Source: IPSOS-Mori

Figures from UK pollsters IPSOS-Mori, meanwhile, suggest that the race is not as close: Asked the official referendum question between February 13-16 (“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”), 54 percent opted for “remain”, with 36 percent stating they wanted to leave. Still, the figures for the “don’t knows” are substantial. And, as the 2014 ballot on Scottish independence showed, the outcome of referenda is sometimes tricky to predict.

One “wild card” factor is Europe’s continuing refugee crisis, with Britons worried about the security of their borders (and, whether justified or not, the sustainability of their social welfare structures); and the concessions Cameron negotiated with European Council President Donald Tusk, underwritten by the February EU summit, have failed to assuage concerns, with a quarter of Britons saying they “[do] not have the makings of a good deal,” nearly 50 percent saying “it has the makings of a reasonable deal yet to come” (“damning with faint praise” doesn’t quite do it) – and 15 percent calling them an “insult”. The number of Britons calling the deal “pretty good” fell nearly within the survey’s margin of error.

Will Britain leave the EU? It is not impossible. But with a couple of months to go before a referendum, Cameron – whose biggest fight to keep Britain in is with his own Conservative party and the press – has time to maneuver and levers to pull. (Germans, meanwhile, displaying tinged Teutonic positivism, said that they would prefer Britain remain part of the EU – 59 percent – but that it was more likely than not that Britain would leave. Whether this was said while picking off the petals of a daisy remains unknown.)

There is, however, an even more immediate threat to European unity. As far back as August 2015 – that is, when the refugee crisis was still discussed as a problem facing Calais and its notorious “jungle” camps – majorities throughout Europe already supported the reintroduction of border controls: two-thirds in France and the UK and over half in the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany expressed a desire to suspend the Schengen agreement which allows for passport-free travel within continental Europe; Britain and Ireland opted not to join. Since then, those numbers have in many cases increased. In January, ARD DeutschlandTREND found that 57 percent of Germans supported re-instituting border controls within the EU (in a YouGov poll, the number was 77 percent).

The fall of Schengen would deal grave damage to the union as a whole. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble warned that, should the Schengen agreement collapse, the EU would be in “tremendous danger” both politically and economically. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has been no less clear in his assessment, saying that, “If anyone wants to kill off Schengen, ultimately what they would do is do away with the single market as well.”

Are their fears justified? Schäuble and Juncker are concerned about the economic repercussions of the end of free movement within the EU, but the risks such an abrogation would pose actually go deeper than that. In its spring 2015 survey, Eurobarometer asked Europeans what the most positive result of European integration had been. “The free movement of people, goods, and services within the EU” took the top spot with 57 percent – somewhat ironic given the aforementioned number of Germans, and Europeans overall, wanting to bring back passport controls. This was followed closely by “Peace among the member states of the EU” with 55 percent.

That “free movement” edged out “avoiding war” is no fluke. In the German Marshall Fund’s 2014 Transatlantic Trends survey, pluralities listed “freedom of travel, work, and study within [the EU’s] borders” as the most important argument for EU membership in the UK, Portugal, Poland, and Greece; German and French respondents were, perhaps understandably, more likely to value the EU for its ability to keep the peace in Europe, along with the fact that it represented “a community of democracies that should act together.”

And even in these countries, younger respondents – those who have not known an EU without Schengen – think the EU is synonymous with mobility: a plurality (32 percent) of Germans aged 18-24 who thought Germany’s EU membership was a good thing listed free travel as its most important benefit, as did a plurality of young French respondents (40 percent).

Put simply: many Europeans – especially those who have not been Europeans for long, whether because of age or nationality – equate European identity with European mobility. Remove the latter and there is a risk of seriously undermining enthusiasm for the former, at a time when such malaise can hardly be afforded.

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Moscow is challenging the Europeans with breathtaking audacity. And we are taking our sweet time to consider which weapons to reach for. Militarily, we have nothing left anyway. Now, it seems, we do not even have faith in our soft weaponry anymore. EU neighbors are no longer on the way to democracy; instead they are embroiled in war and chaos and many of their people are on their way to us. Schengen – borderless movement within the union – is at an end, EU governments divided, joint institutions unable to cope; public threats abound and mistrust is spreading. Now even the German chancellor looks wobbly.

For years it has been fashionable to worry about the state of the European Union. Yet the absolute bottom line moves a couple of centimeters each year. Did the Greek euro-tragedy not ring in the end of the EU, and even Europe? Now there is the refugee crisis – and that is much more explosive because it reaches deep into the identities of Europeans. It seems to expose what divides us and bury what unites us. How can the EU hang on?

The Moral Maze

It is a truism that the best recipe to combat diminishing faith in European policies is one that weakens the centrifugal forces in the EU. That includes a solution for the acute refugee crisis and a long-term strategy to deal with migration streams, a unified, strong presence in foreign and security policy, and a sustainable structure for the economic and currency union – all so difficult to achieve exactly because of those centrifugal forces.

Take upholding the values that EU countries promise to honor when they join the union: Democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and minorities. The EU has always seen itself as the driver of transformation within countries wishing to join, leading them to respect these values as best they can. But the realization that this process can be reversed has provoked significant insecurity in Brussels and other European capitals. The fact that EU structures themselves do not always fulfill the expected democratic conditions does not make anything simpler. The gap between demands and reality has grown markedly.

Although the EU places a great deal of emphasis on values, it currently seems unprepared, even non-responsive, when dealing with this topic. This, however, is not about demanding a new debate on values. Rather, we have to realize that our posturing on values has practical consequences: it is on these that we are judged  and we must accept the fact that this applies not only to our own countries, but also to what happens within the EU. We cannot allow membership for those who continuously abuse basic values all union members committed themselves to respect. This is not a question of patronization or of interfering in the domestic matters of member states,. It is a natural part of a clear, albeit carefully conducted, European debate. We all have a great deal to lose if some of us begin attacking the values and rights we have achieved and upon which we have built the union.

The question of values is also valid in relation to European integration itself. Until now the current level of integration has pretty much held steady. Questioning the distribution of powers between European and national levels was practically unacceptable for those committed to building the union, something that was seen as an attack on the greater idea. But how can we, within the EU framework, deal with competing values? Is the value of the Schengen agreement, of passport-free travel within most of the EU to be regarded as greater than the value of security and order in EU member states? The refugee crisis clearly pushes this difficult question onto the agenda. Under what circumstances is the value of the level of integration that has already been reached secondary – and who should decide that? The general tendency to discuss “Europe” as an almost moral imperative has hampered the EU to take on this debate in a differentiated manner. But that is exactly what is urgently needed.

The Return of Nations

The political forces that have deepened and broadened European integration over the past few decades have been losing ground. But this has little to do with their Europe policies; rather, it is a function of the drift in the political party landscape within member states in general. New movements have emerged criticizing the fundamental direction and substance of European politics, and the state of democracy in many EU countries. Many of their supporters are asking valid questions.

These movements and parties, however, are different from the growing forces that question the basic idea of any peaceful integration of Europeans. These are the actual enemies of European thought and of peace within and between the peoples of Europe. They present themselves as Europeanized alternatives, but their touchstones remain national.

Established parties have in many places adapted their discussions to keep up with voters. Not only does that affect what is possible to be achieved now in daily EU politics. It also illustrates that the EU system’s many and high ratification hurdles make it very difficult to adapt. “Old” European political forces seem powerless. The best way to tackle these centrifugal forces would be a convincing political approach that prevents people from drifting toward the extremes. In the refugee crisis, though, the mood within the EU is making it much more difficult to find joint policy approaches.

The State We’re In

How can this vicious cycle be broken? The old political forces must credibly establish a conversation that demonstrates that they do not see the EU as a sacred cow, but rather as a tool with which to take on the challenges of the 21st century. If they talk of dramatic global changes, but are only ready and able to take on gradual changes within the EU system, the EU will lose ever more credibility.

Perhaps it would be helpful to indeed reconsider the balance of national and European approaches – as we are currently seeing with the refugee crisis. However, the return of state borders causes deep discomfort within the European debate. Did we adopt the post-national integration project with too much enthusiasm, and forget that, for most people, the state remains a significant point of reference? Even though the EU concept is still popular, it also prompts an uneasy feeling among many of its citizens that they no longer count in this new world without borders. Those who are committed to further build the European project must acknowledge that this feeling exists.

Centrifugal forces have also become stronger from a legal perspective. EU law has always been complex. But lately this tendency has been accelerated, first and foremost by attempts to fix the common currency. EU primary law has become a patchwork of international agreements, tied to the primary law of the EU but still making up a complicated web, with many loose ends. Further differentiations such as a “mini-Schengen” are already under debate.

In addition, a British exit from the EU would mean that a new legal basis for the relationship between the EU and UK would have to be found – one which would allow for close economic and trade relations stretching into the future. That is possible, but would only increase the complexity of the legal relationships between European states further. Legally it would probably be tolerable, but the element connecting all the pieces would become less and less visible.

Which Europe Do We Want?

Is the answer to all this to move toward a “core Europe” – an idea that is again winning supporters? The idea would be to counter centrifugal forces with a consolidation of the core in order to maintain the stability of the whole; yet there are a great deal of arguments to suggest the opposite would happen: Disintegration at the periphery could accelerate rather quickly, with fatal consequences for the EU as a model of order for the entire continent.

What then holds the European states together? To answer this question, we should discard the legal community as a frame of reference. Being European is not measured by depth of integration and the application of legal arrangements, but rather by joint values. Concentrating on this theme is not an empty phrase.  It is intimately linked to the lives of many people in Europe, even more so thanks to the dispute with Vladimir Putin’s Russia over the past few years.

It is no accident that Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, is busy with this question right now. The UK is set this June to hold a referendum on Britain’s continued membership based on a package of reforms David Cameron’s Conservative government recently negotiated with the EU. The negotiating position of the European Council included a re-interpretation of the aim of an “ever closer union” from the preamble of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. That has remained a thorn in the side of the British government, as it seems to stand for runaway continental integration – but the European Council president’s advisers offer another way to look at it. The phrase “ever closer union of the people,” they suggested recently, explicitly addresses the people of Europe. The union serves to “promote the trust and understanding between the people of Europe who are linked by living in open and democratic societies which are based on the same universal values.” This, the argument goes, is not the equivalent of aiming for political integration the British so fear; thus the formulation does not necessitate automatic integration in the sense of sovereignty transfer, and London should not worry.

Yet this interpretation provokes resistance. Former long-term MEP Andrew Duff of the British Liberal Democrats warned, with good reason, against a redefinition of the principle of “ever closer union,” which could lead in the end to the disintegration of the union. Clearly, there is a battle of ideas going on that at its core addresses the notion of “EUropeanness.”

What Unites Us?

When considered soberly, it looks like Tusk has his finger on the EU’s pulse. He knows that this interpretation could not only win over British referendum voters;it could also work elsewhere in the EU. The really decisive question is indeed one of common values. It is smart to reach now for the shared experience of universal values in democratic and open societies, which is far greater than the lowest common denominator. It is equally clever to focus initially on people and not states.
The challenge now is to form the debate about what unites us so that it does not push the people and countries of the EU further away from each other. Europe has become a continent of despondency. We are experiencing how thin the layer of Europeanization is, even after many decades. We are witnessing deep cracks within and between our societies, some of which are homemade, but which are also exacerbated from outside the union’s borders.

We must actively direct our focus to repairing these cracks, ask what caused them, listen to each other and acknowledge that we see things differently, and that we have experienced the crises of the past few years differently. We must ask ourselves how the European level has contributed to these developments, and how we are going to deal with that in the future. We must therefore create more places where Europeans can negotiate these difficult questions with each other. If we do this, we can ultimately return to a recognition of what unites us and what makes us confident again about the powerful story that European unity holds.

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The vast majority of the British people do not see European Union membership as one of the most important issues facing the country; every look at opinion polls over the last decades confirms that. By and large, the British are pragmatic about the EU; they are willing to support the pooling of sovereignty as they can see economic and other benefits. They are “skeptical” in the genuine sense of the word – but they do not stay awake at night worrying about the terms of British membership in the EU.

But there is a section of the British elite, particularly in the Conservative party and some sections of the media, in particular the press, that is completely upset with the European issue – and, frankly, obsessed with it. They go to bed worrying about how to get Britain out of Europe, and they wake up in the middle of the night worried about it; they think about it at breakfast, lunch, and dinner. To them, it is even more important than winning general elections. That virulent strain of europhobia has destabilized a number of Conservative governments over the years, and it has made it very difficult for Britain to live up to its potential.

A strong referendum vote in favor of staying in would neutralize that body of elite opinion for a while, which would allow the United Kingdom to play a much more constructive role in the union itself. I suspect that the British public will be happy to enjoy the benefits of that. What we saw after the last referendum in 1975 was a period of time where Britain, while not necessarily always the easiest partner, was actually driving a lot of the big projects. Shortly after the referendum Labor politician Roy Jenkins (he later became a Liberal Democrat) went to Brussels as the president of the European Commission. He was involved in creating the European Monetary System (EMS), the precursor to the euro. Lord Cockfield, a Conservative commissioner between 1984 and 1988, was one of the drivers of the single market project. After that, under Margaret Thatcher’s successor John Major, there followed a period of civil war within the Conservative party over “Europe”, especially the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. During that period, Britain was not very constructive.

When Tony Blair and his Labor party won the 1997 election with a landslide, the UK played a really positive role in Europe again. Blair was at the forefront of a number of the big moves toward European integration: the enlargement of the EU, the European defense initiative of Saint-Malo, the Lisbon agenda. And while Blair’s stand on the Iraq War later split Europe and diminished Britain’s role, London was instrumental in issues like the start of negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program.

Since 2010, however, with the Conservative party back in power, the unresolved fight over Europe is back, which has led to Britain being weirdly absent from a number of big foreign policy issues. The most striking example is the Ukraine crisis – London is not part of the “Normandy format” of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the framework in which negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin have been taking place. However, another strong vote to remain in the EU will likely see Britain returning to its normal position as a big country with lots of global interests – a country able to work with others to drive the EU in a positive and constructive direction. As the Blair years showed, the British public is quite happy to be part of things – if it thinks that Europe is something it is doing rather than something being done to it.

Fighting on Three Fronts

These days David Cameron is fighting on three interrelated fronts. One is the whole debate about the future of Europe and the negotiations between Britain and other member states about the British relationship with the EU, which concluded with the EU summit in Brussels on February 18-19, where Cameron pretty much got his “new deal”; the second front is the internecine warfare within the Conservative party; and the third front is about the British public.

Cameron’s theory of change is that in order to win with the British public, he cannot sell the status quo, because everyone can see that there are a lot of things wrong with the current EU. Therefore, he did not want the referendum to be a popularity contest – the EU wouldn’t win one in any member state at the moment, given her deep problems: the refugee crisis, the euro, and so on. It is not a union at ease with itself.
So the prime minister thought he needed to sell the British public a new, improved Europe – or British relationship with Europe – in order to sway people where the divisions are deepest, i.e. among the Conservative camp, and where he had hoped to convince key voices with impact within the Conservative party like London Mayor Boris Johnson (who is fancying his chances to become Cameron’s successor and came out for Brexit after the Brussels summit) or Home Secretary Theresa May who oversees immigration policy (and supports Cameron).

This sort of person is quite euroskeptic, and they are scared of their constituencies, now dominated by old and quite euroskeptic Conservative supporters. In the old days, they supported the death penalty, and if you said you didn’t support it, you were unlikely to be selected. In recent years, the question has been if you could overturn any single piece of legislation, which one would it be? And the only acceptable answer was the 1972 European Communities Act, in other words: to leave the EU. That is the political context for a lot of Conservative MPs.
Consequently, a very important part of the re-negotiation package was to do with satisfying those people, giving them the political arguments to move from a position of euroskepticism to supporting an “in” vote. And the re-negotiation is the narrow tightrope over which David Cameron and the majority of his cabinet ministers and lawmakers can walk from being euroskeptics to being in the in-camp in the referendum called for June 23, 2016.

That explains a lot of the detail of the re-negotiations, which are of no interest to most of the British public. For example, disavowing the phrase “ever closer union” is symbolically extremely important for these Conservative MPs, but it doesn’t have a huge impact on the public at large. The same applies to the “red card” for national parliaments to stop European legislation; this is of enormous importance to national members of parliaments, but probably of lesser importance to the general public, who don’t necessarily have such a high opinion of their lawmakers.

The ins and outs of Europe’s single currency are a really big issue and something which Chancellor George Osborne in particular is very upset about. But the one issue which is of real concern to the public is immigration, and it could swing the referendum quite easily. While opinion polls over the decades show that the elite conversation drives the salience of the EU for the general public, the immigration issue is very different. Concerns over immigration have been on a steady upward climb for the last fifteen years or so, and it closely tracks the real percentage of net immigration into the country. Elite debate here followed the lived experience of the public.

Abstract and Concrete

The “genius” of the euroskeptics has been to conflate these two issues, turning an abstract question on sovereignty into a concrete question on border control. Therefore, the real battleground in this referendum is not so much the question on the paper, but the question behind the question: Is this a referendum about Britain’s economic future and the dangers of leaving the single market and losing access to the single market, or is it a referendum about immigration and regaining control of our borders?

For years net immigration has risen; in 2014 the number was over 330,000. It is the biggest inflow of people since the World War II. The UK has absorbed 1.5 million Eastern Europeans. The “out” camp is basically saying this is a question about control and that Britain cannot regain control of its own affairs unless it leaves the EU. The “in” camp is going to say: the way to deal with these issues is not through control, but rather by being strong. Their slogan is “Britain Stronger in Europe”; they say the UK has a stronger economy, a stronger foreign policy, a stronger voice in the world when it remains in the EU. Basically it is strength versus control, while the “in” camp is also trying to show that the Brexit supporters don’t really have a plan.

On immigration, the “in” camp says to the public, “We hear what you are saying. We take it very seriously. We are going to try and do everything we can to mitigate the problems of immigration.” And at that juncture the renegotiations, benefits cuts for EU citizens living in the UK and such, come to bear – to show that the pro-EU politicians are aware of what is going on and that they have a plan to do something about it. But they are going to say that there are even bigger and more important issues at stake than immigration, because leaving the EU could destroy our economy and national security and may not even solve the immigration problems. One of the benefits of EU membership is that France helps us, that we can have our border checks in Calais rather than Kent. The refugees would be sitting in Britain rather than in France if we were not in the European Union.

Brexit supporters have not really worked out their argument yet. What they are trying to say – and this is where the rest of the EU can help – is that Britain is a uniquely important country. It has a massive trade deficit with the rest of the EU. It is six times the size of Norway, so it should be able to get a deal six times better than Norwayʼs. And that means it does not need to accept all of compromises which other countries have accepted in order to gain access to the single market. It should be able to negotiate its own terms, including all the benefits of single market access without having to pay into the EU budget or being subject to freedom of movement – obviously not the deals Switzerland and Norway got.

So one of the things that other member states need to do is saying: “You’ve got to be joking!” Either you get access to the single market, in which case you are going to have to assume some of the responsibilities, or you can have a free trade deal or a customs union with us; you can be like Turkey or Canada or some other country. In that case , fine – you do not have to accept free movement, but then you will not have access to the single market, especially not for services. And the other thing is to try to solve the whole question of migration and benefits, because that is the only thing which is really going to have a big impact on the British referendum.  •

* This article is based on a conversation the author had with Berlin Policy Journal’s Editor-in-Chief Sylke Tempel.

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A truly joint European foreign policy – in contrast to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) presently pursued by Brussels – offers the chance to strengthen not only the framework in which individual states operate, but also to multiply their weight, allowing each member state to punch far above its weight in the international arena. The tasks such a foreign policy would be charged with are no less clear: first, stabilizing Europe’s neighborhood; second, strengthening the partnership with the United States; and third, helping to shape the future of globalization.

Stabilization of the Neighborhood

The post-Soviet space has not developed a stable, prosperous order. Russiaʼs view of other post-Soviet countries as its sphere of control is as challenging as the weakness of state structures in the region. Where there is no widely legitimized government delivering public goods, where Mafia-like clans dominate the heights of economic and political power, states will remain fragile and borders unsafe. And as long as Russia systematically inhibits the construction of more solid state structures, the economies will remain weak, the societies will remain fragmented, and policy will generally be structured autocratically.

Here Europe has a double task. First, it must limit Russian aggression, meaning discouraging Moscow from implementing its designs through violence. That will make room for the second task: stabilizing state institutions and strengthening their orientation toward liberal democracy.

If Europe ignores these tasks, instability will grow – and that means more conflicts, more war, more refugees and displacements, and more crime. Europe cannot permanently screen itself off from the East; it must invest in the construction and expansion of order. A prosperous eastern neighborhood offers more than just new markets – the region can also serve as a connection between Europe, Russia, and China.

The ongoing crisis in Syria proves that Europe cannot shield itself from instability in its neighborhood, and that any attempt to do so will carry enormous costs. Just as in the eastern neighborhood, in Europe’s south the construction and expansion of more solid, legitimate, and competent state structures is the core task.

In the Middle East, at least two crises are currently overlapping. The old social contract entailed the acceptance of autocratic elites as long as these elites safeguarded order and a certain prosperity. However, as the population has grown and the income from oil and gas dropped, more and more young, well-qualified people feel cheated. The potential for revolution is ever-present, as the so-called Arab Spring demonstrated.

In addition, there is the battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia over dominance of the region. Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Tehran’s expansive regional politics and is working to expand its activity to limit Iranian influence in the neighborhood, while the US is barely present to maintain order – as it has shown in its hesitant, half-hearted engagement in Syria.

Terror and massive refugee flows coming from Europe’s southern neighborhood have the potential to destabilize the continent itself. In the next few years, Europe will have to finally develop a serious policy for the South. That will necessitate the development of economic options through cooperation, the promotion of zones of stability, the struggle against instability, and cooperation with both regional and global powers to push back against civil war and violence.

The US as Key Partner

The US will, for the foreseeable future, remain the most important global power. With Washington, Europe has a partner that is not only the most powerful country in the world, but one with which it shares significant values and principles – which a comparison with Russia and China makes ever more apparent. Together with their partners, in particular in Asia, Europe and the US keep having sufficient critical mass to decisively shape world politics.

America remains essential for the defense of Europe in the framework of NATO. However, this engagement requires constant care. It is already difficult for American politicians to explain to their constituents why the US must help carry the burden of Europe’s security; Europeans can by no means assume that America will be prepared to do so indefinitely. In order to continue the military partnership, Europe must do more. The stronger the European pillar within NATO, the more ready the US will be to invest further in NATO. At the same time, growing European defensive capabilities mean that Europe can, if necessary, take up its own defense should Washington take an isolationist course.

For a European foreign policy, the connection with the US will remain essential, too. The combined weight of the two powers in normative, economic, military, and political respects remains unmatched, especially when the two are strengthened by sustained cooperation with heavyweights like Japan, Indonesia, India, or Brazil.

Even in its own neighborhood, Europe will not be able to establish order without – or against the wishes of – the US for the foreseeable future. European relationships with Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt must to be tightly coordinated with Washington for the next few years, because in these relationships the US carries such significant weight.

At the same time, it is no longer sufficient to wait for Washington to make the first move. America is no longer prepared to be the strategic leader in and on behalf of Europe. Even if it is not yet clear to what degree the US is permanently reducing its international engagement, it can be assumed that its national interests will be significantly more narrowly defined in the future.

Europe will need to take on leadership itself, developing its own strategies and then working to gain Washington’s support.

Shaping Globalization

The streams of information, people, and goods crossing borders keep increasing, a process that on balance furthers security, freedom, and prosperity of its participants. Globalization is, however, not a natural process – it requires several prerequisites that must be established and secured.

First off, globalization relies on physical infrastructure: transportation routes for planes, ships, cars, and trains, along with internet cable. This physical infrastructure must be built, expanded, and protected. Second, globalization relies on the rule of law: complex contracts and norms that cross borders and allow the mobility of people, goods, services, and information.

Third, globalization relies on a broader political order favorable to openess which supports connectivity and network-building and prevents interruptions. This framework was developed and guaranteed predominantly by the US over decades, and includes both the influence of sovereign states and the structures of global institutions like the UN and WTO.

At the same time globalization is not politically neutral. It is driven by certain liberal principles such as individual freedom in the economy, in society, and in politics; a willingness to limit the role of the state mainly to the task of a guardian of freedom; and the optimistic assumption that crossborder interaction strengthens these liberal principles.

Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has become more widespread and intense. At the same time, however, there is a growing tendency on the part of autocratically governed states to push back against the political ramifications of globalization while profiting from the economic aspects. For those in power in Russia and China, political globalization, with its principles of freedom, is a threat; at the same time they rely on the economic benefits of globalization to keep their regimes in power.

Both use their weight in global organizations to weaken political globalization, while setting up regional orders in their neighborhoods following autocratic principles. In Moscow and Beijing’s view, weaker neighbors have no rights and are at the mercy of their stronger neighbors. For both, imperialistic foreign policy is an important pillar of their respective regimes; both see the US as a rival because it stands in the way of their imperial designs.
Europe, on the other hand, has an interest in strengthening the liberal international order. Political and economic globalization are both expressions of this order; both are two sides of the same coin.

In the past, globalization has been predominantly designed and secured by the US. America’s relative weight, however, has declined, and so has its readiness to invest resources in the global order. Without the preparedness of states to invest in globalization, it cannot be maintained. When even the major liberal democracies only consume global governance without producing it themselves, the fragile structure supporting globalization is in danger of collapse.

It is within both Europe’s interests and abilities to play a stronger role than in the past as a second plank of the liberal world order, in partnership with the US and other liberal democracies, in particular in Asia. The future of globalization depends on Europe and America’s preparedness to play this role.

Launchpad Brussels

In order to be an effective partner to the US in this endeavor, European states need to work together closely. In theory this means that Brussels must play a leading role. With the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states indeed have built the infrastructure necessary for such a foreign policy: a diplomatic service and a high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy.

As a matter of fact, cooperation and coordination between the member states have intensified over the past years. However, foreign policy remains overwhelmingly nationally defined, especially in the areas that are important for the most powerful member states. In these areas the EU only enters the picture when member states want to strengthen their national policies by building coalitions and using joint resources. Brussels plays the role of a broker between states. It provides expertise and helps with the execution of joint policies.

The key to a truly common European foreign policy thus lies in the member states. It is their job to develop strategies, build coalitions, and guide common policies. Whether there will be a European foreign policy depends above all on the big capitals.

How such an unorthodox European foreign policy could work is shown by the example of the European response to the Ukraine conflict. Berlin developed the strategy that formed the coalition and managed its implementation, and Paris was there as a key partner; but without the unity of the 28 member states, the actions taken would have been ineffective. Only the inclusion of their EU partners gave the larger powers the necessary efficiency and legitimacy.

The Ukraine conflict showed at the same time how important US support continues to be for European foreign policy. Washington played not only a key role in ensuring the stability of NATO; close cooperation between the White House and Chancellor Angela Merkelʼs office also presented a united transatlantic front when it came to sanctions.

This Western unity surprised and irritated the Kremlin, which had relied on division and weakness. Along with the resistance in Ukraine itself, this Berlin-led policy stopped Russiaʼs advance in eastern Ukraine, and it helped transferring the conflict from the military to the diplomatic level.

The Ukraine example shows that Europe can act efficiently in times of crisis. By contrast, the example of Syria shows the consequences of the absence of such a joint European policy.
Paris, which has the potential to play a leading role in Europeʼs southern neighborhood, did not push hard to a joint approach to Syria. Instead, the French government tried to achieve its goals as a junior partner of the US. But instead of ending the civil war, or even tamp it down, Paris has only been able to watch from the sidelines as the conflict has exploded into wildfire.

Both Paris and Berlin have failed to build a common European Syrian policy. To what extent such a joint approach would have made a difference is hard to say. But it is clear that no massive engagement in the region can be expected from Washington and that the consequences of war and chaos in the Middle East will not be felt primarily in the US but in Europe. The price for inaction in Syria will be much higher than the European capitals have anticipated.

Stabilize or Become Destabilized

In order to advance their foreign policy interests, European states can either go it alone or work together. The Ukraine conflict shows how great the potential for a joint approach is, while the example of the Syria conflict shows how problematic its absence can be.

Europeʼs southern and eastern neighborhoods are both zones of instability from which Europe cannot simply quarantine itself. European states have the choice either to be active as stabilizing powers or accept that Europe itself will increasingly be destabilized.

Without a unified foreign policy, Europe will increasingly become part of the zones of influence of countries with more ambitious foreign policies, especially Russia and China. Both want to make sure that Europe is not becoming a powerful player, and both are trying to separate Europe and the US in order to “divide and conquer.”

As a plaything of larger powers, the European states will no longer be in a position to safeguard and strengthen the global order in which they are embedded. The US no longer wants to – or can – play the role of global stabilizing power alone; it depends on the EU to become a powerful second pillar.

Together with other liberal democracies, the US and Europe must confront attempts on the part of autocratic regimes to weaken and undermine globalization. The global order is grounded on liberal principles; without the validity of these principles, even economic globalization will not last.

Foreign policy has often seemed like a luxury to Europeans over the past few decades, one that can be done without – but with growing instability it should have become clear that regional and global engagement are absolute necessities. Security, prosperity, and freedom in Europe depend on stability in the neighborhood and on a liberal world order. An investment in foreign policy is an investment in Europe’s own future.

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Is German Chancellor Angela Merkel as isolated as is often reported? In a word: yes. Angela Merkel is isolated in Europe – and that demonstrates Europe’s pettiness and its lack of vision. Merkel is right, but she is alone in being right. That is a problem for Europe.

Merkel is managing the migration crisis in a way that is typical both for her and for the EU – by creating consensus step-by-step. Will she succeed? There is total disconnect between the “refugee calendar,” so to speak, and the EU calendar. The world watches the refugees’ misery while Europe keeps moving at its own pace. To use the analogy of Constantinople in 1453, it is a bit like discussing the gender of angels when the empire is falling apart. This is a major problem. A policy of small steps and finding consensus is good for discussing agricultural quotas or financial aid to Greece. But now people are dying in the cold. This is an entirely different level of human urgency.

Are we perhaps witnessing the limits of the whole European project? If one looks at the behavior of the so-called Visegrád states, Hungary in particular, one could come to the conclusion that the EU’s powers of transformation were perhaps overstated. Are we witnessing the slow retreat of liberal democracy? I think three things are coming together here. The first is the spread of democracy and with it, the questioning of democracies. There are more democracies in the world today than ever before – and democratic principles are also being questioned more than ever. The first symptom of this – the rise of populism – not only affects Europe, but the United States as well. The second element is the return of nations and nationalism with a vengeance. The French feel French when they are attacked by Daesh (the acronym used in France for the so-called Islamic State). They do not feel European – and this is probably true for all European nations. The British may be about to leave the EU because, at the end of the day, they never felt European. This leads to the third element: the dialectical nature of the process. The more Europe fails to deliver, the more people return to their nations. Why should they feel represented by this dysfunctional entity? In my mind, this is the heart of the problem. People no longer feel proud to be European.

How would you turn this around? By making Europe more active, or even proactive? I am not sure it is an institutional problem, thoug the move to a Europe of 28 states has clearly made the problem worse. It has made people realize that old practices no longer work. At the same time we have the divisions between north and south – between countries with successful economies and with failing economies. We also have the division btween Europe’s west and east – between countries with long-established democratic cultures and those whose impregnation with democratic principles came late and were perhaps somewhat superficial. But I believe that politics is the answer, and that brings us back to democracy. One of the key factors is that the Franco-German tandem is no longer functioning – not because Germany has become too big, but because France has become too small. For the last 20 years no French president has been a match for a German chancellor. Can we Frenchmen elect someone who will be on par with a German chancellor, restore the Franco-German relationship, and recreate some kind of dynamism within Europe? Spring 2017 – when the French elect their next president – will be a key moment for Europe.

What kind of candidate do you have in mind? Someone with a strong personality, with gravitas. Someone who does not have the need to be reelected for a second term. In short: Alain Juppé. Could he do it? I hope so, but I am not sure. Looking at the European situation from Paris, I see emptiness. Merkel should not be the only one to stand for Europeʼs morality and principles. I was ashamed when I heard French Prime Minister Manuel Valls denouncing Merkel’s refugee policies in Munich. And I am not proud when I hear the French president say that France will accept 30 000 asylum seekers – absolutely ridiculous when you think of the number of people that came to Germany last year.

Is it also a problem that European nations are steeped in their respective national debates? France has been hit very hard by terrorism; Italy is still traumatized by the mistake of voting Berlusconi into office three times; Germany is presently having a deeply polarizing debate about the refugee crisis … I think you are right. We are obsessed with our own national debates and we look to Europe to denounce its paralysis. In a way, it adds to the immorality of the national debate – a kind of negative dialectical process, which lies at the very heart of what we are discussing. We don’t feel good as Frenchmen, and Europe offers us an image back, a mirror reflection of our own weaknesses. There was a time when we were at least relevant, if not great. But we no longer are. So there’s this feeling that Germany calls the shots, this feeling that Germany decides. But of course it is not Germany deciding, it is France being absent.

… at a time when the United Kingdom and Poland are also quite inward-looking, rather than thinking about how a French-British-Polish-German EU motor could work. When then Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski gave his Humboldt University speech in 2011, there was the chance of a “Club of Four,” but it came to be replaced by a “Club of One,” which really cannot work. And Berlin itself doesn’t want to carry the burden of this responsibility alone.

Paris was once very ambitious – not only in terms of European integration in general, but also for the Franco-German alliance. Why was that impetus lost? Leadership, and the lack of it. President Nicolas Sarkozy was energetic, but failed to realize the paramount importance of the Franco-German relationship. He started his Union for the Mediterranean initiative without even consulting Berlin. I remember former German President Richard von Weizsäcker coming to Paris fuming, “How could he do that? We’ve never felt so humiliated” etc. And then we moved from a charismatic, but problematic president to a president who is basking in his mediocrity – an able tactician, but one without vision or gravitas. As a consequence, reforms were not made and the French are obsessed with the comparison to Germany. We have to break out of this negative spiral. Yes, let’s not forget about the problem of Poland, the problem of the United Kingdom, the problem of Italy, the problem of Spain etc. But without meaning to sound narcissistic, for Europe, the Franco-German dimension is vital. In the past, when the two countries agreed, you could hope that something would happen. But now they are no longer playing in the same league. There is now a 50/50 chance that the United Kingdom is leaving the EU and this would be very bad for both the EU and its image in the world. And Poland may fall permanently to populism, which wouldn’t be good either …

… and then Marine Le Pen wins the French presidency in 2017! It is unlikely – but what if another series of terrorist attacks rocks France? As matters stand today, I don’t think Le Pen can win, but if something goes terribly wrong between now and spring 2017, you cannot even exclude that.

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The answer is that we are living in 2016, in a world that is profoundly different from the world of the Cold War in 1962. It is no longer bipolar, but multipolar; no longer are there two competing ideologies and systems; the economic, scientific, and military potential of today’s Russia is much lower than that of the Soviet Union. Today, local and hybrid conflicts, not superpower proxy wars, drive international relations.

Russian intervention in Syria – which was meant not only to force the United States to work again with Russiaʼs President Vladimir Putin, but also to demonstrate the military prowess of Russia – implies a false impression of Russia’s influence: Moscow and Washington are both important players, but by no means are they the only ones in the Middle East. Both have only limited influence on the outcome of the Syrian disaster, and both are constrained by the situation on the ground.

Both in Russia and the West some might be tempted to feel nostalgic for the stability of the Cold War era. But this nostalgia is much more a product of today’s uncertainty than of the reality of the East-West conflict. Why then did Prime Minister Medvedev refer to a “new Cold War”, and to what degree are his intentions in line with Western interpretations?

Russia’s leaders are struggling to return their country to its former great power status. They want to be recognized by the West, particularly by the US, as one of the important poles in a multipolar world, one that must be consulted as part of any plan to solve pressing international crises.

To think that Russia’s leaders are aiming for a restoration of the Soviet Union is a misconception – and not even realistic by Putin’s standards. Moscow rather attempts to use the prestige of the former Soviet Union to ensure recognition of modern Russia’s sphere of influence, and to be accepted as a superpower equal. While in Western media the Medvedev speech was primarily interpreted as a threat from Moscow, Russian media read it – and Medvedev’s presence in Munich – as possible steps towards de-escalation and negotiation with the West.

The reference to a new Cold War is a symbol and an instrument at the same time. It implies that Russia is again on the same level as the US – just as the “red empire” was. At the same time it serves as a warning that a military confrontation with Russia could lead to disaster, as it nearly did in 1962 when Armageddon was narrowly averted during the Cuba crisis.

In his speech, Medvedev alluded to nuclear war in a purely theoretical sense. But it is crucial to keep in mind that Russia is a nuclear power and that a nuclear war remains a possibility. Russia’s nuclear arsenal and its seat on the UN Security Council are important leftovers from the Soviet Union that the West cannot ignore. Even under the current economic crisis, the Russian government prioritizes investment in the modernization of its nuclear weapons.

The discussion about the possibility of a new Cold War with Russia is not only misleading, but also dangerous. It creates the impression – both to Western “realists” and Russian leaders – that Moscow and the West could cooperate in a transactional way now as they did back then. That implies that a deal with Moscow is possible.

The Putin regime, however, is hardly comparable to Soviet leadership. It is much weaker in terms of economic performance and self-confidence. It is a crony regime, lacking any long-term strategy except staying in power. The decision to stop economic reform, in combination with the high costs of Russia’s attempt to perform as a global power will further weaken Russia.  The weaker Russia becomes, the more aggressively its leadership will act to distract from its failures. There is no deal possible with a regime that is not willing, and sometimes not able, to fulfill its agreements. For Putin there are no rules except the power of the strongest.

No Rules, No Red Lines

The main challenge of today’s world is that there are no rules and no red lines in international relations as there were before 1991. Russia is the primary force undermining the existing European order. That behavior might not be restricted to Russia only – after all, Washington reshuffled the landscape of the Middle East, all while ignoring international law. But at the moment Russia is the main threat to European security.

There is no balance of power possible in today’s international order. The world of globalization is much more interconnected than the bipolar world ever was; unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is a part of the global economy, which has a fundamental impact on developments within the country. At the same time, there are no limits to Russia’s interference in Western society. After all, Russian leadership has learned to use Western vulnerabilities to undermine the credibility of Western media, politics, and governance. Interdependence is a weapon wielded by both the West (in the form of sanctions) and Russia (in undermining democratic systems), and at the same time a threat to both Western societies and the survival of the Russian regime.

To accept the paradigm of the Cold War would mean giving Russia a role in international politics that it cannot fill and it would mean that it is possible to negotiate with the current Russian leadership. Again, this is an illusion and one that will not last long. Trust is the most important currency in international relations. Russia’s leadership has lost both trust and credibility. And here we see yet another difference: Soviet leadership also wanted recognition as a legitimate and equal power. But it understood the importance of rules and red lines.

What Germany and the EU have to do is to strengthen our own resilience in terms of domestic policy and military capabilities. We need to make dangerous provocations in the EU neighborhood more expensive for Russia. At the same time, we need to rebuild trust between Russia and the West – to achieve that, we need a partner with similar interests.

At the moment, the first priority should be improving communication channels and crisis-response mechanisms with Russia. All existing institutions where Russia plays a role should be upgraded and developed, and their rules rebuilt and reinforced. Above and beyond we need arms control, dialog platforms, and institutions capable of enforcing rules.

At the same time, our security and the security of our neighbors need to be a policy priority. NATO might become even more important to Europe while the EU simultaneously needs to grow its own capabilities independent of the US. Institution-building in the common neighborhood needs to include security institutions. The states in question need to improve their ability to protect their own security and borders.

This is not a new Cold War. We may be facing a situation that is even more dangerous.

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