Source: Eurostat

US President Donald Trump does not, to put it lightly, have a warm relationship with Germany, nor with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, against whom he has held a deep but somewhat inexplicable grudge since his emergence on the political scene. Among the topics which he likes to needle the chancellor about – a fictional crime wave this week, the disintegration of the EU the next—there is one to which he always returns: trade.

Trump has endlessly bemoaned Germany’s trade surplus, blaming both an artificially devalued euro and high tariffs for what he sees as a tilted playing field. In March, he tweeted: “The European Union, wonderful countries who treat the US very badly on trade, are complaining about the tariffs on Steel & Aluminum. If they drop their horrific barriers and tariffs on US products going in, we will likewise drop ours. Big Deficit. If not, we Tax Cars etc. FAIR!”

The US president—again, to say it diplomatically—does not devote much attention to the finer points of international trade. There are, in fact, trade asymmetries between the United States and the European Union: The average EU customs duty is 5.2 percent, while the average American customs duty is 3.5 percent; the disparity in customs duties applied to cars is particularly stark, at 10 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively.

There are several sectors, however, where steep duties are levied on the American side as well: The US places a 25 percent tax on small truck imports from the EU, for example. More importantly, because of the degree to which American and European industries are intertwined, implementing retaliatory tariffs—rather than negotiating lower trade barriers in general—is completely self-defeating.

But even a stopped clock is right twice a day, and the US president, despite his best efforts, has made a valid point: most of the EU member states are running significant trade surpluses, and these surpluses are becoming dangerous—for the EU most of all. Since all of the member states are trying to sell their way to solvency and cut domestic spending, there’s no one to buy; and if intra-EU consumption doesn’t grow commensurately with productivity, member states will find themselves dividing up an ever-shrinking cake. At its core, a trade surplus is an excess of national saving over domestic investment. Low domestic investment means slower growth and crumbling infrastructure.

The EU’s aggregate trade surplus of about 3 percent of GDP is not spread evenly across all the member states, but nearly all member states run a surplus: According to the OECD, Germany’s 2016 trade surplus was 8.57 percent of GDP, the Netherlands’ was 8.46 percent, Hungary’s 6.01 percent, Sweden’s 4.25 percent, and Italy’s 2.56 percent. Incidentally, European regulations stipulate that no country’s surplus should surpass 6 percent of GDP. France and the United Kingdom were among the few member states with deficits, at -0.85 percent and -5.78 percent, respectively.

This would be less of a problem for Europe if these countries were trading primarily with external partners. The trouble is that, for the most part, they are not: most EU member states count other member states among their primary trade partners. And as they have all more or less diligently followed the prescribed course of austerity and export-orientation—largely following Germany’s model—the EU has become a shop with 28 salespeople and no customers. By cutting domestic spending, member states are reducing domestic demand for goods other member states might want to sell. And export-led growth has a tendency to merely reinforce existing imbalances in the union: Any eurozone-wide policy to stimulate exports from Greece cannot help but do the same for exports from Germany, preventing the member states with lagging economies from ever catching up.

The countries that have global trade surpluses tend to have surpluses within the EU as well: In 2016, the Netherlands had an intra-EU surplus of €177 billion, Germany €73 billion, Hungary €9 billion, and Italy €10 billion; meanwhile, France had an intra-EU trade deficit of €87 billion, and the UK €115 billion.

Europe’s focus on foreign markets also extends to investment: as the Financial Times reported last year, there’s been a steady drop in investment within the EU since the summer of 2012. Part of this stems from a lack of domestic spending during the various economic crises; but a great deal can also be attributed to the European Central Bank’s decision to maintain near-zero interest rates and the insistence that individual member states reduce their deficits. In an attempt to simultaneously spur growth and balance the books, the EU seems to have plugged some of the leaks in its member states’ coffers, but it’s made itself a less attractive place to invest and reduced the debt instruments with which interested parties might do so.

It should be noted that the Germans themselves have called attention to the problem. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble told the Tagesspiegel last year that he believed the euro was undervalued, saying, “When ECB chief Mario Draghi embarked on the expansive monetary policy, I told him he would drive up Germany’s export surplus.” But Germany also shoulders a great deal of the blame: Citing its “debt brake,” Berlin has resisted running a deficit even when it could have borrowed at near-zero interest rates, choking off one of the potential sources of liquidity—and demand—within the common market.

Trump’s actions will almost certainly do more harm than good, to his own country most of all. But he is not wrong in pointing out that the game is unfair.

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© REUTERS/Leah Millis

In May, US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Now Europeans are waiting for another blow from Washington: the beginning of a transatlantic trade war. On March 23, Trump announced sweeping tariffs on steel and aluminum imports based on national security concerns. Though this decision was mainly directed against China, long-term allies such as Canada and EU member states are also affected. The temporary exemption that the US granted the EU will expire on June 1, and the tariffs will kick in then unless the Trump administration changes its mind.

Troublingly for Europe, the United States only wants to exempt Europe permanently from the steel tariffs if the EU offers significant market access concessions, for example lowering its tariffs on US cars. In addition, Trump has threatened to impose tariffs up to 25 percent on imported cars, based again on the same national security provision used for the metal tariffs, Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962. If Trump decides to impose these tariffs, it could start a spiral of protectionism.

What are the chances of defusing trade tensions? A compromise on steel is possible. If the US sets a steel quota of 100 percent of last year’s steel and aluminum exports from Europe, EU countries probably would not be willing to retaliate. But if the quota is lower, retaliation is more likely. However, for car tariffs, there is no easy solution in sight. Nor is there any agreement on how to move forward in the future. It would make economic sense in the long run to start talks about an EU-US trade deal (previously known as TTIP), negotiated on the basis of an equal partnership. But for this, Germany and France need to find a common ground. At the moment, intra-European disputes look set to weaken the EU’s position as a global player in world trade.

Using the EU’s Economic Power

So far, Europeans have reacted the wrong way to the American threats. The European Commission is responsible for the Common Commercial Policy, one of the EU’s most integrated policy areas. But instead of going through the Commission and forming a unified position vis-à-vis the US, the two largest EU member-states, Germany and France, have rushed ahead on their own.

For example, the German economy minister, Peter Altmaier (pictured), has proposed talks with the US about a “TTIP light”, which would only deal with industrial market access. He wants talks with the Trump administration to be positive and constructive in order to alleviate the tensions in the transatlantic trade relationship. Through this offer Germany also wants to protect its fabled car industry which has caught Trump’s attention.

Meanwhile French President Emmanuel Macron has made a great show of his close personal relationship with his American counterpart. However, with regard to trade, France is taking a much less conciliatory tone than Germany. France supports the European Commission’s view, namely that there is no reason to negotiate under (an unjustified) threat. Cracks in Franco-German cooperation are also appearing with regard to a potential transatlantic trade deal. Macron has said that such a agreement with the US must also include non-tariff barriers as well as agriculture and public procurement. And he has suggested that the EU should only negotiate trade deals with partners who support the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, though he would likely be willing to make concessions in this regard.

The divergent positions of Germany and France weaken the European position, and help the US to divide the individual European member-states. It sent the wrong signal when German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Macron made individual visits to Washington in April to discuss trade as the US president has difficulties understanding and accepting the concept of the EU.

Still, Donald Trump knows that a unified EU strengthens the European position, which is why he is trying to drive a wedge between European powers. During Macron’s visit he said that “trade with France is complicated because we have the European Union. I would rather deal just with France. The Union is very tough for us. They have trade barriers that are unacceptable.” Trump’s lack of knowledge on the subject notwithstanding, the point of the EU is that its members act together on trade: The EU must use the unified power of all its member states (including Germany and France) to deal on equal terms with the US.

Acknowledging Imbalances

A compromise in trade is an important test for Franco-German cooperation. Paris and Berlin should prove that they take common European interests seriously in the medium- and long-term. In other words, they must be willing to accept that national interests need to temporarily take a back seat. A common European position in trade sends a strong signal, particularly in times where the centrifugal forces in the EU are increasing. Without a common understanding between the two largest member-states, the success of the supranational European common commercial policy would be threatened.

There are three key elements to what should be a common Franco-German strategy.

First, Paris and Berlin should keep in mind that the US remains the most important trade and investment partner for the EU and vice versa, harsh rhetoric and political chaos in Washington nonwithstanding. Therefore, the economic rationale for a transatlantic trade deal has not changed. Both sides would benefit from a reduction of trade and investment barriers. France and Germany should not approach the Trump administration on their own; rather, they should convince the Commission that talks about a comprehensive free trade agreement are important in the long-term.

Paris should move closer to the German position, showing greater readiness to open talks between the EU and the US. Here, the good relationship between Macron and Trump can be used to promote European interests. Macron may not have convinced Trump to stick to the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, but their apparent friendship is still a basis for future talks. At the same time, Berlin should accept that the agreement needs to be comprehensive and not just focused on good market access for industrial goods, German ones in particular.

Admittedly, the difficult TTIP talks will hardly have any chance of success under President Trump and his protectionist trade policy. However, it is still worthwhile to review the agreements reached in previous negotiating rounds, and to look where negotiations could continue in the long run. To this end, the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which was founded in 2007, should be used intensively to talk on a working level about regulatory cooperation.

Second, Europe must commit itself to defining new rules in international trade and solving existing problems on a multilateral level. The American concerns about Chinese subsidies for key industries and theft of foreign intellectual property are not imaginary; indeed, Europe shares many of them.

However, the introduction of punitive tariffs is the wrong way to move forward. For example, the problem of (largely Chinese) steel overcapacity should not be solved bilaterally, but on a multilateral level in the context of the G20/OECD Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity. German and France should work with the White House to ensure US cooperation in these forums.

Third, there should be a discussion about international trade imbalances. Germany should take seriously the American and European—and particularly French—criticism of its huge export surplus. Trump’s claim that trade deficits are a sign of unfairness lacks any economic credibility. But it is true that Germany does not comply with European rules stating that a member-state’s trade surplus may not exceed 6 per cent of GDP. The typical German response—that its surplus is a sign of competitiveness—is no longer sufficient. Germany should strengthen its internal demand through increased investment in infrastructure and digital networks, thus reducing its surplus. If the new German government is still committed to restrained spending and no budget deficits whatsoever, the least it could do is to show more openness for dialogue. This would be an important gesture of goodwill with regard to Paris, Brussels, and Washington.

If Germany and France incorporate these three elements in their trade strategy, the EU will be less divided and better able to reach a deal with the difficult partner in the White House.

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© REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

At his farewell speech at the State Department, Tom Countryman, the foreign-service veteran ousted from his post as top US arms negotiator, left an ominous parting shot for the Trump administration. “Business made America great, as it always has been, and business leaders are among our most important partners.” Then his tone shifted. “But let’s be clear: despite the similarities, a dog is not a cat. Baseball is not football. And diplomacy is not a business. Human rights are not a business.  And democracy is, most assuredly, not a business.” His message was squarely aimed at both the White House and the new occupant of Foggy Bottom, Rex Tillerson. Countryman was warning about the new mercantilist nationalism that seems to have become palace doctrine for the Trump administration.

This week, this doctrine will make its debut in Germany, as Vice President Mike Pence, Tillerson, Defense Secretary James Mattis, and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly attend the Munich Security Conference. Indications suggest that, Tillerson – who will also be in Germany for the G20 foreign ministers meeting in Bonn – will function more like a glorified commerce secretary. The State Department will, of course, still tend to the consular duties, stability operations, conflict negotiations, and multilateral organizations that are the staples of diplomacy.  But its core mission will include a more aggressive pursuit of the country’s own narrow geo-economic interests, the likes of which the United States has largely – though not completely – eschewed since the end of World War II. It will have greater authority to attract and even coerce foreign investment in the US, often linking diplomatic support, security guarantees, and development assistance directly to how much market access and preferred treatment for procurement contracts US companies are given. At the same time, access to US markets, infrastructure projects, and procurement will narrow as “Buy American” provisions will increase.

It also means that negotiations will always remain “live.” Trump has already put NAFTA, NATO’s article 5 guarantees, the European project, the OSCE’s Helsinki Principles, the One China policy, and the WTO back on the negotiating table.  “Nothing is true and everything is possible” – the maxim once used to describe Putin’s Russia – could very well apply to Trump’s international agreements and partners abroad.

Trump’s Geo-Economic Axis of Evil

Trump has an “axis of evil”, what he perceives as mercantilist countries masquerading as free traders and taking advantage of US openness and the public goods the US provides in the form of security guarantees, support for international organizations, and the dollar. Under George W. Bush in 2002, it was Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Today it is China, Mexico, and Japan. Germany and the EU barely dodged inclusion on the list, but Trump and company most resent what they see as the bloc’s weakness and exploitation by Germany, and have hinted at an interest in taking a wrecking ball to the European project.

For Germany and the EU, this means several things. On trade, the administration has stated it prefers to negotiate on a “bilateral basis”, in which the US sees itself in a stronger negotiating position. His first actions as president were to withdraw from TPP in the Pacific and launch a renegotiation of NAFTA in North America.

With TTIP, Trump has not personally made his intentions known. The trade pact with the EU was not mentioned by either candidate once during the 2016 campaign. One thing is clear though: TTIP is not Plan A. Instead, the administration will start by probing the weak spots in European unity for cracks. Early outreach has focused on Europe’s populist reactionaries from the UK, France, and the Netherlands; Nigel Farage and Le Pen both met with Trump during the transition, and Geert Wilders was Trump’s guest at the Republican convention.

The Trump team will also likely set its sights on Central Europe as the focal point of its effort to divide the EU on trade.  The US has a number of pre-existing economic agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), tax treaties, and sectoral agreements with a number of EU member states in the region. The administration will likely attempt to reopen these agreements and fill them with regulatory arrangements, tax provisions, and market access that would undercut the Commission’s trade negotiating authority and exploit the power asymmetry of small states negotiating with the US.

Trump’s economic team resents Germany’s privileged position within the common currency. New National Trade Council head Peter Navarro has stated that Germany has latched itself to Greece, Italy, and Spain in the eurozone to maintain a “grossly undervalued” euro that artificially inflates Germany’s competitiveness. In essence, they are priming the discourse for the administration and Congress to consider labeling Germany a currency manipulator by virtue of its eurozone membership.

In early 2018, Trump will get the power to fundamentally reshape the Fed, including the chance to appoint a replacement for Fed Chair Janet Yellen. Most expect a full-fledged assault on the Fed’s independence. The likely outcome would be a weakened dollar meant to shore up domestic demand for US manufacturing and steel, often with negative consequences for German exporters.

Taking Russia Out of the Penalty Box

Trump’s affinity for Vladimir Putin is starting to translate into policy. While UN Ambassador Haley reaffirmed that sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea would remain in place, no such guarantee has been given for sanctions in other areas. Already members of his national security team – including ousted National Security Advisor Mike Flynn – have moved to decouple sanctions imposed for the country’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine from the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Trump and Putin are expected to meet early in his term, and many expect a revival of frozen talks on a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the two countries. A US-Russia BIT has long been on the wish list of US oil and gas companies, particularly ExxonMobil, which are looking to build out joint exploration projects offshore in Siberia and in the Arctic.

This will be disorienting for German foreign policy, especially for the Social Democrats, who have tried to position themselves as both embedded in the West and a bridge between the US and Russia. Trump would like to cut out the German middle man – with implications for the EU’s sanctions policy, the future of the Normandy Process, the Minsk agreements, and the credibility of the OSCE.

The administration’s largesse to Russia extends beyond sanctions. The Republicans working with the White House are ramming through a measure to kill a major anti-corruption law known as the Cardin-Lugar amendment that forces US companies from extractive industries – oil, gas, coal, and mining – to report payments made to foreign governments for all to see. The provision made it much harder for companies like ExxonMobil and others to bribe corrupt officials in countries like Russia, Libya, and Iraq, because payments could be tracked by civil society watchdogs. The EU followed suit with nearly identical legislation to “drain the swamp” of dirty payments from extractive industries.

If the Republicans in Congress get their way, they will put Europe at a distinct disadvantage to US extractive industries, which will be tempted to go native with secret payments to authoritarian rulers like Putin and his cronies.

Not all US industries are benefiting from Trump’s mercantilism, though. Policy is personnel, and the new cabinet is comprised almost exclusively of men from three areas – extractive and raw materials industry, finance, and the military. Noticeably absent is the tech industry, and the Trump team has taken an early shot at American tech with significant implications for Europe’s privacy standards. The Bannon-designed Immigration Executive Order contains a little-noticed provision that, by some accounts, effectively gutted the non-discriminatory treatment of European personal data by the NSA. The provision, known as PPD28, was the basis for a free flow of data agreement between the US and EU known as the Privacy Shield. If this is indeed the case, the bridge that allows digital trade between the United States and Europe could collapse, with serious consequences for tech, particularly for start-ups.

A Reset with Washington

The Trump administration’s formula – a reset with Russia and a pivot away from Europe – is nothing new. George W. Bush famously began his Crawford Ranch diplomacy with a glimpse into Putin’s soul and tried early on to pivot toward the Western Hemisphere before 9/11.  The Obama administration’s reset with Russia – announced by Vice President Biden at the 2009 Munich Security Conference just months after the Georgia War – was coupled with a new pivot – economically, militarily, romantically – to young, dynamic, vibrant East Asia. Obama even famously cancelled the 2010 US-EU summit, complaining that meeting with EU leaders was akin to “a trip to the dentist.” Administrations’ early relations with Europe always seem to inspire one of two emotions: Republicans are hostile, Democrats are indifferent.

Trump’s reset and pivot are qualitatively different. A Trump administration will both exaggerate these trends and make them more malignant. To the extent he has a preference for potential partners, it is for states run by authoritarian strong men that have succeeded in hollowing out their democracies, characterized by reliance on corruption, familial ties, opacity, kleptocracy, and an aggressive negotiating style where wins for both sides rarely exist.

So what relationship can Germany and the EU have with a maximalist US that perceives Germany and the EU as mercantilist rivals? It’s time to look into a reset policy. To the extent that the US reset worked, it relied on areas where narrow interests aligned with a churlish, corrupt, and unreliable Russia. Germany and the EU must take the same approach to the Trump administration.  Here are five ways to do so.

Think interests rather than values. Agreements with the Trump administration will be constantly subject to threats of renegotiation. Trump has demonstrated that he is willing to put all settled arrangements back on the table. High-minded diplomacy will not be effective with the White House. It will require hard-nosed negotiations, clearly defined consequences for breaking agreements, and vigilance in enforcement, including automatic snap back measures when agreements are violated.

Harden EU cohesion now. Mercantilist systems thrive on hub and spoke arrangements in which a country can exploit massive power asymmetries with its potential partners. The EU must put costs in place now for states that break rank on trade, the EU’s core competency. The EU Malta Summit was a good start.

Forge stronger bonds with the institutions where the transatlantic values relationship still matters – Congress, the federal bureaucracy, US states, and civil society. Each will be constrained in its ability to influence policy, and insulated against the erosion of NATO, US-EU economic and security cooperation, and democratic consolidation. But they will be the foundation for the future repair of the transatlantic and international system.

Use some showy public relations diplomacy. Trump will be more transactional than relational, basing decision-making in short-term, high-profile payoffs that can be easily communicated to his base, particularly white American workers in rust belt states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio. This means European leaders need to emphasize every job added as a result of US openness and its relationship with Europe. Japan has already announced the intention to create 700 thousand US jobs as part of its geo-economic charm offensive. Europe should do the same.

Stay rooted in the principle of reciprocity. EU economic policy, particularly access to procurement markets, has long been based on the simple, elegant position of same for same. The Trump administration will fight this, but will be hard pressed to deny it.

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© REUTERS/Marcos Brindicci

Since being elected last November, Argentina’s new right-of-center president Mauricio Macri cannot complain about a lack of international attention – most of it welcome, some of it unwelcome, as his outing last week in the “Panama Papers” as a former owner of an offshore company. The United States and the International Monetary Fund have already made overtures to the business-friendly former mayor of Buenos Aires who ended twelve years of the leftist governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner; US President Barack Obama, on a state visit recently, even demonstrated that he knows how to tango.

Does the EU, too? Given sanctions and counter-sanctions with Russia and stalled TTIP negotiations with the US, intensifying relations with Latin America’s third-largest economy would make a lot of sense. A large EU footprint would also contribute to Western efforts to compete with China’s growing influence and investment in Latin America. Argentina, a major soy exporter, is mainly exporting to China, while Beijing, for its part, has made the most of the West’s absence through sizeable agriculture-based land grabs and multi-billion dollar investments in sectors like nuclear power. Now is the time for the EU to seize this opportunity if it hopes to remain globally competitive amidst the uncertainty within the region.

In Macri, Europe should find an eager partner. He has wasted no time implementing campaign pledges, such as allowing the Argentine peso to float after years under government control, making significant budget cuts, and removing long-standing subsidies. But these immediate reforms are small compared with ending a 14-year-long debt battle with creditors, following Argentina’s $100 billion default of 2002, that has made the country persona non grata in the international credit community.

Since Macri’s election the Argentine government has reached an agreement with creditors, and US District Court Judge Thomas Griesa conditionally lifted a 2012 injunction which had declared Argentina to be in default: The country would be able to return to the credit markets if its parliament repealed the Padlock Law (ley cerrojo), which caps, or “padlocks”, the amount that can be paid to creditors, and the Sovereign Payment Law, a 2014 Kirchner-led attempt to skirt injunctions through backdoor payments to creditors via France.

Remarkably, the congress accomplished this task in March, well before the court-approved payment deadline of April 14, with consensus between Macri’s Cambiemos coalition and the majority Peronists, in both the Senate and Lower House. As a result, Argentina is paying the last holdouts with a settlement of $4.65 billion, roughly 25 percent less than initially desired by the bondholders. To raise funds to make the payment, the legislative deal included an issuance of new bonds worth $12.5 billion. Finally, Argentina can move on from this controversial chapter of its recent history.

Leading up to and after the deal, Argentina has received positive signals on the global engagement front. In addition to the US president Macri has welcomed French President François Hollande, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs. Its Chair, Elmar Brok (from Germany), heaped praise on Macri’s economic agenda and expressed optimism regarding the prospects of finally concluding the EU-Mercosur trade agreement (negotiations started back to 1999).

However, Macri’s economic task at home is daunting. His government must lower inflation rates, which now hover around 30 percent – a major concern, given that the country’s governors are battling with cash shortages and need funding for infrastructure improvements in their provinces. Also, he must sell his pro-growth agenda as one that can benefit everyone – not just the Argentine elite, as in pre-Kirchner days.

Internationally speaking, Macri’s administration should take the lead on the fledgling EU-Mercosur trade agreement. During the last formal round of talks in 2012, the agreement was stymied by France and Ireland over fears of what agriculture competition posed by the Mercosur bloc (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) could mean for their farmers. An agreement would have major implications, as the EU is Mercosur’s largest trading partner, and Mercosur is the EU’s sixth. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff is currently beleaguered by scandals and calls for impeachment, and Macri could use this as an opportunity to reinsert Argentina, a major food exporter, as a lead negotiator. As Brock observed during his visit, “For the first time, Argentina is becoming a stronger protagonist than Brazil in these negotiations.”

The agreement is a high priority for both sides. It was a major topic discussed during the Macri administration’s meetings with EU Foreign Affairs and Security High Representative Federica Mogherini in March. The results of an exchange of proposals between the two trade blocs, scheduled for early April in Brussels, could set the tone for the implementation of Argentina’s bilateral trade agreement with the United States, the framework of which had been agreed upon during Obama’s visit. Both agreements will improve Macri’s ability to foster firmer ties with the West, incentivizing all sides to stay engaged.

A new outlook in Argentina would also benefit a few European powers in particular, as it would offer an opportunity to export more than trade-related goods. In meetings with Argentina Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra during her visit in March, German Deputy Foreign Minister Maria Böhmer highlighted vocational educational training, scientific research, and culture as areas of great interest. Argentina is one of few places outside of Europe with schools compatible with Germany’s dual system, running parallel tracks of vocational education and apprenticeship training. With a large workforce skills gap prevalent on both sides of the Atlantic, this could be Germany’s most significant imprint on Argentina’s economy.

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