Artwork © Dominik Herrmann

After almost a decade in office and 14 years at the helm of his party, the liberal-conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Prime Minister Mark Rutte remains the dominant figure in Dutch politics. Each of his governments have had a completely different make-up. The first was a minority government together with the Christian Democrats (CDA), the second a grand coalition with the center-left Labor Party (PvdA), and the current is a four-way center-right coalition. In each case, however, Rutte managed to keep everyone together by networking incessantly, deploying his disarming smile and willingness to compromise. The question now is whether he will run again next year or whether he will, for instance, take on a high-level position in the EU instead.

A Bit Boring

Mark Rutte was born in The Hague in 1967, the youngest in a large family. As a child he spent a lot of time playing the piano and even dreamed of attending a conservatoire.  But by the age of 16 his interest had shifted to politics and he joined the VVD’s youth organization, the JOVD, although by his own account he wasn’t a convinced liberal yet (this came later). Studying history at Leiden University, he gradually worked his way up in the JOVD and spent three years as its national head, learning the art of managing many and varied stakeholders along the way.

After belatedly graduating—due to all his political activities, it took him eight years to complete his studies —Rutte went to work for Unilever, in the human resources department. In his early years in politics he would pride himself on having strong opinions about the best laundry detergent brands and would quip that he would go back to the peanut butter factory if his political career didn’t work out.

He is a life-long bachelor who describes himself as “a bit boring” and, surprisingly for someone who leads a party that stands up for the entrepreneurial class, has little interest in material possessions, often proclaiming that “possession is ballast.” His personal life was a talking point only during his first election campaign in 2006, when there was some media speculation about his lack of a partner. Since then, it has mostly vanished as a topic of discussion.

Political scandals never seem to do him much harm, even the significant number revolving around cabinet members from his own party. His jovial mannerisms—one of his catch phrases is pointing out how much of a cool country the Netherlands is—his willingness to deflect incoming attacks by rapidly apologizing for any wrongdoing, and his debating skills have meant that any difficulties usually slide off him. He has earned the nickname “Teflon Mark.”

Fragmentation Manager

The political system in the Netherlands fragmented earlier than in many other countries: the Dutch have experienced the decline of traditionally dominant mainstream parties, the rise of right-wing populism, and an increasingly volatile electorate since the 1990s. As a result, large coalitions, often consisting of ideologically disparate parties, are common. Rutte has thrived in this political environment.

Straight after he was plucked away from his desk at Unilever and installed as state secretary for social affairs and employment, he demonstrated his political skills by using his charm and willingness to engage directly with political opponents in order to push through controversial social welfare reforms. Putting his apparently infinite energy to good use in a strategy that would become his hallmark, he spoke to everyone involved and used his jovial style and approachability to get people on board through constant engagement with all stakeholders.

Even political opponents rarely leave a room after a meeting with Rutte without the feeling that they have built a special relationship with him. He subsequently cultivates these relationships by staying in touch with a large number of people he has met over the years, spending more time on his phone than the average teenager.

Following a stint as state secretary for education (a pet portfolio), he ran for the party leadership in 2006 against the popular minister for integration and asylum affairs, Rita Verdonk. The support he had built up within the party through the years of networking helped him win the nomination.

However, it took him until the election of 2010 to  craft a political profile that resonated with Dutch voters. Having initially charted a more progressive course, including a political strategy dubbed “GreenRight,” referencing the name of the Dutch green party GreenLeft, he moved his party to the right. Setting personal ideological considerations aside, he made the VVD the largest political force in the Netherlands, winning just over 20 percent of the popular vote. This pragmatism would become the hallmark of his political career.

The Wilders Challenge

He managed to become the first liberal prime minister of the Netherlands in almost a century by creating a minority government with the CDA, supported in parliament by the far-right populist Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders. Cooperating with Wilders, who had broken away from the VVD in 2004, led to severe criticism, both domestically and internationally. With the PVV refusing to take on government responsibility, it also meant having to placate Wilders all the time. Eventually, the government fell when the PVV refused to accept a new budget, Rutte turned to the centrist opposition and successfully passed a spending plan including significant cuts and tax increases before the next election.

The subsequent election turned into a contest between Rutte and the leader of the center-left PvdA, Diederik Samson. Voters on the left flocked to Samson, hoping to keep Rutte out of office, while those on the right opted for Rutte over Samson. The end result was a coalition of the two main protagonists. As Rutte’s VVD was still the largest party with a (by Dutch standards) whopping 26 percent of the vote, he remained prime minister. Although his coalition had a solid majority in the lower chamber of parliament, its lack of a majority in the upper chamber meant passing legislation still required constant deal-making with the opposition. Rutte’s interpersonal skills and, possibly even more importantly, his ideological flexibility and willingness to compromise made it happen.

Managing a difficult coalition has become even more important during his current term. In the 2017 election campaign he fought off the challenge from Wilders, whom he described as representing the “wrong kind of populism.” He did so by moving further to the right on issues such as integration and immigration. After 225 days of government-building talks, he formed a four-party coalition, resting on a one-seat majority. In part thanks to the rise of a second right-wing populist challenger, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) led by Thierry Baudet, Rutte’s new coalition lost its majority in the upper chamber halfway through its term. This has forced him to again use all his process management skills to get anything done and keep his government together until the next election in 2021.

European Player

Rutte’s political style is one that could be taken as a model for many other European leaders faced with increasingly fragmented political systems. According to his biographer, Dutch columnist Sheila Sitalsing, he manages the decline of previously dominant mainstream parties of the center-left and right by taking the ideological contest out of politics. He combines a willingness to compromise with an ability to push through large chunks of his party’s program at the expense of coalition partners—something the PvdA can attest to after losing three-quarters of its seats in 2017 because it was seen as having enabled VVD policies. Rutte, meanwhile, retained his core support.

Within the EU, Rutte has played less of a connecting role. He has always been a soft supporter of European integration, preferring to focus on the economic benefits it brings, and he has often relied on his finance ministers to act as the bad guys in Brussels for him. More recently, he moved himself into the firing line by seeking to prevent any significant further integration and especially any fiscal transfers.

Following the Brexit vote, the Dutch realized that they were about to lose an important liberal and pro-free trade ally within the EU, one that the Dutch have often hidden behind. In response, they are now taking the lead at the helm of a group of fiscally conservative countries, the so-called New Hanseatic League. This group played a large role in torpedoing the introduction of a eurozone budget, which France had pushed for, after suggestions that Germany might back the idea. Recently, Rutte became the informal leader of the even more pithily named Frugal Four, a group of net contributors to the EU budget (the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark) that opposed higher spending.

His often controversial positions within the EU notwithstanding, there was much speculation last year that Rutte could be in line for an EU top job. As a liberal from one of the Benelux countries, who is held in high regard by many colleagues, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, he appeared to be perfectly suited for Council president in particular. However, the fact that early on he put his weight behind compatriot Frans Timmermans for the commission presidency suggested Rutte did not actually want the job.

This would fit with Rutte’s earlier claims that he will leave politics behind after his stint in the “little job”—as he likes to refer to the Dutch premiership. However, it would not be the first time that he has changed his mind if he does eventually decide to leave The Hague behind for Brussels, possibly after the election in 2021.

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© REUTERS/Yves Herman

You probably still remember the Dutch parliamentary elections on March 15 of this year. The international press landed in The Hague to see if the once-tolerant Netherlands would be the next populist domino to fall after the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. That didn’t happen; far-right candidate Geert Wilders was defeated, Prime Minister Mark Rutte got a strong mandate to form a new government, and a voter turnout of 81.9 percent was the highest in almost thirty years.

“All quiet on the Western front,” you could almost hear international journalists whisper when they left the country breathing a sigh of relief. But a closer look at the post-election Dutch political landscape reveals a heavily polarized country where a cacophony of one-issue and single-group parties forces the establishment to be uncompromising in negotiations for a new government.

It took Theresa May exactly 18 days to form a new government with the Northern Irish DUP in a heavily divided United Kingdom after her disastrous parliamentary elections on June 8. New French President Emmanuel Macron experienced a low-turnout record in the recent parliamentary elections, but needed only 45 days to form a broad-based government. In the Netherlands, talks for Rutte’s third administration are entering their fourth month now, and it is still unclear whether the parties involved will be able to reach an agreement any time soon.

Rutte’s Liberal Party (VVD), the Christian Democrats (CDA), and the Progressive Democrats ‘66, the so-called “engine block” of the future coalition, need a fourth party to have a majority in the Dutch parliament. The Greens left the negotiations twice over the engine block’s demands to change the Geneva convention in order to keep refugees out of the country and Europe as much as possible. Now the Christian Union (CU) is invited to the talks, but their conservatism on ethical issues and drug policy are problematic for the progressive Democrats ‘66. One way or the other, the future coalition will be an awkward mixture of parties close to Wilders’ anti-immigrant rhetoric (VVD and CDA), Wilders’ fiercest critics (D66), and probably a niche party with conservative ethical viewpoints (CU).

For traditional parties in the Netherlands, the price for participating in government, especially as a junior partner, is extremely high. Rutte’s government with the social-democratic PvdA was considered relatively successful in both the Netherlands and Europe. It was the first cabinet in twenty years that actually made it to the end of its term, even though it lacked a majority in the Dutch Senate (the upper house). With tough labor market reforms, housing, and healthcare, it managed to bring government spending under control and push the Dutch economy back in Europe’s top.

Nevertheless, the PvdA was severely punished in March of this year, losing more than three quarters of their voters. Many traditional Turkish and Moroccan votes were lost to the culturally conservative migrant party DENK, the elderly vote went to the populist 50+ party, the young leftist voters supported “Dutch Trudeau” Jesse Klaver, and progressive centrist voters felt more at home with the Democrats 66, leaving the Social Democrats behind as a party for virtually no one. Participating in government and taking responsibility in difficult times are no longer automatically a virtue for traditional parties in the Netherlands. The Greens and other center-left parties noticed this and are now hesitant to jump in.

Close to Wilders’ Wishes

Whereas the left is divided mainly on socio-economic issues after a period of heavy budget cuts, the parties on the right were successful with a renewed cultural conservatism. The CDA and Rutte’s VVD contained Wilders this election by approaching his rhetoric about migration, Islam, and multicultural society. Now that the economy is up and running again and unemployment rates are dropping rapidly, socio-economic problems lose their urgency and are replaced once more by “identity politics” and security issues. And that again is a problem for leftist parties, which are considered to be unreliable on law-and-order and have little to gain in a new center-right government.

The Netherlands will therefore most likely get a coalition agreement that in many ways is close to Wilders’ wishes, with stricter rules for migrants and their integration into Dutch society, and more euroskepticism. The international journalists that claimed that populism was beaten in the Netherlands should have a second look – the populist agenda is increasingly incorporated in the policymaking process.

The explosion of one-issue and single-group parties in the Netherlands is also to some extend a result of Wilders’ success. The migrant party DENK, the Socialist Party (SP), the 50+ party for the elderly, and the party for animal rights have all grown out of distrust for the Netherlands’ traditional popular parties. The anti-establishment attitude that populists have been feeding for years has now created new political formations on all sides of the political spectrum. Where new one-issue and single-group parties in the past used to be pressure valves, they are now becoming the new normal. Or, as commentator Rene Cuperus of the Dutch daily Volkskrant concluded after the elections, “The nation has fallen apart in a populist and a progressive elitist Netherlands.”

Sixteen years of Wilders’ populism have radically changed the Dutch political landscape. The traditional division between left and right has been replaced by pro- versus contra-globalism, by inclusion versus exclusion of minorities, and by anti-establishment versus establishment parties. The volatility of the Dutch voter is looming ever larger for traditional governing parties, which feel the constant pressure of one-issue and single-group parties eating away parts of their constituencies. The new government will have the immense task of dealing with this polarization while providing certainties in an increasingly globalizing world. Otherwise, the international press might conclude four years from now that “the western front has been breached.”

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As the results of the US election sink in and Europe braces for key national votes in the Netherlands, France, and Germany – polls that could potentially end with Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom and Marine Le Pen’s Front National victorious, and a reshuffling of the governing coalition in Berlin – liberals have been doing some deep soul searching. But it’s not their own souls they’re examining. In the hopes of stemming further losses, they’re trying to dissect the motivations of their opponents to see what, if anything, they could do to bring populist voters back into the fold. These barbarians at the gate – what do they want?

And therein lies the problem: They may not really want anything, at least not in terms of policy. Polls show that overwhelming numbers of right wing populist voters – whether they’re voting for Brexit, Trump, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), or Marine Le Pen – are simply unhappy with the general direction their country is heading in in a variety of areas, and are wiling to vote for any leader who promises dramatic change.

Take Brexit voters in the United Kingdom. There were a host of reasons for Britons to vote to leave the European Union, from frustration with having to pay into the EU budget to the UK’s traditional ambivalence towards mainland Europe and a desire to regain regulatory sovereignty – not to mention David Cameron’s clumsy politicking in Brussels. But towards the end of the campaign, the defining issue became immigration. It has been, after all, the most visible sign of change in Europe and the US, and it seems that change itself has stirred up discontent.

As far back as late 2014, UKIP voters were already unhappy with the direction British society was taking. According to a poll from the survey institute YouGov, 61 percent of Tories felt positive about prospects for British people over the next few years, as did 55 percent of Liberal Democrats and 33 percent of Labor voters; among UKIP voters, only 19 were optimistic. Conversely, when asked if they would like to “turn the clock back to the way Britain was 20-30 years ago,” roughly a third of the Tories, Lib Dem, and Labor voters said yes – compared to 68 percent among UKIP.

The same year, the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends survey asked Britons who thought EU membership was generally bad for their country why they felt that way. A 34 percent plurality said there was “too much authority in the European Union,” while 25 percent said it had “undermined British culture” – with both answers beating “the European Union has harmed our country’s economy” at 20 percent. In a survey published by Ipsos MORI this past January, 36 percent in Great Britain said they felt like strangers in their own country.

Brexit voters didn’t just want to go back to sovereignty – they wanted to go back in time.

The same pattern emerges among Trump voters in the United States. A Pew poll conducted just before the election showed a country sharply divided between optimists and pessimists. Two thirds of Clinton voters said the economy had gotten better over the past eight years, and 60 percent said the “job situation” has improved as well. Seven out of ten Trump voters, on the other hand, said both had gotten worse – and between 70 and 90 percent said the same of “security from terrorism,” crime, America’s standing in the world, immigration, and race relations. Many have ascribed Trump’s victory to working class economic woes, but Trump voters were just as likely to cite drug addition as one of the country’s biggest problems (62 percent), as well as “job opportunities for working-class Americans” (63 percent), and they were far more likely to be worried about illegal immigration and terrorism. They were not nearly as worried about income inequality either (33 percent). Seventy-two percent of Trump voters would describe themselves as “traditional”; the same percentage thought of themselves as “typical” Americans. In the same Ipsos poll, 45 percent of Americans feel like strangers in their own country.

So how does this bode for France? Well, not terribly well.

According to the Ipsos MORI survey, the French are more likely to say immigration should be stopped (40 percent) than are the Americans and British (38 percent and 31 percent, respectively). Forty percent feel like strangers in their own country; 77 percent had little confidence in their government, and 65 percent had little confidence in national institutions. The same survey showed that the French are open to some pretty alarming options: 59 percent would be willing to give up basic civil rights to stop terrorism.

With so much desire for change, it would be no wonder if the French wanted a strong leader to take charge – and sure enough, a poll released by Le Figaro on February 6 showed that 80 percent of French want a leader who “is ready to change the rules of the game,” twice as many as said the same in the United States.
To regain voters like these, mainstream politicians may be better off offering a time machine than a platform.

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In the wake of Brexit, crowing right-wing populists throughout the continent are calling for the further dismantling of the European project. But they are contending with very different domestic audiences.

© REUTERS/Alessandro Garofalo

France: Fists Are Flying

There was celebration among both right- and left-wing populists when the results of the Brexit referendum were announced. But while the Front de Gauche still hopes for a remodeling of the EU, the Front National is already preparing France’s exit.

Two fists circled by the stars of the EU flag are freeing themselves from their chains – a quickly understood image, accompanied by the caption: “Brexit, and now France!” The result of the British referendum has barely been announced, and the Front National is already presenting its new poster repeating its demand for an exit referendum in its own country.

No wonder: in that far-right party, British refutation of the EU is cause for celebration. Party leader Marine Le Pen triumphantly spoke of a “victory of freedom.” In the week following the referendum, she celebrated in a press marathon, the result of which is supposed to pave the way for a “free and sovereign” France.

No other party followed the campaign as closely as Front National. If Le Pen were to become president, she would want to organize a referendum on France’s EU membership within the first six months of her mandate. She would use the interim to negotiate the country’s retrieval of complete sovereignty from Brussels. In the ideal world of the far-right, France would regain control over its borders and currency – meaning it would leave both Schengen and the eurozone. Moreover, it would reduce its net contribution to the EU budget to zero, and have a free hand in matters of economic policy so that it can engage in “smart protectionism.” National rights would have precedence over community rights. A newly created “Ministry for Sovereignties” would be responsible for the coordination of such negotiations.

It is difficult to assess whether Front National would follow this hard line if it won the national elections. The debate within the party is more divided than it may seem, but the representatives of other policies – such as those advocating remaining in the eurozone – are completely marginalized.

The Front National’s stance on Europe does not yet have majority appeal. According to a study conducted shortly after the British referendum, 45 percent of the French are in favor of remaining in the EU, while 33 percent would like to leave. But even if the supporters of a “Frexit” are still a minority, they are nonetheless a consequential bloc, one which will influence political discussion in the coming months. And as the population remains unenthusiastic about the future of the European project, political parties will utilize these doubts and fears all the more.

When asked about the ideal reaction to Brexit, a clear majority of the French call for the member states to be more independent from the EU; only a quarter of the sampled population wishes for new steps toward further integration. – BY CLAIRE DEMESMAY

The Netherlands: Wilders’ West

The Brexit decision was grist for the Dutch far-right populists’ mill. Is “Nexit” looming? Even if there is at present no legal basis for a referendum, holding one could unleash an uncontrollable political dynamic.

Geert Wilders enjoyed June 24. The far-right Dutch populist tweeted, “Now it’s our turn” right after the results of the British referendum were released to the public; he then repeated his longstanding demand for such a referendum in his own country.

Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) has been the most popular party in Dutch polls for almost a year. A majority of the increasingly euroskeptic Netherlands would like to vote on a potential exit from the EU. Right now, 48 percent of Netherlanders would vote for a “Nexit”, 43 percent against.

This does not mean that anything is pre-determined. The legal basis for Nexit is lacking, for one thing. Referendums can only be held on new laws and contracts – though some are already wondering whether Nexit would not count as a contract modification, which would allow a referendum.

But it is unlikely that Wilders would want to support such a tricky move. What looks more promising is the prospect of a corrective referendum, which would allow the country to address the question of EU membership directly. This possibility is stuck in parliament – the necessary change in the constitution would require a two-thirds majority that the first chamber does not have.

But majorities could change, as there are new legislative elections in March. Most of the campaign will revolve around the country’s relationship with Europe. And the more the British government succeeds in mitigating the direst economic consequences of Brexit, the stronger Wilders’ position will be in the upcoming elections.

Moreover, the central parties are not only under fire from the right: when it comes to Europe, the PVV has an eager comrade-in-arms in the similarly euroskeptic and often populist Socialist Party (SP). Even though the left is not demanding a complete exit from the EU, it does call for a significantly downgraded EU membership.

Neither the SP nor the PVV has made it into either national or local office so far. In 2010 Wilders came rather close to obtaining power, playing a minority role in a coalition of right-wing liberals and Christian Democrats under the current Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Wilders helped Rutte reach a majority, but the structure fell apart in 2012 when an MP left the PVV, saying he could no longer suffer Wilders’ “dictatorial leadership style.” Wilders cut the experiment short, recognizing correctly that he is better in opposition than in government. He has since become even more radical in his assertions.

Politically, a Nexit vote would put the Netherlands in a difficult situation. A pro-European cabinet like the one currently in power could not bring about an exit; it would inevitably crumble. And if he wanted to avoid sizeable economic damage, a Prime Minister Wilders would have to put together a constructive hybrid solution for his country, which could prove challenging.

He claims to have a plan for this, based mostly on reports he ordered from two British institutes. According to these studies, there would be short-term risks, but Nexit would be beneficial in the long run, bringing each Netherlander €9,800 more per year.

The institutes admittedly assumed that the Netherlands would easily succeed in securing advantageous trade deals with the rest of the world, including the EU – even Wilders acknowledges that retaining access to the single market is essential.

Under Wilders’ plan, however, Poland and Romania would maintain freedom of movement, and the Netherlands would still be on the hook for relatively high contributions to the EU. The Hague would have to accept EU laws almost entirely, without the ability to shape them in Brussels. If the guilder were re-introduced as an independent currency, it would, according to Wilders, entail costs for two years but then settle down; but he also thinks it would be possible to “follow the euro,” meaning the guilder would become a pseudo-euro. In terms of security policy, Wilders’ motto is “Out of Schengen, thick borders.” Muslims would stay out of the country. Police and law enforcement officers would cooperate outside the framework of the EU.

Does this look like a promising future for the Netherlands? The other parties will band together to prevent Wilders from becoming prime minister. The question is whether that will be enough: an EU referendum, even one lost in advance, could trigger a dynamic beyond control. – BY THOMAS KIRCHNER

Northern Europe: Playing with Fire, Using a Small Flame

Precautionary Brexit tourism among the Finns, disunity within the Danish People’s Party, a clearer anti-Europe course for the Swedish Democrats. As soon as the populists of Northern Europe are in power, they fall apart on EU questions.

Resistance against the EU rescue fund, along with criticism of the common currency and Brussels in general, have helped the Perussuomalaiset party (the Finns, formerly known as the True Finns) grow.

They first made it into government in the elections of April 2015, winning almost 18 percent of the vote. But only a few months passed before the party abandoned one of its main demands and voted for a new aid package for Greece in the summer 2015 for the sake of peace within the coalition.

The Finns have had to learn how to build voter support when they are shaping policies from within government rather than rejecting policies from outside. In the meantime, the party’s approval ratings have fallen drastically; at the moment, only 8 percent of voters say that they would vote for them.

In fact, many Northern European right-wing populists seem willing to compromise as soon as they reach power. After the Brexit vote, calls for EU exit referenda were understandably muted – it is one thing when such demands come from the opposition, and another entirely when they stand a realistic chance of success.

For a long time now, Scandinavia has been a paragon of social democracy. Those times are over. It is now the Northern European countries – with the exception of Iceland –where right-wing populists are enjoying some of their most dramatic victories, often earlier than in other countries.

In (non-EU) Norway, the right – the Fremskrittspartiet, or Progress Party – has shown itself willing to negotiate on some of its core issues: now it takes the stance that the country’s robust financial cushion should be tapped only conservatively to avoid destabilizing the economy. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (DF) was not ready to take on the responsibility of leading the government, even though it has represented the second strongest faction in parliament since June 2015. Instead, it has attempted to steer the ruling conservative government under Lars Lokke Rasmussen.

Morten Messerschmidt is one of the DF’s most important representatives on EU questions. For seven years now he has pulled off a tricky balancing act: he has simultaneously been a part of the EU system as a parliamentary representative, while also one of its greatest – and most popular – critics. He received over 465,000 votes in the European elections two years ago, more than any Danish candidate had ever achieved.

This means that Messerschmidt’s voice has a particular weight when it comes to deciding whether the Danes should demand a referendum following the British example. Yet Messerschmidt originally expressed a wish that the British majority would vote against Brexit; now he merely advises to “keep calm.” Conversely, the EU political speaker of the party – the far less influential Kenneth Kristensen Berth – has already declared that he would like a referendum to take place in Denmark if Britain succeeds in securing a good deal with the EU.

In Sweden, the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), which barely attained 6 percent of the vote in the 2014 elections, demands that Sweden’s EU membership put up for debate again; and the right Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, 13 percent) want an exit referendum. Both are part of the opposition; a red-green minority government is in power.

The Sweden Democrats reject EU membership, but they have never made European questions a major topic; they have instead traditionally focused more on policies toward foreigners and domestic security. In Sweden, there is a clear majority in favor of remaining in the EU – unlike in Finland, Norway, and Denmark, working with the right-wing populists on the national level is currently unthinkable. The probability that the Sweden Democrats would have to shift away from anti-European discourse to reach power is thus remarkably low. – BY CLEMENS BOMSDORF

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2016 issue.

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