© REUTERS/Gonzalo Fuentes

France’s election has laid bare a deep divide along geographical and social lines on how voters see the future of their country. The run-off between an urban pro-Europe electorate backing Emmanuel Macron and an anti-EU working class supporting Marine Le Pen represents a clash of France’s two faces.

The map has been split into two, with overwhelming support for Le Pen in the northern and eastern regions of France that have been hard hit by unemployment and de-industrialization. She also swayed voters among the disenfranchised working class on the southern Mediterranean coast and poorer Paris suburbs.

Macron, meanwhile, secured big cities such as Paris, Lyon, and Bordeaux, as well as the west of the country, winning nearly 24 percent of the vote. Le Pen came in just behind Macron with 21.5 percent, a record high for her Front National party.

Despite Le Pen’s significant gains, this might well be the end of the road for her. Not only is her centrist rival Macron already the front-runner, he is also seen as the ideal candidate to unify the right and the left in a Republican Front – an unwritten agreement between France’s mainstream parties to band together and prevent the far-right FN from winning.

As in past elections, analysts expect French voters to strategically gang up against the far-right contender in support of her rival candidate Macron. Political leaders of all mainstream parties have already called to form a firewall against Le Pen in the May 7 run-off.

Has Le Pen Hit a Ceiling?

The large swathe of voters who did not support her in the first round are unlikely to swing behind her now. Le Pen might just have hit a ceiling. That is likely why she announced she was temporarily stepping down as head of the Front National, in a bid to win over a broader base.

She has built her platform on an anti-Europe agenda, calling for a “Frexit” – an exit from the eurozone and the European Union – a message that far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon has also championed. He scored a surprising 19.6 percent of the vote, nearly doubling his 2012 result. Mélenchon, 65, is a former Trotskyite; he ran a campaign denouncing banks, globalization, and the EU – just like Le Pen.

That means the populist vote on both ends of the spectrum adds up to an astonishing 40 percent. Mélenchon and his party “La France Insoumise” (“Rebellious France”) refused to endorse Macron after the first round. He did, however, launch an online appeal to his supporters, calling on them to choose between abstention, a blank vote, or a vote for Macron – with a specification saying: “voting for the extreme right candidate is not an option.” It is indeed unlikely for Le Pen to gain much traction with far-left voters.

Yet analysts warn that turnout will be key to the outcome. If it is expected that supporters loyal to Le Pen will vote en masse, it is not necessarily the case for those who are not convinced by Macron. Should a large number abstain in the final round, Le Pen would benefit.

Despite a marked surge of anti-Europe sentiment, the majority of French voters still fear the Front National; some 58 percent see in it a danger for democracy.  Many believe Le Pen’s nationalist ideas and her anti-immigration stance as based on xenophobia and fanaticism.

Since Le Pen took the reins of the party from her father, Jean-Marie, in 2011, she has worked hard to sanitize its image and rid it of deep-rooted anti-Semitism and revisionist claims.

But her efforts were tarnished by her recent claim that France was not responsible when French police rounded up around 13,000 Jews from occupied Paris in July of 1942 and led them to an indoor stadium, the Vel d’Hiv, before deportation to the Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz. Few survived.

Macron for Europe?

A Macron victory, meanwhile, would make him the country’s youngest president ever at 39 and shatter the political mold of the Fifth Republic, which has been ruled by presidents who hail from either the conservative or socialist parties.

Macron is a polished former investment banker who turned to politics under François Hollande’s presidency in 2012. He stepped down from his post as economy minister and formed a new political movement “En Marche!” (“On the Move”) last year to shake up the country’s traditional right-left divide.

His critics argue Macron is still an obvious product of the establishment, but he has won over voters with vows to rebuild the “failed” and “vacuous” French political system “that has been incapable of responding to our country’s problems for 30 years.”

His platform combines socially left policies with a liberal economy. If elected, he has vowed to invest in job training, extend unemployment benefits to all, reduce the number of students per classroom in working-class neighborhoods, and boost teacher’s salaries. He also would cut business taxes, relax labor laws, and shrink the public sector.

Macron is an ardent supporter of the EU and has indicated he wants to forge a new Franco-German partnership to lead the 27 countries of the EU. He has called for efforts to reinvigorate the eurozone and give a new impulse for the single market, which he said should be vigorously defended in Brexit talks with the United Kingdom.

His goal is to reinforce border control cooperation, establish a European defense fund to finance common military equipment, and to set up a shared intelligence information system. He also said he would expand Erasmus programs, supporting Europe student exchanges, to help the new generations build a European identity.

But if Macron is expected to benefit from the consensus vote against Le Pen on May 7, his presidency will face a huge test in June’s legislative elections. With his movement still in its infancy, he is unlikely to secure a majority in parliament and might be left to juggle with the very constellation he defeated: the traditional left-right bloc that has held sway in the National Assembly for 60 years.

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© REUTERS/Jean-Paul Pelissier

For months, French voters have been told they are likely facing a stark choice in May: maintain the liberal democratic order with a France at the center of the European Union, or turn over the keys to a far-right leader who promises to leave the euro, break up the EU, and have France go it alone. These two sides are represented by the pro-EU centrist Emmanuel Macron and the far-right nationalist Marine Le Pen.

But in the last weeks of the campaign, a third possibility has emerged. Jean-Luc Mélenchon gives voice to the same anti-EU, anti-globalization instincts that Le Pen has tapped into. But instead of a far-right France going it alone, it would be a far-left France.

Mélenchon, who enjoys the support of the Communists, is now polling at 18 percent, above the center-left and center-right candidates Benoît Hamon (9 percent) and François Fillon (17 percent). He is nipping at the heels of the “insurgent” candidates Macron and Le Pen, who each stand at 24 percent, according to polling released earlier this week by Kantar Sofres. The top two candidates in the election’s first round on April 23 will go head-to-head in a second round on May 7.

Tear it all Down

Mélenchon is no stranger to French politics. He has run for president before, in 2012, when his anti-globalization message garnered him 11 percent of the vote in the first round. Then, as now, he promised a wholesale transformation of the French state – a dismantling of the Fifth Republic with its powerful presidency and the creation of a new, socialist Sixth Republic. He would push for a complete transformation of the EU. And if he cannot get it, he will invite the French people to vote in a referendum to leave the EU.

Throughout the campaign, it was assumed that this was not Mélenchon’s year. After all, the French left was in a shambles. Outgoing President François Hollande’s cratering poll numbers meant that the Socialist Party candidate Hamon had no chance. Nor, it was assumed, had the far-left Mélenchon.

But then came the debates – and Le Pen saw her message being co-opted.

Mélenchon stole her thunder by also saying he was open to calling a referendum on EU membership, and then went even further by calling for an end to the Fifth Republic. “I think the Fifth Republic is working just fine,” Le Pen scoffed. Suddenly, she was looking less bold than her challenger – and boldness is what her followers want. For those at home looking for dramatic change, a new option was put before them.

Who’s Losing Support?

The Mélenchon surge is likely coming from three directions.

First, he is attracting Le Pen voters who want a radical break with the established order but are worried about the Front National’s history of fascism and anti-semitism. There are also those voters who had planned to vote for Le Pen in the first round as a protest vote, and then turn against her in the second round. Some of them may know think that opting for Mélenchon would send an even stronger message, but they have no intention of voting for him in the second round either.

Then there are those who may be gravitating from Macron to Mélenchon after ceasing to view the former as the true “insurgent” candidate. There have been concerns that Macron peaked too early. Now, Mélenchon is riding a wave at what political analysts know is exactly the right time. Enthusiasm for Macron may be slipping as people come to view him as the “establishment” candidate.

Finally, there are likely a significant number of voters who are abandoning Hamon in the final stretch as it becomes clear the Socialist Party candidate has no chance. Hamon gave a lackluster performance in both of the debates, and core Socialist voters may be gravitating to the other candidate of the Left.

Anybody’s Game

What was looking like a certain Macron-Le Pen final match has now been thrown open. Mélenchon still has a long way to go to make up the six-point difference between himself and the frontrunners.

But the important thing is that Mélenchon is moving up while the front-runners are stagnating, and at this stage of the race that is significant. Were half of Hamon voters to move to Mélenchon, he would make up the difference and enter the second round. The big question then is: who would he be facing off against?

All might have depended on a third presidential debate scheduled for April 20, but that has been called off (reportedly at Mélenchon’s urging). That gives Hamon no chance for a comeback performance to woo back the Socialist supporters.

If he were to face off against Macron, the dynamics would likely be similar to what would have been seen in a Macron-Le Pen contest. A combined alliance of the right and center would rally behind Macron to defeat the far-left candidate, in the same way that the left and center would rally to defeat the far-right. Polls say Macron would handily win this contest.

Two Extremists?

But what happens if it ends in a Mélenchon-Le Pen contest? It would be a truly incredible situation, pitting the far left against the far right and guaranteeing France an extremist leader in any event – and a leader hostile to the EU, though the chances of a referendum are probably smaller under Mélenchon than under Le Pen.

According to polls, Mélenchon would beat Le Pen but not by a comfortable margin. Would the other candidates rally around a far-left contender? Could France’s institutions and businesses bring themselves to endorse Mélenchon? Or would everyone keep quiet, possibly resulting in the lowest second-round turnout in the history of the French Republic?

The prospect of this scenario has spooked markets. As news of Mélenchon bounce spread this week, the yield difference between French and German ten-year bonds widened three basis points, and a measure of two-week euro volatility against the dollar spiked to over 10 percent, the highest in more than three months.

What may bring them comfort is that Mélenchon experienced a similar bump just before the 2012 election, before falling back down. In the end, his 11 percent was under what polls had predicted.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

They might not be running for office in Germany, but for France’s presidential candidates, a campaign stop on German soil has become par for the course. French politicians have often used their larger, more powerful neighbor as a platform to lay out their visions for France and Europe. It was little surprise therefore to see former Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron, who has built his own “En Marche!” movement, arguing for a more proactive France in front of a crowd at Berlin’s Humboldt University.

Conservative François Fillon, on the other hand, traveled to the German capital to meet with his fellow Christian Democrat, Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the start of the year; he also delivered a speech calling for a more streamlined Europe. As for the leader of the right-wing populist Front National, Marine Le Pen, she teamed up with the German populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party at a gathering of far-right leaders in Koblenz in January, where she took aim at Berlin’s pro-European policies.

All three candidates have drastically different visions for France and its role in Europe, and this May’s presidential election will undoubtedly have a significant impact on Germany and France’s unique bilateral relationship – by far the closest within the EU. It still holds true that any European solution requires Berlin and Paris at the helm, whether it’s dealing with eurozone woes or the migration crisis. Yet in recent years, Europe’s two most powerful states have been increasingly limited in their ability to advance a common agenda.

Disappearing Power

The last few years have shown that Berlin and Paris are finding it ever more difficult to strike compromises and mobilize partners. Despite a series of crises within the EU and beyond, pressing questions remain unresolved. Joint efforts to deal with the refugee crisis in 2016 proved difficult. Merkel and President François Hollande met various times over many months in an effort to find a common solution, with little to show for it: the proposal that emerged from those hours of negotiations aimed to strengthen the EU’s external borders and reform the Dublin asylum regulation. But their in part quite far-reaching proposals met with opposition, and Berlin and Paris proved unable to convince their  European partners of the wisdom of their ideas.

Interests within the bloc have grown increasingly diverse, and European-level governance has become controversial, particularly with the wave of right-wing populism sweeping the continent. And in some policy areas, integration is already so advanced that any step forward threatens to tread upon national sovereignty.

It is precisely the question of integration and sovereignty that Germany and France have failed to address adequately; daily cooperation between the two governments has helped in times of crisis, but neither Merkel nor Hollande have succeeded in setting out a clear vision for Europe or taking responsibility of a fragile community. If the two leaders don’t present a series of goals and agree to compromise on European policy at the highest level, the vaunted French-German partnership could slowly grind to a halt. More importantly, both countries are facing key tests in national elections this year, and new faces could well reshape bilateral relations significantly, redefining a long-standing partnership.

A Fluid Balance

France and Germany’s relationship was long defined by a relatively fluid yet stable equilibrium: Germany was traditionally stronger economically, and France drew its influence from foreign policy and military prowess. But after the end of the Cold War, France’s traditional tools of power – its nuclear arsenal, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and its ties to the United States – started to lose their shine. At the same time, Germany discovered a newfound confidence on the world stage, building a mighty export-oriented economy and assuming a leading role in the EU. The scales began to tip decisively, and the chasm between the two countries sparked tensions.

In the back halls of the National Assembly in Paris, frustration brewed amid feelings that the French government had been relegated to second fiddle and no longer held the keys to its own future. Berlin, on the other hand, felt increasingly vulnerable to the mistakes and weaknesses of France and other European countries. These doubts and misunderstandings still plague their relationship today.

Some perceptions have improved: Gone are the days of 2012, when controversy over German dominance in the EU stirred hefty debates in France. Yet even if Germany is not explicitly mentioned in campaign rhetoric, Berlin’s relative strength has cast a shadow over growth, competitiveness, and economic reforms. For many French voters, Germany is clearly setting the course for the EU.

In a country where a sense of national pride and sovereignty run deep, it is not entirely surprising that German power has become a source of irritation among voters and lawmakers – particularly for those on the more extreme ends of the political spectrum. Marine Le Pen has accused Germany of enslaving “the peoples of Europe.” The far-left politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon, meanwhile, has demanded a showdown with the German government. Voices of discontent have even emerged from mainstream parties: the Socialists’ candidate, Benoît Hamon, is calling for an alliance of Europe’s left to counter Berlin’s policies, and Fillon aims to make France a solid counterweight to Germany. Until now, only Macron appears to see France and Germany bound by their commonalities rather than their differences.

Tensions between France and Germany are hardly new. The familiar power play between the two neighbors featured prominently in the 1970s after the oil crisis, during the ensuing economic crisis, and even in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War and German reunification. At that time, French newspapers were awash with the question of whether a dominant Germany posed a threat to France because it wielded far more economic and political influence. These days, anti-German sentiment has returned.

Yet in these debates, it is often forgotten just how much Germany depends upon a politically and economically stable France. Germany has often been described as a reluctant hegemon, uncomfortable, self-conscious, and uncertain of its own power. In recent years in particular, Berlin has longed for a stronger, more robust partner in Paris willing and able to share the burden of responsibility. France’s weak points are seen as a liability, both politically and economically.

What’s more, fears abound in Berlin, too, where some lawmakers are increasingly concerned they are being hoodwinked, with suspicions that Paris is undermining the eurozone’s rules. In some circles in Berlin, there is the belief and expectation that France “must do its homework” before further steps can be taken. On both sides, mistrust and strained communication have hindered actual progress.

Reset Needed

The framework of France’s and Germany’s relationship has also faced significant structural changes that make it difficult to restore ties to what they once were.

First, Europe’s debt crisis has sharpened the lines of asymmetry between the two; while Germany was barely affected, France is still struggling with an unemployment rate of around ten percent, sluggish growth, and towering public debt. Meanwhile Germany is enjoying full employment, record surpluses, and a balanced budget; and the US has overtaken France to become its largest trading partner.

France has also seen the president’s authority suffer a blow in recent years, due to the governing Socialists’ internal squabbling on European and economic policy. The Front National, meanwhile, has pushed public discourse to the right and destabilized the political landscape. These developments have weakened France’s position in the EU as Paris has become a less reliable partner. Germany has witnessed a long period of stability, but the AfD is threatening to rattle the status quo. If the populists garner enough votes to enter parliament in September (which looks likely at this point), mainstream parties in government will be reluctant to pursue more integrationist policies.

Second, structural changes have reinforced the uneven distribution of power in the EU. A series of crises have tarnished the bloc’s image and made Germany’s disproportionate strength loom especially large. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon shifted power in Brussels, enhancing the role of the European Council and weakening that of the European Commission. That has benefited large countries like Germany that could build coalitions and frame policy; France, meanwhile, has been facing domestic battles and has struggled to appear credible.

Third, skepticism and downright hostility toward the European project has grown significantly in France over the last decade. According to a study from the Pew Research Center in June 2016, 32 percent of those polled were in favor of the European Union, compared to 69 percent in 2004. It’s no wonder then that most of this year’s presidential candidates have curried voters’ favor by portraying the EU as the problem, rather than part of the solution.

For years, European integration was sold to French voters as a form of protection, especially from the powerful forces of globalization. But doggedly high unemployment and the rising number of people in precarious living conditions have seen trust in Europe dwindle. Germany is seen as the main architect behind the EU’s strict “austerity” rules as well. In short, many French believe they have been forced to implement policies that are directly responsible for their economic and social woes.
The EU enlargement in Eastern Europe of 2004 – bringing the bloc to 25 members – was regarded with skepticism, too, triggering feelings of uncertainty and alienation. A year later, those sentiments bubbled to the surface as a majority of French voters rejected the EU’s proposed constitutional treaty. The commitment to more fiscal discipline only fueled frustration further.

Germans, on the other hand, mostly saw the 2004 enlargement as an historic and strategic necessity and a further economic opportunity. Doubling down on fiscal discipline was considered a prerequisite for long-term sustainable growth, and financial solidarity was a key cornerstone of future success. Clearly, France and Germany were drifting apart.

Bringing Back Old Habits

In the past, Germany and France have countered mistrust and resentment with more cooperation: Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing built the foundation for a common currency in the 1970s, for example. Some twenty years later, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand brought their governments together for a conference that paved the way for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Integration, it seemed, was a natural reflex to uncertainty. These days, that seems no longer the natural thing to do.

The task of keeping the EU together and preserving the single market in the face of Brexit and the Trump presidency has taken top priority, while the question of reforming treaties is no longer considered realistic. Yet it is time to return to the old reflex, with a new approach: fresh Franco-German initiatives could be effective if they are based on a deep understanding of the economic and social circumstances in both countries. The labor market is a prime example. German companies have complained time and again about a shortage of skilled labor; France, meanwhile, is struggling to combat high unemployment. French youth lack real prospects at home, and that threatens to destabilize social cohesion with serious consequences. Front National has scored well with young people by portraying itself as a champion of the weak. Together, Germany and France could bridge the labor gap.

This year is likely to be a decisive one for the EU and the French-German relationship. There is no denying that the two countries have the power to tackle crucial questions on integration and reform. It is equally clear, however, that competing interests and political polarization will threaten to drive a wedge between Berlin and Paris, particularly with elections drawing closer. Joint initiatives might fail to overcome anti-European sentiment; yet it is more likely that the EU itself will fail if these two countries do not forge a path ahead together.

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© REUTERS/Christian Hartmann

Back in 2011, when Marine Le Pen became president of the Front National, she set about an ambitious project of reshaping the party in her image. She aimed to preserve the core elements of national populism that defined FN’s vision under the direction of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, while forging a new balance between identity politics and the defense of the social welfare state, thereby targeting the French working-class and modest middle-class voters.

It seems to have worked. Although Marine Le Pen failed to get past the first round of voting in 2012 and FN was unable to take the lead in any French region in 2015, the party obtained the largest share of the vote. That allowed Le Pen to boast that she had transformed FN into “France’s greatest party” in terms of voter numbers.

At its core, FN is built around a coherent rejection of liberalism, both in economic and cultural terms. The party has always been culturally illiberal, but its new economic outlook is a real evolution from its strongly anti-communist tradition and its support for liberal economic reforms in favor of small businesses. While her father wanted to be a “French Reagan” in the 1980s, Marine Le Pen has embraced a protectionist agenda and Marxist rhetoric. This has also enabled FN to reinforce its opposition to the EU, which is seen as weakening national sovereignty and promoting foreign interests while imposing ultra-liberal economic policies in France.

FN’s program for this year’s vote stems directly from this illiberal vision, with a mix of economic nationalism (the so-called préférence nationale), defense of the French welfare state model, and assertiveness on identity and security issues. A strategic council of 35 personalities works around Le Pen to establish the party’s platform: Some proposed measures to appeal to the aspirations of disappointed left-wing voters, like keeping the 35-hour work week and rolling back the retirement age to 60, while others adhere to the traditional far-right program, and suggest limiting legal immigration to 10,000 people a year (it is currently around 200,000). But the platform could also very well be titled “France first.” There are proposed constitutional reforms to forbid all forms of communitarianism, promote French cultural heritage, and transform French economic and labor laws; social benefits would be distributed to French citizens first, and the government would enforce a three percent tax on imports.

These measures, if implemented, would lead to an open breach with the European Union, not least because some of the reforms violate EU law. As far as FN is concerned, the European project is the main agent of liberalism in France, actively working to diminish the country’s unique character. FN justifies its anti-EU posture as necessary in order to regain political sovereignty and economic prosperity. Le Pen has promised to engage in a complete renegotiation of the European treaties if she is elected and to organize a referendum on a so-called Frexit within a year of her election.

Yet, unity within the party should not be overestimated. The views of FN voters are surprisingly diverse, especially on fiscal and social issues. Interestingly, these divisions are embodied by the Le Pen family itself, as Marion-Maréchal Le Pen, the rising star of the party, is closer to the economic liberalism of her grandfather Jean-Marie than the economic protectionism of her aunt Marine. Similarly, the question of exiting the European common currency  has been a thorn as well, because it may not be popular among the middle-class right-wing electorate – and their support will be crucial for victory at the national level. The 2017 program continues to promote a return to national currency, but it stops short of committing to a specific time frame and offers vague alternatives in order to reassure conservative voters. Finally, more symbolic issues such as the death penalty and family planning have been put on the backburner, antagonizing the party’s old guard. Marine Le Pen must turn her program into a real electoral success – at least during the National Assembly elections in June – to prevent these tensions from becoming open fractures.

What could an FN victory in the presidential elections mean for France and Europe? The implementation of its program would have three implications in the relatively short-term future: a constitutional crisis in France, the end of the European project as we know it, and an uncontrolled increase of the public debt that could potentially lead to more economic instability in Europe.

First, the party’s program implies a deep transformation of the French political system and a focus on direct democracy. The use of referendums in order to bypass parliament and all forms of checks and balances would become systematic and call the basis of France’s current republic into question. Second, the FN’s explicit commitment to deconstruct the European Union and fully restore national sovereignty over political and economic decisions would put an end to any future initiatives at the European level. With Brexit negotiations and the migration crisis, the EU may be too weak to survive this additional test. Finally, European partners are likely to be seriously concerned by the implementation of the FN’s illiberal economic program. These doubts would severely aggravate the French public deficit, currently already above the EU limit of three percent of GDP. Implications for the European economy could be disastrous and lead to a new cycle of crisis.

La Dédiabolisation of Le Pen

One of the keys of FN’s rise to national prominence has been the normalization of its image, an effort to break through the “glass ceiling” that has kept the party from winning major elections. When Marine Le Pen took over after her father’s forty-year reign, the FN had a hard-line anti-immigration, anti-Semitic image. She set out to change that by refocusing on economic issues with a pronounced anti-EU bent. This process, known in French as dédiabolisation (literally “undemonization”), also brought in new faces to shift the party away from her father’s numerous and well-documented excesses. The prized recruit was Florian Philippot, trained at the elite École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) like many other politicians. Philippot flirted with the left in his formative years, but is now Le Pen’s lieutenant and one of the few palatable faces FN can feature in the media.

The goal of the normalization process was to widen the electorate, and it appears successful given FN’s various electoral achievements between 2012 and 2015, during which time four separate elections took place (municipal, European, departmental, and regional). In the December 2015 regional elections, FN succeeded in attracting the highest proportion of voters in its history: 6.8 million people voted for the party in the second round of the election, more than in the first round of the 2012 presidential election.

Yet FN has also largely benefited from voter apathy. A closer look at the European and regional elections show historically high levels of abstention, at 57 and 42 percent respectively, with especially high rates of non-voting among 18- to 24-year-olds. That is the very same age group where FN has made the most progress.

In the December 2015 elections, FN attracted about 35 percent of the youth vote, almost 15 percent more than mainstream parties (even if 64 percent did not go to the polls). In 2012, Le Pen only managed to win around 20 percent of young people’s votes. The increase goes hand in hand with rising support among male manual laborers. More than 43 percent of blue-collar workers and 36 percent of regular employees declared their intention to vote for FN. The most dramatic spike can be found among business owners, farmers, and independent workers: 35 percent of them chose FN in 2015.

The gains in these socio-economic segments largely correspond with FN consolidating its vote in its traditional bastions in the southeast, the north, and northeast of France, regions that are still paying the price of deindustrialization. These are the same regions where FN will look to increase its influence, especially by capturing seats in this June’s parliamentary elections.  At the same time, FN will have to worry about the risk of hitting its glass ceiling: A poll from February 2016 shows that 63 percent of French disagree with the party’s ideas, and 62 percent have no intention to cast their ballot for FN. Despite its undeniable progress, the party has struggled to broadly widen its electorate and reach a majority in national polls.

The Failure of Mainstream Parties

FN can also thank the failures and shortsighted strategies of recent governments for its rise. Le Pen’s discourse has gained influence because her criticisms of the so-called system increasingly seem to reflect the reality of French politics. In fact, FN’s greatest achievement has been to take advantage of growing resentment toward mainstream leaders to appear the only real option for change. The lack of clear political alternatives has reinforced that anti-system rhetoric.

Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande have both, for different reasons, failed to fully embrace the traditional role of the president in modern-day France. The Fifth Republic was meant to provide solutions to chronic political instability by ensuring that the government could rely on strong parliamentary majorities. Yet the constitutional framework and electoral code which limits the multiplication of smaller political movements have helped the consolidation of bipartisanism in France. As a result, the same two political parties have ruled France since 1981, winning every presidential and legislative elections for more than 35 years. The shift of power from the main conservative right-wing party – today’s Les Républicains (LR) – to the French Socialist Party (PS) is increasingly seen as politically irrelevant since both seemed to implement the same liberal policies.

The rising “elections without choice” sentiment has played into FN’s hands. Marine Le Pen and her father before her successfully portrayed all their opponents as one single political entity responsible for France’s stubborn economic stagnation and communitarian tensions. Established parties have also participated in the success of FN’s anti-system discourse. The strategy of the cordon sanitaire, the cooperation between the right and the left to prevent a FN candidate from winning at local and national levels, is perceived as confirmation that the system acts to block the democratic process and the victory of non-established forces.

Mainstream parties have also dangerously fostered anger and disillusionment among parts of their own electorates by campaigning on illiberal measures and failing to deliver once in power. Their use of illiberal discourses can be explained by their need to appeal to the most radical parts of the electorate in order to win elections. For the mainstream right, it is essential to obtain the support of voters who are particularly sensitive to immigration, tradition, and security issues; for the mainstream left, victory can only be achieved with the help of voters opposed to the liberalization of the French economy. The last two presidents provide striking examples of this strategy: In 2007, Sarkozy ran a campaign focused on identity and the fight against crime, while Hollande won in 2012 after claiming to be “the enemy of the liberal financial world.”

Yet right-wing governments have not, in fact, reexamined or amended the decisions of the left on cultural issues, from the legalization of abortion and the abolition of the death penalty in the 20th century to rights for same-sex couples in the 21st. Similarly, criticizing the liberalization of the French economy has not led successive left-wing governments to revise economic reforms ushered in under right-wing governments.

What’s more, the role of the president during the last two presidencies provides a key to understanding how mainstream politics and their representatives have been delegitimized. Sarkozy’s presidency (2007-12) was marked by overcommitment: He was unable to delegate, and his exercise of power, called a hyperpresidency, led to a politicization of presidential functions. Eventually, Sarkozy was seen as solely responsible for the failures of government policies. This created a feeling of general instability and weakened the presidency as well as the entire French political system. In 2012 Hollande came to power with the clear intention of reshaping the presidency and counterbalancing the Sarkozy effect. Yet he failed to embody the leadership expected from this role, and his government suffered as a result from being perceived as lacking authority.

The depreciation of the presidency has made mainstream parties look incompetent, and attacking FN for its lack of experience and unfitness to govern has become more difficult in this context. Le Pen’s discourse, centered on ideas of authority and strength, benefited from popular frustration with failing leadership.

While she has considerably transformed the image of the party, the FN still struggles with translating these changes into a decisive national win that would validate her move toward a structured illiberal platform. A loss in the presidential election would need to be smoothed over by a tally of more than 40 percent in the second round, and at least fifty seats (out of 577) in the June parliamentary elections. It would allow her to consolidate power and ensure that her presidential platform remains the guiding light for the way the party will try to influence policy in the next five years and beyond. After all, a new president who fails to rebuild citizens’ trust in the political system will only strengthen Marine Le Pen’s chances in 2022.

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In March 1968, just two months before student protests broke out in France, the famous editorialist Pierre Viansson-Ponté wrote, “France is bored.” He described a country almost sedated, made numb by state television, its young people disinterested in world affairs, and its president, General Charles de Gaulle, content with inaugurating monuments and visiting agricultural fairs. This was a nation “neither unhappy nor really prosperous,” a country wallowing in “apathy and stillness,” wrote Viansson-Ponté. But what could one possibly complain about? “Boredom, for a nation, is the closest thing to happiness,” suggested the author. “Who would miss wars, crises, strikes?” The French, he noted, “have all too often shown how they can love change for change’s sake, and at whatever cost.”

Almost half a century later, it isn’t hard to find signs pointing to a likely explosion of French outrage: 1968 France was perhaps bored, but 2017 France is entirely fed up. It is angry, frustrated, and often scared. All of these feelings will play out in the presidential election. The key question is whether that rage can be channeled into a genuine democratic renewal, or whether dark political forces will win the day.

The risks are hard to overstate. For the first time since World War II, there is real danger that a fascist-type leader will be given the opportunity to rule France. Understand correctly: This isn’t to say Marine Le Pen is the likely next president. But her chances of reaching the highest office cannot be discarded. Her victory is possible. And not just because opinion polls (which indicate she will be soundly defeated in the second round) shouldn’t be taken entirely at face value.

A strong wave of public indignation has gripped France, triggered by a financial scandal rocking the campaign of François Fillon. The mainstream right-wing presidential candidate paid his wife large sums of money from parliamentary funds. The outcry is such that there has been talk of a “regime crisis,” with the presidential vote itself at times cast into doubt. Fillon’s prior image of an “honest man,” which helped him win his party’s – Les Républicans – primaries, took a very bad beating. The current of anger toward the elites has perhaps never run as strong as it does now. Anything that smacks of the establishment seems to be a byword for fraud or incompetence. Ordinary people following the Fillon saga were thinking, “How is it that we struggle just to get by, while politicians continue to cheat and thrive?” Trust in institutions has dipped – the army an exception with its strong popular support. All of this is fodder for populist forces.

French anxieties come in three types. There is fear of globalization, fear of losing a “national identity,” and fear of being further downgraded on the European and world stage – no small matter in a country that likes to pride itself on a “universalist” message and has always sought prestige. In his memoirs, de Gaulle famously compared France to a “Madonna” and “a fairytale princess.” “France is truly itself only when it stands in first rank: Only vast endeavors can compensate for the ferments of dispersion that its people carry within,” he wrote emphatically. Myths can inhabit a nation deeply. Many French people feel reality doesn’t reflect what they are entitled to have.

France suffers from deep domestic fault lines. Entire social groups feel pitted against one another: young versus old, unemployed versus employed, rural versus urban, unqualified versus educated, immigrants versus non-immigrants. To be sure, such divisions exist in many countries, but in France they take on a somewhat existential dimension because of the egalitarianism and indivisibility that are historically attached to the notion of the Republic. After terrorism struck on French soil in ways unseen since the Algerian War, there were stark fears that social cohesion might completely break down. But more than anything, it is the decades of mass unemployment that have taken a severe toll (the joblessness rate stands at 10 percent nationwide and 24 percent among the 18-24 age group). Some 64 percent of French people believe today’s youth have fewer chances of being successful than their parents. Surely, this is fertile ground for those who seek to designate scapegoats. A January 2017 survey showed 62 percent of those polled believe Islam is a “threat to the Republic” – although, interestingly, 55 percent believe “immigration is a source of cultural richness.”

Getting Ready

Le Pen is getting ready to capitalize on accumulated fears. That is why the April 23 and May 7 presidential election stands out as the most volatile, unpredictable, and potentially earth-shattering political event in recent French history. Attitudes toward Marine Le Pen are deeply divided. Although 55 percent of the French find her “worrisome,” she tops the list of the politicians who supposedly “understand the problems of ordinary people.” The taboo of a far-right president no longer holds in France.

In early February, Le Pen was leading in opinion polls with a steady 25 percent of the vote in the first round of the election. That was even before she started ramping up her campaign with a rally in Lyon, where she promised to introduce a system of “national preference.” Le Pen is 48 years old and absolutely determined to reach power – unlike her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was content to be a fringe politician. She wants to court the populist vote, left and right, with protectionist slogans and promises to save the welfare state from “neoliberal” economic cuts or from foreigners. She casts herself as a shield against external forces supposedly seeking to dictate to France, with the European Union high on her target list.

Of course, Le Pen is selling an illusion, but that doesn’t mean people aren’t buying it. She stands to gain from Fillon’s political collapse if it happens. She can also benefit from the divisions and radicalization on the left, now that a Jeremy Corbyn-type figure has been chosen as the Socialist candidate. Benoît Hamon’s designation comes across, by the way, as a definitive indictment of François Hollande’s lackluster presidency. Hamon’s program is somewhere between utopian and maverick, including the introduction of a universal basic income, the legalization of cannabis, and a tax on robots.

As a result, many French democrats have started placing their hopes on the 39-year-old former banker Emmanuel Macron – now seen as the main bulwark against Le Pen. A centrist, Macron emerged from Hollande’s presidency rather disgusted by the state of French politics and the difficulty of reforming the country. A former economy minister with a taste for theater, he runs a distinctly unconventional campaign. He’s broken with traditional left-right party politics. His start-up “En Marche!” (“Forward!”) movement claimed 170,000 members ten months after its launch. One of Macron’s characteristics, apart from his youthfulness, comes from his campaign team’s electoral techniques, which much resemble those of Barack Obama in 2008 (resorting to big data, mapping out neighborhoods, and sending out activists for targeted door-to-door action). Like Obama, Macron casts himself as a messenger of hope (he speaks of “the triumph of hope” in his rallies). Macron wants to “reconcile” French people beyond partisan, ethnic and religious lines. He appeals to an urban, connected, educated, “globalized” part of the electorate. He speaks for a France that doesn’t live in fear, but is fed up with the “old system” all the same. Le Pen, on the other hand, appeals to those who are both afraid and fed up. There are many of those.

Outside the Bubble

To get a measure of France’s mood, it’s important to get out of Paris. France has long been a strongly centralized state, going all the way back to the royal courts where aristocrats spent their whole time plotting against one another or seeking favors from the monarch. The Paris elite is seen as constantly obsessed with itself rather than with the lives of ordinary people – it’s a perfect recipe for popular resentment.

Tarn-et-Garonne, a southwestern region of lovely, rolling hills covered with orchards and vineyards and small villages, was historically dominated by the left. Now, it is Marine Le Pen territory. The number one party is the Front National, which harnessed 35 percent of the vote in the December 2015 regional elections. There is extreme frustration with high unemployment and deteriorating public services. Workshops and factories have been shuttered over the years. People are worried about having to drive longer distances to find a doctor, about whether a school will close down for lack of funding, about low wages, and a general sense that they are being neglected. People feel let down by successive governments, left and right. Le Pen has never been in power, so she gets the benefit of the doubt.

Add to that a new, deep-seated feeling of insecurity. Terrorist attacks in Paris and Nice in 2015 and 2016 have traumatized an entire nation. In Tarn-et-Garonne, xenophobia creeps up in conversations about the local North African community, made up of the descendants of 1950s migrants who provided labor in agriculture, picking fruit. A small number of young Muslims have turned to the strict and often radical strain of Islam called Salafism. They are closely monitored by security services. Although the overwhelming majority of the immigrant population is fairly well integrated, public perceptions have soured.

Of course, France’s travails aren’t unique. Anti-establishment sentiment and a disgruntled middle class are found in other Western democracies, too. They have produced Trump in America, Brexit in Britain, and the rise of the far-right in other parts of Europe. France has specific vulnerabilities, though. Globalization has weakened the role of the state, which had played a strong role in the nation’s economic setup since Colbert in the 17th century. Identity politics and questions surrounding immigration resonate in specific ways because of the country’s colonial past (remember, the Front National traces its roots to the 1960s Algerian War). The trauma left by homegrown terrorism has reignited profound ideological and political battles unique to France because they concern its own specific brand of secularism, laïcité. Witness last summer’s much covered “burkini” dispute in which a high court had to intervene.

Painful Comparisons

Some international comparisons have become painful. The French are acutely aware that their country’s economy has been largely surpassed by Germany in the last decade or so. This fuels criticism of the EU among parts of the electorate – certainly the part Marine Le Pen appeals to with her “France first” rhetoric. The European project was meant to be a multiplier of French influence, but it’s hardly seen that way anymore (although a majority of citizens do want to remain in the EU). After France lost its empire in 1962, de Gaulle had opted for decisive rapprochement with Germany. Assuming Le Pen isn’t elected, rebooting a strong Franco-German partnership could go a long way toward repairing the nation’s perception of itself.

Ironically, when you look closely at some statistics, France’s predicament isn’t quite as bad as generally assumed by its own citizens. Poverty rates, for example, are lower than in Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. But that doesn’t prevent 87 percent of the French from believing that anyone can fall into poverty during their lifetime. Income inequality is equally lower in France than in the countries mentioned above, yet French citizens are convinced of the opposite. The golden rule of politics, however, is that perceptions matter more than realities. And some realities do bite: In the last decade, income per capita in France has stagnated in a way unseen since 1945.

France is today a deeply fragmented country, with no common national narrative driving it forward, no sense of direction, and a loss of trust in the political class. Wide gaps separate those who believe in openness and those who would prefer to erect walls on national borders. France’s upcoming presidential election is not just a battle for the Élysée Palace; it amounts to a redefinition of a collective identity and a nation’s role in the world in the 21st century. The stakes couldn’t be higher: In the age of Brexit, Trump, and populism, this will be a test case for the preservation of democracy in one country and for the survival of the EU as a whole. France today hovers on the edge of political convulsions of a very different sort from those of 1968. But there is little doubt it is heading for pivotal, tumultuous times. The French are fed up, but to use Viansson-Ponté’s words, the danger they now contemplate is “change for change’s sake, and at whatever cost.” Many will want to avoid a collective step into the abyss.

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“We have the right to be proud to be French and should say so out loud!” It was a sentence that drew a roar from thousands of Marine Le Pen’s fans as she launched her election platform over the weekend. They showered her with standing ovations and chanted “Marine Présidente” and “On est chez nous” (“This is our country”).

At a party rally in Lyon, the leader of Front National had painted herself the savior of the nation in the face of terrorism and globalization. And she struck just the right chord with traditional FN voters who had traveled from wide and far to hear her speak.

Le Pen is banking on their support. She is aiming to pull off yet another surprise in what has already been one of France’s most extraordinary presidential election campaigns. But the road to victory seems to be rocky, to say the least.

So far, the presidential campaign has seen a series of twists and turns. Neither the Republican nor the Socialist presidential candidate – François Fillon and Benoît Hamon – had been expected to win their party’s primary elections. And neither of them might now stand a chance to become president. Instead, Le Pen is leading in the polls – at least when it comes to the first round of voting. She may well have to take on independent candidate Emmanuel Macron, whose ratings have unexpectedly been skyrocketing.

Polls are predicting Le Pen won’t win the second round of voting (the decisive run-off vote) whoever she faces. But she’s hoping to prove those figures wrong, and she’s doing so with a 144-point manifesto that reflects traditional FN policy lines – sovereignty, a strong state, an anti-immigration stance, and economic protectionism. It plays to right-wing populist and nationalist sentiment on the rise in France.

Yet at the same time, the manifesto appears to be softer than FN’s previous platform in the 2012 elections. Controversial measures have been toned down or dropped entirely. The return of the death penalty, for example, is no longer to be found. An exit from the eurozone is mentioned, but it no longer takes up a whole chapter. And anti-immigration measures like tougher penalties for foreign criminals are still part of the program but not as omnipresent as they used to be.

That’s a well-known FN strategy – the so-called “dédiabolisation.” By un-demonizing its image, the party has been able to gain significant ground in regional and local elections over the past few years. Emmanuelle Reungoat, political researcher at Montpellier University, believes it’s an easy ploy to pick apart.

“On closer inspection, this manifesto is along classic FN lines and even rather radical in certain points,” she observes. “The party is pledging for a very authoritarian society and party model that is everything but soft.”

Stiff Competition

Le Pen will also be facing stiff competition in Macron, the former economics minister. A central part of Le Pen’s appeal is that she depicts herself as an outsider to the system. After all, her party has never governed the country.

But Macron is also playing the outsider card. He says he identifies with none of the established parties and is running on an independent, market-orientated ticket. To many, his slogans sound more positive and inclusive than Le Pen’s doomsday messages against globalization.

The latest polls predict Macron will be second and no longer third in the first round of voting. If so, he would get through to round two – and beat Marine Le Pen, according to predictions.

Macron has of course been benefiting from yet another surprise of this election season. François Fillon, the Republican candidate who had been campaigned as “Mr. Clean,” has found himself embroiled in a financial scandal over alleged payments to his wife and children for work they didn’t do. Despite increasing pressure to drop out of the race, Fillon, apologizing to voters on Monday, is standing fast. Still, some disappointed Fillon supporters are seen as willing to vote for Macron.

And there is yet another candidate Le Pen should be watching – Benoît Hamon, the surprise winner of the primaries of the Socialist Party (PS). The PS is of course suffering from President François Hollande’s historically low approval ratings and has long been predicted to come fifth in the first round of voting. They are even expected to be outdistanced by the far-left candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

But the former education minister seems to have rebooted the socialists’ image, promising a “desirable future,” or the right to dream again. His message is not lost on French voters: Hamon is speaking out against austerity politics in a country where growth has been sluggish and unemployment high. He is proposing to further reduce working hours from 35 to 32 hours per week and introducing a universal monthly income of €750.

Hamon has now overtaken Mélenchon in the polls and is rising steadily, increasing his share of the vote from 8 to 17 percent. An alliance with the far-left candidate could boost him further. Victory no longer seems completely out of reach, says Bruno Cautrès from the Centre for Political Research at Sciences Po in Paris. “Don’t write him off too early – no-one knows what will happen next in this election campaign,” he warns.

That element of uncertainty could of course also benefit Le Pen. But Jean-Yves Camus, political analyst at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, believes the party won’t be able to win. The reason: the FN is facing a Catch-22.

“The party would need to become a lot more mainstream to win the necessary more than 50 percent of the vote in the run-off. But at the same time, it needs to maintain its outsider image so as not to lose its core supporter base,” he says. “I think the FN is just designed to forever stay an opposition party.”

NB. German readers may want to visit the German Council on Foreign Relations’ “Frankreich Blog” (“Liberté, Égalité, Élysée”) for detailed comment and analysis of the French presidential elections.

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