© REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

On June 2, 2020 the Presidential Administration of Russian Federation published a new decree, titled “On the principles of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence.” Though the text itself claims to be a planning document, it is in fact not exact enough for military planning purposes; nor is it a strategy. It does not even contain any clear references to Russia’s existing security policy documents.

Instead, the decree, five-and-a-half pages long, is a declarative text, designed for consumption mostly by the outside world. Thus, the Kremlin is sending a message about its own thinking on the use of nuclear weapons; more concretely, it serves the informational support of Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy.

The Use of Nuclear Weapons

The text outlines four main cases, in which Russia may use nuclear weapons in retaliation for various forms of attacks. In the first case, Russia would use the nuclear option if it received confirmed information about ballistic missiles having been launched against the territory of Russia and/or its allies. Though the document does not specify it, Russian experts interpret the term “confirmed” as information provided by Russia’s own early-warning systems.

A remarkable detail is that the text does not specify whether this applies to an attack with ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) only, or with any ballistic missiles. This part is often interpreted as a manifestation of Moscow’s long-standing concerns regarding a mass non-nuclear strike launched with high-precision weapons. At present only the US would be capable of launching such an attack and China might gain similar capabilities soon; however, the Russian document does not specify any country as a source of threat.

The second eventuality is an attack by nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia and/or its allies, or by any other weapons of mass destruction. This option is not new; it can be found in the current military doctrine too, published in 2014, as well as in previous doctrines.

In the third case, Moscow would launch a nuclear strike if enemy activities were to target those elements of Russia’s military infrastructure in a way that would endanger Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities. Again, it is noteworthy that it remains unclear whether the attack would need to be nuclear to trigger the retaliatory strike or not. Both Russian and Western experts interpret this as the Kremlin’s intention to deter cyber-attacks against Russia’s critical military infrastructure.

The fourth case would be reached if the Russian Federation falls under a type of conventional attack that would endanger the very existence of the state. This part is not new either. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in the vicinity of Russia there is only country that has sufficient conventional forces for an attack of such a scale: China.

The document emphasizes that the Russian government considers the use of nuclear weapons only as a means of defense. However, this is not fully equal to a “no first use policy,” as Moscow reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear/WMD attacks.

Purposeful Ambiguity

In some passages of the presidential decree, its authors have purposefully avoided clear-cut wording, leaving room for multiple interpretations. The most important ambiguity is that the document does not differentiate between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Hence, it is unclear whether this decree applies to all nuclear weapons, or whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons is based on different considerations.

What makes this relevant is that while the possession, production, storage, and use of strategic nuclear weapons is a field that has been relatively well-regulated by arms control treaties, the state of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons is absolutely non-transparent. Moscow has consistently resisted repeated US efforts to bring tactical nuclear weapons under the umbrella of arms control processes.

The document also leaves it unclear whether nuclear deterrence applies to conventional weapons of strategic effect as well, i.e. to hypersonic weapons, high-energy lasers, space-launched conventional weapons, etc. Nor does it mention cyber threats in particular. It is also remarkable that the third case for using nuclear weapons, i.e. enemy activities against Russia’s critical state and military infrastructure, does not specify which elements of infrastructure count as “critical.”

De-Escalation by Escalation

The decree reflects a well-known characteristic of Russian military theory, namely that when it comes to the de-escalation of conventional conflicts, there is no clear line between conventional and nuclear deterrence. It is important to note, however, that using nuclear deterrence is not equal to actually launching nuclear weapons. Instead, nuclear deterrence is composed of a complex, multi-layered set of measures, such as declarations, exercises, demonstrative deployments, and a number of other steps which fall short of actually firing a nuclear missile, but may already have the desired deterring effect.

This approach has been present in Russian military thinking for decades. Moreover, simulated nuclear strikes have been part of many major strategic military exercises since the late 1990s. Nevertheless, the decree constitutes the first case of the Kremlin co-opting the concept of de-escalating conventional conflicts by employing nuclear deterrence. Of course, this very declaration itself is an integral part of Moscow’s nuclear deterrence policy.

Sending a Message

The timing seems not to be coincidental. In approximately half a year, in February 2021, the START treaty—the last remaining strategic arms control treaty between the United States and Russia—expires. Hence, it is quite likely that the publication of the document is meant to serve the purpose of motivating the US to continue the negotiations about a new START treaty, and possibly also about the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The fact that nuclear disarmament negotiations between Washington and Moscow have re-started in Vienna on June 22 indicates that framing that meeting was also part of the idea.

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© REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

When Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, it banned all American and Soviet (and later Russian) land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and resulted in the destruction of nearly 2,700 missiles.

In 2014, the United States charged that Russia had violated the INF Treaty by testing a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile (later identified as the 9M729, also called Iskander), and in 2017, US officials said that Russia had actually deployed the 9M729. Russian officials deny that charge and assert that it’s the US that is not in compliance.

On October 20, 2018, President Trump declared that the United States would withdraw from the treaty, and in early December, US officials announced that, if Russia did not return to full compliance within 60 days, the United States would suspend its obligations under the treaty (which would relieve Russia of observing its commitments as well).

If we take the US accusation to be true—that Russia has been violating the INF Treaty for many years—then it is indeed logical that Washington withdraws from the treaty or suspends its obligations. The US cannot be expected to remain in the treaty forever if Russia does not correct its violation. However, the timing and manner of President Trump’s decision—announced at a campaign rally in the western state of Nevada—amounts to a major blunder.

A Series of Missteps

First, his announcement was immediately divisive among NATO allies. Senior officials in Paris, Berlin, Rome, and other European capitals have expressed regret and even strong criticism. Amazingly, Washington apparently did not consult with allies about the decision before Trump’s announcement. That stands in stark contrast to when the treaty was negotiated and US officials consulted frequently with NATO allies, aware of the agreement’s impact on member states’ security: Russian intermediate-range missiles can strike targets in Europe (and Asia), but they cannot reach the US. While the treaty was global in scope, it focused on enhancing European security. NATO foreign ministers backed the US position at their December 4 meeting, but there is no agreement yet on how NATO should respond.

Second, by the time that Trump made his announcement, the White House had provided little substance publicly to back up its charge that the 9M729 missile violates the treaty. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats provided more detail on November 30, but the Russians continue to deny the charge and assert that the US has overstepped the treaty rules. This looks like it will degenerate into a war of words between Washington and Moscow. US withdrawal from the treaty will also ensure that it gets most of the blame for the treaty’s demise.

Third, once the treaty’s limits are abandoned, the Russian military will no longer have to pretend that it is observing those limits. It will be free to deploy the Iskander as well as other intermediate-range missiles. The US military currently has no land-based counterpart. As a result, an arms race in intermediate-range missiles may begin in Europe, but it will be one-sided: only Russia will be racing.

The United States ends up the loser on all three counts. And European security loses out as well.

A Better Approach

The Trump administration could have taken other measures that would have had a greater chance of changing the Kremlin’s policy. As part of a strategy to bring Russia back into compliance in December 2017, US officials said that the Pentagon would begin research and development on a ground-launched intermediate-range missile. But that was hardly cause for concern in the Kremlin.

Actually fielding a new missile would take a number of years. Moreover, Russian officials likely calculated that NATO would not find consensus to deploy a new US missile in Europe—and they undoubtedly would be right. An intermediate-range missile based in the US would not bother Moscow much, since it could not reach Russia.

What else could Washington have done? The US military could have increased the number of conventionally-armed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles deployed in the European region. That could have been done quickly, it would have been compliant with US treaty obligations, and most importantly, it would have caught the attention of the Russian military.

Moreover, Washington could have sought to raise political pressure on Moscow. US officials could have consulted with allies and urged them to crank up the political heat on the Kremlin, including at the highest level: Vladimir Putin would have received an earful from Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Emmanuel Macron, and other European leaders who want to keep the treaty and don’t like being targeted by new Russian missiles.

True, these steps might not have been enough to persuade Moscow to alter its course, but even if they did not succeed in bringing it back into compliance, Washington would have at least prepared the ground for withdrawal.

An Illusory Asia Bonus

For Trump, the end to the INF treaty means his country can deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles to counter China, which has hundreds of those kinds of missiles.
But the US military has to build the missiles first, and that will take time and cost billions of dollars from the Pentagon’s already severely stressed budget. And it makes little sense to build the missiles if they cannot be deployed within range of Chinese targets. But which Asian ally will agree to have new US missiles based on its territory and within range of China?

It’s doubtful Japan would: Tokyo has shown no enthusiasm for hosting US missiles that could strike China (or Russia), and even if the Japanese central government agreed, local governments could prove problematic.

South Korea would also prove to be a struggle. The decision to host a US missile defense system there in 2017 triggered huge domestic controversy; the prospect of a US surface-to-surface missile threatening China would be highly problematic, to say the least.

With no ally near to China that is ready to put out the welcome mat for new US missiles, the fallback option will be Guam, a small American territory already stuffed with US military hardware. This, however, means there will be no early solution to the hosting issue. The fastest way the US could develop a ground-based intermediate-range missile would be to take Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles and modify them to be deployed on land-based launchers. But Guam lies 3,000 kilometers from the Chinese coast, and the Tomahawk has a range of just 2,500 kilometers.

It is problems like this—where to put a ground-launched intermediate-range missile—that make the Asian “bonus” of ending the INF Treaty illusory. That is why senior US military leaders have consistently said that they will counter Chinese ground-launched missiles with air- and sea-based weapons.

This Time, It’s Not Gorbachev

Regardless of the challenges, some have posited the theory that a renewed arms race would give the US a significant lever to bring Russia to its knees, economically speaking—that did, after all, work for Reagan.

But while the US economy and defense budget could afford to run an arms race in the 1980s, that may not be so easy today. Washington’s budget deficit is alarmingly high. Trump has already told the Department of Defense that its budget will be slashed next year, and they will have a difficult time finding money to fund existing Pentagon priorities.

Moreover, the Soviet economy in the mid-1980s was a basket case, particularly as the price of oil, a key Soviet export, fell. The Russian economy today can hardly be called robust—stagnant is a more apt description—but it may be better able to sustain an arms race, particularly as Russia today has hot production lines running for new ballistic missile submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and cruise missiles of various kinds.

It’s also important to remember that Reagan dealt with Gorbachev, who recognized that the Soviet Union could not run an arms race and also meet the needs of its people. Trump, on the other hand, must deal with Putin, whose outlook is vastly different. The Russian leader is prepared, if necessary, to engage in an arms race. He appears to believe that stockpiling nuclear weapons is a good thing, and seems more than willing to sacrifice the Russian people’s well-being if necessary.

An arms race is a recipe for more nuclear weapons. That would make no contribution to European or global security, and it would make for poorer economies.

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It had already been a tumultuous political summer for Germany when an article published in mid-August jumbled Berlin and Brussels: a well-known German political scientist, Christian Hacke, dropped something of a bomb, suggesting it was time for Germany to become a nuclear power. The United States under President Donald Trump was withdrawing from the global stage and could no longer be relied upon as the guarantor of European security, Hacke argued, so it was time for Europe—and in particular Germany—to take matters into its own hands.

That sparked heated discussions. “The German Bomb Debate Goes Nuclear,” ran a POLITICO headline, even though the desire of Germans to acquire a bomb of their own is practically nonexistent.

The debate as such is not new. In the past, however, such talk centered around a common point: a desire to avoid relying solely on the US nuclear deterrent to ensure Europe’s security. But this time, things are different. The brutality of President Donald Trump’s body language and policies is unprecedented in transatlantic relations; the European Union is taking major steps to bolster its conventional defense identity and autonomy; and Russia’s behavior adds urgency to the need for Europe to protect itself against strategic threats.

Still, there is a certain amount of intellectual and political confusion when one reads or hears about a “European deterrent.” So let’s be clear up front about what will and will not happen any time soon. It is completely unrealistic to discuss the idea of a single European nuclear force controlled by a supranational executive body. Whatever happens in the realm of nuclear deterrence will be nation-based, and it will depend a lot on US policies toward Europe. It is here that France can play a central role.

The French and British Deterrent

The idea of a European nuclear deterrent has a long history. After the aborted “FIG” (France-Italy-Germany) collective uranium enrichment plan of the 1950s, Germany and Italy both ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975 with an important reservation: they should not preclude the possibility of a European nuclear force.

British and French nuclear deterrents were never designed to exclusively cover national vital interests and always had at least a de facto European dimension. Indeed, since the early 1960s, the UK force has been primarily at the service of the transatlantic alliance. It is less well known, however, that the French have always seen a European dimension to their nuclear deterrent.

For Charles de Gaulle, the fate of his country and that of the rest of Europe were closely linked. In instructions given to the armed forces in 1964, he specified that France should “feel threatened as soon as the territories of federal Germany and Benelux are violated.” That same year, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou made it clear publicly that the national deterrent amounted to a de facto European protection. With the Ottawa Declaration of 1974, NATO officially recognized the broader nuclear contribution of France and the UK to the security of the alliance.

With closer integration in Europe and the creation of the European Union in 1992, France began to stress more clearly the European dimension of deterrence. Several French statesmen mused publicly about the hypothetical transfer, one day, of nuclear weapons to a future common European political authority. President François Mitterrand the  also signaled his acceptance of the need for member-states to tackle the nuclear issue together when the time came: “Only two of the twelve possess an atomic force. For their national policies, they have a clear doctrine. Is it possible to devise a European doctrine? This question will very quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defense,” he said in a speech in January of 1992.

But just two years later, Mitterrand dialed back his rhetoric, stating: “There will be a European nuclear doctrine, a European deterrent, only when there are vital European interests, considered as such by the Europeans, and understood as such by others. As you can see, we are far away from there.”

The Defense White Paper adopted in the spring of that year unsurprisingly adopted the Mitterrand stance but made it a cornerstone of Europe’s future strategic autonomy as well: “With nuclear power, Europe’s autonomy in defense matters is possible. Without it, it is excluded.”

Jacques Chirac turned out to be more open-minded. As France embarked in a final nuclear testing campaign, Paris reaffirmed its European nuclear openings – eager as it was to show that it was not pursuing strictly national interests. French authorities confirmed that Paris was ready to raise issues related to nuclear deterrence with its European partners, and the 1995 UK-French Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation stated that French and British leaders reaffirmed that a threat to the vital interests of one country was a threat to both.

A year later, at a speech at the Ecole Militaire in Paris, Chirac underlined that UK-French nuclear cooperation was about “drawing all consequences of a community of destiny, of a growing intertwining of our vital interests.” He added “we do not propose a ready-made concept, but a gradual process open to those partners who wish to join.”

Cooperation with Germany budded as well. The decision to permanently retire the short-range Hades system in 1996 was taken after consultation with Germany. The Franco-German Common Concept on Security and Defense adopted in December of that same year stated: “Our countries are ready to engage in a dialogue on the function of nuclear deterrence in the context of European defense policy.”

Deterring Deterrence

However, more than twenty years later, this field remains largely fallow. There are several reasons for this, and the French are partly to blame. Their main drive for a European discussion of nuclear deterrence issues happened during their testing campaign of 1995-96, which was heavily criticized by several EU partners. Paris learned the lesson, and these reactions led France to abandon any appetite for major initiatives in this area.

French abstinence from the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has not helped either; EU members of the alliance have often seen it with suspicion. Whereas the French 2009 return to NATO’s military structure was sometimes seen—as Paris sought—as a gesture of goodwill showing that France did not seek to construct a competing European defense system, the same thing did not happen in the nuclear domain.

What’s more, as long as the NATO common deterrent appeared solid, no European country was really interested in discussing a common nuclear deterrent, and even less in rocking the boat by devising alternative nuclear arrangements. Finally, many in Europe (including in Paris) feared that a nuclear debate in the EU could complicate the task of building up common conventional capabilities.

This has not prevented France from making it increasingly clear that its deterrent plays a European role. Paris believes that French deterrence, by its very existence, contributes to Europe’s security and that a possible aggressor would do well to take this into account. Furthermore, an attack against a member country of the European Union could be considered by France as an attack against its own vital interests.

Scenarios for the Future

So how much has this debate revived in today’s context? If one describes the nuclear deterrence question as a matter of “supply” and “demand,” the European debate has evolved on both ends. On the demand side, Russia’s new assertiveness and territorial aggression have triggered a renewed interest in the means to guarantee territorial integrity. This is true in particular for countries that became members of NATO in the 2000s (Poland, the Baltic States, etc.) but also for EU members that are not members of NATO and thus do not rely on a formal US security guarantee. While this applies in particular to Finland and Sweden, it is important to note that after several rounds of enlargement, the number of such EU countries is much higher than was the case in the mid-1990s. On the supply side, doubts about the reliability of the US guarantee to Europe have rarely been as strong as under Donald Trump.

The time thus seems to be ripe for thinking about Europe’s nuclear role in securing the continent. Still, it is worth mentioning the several scenarios that will not happen any time soon, absent a dramatic and unexpected change in the European and transatlantic political landscape. There will be no “joint nuclear force” controlled by the European Union. There is near-zero interest today on the continent for a federal-type Union with a single executive, and there is equally near-zero appetite in France for transferring its nuclear assets to Europe.

Another unrealistic proposal is that European partners could partly fund the French force in return for a say in national policy. There is no political interest in Europe for such a scheme (including in Paris). Equally dubious is a pooling of UK and French assets. While it could have appeared attractive a few years ago, it is no longer a serious possibility. If Brexit happens, Britain will want to cling to its strategic assets.

Paris is also unlikely to join the NPG or assign part of its airborne component to the Atlantic Alliance. While there could be merit in doing so, French absence from the NPG and NATO nuclear arrangements is part of the country’s “strategic DNA.”

Furthermore, it is unlikely that any serious nuclear discussion will happen in the context of EU institutions. Diplomats know how difficult nuclear policy discussions can be in Brussels – as discussions on EU positions every five years for NPT conferences testify. The Nuclear Ban Treaty, on which several EU members have strong positive views, makes a nuclear deterrence debate in formal EU circles almost a non-starter at this point. Any productive discussion about scenarios and options to reinforce deterrence in Europe will have to be quiet and discreet, in bilateral formats or informal gatherings of officials and experts. In addition, any discussion in a strictly EU context would preclude UK presence or involvement.

NATO, the Deciding Factor

What are the realistic scenarios then? That heavily depends on one key variable: the continued existence of the current NATO nuclear arrangements. So the discussion needs to happen at two different levels – first within the existing context, second when taking into account a “what if?” hypothesis.

In the existing context, Paris can provide a complementary insurance to European NATO members and a nuclear reassurance to non-NATO EU members. It would be consistent with French views of the EU to state more clearly that the French force protects Europe as a whole. It seems to fit with the French view of the EU’s role that an aggression against Finnish, Estonian or Polish “vital” interests would jeopardize the very foundations of what our existence is about in the 21st century. Another way to put it would be to make it clear that Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty—the mutual defense clause of the EU—could be exercised by any means. This would not be an “extended” deterrent in the traditional sense of the term: from the French standpoint, one cannot compare the protection conferred by a distant superpower to the recognition of a de facto reality.

This could possibly be supplemented by rotations of Rafale fighter-bombers (without their nuclear missiles) of the FAS to allied bases, including on the territory of the most eastern countries of the Alliance in order to demonstrate solidarity.

The range of possible scenarios would be different if there are dramatic changes in NATO. Think of a unilateral withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe—an irrational decision for sure, but one which is not outside the bounds of the thinkable with the current US administration. Or an unraveling of the NATO nuclear basing and sharing mechanisms following a unilateral decision of a member country to cease being a part of it (think Turkey in particular).

In such scenarios, it is likely that France would be ready to consider playing a stronger and more visible role in ensuring that Europe feels protected by nuclear deterrence. France could base part of its airborne arsenal (say, of the order of ten missiles) in Germany or in Poland (“basing”) and/or agree that they could be carried by European fighter-bombers (“sharing”). For both political and technical reasons (the small size of the French arsenal), it is very unlikely that Paris and its European partners would seek to mirror the scope of current NATO arrangements, though.

A less ambitious option would be to mirror the NATO SNOWCAT (Support of NATO Operations With Conventional Air Tactics) procedure, where non-nuclear nations commit themselves to participate in a nuclear strike with non-nuclear assets. Another option, if and when France replaces its nuclear-powered carrier Charles-de-Gaulle and maintains its ability to embark nuclear missiles, would be to create the possibility of a European nuclear maritime task force, with accompanying European ships and, possibly, a European nuclear squadron.

If such decisions were made, they would need to be accompanied, just as is today the case in the NATO context, by an agreement on the conditions for their use. This would include legal and security arrangements (host nation support, etc.) but also, possibly, a common nuclear planning mechanism, based on a common conception of nuclear employment, which could coexist with national ones.

And then there is the question of the UK’s role. In the context of Brexit, London is eager to bolster its European security credentials. If we are correct to predict that the European deterrence question will not be treated within formal EU circles, it is conceivable that the United Kingdom could be part of such arrangements one way or the other.

Some would say that a France- and UK-based nuclear deterrent would not have the necessary credibility. This is not really a relevant argument in the debate, however. A smaller arsenal can deter a major power provided it has the ability to inflict unacceptable damage. And, most importantly, deterrence exercised by a European power might be seen as more credible than when it is exercised by a distant protector.

On all these questions, whatever happens to the transatlantic relationship, it is time to have a free and candid discussion.

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© REUTERS/Yuri Kochetkov/Pool

Nuclear arms control has been a central feature of the relationship between Washington and Moscow for some 50 years, but the nuclear arms control regime appears increasingly fragile. Several factors are placing the regime under stress, and there are currently no discussions underway that might bolster it. US-Russian relations have fallen to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, beset by problems including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, differences over Syria, and Moscow’s interference in the US presidential election. Should the nuclear arms control regime unravel—a prospect that is unfortunately very real—the world would become a more uncertain and dangerous place.

US and Soviet officials began nuclear arms control negotiations in the late 1960s. Over the next four decades, they produced agreements like SALT, INF, and START. Thanks to those agreements and other unilateral decisions, the United States and Russia currently maintain nuclear arsenals that are large but only a fraction of their respective Cold War sizes.

The latest agreement, New START, requires the United States and Russia to each reduce to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Those limits go into full effect in February 2018, and both countries appear on track to meet the limits. Following the conclusion of New START, then-President Barack Obama proposed a new round of arms reduction negotiations that would include non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic weapons—meaning that for the first time, Washington and Moscow would negotiate on all nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Russian officials balked, citing concerns such as missile defense and conventional strike systems. They also called for the next negotiation to be multilateral, although the United States and Russia each maintain a nuclear arsenal that is more than ten times the size of that of any third country.

Over the remainder of the Obama administration, the two countries were unable to find a formula that would allow new negotiations. US and Russian officials have conducted one round of strategic stability talks since President Donald Trump took office, but those appear to have produced little more than agreement that there would be a second round.

The Eroding INF Treaty

The fate of the INF Treaty poses the most pressing challenge to the nuclear arms control regime. Signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, the treaty banned all US and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. By mid-1991, the two countries had destroyed some 2,700 missiles.

In 2014, the Obama administration charged that Russia had violated the treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range. Then, in 2017, US officials said that Russia had begun deploying the missile, which bears the Russian designator 9M729 and which the United States calls the SSC-8. Russian officials deny that they have violated the treaty, and instead charge the United States with three violations. Two are without merit, but Moscow’s claim that the launcher system for “Aegis Ashore,” the SM-3 missile interceptor site in Romania (and soon Poland as well), represents a violation appears to have some substance. Ashore’s vertical launch system, when on US Navy warships, can launch cruise missiles and other weapons as well as the SM-3, and the Russians say Aegis Ashore could hold ground-launched cruise missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

With more political will in Moscow and Washington, these problems could be addressed. The Russians, however, have thus far refused to even acknowledge any question about their compliance. For their part, Obama administration officials privately said that they would be willing to address Russian concerns if Moscow took the US charge regarding the Russian ground-launched cruise missile seriously.

Silent Allies

Since taking office, the Trump administration has conducted a review of the situation, while Republicans in Congress have added language to the National Defense Authorization Act that would authorize the Pentagon to develop a US ground-launched cruise missile. US officials have also consulted with NATO allies on the Russian violation.

On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the signing of the INF Treaty—the Trump administration announced that it remained committed to the treaty and would pursue an integrated strategy to bring Russia back into compliance. Under this strategy, the United States will (1) continue its pursuit of a diplomatic settlement, including through the Special Consultative Commission established by the treaty to discuss, among other things, compliance issues; (2) commence research and development of options for US intermediate-range ground-launched missiles (which would not per se violate the INF Treaty, though any flight test would); and (3) apply economic sanctions on Russian entities that developed and produced the SSC-8.

Meanwhile, US allies in Europe and Asia have said virtually nothing in public about the Russian violation, a missile designed to strike targets in their neighborhood rather than in the United States. This silence sends the wrong message to Moscow: for the Kremlin, this violation is just one part of an already troubled relationship with Washington, rather than a major political problem with the country’s neighbors. Moreover, if leaders in Berlin, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Tokyo, among other capitals, do not vigorously protest the Russian violation, their desire to maintain the treaty may not carry much weight with the Trump administration.

Trump and New START

If the INF Treaty collapses, it would increase the pressure on New START. New START expires by design in 2021, though it can be extended by up to five years. One would expect some quarters in Washington to oppose extending New START if the INF Treaty breaks down or Russia remains in violation; indeed, some Republicans on Capitol Hill have already sought to block funds for New START’s extension if Russia does not comply with the INF Treaty. Administration officials say that the question of extending New START will be considered after they see what happens in February 2018 and have a chance to complete a nuclear posture review.

US military leaders would most likely favor extension. They have testified to Congress that New START is in the American interest, emphasizing in particular the transparency regarding Russian strategic forces that is provided by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications, and inspections.

Whether President Trump shares that view is an open question, in part because he seems to have a limited understanding of strategic nuclear issues. When President Vladimir Putin raised the possible extension of New START in an early 2017 phone conversation, President Trump was reportedly unclear what New START was, but denounced it as a bad Obama deal.

A World Without Arms Control Limits

On its current course, it is difficult to see the INF Treaty surviving much longer. While the US administration remains nominally committed to the treaty, pressure will grow to withdraw if the Russian violation is not addressed. (That said, it had better be able to present compelling evidence of a Russian violation, or the United States will get blamed for the treaty’s demise.) If the INF Treaty is terminated or doubts about Russian compliance remain unresolved, it would make extension of New START beyond 2021 less likely.

Thus 2021 could see the end of negotiated limits on US and Russian nuclear forces, at a time when Russia is completing its nuclear modernization program and the United States is beginning to accelerate its planned modernization of its strategic delivery systems. Without these limits, the Russian military can be expected to openly deploy its intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. Might Moscow also decide to complement these by developing and deploying an intermediate-range ballistic missile?

Given budget limitations, it could be that neither Russia nor the United States would dramatically expand its strategic nuclear force numbers beyond the levels permitted by New START. Neither side, however, would be constrained by treaty limits. The Russian military hopes to field a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called the Sarmat. New START would likely require that that missile be deployed with fewer warheads than it is capable of carrying—but would the Russian military forgo deploying the maximum number of warheads absent New START? On the American side, the US Navy deploys an average of four to five warheads on its Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can carry eight warheads apiece. Absent New START, would the Pentagon be tempted to deploy a larger number of warheads on its SLBMs?

The Danger of Proliferation

Both sides would also lose the information provided by New START. Under the treaty, the sides exchange detailed data on their strategic forces every six months, and an average of 2,000 notifications every year regarding changes to their strategic forces. The treaty also allows each side to conduct up to 18 inspections per year of the other side’s deployed and non-deployed strategic forces. These provisions yield a huge amount of information, including the numbers of warheads on individual ICBMs and SLBMs at bases or submarine ports that are inspected. It would be difficult and expensive to develop other means of acquiring such information; without it, both sides would face greater uncertainty and be more likely to make worst-case assumptions about the size and composition of the other’s strategic forces. That would inevitably mean more costly decisions about how each side would equip and operate its own strategic forces.

Potential third country reactions also merit consideration. If the United States and Russia abandon nuclear arms limits, what would that mean for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapons states? If the two nuclear superpowers do not limit their arsenals, can they credibly ask other countries not to acquire nuclear weapons?

China has built up its nuclear forces at a modest pace, in part because Beijing has operated in a context in which there were limits on US and Russian nuclear forces. The country certainly has the economic capacity to expand its nuclear forces at a much more rapid rate. Without any international limits, would it be tempted to do so in an attempt to narrow the gap between its nuclear forces and those of the United States and Russia?

Maintaining the Regime

Washington and Moscow can still avoid the breakdown of the nuclear arms control regime. They could have a forthright dialogue on how to preserve the INF Treaty, using the Special Verification Commission to work out ways to address compliance concerns.

For example, the sides could agree that Russia would exhibit its SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile and provide a briefing on its characteristics to US experts. With more information, those experts might conclude that the missile does not violate the treaty. Of course, if it really has a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, the missiles would have to be eliminated.
Meanwhile, the US side could address Russia concerns on Aegis Ashore by introducing observable differences—functionally-related observable differences, if possible—to distinguish those SM-3 interceptor launchers from launchers on US warships. The sides might also set procedures under which Russian inspectors could periodically visit the SM-3 interceptor sites in Romania and Poland to confirm that the launch systems contained SM-3 interceptors, not cruise missiles.

Washington and Moscow could also agree to extend New START until 2026. That would preserve the treaty’s benefits and allow time for negotiation of a possible follow-on agreement. Of course, resolution of compliance concerns regarding the INF Treaty would create a much more positive atmosphere for consideration of New START’s extension.

Unilateral Commitments

Furthermore, US and Russian officials could use the strategic stability talks to explore the possibility of new negotiations on reducing nuclear arms, ideally including non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic warheads. To get to that point, Washington would almost certainly have to agree to some discussion of missile defense. It is difficult to see the Senate consenting to ratification of a treaty that limits missile defense, but a number of steps short of a treaty—an executive agreement on missile defense transparency, a NATO announcement of a self-imposed limit on the number of SM-3 interceptors in Europe, and/or a NATO decision to complete the SM-3 site in Poland but not deploy interceptors there—might interest Moscow.

As for third-country nuclear forces, the disparity in numbers between US and Russian nuclear weapons levels and the nuclear weapons levels of third countries makes it hard to conceive of a workable multilateral agreement, particularly if third countries insisted on equal limits. However, in the context of a US-Russian agreement that further reduced their nuclear arms levels below New START limits, it might be possible to get third countries, or at least Britain, France, and China, to commit unilaterally to not increase their total numbers of nuclear weapons.

An end to the nuclear arms control regime would be fraught with negative consequences for the United States, Russia, and the world, and the US and Russia should carefully consider how they proceed regarding the INF and New START treaties. With political will, the nuclear arms control regime can be maintained and perhaps strengthened, but doing so will require wise decisions in Washington and Moscow—ideally with appropriate encouragement from US allies and others in Europe and Asia, who will see their security diminished if the INF and New START treaties lapse.

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© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

NATO’s recent summit in Warsaw was meant to find convincing answers to the challenges to the alliance’s east and south – the two major themes were increasing NATO’s military presence in Central and Eastern Europe and enhancing NATO’s engagement with countries in the Middle East and North Africa. However, the Warsaw summit was also billed as an opportunity to consider strengthening NATO’s nuclear deterrence. Almost two years after initial steps were taken to enhance NATO’s conventional arms positioning at the Wales summit, Warsaw was supposed to provide a chance to look at the nuclear dimension.

Accordingly, in the run-up to the summit there was a great deal of speculation about whether and how NATO would revamp its nuclear policy. Some observers considered Warsaw to be an opportunity for a fundamental re-think of NATO’s nuclear policy and posture, while others warned against setting off a new nuclear arms race.

“A Nuclear Alliance”

In the end, none of this happened. The Warsaw summit declaration contained lengthy passages on deterrence and defense; yet the nuclear portion, while more elaborate than in previous summit declarations, was far less spectacular than some had hoped and others had feared.

Allies merely repeated that “[as] long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance,” highlighted the role of US strategic nuclear forces as the “supreme guarantee” of the security of the allies, and noted the contribution of the independent strategic nuclear forces of the UK and France. The summit declaration also stressed US nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe and Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) as parts of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture, and vowed to ensure “the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.”

The document also stated that nuclear weapons were “unique” and that any use of them against NATO “would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict.” Such statements indicate that the allies’ main concern was not beefing up NATO’s nuclear arsenal, but rather preventing Russia from miscalculating about the eventual use of its own. The major focus of NATO’s post-Crimea military reinforcements remained conventional.

Much of this language was based on the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This process has become necessary to regain alliance consensus on nuclear issues in danger of losing support. After some allies’ representatives, notably then-German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, argued for a withdrawal of US sub-strategic weapons from Europe, the DDPR helped rein in a potentially controversial debate among Allies about NATO’s future nuclear posture.

Back to Basics

Put simply, the DDPR helped to get NATO back to nuclear basics – and demonstrated that any attempt on the part of Europeans to “hijack” President Barack Obama’s vision of a nuclear-free world for their own domestic agendas would fail. Even though the review was concluded well before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the agreed language of the document – amended by statements that can be read as a signal to Russia not to underestimate NATO’s resolve – still appeared appropriate.

Given the sensitivity of the subject matter, most aspects of NATO’s nuclear dimension – such as the linkage between conventional and nuclear capabilities, exercise patterns, and readiness levels – are not to be found in any public document. The declaration merely alludes to a requirement for “planning guidance aligned with 21^st century requirements.” However, the fact that the Declaration did not offer fundamentally new messages was a message in itself: the issue at stake was not nuclear hardware, but reaffirming the principle of nuclear deterrence. To this end, NATO needed neither to mimic Russia’s high-testosterone nuclear rhetoric, nor initiate a major debate about future nuclear strategies or force postures.

Warsaw showed that NATO’s nuclear “acquis” is unlikely to change anytime soon. This means that several European allies will continue to host aircraft and US gravity bombs in what has come to be known as “nuclear sharing” arrangements. While this concept dates back to the 1960s, it still meets several major alliance objectives better than any conceivable alternative: aircraft, for example, can be deployed to crisis regions for the sake of political signaling.

Above all, however, the current arrangements allow non-nuclear allies to participate in the planning and implementation of the nuclear mission. While some allies host dual-capable aircraft that can deliver US weapons, for example, others play a role in suppressing opposition air defenses. These arrangements underscore the fact that, by sharing risks and burdens, the allies consider their solidarity to extend to the nuclear domain.

Nuclear sharing will continue to draw criticism from anti-nuclear activists, yet their arguments remain spurious. Whereas in the past critics maintained that aircraft armed with gravity bombs were Cold War remnants without military value, they now argue that a new generation of aircraft, plus a refurbished bomb, would dangerously tilt the strategic balance in NATO’s favor.

Feeble Arguments

This shift from one feeble argument to another is not likely to gain much traction. The same holds true for initiatives to ban nuclear weapons in order to speed up the long and difficult process of gradual and reciprocal nuclear disarmament. Some allies may well feel sympathetic to that cause; yet even they have to realize that in the current security environment, advocating initiatives that de-legitimize Western defense policies while leaving potential opponents – including Vladimir Putin’s “managed democracy” – untouched is counterproductive.

The Warsaw summit’s reaffirmation of nuclear deterrence does not suggest that allies must renege on their commitments to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their defense strategies. Nor does it invalidate the objective of creating the conditions for a nuclear-free world. For the foreseeable future, however, these conditions simply do not exist. As the allies put it in the Warsaw summit declaration: “We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament are not favorable today.”

The Warsaw Summit heralded neither a new “nuclearization” of the alliance nor a new chapter of the NATO-Russia relationship. It simply reaffirmed the importance of nuclear deterrence as part of an overall strategy of defense and deterrence at a time when members of the Western strategic community were in danger of forgetting it.

NB. The author expresses solely his personal views.

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