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When French President Emmanuel Macron announced the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech, many were quick to put it in line with recent European projects such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the European Defense Fund (EDF). But E2I is not meant for headlines or the creation of big institutions. It’s a non-EU, military-to-military strategic workshop with a more modest perspective. Contrary to initial speculation, E2I does not aim at being a flagship project for European integration, but an operational get-together for partner militaries. Its results will only be seen when the next crisis arises and its participants decide to move into action together.

With nine signatory countries—Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and Finland expected to soon become the tenth—E2I has already gained traction beyond France. Although the rationale behind the signature may differ from one country to another, all participating countries now share a common understanding of its structure and purpose, even if they are not always good at explaining them. The next few years will be crucial for demonstrating if this peculiar format works, co-exists well with other EU-wide projects, and delivers results. The most pressing challenges lie in the role and approach that both France and Germany will embrace as part of the initiative, and whether these two countries will find compromises in the implementation process.

French Origins

Although E2I was officially presented by President Macron in September 2017, it is the result of strategic analyses that preceded his mandate. The 2013 French intervention in Mali highlighted that France and its European partners did not share the same understanding of Europe’s security environment—which led to both disappointment in Paris and frustration in some European capitals regarding what they saw as French unilateralism. In Paris, one of the lessons learned from this experience was the crucial need for better intelligence sharing and common contingency planning.

During the Hollande presidency (2012–2017), the French Ministry of Armed Forces undertook the mapping of European defense actors in terms of their capabilities, budget, and actual contributions to operations. Following the 2015 Paris attacks, France’s invocation of article 42.7 of the EU Treaty—the mutual defense clause—also helped to assess concrete acts of solidarity from EU countries and calibrate France’s expectations towards its partners. Through this mapping exercise, the French Ministry of Armed Forces identified a small group of countries considered “able and willing,” a core of which were approached to form the original members of E2I.

E21 is defined in the 2017 French Strategic Review of Defense as an “ambitious cooperative framework.” It also marks the French preference for flexible and non-institutionalized formats of cooperation. It’s aimed at providing a political mandate for the military to consider and analyze potential crises of high-intensity, but E2I can only deliver results if unhindered by EU bureaucracy. From the French perspective, this absence of institutional constraints is one of the key strengths of the initiative. This is why Paris places it at the heart of its European defense strategy and goal of strategic autonomy.   

Debunking the Myths

Macron’s Sorbonne speech included a plethora of new ideas and proposals for the European project. Yet the context of the presentation of E2I, as well as the confusing wording used, led to several misunderstandings that continue to affect discussions around the initiative.

The most problematic of these misconceptions is that E2I would imply the creation of a new standing military force and involve military exercises. In fact, E2I is not an “intervention force” in the making but a military-to-military platform aimed at preparing in advance a series of generic scenarios, in order to better anticipate crises and coordinate military operations. The overall endeavor is therefore modest in its form and will primarily rely on liaison officers already in post in Paris.

E2I has also been portrayed as undermining efforts to improve integration in European defense. France has argued, however, that the initiative complements the EU toolkit, while PESCO and the EDF deal with capabilities. There will be no institutional link between PESCO and E2I, and no official joint project between the two frameworks either. Nevertheless, E2I could influence the design of projects, which could advance into a PESCO project format. For instance, “co-basing”—meant to improve the use and sharing of European military bases outside Europe—was discussed and developed in E2I meetings and will be announced on November 20 among the second batch of PESCO projects.

Beyond this, a further conceptual distinction has to be made: the recent EU effort in the domain of defense is meant to improve both the EU’s capability to act and to show a successful side to the European project; E2I’s immediate goal, by contrast, is to answer specific military issues. Its political significance is limited and it should not be viewed through the same lens as major EU initiatives. Unlike PESCO, E2I is not an achievement in itself but a means to an end.

Calibrating France’s Role

Paris is well aware that the success of E2I will depend on France’s ability to listen to partners and prevent the initiative from being perceived purely as a French endeavor. This openness will have to be showcased in both style and content: the next Military European Strategic Talks (MEST), which will set the political guidance and technical processes for E2I, will take place in different capitals, and the working groups will be headed by different countries. On the substance, high-intensity crises in West Africa and the Sahel region—traditional areas of French interest and involvement—cannot appear as the only matters of discussion, as many in Europe suspect. The fact that the first working session was dedicated to a natural disaster crisis in the Caribbean—a scenario presented by the Dutch—came as a welcomed opportunity to prove that all E2I countries can bring their own security concerns to the table.

Perhaps more important though is France’s ability to compromise on entry and participation criteria. For Paris, E2I is meant to remain a “private club” of a limited number of countries—13 to 14 maximum—and the entry process has remained intentionally unclear. As it is neither a capability nor a procurement project, setting quantitative criteria to enter may not be pertinent, and the most important factor should remain a country’s political willingness to address complex operational issues. Finland seems close to signing the Letter of Intent. Other countries may follow, and their integration will constitute a test for the initiative. Indeed, some members such as the United Kingdom and Germany have clearly stated that they wish to have a say on the future constitution of E2I. Other members of E2I have pushed to set more objective rules, and current discussions surrounding the governing principles of the initiative will have to provide clarifications.

The German Question

Germany has been uncomfortable with E2I from the beginning. Whereas the rest of the participating states have accepted the exclusive and non-institutionalized logic of E2I, these adjectives remain an almost philosophical problem for Germany. Wary of causing tensions with countries not party to the initiative and undermining European unity, German officials—especially among the diplomatic corps—are reluctant to multiply the formats outside the EU institutions which they see as crucial to sustaining political momentum. The date of the signature of the Letter of Intent has been postponed several times due to German hesitations, and officials still criticize certain aspects of the initiative while actively slowing its implementation. Yet the participation of Germany in this initiative is crucial for its success and legitimacy in Europe.

For the French, involving the German military in E2I is also a way to influence the German strategic culture. There is support for the project at the highest political level from Chancellor Angela Merkel and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, for the sake of the Franco-German partnership and to avoid sending a negative signal to Germany’s European partners. At the military level, there is a clear understanding of the operational value and modest scope of E2I. Still, the German diplomatic corps and policy-making establishment are reluctant to let the Bundeswehr do military-to-military cooperation without diplomatic supervision.

By empowering the military and giving them arguments to convince the diplomatic corps and political leadership, E2I could contribute to the ongoing debate on Germany’s operational role for European defense. This evolution, however, will only be possible if the larger German strategic community embraces this initiative.

Success without Deliverables

All participating countries agree that the success of E2I is about creating a dynamic rather than quantifiable results. Despite Macron’s original grand rhetoric, E2I is not meant to be revolutionary, but it does have the potential to shake things up at the working-level. Part of a small-step policy, its success will not be measured on the same scale as flagship projects for Europe, but rather as useful for a working group for professionals. At the same time, it holds the potential to become a motor for more strategic convergence between European militaries in practice.

In Paris, E2I will be deemed a success if the core group of Europeans tackle the next crisis together better than Mali in 2013. The outcome will be seen in practice, be it during the 2019 hurricane season in the Caribbean – purpose of the Dutch-led working group – or during the next armed conflict in a region where European interests are at stake. Better intelligence and situational awareness exchange, alongside a raised level of preparedness based on better knowledge of one another’s procedures and contingency planning could become a game changer in the next few years. Thanks to its flexible and light structure, E2I will not require much time to be established, and several participating countries noted that the intensified exchanges between liaison officers have already been useful.

A successful E2I would also contribute to the French pursuit of European strategic autonomy. The dynamic created by the initiative is meant to trickle down to other European and transatlantic defense cooperation frameworks. It will notably make Europeans more aware of how much they still rely on the United States operationally for the defense of their own interests. To that end, the exercise of contingency planning in a small group and without American assets should be an eye-opener.

Expectations, however, do need to be managed. Europe does not need another project that, if it fails, risks hindering the current European defense momentum and reinforcing US discontent with the state of transatlantic burden-sharing.

As a platform for strategic discussions and intelligence sharing, the success of E2I may be difficult to sell politically. Results in both the short and long-term will often remain unknown to the public, and communication is likely to remain minimal. As such, a key effort should be made to better explain the initiative to the German and US policy-making communities, as well as to members of both the EU and NATO. A large part of the transatlantic defense community is still unaware of its purpose and may be suspicious to see an additional project competing with existing ones or simply using scarce resources.

Several officials argue that there is no risk of E2I not working because there is “nothing at stake.” Regarding quantifiable goals that is true, as there is nothing tangible at stake in terms of capabilities not developed or deadlines missed—so Paris could get away with some symbolic proof of success. But the success of E2I takes an obvious political significance, as President Macron will need to show that he can deliver on the European stage. A lot is thus at stake in terms of political and strategic credibility: France’s role as bridge-builder to the UK and natural leader of post-Brexit European defense efforts, and Germany’s operational role in European defense.

A short article based on this research was published on the BPJ website on October 15, 2018.

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The European Intervention Initiative (E2I), outlined by French President Emmanuel Macron during his September 2017 Sorbonne speech, will take a more concrete form this November following the ministerial meeting and Military European Strategic Talks (MEST) setting the political guidance and technical processes. So far, nine countries—Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom—have signed a Letter of Intent, and others may soon join.

The announcement of the initiative led to much confusion and speculation a year ago. French officials have since carried out important work further explaining the proposal, and the perspectives of signatory states have largely converged. The success of E2I will now depend on countries’ political willingness to engage in this format—a challenge for Berlin in particular—as well as on balancing each other’s strategic priorities.

Although the long-term goal of the initiative is to build a shared European strategic culture, the most concrete objectives of E2I is to enable closer cooperation “between the armed forces of European states that are willing and able to carry out military missions and operations, throughout the spectrum of crises.” It will include intelligence sharing and scenario planning as well as serve as an international forum to conduct exchanges on operational needs and doctrine. In fact, France designed the initiative to provide a clear political mandate for European militaries to develop working groups on some security issues that used to be taboo.

However, is not intended to become a separate intervention force or organize military exercises, but rather help better anticipate future crises and plan operational cooperation. For the moment E2I is primarily a military-to-military “strategic workshop.” Although this mandate may seem small in contrast to its political hype, France has deemed it crucial to benefit missions and projects implemented in the EU or NATO formats, as well as to build ad hoc coalitions. Indeed, while some countries, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, already have strong bilateral exchanges on such issues through liaison officers, E2I will now be elevated to a multilateral working platform to include smaller partners. This makes it particularly valuable for Estonia and Portugal, among others, as it allows their militaries to benefit from recent experiences of leading European armed forces.

Exclusivity and Flexibility

Most countries agree E2I should remain an exclusive initiative; not only to guarantee its efficiency but also to ensure all members show the political willingness to address complex operational issues and share perspectives on power projection beyond the Europe. France and the United Kingdom are adamant the number of participants should not exceed 14 or 15 countries. Even Finland, expected to sign the Letter of Intent by the end of the year, promotes the idea that E2I should be kept limited in number.

However, the exclusivity of the initiative is more problematic for Germany, which considers it to undermine the idea of European unity and warns it may cause tensions with countries not party to the E2I. The Netherlands and Spain shared similar concerns, which have since been addressed. Indeed, Germany now seems to be the only country advocating for more inclusivity.

A raison d’être of E2I is institutional flexibility. The majority of participating states share France’s assessment that EU decision-making processes and bureaucracy have proven incapable of leading to ambitious, time-sensitive deployments. Non-affiliation to the EU also has the benefit of allowing cooperation with CSDP opt-outs like Denmark and of tying the UK to wider European defense after Brexit.

Also, E2I aims to reinforce the efforts undertaken in much larger initiatives at the EU and NATO levels; hence, fears of competition and disunion shouldn’t be exaggerated. Although concerns as to how to articulate E2I and PESCO were originally raised by several countries, many of these have now dissipated, and the lack of institutional link between the two projects does not constitute a major issue moving forward. Again, Germany is the only exception. Berlin favors gathering European defense initiatives under the inclusive EU umbrella, for instance linking E2I with the German-led EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core PESCO project.

A Modest Structure

Despite Macron’s grand rhetoric, E2I is a modest and flexible structure with no quantifiable deliverables, thus keeping political cost for joining low. Once countries received guarantees that signing the E2I would not entail any major commitments in terms of staff, new institutions, or budget, they were willing to showcase their willingness to participate in the European defense effort.

Indeed, E2I will only succeed as a modular non-constraining framework that countries can participate in with as little red tape as possible. Three issues in particular will determine its successful implementation.

First, France will have to prove that it is ready to listen to partners and prevent the initiative being viewed purely as a French endeavor. This can be showcased by the organization of future MEST in different countries and by developing working groups dedicated to issues that are not French priorities. A scenario presented by the Dutch of dedicating the first working session to an environmental crisis in the Caribbean was therefore a welcome opportunity.

Second, Germany will have to clarify its position on an exclusive and non-EU format. Germany’s participation is key, but other countries are not ready to make serious compromises on these issues.

Third, the integration of new states will partly determine the future of the initiative. Nordic partners such as Norway and Sweden may follow Finland, introducing new priorities while reinforcing the case for E2I’s institutional freedom. The signature of the Letter of Intent by Italy—postponed until now mostly due to French-Italian frictions—would also confirm the political success of the E2I at the European level.

Editor’s note: For this piece, the authors spoke to officials from the nine participating countries plus Finland in order to highlight key elements of the initiative and explain how it could complement other initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation). An expanded version of this piece will be published in the Berlin Policy Journal issue of November/December 2018. For more BPJ coverage of European defense, check out our September/October issue, especially Jana Puglierin’s cover story on the backsliding German defense debate.

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Ahead of a major European Union summit on February 23, Chancellor Angela Merkel made an appeal to fellow German lawmakers to help forge a more united and powerful Europe. “The world is not waiting for us,” she warned, urging support for “European responses to pressing big challenges of our time.”

Going to bat for Europe was in part an overture to French President Emmanuel Macron. Back in late September, Macron delivered a sweeping speech on his vision for the future of the European Union, championing greater European integration and calling on Germany directly to jointly lead a major push to reform the bloc. Germany, it seems, approves.

Ever since his victory over right-wing populist leader Marine Le Pen in France’s election last year, Macron has been celebrated in Brussels and European capitals as a true champion of Europe—and indeed, the French leader is undoubtedly a pro-European president. He is more than ready to invest his political capital in order to foster a more efficient cooperation among European partners.

Yet the general sense of relief that followed his election win and the strong European symbolism he employs have overshadowed the Elysée’s actual policies. Macron is not an ideological European but a pragmatist. To him, refounding the European project is first and foremost a necessity to better protect European citizens against the dangers of globalization and diminish populism. The French president believes indeed in the European project, but is also very critical of its recent evolutions, its extreme bureaucratization and lack of inspirational initiatives. Perhaps more importantly, he sees Europe in the pure tradition of French European policy—as a lever to promote French interests and values at the global level. “I strongly believe that Europe is good for France; and that France cannot succeed without a stronger Europe,” said Macron in his 2018 New Year’s statement.

In fact, Macron’s political program and his vision for the European project are often misunderstood. His definition of “pro-European” is likely to be quite different from the one held in other European capitals. The relative vagueness of the concept gives ground for a lot of wishful thinking from external observers, but deeper analysis of France’s political culture and Macron’s statements should provide a clearer understanding of his real vision of Europe.

Pragmatist-in-Chief

Macron prefers to promote the European project rather than the EU. He argues for an overhaul of Europe because he views the failure of the EU to protect its citizens against the negative effects of globalization as a major contributor to populism. And he defends Europe but wants to change it quickly in order to see concrete results during his presidency.

Macron’s lack of ideological constraints—“I have no red lines,” he noted during his Sorbonne speech—is best illustrated by his open support for a multispeed Europe. He believes the European project has in fact always worked with a small avant-garde of determined countries that lead the way to further cooperation and integration. Accepting the reality of the European construction means accepting the need for differentiation: “Europe is already multispeed, let’s not be afraid of saying it and wanting it!”

This pragmatism also defines Macron’s promotion of various formats of cooperation. Although the EU is at the heart of the European project, it is not the only framework for an efficient cooperation among Europeans. Because Macron is focused on delivering results, he is not as interested in strengthening institutions as he is in the rapid implementation of policies, even if that involves working outside the EU. The mission defines the coalition, and the EU is only one option among others.

He has also issued an appeal for a less naïve Europe—one that is comfortable defending its interests and protecting its citizens against what he calls the defects of globalization. The French president wants to see more reciprocity in Europe’s engagement with the world, in particular in trade policy. In January 2018, Macron criticized the bloc’s approach of opening European markets to countries that “kept theirs half-closed.” This emphasis on reciprocity and fairness also echoes Macron’s campaign slogan: “Europe that protects.” The same emphasis on protection shapes his approach to intra-European affairs: Macron’s efforts to reform the posted workers’ directive directly stem from this commitment. The directive had become a symbol of the French debate about the EU and the unfair competition that Europe imposed on French companies; it was crucial for the new president not to appear weak on this matter.

A French Lens on Europe

Macron’s positions do not constitute a fundamental change in France’s traditional European policy, as underlined by the president in his 2018 New Year’s address to the French diplomatic corps. The methods and messaging, not the objectives, are new. Macron is more assertive and self-assured than his predecessors, but his words do not stray from the guiding principles of France’s approach to Europe.

Macron has consistently reaffirmed the centrality of the French-German partnership, for example. The nominations of Philippe Etienne—former French ambassador to Germany—as his senior diplomatic advisor and several German-speaking ministers illustrate the early commitment of the president to this principle.

With Macron’s victory came the hope for a new era of coordination between Paris and Berlin, and the need to present joint proposals to strengthen the European project. But Macron intends to go even further and distinguish himself from previous presidents: “The normal French strategy is to start out on the base of Franco-German coordination. When that becomes difficult, you turn to Franco-Italian or Franco-Spanish cooperation and play on the jealousy implicit in those triangles. I have never done that because it leads to nowhere,” he said in the New Year’s address.

As with previous French leaders, Macron’s global ambitions underpin France’s EU policy. Promoting European cooperation is intended to put Europe on par with global powers like the US and China. Similarly, he has indicated that the reform of the eurozone is meant to build an economic power that can compete with the two biggest economies of the world. And Macron’s declarations at the 2018 Davos World Economic Forum repeated that goal in other domains like climate change, the digital revolution, and human rights.

Meanwhile, during his 2018 visit to China, Macron expressed regret that bilateral relations with Beijing often overshadowed European ones and called for a better coordination of EU policies on the protection of strategic sectors against foreign investments and the implications of the One Belt One Road policy.

The Defense Test

Macron came to power in a period of momentum for European defense cooperation. The launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the common European defense pact, was a sign that European cooperation in defense has witnessed real progress. This, too, illustrates the traditionalism of Macron’s policy on Europe.

On defense spending, Macron has committed to reaching the NATO goal of 2 percent of GDP by 2025; beyond the budget, French discourse is also focused on the actual deployment of European military capabilities and the political willingness to use force. Indeed, diverging strategic and military cultures among European partners (particularly Germany and France) continue to hinder defense cooperation. Recently launched initiatives—such as the European Defense Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), and PESCO—are seen by Paris as tools that may help member states become more credible security actors. However, the intense negotiations surrounding PESCO have brought France’s traditional position back to the forefront: European defense cooperation should be about defense, not about European integration. The haggling over PESCO also revealed Macron’s ambition to promote an ambitious avant-garde rather than a more inclusive framework. The final PESCO agreement reflects more of the German position than the French, to Paris’ disappointment.

Macron’s strong support of European strategic autonomy—once again, a traditional French objective—has also framed France’s position on defense. Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy is what he calls “a geopolitical necessity” that was confirmed by Washington’s inability to act decisively in Syria. French diplomats and members of the Hollande government heavily criticized Barack Obama’s decision in August 2013 not to strike the Syrian regime over its use of chemical weapons against civilians. For Macron, Obama’s failed red line exemplifies why Europe should develop the tools to think and act autonomously when necessary.

Similarly, Macron’s idea of a European Intervention Initiative, his proposal to develop formats of cooperation outside the EU, partly stems from the lessons of the 2013 intervention in Mali. The lack of coordination with European partners before the operation and the differences in strategic cultures prevented France from receiving the support it initially hoped from its allies. In practice, the EII will aim to be a flexible and ambitious framework to share contingency planning and intelligence for future crises.

Finally, Macron’s emphasis on reciprocity could lead to heated debates with European and transatlantic partners. Indeed, one of the most pressing issues of European defense cooperation is the involvement of non-EU countries in EDF or PESCO projects. For Paris, reciprocity means that a company from a non-EU country should only be able to benefit from EDF funding if that non-EU country allows European companies to receive public money as well. France’s strict position may trigger tensions—and carry important consequences for future defense cooperation between the EU and UK and France and the US. Indeed, allowing US industries to receive European money when the Trump administration has tightened the “Buy American Act” rules would represent precisely the naiveté that Macron criticizes.

Macron is not the president European federalists may have dreamed of the night of his election. In fact, the French president has often referred to the “Gaullist” tradition of French foreign policy to define his vision of international affairs. Although the relevance of this concept – and even its historical reality – is still largely debated among French experts, its use serves a purpose at the domestic level: being a self-proclaimed heir to this tradition is a way for Macron to tell the French people that he intends to build his European and foreign policy within a certain idea of a national consensus. If he succeeds to durably strengthen France’s leadership within the EU, his vision could deeply change the course of the European project: A more flexible Europe could mean more efficient cooperation, but also a much less cohesive and united continent overall. For Macron, this is the cost Europeans should be ready to pay in order to overcome the threat of anti-European populism.

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Outside of France, the French presidential election has been widely portrayed as a decisive moment for the future of Europe and the liberal order in general. And nowhere was the final contest between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen followed more closely than in Germany, where both the political elite and the public felt that the outcome would directly impact their own national destiny.

A few weeks on the nail-biting has already been forgotten, and Macron’s likely huge parliamentary majority is being treated as something not terribly newsworthy. Now Berlin is ready to get things going with the new French president: When Macron visited Berlin one day after his inauguration, Chancellor Angela Merkel showed she has taken into account the concerns that have dominated the French domestic debate, including the need to better “protect” European (and French) workers from globalization, and is willing to help Macron enact domestic reforms by bending the growth and investment agendas. For his part, Macron is aware that Europe could become a campaign issue in Germany, and has rejected the idea of eurobonds – at least for now – which had become a red line in Berlin.

If Germany wants to move forward with France, it will however have to be willing to compromise, especially where its eurozone policy is concerned. To that end, Merkel’s strong-willed finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, has already said that Berlin was ready to be flexible in working to address France’s economic challenges. And in fact, Macron’s agenda is hardly radical: the foundation can actually be found in the 2014 Pisani-Ferry-Enderlein report, which Macron helped draft with Germany’s then-Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel.So while Macron’s victory does not change the underlying balance of power in Europe, or the magnitude of the task ahead, there are several reasons to think that the Franco-German relationship may be on surer – and more equal – footing than many think.

First, as Merkel said during their joint press conference: “Only if Europe is doing well will Germany be doing well. And Europe needs a strong France to be doing well.” The German government knows that the success of Macron’s presidency will directly impact the future of the whole of Europe, and therefore Berlin. Germany, whose economy is naturally dependent on the economic prosperity of the continent, cannot remain blind to the difficulties of its biggest neighbor. This situation was utilized by far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon during the presidential campaign, who pointed out that Germany will have to compromise with France in order to avoid the economic and political collapse of the continent.

Second, the framing of the French election in the German political conversation gives extra leverage to the new French president. From the Germans’ perspective, Macron was the only one able to prevent the disaster of a Le Pen presidency, and the coming five years may be the last chance for Germany to work a sustainable deal with Paris. The risk of seeing an anti-European candidate become president after the 2022 elections is taken very seriously in Berlin, and the clock is ticking to find solutions before then. The official support for Macron among German leaders like Schäuble reveals this sense of urgency. The fear of seeing the European project end in five years will clearly strengthen Macron’s position in the coming negotiations.

Third, France represents more than its own weight in Europe. Although the continental balance of power clearly favors Germany, the leadership capacity of Paris, especially among Mediterranean countries, should not be underestimated. Germany’s economic hegemony in Europe is insufficient to impose total political leadership. France’s strategic and cultural closeness with some key European actors will play into Macron’s hand; indeed, Macron, who has publicly expressed “sympathy” for Southern European countries, has raised hopes in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece that he may work to soften what they regard as German-imposed austerity. A more nuanced stance from the EU on austerity may even erode the support of the populist parties that have gained ground on the back of the perceived unfairness of current agreements. As the 2018 elections in Italy will be yet another major test for the future of the EU, this cannot be ignored in Berlin.

Finally, there is a certain harmony between what Macron wants to accomplish at home and what he needs to do to strengthen France’s position with Germany. The new president will first and foremost focus on domestic affairs in the coming months, and the reforms he intends to implement – especially regarding labor laws and economic bureaucracy – satisfy German expectations. France’s need to “do its homework” to be taken seriously in Berlin should not be too difficult for Macron given his promises during the campaign. This marks a clear difference from Hollande, who had to strike a difficult balance between his campaign’s domestic promises and its European commitments.

For all these reasons, France will have a window of opportunity to advocate for a new foundation of the European project, even if it meets with some resistance in Berlin. In the more immediate future, Macron will focus on short term reforms that are expected to have a direct and positive impact on France, such as the directive on “posted workers,” tighter trade rules, and tougher anti-dumping regulations, as well as a common asylum policy. In the long run, France and Germany share a common desire to overcome institutional paralysis and make the EU more efficient and effective when coping with new crises. The discussions will be centered on the so-called multi-speed Europe, and on the need to cooperate on defense and security issues. Engaging with Africa as both a security and migration challenge and an economic opportunity will be at the heart of the French-German foreign policy agenda.

In fact, the new French president may face less resistance from Berlin than from other European capitals. His plan to review the directive on posted workers is a sensitive issue for Central and Eastern European countries, while his positions on trade – symbolized by the idea of a “Buy European Act” – could be difficult to sell to traditionally pro-free trade countries like Sweden and the Netherlands. Close cooperation between France and Germany will therefore be absolutely essential to create a consensus, and the wave of optimism following Macron’s victory will have to be translated into political momentum in Europe.

In an acknowledgment of Germany’s strained relationship with the United States, as well as with the United Kingdom post-Brexit, Merkel described Europe’s destiny as in “our own hands,” and signaled that Germany had no choice but to forge a closer alliance with France, despite policy divergences. To achieve greater unity, both Germany and France will have to show flexibility in the fields they dominate – that is, the economy and defense, respectively: Germany will have to be less stubborn when it comes to reforms and burden-sharing in the eurozone, while France will have to accept that its European partners, Germany included, do not share all aspects of its outward-looking strategic culture and vision for European defense cooperation. Only then will a French-German – and European – “new deal” be possible.

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Back in 2011, when Marine Le Pen became president of the Front National, she set about an ambitious project of reshaping the party in her image. She aimed to preserve the core elements of national populism that defined FN’s vision under the direction of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, while forging a new balance between identity politics and the defense of the social welfare state, thereby targeting the French working-class and modest middle-class voters.

It seems to have worked. Although Marine Le Pen failed to get past the first round of voting in 2012 and FN was unable to take the lead in any French region in 2015, the party obtained the largest share of the vote. That allowed Le Pen to boast that she had transformed FN into “France’s greatest party” in terms of voter numbers.

At its core, FN is built around a coherent rejection of liberalism, both in economic and cultural terms. The party has always been culturally illiberal, but its new economic outlook is a real evolution from its strongly anti-communist tradition and its support for liberal economic reforms in favor of small businesses. While her father wanted to be a “French Reagan” in the 1980s, Marine Le Pen has embraced a protectionist agenda and Marxist rhetoric. This has also enabled FN to reinforce its opposition to the EU, which is seen as weakening national sovereignty and promoting foreign interests while imposing ultra-liberal economic policies in France.

FN’s program for this year’s vote stems directly from this illiberal vision, with a mix of economic nationalism (the so-called préférence nationale), defense of the French welfare state model, and assertiveness on identity and security issues. A strategic council of 35 personalities works around Le Pen to establish the party’s platform: Some proposed measures to appeal to the aspirations of disappointed left-wing voters, like keeping the 35-hour work week and rolling back the retirement age to 60, while others adhere to the traditional far-right program, and suggest limiting legal immigration to 10,000 people a year (it is currently around 200,000). But the platform could also very well be titled “France first.” There are proposed constitutional reforms to forbid all forms of communitarianism, promote French cultural heritage, and transform French economic and labor laws; social benefits would be distributed to French citizens first, and the government would enforce a three percent tax on imports.

These measures, if implemented, would lead to an open breach with the European Union, not least because some of the reforms violate EU law. As far as FN is concerned, the European project is the main agent of liberalism in France, actively working to diminish the country’s unique character. FN justifies its anti-EU posture as necessary in order to regain political sovereignty and economic prosperity. Le Pen has promised to engage in a complete renegotiation of the European treaties if she is elected and to organize a referendum on a so-called Frexit within a year of her election.

Yet, unity within the party should not be overestimated. The views of FN voters are surprisingly diverse, especially on fiscal and social issues. Interestingly, these divisions are embodied by the Le Pen family itself, as Marion-Maréchal Le Pen, the rising star of the party, is closer to the economic liberalism of her grandfather Jean-Marie than the economic protectionism of her aunt Marine. Similarly, the question of exiting the European common currency  has been a thorn as well, because it may not be popular among the middle-class right-wing electorate – and their support will be crucial for victory at the national level. The 2017 program continues to promote a return to national currency, but it stops short of committing to a specific time frame and offers vague alternatives in order to reassure conservative voters. Finally, more symbolic issues such as the death penalty and family planning have been put on the backburner, antagonizing the party’s old guard. Marine Le Pen must turn her program into a real electoral success – at least during the National Assembly elections in June – to prevent these tensions from becoming open fractures.

What could an FN victory in the presidential elections mean for France and Europe? The implementation of its program would have three implications in the relatively short-term future: a constitutional crisis in France, the end of the European project as we know it, and an uncontrolled increase of the public debt that could potentially lead to more economic instability in Europe.

First, the party’s program implies a deep transformation of the French political system and a focus on direct democracy. The use of referendums in order to bypass parliament and all forms of checks and balances would become systematic and call the basis of France’s current republic into question. Second, the FN’s explicit commitment to deconstruct the European Union and fully restore national sovereignty over political and economic decisions would put an end to any future initiatives at the European level. With Brexit negotiations and the migration crisis, the EU may be too weak to survive this additional test. Finally, European partners are likely to be seriously concerned by the implementation of the FN’s illiberal economic program. These doubts would severely aggravate the French public deficit, currently already above the EU limit of three percent of GDP. Implications for the European economy could be disastrous and lead to a new cycle of crisis.

La Dédiabolisation of Le Pen

One of the keys of FN’s rise to national prominence has been the normalization of its image, an effort to break through the “glass ceiling” that has kept the party from winning major elections. When Marine Le Pen took over after her father’s forty-year reign, the FN had a hard-line anti-immigration, anti-Semitic image. She set out to change that by refocusing on economic issues with a pronounced anti-EU bent. This process, known in French as dédiabolisation (literally “undemonization”), also brought in new faces to shift the party away from her father’s numerous and well-documented excesses. The prized recruit was Florian Philippot, trained at the elite École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) like many other politicians. Philippot flirted with the left in his formative years, but is now Le Pen’s lieutenant and one of the few palatable faces FN can feature in the media.

The goal of the normalization process was to widen the electorate, and it appears successful given FN’s various electoral achievements between 2012 and 2015, during which time four separate elections took place (municipal, European, departmental, and regional). In the December 2015 regional elections, FN succeeded in attracting the highest proportion of voters in its history: 6.8 million people voted for the party in the second round of the election, more than in the first round of the 2012 presidential election.

Yet FN has also largely benefited from voter apathy. A closer look at the European and regional elections show historically high levels of abstention, at 57 and 42 percent respectively, with especially high rates of non-voting among 18- to 24-year-olds. That is the very same age group where FN has made the most progress.

In the December 2015 elections, FN attracted about 35 percent of the youth vote, almost 15 percent more than mainstream parties (even if 64 percent did not go to the polls). In 2012, Le Pen only managed to win around 20 percent of young people’s votes. The increase goes hand in hand with rising support among male manual laborers. More than 43 percent of blue-collar workers and 36 percent of regular employees declared their intention to vote for FN. The most dramatic spike can be found among business owners, farmers, and independent workers: 35 percent of them chose FN in 2015.

The gains in these socio-economic segments largely correspond with FN consolidating its vote in its traditional bastions in the southeast, the north, and northeast of France, regions that are still paying the price of deindustrialization. These are the same regions where FN will look to increase its influence, especially by capturing seats in this June’s parliamentary elections.  At the same time, FN will have to worry about the risk of hitting its glass ceiling: A poll from February 2016 shows that 63 percent of French disagree with the party’s ideas, and 62 percent have no intention to cast their ballot for FN. Despite its undeniable progress, the party has struggled to broadly widen its electorate and reach a majority in national polls.

The Failure of Mainstream Parties

FN can also thank the failures and shortsighted strategies of recent governments for its rise. Le Pen’s discourse has gained influence because her criticisms of the so-called system increasingly seem to reflect the reality of French politics. In fact, FN’s greatest achievement has been to take advantage of growing resentment toward mainstream leaders to appear the only real option for change. The lack of clear political alternatives has reinforced that anti-system rhetoric.

Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande have both, for different reasons, failed to fully embrace the traditional role of the president in modern-day France. The Fifth Republic was meant to provide solutions to chronic political instability by ensuring that the government could rely on strong parliamentary majorities. Yet the constitutional framework and electoral code which limits the multiplication of smaller political movements have helped the consolidation of bipartisanism in France. As a result, the same two political parties have ruled France since 1981, winning every presidential and legislative elections for more than 35 years. The shift of power from the main conservative right-wing party – today’s Les Républicains (LR) – to the French Socialist Party (PS) is increasingly seen as politically irrelevant since both seemed to implement the same liberal policies.

The rising “elections without choice” sentiment has played into FN’s hands. Marine Le Pen and her father before her successfully portrayed all their opponents as one single political entity responsible for France’s stubborn economic stagnation and communitarian tensions. Established parties have also participated in the success of FN’s anti-system discourse. The strategy of the cordon sanitaire, the cooperation between the right and the left to prevent a FN candidate from winning at local and national levels, is perceived as confirmation that the system acts to block the democratic process and the victory of non-established forces.

Mainstream parties have also dangerously fostered anger and disillusionment among parts of their own electorates by campaigning on illiberal measures and failing to deliver once in power. Their use of illiberal discourses can be explained by their need to appeal to the most radical parts of the electorate in order to win elections. For the mainstream right, it is essential to obtain the support of voters who are particularly sensitive to immigration, tradition, and security issues; for the mainstream left, victory can only be achieved with the help of voters opposed to the liberalization of the French economy. The last two presidents provide striking examples of this strategy: In 2007, Sarkozy ran a campaign focused on identity and the fight against crime, while Hollande won in 2012 after claiming to be “the enemy of the liberal financial world.”

Yet right-wing governments have not, in fact, reexamined or amended the decisions of the left on cultural issues, from the legalization of abortion and the abolition of the death penalty in the 20th century to rights for same-sex couples in the 21st. Similarly, criticizing the liberalization of the French economy has not led successive left-wing governments to revise economic reforms ushered in under right-wing governments.

What’s more, the role of the president during the last two presidencies provides a key to understanding how mainstream politics and their representatives have been delegitimized. Sarkozy’s presidency (2007-12) was marked by overcommitment: He was unable to delegate, and his exercise of power, called a hyperpresidency, led to a politicization of presidential functions. Eventually, Sarkozy was seen as solely responsible for the failures of government policies. This created a feeling of general instability and weakened the presidency as well as the entire French political system. In 2012 Hollande came to power with the clear intention of reshaping the presidency and counterbalancing the Sarkozy effect. Yet he failed to embody the leadership expected from this role, and his government suffered as a result from being perceived as lacking authority.

The depreciation of the presidency has made mainstream parties look incompetent, and attacking FN for its lack of experience and unfitness to govern has become more difficult in this context. Le Pen’s discourse, centered on ideas of authority and strength, benefited from popular frustration with failing leadership.

While she has considerably transformed the image of the party, the FN still struggles with translating these changes into a decisive national win that would validate her move toward a structured illiberal platform. A loss in the presidential election would need to be smoothed over by a tally of more than 40 percent in the second round, and at least fifty seats (out of 577) in the June parliamentary elections. It would allow her to consolidate power and ensure that her presidential platform remains the guiding light for the way the party will try to influence policy in the next five years and beyond. After all, a new president who fails to rebuild citizens’ trust in the political system will only strengthen Marine Le Pen’s chances in 2022.

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