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The third chapter of The World As It Is, the memoir by Barack Obama’s former speechwriter Ben Rhodes, is entitled “A Community of Fate.” The title refers to a phrase that Rhodes proposed to include in Obama’s speech in Berlin in July 2008, but removed at the last minute. Rhodes had hoped the speech would be comparable to the famous addresses delivered by John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan in Berlin during the Cold War. Rhodes’s speechwriter colleague Jon Favreau had been reading a book about the Berlin airlift. In it, a German woman who experienced American “candy bombers” air dropping supplies into West Berlin said of Germany and the United States: “We are a community of fate!”

Rhodes loved the phrase “community of fate,” which he felt “echoed” the Obama campaign’s message—and JFK—and planned to use it to end the speech. Obama loved it too—in fact, Rhodes writes, it was “the one thing in the speech Obama loved the first time he read it.” Obama was even meant to try to say the original German word—Schicksalsgemeinschaft—with the help of phonetic spelling, just as JFK had said “Ich bin ein Berliner” in German in Berlin in 1963.

However, just before the speech was to be delivered at the Victory Column, Rhodes was told by a German who was translating the speech on behalf of the Obama campaign that “Eine Schicksalsgemeinschaft” was the title of one of Hitler’s first speeches to the Reichstag. Rhodes immediately pulled the phrase and considered it a lucky escape. “How had I gotten so close to such a huge mistake?” he asks himself in the book. When he told Obama why they needed to drop the phrase, Obama joked about the headlines they might have got: “Obama echoes Hitler in Berlin speech.”

The implication of the story Rhodes tell in The World As It Is is that Schicksalsgemeinschaft is one of the many German words that has been contaminated by the Nazis. Yet the word is used all the time in debates in Germany—particularly in the context of the European Union. Chancellor Angela Merkel and former Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble have frequently talked about the EU and the eurozone as a Schicksalsgemeinschaft. So what’s going on here? Would going ahead and using the phrase “community of fate” really have been such a huge mistake as Rhodes concluded?

All In it Together

The word Schicksalsgemeinschaft expresses the idea that a particular group of people shares a common fate. Originally, it was used to describe coal miners, hostages, or the survivors of a shipwreck—in other words, groups of people that shared the possibility or experience of a disaster of some kind. But has also been applied to political communities. Put simply, it expresses the idea that we—whoever that is—are all in it together.

The Nazis used the phrase mainly in the context of the nation—Germany as a community of fate. If anything, it’s this application of the term in a national context rather than the term itself that the German political establishment seems to have rejected. the implication being that it’s not so much the concept of a “community of fate” that is problematic, but rather the idea of nation as an exclusive political community.

Yet the term is still sometimes used even in the national context without apparent consequences for the user. For example, in 2006, Christian Democrat parliamentary group leader Volker Kauder said in an interview: “Wer Deutscher werden will, muss sich auch zur deutschen Schicksalsgemeinschaft und damit zur deutschen Geschichte bekennen.” (“Anyone who wants to become German must also commit to the German community of fate and with it to German history.”) The interview was controversial not so much because of Kauder’s use of the word Schicksalsgemeinschaft but because of his use of the concept of Leitkultur—a difficult-to-translate term that suggests a monocultural vision of German society.

Rhodes was planning to describe Germany and the United States—and by implication the West—as a “community of fate.” In other words, he was planning to use the term in exactly the kind of international or transnational context that seems to be completely acceptable in Germany. It seems that he needn’t have been so worried.

However, the confusion about the term raises the question: when, exactly, should be acceptable to speak of a “community of fate” at all? There is a tendency in Europe, and in particular in Germany, to believe that the application of a concept at the European level somehow immunizes it from the problems it poses at the national level. It seems there is some feature of the European project that somehow transforms a problematic concept into an unproblematic one, but this is rarely made explicit, let alone explained. So if it is unacceptable to describe Germany as a “community of fate,” why is it acceptable to describe Europe as one?

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Special relationships are moveable feasts, particularly in times of crisis and transition.

London has learned that twice in the last week: from the outgoing president Barack Obama and his Republican successor, Donald Trump. British Prime Minister Theresa May waited and waited for the next American president to call her after his election triumph. Eventually he got around to it – after calling many others, including a delighted Irish prime minister, Enda Kenny.

It was a diplomatic humiliation for May who, like her predecessors, talks the talk on Britain’s special relationship with the United States. Following Trump, Obama showed Downing Street who, in his eyes, walks the walk.

In the last weeks of his presidency, he spent an unprecedented three days in Berlin with his “great friend and ally” Angela Merkel. On his sixth German visit as president, the seventh in the last eight years, Obama and Merkel met three times and dined together twice, once alone in the five-star Adlon Hotel. Face-time doesn’t get any more exclusive than that.

By the time May – and the leaders of France, Italy, and Spain – were invited to join Obamerkel for brief talks on Friday morning, the European visitors would have been grateful for a cup of tea and a biscuit.

Now: Merkel has hated labels ever since she was dubbed the Pastorentochter or pastor’s daughter in East Germany. Many labels have been applied since, few have stuck. But Trump’s victory has created another, trying label for her: leader of the free/liberal/non-populist world (delete as appropriate).

All post-war German leaders have been allergic to the idea of unilateral leadership – after one prewar leader’s megalomania. But, with France, Britain, Italy, and Spain all facing their own existential crises, who else but Merkel is left to lead Europe? And, until we know if the 45th US president transitions from quasi-fascist candidate to pragmatic president, it’s clear who the 44th president is banking on.

“If I were here and I was German and I had a vote, I might support her, I don’t know if that hurts or helps,” joked Obama in a press conference on Thursday evening that stretched to an hour and beyond. In their last public appearance, the two leaders spoke and thought as one political unit, with the differences of the past – in particular US tapping of Merkel’s mobile phone – all but forgotten.

A Masterclass

Together they delivered a masterclass in high-end politics – and a passionate defense both of the transatlantic relationship and of Western values, as both are suddenly looking vulnerable.

Obama and Merkel urged the listening audiences on both sides of the Atlantic to resist the rising populists and the temptingly simple solutions they offer to the world’s complex problems. Embracing crude nationalism and allowing divisions creep into the Western alliance, Obama warned, would result in a “meaner, harsher and more troubled world.” Just how troubled a world he leaves behind was clear from the long list of unfinished business: Syria, Russia-Ukraine, climate change, the refugee crisis, and the battle against international terrorism.

For her part, Merkel picked on Obama’s warning in Athens and said more must be done to address people’s concerns about globalization, and to give the process a “human face.” Globalization critics cheered as she effectively buried the TTIP transatlantic free trade agreement – dismissed by Trump during his campaign – by vowing to “come back one day to what we have achieved.”

The two leaders’ final warning to the incoming president: do not betray Western values – or smaller countries – in pursuit of a new “convenient” relationship with Moscow on Ukraine or Syria. Merkel, who has spearheaded the icy standoff between Moscow and Kiev, vowed to “nip in the bud” any attempts to relativize national sovereignty and borders in Europe, which she dubbed the cornerstone of the continent’s most peaceful period in its history.

As President Obama said goodbye to Berlin – and Europe – on Friday, Merkel – the only world leader to see him into, and out of, office – must have struggled to suppress a feeling of dread. With pressure building on her to run for a fourth term – an announcement is likely as early as Sunday – the deeply-felt praise from Obama has made it almost impossible for her not to run again.

But, after eleven full-on years, the question now is which will run out first: Merkel’s energy to steer a world in crisis, or the partners willing to assist her, in Europe and the US. A one-woman show, even of one as indispensable as Angela Merkel, cannot conduct a special relationship with herself.

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© REUTERS/Marcelo del Pozo

Barack Obama struck a chord with Germans eight years ago in Berlin, when he promised adoring crowds a sharp break with the Bush era. But as his own era ends, the bloom is off the rose in some German foreign policy circles. Germans who once cheered Obama now complain about NSA spying, the failure to close Guantanamo, and what they see as a mishandling of Syria.

In retrospect, though, it’s hard to imagine a US president being more European – and, specifically, more German – on key foreign policy issues. The next American president will likely be less tolerant of allies who call for US action yet balk at paying their fair share. Other challenges loom.

Initially, the Obama administration seemed to have limited interest in Europe. But this wasn’t altogether a bad thing, especially since its foreign policy philosophy was so congruent with the thinking of so many Europeans, and especially Germans.

Obama’s emphasis on what Derek Chollet, a former senior official at the Pentagon, has dubbed “the Long Game” was greatly appreciated in Berlin. Obama’s reticence on military force and his defense of strategic restraint were mirrored in German circles on the left and the right, as was his emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy.

The Obama White House took important decisions on Russia that made life easier in Berlin early on, ending controversial US plans for “third site” missile defense installations in Central Europe, launching a “reset” of relations with Moscow, and backing off Bush administration plans to enlarge NATO eastward.

When relations with Russia later soured, Obama’s approach still jibed with that of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. On Ukraine, Obama understood the need for transatlantic as well as European unity – and appreciated the difficulties Merkel had in sustaining the latter. He let Europe take the lead with Russia over Ukraine, resisting pressure in Washington for a more forceful US role. Over the recommendations of top advisors, Obama then chose not to offer Ukraine lethal military aid, sparing Berlin a likely European crackup.

Washington and Berlin lined up on Iran, too. Rather than castigate Tehran and threaten regime change as his critics urged, Obama pursued and signed the nuclear deal. Similarly, his balanced policy toward Israel played well to a German public that sees Israel as an essential partner yet is deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians. A course of strategic restraint in Syria – although heavily criticized as “weak American leadership” by some in Germany – allowed Berlin to avoid thorny questions of how Germany might support military intervention there. Obama even backed off from his initial push for regional democracy promotion.

Germany may have sat out the 2011 Libya intervention, but the US president’s willingness to lead from behind there allowed Europe to emphasize its role and responsibilities in the broader region. Obama meanwhile backed the Paris agreement on climate change, opened diplomatic relations with Cuba, and mostly kept his distance from the EU’s internal problems, except when backing Merkel on Brexit or refugees.

Not everything was perfect. Beyond Guantanamo, there was scant progress on nuclear disarmament. White House Keynesians tangled with German conservatives over monetary policy and allegations that US spies had tapped Merkel’s own cellphone sparked a storm of anger in Berlin. The pivot to Asia was seen as a slight. Obama’s weapon of choice for global counter-terrorism operations – unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones – has become one of the most controversial legacies of his presidency and was roundly criticized.

But it’s hard to imagine a future US president being any easier for Germany. With just weeks left to the election, Hillary Clinton looks increasingly likely to become the next commander-in-chief. She is widely expected to seek to build on the Obama administration’s legacies while “leaning in” more on some key security issues. In particular, Clinton will likely be more assertive on Russia and Syria, might revisit lethal aid to Ukraine, and could press Germany on defense spending. Promoting democracy might also take on renewed priority. On the campaign trail, she has contrasted with the Obama administration’s doctrine on global trade – although the possibility that she might amend that position in office remains.

Donald Trump’s campaign appears to be derailing, and fast. That comes as relief to many in Berlin; Trump has  backed both isolationism and a more militarized approach to foreign policy that harkens back to the early George W. Bush presidency, when Berlin and Washington’s relations reached their post-Cold War nadir.

He has been relentless about Europe’s defense contributions.  “They’re not paying us what we need,” he said in his debate with Clinton on September 28, adding,  “NATO could be obsolete.” He is also skeptical of the very international organizations Germany champions, like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and perhaps the European Union itself. While Trump’s apparent admiration for Vladimir Putin might win him some points with Putin’s remaining friends in Berlin, it could undermine Merkel’s investment in a tough European line on Ukraine.

All this could mean Germany is forced to take over even more international responsibility, with all the financial and diplomatic obligations that entails.

The Obama era will be remembered as the time when America’s leadership role in Europe began to shift. Europeans got more freedom of action, but could no longer outsource their foreign, and especially military, responsibilities to Washington. Whoever is president next: Europe will have to do more.

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© REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach

There was an air of déjà-vu all over again as US President Barack Obama concluded his fifth – and probably final – visit to Germany on Monday.

In 2008, as a young senator and presidential hopeful, Obama promised a euphoric Berlin crowd that, if elected president, he would end the unilateralism of the early Bush years. “No one nation, no matter how large or how powerful, can defeat such challenges alone,” he said at the German capital’s Victory Column.

Eight years on, that message remains as striking as ever, but for very different reasons. In Hanover, an older, wiser, and greyer Obama warned Europe that it was still too reliant on US defense support and “sometimes … complacent about its own defense.”

It was a softer version of the damning verdict delivered in a recent interview, in which he described Europeans as “free riders” on US security and military heavy lifting. And he leaves office with a dim view of his European partners, one shared by all his recent Oval Office predecessors – and this despite a clear and present security threat.

Ahead of July’s NATO summit in Warsaw, Obama’s last visit to the continent, the president warned his European partners that their threadbare excuses on defense under-spending were no longer acceptable. If threats from Russia and the so-called Islamic State were not tackled with European verve, he said, they would poison an already tense European political debate where populists ride a wave of discontent over economic divisions and globalization fears – magnified by the refugee and migrant crisis.

Obama said the world needed a “strong and prosperous and democratic and united Europe.” In these “unsettling times”, however, Europe was instead riven with doubts about the transatlantic trade deal – TTIP – and seeking solace in populists who “try to exploit those fears and frustrations and channel them in a destructive way.”

“When the future is uncertain there seems to be an instinct in human nature to withdraw to the perceived comfort of our own tribe, our own sect, our own nationality: people who look like us, sound like us,” Obama said. “But in today’s world more than in any time in our human history that is a false comfort.”

Europe’s only sensible future was a united one, he said; allowing divisions would lead to “oppression, segregation, internment camps, and to Srebrenica” – the 1995 genocide in which 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were murdered.

Rhetorical Carrot and Stick

It was a hard-hitting intervention by the US leader during a visit with lots of rhetorical carrot and stick. Before Obama arrived in Hanover, some 50,000 people protested against TTIP – which they dubbed “Trojan Tricks in Political Business” – fearing that the deal will prioritize US economic interests over EU legal standards.

The US president said he understood the fears of globalization’s critics, saying that “if neither the burdens nor the benefits of our economy are being fairly distributed, it’s no wonder that people rise up and reject globalization.” In the final months of negotiations, however, he urged renewed political efforts to show how a US-EU trade deal would lift all boats and tackle “hypothetical” fears that an agreement would sacrifice EU social standards for US economic interests.

At a press conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel, with whom he has worked longer than any other world leader, a reflective Obama recalled their joint efforts to avert a global economic meltdown, prevent Iran gaining nuclear weapons, and secure the Paris climate-change deal. He brushed over the Snowden unpleasantness, described German troops as “vital” in securing stability in Afghanistan, and paid tribute to Merkel’s leading role in the crisis diplomacy between Russia and Ukraine.

The US leader also predicted that Merkel’s stance in the migration crisis will put her “on the right side of history.” “Perhaps because she once lived behind a wall herself she understands the aspirations of those who are denied freedom,” he said of the East German-raised leader, under domestic pressure for welcoming one million asylum seekers last year.

But on the knotty issue of Berlin offering a greater defense heft, the US leader left Germany empty-handed. Instead of leaving the US to pick up the slack, as usual, he called on the EU in general and Germany in particular to step up its engagement to fight IS in Iraq and Syria. Obama announced a quadrupling of on-the-ground special training forces in Syria, leaving Merkel on the defensive about how far Germany had come in recent years – arming IS opponents in Syria and flying reconnaissance missions over Iraq.

But in 2008 she offered similar special pleading, telling Obama during his visit that there were “limits” on how many troops Germany would send to Afghanistan. And similar arguments were likely made at Obama’s closed-door Hanover meeting with leaders from his British, French, and Italian NATO allies.

His presidency still has some months to run but, despite eight years of effort amid a constant stream of new terrorist threats, Obama must have left Germany disappointed that his promise to end US unilateralism in 2008 has yet to be met by a real European readiness to join forces in a new multilateral era.

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