© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

In an address given in London earlier in June, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg quoted the words of Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of the alliance, who said “there will be persistent efforts to drive a wedge between us” and “we shall have our little quarrels” in a 1952 broadcast.

Today, we are actually talking more about serious transatlantic disagreements than about “little quarrels.” Without a doubt, these are particularly challenging circumstances for a NATO summit. The list of contentious issues between the US and its allies is long and touches on fundamental matters, from trade to the Iran deal (JCPOA), and from the Paris accords to the Middle East. Concerned voices are asking how NATO can, under these circumstances, continue to project the essential characteristics of any alliance, namely unity and resolve.

A closer look shows, however, that the alliance has so far felt hardly any tremors from the various transatlantic disagreements. The two years since the summit in Warsaw have been remarkably positive for the alliance, precisely because of its unity and resolve. NATO, far from being obsolete, has delivered on all promises given in Wales and Warsaw. The Trump administration has reconfirmed Article 5 (which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack against them all) and redeployed troops to Europe. The alliance has boosted its collective defense efforts. European allies have reversed the downward trend and are now increasing defense spending (more on spending targets later). NATO is willing to do more to project stability beyond the alliance’s borders and to combat international terrorism. We have systematically enhanced our cooperation with the EU. And we are adapting to new security challenges in the fields of cyberspace and hybrid threats. Comprehensive institutional adaptation processes, such as the reform of the NATO command structure, have been set in motion to deal with these new and complex challenges. Looking at the pace at which the alliance has kept on adapting to a fundamentally changed security environment since 2014, the remarkable unity and resolve of the alliance becomes obvious. Despite the aforementioned differences, the 29 members of NATO have been able to unite around the core task of standing together and protecting each other.

As we now move to the summit, we need to build on these achievements and concentrate on those areas where NATO makes the difference.

First and foremost among them is NATO’s core business, Euro-Atlantic security. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the alliance has undertaken far-reaching steps to enhance its defense and deterrence, for example by establishing an enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic states as well as a tailored Forward Presence in Romania and Bulgaria. But more needs to be done, while of course maintaining the defensive nature of the alliance.

We need to improve the mobility of our troops across the Atlantic and on the continent and improve their operational readiness. That is why NATO is adapting its command structure, in part by increasing the size of its staff by 1,200. NATO will also set up two new HQs—one new command post in Norfolk, Virginia, to handle the deployment of troops across the Atlantic, and then another in Ulm, Germany. This Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) will be in charge of coordinating deployments, transport, and supplies around the continent. This underlines how seriously Germany takes its responsibility when it comes to making the alliance stronger and more effective.

In addition, we also need to improve our armed forces’ readiness. That is the goal of the NATO Readiness Initiative, which aims at allies having 30 land battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels ready to use within 30 days. This important and challenging initiative is to be formalized at the summit.

These and other measures to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense have essentially been caused by Russia’s actions since 2014. Nevertheless, we agreed at the Warsaw summit that the offer of dialogue would remain open to Russia. The Brussels summit should reaffirm that dual-track policy. True, we won’t get back to business as usual until Russia changes its behavior, in particular contributing more constructively to the implementation of the Minsk agreements in Ukraine. However, there are subjects on which we need to maintain dialogue with Russia in order to reduce risks and prevent misunderstandings and unintended escalation. The NATO-Russia Council remains the key forum for such dialogue.

Projecting Stability

At the Brussels summit, leaders will need to look at what NATO can do to project stability into the troubled regions to the South and to combat terrorism. Together with Afghan leaders and partners, they will discuss the way ahead in Afghanistan. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which provides training and advice for the Afghan security forces, will have to be continued as the most visible element of NATO’s engagement in the southern arc of crisis in the fight against terrorism. That is why NATO recently raised the troop numbers again, from 13,000 to 16,000, with Germany bringing up its troop ceiling from 980 to 1,300, making it the second-most important troop provider.

But the alliance’s role in the south is not limited to Afghanistan. NATO is not the main player in this region, but with its unique expertise in defense capacity building, it can help its partners improve their resilience and put them in a position to more effectively defend themselves against terrorist threats. In this vein, NATO will enhance its defense capacity building activities in Jordan, Tunisia, and – by establishing a non-combat train and advise mission – in Iraq.

As the situation in the south makes clear, NATO cannot deal with the manifold security challenges alone. It depends on cooperation, with the EU primarily – and vice versa. For all their dissimilarities, the two organisations do share values, interests, and security challenges. They are natural partners in a truly strategic collaboration. The joint declaration on reinforcing NATO-EU cooperation issued by Secretary General Stoltenberg and Presidents Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker at the Warsaw summit was a milestone. Since then, we have opened up a new chapter in NATO-EU cooperation, working on implementing an action plan with 74 measures. In recognising the need to strengthen military mobility on our continent, NATO and EU have now identified a new, ambitious flagship project for their cooperation. The Brussels summit will be an excellent opportunity to give guidance for further developing NATO-EU cooperation, based on a common understanding that NATO will remain indispensable for our collective defense. At the same time, developing stronger European capabilities will also contribute to better transatlantic burden-sharing.

Among the many issues to be discussed at the Brussels summit, burden-sharing will be the trickiest. Clearly, the European allies need to do more for transatlantic security: after all, the United States and Europe have roughly the same economic clout, but Europe spends a lot less on defense than the US does. We take the implications of this imbalance very seriously, and a Europe capable of effective security policy needs considerable European investment, not least in military capabilities. For both those reasons, it is worth taking the commitments agreed at the Wales summit seriously.

Increasing Defense Spending

There are three aspects to the pledge. First, the allies made a commitment to reverse the downward trend in defense spending. Second, they pledged to aim to move within a decade towards spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, with 20 percent of that going into investment and procurement in order to fill shortfalls in strategically defined alliance capabilities. This is not about simply pouring more money into defense; it is about channelling investment specifically into the capabilities that the alliance as a whole needs for the tasks it faces. And third, the allies pledged to increase their contributions to, for example, alliance missions and operations.

And there has been progress in these areas. We have reversed the trend in defense spending. In 2016, expenditure by the European allies and Canada rose by 3.8 percent; an increase of 4.3 percent is expected for 2017. Since 2014, the European allies and Canada have spent some additional $87 billion dollars. Germany has increased its defense spending by around 20 percent since 2014 and has now announced that it intends to be spending 1.5 percent of its GDP on defense by 2024. That’s an 80 percent rise in spending compared to 2015.

Germany has furthermore acknowledged all the targets in the current NATO Defense Planning Process and has built its national plans around meeting those targets. And finally, Germany is NATO’s second-largest troop contributor, thus providing substantial support to missions and operations. All that being said, no one will deny that we are not yet where we should be on capabilities.

Looking at the whole range of topics on NATO’s agenda, the ingredients for a successful summit are there. NATO delivers, and it is adapting to the changing security environment. And we largely agree on what to do next. After the agreement between Athens and Skopje on the name dispute, NATO is even looking at the prospect of accession talks with a possible 30th member. With regard to the difficult topic of burden-sharing, we are at least moving in the right direction. For all our shortcomings, we are on the right path.

However, it is key that allied leaders actually broadcast that overall positive message come July. After all, unlike the G7, NATO is about the security of hundreds of millions of people. It is a cornerstone of the rules-based order and the very core of the transatlantic bond, which we need to maintain particularly in these difficult times. That is why it is so important that the Brussels summit send out a strong message of allied unity and resolve. Only if allies maintain their unity as their center of gravity will the alliance be able to protect its nations on both sides of the Atlantic into the future.

N.B. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The post Still the Greatest Alliance appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

The stakes were high in the late 60s. The Soviet Union posed a threat to the entire transatlantic community, and maintained a tight grip on the countries of the Warsaw Pact. France, under President Charles de Gaulle, had withdrawn from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966. German reunification seemed unattainable for the foreseeable future, and Bonn was concerned that the Western powers might opt for a détente with the Warsaw Pact countries on the basis of the German status quo. Henry Kissinger famously described the transatlantic Alliance as a “troubled partnership” whose relevance was in doubt.

In December 1967, in the midst of this particularly challenging period at the height of the Cold War, NATO adopted a report on “The Future Tasks of the Alliance” at the initiative of then-Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. The Harmel report, as it came to be known, represented a major conceptual breakthrough for the Alliance. First, it asserted a twofold political goal for the alliance: NATO would work to both overcome the division of Germany and achieve a just and stable order for the whole of Europe. Second, the report envisioned a method to achieve both goals, essentially a dual-track approach based on military strength and sufficient defense capabilities on the one hand and dialogue to achieve political progress on the other.

For the first time in its history, NATO was defined as a political-military alliance with a genuine coordinating function in shaping détente. The Harmel report stressed that “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary,” broadening NATO’s approach to security to include a political-diplomatic dimension.

These key elements of the Harmel report became a kind of unofficial doctrine for West Germany’s foreign policy. Germany’s Ostpolitik both influenced the dual-track approach and benefited from it; without NATO’s “adequate military strength and political solidarity,” emphasized in the Harmel report, it would not have been possible to make incremental steps toward rapprochement with Eastern Europe. And vice versa, without credible and meaningful diplomatic efforts by the allies to reduce tensions and to rebuild trust, the political will for defense investment and unwavering solidarity expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty might have been weakened.

The Harmel report paved the way for initial talks about conventional arms control, as well as for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. NATO’s “double-track” decision of December 1979, although highly controversial within Germany at the time, is another case in point demonstrating the dialectic of the Harmel method – simultaneously searching for dialogue and negotiating from a position of strength.

The Harmel Method – Still Relevant

The world today looks very different than in the times of the Cold War with its bipolar structure. Nevertheless, the Harmel method is still relevant for the Alliance as it deals with the complex security challenges on its doorstep. With the illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of the Donbas region, Russia has undermined the European security architecture that it committed to when it signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990. Russia’s expansion of its military, its shortfalls in implementing arms control agreements, and its hybrid activities are further causes for concern.

NATO has responded to these challenges, and it has done so in the spirit of the Harmel report, combining deterrence and dialogue, collective defense and cooperative security. At the Warsaw summit in 2016, NATO decided to pursue a strategy of enhancing defense capabilities on the one hand and being open to dialogue on the other. Since then, a package of measures has been implemented to improve NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities – e.g. by establishing an enhanced forward military presence in the Baltic states and Poland, as well as a tailored forward presence in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Black Sea.

These presences, which include the German-led multinational battalion in Lithuania, demonstrate that in a crisis the Alliance will engage as a whole. At the same time, NATO has made sure that the scope and scale of this new military presence is in line with its defensive nature and does not contravene the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Furthermore, NATO remains open to dialogue. The NATO-Russia Council, which had been suspended in the immediate aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, reconvened in May 2016 and has since met five more times. These meetings provide an important opportunity to openly exchange views on difficult and controversial issues, such as the situation in Ukraine, and raise concerns regarding Russia’s role. The NATO-Russia Council also offers an appropriate framework to discuss issues of common concern, such as risk reduction and transparency. Reciprocal briefings, e.g. on exercises, can help to create more predictability in order to prevent incidents or accidents that might otherwise lead to dangerous unintended escalation. Following a discussion on air safety in the NATO-Russia Council, an expert group including experts from Baltic Sea states identified best practices and recommended measures to enhance air safety over the Baltic Sea.

Dialogue of this kind by no means represents a return to business as usual. Military and political cooperation between NATO and Russia remains suspended. There is a clear consensus within NATO that normalization of relations will not be possible as long as Russia maintains its position on the Ukraine conflict and does not implement the Minsk agreements. But at the same time, it is obvious that the current deep crisis of the European security architecture cannot be overcome by just enhancing defense capabilities. It will require political efforts to incrementally re-establish a security order based on OSCE principles and commitments. To get there, we need to continue the dialogue, as difficult as it may be – but we also need Russia to change its behavior.

On the Way to the 2018 Brussels Summit

In the coming months leading up to the next NATO summit in July 2018, the Alliance will focus on further adaptations in line with the Harmel logic. These will specifically involve reforming NATO’s command structure, which has to properly reflect the dramatically altered and more complex security environment as well as the Alliance’s renewed focus on collective defense. Further work is also required to create the conditions for rapid deployment in the framework of a sustainable reinforcement strategy.

NATO also needs to fill its capability gaps. This will take time, and it will require that sufficient funds be made available. The Defense Investment Pledge agreed at the NATO summit in Wales is an important cornerstone in this respect. It is a good sign that the European members of NATO (and Canada) increased their defense spending by 3.8 percent in 2016 and an estimated 4.3 percent in 2017, while Germany has increased its defense expenditure by more than 13 percent since 2014. Even more important than the mere budget figures is the will to develop the necessary capabilities and contribute to operations.

Dealing with the political dimension of the NATO-Russia relationship will be another key task in the run-up to the 2018 summit. Meaningful and periodic exchanges with Russia within the NATO-Russia Council remain necessary. In light of an increase in troop deployments and the frequency of military exercises, miscommunication poses a potential threat to security and stability in Europe. In order to reduce risks and enhance transparency, functioning lines of military communication between Russia and NATO are necessary. Initial contact has been established between the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, SACEUR, and the Russian Chief of Defense; more steps of this kind need to follow. The Structured Dialogue within the OSCE provides another forum to discuss threats to the Euro-Atlantic security order.

The Necessity of Unity

Never since its inception has NATO undergone such far-reaching changes in such a short period of time. Since the watershed moment of 2014, the Alliance has been undertaking its biggest effort in collective defense since the end of the Cold War: European allies have turned the corner on defense spending, the Alliance is committed to projecting stability beyond its borders, and it is adapting to new threats such as cyber and hybrid attacks.

But we must not forget that there is major unfinished business left over from the times of Harmel. The Harmel report stated that “the ultimate political goal of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by security guarantees.” Fifty years after the adoption of the Harmel report and 27 years after the end of the Cold War, this goal seems more and more elusive. To bring it back within our grasp, we need to heed the lessons of the Harmel report, safeguarding necessary defense capabilities and pursuing diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions at the same time. Choosing only one while neglecting the other would not only thwart our efforts to re-establish the Euro-Atlantic security architecture; it would also undermine our credibility.

Implementing such a strategy will require strong political will and unity within the Alliance. Demonstrating both will be a major task for the next NATO summit in July 2018. As we go through a time of transition on both sides of the Atlantic, there is ample reason to remind ourselves that the strength of the Atlantic Alliance always relied on shared values and common interests between the North American democracies and Europe. And it relied on the ability of NATO’s nations to agree on, pursue, and implement a long term strategy. The dual-track approach based on the Harmel method needs to be part of this. Only if the Alliance demonstrates this strategic sense of common purpose will it be able to operate effectively and protect our countries and our people.

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© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

Rarely in its 70-year history has the North Atlantic Alliance faced uncertainties as complex and varied as in the beginning of 2017: a Russia that has violated fundamental principles of the European security order and made unpredictability its trademark, a southern neighborhood in turmoil from Libya to Syria and Iraq and without clear prospects of achieving sustainable stability in the foreseeable future, and new complex threats such as hybrid warfare and cyberwar. Uncertainties also characterize the situation within the Alliance. There is a constant threat of terrorist attacks, and migrant flows from the South might surge again. Turkey as a key ally faces tremendous internal and external challenges. Finally, a new US administration led by President Donald Trump will have to define its position vis-à-vis NATO as well as the old and new issues of European security. How it will do this throughout 2017 will be of the utmost importance for America’s allies and beyond.

Old Alliance – unchanged relevance vis-à-vis new challenges

Against the backdrop of manifold uncertainties and divisive trends, it is important to recall the unique value of the North Atlantic Alliance for both the North American democracies and Europe – the fact that it is an organization in which 28, and with the accession of Montenegro soon 29 nations, have pledged to protect each other in a 360 degrees perspective and on the basis of common values. For almost seven decades, NATO has been – beyond Article 5 – a unique institutional framework for daily transatlantic coordination on a wide range of security policy issues, joint defense planning and military cooperation. It has been the bedrock of European security – despite all the differences which can always occur between allies.

Since the foundation of NATO, the US has benefited from assuming its role as a “European” power by investing both politically and militarily in the Alliance and by fostering European unity. Maintaining a close network of allies in NATO has paid off for the US in many respects. Not least, uniting most of Europe’s democracies in a military alliance has made a crucial contribution to stability on America’s opposite Atlantic shores – unlike the period after World War I when the US withdrew from Europe. The political, economic and human costs associated with that withdrawal were enormous.

NATO’s value has become particularly clear again since 2014, when Russia called the European security order into question by annexing Crimea and destabilizing eastern Ukraine. At its summits in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016), the Alliance gave firm answers to this challenge and to growing instability in its southern neighborhood. Both summits sent clear messages of transatlantic unity and solidarity. Warsaw set out a comprehensive agenda, which will have to be implemented in 2017, on adapting the Alliance to a changing security situation and demonstrating that it is able and willing to deliver on its commitments. Any major backtracking on the agenda agreed in Warsaw would raise questions in this respect.

Swift implementation is also required, as the next NATO summit planned for 2017 will provide not only an opportunity for a first meeting between allied leaders and the new US President, but will also be a vital occasion to take stock and discuss the way ahead. In times when commentators are lamenting the demise of the West and established institutions of the democratic liberal order seem to be weakening, it is all the more important that the Alliance demonstrate unity, resolve and the capacity to act – as a key pillar of the political West.

That remains true first and foremost with regard to European security. At the Warsaw summit, the Alliance decided to move from reassurance (the key topic of the 2014 Wales summit) to strengthening deterrence and defense. While maintaining its defensive character and its readiness to conduct dialogue with Russia, enhanced Forward Presence (deployment of four battalion-sized, multi-national battle groups on a rotational basis to Poland and the Baltic states) and tailored Forward Presence in south-eastern Europe will be key deliverables for the first semester of 2017. The Alliance attached great importance to making sure that the scope and scale of this new military presence is in line with NATO’s defensive nature and does not contradict the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It represents a credible deterrent and shows that in case of crisis the Alliance as a whole will be engaged. Implementation by host nations, framework nations – the US, UK, Canada, and Germany – and other contributing allies is well under way. Furthermore, in the context of its European Reassurance Initiative, the US decided to deploy additional units to Europe, thus underlining its unwavering commitment to European security. Germany is playing a key role in the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan decided in Wales and will assume the role of the framework nation for the battle group to be stationed in Lithuania. Germany is thus showing that it is serious about its commitment to assume responsibility and, where necessary, leadership, as expressed in the new 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy.

However, strengthening deterrence and defense is not only limited to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence. After years of expeditionary operations, national forces are being modernized and restructured to ensure that follow-on forces are also available when needed. In addition, and with a view to challenges emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance will also develop its Ballistic Missile Defense system throughout 2017.

A dual-track approach vis-à-vis Russia – dialogue is necessary

At the Warsaw summit, NATO not only decided to strengthen deterrence and defense, but also pledged to complement them by undertaking periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with Russia in the framework of a dual-track approach. While the Alliance decided in 2014 to suspend practical political and military cooperation with Russia and insists on the implementation of the Minsk agreements, dialogue and consultation on key security questions remains important. Although there will not be a return to business as usual for the time being, necessary business needs to be done with Russia in order to avoid dangerous misperceptions and misunderstandings. This is in the Alliance’s own best interest. The NATO-Russia Council, which met three times in 2016, is a key forum for pursuing this necessary dialogue. It would be important to breathe more life into the dialogue track with Russia over the course of 2017.

There is no lack of urgent questions to be discussed, such as the conflict in and around Ukraine as the main reason for the deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia since 2014. Beyond this conflict, NATO and Russia share a common interest in avoiding unintended military incidents that could lead to serious escalation, in particular as both sides have significantly increased their military activities, e.g. through military exercises. Risk reduction and transparency are thus also important topics for the NATO-Russia Council. Air safety in the Baltic Sea region is one concrete example in this field. NATO and Russia should also continue to inform each other about their respective military posture, their (threat) perceptions and their exercises. Both sides should use their military lines of communication. However, Russia has been reluctant to take up proposals by NATO in this regard so far. It is well understood that a dialogue on these and other issues cannot replace the implementation of obligations in the context of the OSCE, in particular with regard to the Vienna Document.

NATO’s future role in the Southern periphery and in the fight against terrorism – an ongoing debate

Unlike in the past, the Alliance is now confronted with a historically new, double strategic challenge: besides the challenges in the East, it is now facing an arc of crises, violence and instability, ranging from Libya to Afghanistan. At the Warsaw summit, the Alliance made clear that as part of the core tasks laid down in its Strategic Concept, it is willing to help bring about greater stability in its southern neighborhood. It will do so mainly in the context of efforts aimed at projecting stability, in particular by building defense capacity and advising and training partners’ local forces. This approach is based on the assumption that it is better to enable partners in the region to cope with security challenges themselves than to put boots on the ground. Projecting stability also implies that NATO complements, but does not duplicate, ongoing efforts by the Global Coalition to counter the so-called Islamic State, as well as by the UN and the EU. As of January 2017, NATO will start training Iraqi forces in Iraq in specific areas, and will also do more with regard to Jordan and Tunisia. A new maritime security operation called Operation Sea Guardian was launched in October 2016 to improve situational awareness in the Mediterranean and to assist countries in capacity building. NATO has also offered support to Libya in the field of institution building, if the latter so wishes.

Undoubtedly, terrorism is a key threat to allied nations, as recent terrorist attacks in Turkey, Germany, France and Belgium have shown in a dramatic way. NATO is already making significant contributions when it comes to fighting terrorism. While NATO as such, unlike all NATO member countries, is not a member of the Global Coalition against IS, NATO AWACS have been operating in support of the Coalition since October 2016. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, aimed at training and advising Afghan security forces, remains NATO’s most important military operation. It too contributes directly to the fight against terrorism. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that it was after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US that NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history.

Nevertheless, 2017 will see further discussions within the Alliance regarding the right level of ambition when it comes to projecting stability in the South and fighting terrorism. This difficult question, of strategic importance for the future of the Alliance, will certainly be one of the key topics to be discussed at the NATO summit in 2017. It will be all the more important to have developed a realistic framework for NATO’s role in the South by then. More clarity is required regarding the question of which tools NATO can effectively use in this difficult region with its very complex threats requiring not only military answers. In any case, the Alliance should try to generate value added, but not duplicate what others are already doing. Ownership of measures by partners in the region is another important prerequisite for successful engagement in the South.

The indispensable partnership between NATO and the EU – high time to take it to a new level

NATO will not be able to cope with the complex challenges in the South alone – nor can it play the role of a first responder as it undoubtedly does in the framework of collective defense. As complex threats necessitate joint answers in a truly comprehensive approach, NATO needs to cooperate closely with other partners – above all with the EU and UN. A closer partnership between NATO and the EU makes sense as 22 EU member states are members of the Alliance – with only one single set of forces at their disposal. NATO already supports the EU Operation Sophia in the central Mediterranean. NATO’s activity in the Aegean Sea to cut the lines of illegal trafficking and illegal migration in close cooperation with Greek and Turkish coastguards and Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, is another example of what NATO can do to support other actors. Substantial progress in NATO-EU cooperation throughout 2017 is necessary, as both organizations need to implement a comprehensive set of more than 40 proposals for increased cooperation endorsed by NATO and EU Foreign Ministers, as well as by the European Council, in December 2016. These proposals define a comprehensive agenda for more coordinated action, including on cybersecurity, hybrid threats, strategic communication, defense capacity building, early warning and coordinated exercises.

If the EU and NATO manage to take their partnership to a new level, they will be in a much better position to provide security for their nations. Increased cooperation between these two pillars of the political West is also necessary to demonstrate that there is no unhealthy competition between them. That is why the EU made very clear that ongoing efforts to enhance EU capabilities in the field of defense and crisis management are by no means aimed at replacing NATO in the field of collective defense or at creating a European army. US military presence and the unconditioned US nuclear guarantee will remain indispensable to European security for the foreseeable future. In the same vein, the ambition to establish a planning and conduct capability for missions within the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy does not aim to create structures like SHAPE, NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, within the EU. However, the EU needs to be able to tackle security challenges that are not or not sufficiently covered by NATO or the US – in particular in North Africa. In this respect, a stronger European Union can help to bring about a stronger North Atlantic Alliance. Strengthening European defense capabilities fosters more balanced transatlantic burden-sharing and is both in European and US interests.

Transatlantic burden sharing and European defense expenditure: turning around the downward trend, but more “bang for the buck” needed

European defense expenditure will undoubtedly play an even more important role with the incoming US administration. The demand for a greater European share in transatlantic burden-sharing is not new, but with a dramatically changing security environment, it has become more urgent. At the NATO summit in Wales, allies undertook to turn around the downward trend in defense spending and to aim to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense by 2024 as well as increase their annual investments to 20 percent or more of total defense expenditures. Moreover, it was agreed to increase the overall turnout for NATO.

Allies reaffirmed this commitment at the Warsaw summit, where they were able to show that 24 allies had already turned around the downward trend and started to increase their defense budgets. This is also true for Germany, which in 2017 will increase its defense budget by 7.9 percent (to €37 billion) compared to 2016. In many allied countries there is a clear understanding that defense spending will have to be further increased in the future. This will be necessary in order to fill existing capability gaps, but also to ensure continued support among the US public for US engagement in and with NATO.

At the same time, one should not belittle current European defense efforts: on an annual basis (2015), European allies (apart from the US and Canada) spend around 250 billion US dollars on defense – almost matching the official Russian and Chinese defense budgets combined. And unlike the US, which commits a large portion of its defense spending to non-NATO defense (e.g. in Asia-Pacific), all European allies (with the exception of France and the UK) commit almost their entire defense spending and military capabilities to NATO. It should also not be forgotten that Europeans made and make major contributions to military operations in the Western Balkans (and continue to do so in Kosovo and Bosnia), in Afghanistan and North Africa. Insofar, the frequently heard view that the US provides approximately 70 percent of NATO’s defense spending is misleading.

Increasing European defense budgets, however, can only be one answer to the debate on transatlantic burden-sharing. Budget figures are certainly significant – but what ultimately count are capabilities within a truly comprehensive strategic approach. In that respect, Europeans have to do more – in particular when it comes to using resources more effectively. There are many reasons to doubt whether Europeans really need 19 types of infantry fighting vehicles or 29 types of naval frigates and helicopters. With rising security challenges on the one hand and limited defense budgets on the other, the current fragmentation of European defense industries does not seem to be sustainable. Europeans should get more “bang for the buck” by creating synergies and using their resources more effectively. Germany has brought 16 European nations together in the Framework Nations Concept in order to jointly develop capabilities in well-defined areas including larger formations needed for reinforcements. This NATO-endorsed concept provides a good opportunity to develop European capability clusters in line with the NATO Defense Planning Process. In the end, it could lead to European capabilities being used by either NATO or – if necessary – also by the EU.

Finally, 2017 will be a year in which NATO will have to continue to adapt to new challenges such as cybersecurity. 2016 showed that the cyber dimension of security is becoming more and more relevant and that nations will have to deliver on the Cyber Defense Pledge they adopted at the Warsaw summit – first and foremost by making sure that NATO’s networks are well protected and by making their own national cyber infrastructure more resilient against attacks.

In this age of uncertainties only one thing seems certain: There will be no lack of huge challenges in the years ahead – challenges which will affect both sides of the Atlantic. Neither the US nor Europe will be able to meet them successfully alone; in the end, the only successful answers will be joint answers. As in the past, this will require the political will of nations and their leaders to use the Alliance as a prime institutional framework to safeguard their common transatlantic security interests in a complex, volatile and dangerous world. If they manage to do so and to demonstrate unity – the source of strength of any alliance – NATO will remain highly relevant both for the US and Europe, as a cornerstone of stability and reliability. As the designated US Defense Secretary General James Mattis said: “Nations with strong allies thrive and those without them wither.”

NB. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

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