© picture alliance/ZUMAPRESS.com/Idrees Abbas

On June 15 of this year, the armies of India and China clashed in the Galwan valley region of the Himalayas, resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers. While India and China share a long and contentious border, this clash was of vital importance for a number of reasons.

First, this was the first time in decades that the India-China border has seen this level of violence, as well as an increase in the buildup of Chinese troop numbers at multiple points along the border. Second, the clash shattered trust between India and China built carefully over years through agreements dating back to 1993, confining “the entire border architecture to the heap of history.” Third, while India continues to be a secondary concern in China, public opinion in India has decisively shifted to viewing China as a major security threat. Many in New Delhi believe this crisis reflects an inflection point that will fundamentally change the trajectory of India-China relations.

A Pattern of Border Tensions

India and China share an extremely long border running more than 3,000 kilometers, which is divided into sectors—western, middle, and eastern. After the last major boundary war between India and China in 1962 this border wasn’t clearly defined but a Line of Actual Control (LAC) was established. There are several disagreements and the LAC is vague, but both India and China agreed to not alter or re-define it unilaterally.

It was in the western sector in the remote mountainous region of Ladakh that Chinese and Indian soldiers clashed in the Galwan river valley on June 15^th. This violent attack was unprecedented, even on this contested border, representing the first violent deaths on the border since 1975 and the most fatalities in the region since 1967.

This begs the question why now and why this area? This region is strategically important to both countries. As Dhruva Jaishankar of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) notes, in the 1950s China constructed a vital highway through the region claimed by India to connect to the critical regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. For India this region is important for supplying Indian forces along the disputed border with Pakistan, thus making the area critical for Indian security and “the geopolitical balance of power across a large part of Asia.”

Over time both sides have been building critical infrastructure including roads and airfields in the region, which have led to an increasing number of incidences—at the Depsang plains in 2013, then again in 2014 when Chinese troops crossed the border at Chumar coinciding with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India, and finally in 2017 at Doklam where Chinese troops entered a region they had “only patrolled sporadically before.” Galwan differs from these incidents not only because of the scale of the violence, but because this time Chinese troops “came in larger numbers, amassed troops and artillery ranged all along the boundary in Ladakh.” While both sides have blamed each other for sparking the incident most analysts conclude that China unilaterally altered the status-quo on the border by stationing a large number of its troops in the region.

The implications of this incident are bound to be significant. First, whatever the motives, it is evident that China is making more aggressive territorial claims in the region. Second, trust between India and China is at an all-time low. Since 1993, India and China had negotiated a series of agreements and operational procedures to prevent such skirmishes, known as the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement but that has now essentially been voided. Most observers in India believe this was a pre-meditated and well-thought-out action on China’s part, making it very difficult to rebuild trust between the two countries and definitively turning the tide of public opinion against China.

An Inflection Point

While in the short-term, India’s priority will be the restoration of the status quo at the border, in the long term a rethink of India’s China policy seems imminent. Former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon argues that “the reset of India-China relations is now inevitable and necessary,” while C. Raja Mohan, director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, writes that any illusions Indian policy makers might have had about Asian and anti-Western solidarity with China have now been crushed.

This shift has certainly been accelerated by the border crisis, but it has been a long time in the making. As India and China grow in economic size and geopolitical ambition, a clash in policy between the two was in some ways inevitable. For example, Menon notes that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea has become an important issue for India just as China started doubling down on its claims in the region. Tanvi Madan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, points to other long standing problems in India-China relations—the widening trade deficit, limited market access for India, the growing proximity between China and Pakistan, China’s increasing activities in India’s neighborhood, and Beijing working against India at international forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

While a reset is certainly being called for, realistically in the short-term India’s relationship with China will take three parallel tracks—cautious engagement, internal strengthening, and external balancing. India’s engagement with China will continue but with some clear differences. Military balance on the border will be a crucial factor in determining how India-China relations evolve. But as both countries continue to build border infrastructure and roads, such clashes are bound to increase. In economic terms, there are growing calls for India to “decouple” from China. This would be difficult to implement since China is currently India’s largest trading partner, and second only to the US once services are added. Chinese economic investments in crucial sectors like start-ups and fintech in India are estimated to be around $26 billion.

While decoupling is not an option, India will limit Chinese investment in critical infrastructure particularly 5G, telecom, power grids etc. Huawei being included in India’s 5G infrastructure is now certainly out of the question. India recently also banned 59 Chinese apps stating security concerns. The more difficult task is for India to build its domestic capacities and resilience, which would need sweeping policy reform, something that is often difficult to implement in an electoral democracy. For example, to strengthen its economy India needs to be better aligned with the global economy. However, protectionist tendencies run deep, and the Modi government has not delivered on promises of economic reform despite having a clear majority in the Parliament. Similarly, India’s defense sector is in desperate need of reform, but progress has been slow so far.

Diversifying Partnerships

As India aims to bridge its massive economic and military asymmetries with China, it will continue to follow a policy of external balancing by building “issue-based coalitions” with a number of partners. Stronger US-India ties are a prime example. In this crisis the US provided India with “rhetorical support, diplomatic cooperation, the use of military equipment acquired from the US and, reportedly, intelligence sharing.” While India is wary of becoming a pawn in US-China competition, aiming to forge closer ties with the US is part of a broader policy of diversifying its partnerships. It is important to note that over the last few years India’s relationships with Japan and Australia have strengthened tremendously—two partners who have also followed a policy of cautious engagement with China. As part of its broader Indo-Pacific policy, India has also increased security and economic engagement with Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries. In this new constellation of partnerships while India-Russia ties might seem to have taken a backseat, they are still important as most of India’s major weapons platforms are Russian, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. As part of this logic, India’s approach towards Europe has also shifted, though India-France ties have been the biggest beneficiaries. It is important to note that the China question also figured prominently in the recent EU-India summit which took place in July 2020 and instituted dialogues on 5G, connectivity, maritime security, and on deepening the Europe-India trade relationship.

Lessons for Europe and Germany

The Galwan valley border crisis didn’t make headlines in Europe, partly because of the confusing topography and history of the LAC but also because the conflict is essentially seen as far away. However, this isn’t one isolated incident. Over the last few months, coinciding with the coronavirus crisis, China has engaged in military intimidation towards several countries in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Japan. It introduced the national security legislation in Hong Kong. It has issued threats of economic retaliation in response to domestic debates in Australia and New Zealand. These moves are important to note as they give an indication of what kind of international actor a rising China wishes to be.

Europe is in the middle of a debate on its new China strategy. Under the German Presidency of the EU Council, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has called for a unified European approach to China. A new approach and strategic assessment of China will not be complete and effective if it doesn’t take into account how China behaves outside of European borders and with Europe’s partners. Especially because, while Europe doesn’t face a territorial threat from China, on a number of questions of economic security and political interference the dilemmas faced by Europe are the same as many countries in the Indo-Pacific. India, Japan, and Australia are all reconsidering their dependence on China in strategic sectors, in many ways mirroring the debate in Europe.

Second, while the conflict might seem far away, Europe has a stake in the security of the Indo-Pacific. The EU is the largest trade and investment partner of many countries in the region including India. The dynamic economies of the Indo-Pacific will continue to be extremely important for export-focused countries like Germany. In the wake of coronavirus crisis as Europe looks to diversify supply chains, this region will be central. Hence keeping an eye on the security dynamics in the region, which could quickly disrupt supply chains and have an impact on European economies and security, is crucial. And finally, as Europe is diversifying its partnerships beyond China, and strengthening relations with India, Japan etc. it cannot forever stay on the sidelines of these conflicts and developments, refusing to take positions. Political agnosticism has its costs too.

In the past, border crisis between India and China have had two kinds of outcomes. They have either derailed the relationship significantly, as seen in the aftermath of the 1962 war. Or they have served as an opportunity to reset and revitalize the relationship. The latter looks increasingly unlikely especially since altering and questioning territorial status-quo seems locked into Chinese foreign policy choices—whether in the South China Sea or the Himalayas.

Given the geostrategic importance of this region, border tensions are not going to go away. Recent reports show the conflict is still very much active and de-escalation hasn’t taken place. This crisis also comes at a time when India is already struggling to grapple with another external shock—that of the coronavirus pandemic. In a speech last year, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted that these disruptions in the past have led to a rethink and start of new phases in Indian foreign policy and that India has advanced its interests most “when it made hard-headed assessments of contemporary geopolitics.”

By all current assessments, unless Chinese behavior changes or there is a framework for de-escalation agreed upon, the path of engagement seems more constrained and India will focus on making issue-based coalitions and diversifying its partnerships to strengthen its internal and external position vis-à-vis China. These tensions will remain and external players like Europe will no longer be able to ignore these in their foreign policy calculus.

The post Death in the Himalayas appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Altaf Hussain

This May, incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi led his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to a resounding victory in India’s national election. The fact that 600 million people successfully exercised their franchise should give pause to Westerners who portray Indian democracy as merely a little brother to its older Western counterpart. Modi and his Hindu nationalist party have a new mandate to reshape India.

The first promise Modi’s new government holds for European states is political stability, which makes it easier to build lasting diplomatic ties. Unlike the governments of the 1990s—when Indian politics was terribly unstable and coalitions were prone to fall apart, repeatedly requiring new diplomatic efforts from Europe—the BJP looks a safe bet to last the whole five-year term. Moreover, as of now, the party appears as the best contender for the 2024 polls. So it’s a good time for the EU and its member states to unveil medium-term strategies for their relations with India.

In the Company of Indian Companies

Within this political context, Modi’s second term promises economic openness. Yes, his 2014-2019 tenure did not lead to the privatization of any major public company. Yes, new data suggest an economic slowdown occurred in the second half of BJP’s recent rule, and economic growth is probably lower than the New Delhi government would like to admit. Yes, Modi’s flagship campaign, “Make in India,” aimed at attracting foreign investment and creating jobs, was less successful than expected. But one thing remains certain: Modi will use both hands to keep the doors of the Indian market open to foreign firms.

While corruption, poor infrastructure, and uneven levels of governance remain huge thorns in India’s side, the rankings given to the country for the ease of doing business have improved under the BJP. The “Make in India” campaign will continue as long as Modi is in office. The program’s revised list of industries open to FDI includes significant sectors such as automobile production, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, defense, railways, biotechnology, and renewables. Some of these hold great opportunities. India has, for instance, recently built an International Solar Alliance of countries that wish to enhance their use of solar power due to their geographical position. Some European nations, such as France, are visibly attempting to take advantage of this development.

One thing must be remembered, however: large Indian industrial houses remain one of the BJP’s main constituencies. They are among the Party’s main donors and the main beneficiaries of its rule. Modi’s rhetoric has often focused on India’s poor, whereas the BJP’s electoral manifestos keep promising easier ways of investing in India. So it appears that Modi supports both India’s poor and the world’s rich. But despite all of this, it is actually India’s rich―the large Indian companies―for whom Modi most often rolls out the red carpet.

While this approach may offer some opportunities for cooperation, it also reduces the chances for European companies. Two crucial recent policies regarding FDI in retail and the procurement of defense technologies serve as examples here. Despite his own earlier opposition to FDI in retail, Modi allowed it to continue after taking over power in New Delhi. This came as a boost to firms like H&M and IKEA. However, his government recently introduced a rule forcing retailers to source 30 percent of the value of the sold goods from India. As for defense procurement, India’s Ministry of Defense imposed the rule that any foreign company selling major, strategic defense technologies to India needs to have an Indian partner. The controversy around the Rafale jet signalizes the Indian government may in fact try to pick the company itself. In either case, the Indian government is making sure that the country’s companies cannot be thrown out of the race.

Intra-European Competition

Even with an Indian government focused on attracting foreign investment, smaller European nations don’t have much to cheer about. As evident from his foreign trips, Modi, like his predecessors, focuses on New Delhi’s main partners in Europe: Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. As far as his European policy is concerned, India’s prime minister has not ventured into uncharted territory by, for instance, visiting any smaller countries in central and eastern Europe.

Among European capitals, Paris was perhaps most successful in developing its ties with New Delhi, with the government providing a huge diplomatic push to the economic endeavors of its companies. Germany remains India’s top trading partner on the Old Continent, while United Kingdom was the biggest European source of FDI inflows to India over the last 18 years.

Smaller European nations have a much more difficult position with regard to India, as they are both less recognizable and have less to offer in terms of capital and produce. Therefore, they will have to look for niches in the vast Indian market. Modi’s policies do offer some opportunities, however. For instance, a Polish company is installing screens at bus stops as part of the New Delhi’s Smart City initiative.

In some areas, European nations and companies are bound to compete with each other elbow to elbow on their run to India. There is no telling when the India-EU Free Trade Agreement will finally be completed—negotiations began in 2007—but it may end up benefitting the better-positioned companies of western Europe rather than the firms of newer and poorer member states. Meanwhile, France is likely to expand its ambitious push into India’s defense market, which will upset Russia. And if and when Brexit is completed, some Indian companies may start to depart the United Kingdom, which will encourage the major cities on the European continent to compete in order to attract them.

On the Same Page, Sometimes

When it comes to the global world order, there are areas where European Unions and its members may hope to share sentiments with India, and ones which will remain thorny issues. Europe and India have similar attitudes toward the rise of China; that is one aspect of convergence. India’s and EU’s recent steps show that both are willing to accept Chinese investment in general but aqre wary of Beijing’s rising political clout. Indian ministers have expressed security concerns about the Chinese telecoms company Huawei, but the country has not yet taken a decision on barring Huawei from its upcoming 5G trials. Similarly, New Delhi took a firm position against China during the Doklam standoff in 2017, when Indian and Chinese forces squared off (without violence) across disputed territory. But it did not invite Australia to its navy exercises, apparently not wanting to appear too militaristic. India also did not take part in either of the Belt and Road Forums organized in Beijing—and yet is the biggest beneficiary of the China-created AIIB.

Both New Delhi and the major European nations are also keen to retain the JCPOA deal with Iran and unhappy that Washington and Teheran are again on a collision course. If the US and Iran step back from the brink, Brussels and New Delhi will be equally relieved.

India’s relations with Russia, however, will remain a diplomatic challenge for the EU. Moscow is a close political friend to New Delhi and a crucial provider of military technologies (alongside Washington). Even though New Delhi’s elites and experts believe that the US is a much more important global partner, India does not wish to be pushed into a single global alliance. It prefers to hedge its bets. Therefore New Delhi has not criticized Russia’s activities in either Ukraine or Syria. A solution to the Ukraine crisis is not on the horizon, and Europe should know that this is not an issue where it can hope for India’s support.

Don’t Preach

The European Union will probably not be happy with Modi’s policies toward refugees, either. BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, has proved time and again that it is unwilling to welcome Muslim refugees such as Rohingyas from nearby countries, even when it is under obligation to do so. After the persecution of Rohingyas started again in Myanmar, around 40,000 of them managed to flee to India. The BJP government refuses to treat them as refugees, however, and considers them illegal immigrants who must be deported. But while New Delhi and Brussels may not be on the same page, the geographical distance between them means they are not likely to face the same refugee crises.

A word of warning seems appropriate, too, where India’s attitude toward religious minorities is concerned which has undoubtedly hardened unter the Hindu nationalists of the BJP. While this is a matter of concern, the EU should not repeat its past mistakes of being too preachy.

Looking at things from a global and long-term perspective, one of the most important conclusions is that India’s ties with the US are bound to grow much faster than the ones with Russia. New Delhi and Washington broadly agree on the need to counterbalance Beijing, among many other things. This should eventually open new possibilities for cooperation between European countries and India, too. Such developments may extend well beyond Modi’s tenure and shape a part of the global order.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

It is not an exaggeration to say that the EU-India relationship is experiencing an extraordinary momentum. Both sides are taking unprecedented steps to deepen the partnership. This new momentum is largely the result of a changing global environment, particularly the rise of China, its increasing presence in Europe and Asia, and the uncertainty of American policy under US President Donald Trump.

Brussels’ new pragmatic pursuit of closer ties with India is a response to New Delhi’s increasing political and economic weight in Asia. India’s renewed interest in Europe, in turn, is motivated by the need to diversify its partnerships, and balance Beijing by partnering with other middle powers. Brexit is another crucial factor, pushing India to look for new “gateways” to Europe as its traditional partner leaves the European Union.

As a result, there is renewed political will both in Brussels and New Delhi to strengthen this partnership. Annual EU-India summits are back on track, having restarted in 2016 after a four-year hiatus. The last summit produced an ambitious Agenda for Action 2020 refocusing the partnership on political, security, and strategic issues, broadening it from trade and cultural ties which had long been the defining characteristic of EU-India relations. Brussels is also in the process of revising its country strategy for India—the current version dates back to 2004. This revised strategy will reflect not only India’s changing position in the world, but also Europe’s new security and foreign policy ambitions.

New Focus on Security Issues

The clearest sign of the enhanced EU-India partnership is deepening cooperation on political and security issues. The EU’s Global Strategy outlines that peace and stability in Asia is crucial for Europe’s prosperity. For a long time, Europe’s Asia policy focused only on China. Now India is seen as an important actor in a multipolar Asia.

The EU and India have recently instituted mechanisms to cooperate on counterterrorism, maritime security, and nuclear non-proliferation. The Indian Ocean is fast emerging as an arena for geopolitical and geo-economic competition, largely due to China’s entry in the region. It presents a promising area for Europe and India to broaden cooperation on maritime security, particularly as the Indian Ocean is a main conduit for global trade and energy flows. While their joint efforts were initially limited to anti-piracy operations, the EU and India are now hoping to extend their partnership to strengthening institutions and a regional security architecture that can check increasing competition and militarization in the Indian Ocean.

There is also convergence on Europe and India’s position on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While Europe is keener on participating in BRI than India, both agree that investments within BRI should be transparent and sustainable. They should also follow international norms and standards and should not have overlapping commercial and military uses. As Brussels formulates its response to BRI in its upcoming Communication on Euro-Asian Connectivity, this convergence can lead to actual policy cooperation.

While these are promising developments, it will still be a while before India takes the European Union seriously as a security actor in Asia. And the EU is yet to fully articulate how it plans to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives in Asia, given that it is often distracted by challenges in its immediate neighborhood. In addition, with the United Kingdom leaving, Europe will find it harder to sustain its Asia focus.

Trade Woes

While there is movement in many aspects of the strategic partnership, an issue that remains stuck for now is the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA), officially known as the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA). The negotiations have ground to a halt after approximately 16 rounds of talks.

In the past, talks were stalled due to larger political events, for example the detention of Italian marines in India, which derailed the process significantly. Currently, however, the sticking points are intellectual property rights, duties, and visa regimes in Europe. The EU is demanding duty cuts on cars, wines, spirits, and dairy products it exports to India, along with a strong intellectual property regime.

India is asking for better mobility of its service professionals within Europe under a more liberal visa regime, and for “data secure nation” status under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which determines whether a country outside the EU offers an adequate level of data protection domestically. This status is crucial for Indian IT companies wanting market access in Europe.

Some experts argue that Brexit might make the EU-India BTIA negotiations easier, as the UK was one of the main opponents of liberalizing the visa regime. Both France and Germany have been pushing for a resumption of BTIA negotiations. With the UK gone, both countries stand to gain most from a free trade agreement with India. However, the visa regime is an issue for a number of other EU member states as well, and given the domestic political climate in many countries around migration, movement of service professionals will remain a tricky issue politically. India, too, has long been skeptical of free trade agreements and its negotiators are overly cautious after mixed experiences with its ASEAN deal.

Thus, the path ahead for BTIA negotiations remains perilous. With national elections around the corner in India, the political push required for starting yet another round of negotiations is missing. Many on the Indian side feel talks have dragged on for too long and it might be a safer bet to switch to a less comprehensive agreement. This would mean either reducing the scope of issues under discussion or embedding the trade negotiations within a broader political process. Some experts suggest a high level strategic and economic dialogue that would provide a platform for talking about more complex topics while not holding up progress on other areas. In other words, an ongoing dialogue instead of an all-or-nothing agreement. Such a dialogue would go beyond the trade negotiators and might benefit from the overall political momentum.

Sustaining the Momentum

The problems in BTIA negotiations are somewhat symbolic of problems in the larger EU-India partnership. Quite often, member-states have the tendency to push tougher issues in their bilateral partnerships with India to the EU level. India on the other hand has limited capacity to deal with the myriad EU institutions and negotiations.

In his book How India Sees the World, the country’s former foreign secretary Shyam Saran captures India’s view of Europe when he writes that internal crisis, Brexit, and US-Europe tensions have impacted “the promise of a cohesive Europe playing the role of an influential actor.” India’s own focus on confronting China’s increasing influence in South Asia, developing new partnerships, trilaterals, and “minilaterals” in Asia leaves very little bandwidth for engagement with Europe.

In order to sustain the present momentum in EU-India ties, both sides will have to make an extra effort to convert converging interests into concrete cooperation. This will be an uphill task, as both Europe and India remain distracted by their domestic politics and their respective neighborhoods. The dynamics in the Indian Ocean and increasing presence of China in Eurasia could be crucial to drive the EU-India partnership forward. EU-India observers have long lamented that the partnership was all about trade and not “strategic’ enough. Maybe that is finally changing.

The post A New Pact With Delhi appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji

Narendra Modi’s tenure as India’s prime minister has been marked by incredibly active diplomatic efforts. In his first twelve months in office he visited 18 countries – including the United States, China, Brazil, Japan, and Australia – and hosted the presidents of the United States, China, and Russia.

But amid this flurry of foreign policy activity, Brussels was conspicuous in its absence. On Modi’s first trip to Europe this April, he visited Berlin and Hanover, Paris and Toulouse – indications of where India’s strategic and commercial priorities lie in Europe. Although the prospect of a one-day stopover in Brussels was floated, it did not come to pass. Three years have now elapsed since the European Union and India – the world’s two largest democratic polities – held a summit meeting.

The reasons for the latest missed connection vary depending on whom one asks. Around Brussels’ Schumanplein, the accepted explanation is that the dates simply did not work. The European Commission was in a state of flux and did not have its house in order. Indian officials offer a more sinister theory: EU High Representative Federica Mogherini – a former foreign minister of Italy – deliberately refused to respond to Indian requests due to an ongoing spat over the arrest of two Italians by Indian authorities. The two marines, on board a merchant vessel, were charged with killing Indian fishermen whom they mistook for pirates.

This entire episode illustrates many of the fundamental challenges of EU-India engagement: each side sees the other as a relatively low priority; their relationship is overly bureaucratized, adding to the frustrations of both parties; and there is often a cultural and communication disconnect. The center piece of their engagement – a bilateral trade and investment agreement that has been in negotiation since 2007 – is moribund.

Yet there are many important reasons for the two sides to deepen their engagement with one another. For India, the motivations are primarily economic. The European Union is, as a single bloc, India’s largest trading partner and a major export destination. It is also a significant investor. By some estimates, European companies directly employ some 1.5 million Indians and indirectly support 6 million. While India has been more comfortable dealing bilaterally with individual EU member states – Berlin and New Delhi even maintain Intergovernmental Consultations, with a third round set to take place this fall – Brussels holds considerable sway over European standards and regulations. And as the EU negotiates breakthrough trade and investment agreements with the United States (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP) and Japan, India needs to ensure that it is not placed at too severe a disadvantage in a post-Doha trading order.

There is also a technological dimension that is critical for India as the country modernizes and industrializes. Areas of high-tech research – such as space, defense, civil aviation, nuclear, and emerging technologies – may be driven by individual EU member states, such as France, Germany, Britain, or Sweden. But the market and research leaders in these fields – whether Airbus, the European Space Agency, or CERN – are increasingly pan-European in nature.

Drive and Direction Needed

For the European Union, the motivation to deepen relations with India ought to be primarily strategic. The EU’s position as a security actor is still very much in flux, a topic of debate in many European capitals. But consider what a unified European security policy might look like and the scope of potential cooperation with India becomes obvious.

Hybrid warfare, which some commentators seem to think began with Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, is a matter in which Indian security planners are well versed. As a senior US diplomat with experience in both regions noted, Europe’s latest security crisis is being discussed with what is to India a “familiar vocabulary” of proxies, cross-border infiltration, separatism, bombings, and information operations, all intended to allow plausible deniability. Various out-of-area security contingencies, such as counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan or counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, are situations in which India and Europe have worked in parallel, but without much cooperation. Both Europe and India, being heavily dependent on energy imports, are also adjusting to new energy security dynamics, and both must contend with cyber warfare contingencies, an area in which Europe is at the forefront while India remains among the most vulnerable major economies.

Finally, demographics and migration – which ought to be the great unifiers – are perhaps the most vexing issues in Europe-India relations. The United States has been a major beneficiary of migration from India, with Indian-Americans among the wealthiest and best-educated immigrant groups in the country. Yet despite low birth rates in Europe and concerns about integration, efforts at attracting educated Indians to Europe have been modest, and the chances of deepening such ties have suffered from the rising tide of political populism.

The outlines of a mutually beneficial EU-India agenda are visible. And there are few true points of conflict – an economically advanced but aging Europe has little to lose from deepening cooperation with India, a country whose demographic profile and economic potential offer immense possibilities. It may require some drive and direction in both New Delhi and Brussels, but there should be fewer missed connections in the future.

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