© REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay

It was hailed as a breakthrough: nearly four months after the election Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservatives and the Social Democrats agreed to launch formal negotiations on forming a government together, again. In a 28-page draft policy agreement, the negotiating parties listed the compromises they had spent weeks wrangling over – and skirted around the issues where no agreement could be reached.

During negotiations, the two sides appeared ready to drop German-authored plans to lower carbon dioxide emissions by 40 percent from 1990 levels by the year 2020 because it simply wouldn’t be feasible – the country has only managed to slash 27 percent until now. In the end, however, they kicked the can further down the road, appointing a commission to create a blueprint for reducing emissions as quickly as possible and gradually phasing out coal power.

It is a glaring departure from the green image Germany has built. Just a handful of years ago, the country’s Energiewende, or energy transition, was seen as a shimmering example of how the world could beat climate change that the German term itself—rather than “energy transition” or “clean energy revolution”—was being used in American media.  This was its raison d’etre – and the physicist-chancellor Angela Merkel appeared fully convinced of its promise, which she showcased in international climate conferences, winning her the moniker die Klimakanzlerin, or the climate chancellor.

And even though renewable energy generation in Germany broke more records in 2017, growing to cover an astounding 36.1 percent of the country’s electricity needs, that won’t offset the country’s rising carbon emissions enough to meet its own goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent in 2020.

Breaking Up Monopolies

Germany commenced its Energiewende less than two decades ago by breaking up the monopoly of a few giant utilities and setting market conditions for wind and solar power, as well as bioenergy, to become one of the economy’s primary sources of power. In addition, it created over 300,000 jobs, local revenue for rural areas, and cutting-edge exportable technology.

Inspired by Germany’s ingenuity and gumption, I undertook to learn everything I could about Germany’s visionary experiment by visiting the citizen-prosumers on the ground from the Baltic Sea to the Black Forest, and interviewing the Energiewende’s thinkers. I authored a blog about Germany’s clean energy revolution and wrote dozens of articles for English-language media. For five years, I lived and breathed the Energiewende, convinced that Germany was a determined pioneer in an effort that would keep our planet livable for future generations of human beings and other species.

Yet, despite Merkel’s vigorous push after the meltdown at the Fukushima power plant in Japan in spring 2011, Germany’s commitment to the mission has since fallen off dramatically. It is now a middling contender in the field of climate protection, ranked a lowly 29 out of 61 countries worldwide by the NGO Germanwatch. About two years ago, I noticed that there was ever less new hailing from Germany to write about. I cancelled my blog.

There’s a good measure of hypocrisy in the way Germany continues lecturing other countries like the US about climate protection while it falls ever further behind on its own 2020 emissions reduction goals. As much as Washington deserves a lecturing on the topic, Germany no longer has the cachet to do it.

Playing the Spoiler

These days Berlin even plays the spoiler, throwing its weight around in the EU to the detriment of progressive environmental legislation, as it is currently doing on the EU’s long-awaited climate and energy package—seminal legislation, currently in draft form, that will underpin the transformation of the European energy system until 2030. Germany has pushed to weaken provisions that would open up energy markets to citizens’ initiatives and other new business entrants – the very actors who ignited the grassroots Energiewende in the first place.

One reason for Germany’s demise as climate leader is not public opinion, which overwhelmingly backs the Energiewende and is fearful of climate change. On the contrary, it’s Germany’s grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD), which will most probably be renewed this year for another four-year term. Indeed, Germany’s two biggest parties came to power four years ago talking not about hitting Germany’s emissions targets or prompting the Energiewende’s next exciting breakthrough, but rather about how to slow it down. And this they did.

Chancellor Merkel still pays lip service to climate issues, but her party’s commitment to Germany’s automobile industry is obviously greater. She’s illustrated this by pushing to lower emissions standards for cars made in the EU, allowing the EU carbon trading scheme to collapse, and turning a blind eye to the testing standards of Germany’s diesel gas-guzzlers.

The Social Democrats, her partner in office, haven’t been any better, putting the interests of a small number of coal miners and recalcitrant fossil fuel companies above those of the planet. Germany burns more coal than any other country in Europe; state-subsidized, coal-fired plants provide 37 percent of its power, most of it from lignite, the dirtiest kind of coal. At the recent UN climate summit (in Bonn, Germany, of all places), the Germans refused to join a coalition of 19 countries led by Canada and the UK to set a date for ending coal use. In fact, new coal pits are still being excavated in the west of the country.

The grand coalition’s tepid endorsements of renewables and its changes to support systems have caused investment in renewables to drop to its lowest since 2007; permits to build onshore wind parks have been capped at just 2.8 GW a year through 2019—a gross underachievement compared to the 4.6 GW of installments in 2016.  New investment in and deployment of solar power is lagging in a similar way. Moreover, half-hearted energy savings measures failed to stem the still-rising volumes of oil and gas used in transportation, heating, and industry.

Wrong Moment

This is absolutely the wrong moment for Germany to be curbing renewables. Despite the fact that Germany’s renewables have replaced many gig watts of fossil-fuel generated energy, Germany’s emissions have not declined significantly over the last decade. Although this is in part explained by the economy’s growth, the country’s total emissions increased every year over the last three years.

Merkel long ago forfeited her title as climate chancellor, failing time and again to stand up for the climate. She barely mentioned the environment in her election campaign this year (the Social Democrat candidate Martin Schulz wasn’t any better on the topic).

While it’s hard to fall lower than US federal climate protection polices under the Trump administration, I’m not surprised by Trump’s negligence. But I hadn’t expected Germany to balk so suddenly.

After Trump’s election victory and the looming prospect of America’s retreat from the global stage, there was immediate speculation that Germany would assume the mantle of leader of the free world. This, of course, was never a serious option considering Germany’s humble military and skittish geopolitics. But it could have stepped in and led the world on climate protection.

Not so long ago, German energy specialists immodestly called the Energiewende “Germany’s gift to the world.” It was. Now, the least Germany can do is not to play the spoiler.

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© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

In recent months, there has been much soul-searching in Berlin about Germany’s new political instability. In a post-American world, and with Europe deeply divided, the bloc’s anchor of stability appears to be failing the continent—at the very moment that French President Emmanuel Macron has put forth his vision for saving the European project.

Yet Germany’s crisis of government could, paradoxically, turn out to be an opportunity for bringing Europe together. A third grand coalition (or any other form of cooperation between Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservatives and the Social Democrats) could end up not only unifying the country’s political currents, but in the process also help bringing together some of the competing factions in the European Union by forging a grand bargain between the fiscal discipline of: the Northern and Western Europeans (in the form of the CDU); the social conservatism of Eastern Europeans (in the form of the CSU); and solidarity and European federalism of Southern Europeans (via the SPD).

Of course, Berlin must try to generate a positive response to Macron’s proposals for reforming the EU, particularly on economic and monetary policy. Ever since Germany’s long-serving finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble left office to become President of the Bundestag, it has become conceivable to think of going beyond cosmetic changes in order to truly reform the euro group.

But the German government will find that the greatest potential for protecting and relaunching Europe, lies in foreign policy. The refugee crisis, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and US President Donald Trump’s attacks on the liberal world order have threatened the EU’s very foundation. Indeed, the CDU/CSU and the SPD could lay the foundations for an escape from the political gridlock that has held Europe back over these three central issues. Germany’s new government will be in an unprecedented position to reunite the EU during this process—and here, the German culture of consensus politics can play a key role in shaping the European dialogue. It is precisely the spirit of a new grand coalition (with a more balanced distribution of power between the two parties and a mandate for European reform) that could make such far-reaching compromise among disparate member states possible.

Fortress Europe or Open Doors?

The refugee crisis shook Germany to its core and left the country sharply polarized. Berlin must identify a broad solution that reconciles the protection of Germany’s borders and the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers with the introduction of legal migration routes that will help combat smuggling operations in Africa and the Middle East. An agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD on this question would have to include all of these aspects and therefore could also bring together groups in Europe that have been at odds: the front-line states of Greece and Italy, the Liberals of Sweden and Germany, and the skeptics of Eastern Europe. It would help reframe the debate away from a clash between proponents of both “open” and a “closed” Europe into an attempt to develop a common migration system that would honor the bloc’s humanitarian duties while preventing further migration crises.

Together they must show European citizens that the EU’s top priority is to protect its external borders. Thousands more experts at Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, could assist national authorities; this step should be complemented by visible security measures, including a more powerful European public prosecutor’s office and closer cooperation between national intelligence services.

However, securing the bloc’s external borders alone will not be enough. The key to a successful migration policy lies in the principle of “admission for readmission,” a concept enshrined in the 2016 EU-Turkey migration agreement. Even though that pact has not yet been fully implemented, Germany and the EU could reach similar agreements with Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal, which are all key countries of origin and transit in current migration patterns. These agreements dis-incentivize illegal smuggling and uncontrolled migration by providing support for governments and the promise of legal channels. If implemented in conjunction with a modern immigration law, these agreements would help the EU regain control over migration and relieve the undue burden on transit countries.

They would also help alleviate Germany’s problems with deporting rejected asylum seekers back to their home country. But “admission for readmission” will only work if the EU commits to broad partnership agreements with governments in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel region on deepening development work, peacekeeping operations, and good governance.
If Germany truly wants to address the root causes of migration, the country will also have to champion a far larger European role in the Middle East, a region where American and European interests are drifting further apart and Russia has emerged as the power broker.

Europe must seek to stabilize as many regions in Syria as quickly as possible, by working to prioritize de-escalation, rather than pursuing regime change. And by promoting a new, decentralized political order in Syria, Germany could work with the international community to mediate between local rulers and aid reconstruction in some areas. Europe could also put alleviating sanctions against the Assad regime on the table to incentivize stabilization. In order to stabilize as many Syrian regions as possible, Germany and the EU must swiftly identify the levers they have to expand their influence in the conflict. Any solution would have to involve at least indirectly acknowledging Russia’s role in Syria, as well as more German and European stabilization and economic aid. None of this, however, can be given away for free. All of these measures need to contribute to the protection of Europe.

Russia and Turkey: Red Line Policy

Both Russia and Turkey have emerged as challengers to a liberal European order, but they are also both—in very different ways—key stakeholders for European security. Turkey is a member of NATO and EU candidate while Russia is neither, so there will need to be different policy solutions for each. But the fact that the EU has complex relations with both at this time of instability is a big vulnerability for European security. Rather than assuming that Turkey and Russia will be transformed by Europe, the EU needs a set of policies that allows the EU to work with them on areas of joint interest while defending limited, but firm, red lines.

The previous German government, by bringing along its own divided parties, managed to rally a deeply divided Europe behind sanctions on Russia, and, against the odds, managed to defend them for many years. It is clear that this helped to stabilize the conflict in Ukraine and deter further aggression. It now needs to build on this and find a similar way of reconciling the competing European factions on Turkey.

One of the great dangers of the Trump era is the emergence of a power vacuum in Europe that could allow Russia to test America’s security guarantees in Europe. Germany has taken on ever more responsibility in recent years, but its persistently inadequate military capabilities and prevailing pacifism among many Germans has kept the country hesitant towards military interventionism. In the Baltic states, Poland, and Eastern European member states, trust in the West is waning.

In order to rebuild trust, Germany needs to lead solidarity with the states on the front-line.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline project between Russia and Germany must be reconciled with the European Energy Union, an initiative to ensure sustainable energy security across the bloc. If Germany wants to issue a clear signal that it will protect European unity it could lead a joint military exercise modeled on “Reforger” (“Return of Forces to Germany”), a NATO maneuver from the Cold War era. Back then, NATO allies simulated the logistics of defending Germany against a Soviet invasion. Today, Germany’s partners fear for their territorial integrity and the German Bundeswehr has a tradition of “Landesverteidigung,” or territorial defense. Europe requires exactly those defensive abilities now. It would be a symbolic move, less about military logistics and more about demonstrating Germany’s leadership in Europe and its interest in reassuring its Eastern partners.

But there are also limits to the current policy regime of sanctions and strategic reassurance. It has not managed to end the violence in eastern Ukraine, nor has it ensured dialogue with Moscow on stabilizing Libya and Syria. The incoming federal government should also seek paths to step up engagement. One goal should be to explore a new de-escalation initiative in the embattled Ukrainian region of Donbass.

In September 2017, Russia proposed sending UN peacekeepers to Donbass to secure peace. It was likely a tactical maneuver, but for the first time in years there is an opportunity to stabilize the conflict. It is in Europe’s interest to freeze the conflict at this point, and only peacekeepers will effectively do so. The new German government should accept the Russian proposal but demand a far larger peacekeeping mission, one that covers all of eastern Ukraine, not merely the line of contact between pro-Russian rebels and Ukrainian units. In addition, the EU should appoint a special envoy for Ukraine. This should be someone with the stature of Wolfgang Ischinger or Martti Ahtisaari who represents neither Brussels’ interests nor those of any specific European government. He or she could help build the confidence necessary to freeze the conflict. The US is already one step ahead on this issue, having appointed its own special envoy for Ukraine, Kurt Volker.

A Trade Revolution

The most significant challenge facing Europe today is Donald Trump’s attack on the liberal world order. Trump’s policies have upset this order on questions of trade, climate protection, and nuclear non-proliferation in particular.

Berlin alone cannot step into the role of leader of the free world. But the new government can unite with other powers to defend some key achievements of the liberal order—and to take some of the wind out of the sails of its critics. A key plank is to show that the EU will protect its citizens and states from the dark side of interdependence. The two most important ways to do this are to think about protecting social standards and physical security.

On the first, critics of the EU portray the bloc as the manifestation of globalization without protection for workers, citizens, and the environment. The buzzwords in France are le dumping social and le dumping fiscal.

One part of addressing this is to change the emphasis of EU trade policy: ​​instead of serving as the symbol of free trade, the EU should become the guarantor of fair trade—and a grand coalition in Berlin would have just the tools to steer this change. The ratification of free trade agreements—whether with Canada, Vietnam, the Mercosur bloc in South America or Mexico—depends on whether European citizens see them as a danger or a chance to mitigate the effects of globalization. It will therefore be especially important to maintain high European standards of environmental protection and labor legislation when dealing with external contractors, while shielding our own citizens from wage and social dumping within the common European market. Protection against foreign investment in sectors of strategic importance has also been part of the change in emphasis in EU trade policy. To this end, the European Commission presented proposals in September 2017 that aim to protect European companies from takeover by Chinese state-owned companies.

Europe has the potential to become, and should become, a regulatory superpower in the digital age. The economic and social progress of the last few decades has been critically shaped by companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook; due to their turnover and their influence, these companies have risen to the status of large, powerful countries. The EU is the only legal jurisdiction with the will and power to protect its values ​​and its societies from the negative effects of the digital age, and regulators around the globe follow its rulings on cases involving Apple or Facebook.

The other side of a Europe that protects is physical security. The most existential element of this is nuclear. Germany’s new government must also resolutely defend the nuclear agreement with Iran. It is one of the greatest achievements of European diplomacy, and if Washington threatens the deal, the worst-case scenario is a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. At the global level, the end of the JCPOA could spell the end of non-proliferation. If the US breaks the agreement, Brussels, together with Moscow and Beijing, must diplomatically isolate Washington and possibly compensate Iran for the economic damage it would suffer. Aid from the European Investment Bank could come into play. If the US sanctions European companies for doing business with Iran, the EU will have to respond with its own sanctions against U.S. businesses. This policy would require great tact and diplomacy to prevent a trade war with the Trump administration, but acquiescing to huge damage to European interests and the global non-proliferation regime is no option. The EU could also enact a Blocking Regulation and consider banning European companies from complying with US sanctions legislation.

As well as pushing for common measures on non-proliferation, terrorism and border controls, Germany’s next government also has the opportunity to make important progress in European defense policy that goes well beyond the timid beginnings of Permanent Structured Co-operation. In this area, too, the EU is divided, but reforms are possible. There is a big debate over what Germany does with its own defense spending. But the signal that Germany sends to other member states is just as important. One powerful way of incentivizing greater investment would be for defense expenditures to be excluded from the Maastricht criteria, to allow for additional investments. Protecting defense spending from those budgetary caps would accommodate the southern Europeans and give a big boost to the EU’s defense policy.

A new grand coalition of CDU, CSU, and SPD would not represent all currents of European politics. Martin Schulz is not Alexis Tsipras and Horst Seehofer is not Viktor Orbán. Yet the German spirit of compromise and consensus could ensure that Europe grows closer once again, and protects itself from danger more effectively. However, this will require the next government in Berlin to think much bigger than any German government in the post-war era.

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© REUTERS/Marcelo del Pozo

Barack Obama struck a chord with Germans eight years ago in Berlin, when he promised adoring crowds a sharp break with the Bush era. But as his own era ends, the bloom is off the rose in some German foreign policy circles. Germans who once cheered Obama now complain about NSA spying, the failure to close Guantanamo, and what they see as a mishandling of Syria.

In retrospect, though, it’s hard to imagine a US president being more European – and, specifically, more German – on key foreign policy issues. The next American president will likely be less tolerant of allies who call for US action yet balk at paying their fair share. Other challenges loom.

Initially, the Obama administration seemed to have limited interest in Europe. But this wasn’t altogether a bad thing, especially since its foreign policy philosophy was so congruent with the thinking of so many Europeans, and especially Germans.

Obama’s emphasis on what Derek Chollet, a former senior official at the Pentagon, has dubbed “the Long Game” was greatly appreciated in Berlin. Obama’s reticence on military force and his defense of strategic restraint were mirrored in German circles on the left and the right, as was his emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy.

The Obama White House took important decisions on Russia that made life easier in Berlin early on, ending controversial US plans for “third site” missile defense installations in Central Europe, launching a “reset” of relations with Moscow, and backing off Bush administration plans to enlarge NATO eastward.

When relations with Russia later soured, Obama’s approach still jibed with that of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. On Ukraine, Obama understood the need for transatlantic as well as European unity – and appreciated the difficulties Merkel had in sustaining the latter. He let Europe take the lead with Russia over Ukraine, resisting pressure in Washington for a more forceful US role. Over the recommendations of top advisors, Obama then chose not to offer Ukraine lethal military aid, sparing Berlin a likely European crackup.

Washington and Berlin lined up on Iran, too. Rather than castigate Tehran and threaten regime change as his critics urged, Obama pursued and signed the nuclear deal. Similarly, his balanced policy toward Israel played well to a German public that sees Israel as an essential partner yet is deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians. A course of strategic restraint in Syria – although heavily criticized as “weak American leadership” by some in Germany – allowed Berlin to avoid thorny questions of how Germany might support military intervention there. Obama even backed off from his initial push for regional democracy promotion.

Germany may have sat out the 2011 Libya intervention, but the US president’s willingness to lead from behind there allowed Europe to emphasize its role and responsibilities in the broader region. Obama meanwhile backed the Paris agreement on climate change, opened diplomatic relations with Cuba, and mostly kept his distance from the EU’s internal problems, except when backing Merkel on Brexit or refugees.

Not everything was perfect. Beyond Guantanamo, there was scant progress on nuclear disarmament. White House Keynesians tangled with German conservatives over monetary policy and allegations that US spies had tapped Merkel’s own cellphone sparked a storm of anger in Berlin. The pivot to Asia was seen as a slight. Obama’s weapon of choice for global counter-terrorism operations – unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones – has become one of the most controversial legacies of his presidency and was roundly criticized.

But it’s hard to imagine a future US president being any easier for Germany. With just weeks left to the election, Hillary Clinton looks increasingly likely to become the next commander-in-chief. She is widely expected to seek to build on the Obama administration’s legacies while “leaning in” more on some key security issues. In particular, Clinton will likely be more assertive on Russia and Syria, might revisit lethal aid to Ukraine, and could press Germany on defense spending. Promoting democracy might also take on renewed priority. On the campaign trail, she has contrasted with the Obama administration’s doctrine on global trade – although the possibility that she might amend that position in office remains.

Donald Trump’s campaign appears to be derailing, and fast. That comes as relief to many in Berlin; Trump has  backed both isolationism and a more militarized approach to foreign policy that harkens back to the early George W. Bush presidency, when Berlin and Washington’s relations reached their post-Cold War nadir.

He has been relentless about Europe’s defense contributions.  “They’re not paying us what we need,” he said in his debate with Clinton on September 28, adding,  “NATO could be obsolete.” He is also skeptical of the very international organizations Germany champions, like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and perhaps the European Union itself. While Trump’s apparent admiration for Vladimir Putin might win him some points with Putin’s remaining friends in Berlin, it could undermine Merkel’s investment in a tough European line on Ukraine.

All this could mean Germany is forced to take over even more international responsibility, with all the financial and diplomatic obligations that entails.

The Obama era will be remembered as the time when America’s leadership role in Europe began to shift. Europeans got more freedom of action, but could no longer outsource their foreign, and especially military, responsibilities to Washington. Whoever is president next: Europe will have to do more.

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Germany’s new security white paper is a big step for a country still largely averse to strategic thinking. Reception bodes well for the future process of shaping policy, argue two members of the White Paper Project Group.

© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

The media have presented a variety of perspectives on the federal government’s new white paper on security policy. Much of the attention so far has been directed at topics that reveal actual or alleged differences between the ministries, such as the future role of the Federal Security Council, domestic deployment of the military, the significance of ad-hoc coalitions, and whether in the future EU defense ministers should meet in their own council configuration. These were the catchphrases that many commentators used when writing about what they considered to be marked differences.

To be sure, not everyone was in perfect agreement at all times; there were differing opinions within the administration, and it should not come as a surprise that reporters in the capital knew about these different positions given their extensive networks in the political sphere. Nor is it any surprise that an alleged “coalition scuffle” was easier to sell than news about the ministries working sincerely and cordially with one another.

But is that really the whole story? Is a lack of consensus on specific details the most important takeaway to report on the new White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr?

We don’t think so. Or to be more precise, we don’t think it should be. If you’re too focused on certain single aspects, you lose sight of the big picture. And if the new white paper is to have real efficacy as “the principal guideline for the security policy decisions and measures of our country,” a holistic approach is imperative when reading the document. This requires bearing in mind the causal interrelationships between individual chapters as well as the numerous and far-reaching proposals for further developing German security policy still to be implemented.

In short: The white paper is more than the sum of its parts.

If one only concentrates on specific aspects during the upcoming implementation phase, it won’t be long before Germany’s key security policy document gets put on the shelf to gather dust. Its only conceivable purpose then would be to serve as a tool for specific and particular interests trying to support their respective arguments by referencing selective parts, arguing “Well, it’s in the white paper.”

Leading from the Center

What are the key characteristics of the new white paper? In what aspects does it differ from its predecessors? What aspects have been developed further? And how significant a role does it play in the current debate on German domestic and security policy?

Let us begin with the last question. The white paper is impossible to understand without the context of the Munich Consensus and the principle of “leading from the center.” At the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014, Germany’s president, foreign minister, and defense minister declared Germany’s willingness to take on greater international responsibility.

This “Munich Consensus” represents a change in Germany’s understanding of itself and its role, and it indeed marks a “critical turning point,” to paraphrase political science professor Gunther Hellmann. At the same conference one year later, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced that Germany was ready to lead in tandem with partners and contribute the best resources and skills to alliances and partnerships. In 2016 the white paper was released to provide a strategic rationale for Germany’s willingness to play a more active, substantive, and responsible role in international security policy, identifying areas where both German security policy as a whole and the Bundeswehr as one of its instruments will have to evolve further.

This means the white paper is neither a starting point nor an end point, but more of a marker or milestone on the path establishing Germany’s growing international responsibility, recognizing the duties this role requires, and further developing the corresponding toolbox.

The upcoming implementation phase will be critically important to the white paper’s success. As Duke University professor Hal Brands said in his comparative analysis of developments in US strategy since 1945, “conception is only half the battle” – and here the white paper is no exception. After all, as Volker Perthes of Germany’s Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) correctly noted, the white paper is not a planning document. Instead, it is a document that articulates and justifies Germany’s willingness as well as its capability to play an ever more substantive role. Bringing these capabilities to bear – that is where the planning stage comes into play. Whether the white paper will have its intended effect is therefore largely dependent on how vigorously its priorities are pursued and its measures implemented in the various national and international areas of engagement.

Consensus as Opportunity

Let us return to the points on which there were diverging opinions between the ministries involved.

Depending on the granularity of the analysis, the white paper includes 100 to 200 individual topics. Having four aspects that merit clarification in the federal government can hardly be taken as proof of allegedly deep fissures within the administration. On the contrary, this is more an illustration of just how solid the foundation of an ever more active and responsible German security policy is at present. This broad consensus was indeed one of the defining characteristics of the entire white paper process. Consensus about the broad strokes, not the lack of agreement on specific details, is what has characterized the inter-ministerial collaboration over the past one and a half years.

This fundamental consensus is a great opportunity for the post-white paper era, because it represents a promising starting point for shaping policy in a sustainable, comprehensive way – nationally and internationally, in the Ministry of Defense and in the Bundeswehr, as well as in all other ministries and agencies. 
At the same time, it is of considerable importance to continue the debate over security policy. Integrating security policy experts and interested members of the public in this is not part of an “educational campaign” (as Hellmann put it), but follows from acknowledging that there are limits to our own understanding.

As extensive as the communication surrounding the new white paper has been – comprising more than 6,500 participants in different formats – it would be a significant mistake to assume that this approach could be enough to sway the opinion of the majority of people in our country in one direction or another. Instead, special emphasis has been put on lowering the threshold for engagement in the security policy discourse in order to further this discussion, bring in additional perspectives, and gain new momentum and suggestions. At a time when the international order is undergoing profound change and Germany is simultaneously prepared to commit itself to preserving the international order, there has never been a greater need for new ideas.

Setting Priorities, Remaining Flexible 


Although it is tempting to maximize freedom of action by having no explicit strategy, the costs of such an approach considerably outweigh the benefits. Without strategy one sacrifices a considerable amount of capacity to exert international influence and safeguard interests.

At the same time, however, our strategic approach has to reflect the characteristics of the current and future security environment. Germany operates in a complex, volatile and dynamic world – and these traits are here to stay for the foreseeable future. It is one of the key tasks of coherent strategies that they help to reduce complexity, thereby increasing the capacity for reasonable decision-making.

At the moment, there is a considerable and ever-increasing amount of uncertainty in the security environment that limits our ability to anticipate future events. Under these circumstances, it is in Germany’s interest to invest in strategic flexibility instead of opting for narrowly defined priorities. It is one of the hallmarks of the 2016 white paper that the prescribed degree of flexibility is derived from strategic analysis and not announced simply by political acclaim.

Let’s take a closer look at the structure of the new white paper to find out how this was done. First of all, the white paper opted to identify the key characteristics of Germany’s identity, its values, and its interests as an actor in international security affairs instead of starting with an analysis of our security environment. The centerpiece of this strategic narrative is Germany’s willingness to assume greater international responsibility, employing its considerable resources to uphold the international order and safeguard its interests.

It would be unwise, however, not to appreciate the limits of Germany’s power or to ignore our own vulnerabilities. Accordingly, these three variables – Germany’s willingness to actively and responsibly engage in matters of international security, along with an account of the limits of its own influence to shape events and an appreciation of its own vulnerabilities – form the backbone of the introductory part of the new white paper.

True to the idea that defining one’s identity is a crucial enabler for recognizing those developments that are relevant to our security and hence require our commitment, the analysis of the international security environment follows as the second element. This approach helps to reduce complexity further. Having defined both our values and interests and those challenges that either have the potential to put our security at risk or already are doing so means that there is a sound basis for formulating strategic priorities as cornerstones for Germany’s international engagement in the years ahead.

Some would certainly argue against giving equal status to all strategic priorities; pointing out that by refusing to establish a hierarchy among them one dodges a crucial decision. Yet taking a closer look, there are two noteworthy things here: First, although the priorities laid out in the white paper are far-reaching, they are still limited in both scope and content. Choices have indeed been made. Reducing further either the number or the reach of these priorities would not be a sound decision in light of the global reach of Germany’s security policy and the complexities of our security environment. Setting the bar as high as possible – and developing our capabilities further to meet these goals – is only a pragmatic response to the prevailing conditions.

The key areas of engagement at both the national and international level can be seen as a security policy “coupling” that offers all of the ministries options for further spelling out German security policy in subsequent strategies in their respective area of responsibility. The white paper’s first part, therefore, is more than just an introduction to an operating manual for the Bundeswehr. Instead it is a commitment to a whole-of-government approach to security that could hardly have been spelled out more clearly. That it was enacted by the cabinet – not just acknowledged – only underscores this fact.

Those who see nothing more than the “usual hazy, diplomatic prose of politics” (in the words of German journalist Christian Thiels) obviously look at strategic documents through different eyes. This kind of document is not concerned with the details of acute crisis management or organizational charts. It is about the broad strokes and about developing ideas of how to advance Germany’s interests. In this way, plausible strategies help us reach decisions, not forestall them. They are milestones, not end points.

NB. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the German Ministry of Defense or the German government.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2016 issue.

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Germany’s white paper has added significance in a future EU without the UK. There are a number of issues which still need clarification before the Franco-German couple works hand-in-glove on defense.

© REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

Published a few weeks after the Brexit vote, the German security white paper has acquired a broader meaning than intended. Faced with multiple crises and rising euroskepticism across Europe, Europeans are under great pressure to show credible leadership and action. The EU Global Strategy and the mini-summits taking place in preparation for the Bratislava EU summit in September have all expressed support for enhanced defense cooperation, improved intelligence-sharing, and beefed-up border defenses, following the terrorist attacks in France that shook Europeans’ sense of security. In a recent Weimar Triangle meeting, France, Germany, and Poland committed to “reinforce the European Union and the foundations of European integration by demonstrating that the EU is able to act.”

Major crises are driving this push for a revitalized European project and a strategically responsible Europe. However, defense and security cooperation has been hampered for years by the Big Three’s diverging strategic mindsets, with the United Kingdom’s historical rejection of an independent EU military force outside NATO, France’s tradition of strategic autonomy, and post-World War II Germany’s posture as a European economic power reluctant to use military force in global conflicts. With the UK – which has the largest military budget in Europe – heading for the exit, Germany and France are now relaunching closer European military cooperation. The challenge will be to define a project that combines France’s historical role in developing the EU’s defense with Germany’s new active role in shaping it.

In the 2016 security white paper, Germany sees itself gradually assuming a larger defense role within the frameworks of NATO and the EU: “Germany is increasingly seen as a key player in Europe,” and is ready to “assume responsibility” and “help meet current and future security and humanitarian challenges,” the white paper notes. In summary, it states: “The country has a responsibility to actively help shape the world order.” This is a major shift for Germany, signaling a necessary normalization of the German strategic mindset to better match a changing international security environment. The combination of Russia’s resurgence, the spillover effects of the crises of the Middle East and North Africa into Europe (refugee flows, terrorism, Islamist radicalization, etc.), and the Brexit vote are eroding the EU’s – and also the United States’ – capability to project soft and hard power, and changing the way Germans think about the challenges of the world around them.

At the same time, the 2016 white paper can be read as a response to the concerns of Germany’s allies (notably the US and France, but also Poland), who have been nudging Germany to take on more political and military responsibilities. In fact, the white paper aims at showing that Germany has taken their concerns into account. Since the Libyan fiasco of 2011, when Germany abstained in the UN Security Council vote establishing a no-fly zone over Libya rather than voting with its allies, France has been seeking a change in the German position regarding deployment in multilateral formats.

Berlin now recognizes that coalitions of the willing like the one fighting the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq will only grow more numerous in the future. Germany also wishes to be considered a more attractive and reliable military partner – a partner capable of achieving objectives across the entire spectrum of military operations. Paris will closely follow the implementation of these advancements, keeping pressure on Berlin to significantly improve its force projection capabilities and deliver on the idea that the Bundeswehr should broaden its spectrum of capabilities and actions.

The white paper also envisions a future European Security and Defense Union and the establishment of a permanent civil-military operational headquarters in the medium term. Shortcomings in the French- and UK-led 2011 Libyan air campaign and aging equipment used in African missions have convinced French officials of that necessity. France still sees strategic autonomy as critical, but wants to move ahead with ideas long blocked by Britain – for example a joint EU command headquarters and shared military assets. Germany is emerging as a clear leader in this field, and is showing that it means business when it comes to building up a more integrated European force with initiatives including Dutch-German defense cooperation, preparations for similar arrangements with Poland, and a proposal that, in the future, foreign EU nationals will be able to serve in the German armed forces. In the post-Brexit context, Germany is shaping up as the top nation France will turn to on defense matters.

Rebalancing Defense Leadership

This new French-German configuration will most probably benefit Germany and partially weaken French leadership on defense matters. The French are of course reluctant to give Germany too much power when it comes to defense; historically, EU defense was a French concept which benefited from German support and British cooperation (which is quite wide-ranging, as the agreements of Saint-Malo and Lancaster House testify). These days Paris is more interested in a stronger EU defense policy than in the integrationist project per se, seeing the EU as a way to share the burden of counterterrorism and diminish dependence on the US.

A European army could potentially jeopardize French strategic autonomy, though. Hard questions, like who will pay for an EU military headquarters, how it will be structured, who will be in command, and what the European army would be used for, still need to be addressed. The German project for European defense needs to be clarified and based on a French-German plan, with an inclusive approach vis-à-vis other EU member states like Italy, Poland, and other Central European countries. The idea put forward by the Weimar Triangle of an annual European Security Council where strategic issues relating to internal and external security would be addressed by EU leaders is a first, important, and easily-implementable step.

In the short run, however, Germany will not be able to replace the UK as France’s closest military partner. The Franco-German couple combines a budgetarily weakened but internationally active France with an economically strong but strategically restrained Germany, and this can only change slowly, one step at a time. In addition, Paris and Berlin have different strategic cultures and priorities. France has a special sense of responsibility for global security and does not hesitate to act unilaterally if necessary.

From a French perspective, it would be desirable for Germany to take over more responsibilities in areas where France is engaged, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. The French defense minister recently proposed that the EU should send military ships to ensure open waterways in the territorially disputed South China Sea, but Germany is not willing to initiate military operations yet, let alone in East Asia. These differences may be an obstacle to French-German efforts to develop stronger EU defenses. Paradoxically, it currently seems easier for Berlin and Paris to agree on the central strategic importance of NATO for their defense.

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© REUTERS/Ralph Orlowski

I admit I’ve never belonged to the most obsessive collectors of Angela Merkel speeches. Once, during a meeting in the chancellery, I even told her as much.

It was the middle of the euro crisis and, tired of wading through one dreary speech after another, I asked her: what exactly is your crisis message, because nothing you’ve said so far has stuck in my mind.

I cringe at the memory of my bluntness, and smile at how she politely but firmly put me back in my box, which my pride won’t allow me to reveal here. But, even in hindsight, I remain of the opinion that most of her speeches were the opposite of political communication.

Listening to her addressing her skeptical Christian Democratic Party in Karlsruhe last week, however, I finally heard a speech with fire in it. So much fire, in fact, that I wondered: who is this woman, and what has she done with Angela Merkel?

The woman who looked like Merkel said the most un-Merkel things. She insisted that aiding refugees coming to Europe was a “humanitarian imperative” and a historic challenge for the continent – and for Germany.

But mastering historic challenges, she said, is something Germany has done so often – rebuilding from postwar rubble in 1945, reuniting the country in prosperity after 1989 – “that it belongs to the identity of our country to master the greatest” challenges.

In her most daring move, she gave her “we can manage this” (“Wir schaffen das!”) remark from last August the stamp of legitimacy by depositing it in the pantheon of historic CDU chancellors and slogans, alongside Helmut Kohl’s “blossoming landscapes” and Ludwig Erhard’s “prosperity for all”.

By extension, Merkel was elevating herself into the annals of historic German leaders. Not since Frederick of Brandenburg crowned himself “King in Prussia” in Königsberg in 1701 – actually placing the newly-minted Prussian crown on his own head – has anyone in Germany tried that one.

But it worked: Merkel’s clear rhetoric and firm argument arc, livened up with some prodigious gauntlet-throwing and critic-baiting, earned her a 10-minute standing ovation and cementing her power unquestioned in the party. In six months grappling with refugees, Germany has gone from “we can manage this” to “no, we can’t” to, now, “we bloody will”.

Burying Merkel 1.0

By burying Merkel 1.0 wait-and-see caution, the Germany leader has emerged as an unquestioned European authority. Unlike most of her hand-sitting European colleagues she has identified the refugee crisis as the challenge our times – economic, political and moral – and taken bold action. She has faced down demands from her allies for a migration cap, arguing that the fundamental human right to refuge knows no arbitrary upper limits.

But, after an exhausting year of housing, processing, and feeding one million refugees in Germany, it’s clear that things can’t go on like this.

Merkel is using up her hard-earned moral and political authority to buy herself some time. But she has made a leap of faith. Measures she hopes will come on-line in 2016 and ease pressure on Germany – an uneasy alliance with Turkey, a new EU border police worth the name, and hotspot registration and redistribution centers at EU borders – are all beyond her direct control.

And, while she waits and watches, the mood in Germany is darkening. The “refugees welcome” mood from the summer, as much media hype as reality, is now far more equivocal. Overshadowed by so-called Islamic State (IS) violence in France, and a growing dread of the inevitable terrorist attack here, German Zukunftsangst (fear of the future) has made a dramatic comeback.

A poll by GfK this week showed that almost two thirds of people – 64 percent – fear for the future. Despite a robust economy and a record low jobless rate even traditionally optimistic young people are gloomy. Some 42 percent of them are fearful for the future, double the rate of just two years ago.

This age of anxiety is a curse for mainstream politicians who carry responsibility for complex problems and a blessing for extremists who offer simple answers without fear of ever having to implement them.

Dresden’s Pegida movement still mobilizes 10,000 people weekly, people who fear for the future of the Occident even if they can’t tell you what it means. And the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party has jettisoned its euro bailout-critical economist founder to take a radical right turn on migration. Its support has doubled to around 10 percent, and a state election next March in Baden-Württemberg will be a crucial, if limited, barometer of public opinion.

It has taken her a decade, but, not a moment too soon, Merkel has discovered that she can do good, rallying speeches if the mood takes her and the circumstances demand it. Just before the wheels came off her refugee strategy she retrofitted it with a badly-needed narrative: we are doing this because it is our humanitarian imperative and we will succeed because succeeding against the odds is what we Germans do best.

After a wearying twelve months of disasters – two Paris attacks, the Ukraine standoff, Greek dramas, a plane crash – Angela Merkel ended the year with her most dramatic leap to date: deploying German soldiers to assist the coalition against IS.

It is an engagement that even her close allies admit is, at best, a dangerous step into a military and strategic grey zone. While the rest of us wonder who this new Merkel is, her closest advisers insist they still recognize the woman they work for. Everything she does, they say, she does when her analysis reveals action, however risky, to be alternativlos – without alternative.

After a decade in power, a decade of being attacked regularly as an over-cautious pedant, the German Chancellor has quietly buried her anti-interventionalist self. She has taken Germany from being a solidarity-driven follower to cautious leader. But, for the first time, Angela Merkel heads into a new year without knowing for sure if her people will follow.

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Source: YouGov/”Who is handling the European refugee crisis well?”

Now her fortunes have reversed. Since deciding to open Germany’s borders to refugees entering Europe through Hungary, Merkel has found herself embroiled in fights with local leaders and members of her own party – developing a particularly contentious relationship with Horst Seehofer, Minister President of Bavaria and chairman of the CSU, sister party to Merkel’s CDU – and under fire from other European governments, who accuse her of exacerbating the crisis by encouraging more refugees to come.

Her popularity has suffered as well: the October ARD-Deutschlandtrend showed satisfaction with Merkel dropping to 54 percent, with Steinmeier down to 65 percent and Schäuble at 64 percent. Satisfaction with Horst Seehofer, meanwhile, stands at 39 percent – by no means a majority, but an 11 percent gain over September.

Germans are becoming increasingly worried about their country’s ability to handle so many arrivals. While 45 percent said in early September that the consequences of this new wave of migration would be largely positive for Germany (compared to 33 percent who disagreed), the numbers were reversed in early October, when 44 percent said  that the consequences would be mostly negative (compared to 35% who disagreed).  And while a clear majority said in early September, immediately after Merkel announced that Germany would accept refugees from Hungary, that they were not worried about Germany taking in so many refugees (61 vs. 38 percent), that confidence has slowly eroded; as of early October, a slim majority (51 percent) said they were concerned. According to a YouGov poll completed in late September, when asked to choose one word to describe their feelings about the refugee crisis, 57 percent of Germans said “afraid”.

However, other countries are hardly happier. A plurality in Norway (45 percent) said they were mostly “sad”, while the Swedes were split between “pity” (38 percent), “empathetic” (36 percent), and “disgusted” (36 percent). In France, meanwhile, a slim plurality said “angry” (36 percent), while 32 percent said “sad” and 31 percent said “afraid”. In Britain, the core European Union member state most reluctant to accept refugees at all, a 35 percent plurality said the crisis made them “sad” – followed by 26 percent who were simply “annoyed”.

In fact, while no one is particularly happy about the steps being taken, it seems most Europeans agree on one thing: Germany is not doing that badly.  According to the same YouGov poll, pluralities in France (35 percent), Denmark (52 percent), Sweden (59 percent), Finland (48 percent), and Norway (50 percent) said Germany has handled the refugee crisis well; 54 percent of Germans themselves say the same, and even a 44 percent plurality of Britons agree. Meanwhile, pluralities in nearly every country surveyed give poor marks to many of the other countries at the epicenter of the crisis, with Greece and Hungary faring particularly poorly. Europeans generally endorse the measures undertaken by Sweden, which has accepted more refugees per capita than nearly any other country, and Austria earns tepid approval.

The Germans and Swedes expressed particularly strong disapproval of Britain, with 52 percent and a 35 percent plurality, respectively, saying that Britain has handled the crisis badly – and in Germany, 26 percent said Britain had handled the crisis “very badly”. But even the Britons themselves are none too pleased with the job their government has done, with only 27 percent saying the government has handled the crisis well compared to 35 percent who said the government has handled it badly. Meanwhile, the French are particularly frustrated with their own government, with 50 percent of French respondents saying their government has handled the crisis badly compared to only 15 percent who believe their government has done a good job. While it is impossible to infer what British and French respondents would prefer, the fact that both countries express favorable views of Germany, Austria, and Sweden would seem to imply a desire for greater acceptance of refugees – in Europe overall, if not necessarily in their own countries.

Read more articles in the Berlin Policy Journal App – November/December 2015 issue.

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© REUTERS/Philippe Wojazer

Over the past five years, the German government has gathered relevant experience in leading EU policy responses. However, the factors that made Berlin effective on previous occasions only partially apply to the current challenge of managing the refugee crisis and solving the underlying deficiencies of the EU’s functioning in Justice and Home Affairs. From partners to power resources and leverage, the conditions for Berlin’s leadership differ significantly between the three crises – and, so far, there seems to be little carryover from one to another. As a result, Germany’s ability to move things forward in Europe with any sustainability looks uncertain.

Leading with Weakened Partners

If there is a unifying theme across the three cases of German leadership, it is that the German government’s strength reflects the weakness of others. At other times and under different domestic circumstances, some of Germany’s partners would probably have acted earlier and more ambitiously to help tackle the problems confronting Europe. France, for example, has traditionally been more active on migration issues and the shaping of euro area governance than it has been over the past five years. The same is true for the UK, which is traditionally very forward-leaning on foreign policy and defense issues. Since 2014, however, it has been largely absent from the EU’s approach to the Middle East and Russia, including the management of the relationship with the United States.

In both cases, the inward-looking policy-making of the governments stems mainly from the rise of euroskeptical, anti-establishment parties that make it harder for the governments to strengthen joint European approaches and decision-making. In addition, the negative experience of the UK’s intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a more cautious British foreign policy. As far as European policy making is concerned, the rise of UKIP and its attraction to both Tory and Labour voters puts substantial pressure on the British government to accommodate euroskeptical positions, which Prime Minister David Cameron has translated into a pledge to renegotiate British EU membership before a referendum on this matter.

Meanwhile, in France, the Front National (FN) has established itself as a political force. Having adopted slightly more moderate rhetoric while maintaining its traditional right-wing populist positions, FN managed to come in first in the European elections in 2014 with almost 25 percent of the vote. And it is not just the big two that are struggling to drive policy in Brussels. Southern European member states such as Spain, Italy, and Portugal have been focused on dealing with the domestic aspects of the crises in the euro area, while some smaller states that have traditionally been stable and reliable partners of Germany and the Franco-German tandem at the EU level are dealing with more political fragmentation and volatility at home.

The political situation in Germany has been remarkably stable for the past decade. Angela Merkel has enjoyed uncontested political leadership since 2005, while extreme left- and right-wing parties have failed to get a foothold in national government. Of course, domestic constraints, both political and constitutional, have shaped Germany’s approach e.g. to the sovereign debt crisis, but have not turned the government or the vast majority of Parliamentarians into euroskeptics. The country’s relative economic strength and financial solidity is underpinned by socio-economic stability and the trade unions’ readiness to accept labor and wage policies which today still sustain Germany’s global competitiveness and low unemployment.

And yet Germany’s capacity to move things forward in Europe looks anything but certain, and in order to assess it, it is helpful to take a look at the conditions for leadership in each of the crises, in a broader European context and in terms of German power resources.

Veto Power in the Euro Crisis

In the eurozone, Berlin’s position as the largest guarantor of the rescue mechanisms, along with its powerful domestic veto players (in particular the German Constitutional Court), granted the German government an unparalleled degree of influence over EU policy decisions and thus domestic policy choices in debtor countries. The perception that the single currency faced an existential threat compelled Berlin take on financial and political risks that had seemed inconceivable just a few months earlier. But in exchange, Germany was able to set the pace and conditionality of financial aid. Though some governments, at least in certain phases of the crisis, were highly critical of European policy choices with obvious German fingerprints, the gravity of the situation left them with little alternative. Berlin was thus able to push for euro area governance reforms that, from its perspective, encourage member states to adjust budgetary and economic policies and bring the euro area back to the model of a currency union which Germany thought was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, Germany had to accept higher risk sharing and financial solidarity, which has substantively changed the political economy of the euro area.

In the initial phase of the sovereign debt crisis, the German government worked with a coalition of northern and northeastern EU members, and a growing North-South divide seemed to be emerging. But as policies converged in countries struck by the crises and agreement widened that substantive reforms were indeed necessary, Rome, Madrid, and Paris lost their desire to oppose Berlin, not least because of the potential pressure of financial markets.

However, the absence of vocal and engaged political competition over policies and visions for a deepened EU has not proven to be a blessing for Berlin or Brussels. For instance, the continued absence of a strong French voice in European discussions about the future of the euro area has hampered the duo’s traditional ability to forge consensus and compromise between other EU member states. Certain essential policies over the past five years have displayed a French touch, including the creation of the European Stability Mechanism in 2010 and the increased focus on investment and growth under the Juncker Plan; however, there is little evidence of a broader Franco-German vision for the future of the euro area, and the EU institutions’ desperate efforts to push the debate on the euro area have not led to any substantive progress beyond the creation of Banking Union.

Tandem Still Functioning, Partly

In contrast, in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Berlin is working closely with Paris in negotiations with the Ukrainian and Russian governments, with strong explicit or implicit backing of other member states, in particular Central and eastern European countries. In the so-called Normandy format France became Berlin’s key partner (replacing the initial Weimar Triangle approach that included Poland), despite Paris’s reputation of being traditionally less interested in Europe’s East. In recent weeks, France’s role has increased as its strategy towards Europe’s South and Southeast has taken on more importance vis-à-vis Russia. So, although initially conceived of as a tool to handle Ukraine-Russia, this format may turn into the EU’s most important format for developing a broader EU-Russia agenda, which must now include Syria and the wider Middle East.

In this regard, the traditional power of Franco-German cooperation, which finds its strength in their complementary perspectives and preferences, is playing out well. In most policy areas, a deal between Paris and Berlin alone no longer works as a suitable compromise for other member states’ interests; but on foreign policy issues, the countries’ approaches are still rather complementary. The test for the sustainability of this approach will be whether both Paris and Berlin manage to engage the other EU governments to maintain broader internal cohesion and strengthen the EU institutions.

This cooperation on the Ukraine/Russia crisis has been essential, as Berlin has nearly had its hands full just managing the relationship with Moscow and Kiev without the added burden of holding EU and transatlantic partners together. While the direct costs of the crisis have been comparatively low, the German economy has taken a considerable hit. German exports to Russia are estimated to plummet to €20 billion by the end of 2015, half the level recorded in 2012. This sacrifice bolstered Berlin’s credibility when asking European partners to maintain European unity on sanctions against Russia; however, the active role played by France was just as essential in reassuring allies, including Washington, that avoiding a hard power escalation was not tantamount to a betrayal of the West.

Missing Incentives

The leading role Germany has taken on in the refugee crisis, meanwhile, differs substantively from the roles it played in both the Russia and euro crises. When Berlin pushed other EU member states, in particular the eastern states, to subscribe to a quota system in response to the refugee crisis, the limits of Berlin’s power became obvious. With the refugee question, the German government does not have a veto to play, and non-action does not endanger the achievements of European integration as obviously. Germany could threaten to erect fences as other EU countries transport refugees to its borders, but this would mean that Germany would surrender its traditional preferences for open borders and free movement of people within the European Union. This leaves the government in Berlin with little leverage to coerce cooperation, in contrast to the euro-area crisis, when the risks attached to German non-action and non-commitment to financial assurance gave it powerful leverage over domestic politics in other crisis countries and the EU in general.

In handling the refuges crisis, Germany also lacks powerful, supranational allies. In various phases of the crisis in the euro area, the ECB and the European Commission pursued interests similar to those of Germany, paving the way for Germany to pursue its own policy approach. In the current crisis, however, there is no such international body to lay the groundwork beforehand.
There are also important differences between the three crises with regards to financial burden and risk sharing. While in the euro crises Germany took on financial risk and agreed to subscribe to a mutual insurance mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism, Germany’s willingness to take in a large number of refugees (up to one percent of its population in the year 2015 alone) is not seen as being an act of inner-EU solidarity, but rather as an attempt to exert moral leadership in the EU. And while they might admire Merkel’s liberal position, it puts some governments with little experience with immigration, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, in a difficult political situation. As a result, there is a rift between Berlin and the some of the countries that have been its closest allies in both eurozone policies and the Russia sanctions. The challenges Berlin has had to face to move other member states to share the refugee burden may grow even larger if Germany at some point starts asking for financial support from Brussels to help pay for the refugees in Germany.

Meanwhile, Germany’s approach to the migration crisis, which is domestically seen as very open and pro-European, has been viewed differently elsewhere in Europe. The government’s back and forth on the migration issue – initially taking a very liberal position and inviting Syrian asylum seekers from other EU member states, then re-introducing border controls when too many came – puzzled onlookers. First Berlin seemed to have abandoned the Dublin convention, which requires that refugees only apply for asylum in the first EU country they enter, with its invitation. Then it seemed to be violating the Schengen Agreement of open borders by reintroducing controls. This led a number of political leaders and journalists to question Germany’s commitment to European integration and agreed norms and rules. This is a tricky point: in the euro crisis, and particularly with regards to Greece, Berlin seemed to hold rigidly to a “rule-based approach” for fellow member states struggling with debt and recession – and this even after Berlin had previously bent these same financial rules, such as when it pushed for a non-application of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2002/03, and then its eventual reform. It is thus not hard to see how smaller and medium-sized EU member governments could get the impression that Berlin can pick and choose when the rules matter, and that a large country’s power overruns the rules and laws of EU governance.

Germany’s leadership in the refugee crisis is still young. And it is still very unclear where Merkel’s policies will lead, both domestically and on the EU level. In its early stages though, this newest crisis reveals cracks in Berlin’s leadership position in the Union since its moral authority has yet to translate into much substantive movement on the European level and left Berlin struggling to find powerful allies.

Complex Search for a Role

At a time when the European Union is facing unprecedented internal challenges and controversy, external aggression, and global change, Germany is still adapting to being the most powerful and ambitious country in the EU, and to the criticism and reactions that such a position brings. And domestically, Berlin is also still in the process of defining what leadership can and should mean. Germany’s old habits are being challenged, as are its assumptions on close cooperation with allies and friends. It is becoming increasingly clear that the United States, at least for the near future, cannot and will not help as it used to when Europe was faced with serious security challenges, while Germany’s European allies, in particular large member states like France, the UK, and Italy, are mostly preoccupied with domestic challenges. It is still unclear whether we are currently witnessing a learning phase, in which Germany will discover how to use its power resources in a complex setting of insecurity and competing objectives and stabilize the EU as a framework for rules-based action, or whether Berlin is doomed to failure given the difficulties of systemic and domestic conditions.

The complexity of Germany’s search for a role in the EU is illustrated by the fact that, in the three crises, its leadership has not followed a consistent pattern, neither in terms of partners nor with regard to power resources and impact. While for decades the starting point of European initiatives was generally a powerful Franco-German approach, Berlin is now working with different coalitions of member states depending on the policy areas. This requires agility, as well as intense and diverse investments in bi- and multilateral relationships in the EU, particularly as coalitions forged in certain policy areas do not work in others; countries that were with Germany on austerity in the eurozone and a hard line on Greece, for example, were fiercely against Germany on accepting refugee quotas. Despite the indisputable achievements of the recent years, the accumulation of crises and the patchwork of interest coalitions across issue areas indicate how potentially limited German leadership in the EU might be if it cannot partner with large countries or a stable group of smaller member states across policy areas.

In 2010 the German chancellor questioned the role and impact of supranational institutions in crisis management and the big issues of EU policy making in her speech in Bruges, pointing to a future “Union method” based on intergovernmental cooperation over a “community method” led by EU institutions. However, deliberate coordination with the EU institutions may prove the method of choice for the future. Germany’s suggestion to strengthen the European Commission’s role in the surveillance and coordination of member states’ economic and budgetary policies is one example of this. The German foreign minister has also been explicit in lending support to EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who has just completed her first year in office. To make progress in addressing the refugee crisis and improving the EU’s governance in Justice and Home Affairs, large countries like Germany will need to work closely with the supranational EU institutions, in particular the European Commission and the European Parliament. Both institutions are important as venues for secondary law making. In addition, the European Parliament can play an important political role, leveraging its role as a forum for trans-European debate with trans-European party structures, which can be used to further trans-European consensus building.

Investing in Power

In terms of power resources, Germany’s ability to impact EU decisions has proven strongest when others need it to act to protect core achievements of integration (such as the euro) and it has a credible narrative about domestic veto players that limit its flexibility. Where it lacks a credible threat, such as on refugee quotas, it has not been very effective. An alternative to coercing through threats would be persuasion through incentives; but to date, Germany has not successfully implemented incentive structures in the EU that would improve its leadership capacity.

In order to build and maintain leadership capacity in other policy areas, Germany will need to invest in EU capacities in two ways. First, it will not be able to drive EU efforts forward unless it continues to take on a large share of the burden of joint solutions, in particular as a number of member states, including Greece, Spain, and Portugal, as well as Italy and France, are still recovering slowly from the financial and economic crises of the past years. This does not mean that the German government cannot also help build European solidarity mechanisms from which it may eventually benefit itself – for instance for sharing the costs of handling the refugee crisis, or for strengthening crisis resilience in the euro area. In fact, as the influx of refugees continues to put stress on Merkel, Berlin may need to make the case at home that the EU also helps Germany cope in order to maintain public support.

Secondly, the German government will have to invest in building trust, consensus, and coalitions. As the back-and-forth in the refugee crisis or Germany’s pressuring of Greece have shown, any surprise move from the German government risks being interpreted as a manifestation of self-interest and a misuse of its power position. Building and maintaining partnerships and coalitions will require more time and consistent political effort than Berlin has been investing. Germany, as the most powerful country, will likely also need to resort to issue-linkages and cross-policy deals, for instance to keep closed ranks on Russia or to find compromises on the migration issue.

Meanwhile, German policy-makers and the German public will need to learn how to deal with criticism without dismissing it as a natural side effect of a leadership role. Since the financial and economic crises hit the eurozone eight years ago, Germany’s role in Europe has been vehemently criticized; Germany has been accused of shirking responsibility, obstructing progress, and leading in the wrong direction as it suits national preferences. Policy-makers in Berlin need to get better at engaging with their critics, and even learn from them when trying to tackle European challenges.

Since 1946, and in particular since regaining full sovereignty as a nation state, Germany has always defined its European and international role as part of a European and international order that is bound by treaties, secondary law, and EU decision-making procedures. But for German citizens and next-generation leaders, Europe has become a matter of choice, not an obligation grounded on historical memory and shame. This is where the largest domestic leadership challenge for the government emerges. Voters today need more convincing.

This is an especially important task in the face of the refugee crisis, which, for Germany, is a huge socal and political challenge with the potential to destabilize Germany politically. The government will need to balance its liberalism on asylum policy, which is enshrined in the German constitution, and the capacity of its administration, civil society, and policy-makers to actually handle the practical, political and security challenges that come with the current inflow of refugees. In order to maintain Germany’s pro-European stance and its openness to globalization and internationalization, the refugee crisis must not lead to the perception of a loss of control, rising insecurity, or the return of identity issues.

A domestic political crisis leading to further polarization and possible political instability would endanger Germany’s support for European integration. The effects of this would be enormous – not only for Germany, but for Europe as a whole.

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© REUTERS/Mike Segar

Thus, autumn 2015 represents the start of German foreign policy’s next emancipatory phase: In early 2014 the Munich Security Conference marked the beginning of the public debate about the greater degree of responsibility the EU’s largest economy should assume in foreign affairs. The defensive position held at the time has now by necessity given way to an offensive one. The German government is not only ready to assume greater responsibility, it is now actively pushing for this responsibility itself: from Ukraine to Iran, from Libya to Syria, Berlin’s leaders have made clear that they want and will have a seat at the table.

Insistence upon permanent membership in the highest UN body is only one element of this strategy. Berlin has made the decision to assume an active role immediately, at the very least for the stabilization of the entire crisis zone surrounding the EU – stretching from the Maghreb at its westernmost edge across Egypt and the Middle East to Belarus. There are two reasons for this. The first is the overwhelming shock and resultant domestic pressure in the face of the singular wave of refugees currently expected to deliver over one million asylum seekers to the country this year alone. The second is the increasing sense that Berlin can no longer rely on its European and international partners to step up as needed.

Berlin’s Answer to the Refugee Crisis

Merkel’s sober – and for many, too matter-of-fact – analysis of the refugee crisis has been that this problem cannot be solved in Germany, on the German-Austrian border, nor even at the EU’s external borders alone. Despite domestic demands for speedy solutions, Merkel, together with Social Democrat Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Minister for Economic Affairs Sigmar Gabriel (the SPD party leader) as well as her Christian Union (CDU/CSU) party colleagues Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, and Development Minister Gerd Müller, has stressed that relief can only come through cooperation with non-European countries and a common fight against the very conditions which have led to the exodus. In Germany’s view, therefore, the EU must take a vast number of actions in order to restore functioning governmental structures in countries like Libya, to reach a cooperation agreement with Turkey on refugee issues, to halt the civil war in Syria, and to ensure proper care and support for Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.

This will require, according to German government leaders, both considerable rethinking as well as addressing nationalistic reflexes which have been exposed across a number of EU states, including Germany. In response to these, Merkel has underlined more than once that “fences around Germany will not help.” The same applies to the Hungarian wall, a structure relieving no one but that country alone of its duties. A general policy of returning the refugees to Austria is also impossible, because the German government can see this would unleash a fatal chain reaction: every smaller European country along the so-called Balkan route could fall into chaos. Attempts at a common European solution and the preservation of passport-free travel within the Schengen zone would be completely destroyed by such a singularly nationally-focused action. For this reason, an alternative set of rules addressing everything from improved EU external border protections, to common asylum procedures, to a binding quota for union-wide refugee distribution are being negotiated with great haste. Germany self-critically recognizes that it was long a country which not only did not support, but in fact actively prevented the EU Commission from moving forward with exactly these changes.

Unfortunately, from the German government’s point-of-view, these necessary European policy changes no longer go far enough: Over the past two decades, the German credo has focused on the continued coalescence of domestic and European policy. At the moment, however, Merkel’s rhetoric and train of thought resemble those of an international development aid organization: Even domestic and world politics are bound ever more tightly. On public television’s political talk show “Anne Will”, the chancellor admitted that she had long believed countries like Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan to be far, far away. She elaborated her new One World-thinking thusly: “And suddenly we see that there are people running for their lives to such a degree that long distances like these are suddenly shrunk down to nothing, and they come to us in the EU, making us part of these conflicts and unable to differentiate between domestic and foreign policy.” She further pointed to the ways in which tools and methods of communication and information-sharing like smartphones have caused the world to grow together. Merkel also commented that the high number of EU citizens who are fighting alongside the radical Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq alone would have qualified Europe as an actor in this Middle Eastern conflict.

No More Looking Away

Her conclusion: Rather than looking away, as we have done before, we must engage even more strongly in the future “so that people can stay in their homeland, and perhaps we will not face so much integration work.” In other words, every euro spent in a crisis country helps us spare many more that would have to be spent to clean up the mess of failures in other parts of the world. Every current foreign policy attempt can assist in the prevention of domestic problems later. Berlin is beginning to sing the holy anthem of diplomacy. “We have a joint responsibility for the unstable regions surrounding us,” German EU Commissioner Günther Oettinger stressed on October 18.

Thus countries like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt are moving into the forefront of German foreign policy – and no longer simply for export promotion. On October 18, Merkel flew to Istanbul to sound out the degree to which Turkey will let itself be drawn into joint efforts to contain the flood of refugees – despite the fact that the country found itself in the middle of an election campaign. At the same time, Steinmeier visited Iran and Saudi Arabia. Just in the past year, the German government’s delivery of weapons to the Iraqi Kurds eliminated two old German taboos simultaneously: for the first time, Germany both supported a militia group and delivered weapons directly into a war zone. The German Foreign Office further heavily supported the UN special envoys to both Libya and Syria in their attempts to get every conflict actor to the negotiating table. New realpolitik thinking is seeping into the otherwise strongly morals-focused German debate. “Finding something wrong and negotiating at the same time are not mutually exclusive,” Merkel said on October 8. In a TV interview, Merkel rebuffed criticism of her talks with highly polarizing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by noting that it was her “damn duty” to coordinate with Turkey.

Suddenly, the argumentation in an entire line of policy fields is shifting. In New York in late September, Merkel explicitly acknowledged the goal of spending 0.7 percent of GDP on development goals – which, given the current spending level of just 0.4 percent, will result in considerable spending increases and a necessary reorganization of Germany’s annual budget. Defense Minister von der Leyen further explained that foreign military missions are a direct contribution to efforts to keep people in their homelands – at least in Afghanistan, Mali, and Iraq. This too will lead to additional governmental spending. Both Merkel and Environment Minister Barbara Hendricks have argued that an ambitious international climate strategy is an important contribution to the prevention of the next wave of refugees, because people will increasingly be forced to flee their homes due to environmental degradation. Germany is thusly fortifying not only classic developmental strategies, but also its own commitment to climate protection: the country has promised to pay one-tenth of the $100 million contribution promised annually from 2020 by industrial nations to developing countries for their climate protection efforts.

If Berlin Doesn’t Do It, Then Who Will?

The other motive for Germany’s rising diplomacy efforts is an incipient sobriety with regard to the competencies and the political will of the country’s European and international partners. In the EU, the European Council president and the Commission have in Berlin’s view long failed to recognize the immediacy of the refugee crisis. And the 28 member countries have not shown adequate decisiveness in undertaking realistic burden-sharing measures, neither in terms of the refugees themselves nor in external border protection. Despite Merkel and Steinmeier’s attempts to form a common EU foreign policy, they both share the opinion that Berlin must once again negotiate alone and bring its weight as the EU’s largest economy and current haven of political stability to the table – as it did in the Ukraine crisis. Thus, the government increasingly focused its energy on sparking activity through, in the words of one top diplomat, its hand-holding and “cheerleading” of the others. At the EU summit on October 16, Merkel complimented the EU Commission on finally recognizing the seriousness of the situation and putting together over just a few days an action plan for closer coordination with Turkey.

This disillusionment applies even to the five veto powers of the UN Security Council. Expectations of China, a country which has long abstained from involvement in international crises, are the lowest of the bunch. That said, the country had still been part of the successful nuclear negotiations with Iran. At the same time, the Chinese leadership made clear through its actions in the South and East China Seas that it is now prepared to flex its military muscles when it comes to defending its own national interests.

In Berlin’s view, UN veto-holder Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, has proven that it sees itself as more of an opponent to the post-1989 European peace framework than the partner all had once hoped it would become, especially since the dawn of the Ukraine crisis and above all its annexation of Crimea. “If any proof is still needed that the Kremlin exercises massive influence over the hybrid warfare methods of eastern Ukraine’s separatists, then consider the fact that at the very moment when Russia engaged in Syria, the [Ukrainian] conflict stopped virtually overnight,” said von der Leyen on October 17. Following Russia’s attacks on Syria, therefore, the German government has pushed for Moscow’s inclusion in finding solutions, despite the fact that Russia’s support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its bombings of non-Islamic State opposition groups has made it, much like in Ukraine, ultimately part of the problem.

Berlin’s opinion of the three Western UN veto powers is currently little better, though. Every demonstration of transatlantic and European partnership in the past few months has been met with the same criticism by leading German politicians of all stripes, namely: Our Western partners either cannot or do not want to make a decisive contribution to the stabilization of the crisis zone surrounding the EU. On October 18 Chancellery Chief of Staff Peter Altmaier pointed out that it was the Middle Eastern order wrought by France, the UK, and the US that was presently collapsing.

The UK no longer plays the same decisive role in Europe’s foreign policy that it once did, even if London contributes heavily in specific cases, such as the recent financing of refugee camps in Syria’s neighboring states. In Germany’s view, the UK and France contributed to the fall of the Libyan government with their military intervention without so much as a concept for the necessary stabilization of the country in its aftermath. These countries thereby created an unintended hole through which smuggling bands transport refugees to Europe – refugees that neither country is prepared to assume responsibility for in any reasonable quantity.

French President François Hollande may be Merkel’s close partner when it comes to European policy, but he allegedly has the tendency of using foreign military deployments as a short-term means of raising his domestic political profile. A public German-French spat over the unannounced French air attacks in Syria outside of the US-led alliance did not break out only because Merkel needs Hollande’s support in many other areas. With great effort Berlin concealed its anger that Hollande had delivered Putin a perfect set-up and apology for Russia’s unilateral action in Syria just a few days later.

Disillusioned with Obama

The disillusionment with US President Barack Obama also looms large. The German government has acknowledged that given China’s increasing strength, the US is bound to give greater focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Merkel and Steinmeier therefore cautioned in 2014 that the EU must play a greater role in resolving conflicts in its own neighborhood. At the same time, members of all parties accused Washington of lacking vision and rigor in the very areas of foreign policy most important for Europe. In their decisive response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Obama and Merkel were still united. But as the US president insulted Russia by calling the country a “regional power”, Berlin, alarmed, could only shake its head: Such a move demanded even stronger actions from Putin to amplify Russia’s attempts to raise its own profile – attempts which play out on Europe’s, not Washington’s doorstep. Merkel and Steinmeier repeatedly pushed their American counterparts over the past few months to get over their own superpower pride and at the very least to negotiate with their Russian counterparts over how to de-escalate those crises Putin plays an active role in.

And in his attempts to avoid making or even to correct the mistakes of his predecessor George W. Bush, Obama’s promise to withdraw troops helped tip Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan into even greater chaos and created a vacuum which strengthened the radical IS, an opinion held not just by many Republicans in Washington. Only after pressure from his NATO partners, including Germany, did Obama correct his Afghanistan decision in mid-October. Merkel and Steinmeier today openly warn that the collapse of the Iraqi and Libyan states paved the way for the rise of IS and other terrorist organizations and that the international community should not be allowed to make the same mistake again in Syria.

The German government had largely been removed from international efforts in Syria. Berlin first pushed the regime-change rhetoric of its Western allies with regard to President Assad as hard as it has the resulting disavowal of the very same maxim over the past few months as the fight against IS has grown in importance. Steinmeier welcomed US coordination of Western and Arab air attacks against IS forces in Syria. Germany’s military campaign against IS, however, will remain limited to deliveries of arms to Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq.

In October, Berlin followed with alarm as new battles in Syria triggered another wave of refugees from the war-torn country – and without anyone beyond UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura even attempting to reconceptualize political deescalation. Nuclear powers Russia and the US appeared ever more strongly as if they would gamble on such a proxy war turning into a direct conflict.

Germany as Mediator – Also in Syria?

For this reason, German diplomacy has ramped up its engagement in Syria since September as well, making Germany 2015’s unrecognized international negotiations champion. Berlin played a central role in every significant negotiation of the year, from the Ukrainian Minsk Agreement to the long-standing Iranian atomic conflict and even the Greek euro debate. Applying its typical soft diplomacy strategies, the German Foreign Office even made it possible for every party in Libya’s civil war to sit together around a Berlin table. This new decisiveness is illustrated by the fact that a German diplomat, Martin Kobler, will next take on the role of UN special envoy to Libya – despite the fact that Mediterranean countries such as France or Italy have traditionally viewed northern Africa as their domain.

In the face of over 250,000 dead and millions of refugees, Berlin is now begging every regional and international political actor to forget their disparate and particular interests and finally come together for talks – including even Russia, Iran, and representatives of the Syrian government. IS represents a common and dangerous enemy. Berlin sees its own role as facilitator of this “mediation process” – especially as Germany has yet to involve itself militarily. That such a process will require shaking hands with leaders one would under normal circumstances avoid is seen as the lesser evil, considering the degree to which the EU and Germany have been overwhelmed by refugees. As Merkel explained on October 8 at a CDU event in Wuppertal, “Foreign policy will always expose conflict between the values we are bound to and our own interests.”

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Two of them, in the United Stares and in the Federal Republic of Germany, illustrate varying structures and styles of democracy, each with advantages and disadvantages. The measure of both is their capacity for leadership and their ability to govern effectively; but the two systems operate differently, with different arrangements of power, institutions, and processes reflecting their origins and experiences. Understanding these differences helps to illuminate policy-making priorities, processes, and outcomes – which is important when two countries are finding common ground, and even more so when they are not.

Both President Barack Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel are skilled politicians who are confronted with political, social, and economic forces when making policy and interacting with the institutions of their respective systems of government. Both need to shape the narratives around their policy choices to secure domestic political support and leverage in dealing with other national governments. German and American leaders share this challenge, even though they operate in very different environments. …

Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – November/December 2015 issue.

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