© REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

When Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, it banned all American and Soviet (and later Russian) land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and resulted in the destruction of nearly 2,700 missiles.

In 2014, the United States charged that Russia had violated the INF Treaty by testing a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile (later identified as the 9M729, also called Iskander), and in 2017, US officials said that Russia had actually deployed the 9M729. Russian officials deny that charge and assert that it’s the US that is not in compliance.

On October 20, 2018, President Trump declared that the United States would withdraw from the treaty, and in early December, US officials announced that, if Russia did not return to full compliance within 60 days, the United States would suspend its obligations under the treaty (which would relieve Russia of observing its commitments as well).

If we take the US accusation to be true—that Russia has been violating the INF Treaty for many years—then it is indeed logical that Washington withdraws from the treaty or suspends its obligations. The US cannot be expected to remain in the treaty forever if Russia does not correct its violation. However, the timing and manner of President Trump’s decision—announced at a campaign rally in the western state of Nevada—amounts to a major blunder.

A Series of Missteps

First, his announcement was immediately divisive among NATO allies. Senior officials in Paris, Berlin, Rome, and other European capitals have expressed regret and even strong criticism. Amazingly, Washington apparently did not consult with allies about the decision before Trump’s announcement. That stands in stark contrast to when the treaty was negotiated and US officials consulted frequently with NATO allies, aware of the agreement’s impact on member states’ security: Russian intermediate-range missiles can strike targets in Europe (and Asia), but they cannot reach the US. While the treaty was global in scope, it focused on enhancing European security. NATO foreign ministers backed the US position at their December 4 meeting, but there is no agreement yet on how NATO should respond.

Second, by the time that Trump made his announcement, the White House had provided little substance publicly to back up its charge that the 9M729 missile violates the treaty. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats provided more detail on November 30, but the Russians continue to deny the charge and assert that the US has overstepped the treaty rules. This looks like it will degenerate into a war of words between Washington and Moscow. US withdrawal from the treaty will also ensure that it gets most of the blame for the treaty’s demise.

Third, once the treaty’s limits are abandoned, the Russian military will no longer have to pretend that it is observing those limits. It will be free to deploy the Iskander as well as other intermediate-range missiles. The US military currently has no land-based counterpart. As a result, an arms race in intermediate-range missiles may begin in Europe, but it will be one-sided: only Russia will be racing.

The United States ends up the loser on all three counts. And European security loses out as well.

A Better Approach

The Trump administration could have taken other measures that would have had a greater chance of changing the Kremlin’s policy. As part of a strategy to bring Russia back into compliance in December 2017, US officials said that the Pentagon would begin research and development on a ground-launched intermediate-range missile. But that was hardly cause for concern in the Kremlin.

Actually fielding a new missile would take a number of years. Moreover, Russian officials likely calculated that NATO would not find consensus to deploy a new US missile in Europe—and they undoubtedly would be right. An intermediate-range missile based in the US would not bother Moscow much, since it could not reach Russia.

What else could Washington have done? The US military could have increased the number of conventionally-armed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles deployed in the European region. That could have been done quickly, it would have been compliant with US treaty obligations, and most importantly, it would have caught the attention of the Russian military.

Moreover, Washington could have sought to raise political pressure on Moscow. US officials could have consulted with allies and urged them to crank up the political heat on the Kremlin, including at the highest level: Vladimir Putin would have received an earful from Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Emmanuel Macron, and other European leaders who want to keep the treaty and don’t like being targeted by new Russian missiles.

True, these steps might not have been enough to persuade Moscow to alter its course, but even if they did not succeed in bringing it back into compliance, Washington would have at least prepared the ground for withdrawal.

An Illusory Asia Bonus

For Trump, the end to the INF treaty means his country can deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles to counter China, which has hundreds of those kinds of missiles.
But the US military has to build the missiles first, and that will take time and cost billions of dollars from the Pentagon’s already severely stressed budget. And it makes little sense to build the missiles if they cannot be deployed within range of Chinese targets. But which Asian ally will agree to have new US missiles based on its territory and within range of China?

It’s doubtful Japan would: Tokyo has shown no enthusiasm for hosting US missiles that could strike China (or Russia), and even if the Japanese central government agreed, local governments could prove problematic.

South Korea would also prove to be a struggle. The decision to host a US missile defense system there in 2017 triggered huge domestic controversy; the prospect of a US surface-to-surface missile threatening China would be highly problematic, to say the least.

With no ally near to China that is ready to put out the welcome mat for new US missiles, the fallback option will be Guam, a small American territory already stuffed with US military hardware. This, however, means there will be no early solution to the hosting issue. The fastest way the US could develop a ground-based intermediate-range missile would be to take Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles and modify them to be deployed on land-based launchers. But Guam lies 3,000 kilometers from the Chinese coast, and the Tomahawk has a range of just 2,500 kilometers.

It is problems like this—where to put a ground-launched intermediate-range missile—that make the Asian “bonus” of ending the INF Treaty illusory. That is why senior US military leaders have consistently said that they will counter Chinese ground-launched missiles with air- and sea-based weapons.

This Time, It’s Not Gorbachev

Regardless of the challenges, some have posited the theory that a renewed arms race would give the US a significant lever to bring Russia to its knees, economically speaking—that did, after all, work for Reagan.

But while the US economy and defense budget could afford to run an arms race in the 1980s, that may not be so easy today. Washington’s budget deficit is alarmingly high. Trump has already told the Department of Defense that its budget will be slashed next year, and they will have a difficult time finding money to fund existing Pentagon priorities.

Moreover, the Soviet economy in the mid-1980s was a basket case, particularly as the price of oil, a key Soviet export, fell. The Russian economy today can hardly be called robust—stagnant is a more apt description—but it may be better able to sustain an arms race, particularly as Russia today has hot production lines running for new ballistic missile submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and cruise missiles of various kinds.

It’s also important to remember that Reagan dealt with Gorbachev, who recognized that the Soviet Union could not run an arms race and also meet the needs of its people. Trump, on the other hand, must deal with Putin, whose outlook is vastly different. The Russian leader is prepared, if necessary, to engage in an arms race. He appears to believe that stockpiling nuclear weapons is a good thing, and seems more than willing to sacrifice the Russian people’s well-being if necessary.

An arms race is a recipe for more nuclear weapons. That would make no contribution to European or global security, and it would make for poorer economies.

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© REUTERS/Yuri Kochetkov/Pool

Nuclear arms control has been a central feature of the relationship between Washington and Moscow for some 50 years, but the nuclear arms control regime appears increasingly fragile. Several factors are placing the regime under stress, and there are currently no discussions underway that might bolster it. US-Russian relations have fallen to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, beset by problems including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, differences over Syria, and Moscow’s interference in the US presidential election. Should the nuclear arms control regime unravel—a prospect that is unfortunately very real—the world would become a more uncertain and dangerous place.

US and Soviet officials began nuclear arms control negotiations in the late 1960s. Over the next four decades, they produced agreements like SALT, INF, and START. Thanks to those agreements and other unilateral decisions, the United States and Russia currently maintain nuclear arsenals that are large but only a fraction of their respective Cold War sizes.

The latest agreement, New START, requires the United States and Russia to each reduce to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Those limits go into full effect in February 2018, and both countries appear on track to meet the limits. Following the conclusion of New START, then-President Barack Obama proposed a new round of arms reduction negotiations that would include non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic weapons—meaning that for the first time, Washington and Moscow would negotiate on all nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Russian officials balked, citing concerns such as missile defense and conventional strike systems. They also called for the next negotiation to be multilateral, although the United States and Russia each maintain a nuclear arsenal that is more than ten times the size of that of any third country.

Over the remainder of the Obama administration, the two countries were unable to find a formula that would allow new negotiations. US and Russian officials have conducted one round of strategic stability talks since President Donald Trump took office, but those appear to have produced little more than agreement that there would be a second round.

The Eroding INF Treaty

The fate of the INF Treaty poses the most pressing challenge to the nuclear arms control regime. Signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, the treaty banned all US and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. By mid-1991, the two countries had destroyed some 2,700 missiles.

In 2014, the Obama administration charged that Russia had violated the treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range. Then, in 2017, US officials said that Russia had begun deploying the missile, which bears the Russian designator 9M729 and which the United States calls the SSC-8. Russian officials deny that they have violated the treaty, and instead charge the United States with three violations. Two are without merit, but Moscow’s claim that the launcher system for “Aegis Ashore,” the SM-3 missile interceptor site in Romania (and soon Poland as well), represents a violation appears to have some substance. Ashore’s vertical launch system, when on US Navy warships, can launch cruise missiles and other weapons as well as the SM-3, and the Russians say Aegis Ashore could hold ground-launched cruise missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

With more political will in Moscow and Washington, these problems could be addressed. The Russians, however, have thus far refused to even acknowledge any question about their compliance. For their part, Obama administration officials privately said that they would be willing to address Russian concerns if Moscow took the US charge regarding the Russian ground-launched cruise missile seriously.

Silent Allies

Since taking office, the Trump administration has conducted a review of the situation, while Republicans in Congress have added language to the National Defense Authorization Act that would authorize the Pentagon to develop a US ground-launched cruise missile. US officials have also consulted with NATO allies on the Russian violation.

On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the signing of the INF Treaty—the Trump administration announced that it remained committed to the treaty and would pursue an integrated strategy to bring Russia back into compliance. Under this strategy, the United States will (1) continue its pursuit of a diplomatic settlement, including through the Special Consultative Commission established by the treaty to discuss, among other things, compliance issues; (2) commence research and development of options for US intermediate-range ground-launched missiles (which would not per se violate the INF Treaty, though any flight test would); and (3) apply economic sanctions on Russian entities that developed and produced the SSC-8.

Meanwhile, US allies in Europe and Asia have said virtually nothing in public about the Russian violation, a missile designed to strike targets in their neighborhood rather than in the United States. This silence sends the wrong message to Moscow: for the Kremlin, this violation is just one part of an already troubled relationship with Washington, rather than a major political problem with the country’s neighbors. Moreover, if leaders in Berlin, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Tokyo, among other capitals, do not vigorously protest the Russian violation, their desire to maintain the treaty may not carry much weight with the Trump administration.

Trump and New START

If the INF Treaty collapses, it would increase the pressure on New START. New START expires by design in 2021, though it can be extended by up to five years. One would expect some quarters in Washington to oppose extending New START if the INF Treaty breaks down or Russia remains in violation; indeed, some Republicans on Capitol Hill have already sought to block funds for New START’s extension if Russia does not comply with the INF Treaty. Administration officials say that the question of extending New START will be considered after they see what happens in February 2018 and have a chance to complete a nuclear posture review.

US military leaders would most likely favor extension. They have testified to Congress that New START is in the American interest, emphasizing in particular the transparency regarding Russian strategic forces that is provided by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications, and inspections.

Whether President Trump shares that view is an open question, in part because he seems to have a limited understanding of strategic nuclear issues. When President Vladimir Putin raised the possible extension of New START in an early 2017 phone conversation, President Trump was reportedly unclear what New START was, but denounced it as a bad Obama deal.

A World Without Arms Control Limits

On its current course, it is difficult to see the INF Treaty surviving much longer. While the US administration remains nominally committed to the treaty, pressure will grow to withdraw if the Russian violation is not addressed. (That said, it had better be able to present compelling evidence of a Russian violation, or the United States will get blamed for the treaty’s demise.) If the INF Treaty is terminated or doubts about Russian compliance remain unresolved, it would make extension of New START beyond 2021 less likely.

Thus 2021 could see the end of negotiated limits on US and Russian nuclear forces, at a time when Russia is completing its nuclear modernization program and the United States is beginning to accelerate its planned modernization of its strategic delivery systems. Without these limits, the Russian military can be expected to openly deploy its intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. Might Moscow also decide to complement these by developing and deploying an intermediate-range ballistic missile?

Given budget limitations, it could be that neither Russia nor the United States would dramatically expand its strategic nuclear force numbers beyond the levels permitted by New START. Neither side, however, would be constrained by treaty limits. The Russian military hopes to field a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called the Sarmat. New START would likely require that that missile be deployed with fewer warheads than it is capable of carrying—but would the Russian military forgo deploying the maximum number of warheads absent New START? On the American side, the US Navy deploys an average of four to five warheads on its Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can carry eight warheads apiece. Absent New START, would the Pentagon be tempted to deploy a larger number of warheads on its SLBMs?

The Danger of Proliferation

Both sides would also lose the information provided by New START. Under the treaty, the sides exchange detailed data on their strategic forces every six months, and an average of 2,000 notifications every year regarding changes to their strategic forces. The treaty also allows each side to conduct up to 18 inspections per year of the other side’s deployed and non-deployed strategic forces. These provisions yield a huge amount of information, including the numbers of warheads on individual ICBMs and SLBMs at bases or submarine ports that are inspected. It would be difficult and expensive to develop other means of acquiring such information; without it, both sides would face greater uncertainty and be more likely to make worst-case assumptions about the size and composition of the other’s strategic forces. That would inevitably mean more costly decisions about how each side would equip and operate its own strategic forces.

Potential third country reactions also merit consideration. If the United States and Russia abandon nuclear arms limits, what would that mean for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapons states? If the two nuclear superpowers do not limit their arsenals, can they credibly ask other countries not to acquire nuclear weapons?

China has built up its nuclear forces at a modest pace, in part because Beijing has operated in a context in which there were limits on US and Russian nuclear forces. The country certainly has the economic capacity to expand its nuclear forces at a much more rapid rate. Without any international limits, would it be tempted to do so in an attempt to narrow the gap between its nuclear forces and those of the United States and Russia?

Maintaining the Regime

Washington and Moscow can still avoid the breakdown of the nuclear arms control regime. They could have a forthright dialogue on how to preserve the INF Treaty, using the Special Verification Commission to work out ways to address compliance concerns.

For example, the sides could agree that Russia would exhibit its SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile and provide a briefing on its characteristics to US experts. With more information, those experts might conclude that the missile does not violate the treaty. Of course, if it really has a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, the missiles would have to be eliminated.
Meanwhile, the US side could address Russia concerns on Aegis Ashore by introducing observable differences—functionally-related observable differences, if possible—to distinguish those SM-3 interceptor launchers from launchers on US warships. The sides might also set procedures under which Russian inspectors could periodically visit the SM-3 interceptor sites in Romania and Poland to confirm that the launch systems contained SM-3 interceptors, not cruise missiles.

Washington and Moscow could also agree to extend New START until 2026. That would preserve the treaty’s benefits and allow time for negotiation of a possible follow-on agreement. Of course, resolution of compliance concerns regarding the INF Treaty would create a much more positive atmosphere for consideration of New START’s extension.

Unilateral Commitments

Furthermore, US and Russian officials could use the strategic stability talks to explore the possibility of new negotiations on reducing nuclear arms, ideally including non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic warheads. To get to that point, Washington would almost certainly have to agree to some discussion of missile defense. It is difficult to see the Senate consenting to ratification of a treaty that limits missile defense, but a number of steps short of a treaty—an executive agreement on missile defense transparency, a NATO announcement of a self-imposed limit on the number of SM-3 interceptors in Europe, and/or a NATO decision to complete the SM-3 site in Poland but not deploy interceptors there—might interest Moscow.

As for third-country nuclear forces, the disparity in numbers between US and Russian nuclear weapons levels and the nuclear weapons levels of third countries makes it hard to conceive of a workable multilateral agreement, particularly if third countries insisted on equal limits. However, in the context of a US-Russian agreement that further reduced their nuclear arms levels below New START limits, it might be possible to get third countries, or at least Britain, France, and China, to commit unilaterally to not increase their total numbers of nuclear weapons.

An end to the nuclear arms control regime would be fraught with negative consequences for the United States, Russia, and the world, and the US and Russia should carefully consider how they proceed regarding the INF and New START treaties. With political will, the nuclear arms control regime can be maintained and perhaps strengthened, but doing so will require wise decisions in Washington and Moscow—ideally with appropriate encouragement from US allies and others in Europe and Asia, who will see their security diminished if the INF and New START treaties lapse.

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