© REUTERS/US Navy/Greg Messier

US President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy describe a contested global landscape challenged by China and Russia as well as rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea. While the degree to which to the US will adhere to this strategy is unclear, these two documents accurately reflect the strategic reorientation that is currently underway in US security and defense policy. The Trump administration’s focus on inter-state competition may be a continuation of trends initiated years ago, but it sits awkwardly with the outlook and priorities of Washington’s European allies.

For reasons ranging from internal tensions to a fervent belief in a justice-bound “arc of history,” most Europeans have been reluctant to embrace the notion of great power competition. The zero-sum view of international affairs reflected in the NSS and NDS therefore clashes with the worldview that has been promoted in Europe for the last 70 years.

Of course, this is not to suggest Europeans are naïve. If anything, Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has ended Europe’s strategic slumber, bringing about a strengthening of the continent’s defense posture. Several European strategic documents—including, notably, the 2017 French Review of Defence and National Security—also offer clear-eyed assessments on the consequences of global strategic competition.

The US and Europe do share an over-arching interest in rolling back the influence of authoritarian powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Yet they differ in their respective threat perceptions and prioritizations. Concepts such as the Trump administration’s “peace through strength” mantra worry European leaders, most of whom are more accustomed to soft power and diplomatic tools. In this regard, while the NSS and NDS enjoy broad support with European decision-makers for their view of Russia as a revisionist power, the potential for further deterioration in US-Russian relations, such as over nuclear issues, and the effects this would have on European security are nevertheless a cause for concern.

Meanwhile, few European capitals share the Trump administration’s view of China as a revisionist power actively challenging the international order. Although the European view on China is hardening, this is so far mostly confined to the economic sphere. Some European leaders even see Beijing as a potentially useful partner when it comes to upholding multilateralism or combating climate change in the age of Trump. Few European states have either the presence (only France and the UK have overseas territories in the Asia-Pacific) or the necessary capabilities to approach China as a strategic military challenge.

North Korea is viewed in Europe as a serious threat to regional order in Asia and to the non-proliferation regime, but is far from the highest priority in most European capitals. Similarly, most European countries do not share the Trump administration’s adversarial view of Iran, preferring instead to insist on strict adherence to the JCPOA nuclear deal and seeking a deepening of political and economic ties with Tehran.

In contrast to these seemingly remote threats, European leaders have to contend with several serious crises closer to home: Brexit will deprive the bloc of one of its foremost economic and military powers; tension between Brussels and some Central and Eastern European capitals is only getting worse as nationalistic movements threaten to cripple the EU’s internal cohesion; and a revanchist Russia is now seeking to restore its sphere of influence in the East, aggressively subverting national democratic institutions through disinformation, cyber-warfare, and economic coercion.

In a sense, while the NSS and NDS offer a strategic long-term vision of the evolving international system, Europe is mired in short-term challenges that cloud its field of vision. Rather than great power competition and rogue regimes, Europe is fixated on curbing migration and terrorism stemming from disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East and from instability in North Africa, the Sahel, and sub-Saharan Africa. In the east, the potential for renewed instability in the Western Balkans and Russia’s destabilizing actions occupy what is left of the bloc’s strategic attention. On top of this, addressing climate change remains a top EU foreign policy objective.

Reconcilable Priorities

Yet the diverging priorities of the US and Europe are far from irreconcilable. Countering Russian interference and revisionism is key to securing the EU’s eastern flank, and also fits into the Trump administration’s strategy. Stabilizing the bloc’s southern neighborhood aligns with Washington’s interests, and also coincides with the aims of US allies in the Middle East. And, as the world’s largest trading bloc, the EU has every interest in working with Washington to ensure that intellectual property rights and freedom of navigation are respected by its second largest trading partner, China.

That being said, the divergence is real, and some significant introspection is required on both sides of the Atlantic lest the gap between Washington and Brussels become a chasm. Europe has to be prepared to show courage and resolve. Courage because European leaders have for too long relied on an “end of history” narrative to justify their continued reliance on the American military. In order to effectively protect democracy and the global liberal order, Europe will have to take the lead on certain operations, for instance on stabilization and counter-terrorism efforts in the southern neighborhood, especially as the US shifts its focus to great power competition. In addition, Europe must develop its own strategic culture, sharpen its understanding of what inter-state strategic competition means for itself, and invest in emerging capabilities such as artificial intelligence, cyber countermeasures, and drone swarm technology. Europeans must also show resolve: they must be prepared to sustain commitment to their own security in the face of severe budgetary constraints and possibly even the loss of life.

On the other hand, the US must play a supporting and encouraging role in Europe. If the Trump administration intends to keep with its predecessor’s “leading from behind” approach on many matters pertaining to European security, it must at the very least tolerate a more independent European defense posture. More importantly, the US must support European efforts such as PESCO and EDF. American capabilities will remain crucial to European security for decades to come, especially with regard to military deterrence against Russia. In this regard, the Trump administration’s reassurances on NATO are most welcome. But American benevolence should also extend to the EU. Supporting actors that seek to weaken or dismantle the bloc undermine transatlantic trust and do not further US interests.

The NSS and NDS show that Washington, for one, is already giving serious thought to how the world will develop in the coming decades. However, the US is misguided when it comes to non-military responses to security challenges. From its gutting of aid programs to its downsizing of the State Department, the Trump administration seems loath to think outside of the military toolbox. Be it revisionist powers’ insidious sapping of the global informational space, state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, or the already-observable consequences of climate change, some of the challenges to US power and prosperity in the 21^st century will not be solved by military means alone.

Above all, Europe and the United States need a joint vision. The security architecture that binds the two continents is founded upon shared political and strategic concerns. The NSS and NDS highlight the challenges that democratic societies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean will have to grapple with in the coming decades. Whether the EU can muster the determination to power through its current crises and accept a larger share of the global security burden remains to be seen. Similarly, it is uncertain whether Washington is willing to accept a more militarily autonomous Europe and whether US global leadership can be preserved in the absence of investing in soft power tools. Absent this major course correction on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe and the United States seem condemned to move, ever so slightly, further apart.

The post Continental Drift? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Dado Ruvic

Until the last moment of the German election that took place on September 24, large-scale, overt interference by the Kremlin was considered a real possibility. However, in the end Germans were spared the brazen meddling that marred elections in both the United States and France. Yet with the openly pro-Russian Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) strong showing securing its place in the Bundestag, Moscow has every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the vote. In fact, data collected by the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), an initiative run by the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC, shows that Kremlin-oriented networks engaged in low-level, covert interference in Germany. Most notably, these networks actively supported AfD online by targeting the German public with the same type of disinformation they used in the United States.

Since July, ASD has been monitoring the activity of Kremlin-oriented actors on Twitter in the United States via its Hamilton 68 dashboard. Just before the German election, ASD added Artikel 38, a similar tool that monitors the activity of Kremlin-oriented Twitter accounts in Germany. The researchers at ASD trawled through thousands of followers of Russian propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik and used three metrics – influence, exposure, and in-groupness – to narrow the initial list down to 1,100 accounts, 600 in the United States and 500 in Germany, that consistently echo Moscow’s political line. The two dashboards now automatically monitor these accounts in real time and distill their content into an analyzable format.

The information derived from the dashboards reveals that topics and themes promoted in both countries were very similar. In both Germany and the US, Moscow amplifies right-wing content in an attempt to exacerbate pre-existing socio-political divisions. In Germany, Artikel 38 shows that the Kremlin’s messaging follows three broad axes: xenophobic coverage of immigrants; anti-“establishment” attacks, directed at Chancellor Angela Merkel in particular; and support for AfD. Together, the themes pushed by the network target the most salient vulnerabilities of German democracy.

Xenophobic content pervades the stories tweeted by the network. A third of the 122 URLs it promoted between September 13 and September 27 directed viewers to anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic content. The tweeted stories portray immigration as a security threat and seek to stir Germans’ fears of an “Islamization” of their country. Out of 37 xenophobic stories promoted by the network, 23 portray immigrants as either criminals or terrorists. One leitmotiv concerns rapes allegedly committed by refugees. Other stories imply a link between (Muslim) immigration and terrorism. For instance, one article reported that four Syrian refugees with links to the terror group Jabhat al-Nusra were on trial for murder before a German court.

Stories that appeal to xenophobic instincts are often linked to another type of coverage that criticizes the “establishment” forces responsible for the influx of supposedly dangerous and irredeemably alien refugees. Anti-establishment content primarily focuses on Merkel and on the mainstream media outlets accused of dancing to her tune. Over the studied period, 15 URLs criticize, or even criminalize, Merkel for her way of handling Germany’s refugee crisis. These posts claim that by illegally admitting large numbers of refugees, Merkel not only sacrificed Germans’ security, but also started the steady dismantlement of German democracy and rule of law. A particular link that was among the top ten stories for three consecutive days explains why “Merkel belongs behind bars.”

Other pieces focus on “Merkel’s accomplices.” Most of them target the mainstream media, accused of censoring reports critical of Merkel and her refugee policy. Two of the most retweeted stories reported that the German public broadcaster ZDF had uninvited the relative of one of the victims of the terrorist attack that occurred in Berlin last December from a show with the chancellor. Other articles pushed by the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network in Germany focus on alleged instances of censorship and on cover-ups by state authorities, most notably by Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière and Justice Minister Heiko Maas.

By amplifying xenophobic and anti-establishment views, the network pushes the same narratives as AfD. But the network goes further than promoting ideas; it directly promotes the radical right-wing party. Since the launch of Artikel 38, AfD has dominated the hashtags, topics, and stories promoted by the dashboard. Over the period analyzed, #afd was the most tweeted hashtag, either the most or second-most important topic discussed, and the subject of a significant share of the articles pushed by the network. These articles, 36 altogether, serve two main purposes.

Firstly, they seek to create the image of a powerful AfD. Before Germans went to the polls, the network actively promoted pieces that suggested that the party’s support base might be far greater than expected. After September 24, the network was abuzz with posts that cheered the AfD’s “triumph” and gloated at the establishment’s poor assessment of the party’s real strength. Secondly, the articles aim to “expose” what the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network in Germany calls the establishment’s “witch-hunt” against AfD. According to this narrative, before the election, the other parties, mainstream media, and other “establishment” forces were accused of using censorship, fake scandals, and possibly election fraud to prevent AfD’s inevitable triumph. Having failed at their attempts, the “establishment” now tries to downplay AfD’s victory and threatens to fight, rather than engage, the party in parliament.

Honing the Message

While Moscow’s messaging is strikingly similar in Germany and in the US, the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network in Germany does have some idiosyncrasies. For instance, it plays on Germans’ strong concern for environmental issues and climate change. This is reflected in both the hashtags and topics tweeted by the network, which regularly reference issues like nuclear waste, EU regulations for the weed-killer glyphosate, and even the German recycling system. The natural disasters that recently struck the Americas were given sustained attention by the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network in Germany. On September 21, six of the 10 most trending hashtags related to hurricanes Harvey, Jose, Irma, and Maria. The network exploited these catastrophes to promote conspiracy theories, while a website that accuses US research institutes of weather manipulation and of using climate as a strategic weapon is frequently among the most-tweeted URLs of the network.

Beyond the small thematic idiosyncrasies, the dashboards also reveal significant differences between the German and American information environments. Some of these differences are intrinsic to the platform monitored, with Twitter being a much more powerful public opinion influencer in the US than in Germany. In the US, Twitter is a behemoth boasting approximately 70 million active users. In Germany, the social network never really caught on, and hovers at around a million active users. Activities on Twitter thus reach barely more than one percent of Germans directly. Of course, Twitter may still have an indirect effect: while most Germans get their news from traditional media, Twitter plays an outsized role in influencing journalists, who are on the platform and sometimes amplify or repeat its content.

Not only does the platform reach a far smaller audience, it is also used far more “passively” in Germany than in the United States. This is reflected in the dashboards. In Germany, the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network rarely posts more than 20,000 tweets a day, whereas in the United States, it rarely falls below the 20,000-tweet mark. This is further reflected in the fact that the content pushed by the networks sees a far smaller number of retweets in Germany than in the United States – a clear indicator that Germans interact less with messages posted by others. For instance, between September 25 and 27, the five most-tweeted posts were retweeted an average amount of 204 times in the United States versus an average of 39 times in Germany.

Another significant difference between each country’s Kremlin-oriented Twitter network is the number and weight of sources each one uses. In Germany, the content promoted by Moscow sympathizers emanates largely from a small number of single-authored fringe blogs. Large national or local media outlets are seldom referred to. To some extent, it seems that content promoted by Russia is restricted to a niche audience and is isolated from the broader public debate.

The situation is very different in the United States, where Russia has a much larger number of websites whose messages it can amplify. Small sites analogous to the German fringe blogs are more numerous and appear to draw from a larger pool of contributors. More importantly, the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network in the United States relies heavily on content from large outlets such as Breitbart and Fox News. These big organizations allow the Kremlin-oriented Twitter network to be far more embedded in the American public debate than in the German one.

Moscow adopts the same propaganda strategy on both sides of the Atlantic. It uses social media to bolster the political extremes, the far-right in particular, and extend the reach and toxicity of their divisive rhetoric. But analyzing the dashboard’s data suggests that the Kremlin’s online tactics might be better suited to the United States than to Germany. The Kremlin-oriented Twitter network reaches more people in the US, and the American public more readily engages with content pushed by Moscow. In addition, Russian online campaigns in the US can draw on large media outlets and get to people beyond the restricted confines of the far-right.

That’s not to say that Germany is immune to Kremlin interference. AfD has learned from, and largely adopted, the online tactics Moscow used to great effect in other Western democracies. Moreover, as a party in Parliament, AfD is now very likely to have a much-improved access to media channels that have real sway over the German public. If the far-right party maintains its openly Pro-Russian line in the coming months, Moscow will have a Trojan horse perfectly poised to take the German informational landscape by storm.

The post Building a Trojan Horse appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.