© REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis

The state visit to Germany by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan which starts on Thursday shapes up as one of the most controversial in recent memory. It has already met with intense resentment from Germans, critical of Erdoğan’s seemingly irreversible slide toward authoritarianism and repression of the opposition.

Anti-Erdoğan demonstrations have already taken place in nine major German cities, including Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart over the weekend. The German Federation of Journalists and Amnesty International are organizing a protest at the Berlin’s main railway station for September 28, while a protest led by Alevi groups (the largest religious minority in Turkey) and one of Germany’s largest trade unions, Ver.di, is scheduled to take place the next day in Cologne. Meanwhile, a number of leading politicians have expressed their displeasure that Erdoğan will enjoy an official state dinner with German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier. While Chancellor Angela Merkel has signaled she will not attend (she rarely takes part in state banquets of visiting heads of states), Cem Özdemir, a prominent former leader of the Greens (and of Turkish descent) who is fierce critic of the Turkish president will be among the dinner guests: “Erdoğan has to suffer me,” he said.

The fact that the visit is still going ahead, despite such push-back, is significant. It is indicative of Ankara’s strategic importance to Berlin. Indeed, the meeting between Erdoğan and Merkel will be the third high-level meeting between German and Turkish officials within less than a month. Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas had traveled to Turkey on September 5-6, and Berat Albayrak, Turkey’s minister for economy, was in Berlin last Friday for talks with Olaf Scholz and Peter Altmaier, Germany’s ministers for finance and economy, respectively.

This week’s controversial visit, too, will be focused on repairing relations and keeping them steady. Syria and the situation in Idlib apart, at the top of the agenda will be Turkey’s economic troubles. To Erdoğan’s dislike—and very likely in line with what Merkel will put forward—any feasible way out of Turkey’s predicament will require Ankara to build up its democratic credentials.

Strategic Importance

Erdoğan’s visit comes on the heels of an escalation of tensions between the United States and Turkey last month, when US President Donald Trump slapped sanctions on two Turkish ministers and doubled tariffs on imports of Turkish steel and aluminum.

The showdown unnerved international markets, pushing Turkey’s already ailing economy over the edge. The Turkish lira plunged to a series of record lows, losing over 40 percent of its value to the dollar at the height of the crisis. After years of over-borrowing in foreign currencies, Turkish corporates and banks are now on the hook for over $300 billion, nearly half of which will mature within a year. With a depreciating currency, it is much more difficult to service these loans in foreign currencies that were accumulated when the lira was much stronger. And if these loans cannot be financed, there is a chance that Turkey’s economy could collapse.

For Germany, this is an alarming prospect—and is connected to why Berlin is now interacting with Ankara across multiple levels of government.

With a population exceeding 80 million, Turkey carries a massive market potential for German and European exports. It was Germany’s sixth largest trading partner outside of the European Union last year and the EU’s fifth largest—ahead of such countries with substantial economies as South Korea and India.

Furthermore, the EU has consistently ranked as the top destination for Turkish exports. Last year, 47.1 percent of Turkey’s exports went to the EU. In fact, the EU has attracted over 40 percent of Turkish exports every year over the course of the last decade, with the exception of 2012, when the EU’s share was still 39 percent. Germany has led the list of Turkey’s largest export markets for over a decade, drawing 9.6 percent of Turkish exports in 2017. Also, the EU invests heavily in Turkey,and no EU country is more active than Germany, with 7,000 companies currently in operation, including such big names as Bosch, Siemens, and Mercedes.

Curbing Migration Flows

But there is another—an arguably more important—reason why Germany is interested in fixing Turkey’s ailing economy: it is linked to Turkey’s curbing immigration flows into Europe.

This issue has become more acute with the impending assault by the forces of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russian air power and Iranian-backed militias, on Idlib—a Syrian province 50 kilometers south of the Turkish border and the last rebel stronghold standing in the country. Idlib’s population is estimated to have soared over three million after seven years of fighting, and an assault would displace hundreds of thousands of civilians, including many jihadists, along the Turkish border.

Turkey is already struggling to host the 3.5 million Syrian refugees it has admitted since 2011.The presence of these refugees has since become an irritation, and is seen by the Turkish public as a disruption to public order and safety. With the economy faltering and unemployment rising, the migrants are now seen as burdens on the state’s resources. In the event of an exodus out of Idlib, Turkey could not afford to, and would in fact not want welcome another refugee influx.

In return, Germany fears that Turkey may not be able to uphold the migration agreement it signed with the EU in March 2016: in exchange for €3 billion (and the same amount at a later date), Turkey committed to preventing irregular migrants from crossing into Europe and taking back and hosting those Syrians who did make it to Greek shores. If the deal falls through, it could unleash another wave of refugees toward Europe’s borders.

As the violent demonstrations against foreigners in Chemnitz in early September showed, the decision to admit one million refugees in 2015 still dominates and gridlocks German politics. In this sense, Germany needs a strong-performing Turkish economy – so that it could keep serving the purpose of a buffer state.

Revisiting the Customs Union

However, Germany’s options for directly extending financial assistance are limited.

Dispersing a lumpsum is out of question, since 72 percent of the German public would not support such a move, as revealed by a recent Deutschlandtrends survey, understandably fed up with Erdoğan’s comparison of the German government to the Nazis and the rampant human rights violations in Turkey. Instead, Germany needs to work through a rules-based, institutional framework that will not be framed as a “gift” to Turkey.

Re-exploring the modernization of the customs union looks more promising, however. Turkey and the EU have been in a customs union since 1996 that removes tariffs on manufactured goods and processed agricultural products. Upgrading it would expand the arrangement into services, agriculture, and public procurement, diversify the range as well as increase the volume of Turkey’s exports to the EU, and thereby contribute significantly to its economic well-being.

Although the European Council suspended any further debates on the topic indefinitely, Albayrak brought it forward last week in his meeting with Scholz and Altmaier. It is also likely to come up this week in the Erdoğan-Merkel meeting.

Fixing Turkey’s Democratic Edifice

 To open and move the negotiations forward, however, Turkey’s democratic practice (both within and outside the country) will have to undergo a substantial uplift.  Indeed, the customs union with the EU is more than just a trade agreement; it also presupposes a well-functioning justice system, operating with the principle that strong economic links could only co-exist with rules-based governments on both sides. Re-examining it would therefore require Turkey to harmonize its rules, regulations, and institutions, both economic and political, with those of the EU.

This means that Turkey must make significant improvements to the rule of law and independence of the judiciary, as well as release the human rights activists and journalists currently serving unlawful prison sentences, including an unfortunate number of German citizens. After the recent reshuffling of the editorial board at the daily Cumhuriyet, which basically snuffed out Turkey’s last-standing voice of opposition, much will also have to be done to re-forge a climate that fosters freedom of expression and the media.

Merkel will also want to see an end to Turkey’s meddling in Germany’s domestic affairs.

Erdoğan has previously used his visits to Germany to speak to huge crowds of German-Turks, an overwhelming percentage of whom have supported Erdoğan in recent elections. He treated his last two appearances—in Cologne in 2014 and Karlsruhe in 2015—as an extension of his election campaigns, invoking incendiary language to exploit the vulnerabilities of the German-Turks, who have long claimed that they have not been able to integrate well into German society.

Merkel’s government has in return expressed its frustration with these rallies, charging that they fuel inter-communal tension. The fact that no such speech is planned for the upcoming visit should come as a relief.

However, the Turkish Embassy in Berlin has said that Erdoğan may deliver brief remarks at the opening of a new mosque in Cologne on September 29. This could evolve into a thorny issue, mainly because Erdoğan mentioned in a recent speech that Turkey’s Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, had funded the building of the mosque. This contradicts the statement by the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs (DITIB), which oversees the almost 900 mosques in Germany, that the project was realized through contributions from the community of believers.

No Free Way Out

Granted, should the meeting be absent of any substantial commitment from Erdoğan to changing his authoritarian style and the Syrian regime proceeds with an attack on Idlib, Merkel will have to find another way to contain the fallout. This could involve channeling funds specifically for the upkeep of refugees, but will not result in any substantial and fundamental improvements to Turkey’s economy.

Any such progress will only be possible if Turkey stops its democratic backsliding. As Merkel stated, helping Turkey is in Germany’s interest—but it cannot do so while its citizens remain imprisoned in Turkish prisons on spurious charges and Ankara’s actions violate EU’s values and principles. Once can only hope that the Turkish leadership finally accepts this fact and acts accordingly—for the simple reason that there is no other way forward.

The post A Controversial Visit appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© Kayhan Ozer/Presidential Palace/Handout via REUTERS

Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) claimed victory on Sunday night in Turkey’s pivotal elections, securing five more years at the helm of Turkish politics. Following a historic election season, which showcased a resurgent opposition for the first time since Erdoğan’s rise in 2002, the result defied expectations of a serious challenge to AKP supremacy.

The AKP’s long-standing secular rival Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) believed they had fielded a winner in Muharrem İnce, who drew vast crowds to his campaign rallies and stole Erdoğan’s populist thunder as an everyman. Meanwhile, Meral Akşener of the İYİ Party (“Good Party”) promised to outflank the AKP and its coalition partner led by Devlet Bahçeli, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) from the right, attracting nationalist and conservative votes.

But while pre-election surveys had predicted that İnce would force Erdoğan into a run-off in the presidential contest, Erdoğan defeated his challenger with 52.6 percent of the vote to his opponent’s 30.7 percent. Meanwhile in the parliamentary poll, the AKP-MHP coalition received a combined total of 53.6 percent of the vote (against the opposition “Nation” Alliance’s 22.7 percent), which translates into a comfortable majority in the legislature.

With the presidency in hand, Erdoğan will also hold all levers of the state. His victory places him in command of an empowered executive presidency, approved in a controversial constitutional referendum in April 2017. An opposition-controlled parliament would have been the only check on his powers. Now fortified by a parliamentary majority, President Erdoğan will face very few—if any—obstacles in his quest for complete control over Turkey.

Here are the most important takeaways from the elections.

It’s the Economy…Again and Always

Turkey’s once-booming economy—formerly a major source of Erdoğan’s popularity—is now on the verge of a bust. The lira may have gained in early morning trading the day after the vote (June 25), but the factors that plague the economy still remain.

A key area is interest rates. The president does not want to raise them, because doing so would conflict with his method of growth. A reduction in rates brings him lower borrowing costs, which in turn makes it easier to borrow capital to channel towards his mega-projects, such as Istanbul’s “third” Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge, or the city’s massive new airport, which will be six times the size of London’s Heathrow. These projects may deliver tangible, short-term results, but they do not contribute to sustainable growth.

In fact, they have already put the economy in danger of overheating. The lira has depreciated 20 percent since the start of this year, and will soon start tumbling again. As inflation rises further into double-digits, the cost of living will continue to skyrocket. The current account deficit is $60 billion per annum, and foreign debt is almost $453 billion.

With an economy that runs on borrowing and investments, Turkey needs foreign money to repay this debt. But reserves are running low. In the first five months of 2018, foreigners only bought $118 million  worth of Turkish equities and government bonds—a 97 percent drop compared to the same period last year. The volume of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has also sunk to its lowest level in a decade.

Much will depend on whom Erdoğan appoints to oversee Turkey’s economy—and whether that person changes the country’s economic direction. Turkey needs higher-interest rates to cool off its “overheated” economy and to transition into a production-oriented economy that prioritizes agricultural development and long-term investment. And the backsliding in Turkey’s democracy needs to stop: This is crucial if the leadership wants to regain the confidence of financial markets and attract vital foreign funding. But if Erdoğan strengthens his grip on monetary policy—as he said he would ahead of the vote—the future looks bleak.

Erdoğan at the Mercy of Nationalists

The AKP’s support has actually decreased since the last election. Its share of the vote went down to 42.4 percent from the 49.5 percent it received in November 2015.

As a result, Erdoğan can now  command a parliamentary majority only through a coalition with the MHP (unless he moves to form a coalition with any of the other opposition parties, which is very unlikely). In a way, the ultra-nationalist Bahçeli is the real winner of these elections. Expected to win less than 8 percent ahead of the vote and having barely held any rallies, his party won over 11 percent. The president will now need Bahçeli’s support to make sure parliament does not become a stumbling block, which means the MHP leader will be at the center of Turkish politics for the foreseeable future. Erdoğan, however, has argued for years that coalition governments are unstable governments, so it remains to be seen whether he will move to capsize this equilibrium.

The Opposition: A Mixed Success

In contrast to the CHP’s previous performances, İnce’s campaign contained elements that made him more popular within conservative circles. For the first time, the party and its top candidate stopped operating as representatives of the strictly secular and the metropolitan elite. As a result, İnce managed to score 30.5 percent, breaking through the CHP’s recent average of 25 percent. This is an important achievement.

Still, not everything went his way. İnce failed to draw the support of those who had voted “no” in the referendum, including a critical percentage of AKP supporters who were feeling “Erdoğan fatigue” and were ready to break away from Turkey’s long-time leader. The results show that many of these disgruntled voters shifted their allegiance to Erdoğan’s coalition partner, the MHP, but did not cross over to support the “other” side.

Once labeled the dark-horse of the race, Akşener also underperformed. Her party, an off-shoot of the MHP, was expected to collect support from traditional MHP voters unhappy with their party’s partnership with the AKP. Analysts also expected that her right-wing credentials would make her attractive to disillusioned AKP voters. But she only scored 7 percent in the presidential race and 10 percent in the parliamentary poll, down from the anticipated 12 percent and 13-17 percent ahead of the vote, respectively.

In the end, an electoral season that lasted just seven weeks—Erdoğan had surprisingly brought the election forward by eighteen months—was not enough for these two relatively unknown figures to win over the factions within the “Erdoğan camp” unhappy with the status quo and ready for change.

With Erdoğan dominating the airwaves, manipulating the power of incumbency as well as the resources of the state, İnce and Akşener faced an uneven playing field that stacked the odds heavily against them. Television is a powerful medium in politics, especially in Turkey. According to a study released ahead of the vote, 50 percent of AKP and MHP supporters either do not have internet access or do not use it on a daily basis. These voters live in a bubble tightly sealed with Erdoğan’s cult of personality. As long as this repressive environment persists, outreach will be difficult.

Where Do We Go from Here?

The elections showed that Turkey remains a polarized society, almost divided in half. And Erdoğan’s reliance on the nationalists suggests that the president is unlikely to push for “reconciliation” with the opposition and pull the country together. His nationalist partners have spoken against moving forward on the Kurdish peace process, supported extending the state of emergency imposed after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, and traditionally been reluctant to improve relations with the West.

However, even with Erdoğan on top, the spirit of democracy is not dead. The parliament now includes seven parties, representing almost every political movement. It is Turkey’s most diverse legislature in decades. This is the result of energetic opposition campaigns that united the center-left with the center-right, the Kurds with the nationalists, and the secular with the more religiously-minded. Driving attendance by the millions, these campaigns symbolized the undying resolve of those who want a return to liberal democracy.

The anti-Erdoğan camp needs to continue to harness this yearning, and keep the president on the back foot. For the next round is just around the corner—local elections are due in March 2019.

The post How Erdoğan Won Again appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Umit Bektas

Much has been made of the importance of Turkey’s elections in a month’s time—and for good reason. For the first time, Turks will vote for president and parliament on the same day. And for the first time, the winner of the presidential election will enjoy extensive executive powers.

In January 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling AKP party won a vote in parliament to transform the largely ceremonial presidency into a powerful executive one. Then in April 2017, the Turkish electorate approved the change, albeit by a narrow margin (51-49 percent), in a referendum tainted both by accusations of ballot-stuffing and by the Yes camp’s abuse of state resources and domination of the media. The new powerful presidency will go into effect after the June 24 vote—if Erdoğan wins, he will have the power to appoint unelected vice-presidents, place judges in the highest judicial board, and issue legally binding decrees.

In a sense, the elections can be considered the last chance to derail one-man rule in Turkey.

Until recently, Erdoğan had categorically ruled out an early ballot, so he surprised voters and opponents alike when he called snap elections a year and a half ahead of schedule. It was a hasty move likely meant to blindside the opposition parties, who for the most part hadn’t even chosen their presidential candidates. It also serves to secure his power amid growing discontent over Turkey’s growing economic crisis. Inflation is soaring, the Turkish Lira has fallen to a record low, and national debt is ballooning. Erdoğan risks losing more votes if the trend continues.

Another key factor is Turkey’s involvement in Syria and Iraq, where Ankara has intervened to fight so-called Islamic State militants and Kurdish paramilitaries. In March, Turkish forces took control of the Syrian border-town Afrin, a Kurdish enclave. This drew condemnation from Germany, among other countries, but was widely popular among Turkish nationalists and led to growing support for Erdoğan’s coalition with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP. The president wanted to cash in on that popularity at the ballot box, and the sooner the better.

Strange Bedfellows

The upcoming elections are extraordinary, even for a country with a political history as troubled and tumultuous as Turkey’s. For starters, one of the main opposition leaders, the presidential candidate of the left-wing pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş, is the first presidential candidate in Turkish history to be running for office while in prison. The former co-leader of the HDP was arrested in November 2016 for alleged links to Kurdish militants.

Demirtaş and his supporters have denounced the upcoming elections as the most unfair in Turkish history. Erdoğan’s AKP controls most of the media in Turkey, and his rivals practically don’t exist in these government-controlled news outlets. Erdoğan, meanwhile, is not only omnipresent on the national public broadcaster TRT, but also on most private TV stations. Then there is the state of emergency that was introduced right after the 2016 coup attempt and has enabled the arrest of thousands of opposition figures and supposed conspirators; it was just extended for the seventh time, making it even harder for the opposition to campaign freely.

And yet, Erdoğan and the AKP can’t be sure of a win. Polls reveal that Turkish society is more divided than ever. Frustration is growing, especially among young people. More than four million first-time voters will be participating in the election—Erdoğan likes to call them the “AKP-generation”—but enthusiasm among his younger followers is dwindling.

Meanwhile, the state of emergency and difficult campaign conditions have produced unusual partnerships. The so-called “Alliance for Democracy” has been formed, an unprecedented coalition between the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP), the largest opposition party and a long-standing rival of Erdoğan’s AKP, the Islamist “Felicity Party” (SP), formed by Erdoğan’s old allies, the rather insignificant Democrat Party (DP), which has not managed to overcome the 10 percent parliamentary threshold in Turkey since its founding in 2007, and the “Good Party” (İyi Parti), a liberal-conservative and nationalist group led by Meral Aksener, a former interior minister and the first woman in Turkish history to run for president. Her party, only formed seven months ago, has gained popularity so fast that some observers believe it’s another reason for the early elections.

Not much unites these parties other than their disdain for President Erdoğan and their calls for more freedom of speech. In fact, these unlikely allies were only able to form a coalition because of a new law that Erdoğan himself recently introduced to allow his AKP to join up with the far-right MHP.

Choppy Waters

The unusually strong opposition might make things harder than expected for Erdoğan. According to recent polls, he might not reach the necessary 50 percent plus one vote that he needs for a straight win. A run-off ballot on July 8 seems increasingly likely.

It remains unclear which opposition candidate would compete in a run-off against Erdoğan for the presidential post. Will it be CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince, a party veteran known for his sharp anti-Erdoğan rhetoric? Or İyi Parti’s Meral Aksener, whose success stems from the fact that she is religious and conservative but also secular enough to not wear a headscarf. What Ince and Aksener have in common is that they are both fairly unpopular with Kurdish voters, who could tip the scales. Enter Selahattin Demirtaş, the jailed Kurdish presidential candidate. The other opposition parties have excluded him and his pro-Kurdish HDP from their alliance, but they will need his support in order to spoil Erdoğan’s plans.

In the end, Erdoğan’s financial and political advantage will more likely than not help him win these elections, too. But the campaign period has already changed the political landscape of the country in unprecedented ways.

The post Turkey’s Crossroads appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Yasin Bulbul/Presidential Palace/Handout

When Kemal Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the new nation was meant to be a beacon of secular democracy in the Middle East. But even at the country’s foundation, the seed of its current predicament was already planted: in the countryside, far from the urban centers and their Westernized elite, an undercurrent of Islamic piety remained. In the 1990s, Necmettin Erbakan seized on this opportunity and re-introduced overtly religious discourse to Turkish politics. His political successor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is now on the cusp of dismantling the country’s representative government entirely.

But the upcoming referendum will not decide the future of the country – this was already decided in December 2013. After the 19^th National Education Council, the country’s educational system underwent a number of momentous changes, ensuring that future generations of Turkish citizens would be more religious and less inclined to question the country’s leadership. The leaders of Erdogan’s Justice and Development party (AKP) thus successfully laid the groundwork for bringing their policy goals within reach.

Erdogan’s goal – the dismantling of the Kemalist secular state and its replacement with a sort of Anatolian caliphate – was already clear then. Now, he will formalize his intentions through the institution of a presidential system that would end the tradition of parliamentary democracy in the country, originally introduced in 1908 by the Unionist or Young Turk regime. In its place, the AKP leadership wants to institute a pseudo-Ottoman system of absolute rule.

Eliminating a “Bureaucratic Oligarchy”

Talk of introducing a presidential system to Turkey has been around since the 1970s, when Erbakan first introduced the Turkish public to this political concept; over the subsequent decades, Turgut Özal and then Süleyman Demirel kept this discourse alive. In the 21^st century, Erdogan revived this discussion to great effect, and in all likelihood next month’s popular referendum will end with his becoming an absolute president, effectively banishing Atatürk’s legacy to the dustbin of history. The “Yes” camp will probably garner between 60 and 75 percent of the popular vote, an outcome that AKP critics believe would bring an end to Turkish democracy.

But Erdogan supporters and apologist alike argue that the creation of a presidential system would merely end an undemocratic bureaucracy, one they claim has been stifling public life for the past two centuries. The AKP MP for Istanbul, Metin Külünk, spelled out the issue in early January in the Islamist newspaper Diriliş Postası. Külünk delved deep into Ottoman history and explained that the so-called “Charter of Alliance” (or Sened-i ittifak), established in 1808, had instituted a bureaucratic apparatus that since has taken over the country, adding that the constitutional change would “break the back of [this] bureaucratic oligarchy.”

It is no accident that Turkey’s Islamists re-discovered the Sened-i ittifak. Historian Rıfat Önsoy declared in 1986 that “the Charter of Alliance is a document that aimed to limit the autocracy and absolutism [of the Ottoman Sultan] … it was a historic stage in [the development of] Turkish democracy.” In other words, Turkish intellectuals and politicians adhering to Kemalist principles and democratic values have traditionally viewed the “Charter of Alliance” as a positive development that would lead ultimately to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, where Atatürk’s reforms were to liberate the population from the shackles of Islam and its restrictions.

A New Atatürk

The crackdown on freedom of expression and the persecution of journalists, writers, and academics have convinced Erdogan and AKP critics that the upcoming referendum on constitutional changes would transform Turkey into a veritable dictatorship along Islamic lines. Erdogan himself, on the other hand, declared last December that no such threat exists, saying “There is no such problem in my country. Those who want can talk as they want, live as they believe, dress as they want, [and] can drink and eat as they want, all these things are being done. We have not introduced any kind of prohibition. Turkey has never been a country of prohibitions.” Critics, both domestic and foreign, regard such a statement as a blatant lie regarding the current state of affairs in the country.

And in fact, pious Muslims and AKP supporters may wholeheartedly agree with their leader – but see that as a state of affairs in need of revision. During the Kemalist era, wide swathes of Turkey’s population regarded the lenient and permissive attitude in the country as an affront, hindering their personal and public experience of faith. Rather than greet the Kemalist Revolution as a liberation allowing them to “enjoy this world and its delights to the fullest,” these pious Turks felt Atatürk was leading the nation astray. They welcome the post-Kemalist reality in the New Turkey as heralding a hitherto unknown freedom, namely the freedom to live in accordance with the rules and regulations laid down by the Prophet.

The upcoming referendum will afford these pious men and women the opportunity to exercise real democracy, as the envisioned “presidential system” will see “the people elect the figure of an Absolute President, without the intermediary of a ‘bureaucratic oligarchy’ or an elected Chamber of Parliament.“ In this way, Erdogan will assume the reins of power from the people as a “gift from God,” allowing him to replace the figure of Atatürk in the hearts and minds of the Turkish people.

The post A Gift From God appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© Screenshot: zdf_neo

Having stirred up an enormous hullaballoo in German-Turkish relations, German television comedian Jan Böhmermann announced he would withdraw from the public eye for a while. “It’s a short television pause so that the public can concentrate on the things that really matter like the refugee crisis, videos about cats, and the love life of Sophia Thomalla [an actress],” Böhmermann announced, true to style, via Twitter.

Angela Merkel doesn’t enjoy any such privilege. Last week, the German chancellor faced the press to read out a carefully crafted declaration explaining why she was agreeing to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s demand to allow charges against Böhmermann for an alleged insult to his person and office.

“In a state of law, it is not the government’s job, but the task of the prosecution and the courts to balance the rights of a person and other issues against the freedom of the press and the freedom of the arts,” Merkel said.

In his show on German public television, Böhmermann had chanted a satirical poem about Erdogan, mixing vulgar verses about sex with goats and child pornography with references to the fate of the Kurdish minority in Turkey.

Erdogan reacted quickly by pressing double charges against Böhmermann. Not only are his lawyers taking the comedian to court for insult under ordinary German law, but he also requested that Böhmermann be prosecuted under paragraph 103 of the German criminal law code.

This is a provision that carries heavy punishment for insulting foreign heads of state. It is a curious law dating back to the foundation of the German empire in 1871 when it was drawn up to specifically protect foreign monarchs.

In 1953, this “lèse-majesté” clause was re-instated in the law of the Federal Republic, apparently at the particular request of the British occupational forces in Germany. It was widened to apply to representatives of foreign republics as well. Insulting a foreign head of state can be punished by up to three years in jail or by a fine, considerably harsher than insulting ordinary people under paragraph 185.

According to the logic of the law, paragraph 103 is meant to safeguard Germany’s international relations. As these are an executive matter, any case under this particular law needs the German government’s explicit authorization.

In the 1960s, several Cologne journalists were fined for mocking the Shah of Persia. The last known case dates from 2007, when a private citizen was fined for insulting the president of Switzerland. Yet the legal base of paragraph 103 may be shaky: in 2002, the European Court of Human Rights struck down a case against the Moroccan king based on a very similar law in France which was then abolished.

Costly Permission

In Erdogan’s case, Merkel ended up giving permission for the case to go ahead – but it is costing her. Not only the opposition parties, but her junior partner in government, the Social Democrats (SPD), have publicly disapproved of her decision.

Even within her own party, many think it wrong. “I regret this decision and hope that Turkey will be taught a lesson on the freedom of opinion,” said Wolfgang Bosbach, a senior CDU politician in the Bundestag.

Public opinion isn’t happy, either. Granting Erdogan’s request has a nasty smell of selling out to a foreign despot. If Merkel is seen to help him crack down on press freedom in Germany, too, that is not going to go down well. Indeed, a quick poll published by Sunday newspaper BILD am Sonntag showed 66 percent disapproving Merkel’s decision. Only 22 percent considered it appropriate.

Yet Merkel was caught in a dilemma. She desperately needs Erdogan’s good will to keep the flow of refugees to Germany and Europe under control. A disgruntled Turkish president could go back on his deal with the EU and re-open the passage for refugees across the Eastern Mediterranean. Satisfying Erdogan was made even more urgent because the German chancellor is planning an official visit to Turkey on April 23.

So Merkel’s calculation is clear: the huff-and-puff over Böhmermann is unpleasant but hopefully short-lived. In contrast, a massive surge in the number of refugees applying for asylum in Germany would do much more serious damage to Merkel’s standing with her voters and her party.

Yet some things are best not talked about. In her announcement, the chancellor was careful not to mention the word “refugee” even once. Instead, she stressed the importance of good relations with Turkey. She also said that her decision to authorize the prosecution did not amount to prejudging the case, but served to hand over the legal appreciation to an independent justice system.

And with her well-honed political instinct, she announced that “lèse-majesté” paragraph 103 will be abolished by 2018 at the latest. This should help to make clear how much she has disliked being put in this situation; it also ensures that none of her successors will ever find themselves in a similar pinch. Finally, it means that if only the legal process against Böhmermann is sufficiently drawn out, he will only be taken to court according to the milder and more democratic paragraph 185.

In effect, the Böhmermann affair may end up having opposite effects on Turkey and on Germany. In his own country, Erdogan will certainly use the chancellor’s decision to justify his hard line against freedom of expression and any attempt at irony or satire. In Germany, in contrast, it will help rid the country of an outdated and undemocratic law.

The post Merkel’s Turkish Dilemma appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.