© REUTERS/Willy Kurniawan

It began with a patient in Jakarta. In April 2035 the man was admitted to hospital in the Indonesian capital with flu symptoms. Within a few weeks, the novel pathogen, which the World Health Organization named Flu-35, spread first to other parts of Asia and then to Europe, Africa, and North and South America.

Led by the WHO, the international community responded quickly with countermeasures. The disease brought back memories of the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020/21. After successively controlling that virus with a vaccine from fall 2021, extensive reforms were introduced and massive investments were made in prevention, early detection, and crisis response. At the heart of the reforms was the transformation of the WHO into a more powerful and independent global public health organization.

The international community has now been able to benefit from the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic and was thus able to rapidly contain Flu-35—without the outbreak developing into a global crisis. The fact that the end of the crisis was declared after only 10 months shows what great progress has been made since 2020 in combating pandemics.

Containment Thanks to Early Detection

So, how exactly was it contained? After a series of clusters of the novel flu epidemic occurred in Jakarta in April 2035, the local health authorities quickly reported the incidents to the WHO. Within days, it sent a team of virologists, doctors, and epidemiologists to Indonesia to work with the local authorities to gather and evaluate initial evidence of the novel influenza virus and recommend action for all WHO member states.

In the past, there had often been attempts by local authorities or national governments to cover up disease outbreaks, partly because the affected countries feared the economic damage that travel and trade restrictions would impose. However, the earlier outbreaks are detected and reported, the greater the chance of avoiding serious health crises. This is why the international community has been working hard to improve early warning systems.

On the one hand, after the COVID-19 pandemic, incentives for the rapid notification of outbreaks and improved cooperation with the WHO were created. For example, a massive fund is now available from which affected countries can quickly and easily obtain funding to combat the disease if they report outbreaks. The WHO has also increased the number of emergency teams available to help countries cope with the disease.

In addition to these incentives for the early notification of outbreaks, the international community created mechanisms to reveal cover-up attempts and demand accountability from governments. Fears of massive reputational damage drove up the cost of cover-up attempts.

In addition, existing early warning systems were significantly improved. Firstly, by stepping up the monitoring of pathogens in animals in “disease hotspots”: virologists and experts can thus learn more about which pathogens are spreading in the animal kingdom and could possibly jump to humans and trigger the next epidemic.

Secondly, after the COVID-19 crisis, considerable resources had been invested in the assessment of the epidemiological situation and risk. The WHO expanded the Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources (EIOS) initiative and optimized the methods of collecting information on outbreaks and the risk assessment of disease incidents. Here, data from informal sources—such as social networks and media—are also evaluated and assessed. This also increases the willingness to report outbreaks quickly, as countries fear that outbreaks will be discovered and made public by other means.

An Independent and Effective WHO

An effective and strong WHO has been at the heart of the successful response to Flu-35. Its recommendations are quickly implemented by its members and not—as in previous cases—ridiculed and disregarded.

The coronavirus crisis had shown that the world needs a stronger WHO to better face pandemics. Although many experts believed that the organization had done a good job in 2020/21, its capacity as a secretariat of 194 member states, without any authority to issue directives and with an insufficient budget, was severely limited.

As was the case after the SARS epidemic in 2002/03, a reform of the International Health Regulations—the central, legally binding instrument of the WHO in outbreak control—was therefore initiated in 2022. This was completed in 2025 and significantly strengthened the WHO’s mandate. The WHO was now able to publicly demand accountability from member states for non-compliance with its recommendations and refusal to cooperate, rather than, as in the past, only standing idly by when countries ignored the organization. It could also impose sanctions, such as fines or temporary loss of voting rights in the UN institutions.

The WHO was also able to act effectively because its dramatic underfunding came to an end after the COVID-19 pandemic. It was indeed a severe blow when the largest donor, the United States, left the organization in 2020. However, a broad coalition of mid-sized powers and private donors led by the EU was able to make up for the resulting financing gap. In addition, the member states agreed to significantly increase the compulsory contributions. This made it possible to build up and expand operational forces and improve early warning and prevention. As a result, the WHO was in a position to act much more independently of the individual interests of its members or private actors.

Pandemic Playbook

When the WHO Director-General warned about the new influenza virus in spring 2035, governments around the world were able to make use of their national Pandemic Playbooks. Under the guidance of WHO, the Pandemic Playbook initiative was launched in 2022, with all member states evaluating and revising their national pandemic plans, some of which had become very outdated. A regular adaptation of these plans was scheduled for every three years, and pandemic management exercises were also held regularly at both a national and international level.

Pandemic Playbooks cover the health sector, civil protection and large parts of the private sector—especially the companies involved in maintaining supplies. In addition to setting up structures and measures to prevent diseases, the plans contain extensive instructions for concrete pandemic management, which are tailored to the respective conditions in the individual countries.

During the Flu-35 pandemic, countries around the world quickly began to ramp up their testing capacities, monitor airport arrivals and departures more closely, and track passengers, as envisaged in the pandemic plans. As past health crises had taught us that travel and trade restrictions were not very effective in containing the pandemic, there was an increased focus on tracing infected people and their contacts and on quarantine measures. The time advantage allowed the health sectors to increase their capacity to cope with a possible influx of infected persons.

The stockpiling of large quantities of PPE and antiviral drugs, which was regularly checked by the WHO, effectively protected hospital and medical practice staff from Flu-35 and ensured better treatment for the sick. The Playbooks also provided guidance to decision-makers in prescribing quarantine and protective measures such as closing kindergartens and schools and shutting down economic activity.

The Pandemic Playbook initiative was supported by substantial funding from the WHO, private foundations, donors, and individual member states. After COVID-19 there was a recognition that investment in prevention and pandemic management is more cost-effective than repairing the enormous damage caused by a pandemic, which led to increased investment. In particular, poorer, unstable, or war- and conflict-ridden regions, which are not in a position to prepare for disease outbreaks, are thus supported in building structures and capacities.

This is one of the reasons why Flu-35 could not develop into a serious global crisis—even regions of the world that had been virtually defenseless during previous outbreaks were able to take action.

“The international response to Flu-35 has shown that pandemics can be successfully controlled,” said the WHO Director-General in her statement at the end of the crisis in February 2036. Since 2020, enormous progress has been made in outbreak control, including the expansion of early detection, the strengthening of WHO and the improvement of national pandemic plans. Flu-35 has not plunged the world into a severe crisis with long-term and severe socio-economic consequences. The long-term goal must be to detect and control pathogens early enough to prevent major outbreaks from occurring in the first place.

But in a hyper-networked world with a growing world population, an increase in megacities and advancing environmental destruction, epidemics remain a realistic scenario that must be prepared for. Even in 2036 and beyond.

The post How We Learned to Halt Pandemics appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Carlo Allegri

This trend is especially apparent in the UN Security Council (UNSC), the central organ for the protection of peace and security. In order to effectively carry out its responsibilities, it must have legitimacy and the ability to act. It possesses less and less of both: its legitimacy is threatened by the fact that it mirrors the antiquated postwar order of 1945, which leaves some regions grossly underrepresented while privileging the interests of the five permanent members (P5); and it is less and less capable of acting, particularly when its responsibility to protect peace and stability is needed the most.

The Security Council’s recent track record is mixed at best. Perhaps most indicative of this is the fact that important international agreements are often reached in other formats and are then later endorsed pro forma by the Security Council. Examples include the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program and those reached by the International Syria Support Group. Nevertheless, it is only the UNSC that can grant such agreements the necessary international legitimacy.

The international community acknowledges the need for a reform of the UN system, at least in principle. During a summit in September 2015 in New York, Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with Germany’s closest reform partners – Brazil, India, and Japan – stressed this. But no matter how great the fundamental agreement over the need for reform is, especially when it comes to the UNSC, the way to proceed remains equally unclear. UN membership encompasses 193 states, each with its own national interests. Progress in the UN thus often means embracing the lowest common denominator. A structural reform of the UNSC would require changes to the UN Charter, which itself requires a two-thirds majority of members – meaning the concurrence of 129 member states; and should that be achieved, it could still take years until ratification allows these changes to be put into practice.

A Modernized, Transparent Process

Several reform attempts have clarified the demands. What are the issues now up for discussion? One structural change that is often mentioned is the idea of enlarging the UNSC in order to make it more representative. A majority of UN member states have spoken favorably of enlarging both existing seat categories, creating more permanent and rotating seats.

In terms of UNSC working methods, the rules governing the veto have gathered the most attention. When the veto is used, it becomes impossible for the UNSC to tackle pressing issues. This should not necessarily be interpreted as the UNSC breaking down; it is a feature of its design, meant to encourage peaceful conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the veto limits the UNSC’s ability to act in crises. There is widespread support for the demand that the P5 states – at least in the event of mass atrocities – decline to use their vetoes, allowing the UN to intervene when lives are threatened. The chances of success for this proposal remain, however, uncertain.

The process of selecting the UN Secretary-General is another topic reformers wish to address: the process followed in the past – pre-selection of a few candidates by the P5 in closed-door meetings, followed by pro-forma acclamation of only one nominee in the UN General Assembly – has been rightly criticized as opaque and undemocratic. A modernized, transparent process, especially one that provided for candidate hearings, would allow for improvement.

All three reform plans limit the powers of the P5 in order to strengthen the role of the other UN members. The tendency to eschew the UN completely and instead rely on external adhoc negotiating formats has forced the permanent UNSC members to at least engage in the reform discussion. But the initiative must come from the general UN membership – and that means overcoming individual interests and competitive relationships among the member states. Reform proposals must be drafted that can win majority support in the General Assembly and weather the pressure to maintain the status quo.

Legitimacy Through Enlargement

The urgent need for UNSC reform was recognized at the 2005 World Summit. Heads of state and government vowed to move quickly; so far, however, no progress has been made. Various groups of states have presented different approaches, including the suggestion made by Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan – the G4 – to expand the UNSC by six permanent seats and four to five non-permanent seats.

At the center of the disagreement is the question of how many new members the UNSC should take on, for how long, and with which rights. The controversy surrounding the suggestions made so far is so great as to render all of them impossible. That said, a majority of the member states favor both an expansion of the permanent seats and an expansion of the non-permanent seats. The suggested numbers vary, but result in a total between around 20 to 25, with an upper limit to ensure the efficacy of the body.

The demands for new permanent seats range from basic advocacy for higher numbers to proposals that specific countries should become new permanent members. At the same time, arguments are also levelled against the idea of permanent seats in general.

The question about the veto right divides both the P5 and those aspiring to UNSC membership. The African Group insists on a veto right for new permanent members if there is to be a veto right at all. The G4, meanwhile, suggests that new members decline to use the veto until a 15-year review process following the implementation of reform. While France has not categorically excluded the possibility of broadening veto rights, the UK has spoken out against it; and the three other permanent members – the US, China, and Russia – have little interest in an extension of veto rights.

There are also various intermediate models that raise the possibility of new seat categories. They entail additional long-term – though non-permanent – members, possibly with a chance of re-election.

In order to reconcile these often widely divergent reform positions into a single model, an intergovernmental process has begun; but so far there have not been real negotiations and thus no real progress. With the consensus reached in the General Assembly in September 2015, however, an important step was taken: a majority of members have, for the first time, voiced support for the start of text-based negotiations, taking the officially submitted positions of over 120 member states as the starting point.

However, it is important to be realistic: actual reform is not foreseeable in the near future. The debate has shaken the member states from their torpor and contributed to a more open exchange; the political forces working behind the scenes are enormous, though – both for and against reform of the status quo.

Unblocking the Security Council

The working methods of the UNSC, especially the veto rules, are also on trial. Important decisions have been blocked several times over the past few years, including Russian-Chinese double vetoes, first used in 2011 to prevent the International Criminal Court from addressing Syria, and the Russian veto in the summer of 2015 stopping the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate the shooting down of flight MH17 over Ukraine.

In the UN community, there is increasing opposition to the ability of the P5 to block decisions – decisions that in some cases could save the lives of hundreds of thousands – for reasons of national interest. Two initiatives aim to limit the use of the veto: the first, the French-Mexican veto initiative, calls for the P5 to voluntarily pass on the opportunity to use the veto in the case of mass atrocities. So far, results have been limited – the reluctance of the other P5 members to be restricted is too great.

A political declaration of support by member states for the French-Mexican veto initiative during the opening of the 70th session of the General Assembly found widespread support. We, too, support it emphatically.

The second initiative put forward in 2013 by the ACT (Accountability, Coherence, Transparency) group goes in a different direction. Through its “Code of Conduct on voting in the Security Council,” member states, when in the Security Council, would refrain from voting against any resolution to intervene in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. The voluntary commitment would apply to all 193 member states, not just the P5. The project has the potential to build pressure on the veto powers through the widespread support of member states. Already over 100 countries, among them Germany, have announced their support.

The discussion over UNSC working methods has gone on for many years, and has led to practical improvements even without modifying the UN Charter. An important contribution was achieved by the “Small Five” (Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland) in 2006: they suggested several improvements that have led to more open formats – for example, the so-called “Arria Formula” meetings. Arria is the name of the Venezuelan ambassador to the UN of the time, who introduced this format. The number of such informal meetings, often convened to discuss topics of controversy in the UNSC, has risen significantly in the past few years. These are important improvements, but they cannot replace structural reforms.

A Woman for Secretary-General?

The area of reform that generates the broadest agreement among UN member states – with the exception of the P5 – concerns the process of electing the UN Secretary-General. With every new election there is louder and louder criticism of the process as it stands today, with the five permanent members deciding on a single candidate among themselves who is subsequently appointed, by acclamation, by the plenary of the General Assembly.

This process goes back to Resolution II (I) of the General Assembly from January 24, 1946; on a fundamental level, it will likely remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, UN member states and civil society organizations are strongly engaged in changing this process, which is generally seen as outdated. Thus the “1 for 7 billion” initiative and the aforementioned ACT group demand the nomination of more than one candidate by the UNSC, for a one-time, seven-year term, along with a clear timeline for the election process and open hearings with candidates.

These demands enjoy widespread popularity and support. The five permanent members, however, have made it clear that the core election process – and the power of the P5 in that process – will not be altered. In certain questions of procedure, some of the P5 states have proven to be more amenable to change. some things, however, especially the nomination of more than one candidate, will not change quickly.

That said, in light of the initial resistance from the five permanent members of the UNSC, the steps agreed to by the General Assembly in fall 2015 for more transparency in the election process can be seen as a success for the UN member states. Starting in April, candidates will now be invited to “informal dialogs,” organized by the President of the General Assembly and the UNSC, at which member states can pose questions before the UNSC decides who to recommend. How far the new application process increases transparency will be seen this year.

The P5 will retain the last word in the nomination of the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, changes like the planned open hearings will mean that candidates will have much greater exposure to the public. Their communication abilities can be tested; their political opinions and earlier decisions can be questioned. For the permanent council members, it could become difficult to stick with a candidate who withers under the limelight. Thus the current changes are welcome – they are a small but important step toward more transparency.

Those advocating the selection of a woman for UN Secretary-General are meeting with wider support and less resistance. Germany, too, has joined calls to pave the way for a woman to take the office – high time, considering that all eight Secretaries-General so far have been men.

The road to institutional reform in the UN is a long one, and will require patience and determination – however, it is necessary to ensure the UN’s efficacy in the future. It is not enough to take the UN’s unique global legitimacy for granted: we must actively defend it, preparing the organization for an ever more complex modern world.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – March/April 2016 issue.

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