University. Yet he did. This outstanding mathematical mind allows him to be Cartesian in his approach to problem-solving but also means that he can easily become impatient when things don’t work out. This is reflected in his favorite hobby: hiking. Having been born in the mountains, wherever he goes he is immediately looking around for the highest mountain to climb.

Hiking, though, is more an individual than a group effort, and that is also one of Borrell’s traits. He is more of a loner than a team player. His intellectual mind is somewhat allergic to social conventions. In a country obsessed with football, he does not like the sport. He also hates networking (maybe the reason he never led the PSOE, although he was close in 1998 when he won the support of the party base). This does not mean, however, that he does not have a full book of contacts. Even after he left power, people would call him to pick his mind. This is a sign of his strong personality and independent thinking.

Recently a senior official at the German Foreign Office told me that Borrell needed to be brave. He must help unite the Europeans internally (starting with the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen) and project European power externally. If courage is required, Borrell has tons of it. Keen on rafting and other extreme mountain sports, he does not shy away from a good fight if he is convinced it is for a good cause. Already as a junior civil servant he fought his bosses, voicing his opposition to the first fiscal amnesty of the González era, and more recently he stood by Pedro Sánchez when the PSOE apparatus wanted to get rid of the leader and very few thought he had any chance to become the Spanish prime minister. Yet another example of Borrell’s determination paying off.

What You See Is What You Get

People who work under him highlight that Borrell is extremely demanding, and that this also extends to himself. Slightly workaholic, he prepares the dossiers in-depth and tries to look at the problems from different angles. He has a critical mind and is always looking for improvement. And above all, he is sincere. He does not suffer fools gladly. What you see is what to get with Borrell. This makes him come across as blunt but has also given him the courage to criticize obvious misbehavior.

In 2006, as president of the European Parliament he told Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face in a summit in Lahti, Finland, that he was a human rights offender. Later, in 2010, when, in the middle of the euro crisis, he became the president of the European University Institute in Florence he also dared to tell the faculty that they should climb down from their ivory tower and do more policy-oriented research.

This brought positive changes, like the introduction of the now well-established “state of the union” conference, the Migration Policy Center, and the Global Governance Program, as well as the chairs on the “Governance of EMU” and “Energy and Climate Change.” However, it also led to a conflict of interests for being on the board of the energy firm Abengoa and his ultimate resignation. This was not the last time his involvement in Abengoa would give him headaches. In 2015 he sold €9,000 worth of shares belonging to his wife with insider knowledge and was later fined. But overall it is clear that Borrell has never used his power to get rich. His austere lifestyle proves that.

Hatred of Catalan Separatism

The biggest fight of his political life has been with the Catalan separatists. Influenced by the French state culture, which earned him the reputation for being something of a “Jacobin,” he has never understood the obsession of so many of his fellow Catalans with the creation of an independent state. Borrell is proud to be Catalan, speaks Catalan, but has always hated Catalan nationalism. This has been a thorn in the side of secessionists. His successful career has been a vivid example that Catalans are not oppressed by the Spanish state.

He has also sought to counter the idea of the “economics of independence” by publishing a book entitled Las Cuentas y los Cuentos de la Independencia (“The numbers and fairy tales of independence”) where he contests the myth that Catalonia pays annually €16 billion into the coffers of the Spanish state. And he also gave a significant speech on October 8, 2017 (one week after the referendum which Spain declared illegal) in Barcelona in front of 1 million people calling for the unity of Spain. His speech showed that he is a convinced Catalan, Spaniard and European, who is adamantly opposed to any form of ethno-nativist nationalism.

This open Weltanschauung—already as a young student he left Spain to work on a farm in Denmark and in the construction sector in Germany, and he even spent some time in an Israeli kibbutz—will be useful for his job as high representative for the EU. In a time when US foreign policy has become much more nationalistic and reemerging powers like China have become more assertive, the chief European diplomat needs to be a tough negotiator, but also someone convinced that the multilateralist path is the right one.

Dealing with China

A lot of his attention over the next five years will no doubt be devoted to problems in the Middle East and North Africa, including issues like migration and Iran. The future of Africa will be a big dossier too. But hiker Borrell needs to look for higher peaks. Dealing with the Chinese challenge is one of them. Strategically it might be the most defining issue during his mandate. And here, he is convinced that only engagement and cooperation are viable routes.

In short, Borrell will be different to his predecessors. He will not try to find the lowest common denominator in foreign policy. After thinking hard about the problem at hand, he will present his vision and negotiate his way through in order to find a consensus for it. He is determined to make the EU a heavyweight in foreign affairs, expanding today’s G2 into tomorrow’s G3. His experience and determination will be his main advantages. As a convinced European, I wish him luck.

Editor’s note: Watch out for our November/December issue which will focus on European foreign policy.

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© REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis

The scenario faced by both Greece and the EU after the “No” vote triumphed in the Greek referendum is extremely complex. Few things are certain. One is that a Grexit is now more likely than ever, although still avoidable. Another is that the economic situation in Greece will continue to deteriorate rapidly, with shortages in key supplies heightening the anxiety among the population. And yet another, and probably most important, is that only a hefty dose of political leadership can now prevent the economic and geostrategic disaster implied by Greece’s exit from the euro. Unfortunately, leadership has been in short supply in Europe since the crisis started.

Since the left-wing Syriza government came to power in January, trust between the Greek government and the Institutions (previously known as “the Troika”) has vanished. The dominant narrative now features words such as conflict, blackmail and punishment, and those who used to be “partners” now go by the name of “creditors,” or even more unsavory terms. In such a tense atmosphere, an agreement looks increasingly like a pipedream.

However, since most Greeks want to remain in the euro, and a cost-benefit analysis still suggests that it would be much cheaper for the eurozone to avoid Grexit, all efforts should be directed at reaching an agreement. It would be good to bear in mind that the worst nightmare for European creditors would be a Greece that is incapable of growing. For geo-strategic reasons, the EU will have to continue pumping money into Greece even if it leaves the euro to avoid seeing it fall under the Russian sphere of influence.

Furthermore, the only way to achieve growth is through reforms, which are much more likely to happen if Greece remains in the eurozone and “solidarity in exchange for reform” – which has worked so often in the past throughout Europe – is set in motion again. The ECB will probably continue buying time by extending its Emergency Liquidity Assistance, thus allowing negotiations to proceed, although a deal must still be reached before July 20, by which time it will be impossible for Greece to pay back the €3.5 billion it owes the ECB. That will probably be the point of no return, because it will force the Greek authorities to issue a parallel currency to pay pensions and public salaries. Once there is a parallel currency in circulation, it will be virtually impossible to re-establish the euro as the sole legal tender.

An agreement should feature the following. First, it should be politically acceptable to the electorates of all countries (the eurozone has 19 democracies, not just one). Secondly, it should ensure that structural reforms are actually implemented. OECD data show that Greece has approved more structural-reform laws than any other country (in itself a big first step) but their effective implementation is widely known to be more than problematic. That must change. Third, the new deal should downplay austerity and promote investment in Greece so that recovery can become a reality. This would probably require some form of debt relief, which is now more acceptable since it has been recommended by the IMF.

However, this agreement would only work with the right incentives structure. A debt haircut is politically toxic and would be unacceptable to the creditors. Debt restructuring by stretching the time-span of the repayments into the future and lowering interest rates even further would be more palatable. In his latest work, Paul de Grauwe, one of the eurozone’s most-respected economists, argues that Greece is illiquid but not insolvent. That means that creditors can still get 100 percent of their money back (while forgetting about the interest payments). However, for that to happen, Greece urgently needs to get back into growth. Although his bluntness and forms are to be regretted, Yanis Varoufakis’ proposal that debt repayment be linked to specific growth levels is actually very sensible. Politically, it would allow both Merkel and Tsipras to claim victory in the usual ambiguous European way: Tsipras could tell the Greeks that he has gained a major concession while Merkel could explain to her taxpayers that this is the only option to incentivize the Greeks to pay their debts up to the very last euro.

Nevertheless, this would be unlikely to be enough. Merkel, Rajoy and the other leaders of the eurozone need to reassure their voters that the Greeks will be serious about implementing their structural reforms. As Merkel has argued on many occasions, solidarity comes with responsibility and the mutualization of risk is only possible with the mutualization of control. That is a sensible approach too. At the same time, it epitomizes the eurozone’s main problem: for as long as the European monetary union lacks a fiscal union (capable of both centralized spending and disciplining), the euro will remain a fragile currency. The creation of a fiscal union, however, would imply ceding more fiscal sovereignty to the centre. In this regard, the Spanish government’s contribution to the debate on the reform of the eurozone’s governance is welcome. It has clearly stated that member states need to relinquish more sovereignty to the centre: if a country with a long history like Spain can accept that, why not Greece?

Naturally, to create a genuine fiscal union the treaty would have to be changed, but there is no longer time for that. Greece needs an agreement before its banking system collapses. That is why we propose creating a special Euro-Greek Reform Commission, formed by both members of the Greek parliament and of the other 18 parliaments (to ensure co-ownership), which would be in charge of monitoring the implementation of Greece’s structural reforms. Such a commission, which could be formed by 15 members (seven Greeks and eight from the rest of the eurozone) should enjoy full independence and its assessments and recommendations should be absolutely binding to the Greek government. Notwithstanding the political and legal hurdles that such a proposal would entail, if Tsipras could agree to such an arrangement, Merkel would be able to return to Germany and convince her electorate that a third rescue package is necessary because Greece is finally getting serious about reform. Cutting it off under these circumstances would be a historic mistake.

NB. This article was first published by El País.

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