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When it comes to Europe’s Russia policy, most of the impetus seems to be coming from Paris these days. For six months now, French President Emmanuel Macron has been setting the agenda. In August he invited Vladimir Putin to a bilateral meeting at Fort Brégançon ahead of the G7 summit, followed by an exchange at ministerial level between Paris and Moscow. Meanwhile, the most recent meeting of the Normandy Format—which brings together France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine to discuss the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine—took place in Paris in December 2019. And November 2020 marks the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe—an occasion that Macron would like to use for talks about a new European security architecture. Paris, Paris, Paris: France is in the fast lane to Moscow.

This is a new and unfamiliar situation for Germany. Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict six years ago, it was Berlin that defined Europe’s position towards Russia and ensured cohesion and a hard-won consensus in the EU. However, France is now attempting to redefine this consensus and by doing so is overtaking Germany, or so it seems. Is it time for Berlin to modify its policy towards Russia? Has Germany perhaps held on to its previous “post-2014” approach to Moscow for too long?

Traditionally, Germany has always been the driving force in Europe’s relations with Russia. The German-Russian special relationship flourished after reunification and the end of the Cold War. The early 2000s, after Putin’s election and when Gerhard Schröder was still chancellor, is regarded by some as the “golden age” in relations between Berlin and Moscow. However, this closeness has often given rise to mistrust, especially among Central and Eastern Europeans: during this period, Germany was happy to leave it up to the EU to criticize Russia.

In French politics, on the other hand, Russia only really played a role at times when France remembered at its own great power ambitions. This was the case during the 2008 war in Georgia, when then President Nicolas Sarkozy—on behalf of the Europeans, but on a French mission—negotiated the ceasefire between Tbilisi and Moscow. In the Ukraine conflict, France left the leadership to Germany: President François Hollande was neither striving for proximity to Russia nor looking to project French power. Macron is now returning to the same pattern as Sarkozy. And in doing so, he is following the assertion of Charles de Gaulle: “France cannot be France without grandeur.” This includes a positive relationship with the other great power on the continent: Russia.

A German Lack of Direction

Up until the Ukraine conflict, German policy towards Russia was guided by three principles: reconciliation, integration, and rapprochement. Basically, it was a variation on the Ostpolitik theme: from “change through trade” to “rapprochement through interdependence” and “partnership for modernization.” The longer Berlin adhered to this approach, the louder the accusations of German naivety towards Russia became. The annexation of Crimea and the covert war in eastern Ukraine marked a turning point, leading to a short and medium-term reorientation: Russia policy now consisted primarily of “holding the line” and defending common European positions: extending sanctions, implementing the Minsk agreements, and preventing a sell-out of Ukraine—especially in the form of a “grand bargain” between Trump and Putin.

There was a path dependency to Germany’s Russia policy before 2014 remained. Which is why, despite all the political and economic doubts, Berlin stuck with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. From the perspective of its supporters, it was important not to sacrifice the last pillar of the German-Russian special relationship: after all, the gas business with the Soviet Union had functioned reliably even at the height of the Cold War. That is why it is still considered a stabilizing factor in East-West relations today. For critics, Nord Stream 2 is the pivotal issue that could demonstrate a serious change in German policy towards Russia. There is no doubt that Berlin has massively underestimated the political consequences of continuing with the construction: Merkel’s argument that a Russian gas molecule remains a Russian gas molecule, regardless of whether it arrives via Ukraine or the Baltic Sea, has not convinced the US Senate. The pipeline will now probably have to be completed by Russia on its own.

German policy towards Russia thus currently consists of little more than sanctions on the one hand and a commitment to Nord Stream 2 on the other, coupled with an effort to maintain political dialogue, which often leads to frustration—whether in the Petersburg Dialogue or the High Working Group on Security Policy at the level of senior ministry officials. Moreover, the contrasting approaches from the period before and after 2014 make this policy very difficult for European neighbors to understand. In short: Berlin is treading water in its Russia policy. What is missing is a long-term strategy.

An Emotional Relationship

Russia is only 13th (based on total revenues in 2018) on the list of Germany’s most important trading partners, and under the current conditions, there is little potential for growth. It is therefore unclear on what basis German-Russian relations will develop over the next ten to 15 years. At the same time, a kind of “Russia fatigue” has started to take hold in Berlin. For example, the German EU Council Presidency, which starts in July, is setting very different priorities with an EU-China Summit and an EU-Africa Summit. Even a summit on the Eastern Partnership did not make it onto the German agenda, but will take place in Brussels in June instead.

It seems that Germany’s hopes for a positive change in relations with Russia have been dashed. It is the end of a strategic partnership; at the same time, German policymakers are reluctant to see Russia as a strategic adversary, as some other European member states are advocating. Such an approach would be difficult to communicate to the German public. For them, the relationship with Russia is an emotional one. According to a survey conducted by Körber-Stiftung, Germans are consistently in favor of more cooperation with Russia. Moreover, the concept of “decoupling” or “disentanglement” is not popular in German foreign policy, which is based on the principles of multilateral cooperation and collaboration. And Russia is now indispensable in many international policy fields.

Meanwhile, Macron is hoping for cooperation: he wants to form a common front with Russia in order to survive in a new world order marked by US-China rivalry. According to Macron, Europe will not be able to assert itself as a great power if it cannot get along with its biggest neighbor on the continent. The German approach is much more pragmatic: dialogue with Russia—especially in international crises such as Libya, Syria or Iran—is still urgently needed. A geopolitical “alignment” with Russia à la Macron seems, however, absurd. Russia and China each remain challenges in their own right.

Germany, unlike France, cannot take a great power approach to Russia. At the same time, however, Berlin should not leave Russia policy entirely to Macron, but should identify areas in which it can actively advance the Russia policy agenda together with France.

The five Russia principles that the former EU High Representative Federica Mogherini set out in March 2016—the implementation of the Minsk agreements, the strengthening of relations with Russia’s neighbors, resilience, selective cooperation, and civil society cooperation with Russia—are still valid, but they need to be reviewed. An exchange with Russia on European security would be in France’s interest— in the full knowledge that when it comes to European security, Russia is part of the problem, for example because of its violation of the INF Treaty, and only to a limited extent part of the solution.

Putin’s Russia Is Here to Stay

Macron is right to have placed the issue of arms control and strategic stability high on the Franco-Russian “agenda of trust and security” led by diplomat Pierre Vimont. And he is right to argue that European security cannot be decided between the US and Russia and over the heads of Europeans, as happened with the end of the INF Treaty. However, a sense of proportion is required: the Russian offer of a moratorium on the stationing of intermediate-range missiles, which Macron would like to talk about, is a rather unhelpful suggestion if NATO partners believe that such missiles have already been stationed by Russia. Overall, however, Germany, working together with France, can make a useful contribution to this issue.

Macron has also already announced that he will attend the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Moscow in May 2020. Such symbolic gestures form an important part of France’s policy towards Russia. Should Chancellor Angela Merkel decide to follow Macron’s example, she will have to walk a fine line between remembrance on the one hand and rejection of Russian historical revisionism on the other. The politicization of history for the purpose of constructing a positive Russian great power idea and rehabilitating Stalin’s leadership reached a new high point in a speech President Putin gave late last year. History policy is thus also a field in which Germany—ideally together with France—should take a clear stance.

Europe’s Russia policy can only be shaped jointly and not by France alone. Germany should help define the framework conditions of the new French initiative on Russia: inclusivity before ambition, unity before great power. Without the support of other Europeans, Macron’s Russia policy will have little chance of success—and the skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe is already significant. Macron’s visit to Warsaw was a first step towards confidence-building, and others must follow. It is only by working together that the EU can exert a constructive influence on Russia and, if necessary, counteract destructive policies.

Realistically, however, one must accept the fact that there is little prospect of any change within Russia. The constitutional amendments now being pushed through in Moscow point to a continuity of the form of rule and of the ruling elites after 2024, the end of Putin’s current term of office. Whether the Russian president chooses the “Kazakh succession model,” whereby he steers the fortunes of the country as the éminence grise in the background, or whether he finds an alternative model—Putin will in all probability not leave the political stage. This makes it all the more important for the EU to review its principles for cooperation with Russia and ensure they are given a long-term orientation. Neither France nor Germany can achieve this alone.

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Vladimir Putin’s Russia–or Putin himself–has often been described as hard to read, enigmatic, or even misunderstood in the West. Do you agree? Well, I’m asking the question: how was Putin’s Russia with a per capita GDP less than that of Italy, with a declining population, a crumbly infrastructure, a heavy reliance on oil and gas exports able to reposition itself as a global player? And my conclusion is that Putin definitely had a plan given his background and given his view on the collapse of the Soviet Union. He certainly believes that Russia is a great power and wants to restore it as such. But I also think he has been very adept at taking advantage of opportunities that were offered to him by a West that didn’t have a plan. He’s been in power for 19 years now and he has seen lots of Western leaders come and go, and what he was doing is having Russia in many ways act as a disruptor, go into areas where the United States or Europe is trying to accomplish something. So, I don’t think he is misunderstood but I think we aren’t very good at anticipating what his next move is.

The Russian side always insists that there’s nothing untoward in what Putin is doing and pleads ignorance as to why the West is so antagonistic. I think that’s disingenuous. I mean why would they think the West wasn’t upset about the fact that they annexed Crimea and started a war in south eastern Ukraine. Did they really think that the West wouldn’t respond negatively to that?

Is the annexation of Crimea in 2014 an example where long-term planning and short-term action came together? I think it’s not that they didn’t have plans to do such a thing, but it was clearly triggered when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled. This was the moment for them to strike. It’s probably true that the worst fear that they might have had is that Ukraine would terminate an agreement to have a Russian naval base on Crimea and that possibly you would have seen NATO ships in Sevastopol—highly unlikely, but I think that they thought that that was the moment to strike.

Once the Kremlin started the war in south eastern Ukraine, there were fears that the ambitions were even greater—a “Novorossiya” was being built all the way to Crimea to have a land connection. They tried the Novorossiya and it didn’t work. I think maybe they misunderstood the reaction in Ukraine to what they were doing and even though obviously you have support for separatism in those regions it doesn’t extend much beyond that. And I think you could make the argument that the Western reaction, the sanctions, acted also as a deterrent. Now you see what the Russians have done in the Sea of Azov, so they’re trying to deny the Ukrainians access to that body of water from which a lot of Ukrainian exports leave. We don’t know what they are going to do in the Black Sea, but it looks like they are encroaching on some of this area and then ever so often people think that they will still move on Mariupol or maybe Odessa. But the situation is more or less frozen because nothing is getting resolved.

Russia went as far as inferring in the US presidential election. Did they overreach? I think that what they probably didn’t anticipate was the American reaction to the knowledge of their interference. As a consequence of all these inquiries Russia has become such a toxic issue domestically that has made it really difficult for Donald Trump to do what he said he wanted to do which is to make a deal with Russia, have good relations with Russia, etc. He can’t do that and I think the publication of the Mueller report doesn’t change that because in the first volume it documents in great detail how the Russians went about it in the social media sphere, in the cyber sphere, interfering in the election. And so, going into the next US election, this is still going to be a major domestic topic, particularly for the Democrats. So, I think they didn’t anticipate that. But what they did was certainly help exaggerate the polarization that existed in the United States, and I think that was one of their goals. They didn’t really think at that point that Trump was going to get elected; they were as surprised as everyone else.

How successful would you say Putin’s foreign policy is overall? It’s certainly a mixed picture. One of the successes is, at least in the medium term, the relationship with China. It enabled Russia to continue doing what it does. The West obviously can’t isolate Russia—the Chinese signed a big gas deal with the Russians shortly after Crimea, and they backed the Russians up at least formally and publicly on everything. In the longer run, though—China is a rising power, and Russia isn’t. But at the moment you can say that Putin is still looking for other options both politically and economically. The other success is Russia’s return to the Middle East. Unlike in the Soviet times, nowadays it’s much more pragmatic. Russia is the only great power that talks to Iran, all of the Sunni states, and to Israel. The latter, along with Saudi Arabia, (both US allies!) hope that Moscow can use its influence to temper what the Iranians are doing in the region. I’m not sure that Russia can but it is seen as a neutral operator there. And obviously in Syria, it helped Bashar al-Assad to survive.

There also seems to be some ambition to return to Africa. Yes, and both economically and militarily. Russia is also playing a role in Venezuela, making it more difficult for Juan Guaidó to become the president. So, in all of those ways it has reappeared as a disruptor largely. But in Ukraine, for instance, this has been counterproductive. Yes, Russia is making it much more difficult for the Ukrainian government to function, but it helped really unite Ukrainians in a way that wasn’t possible before. This applies also to many other parts of the post-Soviet space. Even if you look at Belarus, the relationship with Minsk isn’t going as well as it was; and the Central Asian countries: yes, they all have strong ties, but they are wary, obviously, of what Russia might do, given what happened in Ukraine. Obviously, its relationship with the West significantly deteriorated, including with its main European partner, Germany.

What kind of future relationship do you foresee? As long as Merkel is in power, no big changes are to be expected. More and more people realize the attempts Russia made to divide the West, and they brought a NATO critic into the White House, which is quite unusual. EU sanctions are still in place largely because of Merkel’s leadership. A number of European countries—Italy, Hungary, some other Central European countries—have argued against the sanctions and would like to get rid of them. So, what you see is a more divided Europe, and I do think there’s a Trump effect, too. The extent to which the US relationship with Europe has deteriorated under Trump has also prompted some rethinking in Europe. If you find yourself between Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia, it’s difficult because the US is no longer seen as a country that is the most reliable partner, as it used to be. In other words, Russia was successful in destabilizing Europe; also, all the euroskeptic parties and groups tend to be pretty pro-Russia.

How successful can disruption be as a long-term foreign policy strategy, though? Do you foresee a future relationship between Russia and the West that is less antagonistic? I think that there’d have to be a different leadership. I don’t see that happening under Putin. He has become convinced that the US wants regime change in Russia, convinced that Europe would like to impose a value system. I think Putin hoped that the US and its allies would recognize the sphere of influence Russia should have, according to Putin, in the post-Soviet space, and that has not happened. So, the preconditions for having a closer relationship with the West would either be that the West changes its policies or that you have a different leader in the Kremlin. And even then it might take some time. I think the best-case scenario would be to have a generation coming to power after Putin that are more technocratic, that understand that Russia has to modernize its economy and its institutions, and that those kind of reforms would be much easier if there were not such antagonistic relations with the West. If you had more people like that coming to power, maybe that could change the way Russia interacts with the West.

 Angela Stent is one of the world leading experts on Russia, Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and director of its Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies. Her new book Putin’s World is now available in German as Putins Russland (Rowohlt).

The interview was conducted by Henning Hoff. Assistance: Melina Lorenz.

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Where do we stand as far as Russia’s relations with the West are concerned―is this a new low? Certainly for the United States, and to some extent for Europe as well, relations with Russia are the worst since before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power back in 1985.
In the US, that has been driven of late by the investigation into Russian influence in the US presidential election last year. Even if some of the media coverage is hyped up, even if some of the characters who claim to have had contact to the Trump campaign or the Kremlin did not, we know there was interference and leaks to WikiLeaks. It is the same in Europe. There have been cyberattacks in Germany on the Bundestag that have been attributed to the Russians. We know in France there was interference as well. Be it Brexit or Catalan independence, we hear about Russia trying to benefit from euroskepticism and populism. These movements already exist in the US and Europe. But the Russians certainly try to intensify both the questioning of our fundamental beliefs about democracy and the European Union and the post-war commitment to a closer Europe.
If we are asking ourselves if we need a new Russia policy, then one part of the answer is that we certainly need better and more sophisticated defenses against the kind of interference we are seeing. We have freedom of expression in the West. We don’t have one state-controlled media outlet. We cannot respond to what Russia is doing perfectly symmetrically because the government cannot tell our media what to write. But you can respond better both in terms of the messaging and preparing stronger cyber defenses.

Is this interference opportunistic or part of a deliberate Russian strategy? Even if we question how state-controlled various hackers are, the Kremlin obviously saw a vulnerability looking at the US and Europe, and they definitely have a policy of trying to influence. Russia does not like dealing with a united European Union, so anything that weakens it, why not? In the US, they listened to what Trump was saying and saw an opportunity to move beyond the sanctions. A lot of these euroskeptic parties they support across the EU would lift sanctions if they had power. And don’t forget, Russia hosts meetings with separatists and far-right groups, and we know they gave money to Marine Le Pen. All of that is deliberate and comes from high up.
There were similar efforts to influence our politics in communist times, of course. I remember in 1982 the Soviet Union was supporting the American peace movement. I think the concern now is that the Russians are so much more effective. And it comes at a time when we in the West are also questioning the moorings of our own democracies. I think the cyber aspect means we are in uncharted territory, and perhaps it is simply a question of building better tools. In Soviet times, there was a lot of Soviet television and propaganda, but we had our own response. Now the cyber tools give the Russians new capabilities.
On the other hand, a lot of Russians, or certainly those who do not like President Putin, cannot understand how we in the West are building up Russia as this monolith capable of destroying our societies and democracies. They say we give far too much credit to the Russians, that we should have some confidence in ourselves.

The EU has on the one hand implemented sanctions alongside Washington, but on the other tried to keep diplomatic channels with Moscow open. What do you make of the EU’s policy? The EU doesn’t have a single Russia policy. You have German policy and French policy that is more or less aligned, and British policy is less important now. But if you look at the so-called “illiberal democracies”, the Poland’s and Hungary’s, and then you look at the Czech Republic and Cyprus and even Italy, Spain, and Greece, there are EU member states that want to lift sanctions but cannot without German-French agreement.
US policy is very divided at the moment, but the official line that US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has put forward is a three-prong policy. You resist Russian aggression where you need to; you work with Russia where you have common interests; and you try and establish strategic stability. It goes back to the old two-track policy of the 1969 Harmel Report―you engage Russia where you have common interest and try and push back in areas where you want to counter Russia. In that sense, I don’t think there is a huge difference between official US policy and German policy or EU policy.

So how do you stabilize or improve the situation? Is it time for another reset? I’m always very wary of a reset. I wrote a book about four American presidents who have done resets and they have all ended in disappointment. You have to think about what your expectations are. Russia hasn’t budged an inch on Ukraine. Do we start to normalize the relationship? Do we try to improve it and begin to lift sanctions? If you do that while Russia hasn’t changed its Ukraine policy, that sends a strong signal. If you want to try and move beyond the Minsk agreement, you would need to have all sides agree, and you would need much more active French and German engagement.
In Syria, the US has basically abandoned its leadership role, and that happened under Obama. It has now ceded that role to Russia, which has become the power broker. Putin has managed to get Turkey and Saudi Arabia to accept Russia in that role. The Saudi king was just in Moscow meeting Putin, and Erdogan, and the Iranian leadership more recently visited Sochi for talks. We have all stepped back from the position that Bashar al-Assad has to go, but we are still dealing with a humanitarian catastrophe. I think now it is up to Russia to see what they are going to do. Are they going to step back? Will there be a reconciliation process? I don’t know. But the US is no longer a main player in the conflict.
So what would be the basis of another reset, of a different Russia policy? Right now everything is suspended until the Russian presidential elections are over. Once Putin is reelected in March, certainly from my discussions with the Russians, I have no sense that there is any kind of policy change in the cards, either domestically or in foreign policy. One of the things we should be asking ourselves is: is it us that should be doing the reset? Or do we need signals from Russia, that Russia understands that it needs to take our considerations into account?
One of the problems if we talk about a new policy is sanctions. Europe could lift sanctions, but in return for what? In the US case that has become really difficult: Congress enacted very tough legislation because Republicans and Democrats were worried that Trump would lift sanctions unilaterally―and I believe he was intending to do exactly that but couldn’t. What’s more, the process of lifting sanctions is so unwieldy. It took 25 years to change the Jackson Vanik amendment of 1974 that denied “most favored nation” status to Russia. Also, the sanctions as they currently are could have far-reaching consequences for Germany because they contain language that says nobody should be building new energy pipelines, and I don’t know what will happen with Nord Stream 2―nobody does. It would be good to have the US and Europe really coordinated. I think one of the successes of the Obama administration is they did work with the Europeans very closely.
Beyond that, what would a new Russia policy look like? Some say the problem goes back to the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, where the final communiqué stated that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO. There was no date attached, but it is very easy for the Russians to say “this is why we had to take Crimea.” So does NATO change that language to prevent another escalation? To do that without going over the heads of Ukraine and Georgia is difficult. This is an issue that the Europeans and NATO have to confront.
A new policy on Russia has to take into consideration what Russia wants from us. It’s a recognition of its sphere of influence. That influence extends at least to the border of the former Soviet states, not the borders of the Russian federation. Are we prepared to do what Putin would like, which is to re-enact the Yalta conference of 1945 with Russia, China, and the US? It is unclear where Europe comes in. There are some who argue that Russia has its historical interests in its region and is threatened by the idea of the West coming closer to its borders. Do we say: no more NATO enlargement? The reality is there won’t be anyways for the foreseeable future.
A new Russia policy that could successfully avoid producing new Russian actions would probably have to accommodate Russian interests. Other people might argue that we need a much tougher Russia policy. We need to push back more. We are already deploying more troops as a result of what happened in Ukraine. We have more US troops in Poland. But there is no consensus on a tougher response.

What does accommodating Russian interests mean―what are the Kremlin’s interests, and its long game? I think it has a particular interest in the former Soviet space, but in general its interest is to have a seat at the international table on important issues, to be one of the great powers again. In the Middle East at the moment it looks as if it has succeeded quite dramatically in the last few years in establishing itself as a major power and influencing policy there, particularly in Syria. One of the lines I use is that Russia would like the West to treat it as if it were the Soviet Union―a great power whose interests we have to respect as legitimate, one that we respect and to some extent fear. The Chinese are very clever in treating Russia as if it’s a great power and equal, even though they understand the reality.
Russia has been able to benefit from opportunities opened by US withdrawal. There are global ambitions there, but I think a lot of it is simply opportunism. And you have to remember that many of these global ambitions feed the current Russian elites’ desire to stay in power and continue to enrich themselves. A lot of foreign policy is driven by that, and obviously a concern is to not have the outside world try and raise questions via democracy promotion. The EU is not going to give up its standards, but it understands the limits. And a country like China is never going to tell Russia it has concerns about its human rights record.

Some, especially in Germany, believe extending economic relations and a “modernizing partnership” be the way forward. Could economic cooperation to help boost the Russian economy provide some leverage? Economically Russia is a raw materials exporter―oil and gas and military hardware. Those are important, but is Russia really interested in modernization? So far I think we can say there are some individuals and groups in Russia that are interested in modernization, that understand if Russia doesn’t modernize its economy it will remain a raw materials exporter while countries around it become much more formidable economic powers. But there is very little evidence that the people in the Kremlin are seriously interested, because such a program in the end would erode the basis of their own power. One of the answers to “Do we need a new Russia policy?” is that we could perhaps have one if we had different leadership in the Kremlin, one that understands modernization and is willing to undertake the kind of economic reforms that would move Russia away from being a petrol state.
There are Russians who say they don’t believe Putin will leave the Kremlin voluntarily. But there are other Russians who say he may well be preparing the path for a successor. We know he has put in power a number of younger people who could potentially be successors and who might understand the need for modernization. So in the longer run maybe such a policy would work. But right now that doesn’t look likely.

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The answer is that we are living in 2016, in a world that is profoundly different from the world of the Cold War in 1962. It is no longer bipolar, but multipolar; no longer are there two competing ideologies and systems; the economic, scientific, and military potential of today’s Russia is much lower than that of the Soviet Union. Today, local and hybrid conflicts, not superpower proxy wars, drive international relations.

Russian intervention in Syria – which was meant not only to force the United States to work again with Russiaʼs President Vladimir Putin, but also to demonstrate the military prowess of Russia – implies a false impression of Russia’s influence: Moscow and Washington are both important players, but by no means are they the only ones in the Middle East. Both have only limited influence on the outcome of the Syrian disaster, and both are constrained by the situation on the ground.

Both in Russia and the West some might be tempted to feel nostalgic for the stability of the Cold War era. But this nostalgia is much more a product of today’s uncertainty than of the reality of the East-West conflict. Why then did Prime Minister Medvedev refer to a “new Cold War”, and to what degree are his intentions in line with Western interpretations?

Russia’s leaders are struggling to return their country to its former great power status. They want to be recognized by the West, particularly by the US, as one of the important poles in a multipolar world, one that must be consulted as part of any plan to solve pressing international crises.

To think that Russia’s leaders are aiming for a restoration of the Soviet Union is a misconception – and not even realistic by Putin’s standards. Moscow rather attempts to use the prestige of the former Soviet Union to ensure recognition of modern Russia’s sphere of influence, and to be accepted as a superpower equal. While in Western media the Medvedev speech was primarily interpreted as a threat from Moscow, Russian media read it – and Medvedev’s presence in Munich – as possible steps towards de-escalation and negotiation with the West.

The reference to a new Cold War is a symbol and an instrument at the same time. It implies that Russia is again on the same level as the US – just as the “red empire” was. At the same time it serves as a warning that a military confrontation with Russia could lead to disaster, as it nearly did in 1962 when Armageddon was narrowly averted during the Cuba crisis.

In his speech, Medvedev alluded to nuclear war in a purely theoretical sense. But it is crucial to keep in mind that Russia is a nuclear power and that a nuclear war remains a possibility. Russia’s nuclear arsenal and its seat on the UN Security Council are important leftovers from the Soviet Union that the West cannot ignore. Even under the current economic crisis, the Russian government prioritizes investment in the modernization of its nuclear weapons.

The discussion about the possibility of a new Cold War with Russia is not only misleading, but also dangerous. It creates the impression – both to Western “realists” and Russian leaders – that Moscow and the West could cooperate in a transactional way now as they did back then. That implies that a deal with Moscow is possible.

The Putin regime, however, is hardly comparable to Soviet leadership. It is much weaker in terms of economic performance and self-confidence. It is a crony regime, lacking any long-term strategy except staying in power. The decision to stop economic reform, in combination with the high costs of Russia’s attempt to perform as a global power will further weaken Russia.  The weaker Russia becomes, the more aggressively its leadership will act to distract from its failures. There is no deal possible with a regime that is not willing, and sometimes not able, to fulfill its agreements. For Putin there are no rules except the power of the strongest.

No Rules, No Red Lines

The main challenge of today’s world is that there are no rules and no red lines in international relations as there were before 1991. Russia is the primary force undermining the existing European order. That behavior might not be restricted to Russia only – after all, Washington reshuffled the landscape of the Middle East, all while ignoring international law. But at the moment Russia is the main threat to European security.

There is no balance of power possible in today’s international order. The world of globalization is much more interconnected than the bipolar world ever was; unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is a part of the global economy, which has a fundamental impact on developments within the country. At the same time, there are no limits to Russia’s interference in Western society. After all, Russian leadership has learned to use Western vulnerabilities to undermine the credibility of Western media, politics, and governance. Interdependence is a weapon wielded by both the West (in the form of sanctions) and Russia (in undermining democratic systems), and at the same time a threat to both Western societies and the survival of the Russian regime.

To accept the paradigm of the Cold War would mean giving Russia a role in international politics that it cannot fill and it would mean that it is possible to negotiate with the current Russian leadership. Again, this is an illusion and one that will not last long. Trust is the most important currency in international relations. Russia’s leadership has lost both trust and credibility. And here we see yet another difference: Soviet leadership also wanted recognition as a legitimate and equal power. But it understood the importance of rules and red lines.

What Germany and the EU have to do is to strengthen our own resilience in terms of domestic policy and military capabilities. We need to make dangerous provocations in the EU neighborhood more expensive for Russia. At the same time, we need to rebuild trust between Russia and the West – to achieve that, we need a partner with similar interests.

At the moment, the first priority should be improving communication channels and crisis-response mechanisms with Russia. All existing institutions where Russia plays a role should be upgraded and developed, and their rules rebuilt and reinforced. Above and beyond we need arms control, dialog platforms, and institutions capable of enforcing rules.

At the same time, our security and the security of our neighbors need to be a policy priority. NATO might become even more important to Europe while the EU simultaneously needs to grow its own capabilities independent of the US. Institution-building in the common neighborhood needs to include security institutions. The states in question need to improve their ability to protect their own security and borders.

This is not a new Cold War. We may be facing a situation that is even more dangerous.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – March/April 2016 issue.

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German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel’s “private” trip to Moscow at the end of October has to be interpreted in the context of a slow shift in Germany’s Russia policy. The SPD leader claimed he did not understand why German-Russian relations had deteriorated over the last ten years and promised to help win legislative support for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project – positions that by no means represent the prevelant view among the German political elite. But the fact that Gabriel was able to make the trip at all – undermining Chancellor Angela Merkel’s hard line on Russia without earning a reaction from the chancellery – shows the change that is underway.

When Gabriel linked the need for Russian cooperation on Syria and the so-called Islamic State (IS) with the Ukraine crisis in September, it represented a first attempt to shift German political discourse on Russia. Merkel’s reaction at the time was prompt: she immediately denied any connection between Syria and Ukraine. This time, she seemed to be too occupied with the refugee crisis to respond in public. What is even more alarming: due to the refugee crisis, the terror attacks in Paris, and the growing influence of euroskeptic populist parties in the EU, the chancellery has a growing interest in solving the Ukraine problem. That means that, from a German perspective, implementing the “Minsk 2” accords is a must – and it is increasingly possible that Germany will push for its completion before Ukraine is ready.

The German Foreign Office is currently preparing a road map for elections in the separatist regions of Donbass and Luhansk to get the Minsk 2 agreement implemented – a job that will only grow more pressing next year when Germany assumes the chairmanship of the OSCE, which is responsible for observing the elections and certifying them free and fair. This will put Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko under a great deal of pressure to implement the decentralization law and accept elections in the separatist regions, steps that could even further destabilize his position in Ukrainian politics.

Yet as long as the borders with Russia are open and there is no security and no free media – and criminal warlords are able to operate in an extra-legal space – free and fair elections are impossible. It would be impossible to send civil election observers from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights into such a region without undermining the credibility of the OSCE.

And while several of these future variables remain uncertain, one thing is already clear: it is not Russia that is compromising in eastern Ukraine, but the EU – especially the larger member states, many of which have an interest in resolving the Donbass problem quickly and improving the relations with Moscow.

European politicians have been emphasizing that since the beginning of September the ceasefire agreement has (more or less) worked. But this merely represents the success of a traditional Russian tactic: create a problem and then “solve” the problem you have created, and make the other side believe that you have thus reached a compromise. We have accepted that Putin is willing to compromise because we lack any alternative to the Minsk process; yet the Minsk 2 agreement already conceded too much to Russia, with many areas left vague and open to re-interpretation.

All this plays into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin. When Putin punctuated his September address at the UN General Assembly with military strikes in Syria, it became clear how much he was willing to do to force negotiation with other international leaders, particularly the US president. And Putin’s timing could hardly be better: as the West has no strategy for restoring stability in Syria and Iraq or fighting IS, it will clutch at any aid Putin offers – even if Putin himself has no plan beyond supporting Syria’s discredited ruler Bashar al-Assad.

Russia’s inclusion in the Vienna Process confirms that, following his meeting with Obama at the G20 summit in Ankara, Putin is to be a part of a diplomatic initiative to solve the Syrian disaster. Thus even if the Vienna format represents a step forward, it also presents Russian leadership an opportunity for a new round of diplomatic games – and once more, it is not Russia that is moving to compromise, but the West. Assad has become at least in the short and medium term a part of the solution in Syria. That is what Putin has always wanted – for his authoritarian ally being welcomed to the negotiating table, and his concept of a stabile rump state to be accepted by the West. How all this will work with the Syrian opposition nobody knows, but the main thing is that Russia is back – and we no longer speak of the Ukraine problem.

It is frightening how much European leaders are driven by the needs of crisis management, winning short term gains without any plan to secure long-term interests. With his support for Nord Stream 2 and trip to Moscow, Sigmar Gabriel has acted as though he is a purely domestic politician, one who is not concerned by Russian foreign policy. He knows how unpopular Merkel’s approach towards Russia is in his own party, and is exploiting her weakness. Germanys OSCE chairmanship next year, along with the idea promoted by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to engage with Russia in a Eurasian Economic Union-EU context, will give Russian leaders plenty of space to finish undermining the credibility of Merkel’s Russia policy.

A new Neue Ostpolitik remains unlikely as long as Russia makes no real compromises to rebuild trust with German leaders, and Nord Stream 2 will not help Vladimir Putin to reengage with Germany on a broader level. Ukraine, however, may well fall victim to these developments – it is increasingly seen as a hindrance to normalizing relations with Moscow. Yet to destabilize the government in Kiev while pressing it to fulfill Minsk 2 might create a next much bigger crisis, one which must be managed by Berlin.

It would be good for German leaders to think carefully before selling out their own values and principles. This is not a new German realpolitik which deals with the reality of Putin’s regime, but a slow return to a policy of hope rather than fact.

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In an essay on the “Revenge of the Revisionist Powers” in Foreign Affairs, US political scientist Walter Russell Mead thoroughly examines the mistakes of Western thinking after 1989-90.^[1] In his view, we misunderstood the collapse of the Soviet Union: although it was indeed a triumph of liberal, free market democracy over communism, it in no way offered proof that tough power politics had become obsolete.

In fact, China, Iran, and Russia never accepted the framework of the post-Cold War order. Their temporary willingness to play by the new rules was only a function of their relative weakness – it was not an agreement to hold to Western principles. The current crisis in the Western-dominated order may come as a surprise, but only because the West had refused to accept that this order was dependent on power differentials remaining unchanged.

This means Europe may have reached the limit of the stability it can achieve on the continent via expansion of integration projects. The approach worked with the eastern expansion of NATO and the EU between 1999 and 2004, but then met with significant Russian resistance, first in Georgia in 2008, and then dramatically in Ukraine. Over the previous 25 years Moscow may have wanted to influence the European security order from within. Now, it has instead declared a “Ruxit” (Josef Janning^[2]), and begun to create a political and ideological alternative to the West.

Let us assume that the West failed to integrate Russia in a lasting post-Cold War European security order. Should we not correct this mistake and prevent a further disintegration of the situation with a new deal that redefines the rules and takes Russian misgivings into account?

And if the security order has already been thoroughly destroyed, do we then have to choose between two options for the future – “new rules” whereby the West has to compromise on some of its principles, or “no rules” and the threat of chaos?

Wrong Analogies

Or would it rather be helpful to turn to the past for ideas? In some ways today’s situation is similar to that of the 1950s, “when the Soviet Union sought acknowledgement of the territorial status quo and legitimation of its influence in Europe,” write Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull, and Kirsten Wesphal^[3] from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). The West’s answer back then was the Harmel Report with its combined approach of deterrence and dialogue and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which led to a modus vivendi. We need a similar new beginning for our security policy, the authors claim, which stresses “security and cooperation,” and would “bring about a peaceful coexistence and ‘coevolution’ between (in short) Western ideas of domestic political order and those of Russia.”

This new order would be rooted in an “acknowledgement of realities” and be oriented around three principles. The principles of national territorial integrity and domestic self-determination must be upheld. The EU must concentrate on strengthening effective statehood along its peripheries – without interfering in sensitive political questions of democracy, media, or elections. Relations with Russia should be stabilized over energy supply and the promotion of long-term trade links. The authors admit that the Europeans will find it difficult to pay the high political price for such compromise. But in their view, “securing a lasting peaceful coexistence in the pan-European region is worth the effort.”

Impractical and Unacceptable

There is, without doubt, some merit to those suggestions. After all, the authors have found the courage to nail down the somewhat nebulous vision of a “new bargain” with Russia with specific measures. At the same time, it is obvious why such a deal is neither practicable nor desirable.

First, the analogy with the 1950s is simply wrong. The current Russian government is less concerned with legitimizing the status quo. It is far more interested in changing it by undermining the principle of self-determination of the states between its territory and the EU. Would “new order” guidelines not in the end lead to the recognition of a Russian zone of influence – even before it has been established?

No less important is a second aspect: Russia’s attack on Ukraine is not aimed against potential membership in NATO or the EU. It is instead primarily against Ukraine’s transition to a functioning democracy. As it is not the West’s promotion of democracy in Eastern Europe that is arousing Moscow’s ire but rather the democratic wishes of the Ukrainians themselves, it would be a mistake to expect symbolic gestures of the West to make any difference to Putin. Moscow sees successful democracies in its immediate neighborhood as a significant threat to the stability of its own regime ­– whether or not those democracies are supported by the West.

The principle of “domestic self-determination” in these “new rules” is also highly problematic. There are two different ways of interfering in another state’s business: “interference” in the sense of EU-type conditionality, to which countries wanting to join the union freely subscribe, and Russian blackmail, which aims to prevent a country from making its own decisions. Russia does not accept “interference” of the first kind, and were the EU to compromise on this it would be a betrayal of one of its fundamental principles.

A policy based on the coexistence of systems would be impossible for a values-based EU to accept – and damaging to its interests. Furthermore, such a policy change would be incompatible with the second guideline: strengthening effective statehood is in most cases hard to imagine without democratization.

No New Cold War

The idea of a new overarching European order including Russia is flawed if it fails to include necessary conditions. Such an agreement would require a minimum of trust ­– trust that has been significantly damaged by Moscow. If we are to learn anything from the analogy with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we must focus on its open character – the framework of a new peace was only formulated at the end of the process in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and not at the beginning.

In light of current domestic developments in Russia, a long phase of relative instability and recurring tensions seems inevitable. This does not, however, mark the beginning of a new Cold War. The West must remain ready to talk, not only about Ukraine, but also about the many other global questions in which Russia could play a part – including Iran, the Middle East, and energy supply, among others.

The principle of the 1967 Harmel Report was “détente with adequate defense.” Western strategy must be built equally on the pillars of deterrence plus containment, and on internal coherence and strength of the EU. This will also strengthen Western negotiating positions.

Russia is currently not ready to become a “responsible stakeholder” within a new pan-European order. The West should not put its fundamental values up for negotiation in the naive belief that such a gamble could secure a “long-term peaceful coexistence.”

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^[1]     Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014.

^[2]     Josef Janning, “Ruxit Is Real: Russia’s Exit from Europe,” ECFR commentary, February 27, 2015.

^[3]     Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull, Kirsten Westphal, “The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning,” SWP Comments no. 18, March 2015.

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Artwork: Cristóbal Schmal

It is also a mistake to focus too much on Putin’s persona: In George Kennan’s famous 1946 Long Telegram, the ultimate strategy paper of the Cold War period, Stalin’s name was only mentioned once. When deciding what to do over the next few months, we must keep in mind that Russia’s current aggressive behavior is a product not only of its strengthened capabilities, but also its internal weakness and growing anxiety. In other words, in order to grasp the difficulties ahead of us, think not only of the Putin factor but also of the Kadyrov factor in Russian politics – what other actors, like Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, are likely to force Putin to do.

A lack of insight into the Kremlin’s master plan – if it exists – does not, however, mean that we cannot clearly see some of Russia’s objectives in the current crisis: Russia aims, among other things, to decouple Europe from the United States, weaken (and even split) the EU, and prevent Ukraine from becoming a functioning state. What is needed in response is not simply “European unity,” but unity that can be sustained for a long period of time. This should be the central logic when crafting sanctions policy. Brussels should design a framework for EU member states that reduces the temptation for constant renegotiation as a result of domestic policy changes.
At present, our ultimate priority is not to convince Russia to change its objectives – this would be difficult – but to change its weapon of choice: “hybrid warfare.” The demilitarization of the conflict is our most pressing task.

Russia has some advantages in the short term, but time does not work in its favor. This leads me to believe that a frozen conflict in the Donets Basin would be preferable to the highly risky and uncertain process of Ukrainian federalization. The state-building process in Ukraine will be a very messy and uncertain enterprise anyway, and increasing that risk by introducing a Bosnia-type constitution would be the wrong policy.

Rather, we should convince the Ukrainian government that at present the best option is to install peacekeepers along the existing ceasefire lines and support the reconstruction of Ukraine proper and the Donbass as two separate projects. We should also keep in mind that if we increase the economic cost for Russia of sustaining Crimea and the Donbass, there is a danger that we push it toward further military action.

EU economic investment in Ukraine is another necessary short-term strategy. While it is considered bad taste to talk about spending money in Europe these days, without heavy investment in Ukraine to help its people survive the present crisis we could end up with a black hole at the center of the continent. And failure in Ukraine would mean that Russia’s strategy is succeeding. Empty promises of EU or NATO membership are no substitute for immediate sizable economic investment in Ukraine – symbolic politics in the absence of real commitment has already cost us dearly in this crisis.

When we talk about the EU’s medium- and long-term strategies toward Russia, the choices are of a different nature. We should be prepared for prolonged confrontation marked by both escalation and de-escalation of tensions. At any given moment we could be confronting Russia on one front while cooperating with it on another. The dynamics of this relationship will be determined more by internal problems faced by the EU and Russia than by the logic of geopolitical rivalry.

Thus a long-term strategy will require three pillars:

First, there is a need for a credible deterrence strategy in response to the military threat emanating from Moscow. Unfortunately, economic and political problems at home can make Russia increasingly aggressive. Any successful policy of deterrence must assume a common transatlantic strategy.

Second, we need consolidation within European values-based institutions. Putin’s game with the EU’s far right and far left as well as the temptation of some EU members to play their own small politics necessitates efforts increasing EU internal cohesion. Let us be frank: The success of Russia’s propaganda lies in large part in the public’s growing mistrust of European elites. Putin is trying to take advantage of this situation, but he did not create it. I happily advocate immediate Russian expulsion from the Council of Europe and will be even happier to readmit it when it truly shares the values of the organization.

Third, we need a long-term strategy for reengagement with Russia – not on the basis of shared values, but on the basis of shared interests. Several things have happened as a result of the Ukrainian crisis: China has emerged as a major power in Eurasia; the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has become a reality, albeit a contested one; and Russia’s dependence on China has increased. Facing this new reality, the EU should think in terms of a Eurasian order and not simply a European one.

Observing political dynamics in Central Asia, where several countries teeter on the brink of troublesome power transitions, we should declare our readiness to work with the EEU; at the very least it should not be the EU’s objective to kill the project. At the same time we should try to bring China into the OSCE-centered discussion about the security architecture of the Eurasian space. This will not be an easy process. At the moment China’s interest in exploiting the economic potential of Eurasia is aligned with the EU’s interest in pressing Russia to denounce military power as an instrument for achieving its objectives – in other words, the EU and China prefer the same tool of economic competition, but do not share values or common goals. In the long run, China’s economic and political presence – not only in Eurasia, but also in Europe itself – could be a risk factor for the EU, but this is probably a risk worth taking.

While trying to find a name for this strategy, I was reminded of Rilke’s beautiful line from Requiem: “Who speaks of victory? / To endure is all.” A Rilke Strategy is what the EU needs – one that does not promise a spectacular victory, but rather the survival of the EU as a liberal project.

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The Russian leadership’s use of force and multiple explicit threats – including nuclear threats – drastically transforms the nature of Russian relations with the EU and the US. The West might have at times mismanaged Moscow, but the deliberate decision to move away from the post-Cold War order is a Russian decision. It is accompanied by a growing reliance on nationalism and a geopolitical project entitled Eurasian Economic Union which unequivocally aims to reestablish uncontested Russian influence in its near abroad and restore Russia as a major power.

This new Russia should, however, not be confused with the Soviet Union. It is economically fragile and further weakened by the decline in oil prices, as well as by limited Western economic sanctions which have discouraged investors. In spite of a rapidly growing defense budget (an increase of 152 percent since 2001) and an ambitious military and nuclear modernization, the Russian Federation is not in a position to be a genuine military threat to NATO and Europe, at least in the realm of conventional weapons. Lastly, the future of domestic politics remains unpredictable, as the popularity of the Russian president may or may not last.

The most difficult challenge for Europe – and the West in general – is to manage two major asymmetries. First, Russia has the upper hand in the short term, while in the longer term the sustainability of Putin’s policy is questionable. Second, there is an asymmetry as far as political will on both sides is concerned. Putin has already sent weapons and troops to Ukraine and lost soldiers, whereas Europeans and Americans have often appeared divided and reluctant to fully acknowledge the gravity of events. Against the backdrop of these two imbalances, Putin retained the initiative, whereas the West has often seemed only to react.

Overcoming these problems and taking into account the lessons of 2014, a new Russia strategy should rely on the following pillars:

First and foremost, the West needs to recognize the reality of a deeply transformed European security environment and relationship with Russia and should no longer expect to go back to “normal” as it did after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. The current state of affairs is the “new normal.” A naive approach underestimating these changes to preserve our comfort would only be perceived as weakness and trigger further unwelcome action by Putin.

Second, NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities need to be restored in order to make any aggression – even in the form of hybrid warfare – against any NATO or EU member state unthinkable, as solidarity amongst allies would be guaranteed. The September 2014 NATO summit in Wales was a first opportunity to address the shortfalls of the alliance’s military posture and improve its ability to address a European contingency. These efforts should continue. The best way to preserve peace in Europe is to make a major war impracticable through robust defense and deterrence, including its nuclear component. The allies should be unimpressed by Russian efforts to bully some of them and ready to display unconditional solidarity should the need arise.

Third, on Ukraine, a two-track policy should be pursued. The Minsk II agreement offers a fragile and narrow path toward peaceful settlement. Its full implementation, including the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over its entire territory and borders, is the real test of Russia’s attitude in this crisis. Events since the first Minsk agreement, however, only allow for moderate optimism. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, it is urgent to strengthen Ukrainian democracy and foster better governance through democratic, economic, and military assistance in order to reduce its vulnerability to Russian pressures, either direct or by proxy. This will come at significant financial cost, but it does not compare with the much higher price of Ukrainian collapse.

Fourth, Moscow stands as a difficult but important partner in the management of a number of international crises (Iranian nuclear negotiations, Syrian Civil War, etc.) and will continue as such for the foreseeable future. Russia also remains a significant economic partner for Europe. A policy combining realistic engagement and increasing repercussions for Putin’s unacceptable behavior currently seems the best way forward. However, this needs to be pursued with the mid- and long terms in view, as the effectiveness of sanctions will increase as time passes. Should the situation arise, the EU and the West should not hesitate to immediately sanction the breakdown of the Ukrainian peace process or further Russian actions in Ukraine or elsewhere.

The real challenge for Europe and the West vis-à-vis Putin’s Russia is to preserve the firmness and consistency of its policy: deterring further aggression through a robust defense posture, staying firm on democratic and governance principles, supporting Ukraine, and refusing to enter into rhetorical escalation, all while disallowing violations of agreements and rules.

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Beyond sanctioning certain segments of the Russian elite and specific branches of the economy, German and European policy needs a positive agenda to present to the Russian public. Thus easing of visa restrictions (such as the removal of visa fees or the lowering of entrance requirements) for the great majority of the Russian population should now follow the travel ban on leading representatives of Putin’s system. EU member states could in part make such changes immediately within the existing legal framework, and the act would be symbolic of a policy of engagement with Russian society. Further, existing exchange programs for young elites, journalists, and students (such as the Erasmus program) should be massively expanded. Existing civil society exchange formats should receive more support, and a shift from the dominance of dialogue between elites to a broader dialogue with varied actors within Russian society should follow.

At the same time, improved communication with Russian society and the Russian-speaking minority within the EU must be used as a short-term instrument: Although the Russian leadership is trying to limit cultural exchange, the work of NGOs, and a free press, we can pursue communication streams reaching Russian society directly to explain European policy decisions. Putin appears on German television – leading German and European politicians should do the same in Russia. The half-truths and lies of Russian policy and media outlets must be made transparent. To this end, an Internet platform (in German, English, and Russian) could be developed to systematically counter the Russian leadership’s propaganda through facts and levelheaded analysis, as well as to provide policy arguments. Further, Russian-language media offerings by EU member states should be increased, and a professional and independent Russian-language news program for broadcast on the pan-European channel euronews developed.

It is equally important to expand capacities for the analysis of political, cultural, economic, and security policy-related developments in every post-Soviet state, as well as to improve coordination between EU member states. To this end, cooperation between state and non-governmental institutions and closer coordination with existing political consulting institutes focusing on the countries in question are essential. Central to this is more effective coordination on the European level, as well as increased cooperative strategy development within existing EU frameworks.

Given the current Russian regime, no real policy change is possible; the Russian leadership is using every resource at its command in its fight to retain power, and only regime change could usher in real change. Such change can only come from inside Russia itself, which appears unlikely for the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, there is a risk of further Russian destabilization due to increasingly difficult economic conditions and the strengthening of nationalistic forces at the cost of liberal ones. For this reason, we must pursue a mixture of containment and engagement: keeping Russia in check where necessary and cooperating with it wherever possible, with the aim of medium- to long-term policy change. Projects working to prevent further Russian isolation or to increase understanding of Russian policy must be counted here. Such projects should not legitimize the Russian leadership – as has been the case with the Russo-German Petersburg Dialogue – but rather be developed into true civil society platforms.

In the short term, the situation in Ukraine must be stabilized through agreements recognizing the limited sovereignty of common neighbor states. For the medium term, this means abandoning NATO integration of Ukraine and other states in the region. Parallel to this, new concepts and increased resources are required to enable the stabilization of security institutions in states outside of NATO as well as to offer them a membership perspective over the long term. Should the EU’s policies fail in its immediate neighborhood, its entire security and foreign policy will be called into question.

The OSCE is simply too weak an instrument to negotiate with Russia on security matters or to ensure the security of Ukraine. We must continue to work within the OSCE framework to secure the Ukrainian-Russian border and to include the separatists in that dialogue; at the same time, however, we need to develop a new format in which to discuss these complex hard security questions. The NATO-Russia Council could be one such forum, given that NATO cannot be blocked unilaterally by the Russians and that the US – both a negotiating partner and important security policy actor – is included.

The conflict with Russia is a long-term challenge that requires both a fundamental strategy change as well as a stronger German and EU policy focus, expanded across the entire post-Soviet region. The destabilization potential of the current Russian regime is enormous – both domestically and in its neighborhood. Such a policy change requires grounded analysis, improved cooperation with other EU countries, and consultation with the US. Germany’s improved Eastern European policy will require closer coordination of all parties active in the region.

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Do not demonize Vladimir Putin and exaggerate his significance. The role of Russia’s president is weighty, but the country is going through a difficult transformation that follows its own logic. Contemporary Russia is not a product of Putin. Rather, Putin is a stage in Russia’s development. The fall of the Soviet Union meant not only the collapse of the previous form of statehood, but also of a common lifestyle and identity. Russia is beginning to pull out of the Soviet rut, but its society has yet to build a new foundation. Twenty-five post-Soviet years have amounted to an unsuccessful transition, leading the country into a blind alley. This state of affairs started long before Putin, and its consequences will be felt long after he is gone.

Do not count on coercing Russia with force and military pressure. Russian history shows that all attempts to influence the country from the outside have led to Russian society closing ranks, with disastrous results for those trying to exert influence. Russia’s main enemy has always been – and remains – its incapacity for timely internal renewal, but only Russia itself is capable of managing its own development, creating conditions for bringing about or avoiding disasters. Outside pressure gives rise to national pride, even in those who are dissatisfied with the government in place.

Do not think that Russia is destined to interact with the West, and that sooner or later it will realize it. It is true that Russia has witnessed two centuries of intellectual discussion on the subject of its Western or non-Western orientation. Those who regard the Western vector as inevitable have always prevailed. However, until now this was not a real choice – Asia could not serve as a source of economic development and innovation. Today the West is still in the lead, but Asia is growing into an ever-larger competitor. Russian supporters of an Asian orientation are putting forward concrete arguments and are offering concrete opportunities. If current trends persist, the picture of Russia’s external relations and its priorities will look quite different. China is ready to invest huge resources into the construction of Eurasian infrastructure, which will bind Russia tightly to the East.

It is pointless to explain to Russia its “genuine interests.” Europeans make this mistake often; Americans make it all the time. This causes genuine irritation and triggers an inclination to act differently.

Do leave history alone and do not call on Russia to reevaluate its past. Both Russia and Europe have had many different historical narratives and views of events, and so it is better to avoid going into this altogether. Otherwise a heated conflict is inevitable, especially since Russia is going through a period of creating a new identity wherein the past plays an important role.

Do not tell Moscow that the West has abandoned the zero-sum approach and is formulating its policies based on the common good. First of all, it is not true; each country – or group of countries – regards its own interests as primary. Secondly, no one will believe it anyway, in Russia or in the rest of the world, but will regard it as hypocrisy. A rational conversation about the balance of powers and interests would be much more productive.

Do not pay attention to all of the public statements coming out of Moscow. In today’s communication environment, where information flows resemble tsunamis, even diplomats have stopped thinking about what they are saying. What counts is the speed and toughness of the response, which in Internet communication is known as trolling – the art of deliberately, cleverly, and secretly pissing people off. The peculiar irony of Russian responses (especially from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense) is sometimes a reaction to the total dominance of Western opinion on the global media scene. They attempt to outmaneuver it with the help of paradoxical and sarcastic pronouncements.

Do not regard Russia as an anomaly, and Putin as a person “living in a parallel reality.” The reality of Russian politics is the reality that the overwhelming majority of the world is accustomed to, one which has existed for the duration of human history. It is the EU that lives in a parallel reality, trying to build an entirely different type of international relations. The deviation from the norm is more likely to be found there.

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