© REUTERS/Annegret Hilse

Seven years ago DIE ZEIT foreign editor Jörg Lau provocatively wrote of the “German love of dictators,” pointing to Germany’s uncritical embrace of autocracies, kleptocracies, and theocracies in the name of smoothly doing business, be it China, Russia, or Iran. Lau criticized the German tendency to value “stability” above all else and to characterize the alternative to dictators like Vladimir Putin always as “chaos, separatism, nationalism or even Communism.” Attempts at criticizing regimes like Putin’s was regularly denounced as “hyper-moralism”—and who are the Germans to play the school master of the world given their history?

Strikingly, this approach remains dominant in the case of Germany’s relationship with China, too. Peter Altmaier, the Economy Minister and close confident of Chancellor Angela Merkel, gave an interview on July 15 to Politico Europe defending Berlin’s refusal to take a hard line over China’s repression of Hong Kong. Altmaier argued that those advocating a more strident approach were ignoring the economic consequences of confronting Beijing. He sounded like many of his Social Democratic (SPD) predecessors, making the case for Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”), stating, “I have always been convinced that change can be achieved through trade.” He argued that this strategy had worked with the former Soviet Union and remained the core of the German approach to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Dangerous Misconception

This answer and approach are mistaken and are quite dangerous in the longer term. The phrase of Wandel durch Handel came out of the earlier formulation of Egon Bahr of Wandel durch Annährung, or “change through rapprochement.”  This was the original concept behind the shift in the West German strategy toward the Soviet Union in the early 1970s under Chancellor Willy Brandt from one of a policy of strength to one of dialogue.

Many Germans, especially Social Democrats, believe to this day that this was the primary factor behind the peaceful reunification of Germany in 1990. It’s true that West Germany’s acceptance of the postwar territorial order and the renunciation of claims for the lost lands in the east were crucial to Mikhail Gorbachev’s acceptance that Germany was no longer a threat to the Soviet Union. Without the support of the United States, however, both with its extended deterrent and diplomacy, German unification would not have happened the way it did.

This way of thinking also downplayed the major political and ideological differences between the West and Communist East to the point that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed with the East German Communist leader, Erich Honecker, that martial law was necessary in Poland in 1981. Stability trumped ideological differences, democracy, and human rights. This was a form of realism to be sure and another example of the German love of stability.

The Primacy of Economics

The reasons behind Germany’s passivity lie in the nature of the its geo-economic approach to foreign policy, which is grounded in its political economy. Germany is the most export driven economy in the world, with close to half of its GDP deriving from exports. It also has the globe’s largest per capita current accounts surplus, is heavily dependent on industry and on the import of energy and other raw materials to fuel its industrial core. The business of Germany is business and despite the importance of Moralpolitik and the need to atone for the crimes of the Third Reich, economics is seen as the foundation of both German democracy and Berlin’s international role.

This approach was adapted to Putin’s Russia from 2008 under the “partnership for modernization” of then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier during the first Merkel Grand Coalition government. This concept argued that change would come through economic interdependence, or Verflechtung. The growing authoritarianism of the Putin regime and the Russian invasion of Ukraine shook, but did not break this illusion. To this day, however, German investment and trade with Russia has done practically nothing to open up the political and judicial system of Russia or to reduce its rampant corruption. Based on data compiled by Transparency International, Russia ranks 137 out of 198 countries in terms of corruption and its score of 28 out of a possible 100 has not changed since 2012. There is little evidence of much Wandel here.

Tough on Trump, Soft on Xi

China is a much more different and more important matter, given its much greater economic weight. Both China and Russia have violated international agreements with impunity, Russia in Ukraine and China in its agreement with the United Kingdom on the “one country, two systems” concept for the status of Hong Kong. Like many other Western corporations, German companies like Volkswagen, Siemens, and BASF are manufacturing in Xinjiang province where Uyghurs and other Muslims are being held in interment and labor camps.

Chancellor Merkel has been silent and Altmaier argues that it might be “too risky to pursue a confrontational course” against China. Yet, there is more risk in dealing with a country which openly violates its international agreements and lies without any attempt at pretending they are doing so. Accommodation conveys weakness and invites further pressure and blackmail, undermining the economic and political objectives of the strategy.

While German leaders have been rightly critical of US President Donald Trump’s disregard for democracy and human rights, they have their own version of value free transactional policies with regard to China, Russia, Hungary, and other illiberal regimes. Merkel’s and Altmaier’s Christian Democrats (CDU) continue to welcome Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz into the European People’s Party caucus in the European Parliament; and the government has no qualms about German car makers continuing to invest in Hungarian plants.

Thus, Berlin is not likely to use its EU presidency in the second half of 2020 to stand up to Orbán and to the consolidation of illiberalism in Poland. The current discussions in the EU about a COVID-19 fiscal stimulus package raised the issue of tying economic support to the rule of law, specifically in regard to Hungary, but this was kept out of the European Council’s final agreement.

Time to Change the Tune

With Germany presently at the EU’s helm, this would be the time to show that the EU stands for more than just economic power. Non-governmental organizations like Transparency International and German foundations have promoted a more values-based approach including support for democratic reforms, but so far Merkel’s government has fallen far short of expectations that Germany can be a leader for liberal values.

This is the more troubling since Germany’s geo-economic position is under threat from both China and Russia. The issue of intellectual property rights, equal and reciprocal access to the Chinese market, and the role of Chinese investment and takeovers of German companies in key sectors is central to Germany’s continued economic power and independence. This was pointed out last year in a major study by the German Confederation of Industry, the BDI. Russian investments, like Nord Stream 2, pose the prospect of Wandel in Germany rather than in Russia with the export of corruption and political influence buying in Germany itself, not to mention the continued waging of hybrid war by Putin in Germany.

As Lau pointed out in his 2013 article, demand for German products, investment, and expertise will survive a more balanced and critical approach. The Chinese will continue to demand German automobiles and German technology even if the chancellor meets with the Dalai Lama or is critical of the suppression of democratic rights in Hong Kong. Putin will continue to pump gas and provide oil to the German market.

Germans need to learn the lessons of their neighbors. The UK spoke of a new “golden decade” of relations with China under David Cameron, but now Boris Johnson’s government has reversed course banning Huawei from the UK 5G network and sharply criticizing China’s violation of the agreement on Hong Kong. The French government under Emmanuel Macron has also taken a tougher line on Beijing (see also “Pariscope: Macron’s Entente Cordiales Against China”).

Germany is in a far stronger position than the UK to exercise its economic power to speak for its values. Along with Paris, Berlin is key to the development of a strong EU position on China, Russia, and on authoritarians in Europe. As Andreas Fulda recently argued in a commentary for the British think tank RUSI, “Europe can no longer afford Germany’s unprincipled and failed China policy of change through trade… While trade clearly matters, European values need to be defended too.”

NB. Noah Ramsey contributed research to this article.

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© REUTERS/Nicolas Asfonri/Pool

As Barack Obama begins to prepare to turn the White House over to Donald Trump in January, many Germans and Americans might go through a prolonged period of Obama nostalgia. Obama restored the sense in Germany and Europe that it’s possible to have an American president who looks at the world very much the way European leaders and publics do. After the tumultuous George W. Bush years, the American image in Germany was at a low point. Polls taken over the past summer show that Obama is more popular with the German public than Chancellor Angela Merkel, and that he has also raised the approval rating for the United States.[1] While the revelations of NSA spying on and with Germany damaged trust, even now a majority of Germans believe the US government respects the personal freedoms of its people, if not necessarily of its allies.

All of this was unexpected at the beginning of Obama’s time in office. The two leaders got off on the wrong foot after Merkel denied Obama’s request to hold a speech at Berlin’s iconic Brandenburg gate. Merkel was unhappy and perhaps even envious about the enthusiastic welcome he received. But that awkward beginning didn’t last long, as these two similarly rational, realist, and serious leaders came to appreciate one other. Obama was unlike Russia’s Vladimir Putin, France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, and other macho leaders who Merkel could not stomach. Obama called Merkel his closest ally over his eight years in office during his last visit to Berlin in November 2016.

The Legacy with the Public

While the American public is less concerned about Germany than the German public is about the US, what it does know about Germany is quite positive. A Pew survey in 2015 found that a widespread majority of Americans (72 percent) see Germany as a reliable ally, including nearly a quarter (24 percent) that think of Germany as very reliable. Older Americans (77 percent) have more faith in Germany than younger ones do (66 percent). Roughly four-in-ten Americans (38 percent) also approve of how Merkel is handling bilateral ties, while fewer disapprove (27 percent). Notably, men (44 percent) are more supportive than women (33 percent), as are those with a college degree (46 percent) compared with those with some college education (35 percent). The finding that 35 percent of Americans have no opinion of how Merkel is dealing with US-German relations is further evidence that Americans are not paying much attention.[2]

While American opinion on Obama’s handling of relations with Germany was mixed, 40 percent approve of the job he is doing, 36 percent disapprove. As might be expected, Democrats (67 percent) say Obama is doing a good job, while only 16 percent of Republicans agree.

Other surveys have found widespread positive views of German society and German economic achievements. A poll commissioned by the German embassy in Washington in March 2016 found a majority of Americans have a positive image of Germany, see German-American relations in a good light and consider Germany to be the third most important partner for the US after Britain and Canada.[3] There are however continuing concerns that Germany is taking more than it is giving. Polls show more than half (54 percent) of Americans think Berlin should play a more active military role in maintaining peace and stability, while only 37 percent say it should limit its role. Democrats (60 percent) are most likely to back a more active German military.[4]

Polling has also found a growing tendency in both countries to look inward. “In particular, it is younger Germans and Americans who are more inward looking than their older counterparts. More than half of both Americans (57 percent) and Germans (54 percent) ages 18 to 29 hold the view that their country should deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs.”[5]

Mixed Record

After Brexit, Germany clearly became America’s most important political partner in Europe, with Merkel as Europe’s key leader. The economic relationship has been far more mixed. America is Germany’s largest trading partner while Germany is the fifth largest US trading partner globally. American firms have invested $116 billion in Germany. German investments in the US total $224 billion and German firms employ over 620,000 American workers.[6] This close economic relationship has been an important factor in promoting close political ties. But there are key differences: the Obama administration took a Keynesian approach to deal with the American financial crisis and believed that Germany should do the same in the eurozone. Instead, Berlin took the austerity approach, emphasizing structural reforms over stimulus.

Also, a major initiative to expand transatlantic trade and investment (TTIP) fell apart. The growing anti-free trade movement in the US, combined with a public backlash in Germany, delayed negotiations long enough so that it failed to be passed during the Obama-Merkel era. And European concerns over big data and the role of American corporate giants like Apple, Microsoft, and Google created both economic and political tensions.

Facing Uncertainty

The German-American relationship is now facing uncertainty. President-elect Trump stands for almost everything European and German leaders don’t: he has denied climate change, championed “America First” unilateral nationalism, and expressed admiration for illiberal regimes and leaders. Just as President Obama came in as a corrective to the nationalistic policies of George W. Bush, Trump sees himself as a corrective to the multilateralism and soft power approach of Obama. He will inherit the mantle from a president who many in both parties believe has been too reactive and passive, especially regarding Putin and Russia.

Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Trump all believed that European allies have to boost defense spending to shoulder a growing burden with the US. But Trump has gone much further and linked American security guarantees to levels of European burden sharing. Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to expand defense spending significantly and move towards the NATO target of two percent of GDP is an important step, but it will have to be followed up with substantial improvements in German and European defense capabilities.

What’s more, expectations of stronger German-American partnership in the wake of Brexit are vanishing. Hopes for a reliable European partner were already cast in doubt with the current disarray in the EU – not to mention next year’s elections in a number of key countries, including France and Germany. The American election has now accelerated this fragmentation. They have also placed Merkel in the uncomfortable position of being the last and best hope of the Western liberal order against Trump’s America. [7]

Europe now faces its greatest global disruption since at least 1989. Something significant is going on in the West that would seem to auger an unstable and dangerous period, both at home and internationally. America will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe, as it will be consumed with its “civil war” at home. And as Robert Zoellick recently pointed out: “The next president will need to start by deciding if the US should perpetuate the 70-year-old order.”

____

[1] See the June 2016 Pew poll, “As Obama Years Draw to a Close, President and US seen Favorably in Europe and Asia,” Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes and Trends, June 29, 2016.

[2] Pew Research Center, “German and the United States: Reliable Allies,“ Pew Global Attitudes and Trends, May 7, 2015.

[3] Frank Magid, “Perceptions of Germany Among the US Population,” March 2016 (Washington: Frank D. Magid Associates, 2016)

[4] Nearly seven-in-ten Republicans (69 percent) say the United States is not being tough enough on Russia over Ukraine; only 47 percent of Democrats agree. Most Democrats (59 percent) believe TTIP will be good for the country, while only 45 percent of Republicans support that view. And while 60 percent of Democrats would like to see Germany play a more active military role in the world, just 51 percent of Republicans want Germany to take on more of the security burden. The poll done for the German embassy found that while Germany is an important ally in the fight against terrorism, it should do more to combat terrorism including doing more militarily.

[5] Pew Research Center, “Germany and the United States: Reliable Allies.” (FN2)

[6] Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S Department of State, US Relations with Germany, Fact Sheet, November 5, 2015.

[7] Alison Smale and Steven Erlanger, “As Obama exits the world stage, Angela Merkel may be the liberal West’s last defender,” The New York Times, November 12, 2016.

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© REUTERS/Mike Sager

Taking the Reins

Europe will need to pick up where the United States leaves off.

European leaders and policy makers were confounded, like so many Americans, by Donald Trump’s election as the 45th president of the United States. As so many others, they are now scrambling to make sense of the consequences. So what will it likely mean?

A Trump presidency will lead to profound changes in America’s engagement with the world. At its base, it will represent a transition back from the highly internationalized and engaged America that we have known since the beginning of the 20th century.

This should, in fact, come as no great surprise to Europe. This transition is exactly what America has been speaking of for decades now – the desire to step back from being the world’s policeman. The translation of this sentiment into fact has also been an underlying trend during the Obama administration.

However, it will without question be different than it was under President Barack Obama. It is likely to take a different hue and accelerate at a far quicker pace.

Trump has said bluntly that America’s allies are not pulling their weight and that under his leadership they will have to start doing so if they want American support. That differs little from the position (stated rather more politely) of the last four

US defense secretaries – Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Chuck Hegel, and Ashton Carter. But unlike them, Trump expects quick action from allies in response.

So this may not be news. But there is another, more profound consequence that will now underlie this trend, one that is far more damaging. This election has fundamentally and perhaps irreparably damaged America’s soft power. The appeal of American (and Western) democracy has been greatly weakened. The Western ideal no longer holds the same glow.

Brexit Distraction

With Europe distracted by Brexit and its own internal concerns, and the US led by Trump, Western leadership is now absent. The consequences of this will be grave for Europe and the US. The institutions that have provided the basis for the current global architecture will be diminished, and the norms that many have relied upon have been cast in doubt. Others, notably China and Russia, will take advantage of this (as they have already been doing).

It is in this highly uncertain and unstable environment that Trump will insert his foreign policy objectives.

It is worth noting that his foreign policy positions are very unclear. Few candidates for president actually speak honestly and candidly about their foreign (and domestic) policy objectives; they swing to the extremes in the primaries, move more toward the middle during the election itself, and then, upon gaining office, discover that the facts are not what they had thought: Governing is far more difficult, and compromises must be made.

Thus, some of Trump’s more extreme positions, such as pulling out of NATO, can likely be put aside.

There are, however, some positions we can take seriously. TTIP will not progress during his tenure (although a trade agreement with the UK could), and Trump could presage a global move toward greater protectionism, with significant global consequences. US-Russia relations could well undergo the long anticipated “reset”, where Trump could well sacrifice things for which he has little interest (Crimea, for example) for the chance to announce he’s “made a great deal.” And Obama’s positive environmental agenda will be quickly reversed.

Still, the greatest fears of many around the world are unlikely to become reality. Trump will be constrained by his bureaucracy, by the judiciary, by Congress (there is little consensus today among Republicans, and the current conciliatory tone is unlikely to last), and finally by his cabinet (who will have far more experience governing than he does).

The world today is a more dangerous place. Trump’s enthusiasm for unpredictability will make it worse. But the steps required to mitigate the worst are clear (albeit difficult): Europe will need to step forward, to take more leadership, and to bear more burdens.  – BY XENIA WICKETT

Make Him Look Good!

Europeans should play to Donald Trump’s penchant for power – against their own instincts.

How should Europe deal with Donald Trump? According to the flood of initial reactions, Europe is now facing a massive challenge and a great deal of unpredictability.

Not necessarily. Dealing and even working cooperatively with Trump might be easier than anticipated if Europeans get the basics right from the start. Here’s an example of how to get it wrong, how to get it right, and a few ideas for Europeans trying to wrap their minds around the challenge the election poses to transatlantic relations.

The presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, addressed the newly elected president in a joint letter on November 9. “We would take this opportunity to invite you to visit Europe for an EU-US Summit at your earliest convenience. This conversation would allow for us to chart the course of our relations for the next four years.”

There was nothing wrong in writing that letter, but I doubt it was the best way to woo Trump to Europe. To begin with, his instincts certainly don’t lead him to embrace the European Union as an institution or as a partner. Trump is interested in power, and the EU has given him ample opportunity to associate it with powerlessness, and, perhaps worse, with the impression of a “rigged system” that he so fervently attacked in his own country during the campaign.

Trump’s attitude suggests that he believes power lies in the hands of strong men rather than with institutions, and the course of history has been shaped by deals from strong leaders, as Jeremy Shapiro argued in a recent ECFR paper. There is no reason to believe that Trump will have an interest in or even understand the post-World War II logic of various nations sharing power under the EU umbrella.

Early Mistakes

So the first mistake Tusk and Juncker made was to suggest the initial contact point should take the form of an EU-US summit. For us Europeans, this is the way we operate. We believe in having everyone around the table, regardless of size and prowess. But this certainly won’t impress Trump. The second mistake the presidents made was to leave the timing to President Trump: “at your earliest convenience.” It gives the impression that Europeans are fawning and needy, keen for the US president to give them a bit of his precious time.

So how can Europe do better in piquing Trump’s interest and making his cooperation more likely? Fundamentally, Europeans should play to his penchant for power, even if it goes against their own instincts, and they should clearly be the ones to set the agenda and timing. Furthermore, Trump is a newcomer in the world of international politics, and being the narcissist he is, he wants to succeed.

So Europeans should help introduce him to the international arena and make him look good in the club, as long as it doesn’t hurt them. The most important thing is for Europeans to impress President Trump with how they work and cooperate as Europeans, and with others, around one table. Europeans should therefore orchestrate the best opportunities to show their own strengths. They should utilize the various resources they have in playing old-fashioned power politics, which has seen a resurgence in Europe and the world. We can play this game of power by putting our strongest leaders out front, but we must also show the added value of the union’s institutional machinery.

A prime example is the EU3+3 in negotiations with Iran: The High Representative and the EU’s most influential countries played a pivotal role in shaping those talks. President-elect Trump will push Europeans to perform better in other areas where they can marry the strength of member states and EU institutions.

Two events will be important benchmarks in that process. As of December 1, Germany will take over the G20 presidency from China. In the run-up to the summit in Hamburg in July 2017, there will be a host of meetings between officials on various levels. European members of the G20, including EU representatives, should use these talks as an opportunity to coordinate and liaise with their US counterparts in the new Trump administration so they can build alliances at working levels. At the summit itself, Europeans should make an extra effort to show unity, and the German presidency can help a great deal in portraying a Europe in motion.

Italy will hold the G7 presidency in 2017, and this will present another important opportunity. The next meeting will be held in Sicily next May (though it’s a bit ironic to imagine President Trump in this setting). The overall subject is migration, a topic that has been hugely divisive in Europe (this will also be Theresa May’s first G7 appearance), and will likely also be a major point of discord with Trump, going by his campaign rhetoric. However, this is not necessarily an impediment to a successful display of European unity and strength, precisely because we have got to know so well each other’s domestic limitations. There is a strong interest in the EU to internationalize the challenge of migration, and Europeans should naturally be looking for points of convergence. This might be the chance.

Yes, Europeans are facing a great deal of unpredictability with President Trump. But if they manage to get the fundamentals right, they might be able to turn it into an opportunity for Europe itself. – BY ALMUT MÖLLER

Honor Your Commitments

A staunch ally like Poland shouldn’t be left in the cold.

Poland has been a staunch ally of the United States, both within NATO as well as bilaterally. It is participating in the US-led anti-ISIL Operation Inherent Resolve, spends the requested two percent of GDP on defense, and has joined the US and other allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fate of both countries is deeply intertwined, and the policies of the next US president will have profound implication on the security and prosperity of Poland.

These are uncertain times in Poland. Brexit only added to the sense of fragility of the European project and anxiety over the future of the West, both of which have been the guiding stars of Poland’s foreign policy over the past 25 years. During this time of instability, the US has become Poland’s predominant security partner. Together we face the main challenger to a stable, values-based European security order, Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine set off alarms in every NATO capital, but particularly in Warsaw.

Russia’s determination to undermine the European security order based on the principles of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 means the region has entered a new era of dangerous competition. Russia’s aggression was met with NATO’s move from reassurance to deterrence, codified by the Warsaw NATO summit declaration in July. Security will remain the key concern for Warsaw, and security policy will remain the key pillar of Polish-American relations.

America is committed to placing 5000 soldiers on Polish soil over the coming months. An armored brigade (ABCT) is scheduled to arrive in February 2017. This is a clear commitment to NATO and European security that the next president should embrace. The troops deployments already in the pipeline are a message of resolve, and there is no need to modify military planning. The next administration should focus early on providing resources for the beefed-up US presence on NATO’s eastern flank by quickly working with the new Congress on the next cycle of the European Reassurance Initiative. Any delay or change in the pace of implementing NATO summit commitments would send the wrong signal to both the allies as well as Russia.

No Quick Deal with Moscow

In the past, every new president since the end of the Cold War made the mistake of trying to fix relations with Russia in one quick move. Under President Barack Obama this led to the infamous “reset” that many in Warsaw saw as sacrificing the interests of Central Europe on the altar of closer (but in the end unsuccessful) cooperation with Russia.

Even if an exact repeat of this situation is unlikely, there is certainly a worry in Warsaw about the next administration attempting to fix America’s relations with Russia without addressing the issues that led to the breakdown of ties in the first place. It would be a mistake to go back to business as usual without resolving the conflict in Ukraine. This would be seen by Moscow as confirmation that it can trample on Western values and interests whenever it chooses. Such a step would further embolden Moscow in its aggressive policies, which would eventually lead to a renewed clash with the US. Russia’s behavior will change only if Kremlin elites understand that Western pressure transcends US administrations.

Whenever the US disengaged from Europe in the 20th century, it always led to conflicts that required American reengagement with great loss of blood and wealth. The 21st century is no different. Poland, as well as many other front line US allies, needs an America that is engaged in the world and focused on the maintenance of an alliance system that has benefited the US so much over the past seventy years. The US remains a key European power. Post-Brexit Europe should be one of the key focal points for the next administration.

European allies need to contribute more, sharing the burden more equally – especially when it comes to spending on security and defense. Much of the work should be done behind the scenes, but the next president needs to make it clear that the US wants a strong, united EU both as a global partner and a key player in its own neighborhood. – BY MICHAL BARANOWSKI

A New Order?

The US will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe.

President Donald Trump will be leading a country that is more preoccupied with itself and its domestic divisions than usual. He enters the White House as the most divisive first-term president since Abraham Lincoln. This bruising election campaign has cast a shadow over his judgment and suitability for office.  He will, however, have Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and an energized base of voters behind him. The Democrats will be demoralized and leaderless for some time to come.

Presidents matter on foreign policy; that is where they have the most independence from Congress. And the world is not going to allow Trump to focus solely on domestic priorities.
A Trump presidency will be a complicated one for Europe. President Trump stands for almost everything both European and German leaders have opposed: denial of climate change; an America First version of unilateral nationalism; an open admiration for illiberal regimes and leaders, most importantly Russia and Putin.

Just as President Obama came in as a correction to the nationalistic policies of the George W. Bush administration, Trump sees himself as a correction to the multilateralism and soft power approach of Obama. He will inherit the mantle from a president who many in both parties believe has been too reactive and passive, especially regarding Putin and Russia. He is likely to take a much softer line on Russia than Obama. He knows that Putin tried to influence the election in his favor and will be open to another reset in Russia policy. He views Russia and Putin as an ally in the war against Islamic extremism. He will be much more open to recognizing a Russian sphere of influence and will see Ukraine as a needless drain on American attention and resources. He will be open to lifting the sanctions regime on Russia in return for a bigger deal with Putin.

Not Merkel’s Preferred Partner

Hillary Clinton was clearly Angela Merkel’s preferred partner, but with Clinton there was a real danger of division over Russia policy given Clinton’s harder line on Moscow. Now, Merkel faces the opposite problem of Trump accommodating Russia. That would undermine Western unity built upon close ties between Washington and Berlin. Trump is also more open to giving Putin free rein in Syria as part of the larger fight against Islamist extremists.

As Robert Zoellick put it recently in the Financial Times, “Europe’s problems will probably be left to the Europeans.” Given the challenges and choices any American administration faces in the Middle East and Asia, Europe will be expected to offer more leadership and partnership. Both Clinton and Trump agreed that European allies have to boost defense spending to shoulder a growing burden with the United States, but Trump went much further and linked American security guarantees to levels of European burden sharing.

Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to expand defense spending significantly and move toward the NATO target of two percent of GDP is an important step in meeting these expectations, but it will have to be followed up with substantial improvements in German and European defense capabilities. What’s more, expectations of stronger German-American partnership in leadership in the wake of Brexit are now on life support. Hopes for a reliable European partner were already in doubt given the current disarray in the EU – not to mention next year’s elections in a number of key countries, including France and Germany.  The American election has now accelerated this fragmentation.

Trade and the future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be another important policy challenge. Trump ran on a clear anti-free trade platform and has rejected both NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). His views reflect the substantial domestic opposition to more free trade agreements among American voters. It seems highly probable that not only TPP but also TTIP are now dead.  The transatlantic partners may need to find another way to enhance economic cooperation.

Great Discontinuity

A Clinton presidency would have come as a relief to Europe. It would have signaled continuity with Obama on the Iran nuclear deal, better ties to Cuba, and the close relationship with Germany. Instead Europe faces the greatest discontinuity it has faced since at least 1989.  Something significant is going on in the West that would seem to auger an unstable and dangerous period, both at home and internationally.  America will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe, as it will be consumed with its “civil war” at home. As Charles Lane put it recently, “Today’s Republicans and Democrats are so divided that they no longer seem like citizens of the same nation or acknowledge even the same factual reality.”

And as Zoellick points out, “The next president will need to start by deciding if the US should perpetuate the seventy-year-old order.” The American election has now put that order into serious question. – BY STEPHEN S. SZABO

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