© REUTERS/Stringer

The sparkling Adriatic jewel of Dubrovnik was snarled with traffic last Friday as the leaders of 16 Eastern European countries converged on the city to hold a summit with the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang. They came hat in hand, hoping for more Chinese investment in big infrastructure projects in their countries.

Already, this city in Croatia is surrounded by examples of such investment. Just a few dozen kilometers to the South, Montenegro has taken out a €809 million loan from China to build a highway through the mountains. Neighboring Bosnia has around €2.5 billion in loans planned for Chinese-backed construction projects, and Serbia has almost €4 billion planned.

The summit’s final statement included a list of nearly 40 existing deals signed between China and the 16 European countries including in agriculture, technology, exports, e-commerce and finance.

Chinese investment in Europe is continuing to grow. Friday’s summit saw the surprise appearance of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who promptly announced he is taking Greece into the partnership, making it the 17+1. Greece is the first new country to join the partnership since the first summit was held in Warsaw in 2012 and included 11 Eastern EU member states, five Balkan countries and China. The Chinese already own the country’s Piraeus port, from which Beijing wants to build roads to bring Chinese goods through the Western Balkans to Southern Europe and beyond.

Not in attendance was Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, though Italy could be the next country to join the group. Last month, Conte and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a pact making Italy the first G7 country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to establish a new Silk Road from the Far East to Europe.

Divide and Conquer

All of this has Western leaders in the European Union very concerned. They would prefer to see relations with China coordinated from Brussels in a way that will protect European industries from possible unfair competition. And there is concern that with formats like the 16+1, China is pursuing a “divide and conquer” strategy, locking small European countries into debt arrangements through which they can control them in what some have dubbed “debt-trap diplomacy.”

“When we negotiate with China as the EU28, we have power,” one frustrated EU official observed this week. “When they negotiate as 16, in a group that doesn’t include any of Europe’s big powers, China is dominating that format.”

This issue was supposed to be discussed at the European Council summit last month in Brussels, where Council President Donald Tusk wanted to have a broad and robust conversation about the EU’s positioning toward China. However, that summit was hijacked by the continued Brexit crisis and a robust discussion did not take place.

There were some signs at this year’s 16+1 summit that both Beijing and the Eastern EU countries are trying to allay Brussels’ concerns. After EU leaders reacted angrily to the fact that last year’s 16+1 in Sofia, Bulgaria preceded the annual EU-China summit in Brussels, this year’s 16+1 followed the Brussels summit, which took place last Tuesday ahead of the EU summit. This was meant to signal that the Brussels summit between the EU28 and China is the more important one.

Speaking in Dubrovnik, Tsipras seemed keen to avoid alarming Brussels over the idea of the partnership’s expansion. “I look forward to working with all of you in this framework of this initiative, in full respect of the rules and procedures of the European Union, to promote economic co-development through this very effective platform of cooperation with China,” he said.

The EU’s Unguarded Back Door

But concerns persist. In February, the EU voted in favor of a new law that would screen foreign investments into EU countries, thus limiting China’s ability to buy companies or infrastructure that has strategic technology, transport or military importance. While the EU could not block such bilateral deals between Beijing and member states, it will be able to screen them and render a verdict about whether they harm the national security of economic interests.

However, the law does not apply to the five countries in the Western Balkans which are not yet EU members: Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania. China has particularly focused infrastructure investment in these 16+1 countries, and some EU politicians are worried that these tiny governments, which all have significant corruption problems, represent a back door through which China can skirt EU investment oversight, as well as human rights concerns.

According to the IMF, China is already financing at least €6.2 billion worth of construction in the transport and energy sectors in the Western Balkans. These projects are not subject to the restrictions that investments in EU countries would be. For instance, China is funding new coal-fired power plants in the region, something that EU structures are now set up to discourage. The European Investment Bank, for instance, will not invest any EU money in coal projects.

China represents a hassle-free way for these governments to get financing. Money from the EU usually comes with strings attached, requiring the government to crack down on corruption and human rights abuses in exchange for getting the cash. Chinese money comes with no such restrictions. Brussels worries that for these smaller countries that are struggling economically, the Chinese money may seem like the easier route in the short term. But in the long term it will not help the countries develop and could make them indebted to China both financially and politically.

EU enlargement commissioner Johannes Hahn, who is in charge of overseeing the accession process for these countries, has cautioned them against taking the Chinese money. He has warned that these projects could jeopardize these countries’ chances of getting into the EU, saying on Twitter that irregularities in environmental impact assessments, state aid and public procurement will be “closely looked at” by the Commission.

Hahn told the AFP news agency last week that there are “concerns over the socioeconomic and financial effects some of China’s investments can have.” Saying he is particularly concerned about the amount of Chinese debt being taken on by Montenegro, he told AFP that the strings attached by Beijing to these investments has a detrimental impact on the EU’s aim to improve stability and economic development in the Balkans.

The problem with this attempt at pressure is that the Commission has publicly said there is little prospect of any new EU accession happening within the next five years, because the corruption problems in these five countries need much more work to get them up to a level where they could be in the EU. This reduces the effectiveness of any carrot-and-stick approach by the Commission, since these governments now view EU accession as a distant prospect, even though most believe it will eventually happen for all of the Western Balkans. However, by the time they join, these countries could be up to their ears in Chinese debt, with Beijing owning their infrastructure.

Reassurances

The final statement issued by the 17+1 clearly tries to allay these concerns.

It references new principles that have not been part of previous years’ statements pertaining to human rights, saying that the “three pillars of the United Nations”—peace and security, human rights and developments—are central to the partnership.

The statement also references the need for a “level playing field” for European and Chinese companies to compete on equal terms—a key Brussels demand. The summit backed away from announcing any major new projects or financing mechanisms, and the 18 countries invited the EU financial institutions to become involved in the financing of the China-backed projects.

“We respect the EU’s laws and standards,” Premier Li said while unveiling the final statement at the end of the summit. “We all need to increase trade and connect our economies.”

The assurances at this year’s summit may have put some minds at ease in Brussels. But the continued existence of a rival formation for coordinating Chinese investment in Europe—one that is very clearly dominated by China—will still raise alarm among Western EU leaders.

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© REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis

The 28-year long row between Macedonia and Greece appears to be over. The international community can finally put the five-letter acronym FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) aside and embrace its new moniker.

In a deal reached last Sunday, Macedonia will rename itself the Republic of North Macedonia. The Greek and Macedonian foreign ministers met at Lake Prespa which straddles their common border to sign the agreement, joined by UN mediator Matthew Nimetz and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini.

The two countries’ young prime ministers, Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev, were also on hand to celebrate the historic rapprochement. In front of the cameras, they spoke of peace, stability, and, of course, music. There were even shows of friendship—Tsipras and Zaev exchanged three kisses, as is tradition in the Balkans region, and Zaev removed his tie to hand it over as a present for the always-tieless Tsipras.

And the agreement was indeed historic. For decades now, political careers in Greece have been built on the mantra that all things Macedonian are Greek. Now, Athens will recognize its neighbor as North Macedonia. Macedonia, meanwhile, will be able to call its language and its citizens Macedonian, but it will cease to make claims on Hellenic history or the ancient Greek King of Macedonia Alexander the Great. In return, Athens has agreed to stop vetoing Macedonia’s EU and NATO membership. In the Balkans—Europe’s traditional powder keg—that’s a lot of compromising.

At home in their respective countries, however, the deal sparked outrage among nationalists; they protested outside both parliaments, chanting: “Down with the traitors. You’re selling our country. Macedonia is ours.” And both governments know the issue is not well and truly resolved. First, they’ll have to convince the people of their countries that the deal is mutually beneficial. Then they have to submit the agreement to their parliaments for ratification.

The FYROM needs to change its name by the end of 2018 and expunge any territorial claims on the northern Greek province of Macedonia from its constitution. After that, it will need to notify all countries as well as international organizations and institutions that its name has been changed to the Republic of North Macedonia.

Within a month from the signing, a joint committee of experts on historic, archaeological, and educational matters must also decide whether school textbooks, maps, historical atlases, and teaching guides in both countries need revising. Another committee will meet to agree on trademarks and commercial names.

Seeking EU Membership

Macedonia will seek admission to NATO and the EU as soon as the agreement comes into effect, and Tsipras will notify the President of the European Council that he supports the opening of accession negotiations. The Greek prime minister hopes his support will boost his negotiating power during upcoming talks on Greece exiting the EU’s bailout program.

After all this, the ball is firmly in the EU’s court. Enlargement has virtual been on hold for more than a decade now, with Croatia being the last country to join in 2013. Even though the latest Commission Staff Working Document on Macedonia’s accession process, published in April, says that Zaev’s government is advancing the EU reform agenda, the absence of a concrete accession date has emboldened nationalists and euroskeptics in the country.

Ethnic passions still run high. Just last year, Zaev, who was then the leader of the opposition, was beaten up by protestors for electing an ethnic Albanian as parliament speaker. In 2001, ethnic violence broke out between the Albanian minority and security forces, spilling into an armed conflict and leading to the death of a thousand people. The violence only ended after the United Nations became involved.

For the EU, moving forward with accession might be the only way to stop Russia’s and Turkey’s expanding influence in the Balkans. But that would then be more of a political decision rather than a genuine consideration of whether the countries in question meet the EU accession criteria.

Perpetual talks with little progress have led to disengagement in the Balkans. It wouldn’t be a surprise to see some parts of former Yugoslavia falling into another world power’s lap. Both Moscow and Ankara—not to mention Beijing—have gained significant footholds in the region while, in the meantime, Brussels has been dragging its feet.

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© REUTERS/Vassil Donev/Pool

In politics, there are no coincidences. That could be the lesson from the fact that the EU hosted its annual Western Balkans summit just days ahead of President Erdogan’s visit to Sarajevo, as part of his AKP party’s “regional” election campaign.

The EU summit, of course, has been in the works far longer than Erdogan’s visit, but that makes the Turkish president’s arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina all the more striking. After all, the summit in Bulgaria was a true non-event: No major policy initiatives were announced, no significant projects unveiled, nor were there any major breakthroughs concerning any of the region’s myriad unresolved disputes or worrying decline in democratic standards. There had been hopes that Macedonia and Greece might use the Sofia meeting to finally settle their long-standing dispute over the former’s name. But even that scenario fizzled out—although rumors persist that a solution is imminent.

That lack of progress is striking because the region does not lack for urgent crises. Consider only the deteriorating state of human rights, the free press, and democratic accountability in Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbia. Instead of drawing attention to these developments, or similar concerns in, say, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU continues to insulate the Balkan elite from any meaningful criticism.

Local civil society activists and NGOs continue to pressure Brussels to frontload substantive concerns with the quality of democratic governance in the region, but so far their pleas have largely fallen on deaf ears, notwithstanding brief references to these subjects in the respective EU missives about regional events.

Meanwhile, Erdogan announced his rally in Sarajevo before anyone in the Bosnian public administration even confirmed that such a visit had been cleared with the relevant local authorities. And indeed it took weeks for such a confirmation to arrive at all, giving the distinct appearance that the Turkish President was telling the Bosnians that he was coming, not asking.

The differences between these two events, from preparation to execution, tell the story of the contemporary Western Balkans. And it is not a tale that should put anyone committed to genuine democratic governance or the rule of law in the region or in Europe at ease.

Contested Terrain

Western Balkan politics are shaping up as a contest between a slow-moving and unresponsive EU and a constellation of opportunistic and cynical foreign authoritarians—chief among these Russia and Turkey, but also China and the Gulf monarchies. Each of these is competing for the favor and compliance of illiberal local elites, who more often than not look to authoritarian powers abroad to bolster their own undemocratic aspirations.

It is no simple matter to explain how the EU as the world’s largest economic bloc could find itself outmuscled by tin-pot autocrats of both the local and international variety. But the crux of the problem is straightforward: the technocratic establishment in Brussels, by their own admission, has no Plan B to EU enlargement.

There is no strategy for this region in Brussels beyond the belief that EU accession is essentially the ultimate objective. Once the “Western Balkan Six” are in the EU, so the thinking goes, their leaders will cease to be corrupt proto-authoritarians and their economies will cease to be patrimonial basket cases.   And if this will not quite be accomplished through the process of accession itself, then by the time these polities actually join the EU, their societies will be transformed by the decorum they will find on the other side. But the consequences of such policymaking are already on display in the illiberal and authoritarian backsliding seen in EU member states like Poland, Hungary, and Croatia.

By shirking from demands for concrete reforms from local governments, the EU’s transformative potential has actually played into the hands of local elites whose priority has long been the survival of their respective oligarchies, through a combination of confrontation and accommodation with the international community. That is why the roster of ruling elites in the region has remained virtually unchanged, except for the most minor rotations, for the better part of the last three decades.

In principle, the EU’s liberal-democratic foundation should be an existential challenge to these patrimonial regimes, but that is not what has happened in practice. Take the “Prishtina-Belgrade Dialogue,” the moribund framework for the resolution of Kosovo’s status and the opening of Serbia and Kosovo’s path towards EU accession. Governments in both countries admit the process is, for all intents and purposes, dead.

Ceding the Initiative

Instead of forcing the two sides to negotiate, the EU has ceded the initiative to illiberal forces on the ground. Even as Vučić and his cabinet openly declare their desire to partition their erstwhile province, and the still unsolved assassination of the Kosovo Serb opposition leader Oliver Ivanović quietly fades into obscurity, EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn appears to be waving Vučić’s government through the accession process. Kosovo, meanwhile, remains internationally marginalized.

To local elites, and authoritarian regimes in Ankara and Moscow, this reads as a combination of incompetence and fear on the part of the EU. Brussels has been unwilling to enforce its own values on candidate states but also afraid of having these polities fall under the influence of states like Russia and Turkey; its inaction favors strongman regimes like those in Serbia and Montenegro, where powerful ruling autocrats can dress up their pro-EU oration as decisive leadership while making fragmented polities like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia appear like the worst of a rotten bunch. But the underlying dynamics are identical: Brussels is squandering its political capital.

Such inconsistency by the Europeans leaves a vacuum for Erdogan and the Kremlin in the region; local governments, meanwhile, are eager for the influx of money that comes with marquee projects like the Turkish-sponsored Belgrade-Sarajevo highway.

These initiatives will further enable both local and foreign governments to distribute cash handouts to clients while creating the illusion of economic progress and political relevance at home. Along the way, democratic accountability will further deteriorate, as will any semblance of the rule of law or even regional security. But that is exactly what Turkey and Russia are knowingly offering local elites: a non-democratic means to cling to power and thus expand their own regional and continental ambitions.

So even if, well after the horse has left the barn, the Europeans decide to freeze accession talks with undemocratic regimes like the one in Belgrade, it won’t matter—local elites will have already secured new foreign benefactors.

In short, unless the EU earnestly recommits itself to genuine democratization in the Balkans—credible policy proposals already exist, but this would also mean incorporating the region’s most vulnerable states (like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia) into NATO—then its already tenuous grip on the region may dissolve much sooner than anyone in Brussels would care to imagine.

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© REUTERS/Ognen Teofilovski

At first sight it looks like business as usual in Bosnia. True, ethnonationalist parties there have sharpened their rhetoric and threatened to paralyze state institutions – but they have been doing so for years. In Macedonia, on the other hand, we are witnessing a rather unusual development: in images broadcast around the world, an angry mob of VMRO supporters, a Macedonian nationalist party, stormed parliament to block a coalition between the Social Democratic Party and Albanian ethnic minority parties. The Albanian parties’ MPs were attacked and beaten, but they reacted to the provocation in a conciliatory manner, preventing an ethnic conflict. Still, the EU and NATO urged calm as the international community raised alarm bells.

These tensions have sparked serious concerns in the West, although – paradoxically – they have actually been triggered by initiatives coming from the West itself. Tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia flared after op-ed articles appeared in Foreign Affairs and the New York Observer, written by former British diplomat Timothy Less and John R. Schindler, previously of the US National Security Agency (NSA), respectively. This development can hardly be cast off as coincidental, particularly given the fact that Balkan leaders are easily played one against another when they detect that the West is considering a geopolitical reshuffle in the region. Since they are already well accustomed to escalating inter- and intra-state tensions for their own political gain, Balkan leaders can readily assemble such tensions as soon as they see signs in the US media – supported, of course, by the authority of “experts.”

These two articles advocate a total redesign of the existing state boundaries in the Balkans: A Greater Serbia would appropriate the existing Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the internationally-recognized Republic of Montenegro; Greater Croatia would usurp a future Croatian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Greater Albania, meanwhile, should envelop both Kosovo and the western part of Macedonia. All these territorial redesigns would end the chaos in Bosnia and Macedonia and bring about lasting peace and stability in the region.

Of course, it is easy to claim that this approach has nothing to do with the policies of the authors’ former employers. However, certain circles within the foreign policy establishment in both the United Kingdom and the United States have repeatedly advocated the very same ideas – i.e. partition of multiethnic states and creation of monoethnic greater states – as a path toward lasting stability in the Balkans, with Bosnia and Macedonia’s disappearance as collateral damage. These narratives have been circulating in the back halls of London and Washington for decades.

They would argue that the creation of monoethnic states contributes to the region’s stability, but this claim has always served as a pretext for implementing what many in these circles consider a fundamental geopolitical doctrine – the so-called Heartland Theory by Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947). The British academic and politician, seen as one of the founding fathers of geopolitics, famously proclaimed: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”

Mackinder’s doctrine argues for the long-term destabilization of the territorial belt between Germany and Russia (consisting of Eastern Europe and the Balkans) as its primary geopolitical goal, in order to prevent these two continental powers from establishing a direct territorial link, which would enable them to gain control over the entire Heartland, and thus over the entire world.

Beware of Redrawing Maps

Ostensibly, these narratives are rooted in what is considered a plausible presupposition: as long as greater state projects remain unrealized, nationalist tensions will continue to act as a destabilizing force. Yet history has clearly demonstrated that this theory is a simple fallacy. The concept of ethnonational states has always led to deep instability wherever applied. Such territories cannot be created without extreme coercion and violence over populations that do not “belong” – including ethnic cleansing and genocide. Solving national issues by creating ethnically cleansed greater states is a strategy that spawns permanent instability.

What’s more, such a scenario would be politically unacceptable, unless presented as an alternative to a full-scale war. But no state in the Balkans has the capacities or resources – military, financial, or demographic – to wage such a war, and their leaders are too aware of this to even try. Therefore, the only remaining option is to create an atmosphere that simulates the immediate threat of war by stoking nationalist sentiments between and within Balkan states. Of course, these tensions have already been present since 1990, but now they are evolving into a festering chaos, creating the illusion of an imminent armed conflict.

In this simulated atmosphere of “inevitable war,” a radical geopolitical reconfiguration of the entire Balkans can quickly become politically acceptable if it is seen as the only peaceful solution. All that is left is to offer to implement this reconfiguration at an international peace conference, like the one held in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995.

It comes, therefore, as no surprise that a conference on the Western Balkans has been scheduled for 2018 in London. The specter of renewed conflict in the region may grant a geopolitical redesign the legitimacy and urgency needed to be implemented at this conference.

Of course, such a redesign will only lead to further resentment and volatility in the Balkans and Eastern Europe and trigger more instability across the continent. It is in the EU’s best interest to prevent the continent’s destabilization, and Brussels has no choice but to clearly reject such greater state projects and assume responsibility – both political and legal – for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Balkan and Eastern European states, from Bosnia and Macedonia to Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states.

The post The Cloak of Instability appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

After an extended absence, the Western Balkans finally returned to the European agenda at the March 9 EU summit. Traditionally, the region is discussed primarily in terms of its slow progress toward EU accession. This time, however, geopolitical and ethnic tensions are raising alarms about the stability of Europe’s “inner courtyard.” As the region grapples with new sources of instability, Serbia will be electing a president on April 2 – and though polls predict a smooth victory for Aleksandar Vucic, it could be a watershed event for the whole region.

European Council President Donald Tusk warned that some of the ethnic divisions in the region have been exacerbated by destabilizing external influences, a veiled reference to Russia, which has been waging wider disinformation campaigns in Serbia and elsewhere. Tusk also called for EU institutions to take more action. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, meanwhile, reported on her recent tour of all six Western Balkan countries, undertaken to reassure the region it had not been forgotten. She returned with “profound concerns” about destabilizing external factors. “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played,” Mogherini said. These warnings were echoed by the chairman of the European parliament’s foreign affairs committee, David McAllister, who thinks that the EU must be much more visible and engaged in Balkan countries to counter Russian attempts to destabilize them even further.

It was a timely wake-up call for Brussels and Berlin, which have been preoccupied by other pressing issues. “The 21^st century in the Balkans is starting to look dangerously like 19^th,” Ivan Krastev observed in the Financial Times. However, he noted one important difference. In the 19^th century, Russia and Turkey were rivals in the struggle for regional influence, while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Britain played Russo-Turkish divisions to their commercial and political advantage. Today it is the other way around: Moscow and Ankara are united in their efforts to reduce the EU’s influence.

The Moscow-Ankara Axis

Both Moscow and Ankara are thought to be weaponizing renewed Balkan ethnic tensions to play them against the West. So far, Turkish efforts have been subtler and less disruptive, but that is beginning to change. In addition to promoting historic ties and Ottoman cultural heritage throughout the region, Ankara has recently moved into the business of funding (and perhaps also organizing) new political movements among Muslim minorities in several Balkan countries to create its own “zone of influence”. One example is the new anti-establishment ethnic Albanian party Besa in Macedonia, which inflicted heavy losses on traditional Albanian parties in the December 2016 elections.

However, Russia stands out as the most systematic, disruptive and dangerous external factor, and its behavior has raised multiple alarms over the last few months. The real game changer was an attempted coup in Montenegro during parliamentary elections in October 2016. A group of Serbian ultra-nationalists and paramilitaries fresh from fighting in the Donbass was prepared to storm the parliament, cause riots on the streets of Podgorica, and help the pro-Russian, mostly ethnically Serb opposition seize power. This would have meant a dramatic turn in Montenegro’s foreign policy, halting its accession to NATO and withdrawing its recognition of Kosovo’s independence, with huge repercussions within the region.

In February 2017, a special prosecutor in Podgorica overseeing the investigation accused “organs of the Russian state” of taking an active part in the attempted coup. Pro-Russian opposition parties still bitterly contest the entire claim, as well as the implication that two of its leaders were in contact with the perpetrators. The result is a political stalemate in the country – the opposition is boycotting the new parliament. There is hope, however, that things will calm down since the US senate ratified Montenegro’s NATO membership with a nearly unanimous vote on March 28, sending a strong signal of continuity.

Still, of more immediate concern is the deep, prolonged constitutional crisis gripping Macedonia, now the most explosive Balkan country. Macedonia’s troubles have been simmering ever since its EU and NATO candidacies were put on hold due to a dispute with Greece over the country’s name, Moscow was not very active there until last year, when the Russian Foreign Ministry began issuing regular statements on Macedonia. Pro-Kremlin media began to focus on the country, too, and the Russian embassy in Skopje significantly increased its staff. Moscow now openly supports the weakened autocrat Nikola Gruevski, who is trying to remain in power no matter what. It is also challenging coordinated EU-US efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated way to transfer power to a diverse coalition of democratic parties, which pledged to further enhance the status of Macedonia’s large Albanian minority. At critical moments, when Gruevski called for protests on the streets of Skopje, Moscow poured oil on the fire by accusing the EU of trying to create a Greater Albania, and promoted this narrative through its media network across the Balkans.

And as part of a long-term game in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia is backing another controversial strongman: Milorad Dodik, the nationalist president of the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS). Dodik is again pushing for a referendum on RS independence, which would alter the Dayton peace agreement – another keystone of the Western liberal order in the region built after the ethnic wars of the 1990s.

The Return of Geopolitics

This return of geopolitics has in turn benefited Balkan autocrats, according to the latest policy brief by the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). It has allowed them to pander to various geopolitical players and investors, expanding their own informal power structures, patronage networks, and control of the media at home.

In this context, as stability is given priority over democracy, Balkan strongmen have become even stronger, less accountable, and more contemptuous of democratic standards. The result of this new paradox – with countries moving closer to the EU but further away from democracy and the rule of law – is growing dissatisfaction among citizens, accompanied by a loss of trust in the EU and further alienation from domestic politics.

Nowhere is this seeming contradiction more clearly displayed than in Serbia, the largest Balkan country and the lynch pin of stability for the whole region. While current president Tomislav Nikolic is a key Russian ally in Belgrade, Prime Minister Vucic represents a younger, pragmatic, and less Moscow-friendly generation in Serbian politics – but not necessarily a shift toward European values. The recent events in Montenegro apparently spurred Vucic to action: In February, following a long period of rumors and speculation, he announced his decision to run in the upcoming presidential elections, and arranged to move the date up to April 2.

Vucic has come a long way since joining the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), headed by the notorious Vojislav Seselj, serving as its minister of information during the Milosevic era. A decade later, in 2008, Vucic followed Nikolic, resigning from the SRS over its resistance to Serbia’s EU integration and switching to the latter’s new Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). SNS subscribed to the pro-EU, pro-Western course that has since dominated Belgrade’s geostrategic orientation since the end of the Milosevic regime.

In 2012, when Nikolic became president, Vucic took over the SNS party and led it to form the next government. He became popular for his vigorous drive against corruption, which resulted in several high-profile investigations and arrests, including that of the country’s main oligarch. He also focused on starting EU membership talks and did not shy away from the tough decisions they required. In particular, he proved to be more willing to compromise on Kosovo than the pro-EU liberals before him. In economic policy, he helped the country manage its public debt, which is now under 70 percent of GDP. He also pledged to increase pensions, privatize state companies, and expand the private sector, though so far that has been more talk than action. In the meantime, his governing style has also become increasingly authoritarian, in tune with his shady control of the country’s tabloid media.

Despite the fact that Serbia’s opposition has never been weaker or more fragmented, Vucic now presents himself as a lone fighter against a united front of traitors and crooks, financed by Serbia’s enemies.

He is the undisputed front-runner in the presidential election; the only open question is whether he will be forced into a run-off or win an outright majority in the first round. Forcing Vucic into a second round would be a healthy development for Serbia’s embattled democracy, opening more space for liberal opposition and alternative political actors, including authentic anti-corruption social movements that now target and mock Vucic himself.

To keep his power base in Belgrade intact, Vucic needs to win a convincing victory. In order to mobilize his nationalist core constituency, he even traveled to Moscow on March 27 for a photo opportunity with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In a delicate balancing act which went unreported in domestic media, his minister of defense, Zoran Djordjevic, called for joint Serbian-US military exercises. This comes on top of another development:  so far, Vucic has refused to grant personnel at the joint Russian-Serbian humanitarian center in Niš diplomatic status. Insiders say that such move would turn it into a Russian spy outpost for the whole region.

In spite of these setbacks, Russian influence in Serbia is greater than in any other Balkan country. On top of historic ties between the two Slavic and Eastern Orthodox nations, Moscow has been able to play on Serbia’s national sentiment as a humiliated regional power that was forced to accept the Pax Americana. Belgrade lost a series of brutal wars after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and was bombed by NATO during the war over Kosovo (1999). Revisionist, anti-Western rhetoric has thus been very popular in Serbian politics and media.

And Moscow skillfully played this card a decade ago to privatize part of Serbia’s energy industry, which is now owned by Gazprom. Since then, the Kremlin has established a significant presence in the country’s disgruntled media. The local branch of Sputnik, established three years ago, has become the leading news agency in the country, and about 20 other media outlets spread distinctly Russian spin on domestic and foreign developments.

Business as Usual Won’t Work

So, what should the EU do? First, it should build up on the momentum from the last few weeks to demonstrate more attention and reassurance. Several EU foreign ministers could work together on a series of high-profile visits to the region. This might be a good opportunity for new German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel to provide some leadership and initiative for Europe’s political re-engagement in the Balkans. The status quo there is no longer sustainable, and carries considerable risks.

EU foreign policy chief Mogherini and her European External Action Services (EEAS) should be given a new mandate to expand their work in the Balkans, now limited only to Bosnia and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. Other dangerous situations, like the one in Macedonia, have become urgent security challenges and cannot be left to the EU Commission’s technocratic approach alone. Instead of playing geopolitics with Balkan leaders, EU Enlargement Commissioner Hahn should return to his task of helping candidate countries prepare for EU membership. He could also improve the way EU funding and other support is promoted among Balkan societies and counter widespread perceptions that Russia is doing more for them.

Once Brussels get its act together, Berlin and a few other EU capitals that still pay attention to the region (a diminishing number!) could reach out to Washington to come up with joint transatlantic effort to calm the Balkan waters. This is a good moment to engage with the new US administration to support a vital interest of Europe’s, one that is closely related to the future of NATO and also fits into American global strategy.

The belated wake-up call at the EU summit a few weeks ago was a reminder that the fates of Europe, NATO, and the Balkans are inextricably tied together. If it is followed by diplomatic action and sustained political engagement, not everything about the EU will look so gloomy in 2017.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

At 1.20 pm Brussels time on March 29, the clock started ticking on the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Britain’s EU ambassador Sir Tim Barrow hand-delivered the divorce letter to EU Council President Donald Tusk, who said he was saddened to receive the document. Under EU rules, the UK must leave the bloc no later than March 29, 2019.

If British Prime Minister Theresa May, who had signed the letter the previous night, had any illusions left about the likelihood of being handed a smooth and easy exit agreement by the EU, they should have been put to rest today. While expressing disappointment, the remaining 27 EU members repeated their determination that the UK will not get special privileges as a result of these two-year negotiations.

Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, tweeted a picture of himself and his negotiating team, saying they are “ready.” “We will work for #EU27 member states, EU institutions and citizens,” he said, very clearly leaving out the 28th member state – Britain. The European Parliament’s chief negotiator, Guy Verhofstadt, issued a statement reiterating that there can be no special treatment for the UK, no cherry-picking of EU market access, and no sectoral agreements. Manfred Weber, the leader of Europe’s center-right caucus and Angela Merkel’s point man in the European Parliament, said that from now on, only “real” EU citizens concerned him.

Across Europe, national leaders issued statements in the same vein – expressing sadness at the UK’s departure but determination to protect the remaining citizens of Europe from an unfair deal that advantages London. EU countries may still disagree on many things, but on Brexit they are united as never before.

Even BusinessEurope, one of the most conservative industry associations in Brussels which represents businesses from across the continent, issued a statement today demanding that any deal must “preserve the integrity of the single market based on its four freedoms” (one of which is freedom of movement, anathema to the British government).

Mission Impossible?

May will step into this lion’s den on April 29, at the first summit of national leaders convened to deal with the Brexit question. From the start, the odds are stacked against her.

Despite repeated British requests to start informal negotiations early, the EU refused to begin talks with the UK about its future relationship with the bloc until today’s letter was delivered. The insistence, made in a united front by all 27 national leaders, was an early warning sign that this would not be an amicable divorce.

May has signaled that she has no intention of accepting continued adherence to EU rules or EU court jurisdiction. In a sudden policy reversal, she announced in January that rather than trying to negotiate access to the EU’s single market, she would be pursuing a so-called “hard” Brexit. This will mean a clean break with the European Union – the UK will leave the single market as well as the customs union. Unless the UK can reach a free trade deal with the EU within two years, it will suddenly be forced to do business with its largest trading partner on World Trade Organization terms – enjoying the same privileges as Sri Lanka or Malaysia.

In reality May didn’t have much of a choice. The June 23 referendum had been tipped by anti-immigrant feeling, and there was no way she could accept an arrangement with the EU that maintained free movement – the right of EU citizens to live in the UK (and vice versa) if they can find a job. Even the countries in the single market that are not in the EU – Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland – must accept the principle of free movement as well as the jurisdiction of EU courts.

Now the UK must negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU in two years – something that has takes seven years on average in the past. Even if an agreement is reached in this short period, it must then be approved by the parliaments of all 27 remaining EU countries – while the UK parliament has opted to reduce its own role to that of a bystander.

The likelihood of May’s plan working out is slim, to say the least. And EU leaders are in no mood to cut her any slack.

Anarchy in the UK

Saddened, but unified in determination – that was the mood in Brussels today. Across the channel, the mood was anything but.

As the letter was delivered, May was being jeered in the House of Commons as she spelled out her vision of negotiations. And the light ribbing she took from her enfeebled opposition was nothing compared to what is happening outside the chamber’s walls. On Saturday tens of thousands of British people swamped the streets of London as they demonstrated against Brexit, on the occasion of the EU’s 60th birthday. It is estimated to have been one of the largest public demonstrations in British history, rivaling the Iraq War protests of 2003. The sentiment that the British government was doing something fundamentally wrong and dishonest would eventually bring down Prime Minister Tony Blair a few years later.

May’s biggest headache now is a specific subset of the British population – the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland. The previous evening the Scottish Parliament had voted to back First Minister Nicola Sturgeon’s call for a new referendum on Scottish independence. The timing was no accident. Sturgeon’s original announcement of the new referendum push earlier this month occurred one day before had May planned to submit her divorce letter to the EU, upstaging May and forcing her to delay the delivery until March 29. Scotland is remaining one step ahead of Westminster.

Sturgeon’s central argument is that the Scottish people deserve a second referendum, just four years after the last one rejected independence by a 55-45 margin, because they are about to be taken out of the EU without their consent. Only 38 percent of Scots voted to leave the EU, but the national result of 52-48 means that the entire United Kingdom is being dragged out of the bloc. So far May has said she will refuse to allow this referendum, certainly before Brexit is completed, but many predict this will be a politically difficult position to hold.

Scotland’s anger is being felt also across the Irish Sea, where 56 percent of Northern Irish voters opted for remaining in the EU. But in this part of the UK the dilemma is even more serious than in Scotland. Brexit will mean that checks will have to be reintroduced along the presently invisible border separating the territory from the Republic of Ireland to the South – a prospect that has driven increasingly loud calls for a referendum on unification between the North and the South of Ireland. The situation is evolving rapidly, with more and more politicians on both sides of the border calling for such a unification plebiscite.

And extraordinarily, there seems to be a creeping acceptance by the British government that even if they will not accept a Scottish secession, the possible loss of Northern Ireland is now in play. On Tuesday David Davis, the UK’s Secretary for Brexit, said in a letter to an MP that if the North wants to remain in the EU, the best way to do so would be to unite with the Republic.

These are the conditions in which May will begin negotiations. She may have succeeded in hobbling opposition within the British parliament, but her real problems lie outside of Westminster. Meanwhile there are almost no voices left in continental Europe calling for lending her a hand.

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