© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

Over the past two decades or so, German foreign policy has been driven into two directions: some leading actors were looking West toward America, while others were rather looking East, toward Russia.

The red-green government of 1998 to 2005 provides a good example. In his second term, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democrats (SPD) concentrated on his relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin, in an attempt to counterbalance George W. Bush’s America, together with French President Jacques Chirac.

But while Schröder was exploiting his rejection of the Iraq war for electoral gains, his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer of the Greens, who was equally opposed to the Iraq war, continued to articulate fundamentally positive views of America (in a reversal of the anti-American views he had propagated as a left-wing protest leader in his youth).

Chancellor Angela Merkel, who took over from Schröder, is clearly a „Westerner.“ Having grown up in East Germany under Soviet domination, Merkel sees the US-led West as a political and cultural counter-model to what she experienced in her early years.

Her foreign ministers, however, have tended to focus rather on Russia. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Schröder’s former chief of staff, in his two terms (2005 to 2009 and 2013 to 2017) first tried to bring Russia closer to the West under the catchword “modernization partnership” and then, even as major tensions erupted over Ukraine, tirelessly kept arguing for cooperation and coordination with Moscow.

Guido Westerwelle, foreign minister from 2009 to 2013, was equally soft on Moscow, calling for “more respect.” Sigmar Gabriel, who succeeded Steinmeier in 2017, was an outspoken skeptic of the Russia sanctions over Ukraine and a driving force behind the project of a second gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, Nord Stream 2.

Schröder, Steinmeier, and Gabriel all belong to the SPD, which considers Ostpolitik as established by Willy Brandt in the 1970s its foreign policy trademark. Indeed, Ostpolitik still plays an important role in the Germany public discourse, especially in SPD circles. But while Ostpolitik during the Cold War was aimed at bringing political change in the east, and was oriented toward Central Europe no less than toward Russia, today the term has often become a shorthand for good relations with the Kremlin.

Maas’ Surprising Change

Against this backdrop, current foreign minister Heiko Maas—also a Social Democrat—has performed a surprising change of course. Maas himself is, broadly speaking, a “Westerner” like Merkel. He has a strong commitment to liberal, western values and puts special emphasis on international rules and institutions. His „West,“ however, seems sometimes to be more defined by France than by America (Maas comes from the Saar, a region neighboring France).

Shortly after becoming foreign minister in March this year, Maas made it clear that he wouldn’t follow in the footsteps of Steinmeier and Gabriel with regard to Russia. He refused to use the established rhetoric about the need “to build bridges” with Moscow and to “keep channels open,” which was so often paired with criticism of the West’s supposed “saber-rattling” vis-à-vis Russia.

Instead, Maas has set a new tone, noting that “if Russia defines itself more and more in distinction, even in antagonism to the West,” then this changes “the reality of our foreign policy.”

And more recently, Maas has started talking about the need for a “new Ostpolitik,” one that is more focused on Central Europe.

A key point of his new approach is that EU member states must better coordinate their policies toward Moscow: “We need an understanding between all EU members about the foundations of joint action” toward Russia, Maas said. A new Ostpolitik “must take into account the needs of all Europeans—those of the Baltic states and Poland as well as those of the western [European] countries.“

In order to achieve this unity, Germany should act as a bridge-builder, counterbalancing the recent drift between the EU’s East and West triggered by the refugee crisis. Rather than simply criticizing Eastern neighbors for their attitudes, “[Germans] must learn to see Europe more through the eyes of other Europeans,” Maas said. “We Germans in particular should stop taking the moral high ground on migration, especially vis-à-vis our partners from Central and Eastern Europe. Mutual finger wagging and moral arrogance will only deepen divisions.”

A first concrete step in that direction was Maas’ participation in the third summit of the Three Seas Initiative in Bucharest in September 2018, where he also made clear that Germany would like to join this group. The initiative, launched by Poland and Croatia, aims at improving regional cooperation on infrastructure and energy from the Baltic to the Mediterranean via the Black Sea.

In a speech in Bucharest in August, Maas laid out the strategic context of his vision. First, there is the goal, central for Maas, of “a sovereign and strong Europe” at a time when the Franco-German motor is no more “able to drive Europe forward alone.“

Second, there’s the challenge from China. “Europe must also guard itself against divisions from outside. China has clear ambitions with respect to power politics, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe”, Maas said. Therefore, “we need a common European policy in our dealings with China. Only then will China perceive us as a partner on an equal footing.”

Third, there is pressure from Russia. “The same goes for Russia. As Europeans, we must defend the principles of the European peace and security order.” Only “a culture of common, coordinated action in our approach to our eastern neighborhood” can produce good relations with Russia.

A New Sound

This is a new sound coming out of Berlin. Maas is putting to rest a Russia policy that has failed to achieve the desired results. Instead of becoming more liberal, democratic, and peaceful, Russia has turned more autocratic and aggressive toward its neighbors and the West.

At the same time, Maas is signaling that Germany understands the strategic importance of Central and Eastern Europe at a time of renewed great power-competition. This a region where Germany must be deeply engaged on its own, not just through the EU mechanism.

The biggest challenge for Maas will be to turn his ideas and initiatives into political reality. The foreign minister will need substantial support from the chancellery in order to convince Central European partners that the German push is genuine, especially because German credibility has been massively undermined by Berlin’s continued support for the Nord Stream 2 project.

And Germany must find a middle way, balancing a value-based approach toward Hungary and Poland (with regard to their attitudes to liberal democracy) and the need to keep Europe together in a competitive, multipolar geopolitical environment.

Working with Germany’s eastern neighbors on infrastructure and energy through the Three Seas initiative, as Maas has proposed, looks like a good first step.

The post Toward a “New Ostpolitik“? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Pavel Golovkin/Pool

Mr. Voigt, is Germany’s view of Russia special? Well, every relationship between one nation and another is special; many countries claim to have a special relationship with the United States, the British do and so do we. Naturally, in light of our history, we do have a special relationship with Russia – but so do others, including the Poles. They have a very negative one! In the Russian mind, the German-Russian relationship has always been important but not always negative. At the Congress of Vienna – or later the Congress of Berlin – Russia, the Habsburg monarchy, Britain, France, and Prussia were all part of a concert of European powers. Some want to return to this constellation. I’ve had Russian counterparts tell me that we need to revive this concept of a concert of big powers – a kind of a new Yalta conference, but this time with Germany, not about Germany. This is the exact opposite of what most German politicians think. It would also be unacceptable to the German public and run counter to our national interests. In our relationship with Russia in particular, we have to consider the interests of our neighbors in Eastern Europe, especially if they are part of NATO and the EU. Our allegiance to them and the EU is fundamental.

The Kremlin seems to be trying to drive wedges between EU member countries. I first visited Russia in the 1970s, and there’s always been a misunderstanding about the substance and character of European integration. But this is not a problem exclusive to Russia – the US president is also struggling with it.

But within your own party, the Social Democrats (SPD), there has been an ongoing debate about taking a softer tone with Moscow. Nostalgia for Ostpolitik seems to play a role, often seen as the good times … You have to remember that the “good times” started at a very low point – after the building of the Berlin Wall. There was a need for change. And that’s how the SPD started its détente strategy, with the assumption that the character of the Cold War could change over time. The SPD has always believed in a policy of cooperation and dialogue – something that has often been misunderstood as being too soft. That is a misreading of détente policy. Today the SPD leadership is very realistic about how Moscow’s policy has changed. Be it for internal or external reasons, Russia no longer wants to develop a Western-style democracy, and Moscow’s behavior toward Ukraine was totally unacceptable. The SPD therefore supported sanctions. Beyond that, we have to realistically assume that Russian policy has taken a negative turn over a long period of time, so it might take years before its policy takes a turn for the better again. That means in the foreseeable future, we have to test whether there are areas for useful cooperation in spite of these negative trends.
The annexation of Crimea did indeed spark internal discussions in the SPD, for example with Egon Bahr, the architect of Ostpolitik who died in 2015. But because of the changes in Russia’s policy, I myself – like former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and MP Gernot Erler, the government’s coordinator for relations with Russia – adjusted my position on Moscow accordingly.
Generally, those who sympathize with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his policies are often members of the older generation. Some are Social Democrats, but there are also people like Horst Teltschik, foreign policy adviser to former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and others from Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU party. For them, “east of us” is still dominated by the memory of the Soviet Union. Today, Russia is still a major player east of the EU and NATO. But it is not more important than our relationships inside the EU and NATO, including ties with our smaller and medium-sized eastern neighbors. The younger generations have grown up with independent Baltic states and Ukraine. The older generation has difficulties grappling with the changed geopolitical situation. For the young, it is unthinkable to support someone who rules in an authoritarian way or who cracks down on homosexuality. Therefore they wouldn’t trust Putin.

Do you think it’s problematic that Putin’s Russia is often seen as a normal country, when in fact it is a kleptocratic system? We also find that in a lot of other countries. In Ukraine, political oligarchs are even more numerous than in Russia, so the problem is not unique to Russia. Regrettably, you find it in Romania and Bulgaria as well, both members of the EU.

You mean we have to live with it? No, we stand for our values. These values and principles were formulated in the Paris Charter, which the Soviet Union signed. Russia has not withdrawn its signature – but it is violating the agreement. That doesn’t mean that the values of the Paris Charter are rendered invalid! They are still valid, but we cannot change Russia from outside; we can only help when it wants to change. The same is true for Ukraine.

The Kremlin thinks it can make a difference in Western elections … Yes but that’s actually nothing new, either. When I was leader of the SPD youth wing in the 1970s, there were constant attempts to influence certain elements within our party. Today those attempts have taken on a different character. Moscow is no longer defending Marxism-Leninism, and the ideological component has become less important. It has changed but not disappeared. The geostrategic conditions are very different now. The SPD leadership knows that very well.

How powerful is Russia today? On one side it is the most powerful nuclear state, together with the US. Russia’s sheer size gives it a lot of weight not only in Europe but also in large parts of Asia and the Middle East. In that sense, it’s a world power. In other areas, though, it is a regional power, and economically, it is limited. The Russians are looking to regain their old status and that shouldn’t come as a surprise. But to be strong militarily and weak economically is in the long run not a stable foundation for a country aspiring to be a world power. Obviously, Putin thinks that he can separate technical modernization from societal modernization, but that is not likely to work. I deeply regret that Russia is stagnating; its society is deadlocked, even though they think they’re moving forward. This is bad for Russia and also for us. Russia is the biggest potential challenge and partner east of the EU, while for the US, China is the biggest challenge and partner. What many Russians have interpreted as America’s deliberate attempts to limit Moscow’s influence were in reality a lack of interest in Russia.

Moscow certainly has made some waves in the US of late. Yes, they have regained the attention of the US, but in a negative context. Whether the presidency of Donald Trump is a success for them, well, I have my doubts.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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