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There’s a lot to be said for having a European policy on arms exports: a joint set of rules could prevent weapons manufactured in Europe from being used in a way that violates international humanitarian law, for example. Arms embargoes can constrain aggressive behavior by depriving a country of military resources, or at the very least send a strong signal condemning human rights abuse. Weapons exports can improve defense cooperation with allies by improving troop interoperability. And, in individual cases, they can improve the defense capabilities of strategic partners in order to help them tackle globally significant security challenges like piracy or terrorism.

All of these measures are more effective when Europeans work together. Weapons embargoes in particular are similar to economic sanctions in that the more countries that participate, the stronger the impact. Hence, an embargo on Saudi Arabia imposed unilaterally by Berlin may help to alleviate the German conscience, but does little to prevent British and French arms from being delivered to Saudi Arabia for use in the war in Yemen.

Despite this, the European Union has thus far failed to enforce a joint weapons export policy.  The goal of a Europe that is “weltpolitikfähig” (loosely translated: capable of geopolitics) and pursues a foreign policy stance based on shared values doesn’t seem to have provided sufficient motivation. Now, however, von der Leyen’s aim of creating a defense union leaves Europe no choice but to tackle the question of exports—the absence of a coherent arms export policy undermines not only the strategic interests and the credibility of a values-based EU, but also its defense capabilities.

European governments will only join forces in the development of military equipment if they are able to trust their partners to provide the necessary components to export customers and to other EU members. In order to achieve this, they need to agree on a transparent and predictable set of export rules.

New Initiatives

Exporting to third countries allows defense companies to enlarge their customer base and create economies of scale. At the same time, it pushes European firms to make more competitive products. By spending money on defense R&D, the EU could help companies be more selective about where to export to in the future and prioritize European technology requirements over those of external customers.

EU member states and institutions have developed a string of new initiatives for the improvement of defense coordination. Among them are the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the European Defense Fund, and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

Ideally, the future of EU defense industrial cooperation will look something like this: EU institutions and governments identify gaps in the bloc’s defense capabilities and draw up a list of the military equipment required; a group of capable countries decides to develop the equipment in question; in return they receive EU funding for the research into and development of necessary technology.

But the EU does not have a plan for how to proceed if member states cannot reach agreement on arms export rules. Without a reliable and consistent arms export policy at the European level, the union’s high-profile plans to improve European defense capabilities risk falling flat.

A European Regime

The European Council adopted a common position on arms export controls in 2008, which defines common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. If it were properly implemented, the Common Position would be one of the strongest arms export frameworks in the world. But although it is legally binding, the Common Position is poorly enforced. There is no formal mechanism to punish non-compliance. Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU affirms that defense decisions taken by member states for the protection of their security interests are outside the remit of EU law. As a result, member states often fall far short of their obligations under the Common Position and fail to apply its criteria to their export decisions. In addition, licenses are only granted under the EU Common Position on a case-by-case basis. Authorities probe whether a particular export violates any of the eight criteria outlined in the Common Position. This methodology often means that the authorities fail to take into account the wider geopolitical context and the cumulative effect weapons exports might have.

A Defense Union

The EU’s plans to build a Defense Union raises the question of whether there could ever be “more EU” in arms export policy. The commission has begun slowly carving out a role for itself in EU defense industrial policy. It recently tightened the regulation of cyber-surveillance equipment, which could bolster its influence over trade in dual-use goods. But the European Defense Fund guidance stipulates that funding from the commission should not have any influence over the export decisions of those military goods that were developed with the support of EU funds—this was the result of rigid opposition by member states to any EU authority over exports.

Civil society organizations have expressed concern that transferring powers to the European Commission, which is less accountable to voters than national governments, could decrease rather than increase transparency around defense exports. And an EU-wide policy would necessarily be based on the smallest common denominator and thus have limited impact.

The European Parliament has so far not been very involved in the EU’s new defense activities. When it first voted on the European Defense Fund in April 2019, 328 MEPs supported it, while 231 voted against. Those who are fundamentally opposed a greater EU role in defense matters aside, lawmakers took issue with the defense industry’s participation in the development of the commission’s proposal and questioned the plan to use EU funds for supporting new technologies (including artificial intelligence, robotics, and unmanned systems) that could pose ethical dilemmas. The parliament may want to have more control in the future over questions such as who will be eligible to import military goods financed by the EU.

Some Proposals

It is unlikely that EU member states will cede national control over their arms exports to the EU. There is no political will to do so, neither in Berlin nor elsewhere. Any attempt to establish an EU supervisory body to report on violations of the Common Position would require a change to the EU treaties and therefore unanimity among EU member states.

But there are a few things Europeans could do right now to improve the workings of the Common Position. A recently concluded review process is promising but limited in scope. For example, member states are obligated to provide an annual report on the export licenses they have granted. The EU should start imposing strict deadlines and standardize the report’s format. The reporting requirements should further include actual deliveries rather than just exporting licenses. This would facilitate a more precise analysis of situations in which the sudden arrival of arms could imperil a fragile ceasefire, for example. For this reason, members should also inform one another of their respective risk assessments. Some countries have difficulties meeting even the current reporting requirements due to a lack of resources and know-how. The EU should organize a peer-review meeting that would allow governments to share best practices for the purpose of data collection.

The EU could also encourage member states to conduct their own controls with regard to the end use of exported weapons. Export licenses should only be granted if the seller is aware of who might end up using the weapons and how they will be deployed. There is no export regime that does not run the risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands. This is particularly true for small arms, which cause the majority of casualties in both domestic and cross-border conflicts. End-use control is expensive, time-consuming, and requires political influence in the recipient country. The EU could contribute by deploying to importing countries teams of experts made up of employees of the Commission and the European External Action Service. This would have to be negotiated in advance and incorporated into export agreements, however, and the EU would have to find a way to handle the difficult exchange of sensitive data.

But in the absence of a credible EU-wide weapons export regime, a positive step toward harmonizing EU arms exports would be for smaller groups of member states to come together, following the model of the Farnborough framework agreement of 2000. In 2019, Germany and France signed the Treaty of Aachen, an extension of the 1963 Elysée Treaty. The two countries promised to “develop a common approach to arms exports with regard to joint projects.” According to the EU truism that nothing happens without consensus between Germany and France, any agreement between Berlin and Paris could be expanded to include other countries, or member states could forge similar agreements with one another. This process could be expanded step by step in order to make the guidelines for weapons exports more predictable for all EU members. But in order to further EU foreign policy goals, these agreements would have to be much farther-reaching than the one proposed by Berlin and Paris, and they would have to encompass legally-binding export rules.

What is more, the agreement recently reached by Paris and Berlin is reminiscent of the Debré-Schmidt accord, which was signed in 1972 by the countries’ then-defense ministers Michel Debré and Helmut Schmidt and stipulated that neither side could block the export of jointly developed weapons systems. Germany nonetheless decided to impose an arms export ban on Saudi Arabia in 2018. This highlights the fact that the problem is not so much a lack of agreements, but rather a lack of a common strategic perspective on regional threats.

What Next?

Before a common weapons export policy can be developed, EU member states must agree on the interests the bloc has in a particular conflict, which is often difficult. Opinions diverge, for example, on whether exporting weapons to Saudi Arabia stabilizes or destabilizes the Gulf region. And arms exports or embargoes must form part of a larger foreign policy strategy, since they are often ineffective on their own in changing state behavior. The most effective embargoes are usually accompanied by other measures such as economic sanctions.

EU member states must take on the enormous task of reaching a shared view on the security context of arms exports. They should also improve the wording of the Common Position and reporting by member states, tighten end-use controls, and conclude far-reaching inter-governmental export agreements. The new incentive: without an effective European arms export policy, the European defense union is unlikely to succeed.

This article is based on the CER Policy Brief “Up in Arms: Warring over Europe’s arms export policy,” co-authored with Beth Oppenheim.

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Germany, along with France, was the driving force behind the initiatives that have given new momentum to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) since the summer of 2016. With the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), Berlin and Paris have succeeded in bringing new life to a policy area that had been deadlocked for decades and written off by many observers. As a result, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was recently able to, with some justification, underline the progress the EU has made towards a “European Defence Union” and the speed it is demonstrating. Without Germany’s involvement, she noted in the German newspaper Handelsblatt, the way would not be paved for a comprehensive change in the understanding of the EU’s, particularly the Commission’s, role in military security.

Nevertheless, Germany consistently faces criticism for not playing a role commensurate with its political clout and the size of its economy, whether it’s because the government still spends too little on defense—and the current US president is not the first one to lament this—or because it doesn’t do enough to make Europe capable of quick and effective military action, a common complaint in Paris. Not ambitious enough, too hesitant, too inflexible, too dogmatic—Berlin hears it over and over again. How can this German approach be explained? How does the German government think European security and defense should be organized? What does Berlin want to achieve with which instruments and how does it define success? Putting on our “German glasses” to look at the CSDP initiatives, the French-created European Intervention Initiative (EI2), and the consequences of Brexit allows us to take stock.

Holding the EU Together

The CSDP has many functions for Germany. For one, the European framework gives domestic legitimacy to Germany’s defense-policy engagement. For large parts of the population, the idea of Germany going it alone is still unthinkable. More than a few Germans are also wary of NATO. They don’t want increased cooperation with the US, especially since Donald Trump took office; instead they advocate close connections with European partners, above all France. Embedding German defense policy in the EU takes the edge off it. In Germany, the EU Army (or the European Army or Army of Europeans, depending on how the politicians calling for it feel on the day) has for years been a popular rhetorical tool for affirming the commitment to defense in an EU framework—in part because its realization is always just beyond the horizon.

Moreover, by further developing the CSDP, the German government is pursuing the goal of tying another band around the EU to hold it together. After the Brexit vote of June 2016, attention turned to finding a joint future project with France, and both governments saw security and defense policy as having the most potential. The strengthening of the CSDP serves, then, as an additional measure to promote the cohesion of EU member states, which can no longer be taken for granted these days.

But it would be wrong to accuse Berlin of having no ambitions for the CSDP beyond favorable rhetoric and EU integration. Germany wants to substantially and sustainably build up the CSDP with “confidence-building intermediate steps” and not “in a hurry,” as von der Leyen puts it. For example, for Berlin it is not about the ability to send large numbers of soldiers to Africa for military intervention as quickly as possible. Rather, Berlin wants to work to improve Europe’s ability to act in the long term, in the hope that the bloc’s decision-making capabilities will improve along with it in the coming years.

Strategy with a Downside

These considerations absolutely make sense. Trust in the EU as a defense actor still has to grow in many member states. Germany does see itself, along with France, as a driver of the CSDP, but it also tries not to leave any country behind—in Berlin one speaks of an “inclusive” CSDP. One reason PESCO is currently being described as a success is that nearly every EU country is taking part in the format, including countries like Poland that initially took a skeptical view. The downside of the strategy, however, is that Germany must face accusations that it is setting up CSDP institutions in order to register their mere existence as a success, rather than using the CSDP to take concrete action against the threats on Europe’s borders.

One thing is often neglected in the public debate in and about Germany: for most German decision-makers, including in the defense ministry and the Bundeswehr, NATO under US leadership remains the key pillar of German defense. This is true (for now) despite the Trump factor in Washington and the “beer tent” speech in which Chancellor Merkel obliquely questioned the US’s reliability. Germany’s leadership of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and its participation in the Baltic air-policing mission and the NATO Battlegroup in Lithuania are often overlooked in the domestic and international debate. The decision-makers do not consider the CSDP an alternative to NATO but rather a means to expand the European footprint in the alliance with the Americans in the long term.

The French Initiative

For Germany, multilateral institutions are the linchpin of the international order. On the other hand, there is little understanding for “more flexible” or “more pragmatic” formats. Attacks on multilateral institutions—which come from all sides, a particularly clear instance being US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech in Brussels on December 4—are from Berlin’s perspective not to be answered by strengthening ad-hoc coalitions in supranational structures. This explains why Berlin has so far only reluctantly gone along with the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which aims at enabling closer cooperation between the armed forces of European states that are willing and able to carry out military missions. In Berlin’s view, however, the goals of the French initiative remain unclear. Germany fears EI2 may even undermine the CSDP because it has been set up outside of EU structures.

That is why Berlin has clearly spoken in favor of moving the EI2 into the EU framework, and sooner rather than later. In the German understanding of the European security architecture, there is no place for efforts involving only a few select countries. Concerns about fragmentation and the weakening of multilateral organizations in which Germany has invested so much capital, political as well as real, are too great. This is even true for the special relationship with France: While Berlin subscribes to the idea of a Franco-German “motor” in the CSDP, the bilateral Aachen Treaty does not go appreciably beyond the existing multilateral commitments.

However, in their efforts to hold the EU together, many in Berlin overlook the fact that the EI2 can make a strong contribution to Europe’s ability to act—and that it does not necessarily conflict with the CSDP. Admittedly, it was difficult to grasp the ambition and scope of the initiative in the first weeks and months after President Macron announced it. But in its current form, the EI2 is bound by sensible and clear limits: it is not the silver bullet of European defense, but it is well-placed to fill gaps, for example in terms of Europe’s common analysis of threats. What’s more, it includes the United Kingdom.

Brexit and Its Consequences

Berlin’s understanding of the CSDP has an effect on the German approach to security and defense cooperation with Britain after Brexit, both in a European and a bilateral context. The German government understands the CSDP to be inwardly inclusive but outwardly exclusive. As with the entire Brexit process, the feeling is that, with regard to the CSDP, there must be a significant difference between EU member states and third countries. It is a matter of not making mere cooperation with the EU appear as attractive as EU membership. Even though Germany is seeking to create a close and constructive relationship with Britain after Brexit, from Berlin’s point of view the goal cannot be to duplicate the level of cooperation that takes place in the EU framework.

In the Brexit negotiations, the unity of the remaining 27 member states has always been the top priority for Berlin. Therefore the government has avoided undermining the divorce process with bilateral agreements and creating the impression of a “special relationship” between Germany and the UK. Even the “Joint Vision Statement” on closer cooperation on security and defense policy was only released after some hesitation, while a corresponding and nearly-complete declaration on foreign policy is still parked in a desk drawer. In order to limit the space for security cooperation outside of the EU and NATO (and the UN), neither statement has objectives as ambitious as those in the Lancaster House treaties between France and Britain.

On top of that, many in Berlin argue that real progress in the CSDP has only been possible since Britain voted to leave. They see Brexit as more of a liberation than a loss. To prove their point, they point to the obstructionist British stance that for years prevented the CSDP from reaching the agreements it has since the Brexit vote, for example on a European headquarters for EU missions. From this perspective, keeping Britain too close risks allowing a Trojan horse into the EU. The argument that cutting the cord to the greatest military power in Europe could lead to problems in the quest for autonomy is not catching on. Nor does Berlin really fear the frictions that could arise when it comes to cooperation with Britain in the NATO framework.

From a German point of view, Britain should take part in the CSDP within the framework of third-country cooperation, as is already common practice. It’s important for Berlin that political control and decision-making authority remain EU competencies if Britain takes part in PESCO projects on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the European Defense Fund, the approach is that no EU money should flow to third countries and that Britain should participate financially in the fund. There is a long-term interest in keeping in check the Commission’s decision-making authority over European arms policy should the Brussels executive act against German interests.

However, the German position is not yet set in stone on every point, and there are certainly different positions in the relevant ministries. Thus the way Brexit plays out will influence Germany’s position. It is already clear that, in the course of the Brexit process, much of the trust in the British negotiating partner has faded away.

Form Follows Function

The creation of a “European Defense Union” serves in Germany’s eyes to create a connective framework in which as many EU member states as possible can come together and cooperate. Only in the long term is it an instrument for strengthening Europe’s ability to defend itself, which Berlin continues to see as something guaranteed by NATO. The German government has been clear that it doesn’t want any parallel structures or incentives–neither bilaterally nor as “coalitions of the willing”—that could undermine EU institutions.

But since, at the moment, there is no shared understanding among all the EU member states about which EU foreign policy interests are the most important and must be defended, member states will inevitably and increasingly set up ad hoc formats in which smaller groups of EU and NATO countries can act directly. There is of course the danger that the supranational and binding power of CSDP will be subverted. But the risk of creating EU formats incapable of action is even greater.

After all, every format in which Europeans work together on defense policy strengthens Europe’s ability to act, whether through improved interoperability or the harmonization of threat analyses. Berlin should not only support the EI2 but also push harder to expand cooperation between the EU and NATO. The European security situation demands all hands on deck.

If the EU, as a complement to NATO, is indeed to become an organization that “produces” European security, it also needs to offer attractive “docking mechanisms” to those countries that are central to European security, even if they are no longer EU member states. If attractive participation mechanisms for strategic partners—like the British, the Norwegians, in some cases even the Turks—are not created soon, the CSDP won’t be able to live up to its promises. An “inclusive” CSDP is only effective with the inclusion of Britain.

So Germany should get more involved in EU negotiations about third-country participation in the CSDP. With regard to industrial cooperation in the field of defense, Berlin is less dogmatic than, say, Paris. The Brexit negotiations haven’t yet reached the stage of “future relations.” But on the EDF, for example, the EU is already agreeing on directives that stipulate the “strict conditions” under which third countries can take part in EU-promoted defense capabilities projects. In the next few years, member states will have to weigh security and defense interests, economic interests, and the union’s security of supply in a crisis. On this issue, Berlin should join the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries to speak out for the unproblematic participation of like-minded third countries in EU defense capabilities projects.

With regard to British participation in CSDP decision-making and the operational participation of British associations, it is understandable that Berlin has doubts about the sincerity of Britain’s newfound enthusiasm for the CSDP. Berlin should, though, give Britain the opportunity to prove that its offer to become an “ambitious” CSDP partner is a serious one.

At the heart of Berlin’s efforts is the goal of making the EU into an international organization capable of action on defense. This ambition for the distant future does not, however, meet the challenges of the current threat situation. The pressure on Europe is acute. The CSDP has to be able to deliver on its promises if it is to to be effective against the dangers Europe is confronted with—especially in areas where NATO is unwilling or incapable of action.

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The United Kingdom’s exit negotiations with the European Union have not yet officially begun, but it is already becoming clear that no policy area will remain unaffected by the breach between the EU and the UK – not even security and defense policy cooperation.

In fact, Prime Minister Theresa May considers British contributions to European security one of her strongest cards in the Brexit negotiations – but she is walking a tightrope between fostering goodwill in Europe and alienating Europeans by issuing hollow threats. For their part, many European governments are too quick to dismiss British security capabilities, prioritizing principles over pragmatism instead of looking for ways to keep Britain close.

The UK is one of only two credible military powers in Europe and has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. London commands extremely effective intelligence services with substantial skill and know-how in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. And while the British military has been subjected to budget cuts in recent years, the global outlook of the British, their diplomatic network, and the professionalism and training of their military personnel all contribute to European security.

So how could the UK use its defense and security capabilities to win a favorable Brexit deal from the EU? Crude blackmail would not work and thankfully seems unlikely in any case. It is true that some Brexiteers are asking, in private and in public, why British troops should risk their lives for EU member states that want to impose a “punitive” Brexit deal.  But May knows that any open threat for example, to withdraw troops from NATO rotations in Central and Eastern Europe if the Baltics block a tariff-free trade agreement between Britain and the EU-27 would not just be unhelpful, but would also lack credibility.

The Trump Card

Britain, unlike newly elected US President Donald Trump, knows that the value of collective defense and security is greater than the sum of its parts. During the EU referendum campaign, Brexiteers and Remainers alike stressed the enduring value of NATO as the bedrock of British security. And the UK government has a continuing interest in investing time and resources in Europe’s defense, not only to protect its own national interests but also to generate goodwill abroad – especially as Brexit negotiations unfold and demonstrate to other allies (not least the US) Britain’s enduring or ambition to be a global player. Almost immediately after the Brexit vote, Britain signaled its continuing international engagement at the July Warsaw summit, when it announced the deployment of 650 British troops to Estonia and Poland as part of a new deterrent force on NATO’s eastern flank.

Still, the UK government is well aware of the value of its military capabilities.  In her Brexit speech at Lancaster House in January, May said she was optimistic that Britain and the EU would come to “the right agreement,” because the EU needed the UK as a partner in matters of security and defense. She stressed that Britain had led Europe “on the measures needed to keep our continent secure,” on implementing sanctions against Russia, working for peace and stability in the Balkans, and securing Europe’s external border. She reminded all EU countries that British intelligence services were “unique in Europe” and had saved countless lives, thwarting “very many terrorist plots” in countries across Europe.

May is right. The EU needs the UK’s capabilities – and Trump’s election has the potential to further strengthen the British negotiating position. Notwithstanding recent attempts by new US Secretary of Defense General James Mattis and others to reassure European allies, Trump’s “America First” nationalism and his skepticism of multilateral organizations calls into question the American security guarantees that Europe has been relying on for decades.

May wants to leverage the UK’s special relationship with the United States in conversations with other European leaders, by offering to act as a bridge between the US and the EU. On a visit to Washington, DC she managed to wrest a commitment to NATO from Trump, whereas in Brussels she conveyed Trump’s message that Europeans need to invest more in defense spending through NATO.

Most EU leaders agree with May’s message but disapprove of the messenger: They know that the Trump administration’s erratic approach to Europe and NATO is a real concern, but they find it difficult to accept May and her Brexit government’s help. They want to spend more money on defense for the EU’s sake, not because Trump or May request it. To make her offer more acceptable to Europeans, May should coordinate her next meeting with Trump and other EU leaders together.

Walking the Tightrope

With its embrace of the Trump administration, the UK government is attempting a difficult balancing act: Britain will appear more alien to the EU-27 the more it fails to criticize Trump on his most egregious policies. But if Britain uses its special relationship to promote European security and the crucial role the EU has played in consolidating a troublesome continent, it can earn European goodwill for the upcoming negotiations.

Trump’s election, and, more importantly, Europe’s unstable neighborhoods to the east and the south have spurred EU leaders to boost their support for European defense. France and Germany in particular have thrown their political weight behind a reform of the union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This presents a potential European vulnerability during Brexit negotiations: As long as the UK is still officially a member of the European Union, London also retains its veto on EU defense policy initiatives that require unanimity. For now, it seems unlikely that the UK would block the CSDP ambitions of the EU-27; the British government is well aware of how badly the EU would take such obstructionist behavior.

But many Britons are worried about the potential of EU defense policy duplicating and undermining NATO. In the months before the EU referendum, the old bogeyman of the EU army became a favored trope of Brexit campaigners. If the mood worsens significantly between the UK and the EU-27 over the course of Brexit negotiations, these concerns could take center stage once more, and May’s government could find itself pressured to disrupt EU defense initiatives.

Yet doing so would not be in Britain’s long-term interest. Once the UK’s exit has been negotiated, London will want to strike some form of association agreement on EU defense. The less obstructive Britain is now, the more it can ask for voting and operational planning privileges in the future.

Turning its contributions to the European security architecture into a bargaining chip, London risks undermining European goodwill. Playing the security card as an open threat would backfire, as it would be considered an assault on a core common interest and European values. Instead, London should make clearer how it aims to contribute to European security, prosperity, and stability once it has left the EU.

However, it is not just Britain that needs cordial post-Brexit relations. Some EU governments would be well-advised to take a more pragmatic stance on security and defense policy cooperation with the UK. The EU’s negotiating strategy is currently guided by one basic principle: Britain cannot be better off outside the EU than as a member. This is aimed at undermining euroskeptic movements in other member states. Following this rationale, many EU countries are quick to dismiss privileged association formats for the UK post-Brexit, for example on CSDP operational planning or European Defense Agency projects.

But Europe cannot afford to lose British capabilities at a time when the European security situation has deteriorated significantly. Close cooperation between Britain and the EU in the area of ​​security and defense, guided strictly by shared interests, would be a good thing for both sides.

N.B. This article draws on the findings of an extensive Center for European Reform (CER) study conducted
with Christian Odendahl: “Berlin to the Rescue – A Closer Look at Germany’s Position on Brexit”

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