© REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko (the banner reads: “Russia – DNR together!”)

In the separatist-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, some three million people are growing increasingly detached from the rest of the country. While there has been no official acknowledgement of the Kremlin’s influence, there has been plenty of evidence pointing to Russia’s role as the de-facto authority in the region. The leaders of the self-declared “People’s Republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk regularly declare that they see their future exclusively with Russia and only pay lip service to the Minsk agreement.

But the agreement, which stipulates that the government and the separatists negotiate a return to Ukraine, is deeply unpopular in Kiev as well. Legislators’ attempts to give the separatist areas a “special status,” as stipulated by the Minsk agreement, ended in August 2015, when four people were killed in clashes between police and right-wing activists outside the Ukrainian parliament. The protesters saw the move as a sell-out to Russia. Parliament subsequently failed to muster the 300 votes necessary to pass the legislation.

It was of little surprise then that a recent attempt by German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas to revive the peace process by convening his counterparts from France, Ukraine, and Russia for “Normandy Four” talks in Berlin on June 11 did not achieve an immediate breakthrough.

Instead, the bloody stalemate in Donbass looks set to continue. The frontline, dubbed “Line of Contact” by the Minsk negotiators, cuts arbitrarily through settlements and roads as well as electricity and water supply lines simply because this is where government troops and Russian-backed separatist forces came to a halt in February 2015.

It is perhaps the Minsk agreement’s only major achievement that the 500-kilometer long contact line has not been crossed since by a significant number of troops from either side. But that is due more to the consequences of military action than to actual compliance: the Ukrainians know that if they were to attack, Russia could swiftly send large military forces across the separatist-controlled border. The Russians and separatists, in turn, know that any military advance on their side is likely to be met by a much more professional and disciplined Ukrainian army—and likely another round of Western economic sanctions.

The respect for the frontline does not exclude exchange of fire, however, with wide-range indirect weapons such as artillery, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers in use by both sides. Despite the Minsk agreement’s stipulation that such heavy arms should be withdrawn from the front, they have been deployed nearly every time fighting has escalated since 2015.

The Information War

What lies behind the outbreaks of violence if they won’t achieve significant territorial gains? It has become a sad ritual in this conflict to initiate deadly battles only to make tactical gains in the perceived information war between Russia and the West. One of the bloodiest phases took place at the end of January 2017, when at least 37 people, including seven civilians, were killed in and around a town north of Donetsk called Avdiivka.

Significantly, the fighting occurred in between two phone calls: on January 28, newly-elected US President Donald Trump called his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin for the first time and pledged to seek cooperation over Ukraine and other issues. And on February 4, Trump held his maiden phone call with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, in which he told him that the US “will work with Ukraine, Russia, and all other parties involved to help them restore peace along the border.”

Whether the outbreak of fighting was more in Ukraine’s or in Russia’s interest is not entirely clear. But Kiev has shown many times that it will try for even minor advances if the opportunity arises. Since 2015, government troops have moved into a number of small settlements located in the so-called gray zone. In November 2017, Ukrainian forces entered Hladosove and Travneve, two frontline villages in the Donetsk region, just when the Donetsk “People’s Republic” was busy sending troops to support a putsch in the neighboring Luhansk “People’s Republic.”

And in May, when rumors began swirling that Putin would sack his powerful aide Vladislav Surkov as the Kremlin’s Donbass point man, Ukrainian troops entered Chyhari, a tiny Donetsk settlement just west of the separatist-held city of Horlivka.

While moving closer to the contact line does not violate the Minsk agreement’s letter, it clearly goes against its spirit by increasing the risk of escalation. In some areas, the opponents’ frontline positions now lie less than 100 meters apart.

No Sign of Compromise

Events this spring also gave the Ukrainian military reason to feel emboldened. On May 1, the “Reintegration Law” handed command of the military operation in the east from the SBU security service to the Armed Forces, and the mission was promptly named “Joint Forces Operation.” The military was further rewarded with the delivery of long awaited US Javelin anti-tank missiles.

Last but not least, Ukrainian politicians are gradually shifting into campaign mode as the country prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. President Poroshenko is expected to stand for another five-year term, but his approval ratings are currently at a miserable seven percent, according to a June 14 poll by the Kiev-based think tank Razumkov Center. Given the widespread patriotic and anti-Russian sentiment in the country, the government is unlikely to agree to any concessions in the Donbass.

On the Russian side, any hopes for change were crushed when Putin reappointed Surkov on June 13. The move came after a month of speculation that the long-time Kremlin spin-doctor would be replaced. Instead, the Kremlin is signaling a continuation of its previous policies: despite officially adhering to the Minsk agreement, Russia supports the separatists financially and militarily, while its state-controlled media keeps publishing anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

Can Peacekeepers Find a Solution?

Given these multiple impasses, it is understandable that negotiators have jumped on the idea of a UN peacekeeping force, something that was long promoted by Ukraine and suddenly endorsed by Putin in the fall of 2017.

However, consensus is proving elusive here, too, because Putin’s endorsement comes with strings attached. According to the Kremlin, the peacekeepers should only be deployed along the Contact Line, in order to protect the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe’s existing Monitoring Mission.

In theory, a round-the-clock observation of the frontline by armed UN peacekeepers might reduce the level of violence, as the unarmed OSCE monitors do not work in darkness for security reasons. But it is unclear how such a force could offer effective protection against well-armed and entrenched troops on both sides. Overall, the Russian proposal seems mostly designed to protect the current separatist civilian and military structures.

This is why Ukraine and most of its allies reject the Russian proposal and call for a well-armed international force that should take over control of the “People’s Republics,” including the state border with Russia.

The “People’s Republics” lie at the heart of another, more fundamental, dispute. Because of their illegal foundation, Ukraine and the West demand their dissolution. Kurt Volker, the US Special Representative to Ukraine, said in March that this is central to the Minsk agreement’s purpose of restoring constitutional order. “Implementing Minsk = dissolution of these illegal structures. Unwillingness to disband = unwillingness to implement Minsk,” Volker wrote on Twitter.

Russia and the separatists reject this. In a recent interview with Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency, the Luhansk “foreign minister” Vladislav Deinego argued that his “People’s Republic” would remain an “independent subject” entering into treaties with Ukraine.

While the Minsk agreement details a list of rights that includes a law-enforcing people’s militia, it stipulates that Kiev and the separatists hold a dialogue over their exact status. Nowhere does the document mention “People’s Republics;” it speaks of “Certain Areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk Regions” instead. It is important to remember, too, that the seperatist leaders also signed all three parts (Protocol, Memorandum, and “Package of Measures”) of the agreement.

Two Billion Euros per Year

When the agreement was signed, it was expected that the conflict could be settled within weeks or months. Three years later, the “People’s Republics,” despite being recognized by nobody except separatist South Ossetia, are on their way to becoming de-facto states with their own governments (Luhansk alone boasts 19 ministries), passports, vehicle number plates, school curriculums, diplomas, and so on. Their currency is the Russian ruble, and clocks are set according to Moscow time.

The longer people live (and die) in this reality, however imagined or illegal, the harder reintegration into Ukraine will get. Some hope that their sheer size might force Moscow to give up the “People’s Republics.” The subsidies necessary to feed the region’s aging populations—many young people and skilled workers are thought to have left—and sizable armies are estimated at well over €2 billion a year.

And while Ukraine has a mixed track record of winning the local population’s hearts and minds, showing off economic success can be a promising strategy. Already today, Ukrainian wages and pensions are significantly higher: in the Donetsk “People’s Republic,” an average salary is 10,000 rubles (€136), compared to 8,927 hryvna (€287) in government-controlled areas.

Supporting Ukraine, its economy, civil society, and democratic institutions therefore seems the most promising way to end the conflict in the Donbass. With an estimated one million crossings of the Contact Line every month, Ukrainian soft power may, in the end, prove decisive.

The post Shadow States appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Cover artwork: © Mitch Blunt

Dear Mr. or Ms. Chancellor,

Your new government is likely to have considerable political clout in the Ukraine conflict. While US foreign policy remains in relative disarray and France is led by an inexperienced president, Berlin could assume a leading role in the diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis. Under Chancellor Angela Merkel (know her?), Berlin was already in a strong position. But your government should step up the pressure to find a solution both the government in Kiev and the Kremlin can live with. Here are a few pointers:

Stick to the Minsk Agreement.  Yes, it has proven tricky to implement, but it is the only agreement currently in existence. Any attempt to renege or replace it risks a dangerous hiatus and would give both sides incentives to act irresponsibly.

Step up the pressure on both Kiev and Moscow to implement said agreement. The longer non-implementation lasts, the higher the risk of frustrated players calling for a military solution.
Keep the United States involved. This won’t be easy given the Trump administration’s erratic foreign policy record. Make it clear to Washington that arms deliveries to Ukraine will only make matters worse.
Be honest about NATO. The possibility of Ukraine joining the US-led alliance was a key motivation for Moscow to annex Crimea and destabilize the Donbass. Now the Ukrainian public deserves to know that the West is not ready to embrace a new NATO member facing the real threat of a Russian invasion. Georgia is a point in case.

Do not ease sanctions against Russia unless there is substantial progress. In fact be prepared to introduce new sanctions. Moscow is responsible for igniting the conflict and keeps adding fuel to the fire, be it by sending arms and fighters or by spreading anti-Ukrainian sentiment via state TV. The international community (read: the West) must signal that it does not tolerate the violation of borders and meddling in sovereign states’ internal affairs.

Do more to explain the sanctions policies to domestic audiences and EU partners. Economic sanctions can be extremely powerful because the West, if it stands united, is far stronger than Russia. President Vladimir Putin clearly understands this, unlike some in the West.

Keep up the pressure on Kiev to carry out reforms and root out corruption. This is not only necessary to honor the agreements with the EU, but also a crucial part of any solution to the conflict with Russia.

Ukraine is undoubtedly the victim of Russian aggression, but it nevertheless bears some responsibility for the ease with which Moscow won control over Crimea and parts of Donbass. Ukrainian officials like to claim that people will side with Kiev as soon as they stop watching Russian TV, but this is by no means a given. Only a prosperous and stable Ukraine can become an attractive alternative to Russia’s “Russky Mir” Soviet nostalgia.

Don’t let the West be held hostage to Ukrainian demands. An effective peacekeeping force would require vast resources, while free elections in the Donbass are impossible as long as the pro-Russian military dictatorships disguised as “people’s republics” are in place.

Develop new recipes against Moscow’s ongoing propaganda campaign. While talk of “hybrid war” is often vastly exaggerated, Russian state media continues to poison the hearts and minds of audiences in Russia and (eastern) Ukraine.  Foreign news outlets and recently created fact-checking and anti-fake news websites tend not to reach those audiences. Foreign governments would do better supporting home-grown critical media outlets like Russia’s Dozhd TV or Ukraine’s Novosti Donbassa.

The post What Germany Needs to Do Next … On Ukraine appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Gleb Garanich

For three years now, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has deployed civilian observers in Ukraine. From a humble beginning in March 2014, when ten teams with ten members each were dispatched throughout the country, the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has grown to currently just over 700 international observers, with some 600, or 85 percent, in the conflict-ridden eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions. With a total staff of more than 1100 (as of February 2017), it is the biggest field mission in the OSCE’s history – and among the most controversial.

Having said that, the mission’s achievements have been widely acknowledged by the OSCE’s 57 member governments, who voted unanimously to prolong the mission in 2015 and 2016.

First, the SMM daily reports, which are published in English and translated into Russian and Ukrainian, are a unique resource of objective information about a conflict in which local media – on both sides – tend to be biased and international media tend to be absent.

On the ground, the OSCE has become a vital international element, especially since foreign aid organizations like Doctors Without Borders and People in Need were kicked out of the separatist “People’s Republics.” It should not be overlooked that the mission’s two teams working in eastern Ukraine are both headquartered in the separatist “capitals” of Donetsk and Luhansk, and that its monitors cross the contact line between the hostile sides dozens of times every day.

Moreover, the mission’s mandate tasks observers with monitoring not only security issues but also human rights and fundamental freedoms. The OSCE may not be a humanitarian organization, but beyond recording ceasefire violations, its monitors pick up significant amounts of information about the lives of civilians on a daily basis. When they pass this information on to the right people, they can reduce human suffering, as when they reported on the removal of unexploded ordnance.

More fundamentally, the OSCE’s participation in the ongoing Minsk negotiations (the Trilateral Contact Group) and the fact that senior mission members regularly commute between Minsk, Donbass, and Kiev, give the SMM a key role in overseeing the Minsk agreement’s implementation.

Obligations like the withdrawal of heavy weapons, stipulated in the Minsk Protocol, and the so-called disengagement agreement signed last year hinge on the continuous verification by OSCE observers on the ground. It is not enough to state that an obligation has been fulfilled; it is vital that compliance (or the lack thereof) is monitored daily as long as an agreement lasts.

Despite this, the OSCE has come under criticism for its role in the restive region. And Ukrainians are not unanimously satisfied with the mission, even though it was their government that requested it.

A survey conducted by the Kiev-based Gorshenin Institute in February 2016 found that almost half of respondents (46.9 percent) do not approve of the mission’s work to support the Minsk agreement’s implementation, while more than a third (35.6 percent) approved. No comparable surveys have been conducted in Russia or in the separatist-controlled areas recently, but judging from the general tone in Russian state-run media, public opinion is unlikely to be much better. In a survey by the Moscow-based independent Levada Center in April 2014, 58 percent of respondents said that they believe that the OSCE mission was biased toward the Ukrainian government, while just 19 percent found the mission to be objective.

To a large extent, such numbers reflect the criticism of the mission among political and military leaders on both sides. After all, the conflict in Donbass lies at the heart of the split between Russia and the West, leaving the mission exposed not just to guns and artillery but also to the sort of information warfare that has become a hallmark of this conflict.

Cameras of Contention

A standard complaint is that the OSCE’s work in Ukraine lacks objectivity. Take the comments made by the leader of the Donetsk “People’s Republic,” Alexander Zakharchenko, in January. Speaking during a visit to Crimea, Zakharchenko claimed that the mission’s observation cameras were looking only in the separatists’ direction, and transmitting video footage straight to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. “Their soldiers are sitting at those cameras watching our movements,” he was quoted by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti.

Zakharchenko’s claims more or less mirror those voiced by the Ukrainian side when the mission set up its first observation camera one year ago outside Shyrokyne, a village close to the shore of the Sea of Azov. Back then, national television aired interviews with Ukrainian soldiers who said they suspected the signal would be transmitted to the other, i.e. separatist, side. That claim was later repeated by prominent Ukrainian television journalist Andriy Tsaplienko, who said that the camera only allowed the “Putinists” to watch the Ukrainians’ rear units.

The OSCE gave assurances that the camera transmission was encrypted so that it could only be seen by mission members, that its location allows for monitoring of both sides, and that it was chosen in agreement with both sides, including the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Vladislav Seleznyov, a spokesman for the Ukrainian General Staff, even pointed out that the number of shellings fell after the cameras were installed.

It is difficult to say if that message convinced more people than the criticism. What is clear, however, is that the mission’s communications efforts are complicated by persistent rumors that at least some of its monitors are not engaged in observing, but rather in spying. Allegations that Russian members use the OSCE to spy on Ukrainian forces have dogged the mission from its onset, as distrust against Russians runs deep among some Ukrainians, who see their neighbors as their enemy.

In late 2014 Ukrainian officials started to claim that up to eighty percent of the monitors were Russians, many of them with a background in the intelligence services. Following such disinformation, the mission began to publish its national composition in biweekly status reports. As of January 2017, Russian citizens made up 38 out of 709, or 5.3 percent of the SMM members. This did not prevent retired US General Wesley Clark from repeating such false claims during a talk in Washington, DC, after returning from a field trip to eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian activists use Clark’s unfortunate remarks to this day to tarnish the mission. Rather tellingly, they serve as the introductory post for a nationalist Twitter account that has in the past specialized in exposing mission members’ lack of impartiality.

OSCE officials also point out that passing on sensitive information is strictly prohibited under the OSCE Code of Conduct. All monitors must sign the agreement, which obligates them to “refrain from any action that might cast doubt on their ability to act impartially.”

When in October 2015 a clearly intoxicated Russian mission member in the Luhansk region was shown on Ukrainian TV saying that he was an operative for his country’s military intelligence service, the man was immediately removed. No evidence was presented to prove his drunken claim, but reservations among Ukrainian officials clearly remain. Just this January, Ukrainian General Boris Kremenetskiy said in a widely quoted interview that all Russian OSCE mission members are intelligence officers.

Kremenetskiy, who until December served as the Ukrainian head of the Joint Center for Control and Coordination, a Russian-Ukrainian military observer mission overseeing the ceasefire, refrained from demanding the Russians’ removal from the mission. But such demands have been voiced in the past. It is highly unlikely they will be heeded, given that the OSCE’s strict consensus principle would require Moscow’s approval.

The Ukrainians are not alone in their criticism. Spying allegations are a common feature in the separatists’ military dispatches as well. In May 2016 the Donetsk “People’s Republic” even alleged that monitors were transporting ammunition – a claim that was never backed up by any evidence.

Observers Are No Peacekeepers

These political limitations also tend to frustrate local civilians, who often expect that an international mission will do something to stop the fighting around them. But the OSCE observers cannot act as peacekeepers. They have no executive powers, meaning they cannot even stop a soldier on the street and demand proof of his citizenship. This is why the mission does not report regularly about Russian soldiers in the rebel-held “republics,” even though fighters recently introduced themselves to the observers as Russian citizens.

The fact that the mission is unarmed and composed of civilians also means that, with the current level of violence, patrolling must be limited to daylight hours. As this is widely known to both sides of the conflict, major attacks often happen at night. This has in turn led to increasing demands that the OSCE institute night patrol. An article in The New York Times last year accused the mission of keeping “bankers’ hours” instead of helping to “end the only active war in Europe.”

It is doubtful, however, that sending monitors out in the dark would do anything to change that. Given the strict curfews and soldiers’ nervousness along the contact line, it is likely that any vehicle or person approaching military checkpoints in the dark would be fired upon. The mission is lucky that there have been no fatal casualties among its members so far. Should this change, it will certainly test the contributing countries’ commitment to the extreme.

Under these circumstances, the mission has to walk a fine line between its obligations and the security of its own staff. Becoming a buffer or shield between the opposing sides is not just too dangerous for the monitors, it would also clearly overstep their mandate.

Over the past 18 months, the OSCE has done a lot to expand its monitoring capacities. It has spread out to permanently manned forward patrol bases, meaning that there are now 14 locations from which monitors can operate along the contact line, thus reducing travel times. It has introduced night watches from hotels and installed 24-hour surveillance cameras at hotspots like Donetsk Airport and Shyrokyne.

It has also started using smaller and flexible unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor areas deemed too dangerous to enter. The mission used to employ long-range UAVs, but their flights were suspended last summer after a series of crashes believed to be the result of direct fire.

The new OSCE chairman in office, Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz, has said that he wants to strengthen the mission. After talks with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on January 18, Kurz suggested both that monitoring would be extended into the night and that monitors should be better equipped. Lavrov said that the numbers of observers should be increased, and that they should be present around the clock.

However, this does not necessarily mean patrolling during the night. As in the past, the mission can use technical equipment like cameras and drones to carry out risky nighttime observations, and they can demonstrate 24-hour presence at weapons storage sites and the contact line by opening forward patrol bases there.

As Strong as Its Weakest Links

The OSCE mission’s limitations described here in many ways reflect what the West is ready to do collectively to restore Ukrainian sovereignty in the Donbass. While Kiev has long campaigned for an international peacekeeping presence, led by the UN, NATO, or even the OSCE, influential Western governments like Germany, France, and Italy agree that the conflict can only be solved if Russia is a party, rather than an adversary. In consequence, the OSCE, being the only regional security organization that includes Russia as a member, has become a keystone to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Its unarmed and civilian nature makes the observer mission acceptable to both parties and retains the spirit of the Minsk agreements, which call for the secessionist regions to be returned to Kiev’s administration by political compromise.

But with negotiations over the agreements’ implementation in a deadlock, Ukraine has over the past months stepped up its call for an armed mission, including the proposal to transform the current mission into an OSCE police mission.” The German Foreign Office, however, has argued that this would undermine the mission’s neutrality and unleash a host of new and more difficult problems.

The costs of an armed peacekeeping presence in Eastern Ukraine would also be massively higher than the current mission’s annual budget of just €100 million. For a robust peacekeeping mission in Eastern Ukraine to be effective, the international community would have to deploy around 50,000 troops, according to contemporary Russian and Ukrainian history expert Andreas Umland – more than seventy times as many as the current OSCE mission.

Most probably, Russia will be decisive for the future of the OSCE observers. Moscow itself has pushed for enlarging the mission – while at the same time turning a blind eye to the fact that the separatists restrict the mission’s work far more than government troops. It has also allowed campaigns in state-controlled media and protests against the SMM to go forward, as last happened on February 15 in Donetsk.

Put simply, improving the monitoring mission’s efficiency could be easy – if only there is political will.

N.B. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the chief monitor or the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

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