© REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

Whenever Angela Merkel considers a political issue to be of pressing importance, she invites experts to the Federal Chancellery. The evening of May 29, 2018 was no exception: Merkel convened a group of 20 experts from business and science to discuss artificial intelligence. The chancellor has long been worried that Germany and the EU may miss out on this groundbreaking technology.

To also give her cabinet the benefit of the specialists’ urgent message, Merkel asked a number of ministers to attend, including her close confidant, economics minister Peter Altmaier, and labor minister Hubertus Heil of her coalition partner, the SPD. Germany is meant to have an AI strategy by the end of the year, so the cornerstones of a strategy have to be in place before the Bundestag’s summer break in July.

The chancellor has long been clear: Dominance in AI could entirely restructure the geopolitical order—or serve to cement American supremacy and Chinese power. There is resistance to this latter outcome, above all in Berlin and Paris. If there is one thing that French President Emmanuel Macron and Merkel are in absolute agreement about, it is the strategic importance of AI.

Since taking office, Macron has been talking of Europe’s need to defend its “strategic sovereignty”, adding that this will be a battle fought on many fronts, including technology. In a June 3 interview with the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Merkel emphasized that as early as 2017, she has been calling for Europe to take its destiny more into its own hands. Most have taken those statements as references to Europe’s security dependence on the United States. But she was also taking about technology.

It was in 2013, in the wake of the NSA spying scandal, Merkel first had to acknowledge how being dependent on American software and Chinese hardware could limit a country’s capacity to act. Five years later, during a visit to China, Merkel took a detour to the high-tech city Shenzhen, where she visited the Chinese startup iCarbonX and saw how far advanced China is in the usage of big data for the health sector. It was a painful reminder for a chancellor who, for all her time in office, has yet to witness a successful introduction of an electronic health card in Germany.

As always after a trip to China, Merkel returned to Germany impressed and worried by the pace of change. While she is quick to stress that certain aspects of communist China—be it the desire to control citizens or the lack of data protection—could never be replicated in in a democracy, that doesn’t change the fact that German companies have to compete on the same field as American and Chinese tech giants.

Ever Louder Warnings

Warnings about the explosive potential of AI development have been getting louder and louder. Military officials believe that AI is already in the process of revolutionizing warfare. The US and China have been long been experimenting with autonomous weapon systems, drones, and ship fleets that can organize themselves. While Germany was debating whether its conventional weapons systems are even operational, or if there are enough boots and protective vests for its soldiers, other places were developing the technology that will decide future wars. The technological gap is widening even more rapidly—and in the outdated German security debate, nobody seems to have noticed.

Merkel on numerous occasions, even to her coalition partners, has warned of the need for increased spending on German defense. But she has so far avoided a debate about the possibilities and dangers of these new types of weapons. In the meantime, Germany’s Foreign Office has begun to consider how AI will change foreign policy. An international debate over the ethics of using automated and autonomous weapons has begun.

Merkel has, to this point, limited her attention to the shortcomings of digitalization in the civil sector. She has been pushing the issue since 2012. Her initial efforts attracted ridicule after she described the unpredictable consequences of the internet for society as Neuland—terra incognita. Then she threw her weight behind Industry 4.0, a campaign meant to push German companies to understand and implement the digitalization of production, administration, research, and sales. Merkel warned that, unless Germans master Big Data and the specialized manufacturing technology of digital-age products, proud German industry could simply become the work bench for American IT firms.

In 2016, the term “artificial intelligence” finally appeared in the chancellor’s vocabulary when Merkel, a trained physicist, realized during conversations with entrepreneurs and scientists that artificial intelligence would massively accelerate the fusion of otherwise separate research domains. “I’ll put it bluntly: It is not entirely clear to me in which fields we are actually top-notch; in which fields we need to buy more knowledge; what the interconnection of diverse fields will look like one day; and if we will, by then, have all of the technological capabilities that we need to be at the front of the pack,” she acknowledged at a research summit on June 12, 2016. Afterwards, Merkel called even more urgently for Germany to go on the offensive in AI research. If necessary, Germany should protect its AI companies from being taken over by American or Chinese firms.

Three Competing Ministries

One reason Merkel was turning up the heat was her improved understanding of the complex effects of AI, which she now describes as “disruptive” or “revolutionary.” Another was the realization, at the end of the 2017 legislative period, that the grand coalition’s digitalization efforts have had little success. For example, though national broadband expansion was ranked among one of the government’s top priorities in 2013, Germany’s position in the international rankings for data connectivity has continued to worsen.

The chancellor credits herself for the steady expansion of Germany’s research budget. But research expenditure was not tax deductible—an issue especially important small and medium-sized businesses—until 2017. Venture capital has also been slow to arrive. In the last election campaign, politicians of all stripes complained that having three ministries, run by three different parties, responsible for digitalization didn’t exactly speed things up. On top of that, critics said that the government had made too many special considerations for Deutsche Telekom. By allowing Telekom to increase network speeds by “vectoring” preexisting copper cables, they cut costs in the short run, but only delayed the expensive and inevitable transition to fiber-optic cables.

In response, Merkel insisted during the campaign that the chancellery should centrally manage all digitalization activities in the future. In her new grand coalition, she has two senior figures dealing with the issue: Helge Braun, head of the federal chancellery, and Dorothee Bär, federal government commissioner for digitalization. Additionally, she created a new department responsible for digital issues in the central government office and integrated it with other departments from the interior ministry. In short, Merkel wants to speed things up. Her May 2018 meeting with AI experts only reinforced the point that Germany was lagging behind and needed to take decisive action. One element is to make it clear to small and medium-sized companies that if they want to survive, they have to engage with AI technologies.

In the battle to win back some technological sovereignty, lots of levers need to be pulled at the same time. That is not easy given Germany’s federal structures and the distance between politics and the economy. Unlike Beijing, Berlin cannot “rule from the top.” And unlike in the US, there are not huge sums of private money ready to be spent on scaling up start-ups or accelerating IT research. In Germany, the federal government has to ask the states to reform their educational systems in order to meet new technological challenges. And when the big companies in China or the US come calling, company managers naturally think about their own interests or the firm’s interests—not necessarily about Europe’s strategic needs.

The Complete Value Chain

In the tech age, a region only has technological sovereignty if it can produce the complete value chain of digital products. Whether it be computer chips, computers, batteries, or software, the European countries have collectively given up on competing at the top. Instead, they have become customers for other nations’ companies. The US and China dominate the market for software, hardware, and social media platforms, which have an ever-greater impact on daily life. And when there are interesting technological developments from German startups or companies, the large American and Chinese firms eagerly buy them out.

These problems are why the 2016 Chinese acquisition of the German robotics company Kuka generated such a passionate debate in the government about foreign investors. Should foreign takeovers of strategically important companies be more strongly controlled? “We need to exercise caution, so we can maintain a foundation, so that not everything will be bought out from us,” warned Merkel in May 2017. Merkel also called for more flexible European aid rules that would allow member-states to better support AI firms.

Yet the attempts to redress Europe’s deficiencies seem modest given the speed of innovation elsewhere. For years, Merkel has worked in the background with some similarly minded European leaders to try and develop an independent European computer chip factory, or perhaps a European battery factory. But the fragmentation of the EU internal market, national reservations, and the lack of strategic direction have hindered progress. Only in 2018 did the European Union implement its General Data Protection Regulation, which provides a common legal framework for handling data in the EU. Everything is too slow.

A Three Percent Benchmark

Merkel and Macron want to kindle a new research dynamic—or at least expand on current basic research and its applications. For the chancellor and the French president, the possibilities of AI are so revolutionary that the research needs to be revolutionary too. The model is the Pentagon’s DARPA program for defense research which has regularly boosted civilian R&D. But accepting that research projects will sometimes fail conflicts with the German approach of accounting for every penny spent.

The leaders of France and Germany argue that such a cautious, rigid approach makes it impossible to discover the necessary “game changers” or “technological leaps” that could secure the survival of European industry. They believe that the EU should use the European Innovation Council to support high-risk research projects—even if nine out of every ten projects will ultimately fail.

It is not clear whether the drive to catch up will work. China and the American tech giants have been following forward-looking strategies for years, investing tens of billions in new technologies. In an aging Europe, on the other hand, the debate focuses almost exclusively on the distribution of social benefits and fears of migration. The EU will still have around 450 million citizens after Brexit, but no functional European digital market to serve them.

On top of that, there is the general lack of awareness about the importance of innovation. Much of the EU is absorbed by passionate debates about NATO members’ commitment to spend two percent of GDP on defense. Yet nobody seems to be noticed that almost all EU member states are seriously neglecting another, more important commitment that dates back to 2010: they should all be spending three percent of their economic performance on research and innovation.

The post A Question of Sovereignty appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

Angela Merkel’s path to the chancellery did not start particularly well. It was September 18, 2005, and the polls had just closed. Some 13 million Germans tuned into the public broadcaster, ARD, to see the leading candidates of Germany’s main parties – including the incumbent, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democrats (SPD), and a wide-eyed and visibly uneasy Merkel – grilled on who would run Germany’s next government. They witnessed a somewhat surreal scene: an irate Schröder  tried to cow his opponent into admitting that she would never be able form a government. Merkel, nervous but resolute,managed to face him down.

Until just a few months before the vote, Merkel’s conservatives, the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union, had enjoyed robust poll numbers upwards of 50 percent. However, by the time the talk show went live on election night, SPD and CDU/CSU were neck and neck, both hovering near 34 percent. It was a debacle for the conservatives. Merkel’s future as chancellor was suddenly shrouded in doubt.

In the end, after all the votes were counted, the CDU/CSU limped away with a slim majority and Merkel ended up as chancellor. Yet this was just the first of many storms she would weather. Few would have predicted then that she would go on to overcome global crises and an increasingly volatile political landscape to challenge former Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s record of 16 years in office.

The Outsider

Merkel profited from her outsider status right from the start. She launched her political career in 1990, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall; unlike many West German lawmakers who had been immersed in a culture of ideological and political debate since childhood, Merkel arrived with a fresh, raw perspective – a perspective often at odds with what she encountered in a new, unified Germany.

In the former East, for example, some 80 percent of women were working, making West Germany’s reluctance over women in the workplace look decidedly outdated.  That may have been one of the reasons why Chancellor Kohl put Merkel in charge of two areas where he saw drastic need for improvement within the CDU: family politics and environmental policy.

Merkel admits she was surprised and even annoyed by the West German peace movement and education policy at first. She did not share Helmut Kohl’s emotional connection to France and European integration; but then, Kohl had grown up very close to the French border. Instead, she approached Europe with reason and rationality that made her a more objective judge of how best to achieve closer integration. Her ties to East Germany made her view the EU’s expansion into Eastern Europe as a crucial step toward a more unified European bloc.

The Anti-Ego

A key factor driving Chancellor Merkel success has been her unassuming approach to power. As a woman and a politician from a small, regional CDU chapter in the former East, she was forced to patch together her base of support. Early on, she had to learn the art of making deals and striking alliances with lawmakers from across the spectrum. As chancellor, she has drawn on that experience time and again, regularly inviting experts to brief her on a wide array of topics – a way of deepening her expertise while also expanding her network.

In an era when increasing individualization and rapid digitalization have dissolved traditional power structures, Merkel has proven to be wily and versatile, more so than many of her former fellow CDU lawmakers form the former West Germany. Lest we forget, Merkel is now dealing with her fourth French and third American president.

The chancellor is also known for her ability to de-escalate crises, a skill owed to her experiences in politics but also her upbringing in the East, her background in science and, not least, her reticent personality. For Merkel, smart, rational decisions lead to long-term success in politics. So does integrity. She allows defeated opponents to save face and refrains from exulting in victories, even significant ones. Times change, after all, and a win can quickly turn into a loss.

Merkel believes in the importance of respecting other views as a cornerstone of democracy. She once quoted Henry Kissinger’s hypothesis that decisions are often 51 percent correct and 49 percent wrong – an explanation, perhaps, for her long and protracted decision-making process.

Before doing battle, Merkel works diligently to prepare in great detail. She takes her opponents seriously, but she avoids provocation. This year, SPD candidate Martin Schulz lambasted Merkel for what he saw as attempts to avoid real, substantive debate on issues like pensions, calling it an “attack on democracy.” She brushed his rebuke aside with a mild smile. As the head of the CDU, Merkel urges party members to avoid being steered by their opponents’ agendas and instead focus on their own course.

The Strategist

Her approach to politics, particularly in the face of impulsive leaders like US President Donald Trump or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, may seem plodding or even hesitant. But for Merkel, politics is about the long game, not short-term gains or setbacks – a lesson learned from her mentor, Helmut Kohl. Despite rocky relations with Trump and Erdogan, Merkel has strived to keep the channels of dialogue and diplomacy open, well aware that she will likely be working with one or both for the foreseeable future.

Critics have also derided Merkel for flip-flopping. Take her and her government’s sudden decision to shut down all nuclear reactors in Germany after the Fukushima disaster in Japan. Such an about-face could be seen as a sign of weakness. Merkel, however, believes it to be a strength. To that end, she cited Winston Churchill’s famous truism in 2014: “To improve is to change, to be perfect is to change often.” She has repeatedly reminded her critics that one must always be ready to adapt policy in a constantly changing world.

It is no wonder, then, that Merkel seems to deliver policy messages in ambiguous terms that are difficult to decipher, like “solidarity and responsibility.” Other turns of phrase even appear to be contradictory, like describing her party as “social, liberal, conservative.” She uses these koans to preserve her flexibility and neutralize any accusations that she is making too many political changes.

The Moralist

Policies may sometimes change with the wind, but Merkel is quick to point out that she has upheld the same fundamental values throughout her career. She has steadfastly championed the values of Western democracy, reminded Europe of its humanitarian duty towards those in need, and strongly rejected all forms of anti-Semitism and xenophobia. In the case of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Merkel has indicated that some of Europe’s positions toward the Kremlin must be maintained for decades, if necessary.

EU integration, transatlantic ties and the security of Israel are core elements of Merkel’s world order. However, ever since Donald Trump’s election, she has put more emphasis on the importance of honoring the West’s shared values. In her congratulatory message to the newly elected US President on November 9, 2016, Merkel qualified her diplomatic statement with a pointed admonition to the new US leader: “Germany and America are united by shared values: through democracy, freedom, respect for the right and dignity of every individual, irrespective of their origin, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation or political attitude. On the basis of these values, I would like to offer you a close cooperation between the governments of our countries,” she said. Shortly thereafter, media across the world began postulating that Chancellor Merkel had inherited the mantle of leader of the global democratic order – something she resists, as it puts her and her country in a position where they can only disappoint.

In times of crisis, Merkel is able to recognize the opportunity within a setback, possibly a relic of her dialectic training in communist East Germany. She viewed both the election of Donald Trump and the shock of Brexit as wake-up calls and signs that Europe must take its fate into its own hands. The chancellor also openly admits her own fallibility. She takes on her opponents’ issues, and praises her predecessor Gerhard Schröder for his Agenda 2010 labor market reforms, which have benefited her greatly during her time in office. Ever the realist, she promised voters on the campaign trail that the CDU would do its best to represent their interests, but that no party could fulfill all their wishes.

The European

Over the years, Merkel has often said that she thoroughly enjoys her job. She is driven by curiosity and perceives problems as welcome challenges, not as a burden. “I find my work as chancellor enjoyable and inspiring – to constantly face new problems,” she said in 2013, repeating that sentiment again during this year’s campaign. Her perspective can be traced back to her roots in physics, where she was tasked with analyzing and solving complex problems. Last November, for example, she admitted that she had brooded over the decision to seek a fourth term for months, contemplating whether she still had sufficient curiosity for the job. Clearly, the answer was yes.

It is perhaps that self-reflection that makes the chancellor still appear authentic to German voters, according to public opinion surveys. Even after twelve years in office, her popularity ratings have remained remarkably stable and high, with only a single, relative low during the refugee crisis.

At the core of Merkel’s approach to politics lies the belief in the evolutionary process – in the power of hard-fought victories rather than in rapid, revolutionary change. That same perspective shaped Germany in the post-war era, when politics were founded on the importance of coalitions and consensus building between nations, but also between the federal government and its states.

Compromise has been a pillar of Merkel’s approach to politics at home and abroad, particularly in the European Union. The chancellor has taken on the task of shoring up the very building blocks of the EU’s foundation, from the Eurozone currency union to the Schengen free-travel zone. During the German EU presidency in 2007, Merkel wrangled with her European counterparts to win support for the Treaty of Lisbon, an agreement that amended and streamlined existing EU legislation.

At the height of the eurozone debt crisis, Merkel’s skepticism concerning the EU framework’s ability to stem the downward spiral became evident, and Germany quickly took a leading role in steering the bloc back to stability. In 2013, the chancellor began pursuing a series of steps towards further integration, from a common European budget to a eurozone finance minister and closer coordination on social policy and research.

The 2015 refugee crisis served as yet another obstacle to European unity and a cautionary tale for Merkel. She has repeatedly remarked that the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants exposed the need to revisit Schengen: Europe needed to secure its outer borders, relieve member states bearing the brunt of the burden (Italy and Greece), and formulate a unified, EU-wide asylum policy. While her predecessors Kohl and even Schröder championed ambitious new projects for Europe, Merkel has appeared to see her job as patching up the union’s leaks and gaps.

The Techie

Many in Germany do not know that Merkel is a zealous advocate of technological progress. She was ridiculed for her 2013 statement: “The Internet is unchartered waters for everyone,” but the chancellor says she is deeply aware of how technology and digitalization will transform the future in Germany and Europe.

It is therefore one of her chief missions to ensure that Germany and the EU keep up with technological developments on a global pace. Her German government has launched the “Industry 4.0” initiative to urge the Mittelstand – family-owned small- and mid-sized companies that make up the backbone of Germany’s manufacturing base – to embrace the synergy of industry and IT and ready themselves for the future. Just this year, Merkel called artificial intelligence the real driving force behind digitalization, a force that will re-calibrate all aspects of life. Here, too, she warned that Germany and Europe lagged far behind the global leaders, the US and China.

At the same time, Merkel has spurred the country’s mighty auto industry, the engine of the German economy, to shift gears and invest heavily in electric mobility, self-driving cars, and innovation. The ongoing diesel emissions scandal has only sharpened Merkel’s admonitions. She knows perfectly well that if she wins a fourth term, her legacy will largely depend on how well German industry copes with digitalization.

Failure – as reflected in lower growth, declining incomes, and higher unemployment – would certainly erode the Merkel mystique. A safe pair of hands needs, above all, to maintain safety. Otherwise, the caution, rationality, and sobriety that Germans seem to like so much about their chancellor could one day turn stale.

The post The Merkel Mystique appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Dado Ruvic

It has become a familiar dynamic: AWD News, a website knowing for disseminating fabricated “news,” quoted Marine Le Pen of France’s right-wing Front National allegedly comparing President François Hollande to Adolf Hitler. Le Pen’s comparison quickly went viral and drew considerable condemnation. A fact-checker at the French daily Le Monde, however, debunked the quote – after all, in democracies, the principle of distinguishing between fact and fake applies to everyone, including political opponents. Le Pen, it turned out, had never made the comparison.

It is a small yet significant example of how public opinion in both the US and Europe is being roiled online. And it is not just extremist fringe groups that are to blame. Politicians and mainstream media have long neglected to address the rise of fake news and conspiracy theories that flourished after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th US president have thrust this issue squarely into the spotlight. German parties are only now realizing just how powerful modern digital tools can be in influencing public opinion and destabilizing democracy. After the US elections, it was Chancellor Angela Merkel herself who drew attention to the problem of so-called social media bots – automated software active on platforms like Facebook and Twitter that resembles real users. Merkel was so concerned that she suggested a code of conduct for German parties in this year’s election.

For German lawmakers, the way the US election campaigns were conducted came as a sobering realization. Both Trump’s campaign and, to a lesser extent, Clinton’s employed social bots to artificially pad likes on Facebook, create the illusion of widespread support, or frighten and silence moderate politicians with relentless abuse and harassment online. “Bots contribute to a radicalized tone in debates, overwhelming more measured voices,” warned Peter Tauber, chairman of Merkel’s conservative CDU party.

Now barely a week passes without new information emerging, especially from the US, on how hacks, leaks, and fake news can affect an open, democratic political system. Until recently, German politicians only knew trolls: users who sow discord online, inciting hate and abuse and harassing others, either for money or out of conviction. Now, Germany is waking up to the various other ways that opinion can be manipulated, for example by fabricated news stories targeting certain social networks or accounts. Echo chambers prevent people from being confronted with opinions different to their own. And digital tools morph so quickly that even experts are finding it difficult to identify and assess the impact. When Merkel in 2013 called the Internet “unchartered territory,” she was ridiculed. Nobody is laughing now.

The Populist Advantage

The right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD, has created its own team of bloggers and wants to found its own television network as well, just as Austria’s far-right Freedom Party did. The AfD justifies the need for these tools with the argument that mainstream media is controlled by the establishment, including the governing parties.

Merkel has warned that biased media only reinforce echo chambers and give fringe groups and their supporters the illusion that they are many, while in reality they are a minority. The anti-Islam Pegida movement’s slogan, “We are the people,” is a classic example.

Experts have highlighted various tools that are increasingly able to influence ever smaller, customized voter groups. In the US, authorities essentially have free rein to gather metadata on individual voters and their opinions. The Trump campaign took profiling to the next level, creating starkly different, even contradictory, political ads to target voters in Pennsylvania versus Florida. These ads specifically addressed the emotions and desires of the individual recipients and voter groups.

Trump’s data team, Cambridge Analytica (CA), was behind that approach. The company describes its work as using “big data and advanced psychographics to grow audiences, identify key influencers, and move people to action.” Essentially, it targets individual voters based on psychological profiles. An in-depth report on CA by the Swiss news site Das Magazin quickly went viral in the German public and among decision makers.

CA had worked with the pro-Brexit campaign as well, gathering massive stores of data on voters and analyzing them to create psychological dossiers. They mined users’ clicks and likes, their purchase histories, their medical information, their smartphone usage and even information on where they live. All that data helped CA understand voters’ beliefs and desires down to the individual. Now there are fears that parties in Europe will buy up metadata on their own citizens and resort to the same measures. France’s populist Front National has reportedly already contacted the company.

At the same time, the combination of globalization and digitalization has provided external actors with new tools to interfere in national elections. In the US, 17 security agencies concluded that Russia hacked the presidential election in favor of Donald Trump. According to The Washington Post, after months of vehemently denying any involvement, the Kremlin actually deferred to the president-elect on the CIA’s assessment.

Europe is now worried that Russian hackers could sway elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany this year, in favor of populist, anti-immigrant (and anti-European) forces. The head of Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution – the domestic intelligence service – Hans-Georg Maaßen openly warned that aggressive cyberspying and cyberattacks are threatening to destabilize Germany’s democracy. Referring to a high-profile case last year of a German-Russian girl who Russian media said was kidnapped and raped by migrants in Berlin – a claim later refuted by German authorities – he said, “This could happen again next year and we are alarmed. We have the impression that this is part of a hybrid threat that seeks to influence public opinion and decision-making processes.”

Fighting Back

Germany’s security forces are now arming themselves to fight cyberattacks. The government is trying to sharpen legislation on hate speech online and is putting Facebook under increasing pressure to take down blatantly racist, inflammatory, and inappropriate posts the same way traditional media is obliged to do. Social Democrat legislator Lars Klingbeil has proposed a mutual “no-attack” agreement for parties involved in the election campaign, and another parliamentarian, Thomas Jarzombek (CDU), is calling for a press law to hold social media in check – especially as sites like Facebook and Twitter have become primary news sources for many users.

All of Germany’s established parties have agreed not to utilize social media bots in the upcoming campaign. The question remains whether the AfD will go along with the pact. The party originally said it would make bots part of its strategy, but later distanced itself from that statement. These self-regulatory initiatives may help, but the problem is far from solved – third party actors can swoop in and create social media bots in lawmakers’ names without their knowledge, discrediting them. Still, there are key differences with the US and the UK, where societies are far more polarized and data privacy does not carry the same weight it does in Germany.

As Berlin is building up its technical infrastructure in preparation, experts and lawmakers believe education and clarification will be the most effective tools in combating all forms of interference – and they have to be utilized as early as possible. Children, too, have to learn that Facebook and Twitter do not provide objective perspectives on reality, and that algorithms generate bubbles that only reaffirm their own beliefs.

Transparency is considered the best weapon to prevent fake news and conspiracy theories from taking root. Here, too, careful, accurate journalism is paramount, as the example of Le Monde’s fact checking revealed. “The best approach is to talk about it,” said Maaßen. “When people notice that the information they’re receiving isn’t trustworthy, that they are being fed propaganda and misinformation, then the poison of lies loses its effect.”

The post Disinformation War appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Sahra Wagenknecht, parliamentary leader of the Left Party, was roundly criticized for referring to “antidemocratic” forces in Brussels. But she is by no means the only German politician undermining EU institutions.

© REUTERS/Stefanie Loos

In Germany, one principle has united the established political parties for decades: ever-deeper European integration is in Germanyʼs national interests and should be encouraged. German politicians like to think of themselves as the “good Europeans,” combating excessive nationalism and encouraging closer cooperation and shared economic growth. The bad guys, on the other hand, are right-wing populists in the EU Parliament – the British nationalists leading the charge for Brexit and the nationalist conservative Eastern Europeans in Poland and Hungary – and the left-wing populists in Greece, Italy, Spain, and France, who reject the fundamental rules of the EU and eurozone. …

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2016 issue.

The post Good Europeans? Not Quite appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – March/April 2016 issue.

The post The Last European appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Mike Segar

Thus, autumn 2015 represents the start of German foreign policy’s next emancipatory phase: In early 2014 the Munich Security Conference marked the beginning of the public debate about the greater degree of responsibility the EU’s largest economy should assume in foreign affairs. The defensive position held at the time has now by necessity given way to an offensive one. The German government is not only ready to assume greater responsibility, it is now actively pushing for this responsibility itself: from Ukraine to Iran, from Libya to Syria, Berlin’s leaders have made clear that they want and will have a seat at the table.

Insistence upon permanent membership in the highest UN body is only one element of this strategy. Berlin has made the decision to assume an active role immediately, at the very least for the stabilization of the entire crisis zone surrounding the EU – stretching from the Maghreb at its westernmost edge across Egypt and the Middle East to Belarus. There are two reasons for this. The first is the overwhelming shock and resultant domestic pressure in the face of the singular wave of refugees currently expected to deliver over one million asylum seekers to the country this year alone. The second is the increasing sense that Berlin can no longer rely on its European and international partners to step up as needed.

Berlin’s Answer to the Refugee Crisis

Merkel’s sober – and for many, too matter-of-fact – analysis of the refugee crisis has been that this problem cannot be solved in Germany, on the German-Austrian border, nor even at the EU’s external borders alone. Despite domestic demands for speedy solutions, Merkel, together with Social Democrat Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Minister for Economic Affairs Sigmar Gabriel (the SPD party leader) as well as her Christian Union (CDU/CSU) party colleagues Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, and Development Minister Gerd Müller, has stressed that relief can only come through cooperation with non-European countries and a common fight against the very conditions which have led to the exodus. In Germany’s view, therefore, the EU must take a vast number of actions in order to restore functioning governmental structures in countries like Libya, to reach a cooperation agreement with Turkey on refugee issues, to halt the civil war in Syria, and to ensure proper care and support for Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.

This will require, according to German government leaders, both considerable rethinking as well as addressing nationalistic reflexes which have been exposed across a number of EU states, including Germany. In response to these, Merkel has underlined more than once that “fences around Germany will not help.” The same applies to the Hungarian wall, a structure relieving no one but that country alone of its duties. A general policy of returning the refugees to Austria is also impossible, because the German government can see this would unleash a fatal chain reaction: every smaller European country along the so-called Balkan route could fall into chaos. Attempts at a common European solution and the preservation of passport-free travel within the Schengen zone would be completely destroyed by such a singularly nationally-focused action. For this reason, an alternative set of rules addressing everything from improved EU external border protections, to common asylum procedures, to a binding quota for union-wide refugee distribution are being negotiated with great haste. Germany self-critically recognizes that it was long a country which not only did not support, but in fact actively prevented the EU Commission from moving forward with exactly these changes.

Unfortunately, from the German government’s point-of-view, these necessary European policy changes no longer go far enough: Over the past two decades, the German credo has focused on the continued coalescence of domestic and European policy. At the moment, however, Merkel’s rhetoric and train of thought resemble those of an international development aid organization: Even domestic and world politics are bound ever more tightly. On public television’s political talk show “Anne Will”, the chancellor admitted that she had long believed countries like Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan to be far, far away. She elaborated her new One World-thinking thusly: “And suddenly we see that there are people running for their lives to such a degree that long distances like these are suddenly shrunk down to nothing, and they come to us in the EU, making us part of these conflicts and unable to differentiate between domestic and foreign policy.” She further pointed to the ways in which tools and methods of communication and information-sharing like smartphones have caused the world to grow together. Merkel also commented that the high number of EU citizens who are fighting alongside the radical Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq alone would have qualified Europe as an actor in this Middle Eastern conflict.

No More Looking Away

Her conclusion: Rather than looking away, as we have done before, we must engage even more strongly in the future “so that people can stay in their homeland, and perhaps we will not face so much integration work.” In other words, every euro spent in a crisis country helps us spare many more that would have to be spent to clean up the mess of failures in other parts of the world. Every current foreign policy attempt can assist in the prevention of domestic problems later. Berlin is beginning to sing the holy anthem of diplomacy. “We have a joint responsibility for the unstable regions surrounding us,” German EU Commissioner Günther Oettinger stressed on October 18.

Thus countries like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt are moving into the forefront of German foreign policy – and no longer simply for export promotion. On October 18, Merkel flew to Istanbul to sound out the degree to which Turkey will let itself be drawn into joint efforts to contain the flood of refugees – despite the fact that the country found itself in the middle of an election campaign. At the same time, Steinmeier visited Iran and Saudi Arabia. Just in the past year, the German government’s delivery of weapons to the Iraqi Kurds eliminated two old German taboos simultaneously: for the first time, Germany both supported a militia group and delivered weapons directly into a war zone. The German Foreign Office further heavily supported the UN special envoys to both Libya and Syria in their attempts to get every conflict actor to the negotiating table. New realpolitik thinking is seeping into the otherwise strongly morals-focused German debate. “Finding something wrong and negotiating at the same time are not mutually exclusive,” Merkel said on October 8. In a TV interview, Merkel rebuffed criticism of her talks with highly polarizing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by noting that it was her “damn duty” to coordinate with Turkey.

Suddenly, the argumentation in an entire line of policy fields is shifting. In New York in late September, Merkel explicitly acknowledged the goal of spending 0.7 percent of GDP on development goals – which, given the current spending level of just 0.4 percent, will result in considerable spending increases and a necessary reorganization of Germany’s annual budget. Defense Minister von der Leyen further explained that foreign military missions are a direct contribution to efforts to keep people in their homelands – at least in Afghanistan, Mali, and Iraq. This too will lead to additional governmental spending. Both Merkel and Environment Minister Barbara Hendricks have argued that an ambitious international climate strategy is an important contribution to the prevention of the next wave of refugees, because people will increasingly be forced to flee their homes due to environmental degradation. Germany is thusly fortifying not only classic developmental strategies, but also its own commitment to climate protection: the country has promised to pay one-tenth of the $100 million contribution promised annually from 2020 by industrial nations to developing countries for their climate protection efforts.

If Berlin Doesn’t Do It, Then Who Will?

The other motive for Germany’s rising diplomacy efforts is an incipient sobriety with regard to the competencies and the political will of the country’s European and international partners. In the EU, the European Council president and the Commission have in Berlin’s view long failed to recognize the immediacy of the refugee crisis. And the 28 member countries have not shown adequate decisiveness in undertaking realistic burden-sharing measures, neither in terms of the refugees themselves nor in external border protection. Despite Merkel and Steinmeier’s attempts to form a common EU foreign policy, they both share the opinion that Berlin must once again negotiate alone and bring its weight as the EU’s largest economy and current haven of political stability to the table – as it did in the Ukraine crisis. Thus, the government increasingly focused its energy on sparking activity through, in the words of one top diplomat, its hand-holding and “cheerleading” of the others. At the EU summit on October 16, Merkel complimented the EU Commission on finally recognizing the seriousness of the situation and putting together over just a few days an action plan for closer coordination with Turkey.

This disillusionment applies even to the five veto powers of the UN Security Council. Expectations of China, a country which has long abstained from involvement in international crises, are the lowest of the bunch. That said, the country had still been part of the successful nuclear negotiations with Iran. At the same time, the Chinese leadership made clear through its actions in the South and East China Seas that it is now prepared to flex its military muscles when it comes to defending its own national interests.

In Berlin’s view, UN veto-holder Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, has proven that it sees itself as more of an opponent to the post-1989 European peace framework than the partner all had once hoped it would become, especially since the dawn of the Ukraine crisis and above all its annexation of Crimea. “If any proof is still needed that the Kremlin exercises massive influence over the hybrid warfare methods of eastern Ukraine’s separatists, then consider the fact that at the very moment when Russia engaged in Syria, the [Ukrainian] conflict stopped virtually overnight,” said von der Leyen on October 17. Following Russia’s attacks on Syria, therefore, the German government has pushed for Moscow’s inclusion in finding solutions, despite the fact that Russia’s support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its bombings of non-Islamic State opposition groups has made it, much like in Ukraine, ultimately part of the problem.

Berlin’s opinion of the three Western UN veto powers is currently little better, though. Every demonstration of transatlantic and European partnership in the past few months has been met with the same criticism by leading German politicians of all stripes, namely: Our Western partners either cannot or do not want to make a decisive contribution to the stabilization of the crisis zone surrounding the EU. On October 18 Chancellery Chief of Staff Peter Altmaier pointed out that it was the Middle Eastern order wrought by France, the UK, and the US that was presently collapsing.

The UK no longer plays the same decisive role in Europe’s foreign policy that it once did, even if London contributes heavily in specific cases, such as the recent financing of refugee camps in Syria’s neighboring states. In Germany’s view, the UK and France contributed to the fall of the Libyan government with their military intervention without so much as a concept for the necessary stabilization of the country in its aftermath. These countries thereby created an unintended hole through which smuggling bands transport refugees to Europe – refugees that neither country is prepared to assume responsibility for in any reasonable quantity.

French President François Hollande may be Merkel’s close partner when it comes to European policy, but he allegedly has the tendency of using foreign military deployments as a short-term means of raising his domestic political profile. A public German-French spat over the unannounced French air attacks in Syria outside of the US-led alliance did not break out only because Merkel needs Hollande’s support in many other areas. With great effort Berlin concealed its anger that Hollande had delivered Putin a perfect set-up and apology for Russia’s unilateral action in Syria just a few days later.

Disillusioned with Obama

The disillusionment with US President Barack Obama also looms large. The German government has acknowledged that given China’s increasing strength, the US is bound to give greater focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Merkel and Steinmeier therefore cautioned in 2014 that the EU must play a greater role in resolving conflicts in its own neighborhood. At the same time, members of all parties accused Washington of lacking vision and rigor in the very areas of foreign policy most important for Europe. In their decisive response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Obama and Merkel were still united. But as the US president insulted Russia by calling the country a “regional power”, Berlin, alarmed, could only shake its head: Such a move demanded even stronger actions from Putin to amplify Russia’s attempts to raise its own profile – attempts which play out on Europe’s, not Washington’s doorstep. Merkel and Steinmeier repeatedly pushed their American counterparts over the past few months to get over their own superpower pride and at the very least to negotiate with their Russian counterparts over how to de-escalate those crises Putin plays an active role in.

And in his attempts to avoid making or even to correct the mistakes of his predecessor George W. Bush, Obama’s promise to withdraw troops helped tip Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan into even greater chaos and created a vacuum which strengthened the radical IS, an opinion held not just by many Republicans in Washington. Only after pressure from his NATO partners, including Germany, did Obama correct his Afghanistan decision in mid-October. Merkel and Steinmeier today openly warn that the collapse of the Iraqi and Libyan states paved the way for the rise of IS and other terrorist organizations and that the international community should not be allowed to make the same mistake again in Syria.

The German government had largely been removed from international efforts in Syria. Berlin first pushed the regime-change rhetoric of its Western allies with regard to President Assad as hard as it has the resulting disavowal of the very same maxim over the past few months as the fight against IS has grown in importance. Steinmeier welcomed US coordination of Western and Arab air attacks against IS forces in Syria. Germany’s military campaign against IS, however, will remain limited to deliveries of arms to Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq.

In October, Berlin followed with alarm as new battles in Syria triggered another wave of refugees from the war-torn country – and without anyone beyond UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura even attempting to reconceptualize political deescalation. Nuclear powers Russia and the US appeared ever more strongly as if they would gamble on such a proxy war turning into a direct conflict.

Germany as Mediator – Also in Syria?

For this reason, German diplomacy has ramped up its engagement in Syria since September as well, making Germany 2015’s unrecognized international negotiations champion. Berlin played a central role in every significant negotiation of the year, from the Ukrainian Minsk Agreement to the long-standing Iranian atomic conflict and even the Greek euro debate. Applying its typical soft diplomacy strategies, the German Foreign Office even made it possible for every party in Libya’s civil war to sit together around a Berlin table. This new decisiveness is illustrated by the fact that a German diplomat, Martin Kobler, will next take on the role of UN special envoy to Libya – despite the fact that Mediterranean countries such as France or Italy have traditionally viewed northern Africa as their domain.

In the face of over 250,000 dead and millions of refugees, Berlin is now begging every regional and international political actor to forget their disparate and particular interests and finally come together for talks – including even Russia, Iran, and representatives of the Syrian government. IS represents a common and dangerous enemy. Berlin sees its own role as facilitator of this “mediation process” – especially as Germany has yet to involve itself militarily. That such a process will require shaking hands with leaders one would under normal circumstances avoid is seen as the lesser evil, considering the degree to which the EU and Germany have been overwhelmed by refugees. As Merkel explained on October 8 at a CDU event in Wuppertal, “Foreign policy will always expose conflict between the values we are bound to and our own interests.”

The post Aiming High appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Joe Klamar/Pool

In fact, the common thread linking Germany’s recent diplomatic successes lies in one of the fundamental guidelines of German diplomacy: a firm adherence to principles, matched with a willingness to talk – and to accept a price to achieve success.

Lesson 1: Minsk

The conflict in Ukraine offers a perfect example of the role Germany can play in the EU neighborhood. US President Barack Obama, unwilling to consider American military intervention and unable to play the role of honest broker in the region himself, left the field to the Europeans, above all German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The chancellor had a double mission: she had to convince the Ukrainian government as well as the US, Eastern Europeans, and NATO partners concerned by Russian aggression that military escalation would achieve nothing, as the Russian army would always prevail; and she had to make it clear to Russia that such a breech of international taboos would carry consequences.

Over the months preceding the Minsk meeting in February 2015 her government attempted to maintain this balance. Merkel undertook delicate talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Milan and Brisbane, and, along with French President François Hollande, redoubled her commitment to a diplomatic solution when it threatened to escalate to open warfare in January. During the marathon negotiations on February 12 in Minsk, it was Merkel who played the lead. She stressed that military escalation must be avoided at all costs; echoing Christopher Clark’s book on the outbreak of the First World War, she said she was determined not to be a “sleepwalker”, watching helplessly as countries drifted towards war.

…

Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2015 issue.

The post Negotiating Weltmeister appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

The July 13 resolution to start negotiations with Greece on a third financial assistance package was the conclusion of years of wrestling with various Greek governments over the stabilization of the country. Under the 2014 conservative government led by Antonis Samaras, it appeared that Greece would require little more than preventative treatment to avoid a relapse after its second stability loan ran out. When Syriza politician Alexis Tsipras formed his coalition government in January, however – comprised of opponents of the previous European Stability Mechanism (ESM) policy from both the extreme left and right – the shock was felt throughout Europe.

In a matter of just a few weeks, the front lines between Athens and the rest of the eurozone solidified. The country’s sharp economic decline made it even clearer that Greece and its 18 eurozone partners would be forced to answer two questions in short order: Would Tsipras refuse a third Greek bailout to avoid further reform obligations? And would the eurozone partners alter their previous ESM stance, or would they let Greece go bankrupt, and perhaps even tumble out of the eurozone? The situation was complicated by the fact that Greece, as both a NATO member state and a country currently accepting a huge number of Middle Eastern refugees, plays a huge strategic role in general European security. Even the United States was demanding some sort of resolution – especially in the face of Prime Minister Tsipras’ repeated attempts to draw his country closer to Russia.

Trying to Divide vs Trying to Unite

Thus the diplomatic challenge for the German government was completely different than the one publicly acknowledged: from the very beginning, the German government’s goal was to keep the eurozone countries, the European Union, and the transatlantic community from ripping apart. Tsipras, meanwhile, worked to divide the EU and eurozone to reach his political goals. His first diplomatic meetings were with the Russians and the Chinese, not with his European partners. His next stops were eurozone countries with socialist or social-democratic governments and those states from which he hoped to receive the most support: France and Italy. Consciously invoking World War II’s brutal German occupation, he attempted to portray the general debt crisis as one between Greece and Germany alone, reducing the conflict to “solidarity” versus “austerity”.

Following the February decision by the eurozone governments to extend the second rescue program until June 30, the positions of the eurozone’s finance ministers began to harden. From the end of May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with French President François Hollande, sought a “trialogue” with Athens: Tsipras needed to understand that the division of the eurozone into socialist and conservative camps would not work. Athens’ repeated refusal to begin any reforms or guarantee the country’s solvency come July in fact only solidified the unity of the 18 other eurozone governments. Unlike in previous controversies over ESM measures, frustrated Northern and Eastern European governments were now strongly outspoken. For this reason, Germany assumed a moderate position very early in negotiations – a point lost on the media and the critics fixated on Berlin’s actions.

Mouthpiece of the Majority

Following the Greek government’s call for a referendum on July 5, it became impossible for the eurozone to reach any clear consensus on policy: the German government, along with a majority of other eurozone states, attempted to stifle any further discussion until after the results of the referendum, while Hollande publicly demanded new negotiations before said results. At this point, Germany had become the mouthpiece for the majority, whose worries Social Democrat (SPD) party leader and Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel clearly enumerated. The price paid in public opinion for this engagement, however, was quite steep: in the end, many observers blamed the expiration of the second aid program and the imminent Greek default on Merkel and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble.

It was at the extraordinary eurozone summit on July 7 that a large number of northern and eastern European states made clear that they no longer wished to negotiate with Tsipras – and would rather see the country leave the eurozone. Gabriel had previously stated that Athens had burned its bridges with its referendum vote. It was the impression of most governments that Tsipras knew the danger the referendum posed to his hopes of keeping Greece in the monetary union – and understood that it had in fact weakened his bargaining position with the other 18 eurozone members.

From this point forward, German crisis diplomacy shifted into high gear: on Friday, July 10, the German Ministry of Finance presented its plan – later criticized – to the eurozone’s working group and stated its preference for an extensive program of reforms in return for another multi-billion rescue package. If Greece was unable or unwilling to accept these conditions, the alternative proposal encompassed a five-year “time out” from the eurozone alongside simultaneous debt relief. Given the much harder line proposed by the Finns, Balts, Dutch, and Slovaks, among others, Berlin considered its own proposal not only a warning for Athens, but also a more reasonable position within the 18 eurozone partners. The idea was that it would be better to put the options clearly on the table, and to ensure that Greece’s alternative to an ambitious reform package would not be a chaotic regression into bankruptcy, a danger that was openly discussed at this point. Many eurozone finance ministers later praised the proposal for ultimately increasing the Greek government’s willingness to negotiate. But even the German authors of the paper later acknowledged that they were surprised by the intensity of the response – which, in their minds, only explained the obvious.

In Saturday’s first meeting of the eurozone finance ministers, 15 of 19 euro countries initially refused to negotiate further with Athens on the basis of Greece’s own proposals. When the finance ministers finally got to work drafting a new framework for a third rescue package and laying out what the necessary reforms would be, Germany pushed for the inclusion of numerous demands from its plan – including the idea of a privatization trust and the alternative “time out” proposal – in a draft that was passed, without a vote, at the emergency Brussels summit of eurozone leaders on July 12. But it is important to note that it was France, not Germany, who was isolated in the debates, only supported halfheartedly by Italy and Cyprus.

No “Beauty Pageant”

Only Merkel, Hollande, and EU Council President Donald Tusk negotiated with Tsipras on the fateful night – for 17 hours (incidentally, the same time it took to reach an agreement with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Minsk). Because France was against any eurozone exit, the chancellor and the French president agreed on an early compromise: there would no longer be talk of any temporary eurozone departure for Greece, especially since the idea had already served its function as a warning. In exchange, Hollande supported Berlin’s effort to bind Tsipras to concrete reforms. The Netherlands’ Mark Rutte joined at least once in the nightly debates to show that Merkel’s position was by no means the most radical in the eurozone. Public discussion has largely ignored the fact that eurozone governments included severe language in the agreement largely to make further aid palatable to their publics.

Once again, Merkel had to accept that Germany would carry twice the burden. As the largest shareholder in the ESM, Germany would assume the lion’s share of any new loan guarantees. And further, unlike in the wake of the Minsk resolution, Germany would face severe criticism for its role: there was talk of a “German diktat” or even a “coup” (on Twitter, the hash tag #thisisacoup trended that night). But Merkel chose a hard tone in her final press conference at the end of the special Euro-summit, mainly for her domestic audience – she had to make sure that she would get new agreements approved by both the Bundestag and skeptics in her own party.

The third “price” Merkel had to pay was tension within her coalition. The act of openly putting Grexit on the table itself created tensions between the German government’s coalition partners. Pressure in the SPD, the coalition’s junior partner, even led party chief Gabriel to distance himself from the Grexit-proposal. However, Merkel and Schäuble, the negotiators, said afterwards that they saw no alternative to being open about what was and is at stake. It’s not about “beauty pageants and popularity contests,” said Merkel later, explaining why there had been no alternative way to reach an agreement.

The post #ThisWasNotACoup appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Pawel Kopczynski

Act I: From March 16th – Looking for Something to Build on

It is March 16, 2015. A long silence between the far-left-far-right coalition in Athens and the German government breaks as Angela Merkel and Alexis Tspiras finally talk on the phone. German politicians and top officials had watched – at first amazed, then irritated – as the new Greek leaders systematically avoided Berlin for weeks. In place of introductory phone calls or visits there had been silence. Tsipras’ team had intentionally sought symbolic gestures to show they were following a new European policy. The German leadership was left waiting.

Initially, there was some understanding for Tsipras’ behavior in Berlin. He and Merkel are considered opposites, at least in Athens. He, the left-wing, 40-year-old elected to pull politics not only in Greece but across the EU to the left. And she, the 60-year-old conservative who has ruled for nearly a decade. Although she is seen in northern Europe as the guarantor of thrifty budgetary policy, in Greece she is the symbol of cold-hearted austerity.

…

Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2015 issue.

The post A Greek-German Drama appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

(c) Mykola Lazarenko/Handout via REUTERS

After years of a “partnership,” Berlin and Moscow are back in “crisis mode.” It is the third phase of German-Russian relations since protests in Kiev began during the winter of 2013-14. By fall of 2014, recognition sets in that the conflict is not going to blow over in a few weeks – the West has to settle in for the long haul, a point that Merkel acknowledges in demanding “strategic patience” in the West’s dealings with Russia and Ukraine.

After the annexation of Crimea, Berlin’s determination surprises Moscow. Yet it takes until November 2014 for a serious debate to begin over how long-term concepts of Germany’s relations with Russia need to change given this breach of trust. The Chancellery and the Federal Foreign Office both see previous ideas on security, political, economic, and even societal cooperation with Russia as outdated.

Russia, until recently a partner, has become an adversary, and not only in the conflict in Ukraine, which increasingly is seen as and called a “war.” Russia has become an opponent of the West itself. And there is more: The Russian leadership suddenly went from an uncomfortable proximity with Europe’s left- and right-wing populist, anti-EU parties to full interference in the internal politics of EU member states. Germany’s ruling coalition of Merkel’s conservative CDU and the Social Democrats (SPD) of Steinmeier and Economics Minister Sigmar Gabriel agrees: Russia is now defining its foreign policy interests not in alignment with Europe’s, but in opposition.

For several reasons, the driving force for such a shift in Berlin is the Federal Foreign Office. Time and again, Foreign Minister Steinmeier has suffered setbacks over Putin’s handling of the Ukraine crisis. During the negotiations to form Merkel’s third government in autumn 2013, Steinmeier had clung onto his “modernizing partnership” approach. One year on he no longer harbors illusions. A different framework for German foreign diplomacy is needed.

Successful and sustained cooperation with Russia on international problems, such as nuclear negotiations with Iran, is not enough on its own. Work with Russia in fora and organizations like the NATO-Russia Council and the Council of Europe – which were believed to be effective in bridging the gaps between East and West – has collapsed. In Merkel’s Chancellery, interest grows in a new, long-term line of argument: The German government must equip itself for the 2015 EU debate over the extension of Russia sanctions, originally imposed for a single year. It must be made clear to EU partners that even though hope for future cooperation with Russia has not been lost, sanctions remain essential until the situation improves.

Finding a new concept is also crucial for Steinmeier in his role as leading SPD politician. Germany’s Social Democrats not only experienced the crumbling of their Russia policy in 2014. The party also struggles with the (not entirely welcome) input of its previous leaders. Former Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt, even Willy Brandt’s Security Adviser Egon Bahr publicly voice their “Putinversteher”-views on the Russia debate. These are out of tune with Steinmeier’s recent experiences of Russian behavior in Ukraine. As the SPD has seen itself as the guardian of German Russia policy since Brandt’s Ostpolitik, Steinmeier and Gabriel consider it essential to stake out a new position for intra-party debate.

On November 16 Steinmeier suggests to further trade between the EU and the Moscow-driven Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). He hones in on Putin’s remarks at the end of October, when the Russian president requested further dialogue between these organizations. Three days later, at the 17th German-Polish Forum in Berlin, Steinmeier stresses, “There is a consensus in the crisis among EU foreign ministers that Europe’s long-lasting security is only conceivable with Russia, not against it. For that we need conversations … and we need venues – something like the Council of the Baltic Sea States, or an exchange between the EU and the Russia-founded EEU, and of course the OSCE.” A few weeks later, during a discussion with students in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg on December 9 Steinmeier again emphasizes the necessity of cooperation. He makes clear that this should be a part of a greater conceptual framework in a December 14 letter to an SPD party colleague: “As Social Democrats we must confirm the basic concepts of our Ostpolitik under these new and more strenuous conditions.”

He is not alone in this approach – four days later at the EU summit Merkel advocates the introduction of a free trade zone between the EU and the EEU: “Indeed, we have nothing against working together with Russia, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus on a large common economic area, and I believe that with appropriate progress in the course of the Minsk agreement we can keep that goal in sight.”

But closer cooperation with Russia will depend upon developments in eastern Ukraine. Even discussing closer cooperation is only possible thanks to a perceived relative quiet in eastern Ukraine at the time. Pro-Russian separatists do make further territorial gains, but these are mainly unnoticed by the broader western European public. With the Ukraine conflict knocked off the top of news broadcasts, voices in the German public grow louder to “offer something to the Russians.”

During the World Economic Forum in Davos, the debate over an “offering to Putin” dominated the media. When Merkel and Gabriel repeat their suggestion for a common free trade zone as a long-term vision, it too generates much media coverage.

Back in Crisis Mode, January 24-30

Yet events again intervene – the search for long-term cooperation is dramatically interrupted on January 24 by a rocket attack in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Mariupol. Attributed to pro-Russian separatists, it kills more than 30 people. Perceptions of the conflict become more acute, not just in the public mind, but also among political actors. Western intelligence had already reported a massive secret operation supplying separatists with modern equipment from Russia. Berlin increasingly gets the impression that the relative quiet since Christmas was no more than preparation for a new offensive. The attack on Mariupol in particular revives previous fears that separatists could, under Russian leadership, seize enough territory along the Black Sea coast to create land access to the Crimean Peninsula, which remains difficult to supply. Putin himself used the term “New Russia” (Novorossiya) in April 2014 among Russian nationalists to refer to the Black Sea coast as far as Odessa.

That fear is heightened by a massive attack by separatists on the Debaltseve railway junction between Donetsk and Luhansk. The size of the attack on the several thousand-strong Ukrainian force assembled there alarms the German government. In the EU the question of stronger sanctions return to the agenda; proponents of a softer approach, among them Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, now have trouble making their case. The United States openly accuses the separatists and Russia of seeking territorial gains in the Ukraine. In Washington, a serious discussion starts about supplying weapons to Ukraine.

On January 29 the EU foreign ministers – including their new Greek colleague – decide to extend by six months the visa and banking restrictions imposed in March 2014 on pro-Russian separatists and Russians connected with Crimean annexation. They also consider further sanctions and ask the EU Commission and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini to compose a list with more candidates for visa and account restrictions.

Dramatic Diplomacy, January 30-February 12

One of the most dramatic diplomatic phases of the crisis begins on the weekend of January 30. Military action, with separatist attacks on 80 Ukrainian army positions, becomes so intense the German government fears an open war in the east. At the same time, behind the scenes, the Russian government makes suggestions to resolve the crisis – suggestions completely unacceptable to Ukraine and the Europeans. It prompts a hectic bout of telephone diplomacy with dozens of discussions on the highest levels, led by Merkel and Hollande and including Presidents Obama, Poroshenko, and Putin.

Top German and French diplomats work on responses to Ukraine and Russia. On the evening of February 3, Merkel and Steinmeier and their closest advisers hold a long session. The chancellor also phones the Russian president. On February 4 the idea to start a diplomatic mission led by Merkel and Hollande starts taking shape, underlining the severity of the situation. The first priority seems to be to prevent further territorial gains by the separatists south-east of Mariupol and avoid a complete debacle for the Ukrainian army in Debaltseve. The September Minsk agreement remains the necessary basis for a renewed ceasefire, even if details need changing to take into account the separatists having since conquered more than a hundred square kilometers. In the background Merkel’s Foreign Policy Adviser Christoph Heusgen, Steinmeier’s State Secretary Markus Ederer, and Foreign Office Political Director Hans-Dieter Lucas race between Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and Kiev to explore which “adjustments” Kiev might accept, to enable ceasefire negotiations to begin. Poroshenko and Putin also talk at length on the phone on February 3 and 4.

Washington’s role remains ambivalent. On February 4, US Secretary of State John Kerry stops in Minsk and is informed of the united European effort. Yet both Merkel and Steinmeier regard the American debate over delivering weapons as unhelpful to their efforts. They fear it might raise false hopes within the Ukrainian government and reduce the potential for compromise.

On Thursday, February 5, Merkel and Hollande fly to Kiev – and then on to Moscow; a plan to which previously only a small circle has been privy to, including EU high representative Mogherini and EU Council President Donald Tusk. At the same time, Steinmeier visits Warsaw and Riga to inaugurate the Latvian EU Council presidency. Latvia and Poland are the EU members closest to Ukraine, and Steinmeier aims to clarify the current diplomatic approach. The hope is to avoid the impression that Ukraine is being coerced to concede its territorial claims in eastern Ukraine.

The talks between Merkel, Hollande, and Putin in Moscow on Friday, February 6 last four hours. The German-French duo stress that there will not be any rupture in the trans-Atlantic alliance even if the US were to deliver weapons to Ukraine over European objections. The message is twofold: Putin may be better off making an agreement over Ukraine under the mediation of the Europeans. And the repeated offers of establishing a Russo-EU free trade zone should not be misunderstood: Europe and the US would not be divided over the conflict.

On Saturday, February 7, Merkel and Poroshenko meet US Vice President Joe Biden at the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference and brief him on their discussions. The next day during a phone conference in “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia) they arrange a summit in Minsk for the following Wednesday. Representatives of the “Trilateral group” – Russia, Ukraine, and pro-Russian separatists – are to join the meeting. After Merkel gets assurance by President Barack Obama that the US would back the European-led negotiations, February 12 sees the agreement of a 48-hour truce. It includes concrete implementation plans – complete with deadlines – for the essential points of the Minsk agreement.

During this period it becomes clear that the various levels of response – short-term crisis management, medium-term planning, and long-term consideration – must all be pursued simultaneously. Back on February 5, NATO’s foreign ministers had resolved to strengthen the rapid response force for eastern Europe to reassure increasingly uneasy eastern NATO and EU partners. In western capitals, efforts are also made to push back against the Russian “information war.” On February 16, in response to the earlier shelling of Mariupol and in spite of the Minsk agreement, 19 additional separatists and Russians are added to the EU sanctions list.

Agreement of the Minsk implementation treaty (“Minsk II”) affords little respite to the exhausted diplomats – it immediately becomes apparent that Putin’s request to delay the ceasefire for 60 hours was a ploy to give the separatists time to seize the crucial rail junction of Debaltseve. In marathon telephone conversations, Merkel, Hollande, their foreign ministers, and their advisers nevertheless convince Kiev, Moscow, and the separatists to keep to the agreement.

On the European side, the tone changes to a cautious optimism. In the coming weeks a trans-Atlantic discrepancy emerges as some American generals underline their concerns that the ceasefire will be exploited by the Russian side to resupply forces so they can later march on Mariupol. But Germany’s statements stress minor progress in implementation of the Minsk agreement.

Thoughts on New Concepts

Despite the massive efforts demanded by the management of the immediate crisis, efforts to develop long-term concepts for dealing with Russia have continued. In January, the German government decides to establish a new Russia and Eastern Europe research institute. Steinmeier wants new policies to be grounded in an improved understanding of social, economic, and political developments in Russia and post-Soviet countries.
And again, Moscow is offered incentives to work with the EU, particularly in light of Russian economic troubles ­– a result not so much of Western sanctions, but of low oil and gas prices. In their conversations with the Russian government, the Germans and French insist that a new gas agreement with Ukraine and adjustments to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement must be addressed in the first half of 2015. Indeed, Merkel explicitly emphasized on February 2 that she wants Russia to remain Europe’s energy provider, even as countries like Ukraine have turned away from Russian energy with surprising speed, threatening Russian gas provider Gazprom with the loss of important markets.

Steinmeier uses the Munich Security Conference to stress that the development of new concepts for dealing with Russia continue – necessarily so, despite the crisis. The relationship with Russia must be built on new foundations – even as the trust of ten years ago is now destroyed. His speech included this core section: “Germany has a particular responsibility for Europe’s security. That means that we must think beyond the current conflict in eastern Ukraine. I don’t mean that in the sense of going back to how things were – that won’t happen and it would be an illusion, a dangerous one at that. What I mean is that if we’re able to de-escalate and resolve the critical conflict, how do we then want to re-incorporate Russia into a European security architecture after trust has undoubtedly been lost. … And this is why what I am saying now is also a call to Russia to tell us what kind of contributions they want to make, what they want to contribute in order to bring about a security architecture that is beneficial to all of us.”

The same day, February 8, Steinmeier’s party leadership committee publishes a paper that refers back to Brandt’s Ostpolitik while aiming to point the way forward: “The EU and Germany cannot give up on a European Russia. Our goal remains the integration of Russia in the broader European political, economic, and security structure,” it says. “We should be aware of the opportunities that a trade policy initiative offers for conversations between the EU and the recently founded Eurasian Economic Union. This project shows an opportunity for equal partnership in the future.” Of course, respect for the democratic rights of self-determination of Ukraine and other countries of the eastern neighborhood of the EU is a prerequisite for such partnership. The goal is a common trade area “in which, beside the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, all countries would be able to take part.”

On February 12 Merkel, Hollande, Poroshenko, and Putin sign a general declaration in Minsk saying: “The national leaders and heads of government commit to an unchanged vision of a united humanitarian and economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific on the foundation of full respect for civil rights and the principles of the OSCE.” At the following EU summit, all 28 member states support the agreement. Meanwhile, Moscow continues to receive signals that further cooperation is wanted – if and when basic framework conditions are met. Steinmeier says in a March 5 interview with the German daily Handelsblatt: “I do not want Europe to be permanently walled off from Russia. Even if a political solution takes many years, possibly even a decade, we must do everything in our power to solve the conflict.”

Yet in Berlin talk of cooperating with the Eurasian Union is quieting down – partly due to the reticence of Eastern European countries who think little of the inclusion of Russia at the moment. The “wiggle room” for a new German and European Ostpolitik is narrow – especially as polls show that German citizens have lost their trust in Putin. Concern remains that Hungary and Greece might pursue a separate policy of rapprochement with Russia, thus undermining unity within the European Union.

Despite slow progress in the development of a new Russia policy, two important decisions are made within a week: On March 11 the International Monetary Fund decides to release $17.5 billion for Ukraine. And on March 12 the OSCE member states – including Russia – extend the Ukraine mission by a year and increase the number of observers to a thousand. Both decisions are seen in Berlin as important contributions to stabilizing the situation in Ukraine.

Shortly before, Merkel had sent a signal to Moscow: She will not attend the traditional military parade commemorating the end of World War II on Red Square on May 9. Instead, she agrees to join Putin in laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier a day later. The gesture is symbolic – when the present is marked by enormous problems and few specifics are known about the future, the memory of a shared, bloody past could help: “The duty to remember the dead exists independently of what currently separates us from Russia,” says Merkel’s spokesman Steffen Seibert when announcing her trip.

Read more articles from the April 2015 issue FOR FREE in the Berlin Policy Journal App.

The post In For the Long Haul appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.