© REUTERS/Ammar Abdullah

In April, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France hit Syria to punish Bashar al-Assad for what French President Emmanuel Macron called clear proof that the Syrian government had wielded chemical weapons in Douma, outside of Damascus.  

While the US-led coalition launched their strikes, German Chancellor Angela Merkel supported her allies but did not join the operation—a decision that reflected Germans’ deep-seated pacifism and aversion to military missions in the post-war era. Still, her decision to publicly support the mission, but not join it, made it look like Berlin did not have the stomach to engage militarily itself.

Since the Syrian conflict began more than seven years ago, Germany has been caught in a conundrum. It is struggling to support fleeing Syrians while navigating a complex political terrain at home. It’s a conflict that has had very real consequences for  Merkel, with some one million Syrian refugees seeking asylum in Germany. It was the chancellor’s open-door policy in the summer of 2015, accepting those refugees stuck on the Balkan route, that led to a significant shift in Germany’s political landscape, reviving the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

And the war is far from over. Assad’s regime has regained control of most of the country, displacing half of the population in the process. Now, another flare-up is looming in Idlib, one of the areas that remains out of the government’s grasp. Syria observers fear another catastrophe is imminent, one that would have further consequences for Berlin.

Opposition Stronghold

Idlib, in the north of the country, is one of the last remaining strongholds for opposition forces. It is home to 2.5 million Syrians. A serious attack on Idlib is a question of when, not if. The war is set to escalate in the province, and Germany may have more Syrians at its doorstep once Assad begins his quest to take it back. Among the thousands of Syrians who were displaced from Ghouta, many told me in phone conversations that they are already trying legal and illegal avenues to reach Germany.

It’s worth looking at the complex situation on the ground. Myriad groups are competing for control of Idlib. The Free Syrian Army, made up of several smaller alliances, is locked in a fierce battle for control with the Islamist extremist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, a group that was previously known as Jabhat al Nusra and was allied with Al Qaeda.

HTS dominates Idlib and has imposed a harsh social code on people living there; it poses a vital threat to civilians who moved there to escape Assad’s clutches and sought safety near Turkey. And Russia, Assad’s ally, will use the presence of HTS in the region, and the group’s former ties to Al Qaeda, to justify an eventual regime offensive in Idlib.

Germany’s Time to Step Up

If Chancellor Merkel does not want to put boots on the ground in Idlib or threaten Assad militarily, what can Germany do to avoid the devastation waiting to unfold in Idlib?

Germany can come in and play an active diplomatic role in encouraging Turkey to rein in the jihadis just across its border, either by using its existing channels of communication or military force. Ankara’s relationship with the jihadis is ambiguous; in the early stages of the Syrian war, Istanbul was accused of supporting the Islamists in Syria, but of late President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who got reelected on Sunday, appears more willing to limit their influence. 

If Turkey fails to reach some sort of agreement with the Islamists, Ankara could opt for pushing the jihadis out with force. It might well have an interest in doing so. The proximity of Idlib to Kurdish-controlled areas on Turkey’s borders makes it an important location for Ankara’s strategic interests. Erdogan is in a position to better manage secessionist Kurds if the Free Syrian Army is in charge rather than the HTS. Without HTS in Idlib, the regime and the Russians wouldn’t have a pretext to bomb the region. Turkish forces are already in Idlib anyway, operating observation posts in rebel areas to assure a stake in region after the war ends.

There are other reasons why bold action might serve Turkish interests. Turkey, already home to three million Syrian refugees, has all but shut its doors to accepting more asylum seekers. In the event of a fresh offensive by Assad’s forces, millions of Syrians would be forced to knock on Turkish doors before they seek entry to Europe. In turn, Berlin can add its voice to calls from Washington and Istanbul to allow Free Syrian Army groups to take control of the province.

Even so, these measures might not be enough to stop Assad. He is quite likely to go ahead with the attack on Idlib in the name of Syrian sovereignty. One man who can stop him is Russian President Vladimir Putin. And the Russians might have a stake in containing Syria’s Islamist forces as well. Moscow believes hundreds of Russians joined ISIS and HTS and fear their return may present dangers back home.

A Constructive Role

What’s more, Berlin has professed its willingness to play a constructive role in the Syrian crisis. Idlib can be a test case for German diplomacy. If the Germans won’t talk to Assad they must talk to Putin. German-Russian relations have been strained by Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and cyber attacks linked to Russian hackers, but Merkel is the Western leader that always kept communications open with the Kremlin and knows Putin best. She should make the case to Russia that Idlib is crucially important as a safe zone for Syrians escaping regime-held areas.

Germany can attempt to save millions by exercising its leverage through tactful foreign policy. In my conversations with Syrians and senior Syrian government officials, Berlin has emerged as a fair player for both pro-regime and anti-regime camps. The rebels have told me they are grateful for the welcome many refugees have received in Germany, while pro-regime Syrians say Berlin has remained a moderate voice in criticizing Assad’s government, at least compared to Paris, London, and Washington.

So far, however, it seems Germany will take a back seat and watch as the regime attacks Idlib. But, with its stature on the international stage, Germany should step up and use its diplomatic might to resolve the crisis. Merkel must move beyond empty statements that do little else than express a desire for peace.

The post Idlib’s Impending Tragedy appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

On February 20, German authorities rounded up 14 Afghan men to return to their home country in spite of protests and the very real threats they would face upon their return. These forced returns of rejected asylum seekers had become an issue in Germany’s elections last September: In part due to the growing political influence of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Angela Merkel’s CDU has embraced a harder line on migration, and celebrated a decision made by the German foreign office in August of 2017 to bolster the deportation process.

In fact, with the AfD now Germany’s largest opposition party, these deportations could well expand to target Syrians as well: Of the 890,000-plus asylum seekers who began arriving in Germany in 2015, the majority were from Syria, and Syrians have become symbolic of the entire refugee debate. According to the country’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Germany has received 476,331 Syrian asylum requests since 2015. Of those, 301,201 were granted refugee status.

As the mood in the country shifted, however, the German state began offering subsidiary protection, a temporary status where an asylum seeker does not qualify for full refugee protection but cannot be sent back immediately. Those who are granted subsidiary protection receive a residence permit that has to be renewed annually. In 2015, only 61 Syrians received subsidiary protection; in 2016 the number jumped to 121,562. Only 300 Syrian asylum seekers have been denied protection entirely, and the deportation of Syrians has been delayed until this year.

Before taking any further steps to deport Syrian asylum seekers, the German government will almost certainly have to make the case that those being deported—whether individuals or whole groups—have had their applications for asylum rejected because they are not personally in danger in their home country. A group of AfD lawmakers made headlines earlier this month after they traveled through Syria to prove the country was indeed safe enough to send refugees back.

Syrian Isn’t Safe

It is crucial to understand, however, that this is not true: Syrians who return, men in particular, are in deadly danger from both the continued military operations of the Assad regime and the vast scale of destruction the country has experienced. The war in Syria is winding down in most areas but heating up in the remaining rebel enclaves. Even if intense bombardment ceases in the next year or two as planned, it will take much longer to rebuild basic infrastructure, not to mention provide education and jobs.

And Syrian men who fled to avoid being drafted into Assad’s army are at risk as long as the regime is in power. These men opted to leave Syria rather than shoot their own countrymen, and now they are caught between a rock and a hard place—they have become a lightning rod in Europe, with right-wing politicians blaming young, male asylum seekers for increases in crime and sexual violence; having left, however, they are unable to return.

In refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey and shelters in Berlin, male refugees between 18 and 34 say they fear the regime will arrest them, or even execute them, if they return. Most of the Afghans deported thus far are men, and activists believe Syrian men would be the first deported as well. Belinda Bartolucci, a legal policy adviser with Pro Asyl, a German non-profit that supports refugees and asylum seekers, echoes these concerns: “It is to be feared that in the future Germany will use this concept again for other countries.”

Pro Asyl is making a legal case against the deportations, reminding authorities that asylum seekers have several recourses available even after their applications are rejected. In fact, they say it is nearly impossible to bypass all of those recourses and deport a Syrian asylum seeker. German law states, for example, that a refugee cannot be deported if that would entail an immediate risk to their safety. In early January, a German-born Salafist who is a Turkish national appealed his deportation, saying that he would be tortured by Turkish authorities if he returned– and Germany’s highest court ruled in his favor. This effectively forces the German government to obtain a guarantee from an asylum seeker’s country of origin that they will not be tortured upon arrival, a high hurdle to clear.

The Assad regime will almost certainly not produce such an assurance for Syrian men. Since it is now expected that Bashar al-Assad will remain in power, European nations will need to make this an issue in international fora if they wish to begin reducing the number of rejected asylum seekers remaining in the EU; some Syrian men may even be willing to return on their own if they know they can safely do so.

Starting Aid

One option may be through a loophole in Syria’s draft law that allows draft dodgers to return if they have lived abroad for four years and can pay a fine of $4,000. Germany’s interior ministry has recently been trying to lure Syrians to return under their own volition in exchange for a payout of €1,000 for individuals and €3,000 for families in a scheme called Starthilfe, or starting aid. If Germany—or other European states—reworked this idea to target the needs of Syrian men who fled army service, it could be promising.

Syrians who fear oppression at the hands of their own government cannot return, and they cannot be sent back either if their lives would be in danger—not just for their own sake, but for the sake of the values that have defined modern Germany in the post-war era. Those who are willing to return if their safety is secured should be supported, with financial means if necessary; those who would not be safe in their home country must not be forced to return to it.

The post Germany’s Deportation Dilemma appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.