© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

Now that Germany has agreed with France and other member states on new EU regulations for the controversial Nord Stream 2 project, the path for the pipeline to be built seems clear. Nevertheless, the German government is mistaken if it believes that it has satisfied its critics with this deal. Berlin has, from the beginning, underestimated the damage this project would do to its image. Its support for Nord Stream 2 demonstrates how the German government puts the national interest ahead of European and international strategic questions, thereby hurting its credibility in the long-term.

Amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and with the help of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the discussion about Germany and the EU’s energy independence from Russia has continued to intensify since 2014. The German government claimed for years that this was a purely commercial endeavor. But then in April 2018, at a meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Chancellor Angela Merkel recognized for the first time that the political factors surrounding Nord Stream 2 also had to be taken into account. By not turning against the project, the German government supported it from the start. Sigmar Gabriel, formerly the economy and energy minister and later foreign minister, assured Vladimir Putin at a 2015 meeting in Moscow that he would personally campaign to have the project under German jurisdiction. While the current agreement does not achieve that, Germany is nevertheless now responsible for negotiating the EU regulations and possible exceptions to them. And yet the objectives and repercussions of Nord Stream 2 go beyond Germany and run counter to German and EU interests.

Russian vs. Ukrainian Interests

From a Russian perspective, building Nord Stream 2 is about securing its most important gas market, the EU, with another pipeline. In addition, Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream are meant to make the Ukrainian transit-pipeline system superfluous, undermining Ukraine’s bargaining position vis-a-vis Russia and punishing it for its pro-EU stance. At the same time, the pipeline gives political Russia, which is closely tied to the economy, another connection to the EU and makes it possible to create dependencies with businesses and politicians on the local and national levels. Big infrastructure projects with European companies stabilize the Putin system because the Russian firms involved in construction are owned by people close to President Putin and generate additional funds with these projects. That strengthens the Putin system, which is based on loyalty through corruption. The economic cost, then, no longer matters.

The consequences for Ukraine are the loss of transit fees worth 3 billion euros a year and, even more importantly, the loss of a bargaining chip against possible Russian aggression. That can have an effect on the security-policy stability of the Sea of Asov and the Black Sea. If Nord Stream 2 is built by the end of the year, the Kremlin could take it as a signal to conquer the land bridge between Crimea and the Russian mainland and further expand its military activities at Ukraine’s southern ports. Ukraine would no longer have a way to exert pressure on Russia. The fact that EU member states are promoting the project also has a psychological effect, as many Ukrainians ask themselves how much support they are really getting from the EU in their difficult situation.

Domestic Policy Comes First

It all raises the question of to what extent the German government truly realizes the strategic consequences of its policy and how the pipeline undermines other elements of its foreign and security policy. If Foreign Minister Heiko Maas wants to be more considerate of central and eastern European neighbors in the framework of his new European Ostpolitik, the support for Nord Stream 2 is a glaring contradiction. If the German government wants to bring peace to the conflict in the Donbass and stabilize and support reforms in Ukraine in the long-term, it is doing exactly the opposite with this policy. If the cohesion of the EU is a strategic goal of Berlin, then it shouldn’t weaken the EU’s Energy Union. Here is a shortage of foresight and strategic depth in a country that has been discussed as the leading power in Europe and promotes multilateralism as Angela Merkel did at the Munich Security Conference recently.

The support for Nord Stream 2 is not primarily governed by a foreign and security policy logic but rather is part of a domestic negotiation process. If the Chancellor needed the SPD’s support for the sanctions against Russia in the context of the annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine, then Nord Stream 2 was part of an offer of cooperation made to Russia, under the approach: deterrence where necessary and cooperation where possible. The pressure the federal government faced from economy representatives, but above all from states like Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenburg, seemed to be more important than the security interests of countries like Sweden, Poland, or the Baltic states. In foreign policy terms, the price for this domestic negotiation process seemed to be calculable. But the longer the chancellor tried to sit this project out—in the process helping it succeed—the worse it got.

Of course, the federal government couldn’t have anticipated Donald Trump using Nord Stream 2 as a bargaining chip for a trade deal with the EU and threatening sanctions to extract more concessions for the export of US-LNG to Europe. But to still believe that economic and energy projects could satisfy the Russian leadership, that political change will follow economic convergence, is a sign of a political inability to learn. Despite trade, Russia is waging war in the EU’s direct neighborhood. Despite the exports of oil and gas to the EU, Russia has annexed Crimea, interfered in member-state elections with disinformation campaigns, and systematically destabilized the western Balkans. A strategic partner has become a strategic adversary, one that is using the pipeline to exacerbate transatlantic and intra-European divisions.

Seeking Strategic Change

The German chancellor’s attempts to get President Putin to keep sending gas through Ukraine after Nord Stream 2 is finished will fail. Doing so would contradict the Kremlin’s strategic objectives of weakening the current Ukrainian leadership ahead of the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections and keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence in the long-term. Economy Minister Altmaier will also fail to get Donald Trump to change course by offering to buy more US LNG—Trump is, after all, interested not in Nord Stream 2 but in a new trade deal with the EU. Nor it will be possible to stop the US Congress from sanctioning companies involved in the construction of the pipeline if Democrats and Republicans believe sanctions are in their interest for domestic political reasons. And there is one other key truth: Putin wants this project for the strategic reasons listed above, and he will build it whatever it costs.

If the German government now made a political push to stop the pipeline, the participating companies would take legal action in response to the withdrawal of already approved permits, which could get expensive for Berlin. That’s not to mention the fact that Berlin has no political interest in stopping construction at this point and doing further damage to its relations with Moscow. So Berlin is in a dead-end. Only completing the project can, from this perspective, bring peace and quiet. Is the answer to keep playing for time?

Foreign Policy without Strategy

The fight about Nord Stream 2 and the failure of the sitting-it-out policy are symptomatic of Germany’s loss of prestige and relevance on the international stage. The discussions around this project were supposed to give Germany cause to rethink its foreign policy, which currently lacks both vision and long-term strategy. There is nothing less at stake than the question of whether Germany is still capable of leading the EU when it comes to Russia and Eastern Europe policy, and of being taken seriously by Washington on the important strategic questions. Germany and the EU need a long-term strategy for how to deal with corrupt and kleptocratic Russian elites, and for how to integrate into Europe a Russia that is more than Vladimir Putin. For that to work, Berlin needs to be able to negotiate on equal footing, not to support big infrastructure projects that give the current Russian leadership openings to influence and divide the EU. And for that, in turn, it needs to be capable of military action, willing to intervene in the neighborhood and internationally—within an EU or NATO framework if necessary—and to have a clear definition of what responsibility Germany and the EU want to and can take on in this changing world.

There is no more “comfort zone Europe”. The longer that German elites deny international realities and do not seriously work towards a strategic realignment of their policies towards Russia, China, and the US, the more irrelevant Germany and the EU will become in the strategic power competition of the multipolar world order. Russia is a strategic adversary that is trying to weaken the EU from the inside and in its neighborhood. The EU is no longer a development model for the Russian elite; from a Russian perspective it seems incapable of action. Why make concessions to a weak opponent if those concessions help secure the opponent’s financial survival? Now the task of the German foreign-policy elite is to fill the strategic vacuum. The fight about Nord Stream 2 was supposed to be an opportunity to fundamentally rethink things and leave this dead-end. Only a realigned European Union with a Germany that is capable of action will be able to meet today’s global challenges.

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© REUTERS/Eduard Korniyenko

In today’s Russia, elections are above all a stress test for the political system Putin has built. Even if the results of the presidential election scheduled for March 18 are already established, the “campaign” exposes both the strengths and the weaknesses of the reigning regime.

First off, it is important to clarify that these are not free and fair elections in which real candidates compete against each other and enjoy equal access to the media and the public. Instead, this is a collection of candidates selected by the Kremlin (including newcomer Ksenia Sobchak) who will run a pointless race that only Vladimir Putin can possibly win. Putin has all the resources of the state at his disposal and unlimited access to Russian media. The Kremlin will manage the entire process in minute detail. This presidential election is thus a referendum on Putin’s popularity more than anything else.

Second, the actual votes cast on election day are less important than what happens before and after. Who will actually go to the polls? Who will get access to the public, and how much? And which numbers will the Central Election Commission recognize when it’s all over? Even if there are once again irregularities on the day of the election, with groups bussed from one voting location to the next to cast their ballots for the correct candidate several times, the process has become more and more professional.

Despite exercising almost perfect control over the opposition, the media, and the NGOs, the regime is always nervous ahead of an election. It has no real contact with the public, and does not trust the people. With Russian political leaders, communication is a one-way street: The public is meant to be directed by what the regime communicates via the media, but the regime receives no communication back. It has to rely on opinion surveys to understand the mood of the population.

While Putin, as a non-ideological populist, has sought direct contact with Russians in his annual TV appearances, only carefully selected individuals are given the chance to bring their problems to the president, and only as an opportunity for him to display the full power of his office in solving them. Putin issues direct edicts to governors, CEOs, and managers to solve the problems he has chosen to address, and for a brief moment he seems to be in touch with the concerns of his citizens. To the viewer at home, the message is clear: The corrupt bureaucrats are responsible for their problems, not the president himself.

A Magnifying Glass

Against this background, the presidential campaign serves as a magnifying glass that exposes all the weaknesses of Putin’s system. Putin has been in power for 18 years now, and it is becoming harder and harder for his government to pretend to stand for any kind of innovation or change; the system is geared entirely towards retaining power and enriching its elites.

Despite Putin’s considerable foreign policy successes in 2017, both the president and the media have been focusing their attention for several months now on domestic politics. The “Crimea effect” has been exhausted, Ukraine is mentioned less and less in Russian media, and there is a growing desire among Russians to withdraw the country’s military forces from Syria. Putin has been listening and announced a massive troop withdrawal at the end of 2017. Even if he does not entirely follow through on this promise, the shift in the public’s attention to domestic concerns is unmistakable.

Thanks to the rising price of oil, the economy has begun to slowly recover. Despite the sanctions, the Russian state is doing better than many economists predicted. Yet the average Russian’s standard of living has been deteriorating for years. According to the state statistics office Rosstat, real income decreased 1.7 percent in 2017. Poverty, social justice, education, and the health care system are the topics that actually concern Russians. It is increasingly difficult for the government to distract from this socio-economic reality, and Putin’s campaign offers no solutions to these issues; the long-serving president represents only continuity and stability. The state-directed media work to make this look like an attractive platform, pointing to Islamist terror in Europe or the EU’s eternal existential crisis as the potential alternatives. Be happy, they say, that you’re living in Putin’s Russia: At least we guarantee you security and stability.

Many Russians buy into that, especially in the regions where memories of the catastrophic 1990s are still fresh. And it is important to remember that over 90 percent of Russians get their information from the national, Kremlin-directed TV channels. Many of the active, educated young elites left the country long ago to try their luck in the US or Europe.

Putin does not have a particular theme for this campaign and offers no specific prospects for his country’s future other than himself – which will not be enough. The journalist Oleg Kashin described the feelings of many Russians, especially those who live in the big cities: Even if the entire state apparatus works to secure six more years in power for Putin, the whole process seems unreal to many. Despite Putin’s consistently high approval ratings, a discussion has started to brew among intellectual and elite circles and even in the streets over what will come after Putin. Is he still the right person to determine the future of the country, and does he have answers to the country’s real problems? How much does he really understand the reality in which most Russians live?

The Anti-Putin

With his own campaign, opposition leader Alexei Navalny is making the weaknesses of Putin’s system clear. He is the only one waging a real election campaign, and by addressing topics like corruption, social justice, and freedom, the only one truly communicating with the people.

While Putin’s campaign relies on a negative worldview—the world is evil and Russia is surrounded by foes—Navalny appeals to Russian’s patriotism and their positivity, above all among younger Russians. Russia is a wonderful country, he says, and if it were not for the corrupt elites it could do much better—and Russian citizens have the power to change their country. While Putin speaks of the past, Navalny speaks of the future. He is the only real candidate, and he campaigns as if he could win the election.

Even if he never had a chance to be allowed to run, he has already changed Russian politics. With his social media presence, his website, and his YouTube channel, he is in continuous contact with his public, informing and motivating his supporters. Through a crowd-funding campaign, he has managed to open 84 regional offices and attract more than 200,000 volunteers.

With his ironic and lively videos, Navalny reaches young people whom Putin has failed to reach and who are not afraid to take to the streets. For the first time in post-war history, many young Russians are becoming engaged in politics. They do not see themselves as liberals, but rather as patriots; they want to live like people in the West, while maintaining their differences.

These self-organized campaigns worry the Kremlin. It has not organized them, and it cannot control them. Particularly when it comes to elections, authoritarian regimes do not like to leave anything to chance, even when there is little actual risk of losing control. Putin would also win if elections were free and fair, after all. This element of uncontrolled irrationality is something the powerful in Russia cannot allow. Thus, they are trying to silence Navalny: Putin will not speak his name, as though he would deny his very existence.

According to political scientist Alexander Kynev, Navalny is the first person in modern Russia to communicate a liberal political discourse in a language people can understand. He presents himself as a patriot and a nationalist; he supported the annexation of Crimea; and, unlike traditional Russian liberals, maintains few contacts abroad—yet his platform is a synthesis of freedom and justice. He is trying to create change within the system, and he is ultimately calling into question the fundamental power structure governing the state – yet another reason he is not allowed to campaign.

Ksenia Sobchak’s campaign, on the other hand, is targeted at a minority of Russians. With her references to European values, sanctions, the legalization of drugs, and LGBT rights, Kynev believes that Sobchak is consciously bypassing the majority and speaking to only a small group of the Russian population. She is committed to appealing to all the values that the regime has described as “liberal decadence” for years. In doing so, she is legitimizing the official discourse on the decadent, liberal elite, and making herself one of the political leadership’s favorite candidates.

Navalny is competing in earnest – he wants to build a parliamentary majority and change the system. Sobchak has no chance and will not win a majority of the vote for the foreseeable future. She has gained media access, however, and the chance to address the public in ways that are barred to Navalny. Thus, she has become a candidate for the powerful. There is no candidate “against everyone,” as Sobchak describes herself; each candidate either supports the current political arrangement or does not. And even opposing the current political constellation can be, in a certain sense, futile: Navalny’s appeal to boycott the election entirely will predominantly find an audience among the young people who would not have voted anyway.

Mobilization with Social Media

The video Navalny published in March 2017 revealing the riches amassed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has now been seen 26 million times. The fact that so many young people were engaged via social networks in such an apathetic, apolitical, paternalist system shows that even Russian society is going through a process of fundamental change.

The Putin system has been holding the lid down on Russian society since at least 2012, but pressure has been growing faster than outsiders have realized. Many Russian regions have seen an increasing number of spontaneous demonstrations, usually concerning social justice or mistakes made by local administrators. These protests have no common goal, and there are still no political leaders who could assemble these outcroppings of anger into a coherent movement. But it is evident that another six years of stagnating economic growth—particularly alarming in an emerging economy like Russia—will not be enough to satisfy people.

That means that President Putin, so successful in his international relations, will have to devote even more attention to domestic politics, and he will have fewer tools and resources to pacify his citizens and the country’s elites. He has no answers to challenges like digitalization, the future of education, the country’s demographic problems, and migration.

The country’s isolation and the black-and-white thinking of its leaders will simply not suffice in an increasingly complex world. One should not underestimate Putin’s flexibility and adaptability, but it is already clear that in many key areas Russia has gone off the rails. Representatives of the more liberal economic elite inside the system, like Sberbank head German Gref, are pushing for an improvement of the country’s geopolitical environment to prevent Russia from falling further behind in technological and social competitiveness. The brain drain of the past few years has led to a shortage of qualified specialists in technical fields, no matter how many personal visits Putin makes to important Russian technology companies like Yandex.

Putin’s power is built on two elements: First, it is based on his apparent closeness to the people and his image as a populist leader. Putin is becoming a sort of sacred figure within the state, a leader who single-handedly directs all the governing institutions—which tends to undermine the tough everyman image he projects in his televised discussions. Second, it relies on the institutionalization of Putin himself and his supposed ability to change the bureaucracy. He has begun to remove his old friends and acquaintances from his time in St. Petersburg and the KGB from key positions, replacing them with young, professional and technocratic officials.

A Shrinking Circle

As a result, Putin’s role within his system has grown even larger—he now makes all the decisions himself. His close circle has contracted so much that there is almost no one left to serve as any kind of counterweight. Sooner or later, this will inevitably lead to the question of how much responsibility he bears for the mistakes of his administrators.
At the same time, representatives of the security services have gained prominence in the bureaucratic apparatus. Vladimir Pastukhov, a political scientist and research associate at the University College London, says the competition among various groups within Putin’s circle to gain influence and resources is becoming an institutionalized battle between the civilian and military bureaucracies. That makes the system even more opaque and calls into question the degree of control Putin is able to exercise himself.

The prosecution of former Minister of Economic Development Alexey Ulyukaev and legal action against film director Kirill Serebrennikov have worried the elites. Whether someone is close to Putin or not, no one is safe. Putin’s system demands absolute loyalty; he has less and less patience for statements and behavior that indicate any kind of independent thought. If this trend continues, it can lead to destabilization.

The Russian presidential election may seem a boring, forgone conclusion. However, look more closely, and the fundamental changes reshaping Russian society become clear. If the political system cannot find answers to the questions Russians are increasingly asking, it will eventually be replaced. The longer the lid is held down, the longer the current challenges are ignored, the likelier it is that eventually there will be an explosion

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© Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

Years after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia still was considered a second-tier power and a paradigm of inefficiency: corrupt, authoritarian, its economy dependent upon high energy prices. Until President Vladimir Putin, that is: he turned his country’s soft power deficit into strength.

At home, his government systematically clamped down on media and internet freedom, curtailed the work of NGOs, and unleashed security forces on protests. Abroad, the Kremlin used its foreign news outlets and social media to sow fear and unease by creating the impression that it could manipulate European societies. In doing so, Russia was bypassing EU leaders and directly addressing their people – a lesson learned from the West.

This is Putin’s real strength: He is not intimidated by the West’s economic or technological superiority. He shrewdly analyzes and learns from his opponents, just as he was taught to do as a Soviet intelligence agent. Unlike many of his peers in Europe, Putin sees the world as it is, not as he would like it to be (like many Western leaders do). He recognizes his own weaknesses and those of his opponent, and time and again he proved able to turn an apparent defeat into a victory.

His stubborn ability to surprise opponents and unscrupulously exploit their vulnerabilities has won him considerable gains. He has been able to push through significant projects, like the 2008 military reform, and to optimally use the limited resources of a corrupt, inefficient state. The military operations in Crimea and Syria also showed the Russian army’s astonishing progress in speed, communication, discipline, and equipment.

Behind the Bluster

These victories cast an image of a strong and powerful Russia. The reality, however is different. The country’s well-known shortcomings remain. As one of the largest producers of gas and oil in the world, Russia has steadily increased its reliance on commodities exports since Putin took office. Raw materials now account for up to 75 percent of exports and 40 percent of Russia’s revenues. Moscow depends heavily upon selling its goods but has little influence over the price.

When commodities markets dip, the country’s vulnerability is exposed and its economic sovereignty threatened. Though Russia was the world’s eighth largest producer of industrial goods in 2013, those goods were sold primarily on the domestic market due to weak competition internationally.

In terms of GDP, Russia ranked 12th among the world’s largest economies last year, ahead of South Korea. Still, according to the World Bank, Russian per capita income put the country on par with Latvia and Chile in 2015. Meanwhile, according to SIPRI, defense spending ballooned to 5.4 percent of GDP last year, significantly overstretching the economy. As a result, the government cut heavily on education, research, and health.

The country’s population has shrunk to around 143 million – some five million people fewer than in 1991, at the collapse of the Soviet Union. While unemployment is relatively low (just under six percent), that can also be attributed to a quickly aging society and a corresponding decline in the working population. And in many industries, the government’s generous subsidies are propping up jobs that would otherwise disappear.

Competitive, in Parts

And yet, Russia is internationally competitive in certain areas. Western sanctions over Moscow’s role in the Ukraine conflict have benefited some sectors (like agriculture) of the economy by sealing them off from foreign competition. It is one of the few countries in the world capable of generating the entire production chain of nuclear energy. With the exception of the US, no other country produces such a large range of weapon systems. And it is still the second largest weapons producer in the world, ahead of China. In nuclear weapons, Moscow is already at least on par with the US, having started to modernize the sector earlier than Washington; a strong nuclear stockpile is central to Russia’s self-ascribed great power status.

But the government has invested enormous sums in modernizing nuclear arms at a time of economic crisis. It is a risk that could backfire: Washington already spends eight times more on its military and equipment, and US President Donald Trump announced a further increase in military spending. In a high-stakes bidding war, Moscow cannot keep up.

Russia’s burgeoning software industry has been a relatively new bright spot. Between 2003 and 2014, its exports grew at a rate of thirty percent a year – more than any other segment of the economy. That success, however, is due in part to the Russian diaspora in innovation hubs across the world, from Israel to Silicon Valley. Creative entrepreneurs have been forced to seek opportunities abroad as the Kremlin tightens its grip on the internet, particularly after the mass anti-government demonstrations in 2011 and 2012.

Still, much has slipped through the Kremlin’s fist. At the end of March, demonstrators took to the streets across Russia to protest corruption after opposition leader Alexei Navalny released a video accusing Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of large-scale corruption; before long, the video had generated more than twenty million clicks. The government has struggled to reach and influence the younger generation online. The recent terror attack on a subway station in St. Petersburg could be the opportunity President Putin needs to further curb freedom of the internet and other forms of communication.

Destroying the Spirit

By intervening in public life and restricting liberties, the government is simultaneously consolidating power around Putin’s circle and destroying the spirit of creativity and freedom that emerged in post-Soviet Russia.

Under Putin, the Kremlin has overhauled the country’s security apparatus, built the National Guard, and expanded the powers of the secret service (FSB) in the name of fighting terrorism. The president used the annexation of Crimea to restore his legitimacy at home. He plays up elements of the country’s history to evoke national pride and introduce Soviet-style propaganda, glorifying the Red Army’s victory in World War II and Josef Stalin’s rule. Putin indeed sees himself as the heir of that historic legacy. The October Revolution and the Bolsheviks, meanwhile, have been nearly forgotten. The centenary of the 1917 uprising was barely celebrated in Russia because it undermines Putin’s model of a stable state.

The idealization of Soviet power has revived the specter of Russia’s old foes as well; the US, NATO, and the West as a whole are seen as relentless enemies intent on keeping Russia weak. It is a ghost of the Soviet past that still haunts Russians today, but the West has also done little to allay their fears – and this may be Putin’s greatest success. Russia has now managed to project itself as a great power at home and abroad without having the requisite economic fundament.

At the same time, President Putin’s ascent to strongman status was only successful because the EU and US lost credibility as liberal democracies. The George W. Bush administration’s systematic disregard for international law in the fight against terror, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and the West’s inability to uphold its own ethical standards have allowed authoritarian leaders like Putin to shine on the international stage. Global power and prestige have become key tools to secure approval at home and recognition among the international community. Ironically Putin – a man who has built his leadership on cronyism, corruption, and blatant disregard for his own citizens – has become a torchbearer for those who categorically reject the West, mainstream media, and “the establishment.”

Empty Threats

Meanwhile, Putin is using hard and soft power to exploit the values of pluralism and freedom that constitute the West’s strength as well as expose its shortcomings. The conflict in Ukraine is a prime example of this strategy: It was widely considered a wake-up call for the European Union, but there has been little action of any real consequence. Sanctions did not force Moscow’s hand; crucial economic and business ties have been mostly unaffected; a thriving middle class in Russia did not  inevitably lead to democracy.

Diplomacy hasn’t resolved the conflict either. In fact, Russia has abused its ties with Europe to improve its negotiating position. The Kremlin is aware of the limits of its ability to get candidates like Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen elected; instead, it seeks to undermine liberal democracies by supporting the forces that have threatened to destabilize the Western system.

The crucial question is: What is Russia is capable of and what do we believe Russia is capable of achieving? Ever since it became clear that Russia might have influenced the US election campaign, Russia’s power to manipulate has been exaggerated. Increasingly Putin and Russia are seen as synonymous. It is an image the Kremlin has worked hard to cultivate. According to polls, Putin’s approval ratings after the annexation of Crimea are upwards of eighty percent (an important figure ahead of next year’s elections). But Putin is not necessarily as popular as he would have us believe. The protests in March revealed how his regime has struggled to win over younger Russians, and it will be difficult to drive voters to the polls next year for an election where they have no real choice.

European leaders must learn to dial back their expectations of what is actually possible with Russia’s leadership. Apart from economic ties, the relationship with Moscow will not improve in the foreseeable future. Civil rights will be curtailed even more and corruption will remain entrenched. There may be small steps forward in trust-building and arms control, but a deal that would work in Europe’s interests is highly unlikely.

We cannot change Russia, we rather have to accept it as it is. Europe’s strength lies in its values and norms, and it must uphold them to remain credible in Russia and Eastern Europe. It was Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s first chancellor, who pointedly noted: Russia is never as strong or as weak as it seems.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

It was a case that shocked German politicians across the spectrum: In January 2016, a Russian-born teenager in Berlin reported that she had been raped by three immigrant men. Russian media outlets picked up coverage immediately and the Russian-speaking community in Germany took to the streets in outrage. It escalated to the governmental level when Moscow accused Berlin of trying to sweep serious problems under the rug, and Berlin shot back with a warning against political propaganda. In the end, it turned out that the assault had never taken place.

The “Lisa case” revealed how Germany has underestimated Russia’s ability to influence the information space for far too long. In fact, some German lawmakers still question the existence of Russian disinformation campaigns, despite of what has happened during the US presidential elections and a wealth of comprehensive analysis and information regarding Russian activities in Europe that serve as proof. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, those doubts contribute to growing uncertainty in Germany over the credibility of Western politics and mainstream media – and this is precisely the Kremlin’s goal.

Russia’s efforts to manipulate and influence public opinion are only part of a larger security strategy that emerged from a self-perceived weakness. In the run-up to Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, anti-government protestors took to the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg to stage major rallies. As a result, Russian elites felt they were under increasing pressure from Western media, NGOs, and critics. It is important to understand this perception in a larger context. Russian policy makers and security officials realize that they are technologically and militarily weaker than NATO and the United States. They have responded to that sense of imbalance by modernizing the country’s nuclear arsenal (the only area where Moscow is on a level playing field with Washington) and by using elements of coercive soft power and hybrid warfare to compensate for conventional deficiencies. In an address to the Russian parliament, the State Duma, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu confirmed in February that the Russian military has created forces tasked with waging information warfare.

Russia’s leadership realized somewhat late in the game that 21st century warfare could no longer be won with conventional weapons, but rather with a combination of covert and classic military strategies and information manipulation. It has since put this insight into practice with remarkable consequence. For the Kremlin, it is a far more cost-effective and efficient way of waging war, particularly because modern technology assures that disinformation has a far greater impact than it used to during the Soviet era. The information war we see today was tried, tested and refined in Russia, then exported to the post-Soviet space. Now it has been expanded to Europe and beyond as well.

A Public-Private Partnership of Sorts

Russia’s security apparatus built a public-private partnership of sorts with commercial hacking groups and troll factories that allowed them to sharpen a series of powerful tools. Together, Russian security officials and hackers have orchestrated systematic cyber-attacks on European politicians, institutions, and media; they have used platforms like WikiLeaks to disseminate damaging information; they have wielded social media bots and trolls as well as fake news to discredit leading figures, like French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron. He personally has been deluged with “fake news” and cyber-attacks stemming from Russia.

In addition, Russian media outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik disseminate conspiracy theories and provide a platform for populist parties like Germany’s right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) or pundits critical of the West. These outlets do not bother themselves with large audiences or impressive click rates. They focus instead on ensuring that their stories are shared among like-minded groups on social media networks and perceived as fact, strengthening support among their base; some of those stories, however, also spread into the mainstream media. It is still unclear whether these targeted social media campaigns have a real impact on electing leaders like Donald Trump or taking down leaders like Angela Merkel.

What we can indeed learn from the US election campaign, however, is to recognize how cyber-attacks are used to disseminate information to discredit a candidate. During the US campaign, Russian agents were making direct overtures to the Trump team and activating old business contacts at the same time. Russia was systematically growing its informal networks and maneuvering private, economic, and political ties to serve its own interests. It is a strategy that combines a variety of legal and illegal instruments – and one that could be used in Germany’s upcoming federal elections.

Next Stop Germany

Leading up to the September vote, the Kremlin will likely distribute information across various online platforms and Russian media outlets and activate networks and contacts that already exist in Germany. It is also likely to build new networks to influence public and political discourse. In Russia, the boundaries between business and politics, between security and information policy have disappeared both in internal and external policy. That has exposed liberal democracies’ vulnerabilities as a result, making them appear weak and fragile.

It has also led countries like Germany to overestimate Russia’s real abilities to influence elections and public opinion significantly. Putin’s power is perceived to be greater than it really is; Russia has used bluffs and lies to unsettle its opponents in Ukraine, and it is successfully using that same strategy against the European Union.

For the Kremlin, neither Merkel nor her Social-Democrat challenger Martin Schulz would be a favorable choice for German chancellor – but that is not particularly important, either. The Kremlin’s goal is not to change the outcome of the election, but rather to make its opponents believe that it can. This strategy ultimately weakens Western governments and strengthens Russia’s negotiating position on issues like Ukraine or spheres of influence. And it also serves to consolidate Putin’s power at home, distracting Russians from their government’s own corrupt structures.

Exposing Moscow’s Methods

The answer is clear: Germany and Europe as a whole will have to work together to publicly expose Russia’s methods of manipulation. They cannot allow themselves to be unsettled. They must identify and understand Russia’s strengths and weaknesses as well as they do their own. The German government has to counter fearmongering among mainstream and fringe media outlets; it must also counter politicians and institutions that believe in placating Moscow. Those who continue champion appeasement must be made to understand one key point: Putin’s regime will not change, not through compromise nor trade. It will continue to generate and export corrupt structures, infecting any country that has failed to build a robust immune system.

Finland provides an important example of how to successfully stem Russian fake news and manipulation. Earlier than in Germany the Finish government made disinformation a top priority, setting up a central agency – in Finland’s case it is located at the prime minister’s office – to collect all information and coordinate counter-measures rapidly. Thus the agency not only helps coordinating all government bodies responding to fake news stories or cyber- attacks but enables the government to respond quickly to any social media campaigns directed against Finish policy or a particular person.

In Germany, there are a number of government bodies dealing with disinformation, but they lack coordination. The fact that the line between internal and external threats is hard to draw makes it difficult for those bodies to respond while traditional intelligence or security counter-measures no longer apply. In addition to such an agency, investigative journalists, democratic institutions, and civil society groups need to work in harmony to make the Germany’s democracy more resilient.

At the same time, it is important to remember that Russia – a country that has bucked modernization and sustainable development – is not the global power it appears to be. Moscow did not cause the crisis that Western countries find themselves in, it has simply benefited from it. German and EU stakeholders must bear down and do their homework, defending and enforcing liberal values at home and abroad. The same is true for parts of the media always ready to demonize Putin and Russia but neglecting their job of soberly analyzing what Russia can and cannot do. Anything else would only serve to amplify the very campaign of fear and panic that Moscow created.

The post Moscow’s Manipulation Game appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Stevo Vasiljevic

Several American presidents, including Barack Obama and George W. Bush, have attempted to “reset” relations with Russia. Each failed because of the fundamental contradictions in the relationship between the United States and Russia, which include different understandings of the sovereignty of smaller states, the importance of democracy and the rule of law, and the basic principles of the global order.

President-elect Donald Trump, however, might have a different experience: unlike his predecessors, he shares Russian President Vladimir Putin’s distrust in liberal Western values. Both reject the norms and institutions created by post-World War II US policy. This could further undermine the very functionality of the international order, a path Putin began with the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine.

For Putin, this axis of irresponsibility is much more effective than merely linking and funding a network of populist movements throughout the Western world. The new US president might undermine the international order all by himself by cutting private deals with authoritarian leaders, including the Russian president. The first victim of such a deal could in fact be Ukraine, which is not really important to US policy and apparently easy to cede to Russia’s sphere of influence.

A Nightmare for the EU

All this is indeed a nightmare for the EU member states, which are struggling with their own institutional reform crisis and already face Russian security challenges. They are not prepared for an American withdrawal from Europe, which Trump threatens to accelerate. Germany in particular is not ready to take on the kind of European leadership role the US government expects – and the already precarious balance of power between the EU’s larger and smaller states makes it unlikely that Berlin will risk further polarization.

However, this American-Russian reset has several constraints.

First, as Putin’s Valdai speech at the end of October clearly showed, Moscow was preparing for a Hillary Clinton victory, despite its support for her opponent. Putin’s message in Sochi was that Russia will make no compromises in Ukraine or Syria, and will continue challenging US dominance in international security, in effect saying that in any compromise the US would have to make the first offer. Now, Russian leadership has to change its paradigm. The US will no longer be Russia’s main enemy – which poses significant challenges to the Putin regime, which, hamstrung by low oil and gas prices and lacking an economic development strategy, relied on an external enemy to maintain national unity.

Second, Russian leadership is obsessed by its desire for recognition as equal to the US in international politics, which was one of the main reasons for its Syria campaign. An isolationist President Trump might make a deal with Vladimir Putin on Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, but will do this primarily to focus on domestic policy. As a result, Putin will not get the attention he is looking for, which could become a source of frustration. Furthermore, Russia lacks the resources to fill the gap the US would leave in Syria and other parts of the world. The country is economically the size of Spain, but maintains the ambitions and military of a global power. That will overstretch its economic capacity – and could lead it down the same path that brought the Soviet Union to collapse.

Third, even if Trump wants to strike a deal and recognize Crimea as part of Russia – and Ukraine as part of the Russian sphere of influence – and tries to abolish the Magnitsky Act along with the Ukrainian sanctions, he will struggle with a strongly anti-Russian Republican-dominated Congress. This could be the first major conflict to demonstrate clearly that Trump was never a purely Republican candidate, and in fact stands in direct opposition to many of the party’s principles. Without making compromises and building bridges, Trump will be completely blocked.

Furthermore, would Ukrainian society accept such a “deal”? Further destabilization of Ukraine would be a major catalyst for an even more dangerous security conflict in Europe, one in which Russian leadership has the impression that it has permission from Washington to solve the Ukrainian problem however it likes.

Fourth, Trump wants to spend less on NATO and defense – which Moscow likely hopes will mean the end of missile defense systems in Europe. Missile defense is a major project for the American arms industry, however. Will Trump the businessman really start a fight with a key US industry and the defense lobbying groups – and, once again, with his own party – on this issue? Is this in America’s interests? And what can Russia offer in return for stopping this project?

Finally, many observers argue that fighting terrorism, particularly the so-called Islamic State, might become a common project within the context of a US-Russia reset. But Russia has thus far been primarily fighting groups that oppose Bashar al-Assad – some of which have American support – rather than IS. Putin has used and is still using the uncertainty around the US election and subsequent transition to gain as much as territory in Syria as possible at the cost of civilian lives. When Trump was elected, Moscow and Damascus began a comprehensive new campaign against rebel groups in Aleppo. Is this the basis for a trust-based relationship?

Don’t Panic

All this shows that it will be difficult to reset US-Russia relations. The two presidents’ unpredictability, their tendency to make deals based on informal relationships, and their disinterest in the basic functionality of multilateral institutions will make building a sustainable new foundation for US-Russian relations unlikely; they will both maneuver for short-term gains, but lack long-term common interests. For Moscow, Trump is a person who can undermine US democracy, but not someone you build a global agenda with. Putin and Trump have no answers to global challenges. Both are great at deconstructing the existing order, but have no idea how to fix it or build a new one.

What does this mean for the EU and Germany? Strengthening international law and institutions is now more important than ever before, and has to stand at the core of European policy. Europe has become even more important for its role in protecting and embodying an open, tolerant, rule-based, and democratic order. Angela Merkel made this very clear in her congratulatory letter to the new US president-elect.

But the EU member states have work of their own to do – they need to reform their bureaucracies, find answers to both globalization and populism, and recognize the limits of neoliberal policy. As long as Russian leadership undermines the European (and international) security order and is unwilling to support peace in eastern Ukraine, the sanctions against Moscow have to continue. It’s crucial for member states to show the new US president how important NATO is for European security and transatlantic relations, while investing more in their own security.

It’s not time to panic just because Putin and Trump are meeting – but it makes it all the more urgent that the EU rebuild confidence in Brussels and the European institutions. Their homework is to respond to their citizens’ demands while strengthening rule-and-norm-based order.

The post A New Reset? appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Michael Dalder

The answer is that we are living in 2016, in a world that is profoundly different from the world of the Cold War in 1962. It is no longer bipolar, but multipolar; no longer are there two competing ideologies and systems; the economic, scientific, and military potential of today’s Russia is much lower than that of the Soviet Union. Today, local and hybrid conflicts, not superpower proxy wars, drive international relations.

Russian intervention in Syria – which was meant not only to force the United States to work again with Russiaʼs President Vladimir Putin, but also to demonstrate the military prowess of Russia – implies a false impression of Russia’s influence: Moscow and Washington are both important players, but by no means are they the only ones in the Middle East. Both have only limited influence on the outcome of the Syrian disaster, and both are constrained by the situation on the ground.

Both in Russia and the West some might be tempted to feel nostalgic for the stability of the Cold War era. But this nostalgia is much more a product of today’s uncertainty than of the reality of the East-West conflict. Why then did Prime Minister Medvedev refer to a “new Cold War”, and to what degree are his intentions in line with Western interpretations?

Russia’s leaders are struggling to return their country to its former great power status. They want to be recognized by the West, particularly by the US, as one of the important poles in a multipolar world, one that must be consulted as part of any plan to solve pressing international crises.

To think that Russia’s leaders are aiming for a restoration of the Soviet Union is a misconception – and not even realistic by Putin’s standards. Moscow rather attempts to use the prestige of the former Soviet Union to ensure recognition of modern Russia’s sphere of influence, and to be accepted as a superpower equal. While in Western media the Medvedev speech was primarily interpreted as a threat from Moscow, Russian media read it – and Medvedev’s presence in Munich – as possible steps towards de-escalation and negotiation with the West.

The reference to a new Cold War is a symbol and an instrument at the same time. It implies that Russia is again on the same level as the US – just as the “red empire” was. At the same time it serves as a warning that a military confrontation with Russia could lead to disaster, as it nearly did in 1962 when Armageddon was narrowly averted during the Cuba crisis.

In his speech, Medvedev alluded to nuclear war in a purely theoretical sense. But it is crucial to keep in mind that Russia is a nuclear power and that a nuclear war remains a possibility. Russia’s nuclear arsenal and its seat on the UN Security Council are important leftovers from the Soviet Union that the West cannot ignore. Even under the current economic crisis, the Russian government prioritizes investment in the modernization of its nuclear weapons.

The discussion about the possibility of a new Cold War with Russia is not only misleading, but also dangerous. It creates the impression – both to Western “realists” and Russian leaders – that Moscow and the West could cooperate in a transactional way now as they did back then. That implies that a deal with Moscow is possible.

The Putin regime, however, is hardly comparable to Soviet leadership. It is much weaker in terms of economic performance and self-confidence. It is a crony regime, lacking any long-term strategy except staying in power. The decision to stop economic reform, in combination with the high costs of Russia’s attempt to perform as a global power will further weaken Russia.  The weaker Russia becomes, the more aggressively its leadership will act to distract from its failures. There is no deal possible with a regime that is not willing, and sometimes not able, to fulfill its agreements. For Putin there are no rules except the power of the strongest.

No Rules, No Red Lines

The main challenge of today’s world is that there are no rules and no red lines in international relations as there were before 1991. Russia is the primary force undermining the existing European order. That behavior might not be restricted to Russia only – after all, Washington reshuffled the landscape of the Middle East, all while ignoring international law. But at the moment Russia is the main threat to European security.

There is no balance of power possible in today’s international order. The world of globalization is much more interconnected than the bipolar world ever was; unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is a part of the global economy, which has a fundamental impact on developments within the country. At the same time, there are no limits to Russia’s interference in Western society. After all, Russian leadership has learned to use Western vulnerabilities to undermine the credibility of Western media, politics, and governance. Interdependence is a weapon wielded by both the West (in the form of sanctions) and Russia (in undermining democratic systems), and at the same time a threat to both Western societies and the survival of the Russian regime.

To accept the paradigm of the Cold War would mean giving Russia a role in international politics that it cannot fill and it would mean that it is possible to negotiate with the current Russian leadership. Again, this is an illusion and one that will not last long. Trust is the most important currency in international relations. Russia’s leadership has lost both trust and credibility. And here we see yet another difference: Soviet leadership also wanted recognition as a legitimate and equal power. But it understood the importance of rules and red lines.

What Germany and the EU have to do is to strengthen our own resilience in terms of domestic policy and military capabilities. We need to make dangerous provocations in the EU neighborhood more expensive for Russia. At the same time, we need to rebuild trust between Russia and the West – to achieve that, we need a partner with similar interests.

At the moment, the first priority should be improving communication channels and crisis-response mechanisms with Russia. All existing institutions where Russia plays a role should be upgraded and developed, and their rules rebuilt and reinforced. Above and beyond we need arms control, dialog platforms, and institutions capable of enforcing rules.

At the same time, our security and the security of our neighbors need to be a policy priority. NATO might become even more important to Europe while the EU simultaneously needs to grow its own capabilities independent of the US. Institution-building in the common neighborhood needs to include security institutions. The states in question need to improve their ability to protect their own security and borders.

This is not a new Cold War. We may be facing a situation that is even more dangerous.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – March/April 2016 issue.

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© REUTERS/RIA Novosti/Kremlin

German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel’s “private” trip to Moscow at the end of October has to be interpreted in the context of a slow shift in Germany’s Russia policy. The SPD leader claimed he did not understand why German-Russian relations had deteriorated over the last ten years and promised to help win legislative support for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project – positions that by no means represent the prevelant view among the German political elite. But the fact that Gabriel was able to make the trip at all – undermining Chancellor Angela Merkel’s hard line on Russia without earning a reaction from the chancellery – shows the change that is underway.

When Gabriel linked the need for Russian cooperation on Syria and the so-called Islamic State (IS) with the Ukraine crisis in September, it represented a first attempt to shift German political discourse on Russia. Merkel’s reaction at the time was prompt: she immediately denied any connection between Syria and Ukraine. This time, she seemed to be too occupied with the refugee crisis to respond in public. What is even more alarming: due to the refugee crisis, the terror attacks in Paris, and the growing influence of euroskeptic populist parties in the EU, the chancellery has a growing interest in solving the Ukraine problem. That means that, from a German perspective, implementing the “Minsk 2” accords is a must – and it is increasingly possible that Germany will push for its completion before Ukraine is ready.

The German Foreign Office is currently preparing a road map for elections in the separatist regions of Donbass and Luhansk to get the Minsk 2 agreement implemented – a job that will only grow more pressing next year when Germany assumes the chairmanship of the OSCE, which is responsible for observing the elections and certifying them free and fair. This will put Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko under a great deal of pressure to implement the decentralization law and accept elections in the separatist regions, steps that could even further destabilize his position in Ukrainian politics.

Yet as long as the borders with Russia are open and there is no security and no free media – and criminal warlords are able to operate in an extra-legal space – free and fair elections are impossible. It would be impossible to send civil election observers from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights into such a region without undermining the credibility of the OSCE.

And while several of these future variables remain uncertain, one thing is already clear: it is not Russia that is compromising in eastern Ukraine, but the EU – especially the larger member states, many of which have an interest in resolving the Donbass problem quickly and improving the relations with Moscow.

European politicians have been emphasizing that since the beginning of September the ceasefire agreement has (more or less) worked. But this merely represents the success of a traditional Russian tactic: create a problem and then “solve” the problem you have created, and make the other side believe that you have thus reached a compromise. We have accepted that Putin is willing to compromise because we lack any alternative to the Minsk process; yet the Minsk 2 agreement already conceded too much to Russia, with many areas left vague and open to re-interpretation.

All this plays into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin. When Putin punctuated his September address at the UN General Assembly with military strikes in Syria, it became clear how much he was willing to do to force negotiation with other international leaders, particularly the US president. And Putin’s timing could hardly be better: as the West has no strategy for restoring stability in Syria and Iraq or fighting IS, it will clutch at any aid Putin offers – even if Putin himself has no plan beyond supporting Syria’s discredited ruler Bashar al-Assad.

Russia’s inclusion in the Vienna Process confirms that, following his meeting with Obama at the G20 summit in Ankara, Putin is to be a part of a diplomatic initiative to solve the Syrian disaster. Thus even if the Vienna format represents a step forward, it also presents Russian leadership an opportunity for a new round of diplomatic games – and once more, it is not Russia that is moving to compromise, but the West. Assad has become at least in the short and medium term a part of the solution in Syria. That is what Putin has always wanted – for his authoritarian ally being welcomed to the negotiating table, and his concept of a stabile rump state to be accepted by the West. How all this will work with the Syrian opposition nobody knows, but the main thing is that Russia is back – and we no longer speak of the Ukraine problem.

It is frightening how much European leaders are driven by the needs of crisis management, winning short term gains without any plan to secure long-term interests. With his support for Nord Stream 2 and trip to Moscow, Sigmar Gabriel has acted as though he is a purely domestic politician, one who is not concerned by Russian foreign policy. He knows how unpopular Merkel’s approach towards Russia is in his own party, and is exploiting her weakness. Germanys OSCE chairmanship next year, along with the idea promoted by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to engage with Russia in a Eurasian Economic Union-EU context, will give Russian leaders plenty of space to finish undermining the credibility of Merkel’s Russia policy.

A new Neue Ostpolitik remains unlikely as long as Russia makes no real compromises to rebuild trust with German leaders, and Nord Stream 2 will not help Vladimir Putin to reengage with Germany on a broader level. Ukraine, however, may well fall victim to these developments – it is increasingly seen as a hindrance to normalizing relations with Moscow. Yet to destabilize the government in Kiev while pressing it to fulfill Minsk 2 might create a next much bigger crisis, one which must be managed by Berlin.

It would be good for German leaders to think carefully before selling out their own values and principles. This is not a new German realpolitik which deals with the reality of Putin’s regime, but a slow return to a policy of hope rather than fact.

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© REUTERS/Khaled Al Hariri

With the crisis in Ukraine still unresolved, Russia has once again upended Western strategic planning, intervening in the conflict in Syria in ways that complicate European and American efforts to achieve stability in the country. Though Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that the goal of Russian airstrikes is the degradation of the Islamic States’ (IS) capabilities, the strengthening of client Bashar al-Assad seems to be equally, if not more, important – and in doing so, Putin seems intent on both limiting the United States’ options, and furthering Russia’s own model of state sovereignty.

Russian leadership wants to be recognized by the US president as a key player in international relations, one with whom Washington has to interact when attempting to solve global conflicts. Thus Russia’s Syria campaign has two main goals: First, Putin wants to use Syria to show the US – and the world – that it has returned to the stage. Washington can no longer isolate Russia as it did during the Ukraine crisis. Putin is using America’s absence in Syria to force Barack Obama to speak with him; while the US president hesitates, Putin is reshaping the battlefield. Now the US military has to coordinate with Russian leadership if it wants to fly airstrikes in Syria.

The second main goal is connected to the Russian conception of foreign policy and the role of states in international relations. Russian leadership wants to fill the gap the US has left – not only militarily, but ideologically as well. In his Collective Security Treaty Organization speech in mid-September and again at the UN General Assembly two weeks later, Putin promoted a different approach than that of the US to fighting international terrorism. From Russia’s perspective, the US policy of democracy promotion has not only destabilized Ukraine, but also Iraq, Syria, and northern Africa.

When Putin supports Assad, he sends a clear message: from his perspective, only legitimate (authoritarian) regimes can create order and security in the world. Groups that undermine these regimes and the sovereignty of states are terrorists, including all the opposition groups in Syria fighting against the “legitimate” government. Assad is not only Russia’s most important ally in the region, he also stands for the rationale of the Putin regime, which sees its own main challenges as coming from externally inspired social movements (blaming the US in particular).

Stabilizing Assad means stabilizing authoritarian rule in other regions of the world, and the current Russian regime itself, promoting an alternative model for crisis management and international relations than that supported by the US. This is consistent with Russian foreign and security policy, which opposes color revolutions and regime change inside and outside the post-Soviet region and stands for the sovereignty of states and against the concept of responsibility to protect (with the exception of the Russians outside Russia).

A Risky War

So what are the implications of Russia’s actions? For the first time in post-Soviet history, Russia is fighting outside the post-Soviet region in a risky war. Russian leadership is willing to take high risks to gain recognition from the US as an important player and promote its own model of “conflict solution”. Even if Russian is unlikely to deploy ground forces, air strikes have already begun. All this takes place despite the opposition of a majority of Russians, who are against military action in Syria and retain a deep memory of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. According to a recent poll from the Levada Center, only 14 percent of Russians agree with providing Assad with direct military support, while 69 percent are against it. Only 16 percent are in favor of technical military support for Assad. All this makes the Russian action vulnerable should Russia suffer casualties. Russian propaganda may affect this position over the short term, but only until Russian soldiers are killed.

It is indeed impressive that the Russian army is able to prepare and implement airstrikes in Syria, coordinating an entire supply chain. That means that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the Russian military reform started in 2008 after the Russian-Georgian war was successful. The Russian army is not only able to organize a hybrid war in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, but to act in a very difficult environment far away from Russia after a short period of preparation. Russian cruise missile strikes from the Caspian Flotilla were not militarily necessary – the same attacks would have been possible much more cheaply with airstrikes. But they demonstrated the ability of the Russian army to carry out long distance attacks and challenge the US-led NATO missile defense system in Europe. This has consequences for NATO, and was a clear message to the US.

Assad is an important ally in the Middle East, and the Russian military base in the Syrian city of Tartus is important for Russian prestige. Showing that the Russian military is able to carry out a military airstrike in other regions of the world improves Russian global standing, and Putin’s bargaining position with regard to other crises – including Ukraine. Russia promotes itself as a player that cannot be ignored by the US.

At the same time, Moscow will not support Assad at any cost – there are clear domestic limits to its capacity. It is a rationale cost-benefit calculation: if the costs to support Assad become too high, Russian leadership will accept the fall of the regime.

For the Russian leadership, fighters from the Caucasus and Central Asia who have joined IS and other terrorist groups in the Middle East pose a problem. According to various sources, the total number of militants from Russia fighting in Syria might be as high as 5000 fighters. There is a growing threat posed by fighters who return to Russia and other post-Soviet countries, particularly in Central Asia – they might commit acts of terrorism, destabilizing a region with many weak states. One argument being made by the Russian general staff is that Russia needs to kill as many of its own citizens who are fighting in the Middle East as possible before they return home.

Russia has become an unpredictable player, not only in the post-Soviet region, but also in other regions of the world. It is not willing to coordinate or communicate in an adequate way with the West if communication does not suit its own foreign policy goals. If the US and its allies are not willing or able to take responsibility for conflict resolution in a way that Russia finds acceptable, Russia seems to be increasingly willing to fill the gap itself, and not only in the post-Soviet region. This is a clear message to authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, but also in post-Soviet countries: we are willing to support you, and we offer an alternative to the US.

Russian leaders are promoting their own model of the role of state sovereignty and stability in other regions of the world in direct competition with that of the US. The coordination of its actions in Iraq, Syria, and Iran are meant to create an alternative to the Western coalition in the region, one that directly contradicts US foreign policy, but will primarily serve to create more instability and more victims.

Russian propaganda and hybrid methods are also on display in Syria, and form an important part of Russian strategy. From the beginning of its military campaign, Russian leadership provided limited information about its activities. Putin used his speech at the UN General Assembly to offer a coalition against IS, but then only acted to stabilize Assad. All this shows once again that Russian leadership uses tactics to improve its bargaining position, but that it has no serious interest in cooperation with the West. It is an illusion that Russia is part of the solution in Syria. All who argue the opposite only serve to emphasize the West’s lack of ideas to handle instability in the region.

The West has few good options for responding to Russia’s actions. The main problem of Western policy is that it is focused first and foremost on crisis management and short-term solutions, while lacking a strategic perspective. What is needed at the moment is more communication with Moscow – also on topics other than the Middle East –, without compromises made in advance. The Ukrainization of general relations with Russia was a mistake; it is necessary to rebuild channels for regular communication with Russia, especially for emergencies. Stabilizing Syria must not mean accepting the Russian requirement that Assad be involved. At the same time, the US and its allies need to learn that they cannot leave countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya alone after a change in regime. Russian leadership is willing to fill these gaps to promote its own concept of conflict solution, but it is not a serious partner interested in solving problems. It lacks concepts and resources. Putin has its own agenda, which stands increasingly in conflict with the West’s regionally and globally.

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© REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

Last week there were two pieces of news from Russia, which at first may not seem connected: Putin announced the addition of more than 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles to the country’s arsenal, and Russian industrial production declined 2.3 percent for the first five months of the year (with a 5.5 percent decline in May alone). President Vladimir Putin’s announcement – delivered in the newly opened Patriot Park, something of a Russian “military Disneyland” – was widely interpreted as a reaction to American talk of deploying 5,000 US soldiers to and pre-positioning heavy ordinance in Eastern Europe. However, it should really be seen in connection with Russia’s resounding economic crisis. Without any prospect for an improvement of the political climate and with an economic crisis that has continued nearly unabated since 2008-09, Russia’s downward spiral is only just beginning.

Putin is opting for a mobilization of Russian society in order to distract from his failed economic policy. This is nothing new, as the “Pussy Riot” case of 2012 showed: an example was made of Russian punk rockers during a period of slipping approval numbers, displaying the consequences of “decadent” Western influence before the eyes of the populace and allowing Putin to play the defender of traditional values. In the same vein, the Kremlin is using the expansion of the army, particularly Russia’s symbolic “Great Power” nuclear forces, to orchestrate conflicts with the West. However, the intended target is not the West but rather Russia’s own people, who must hold someone accountable for their country’s failed economic policy or find a culprit – even a new enemy.

In this narrative, the EU, with its recently extended sanction policy, is to blame for this crisis. The US is another enemy, playing its little game in Ukraine and now planning to station troops and heavy weapons in Eastern Europe. Moscow’s answer was almost to be expected: in addition to the nuclear arms build-up, Putin announced the creation of two more radar nodes in both the West and the East of the country. The defense ministry also wants new Iskander rockets – compatible with atomic warheads – stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast near the EU border.

While the Russian economic crisis of 2008-09 was primarily caused by external factors amenable to massive state intervention, the continuing deterioration of Russia’s economy is due to structural deficits; it is a deterioration that is merely reinforced by outside factors such as oil price drops and sanctions, coming at a time when the Russian state lacks the funds for another massive intervention. The state is already spending to cover its enormous public expenses, particularly the salaries of loyal civil servants and the cost of modernizing the army – and despite its outlays, Russia is only in third place in terms of military expenditure, behind the United States and China.

In contrast to his first two terms of office between 2000 and 2008, Putin must now govern a country in economic decline, one that is questioning the legitimacy of his system. This has led straight to the Ukraine crisis and the present confrontation with the West. Should the United States actually arm its Eastern European partners, Moscow would have Washington where it wanted it since the beginning of the crisis: as an antagonist on equal terms attempting to use Ukraine to limit Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet sphere.

US President Barack Obama and NATO would be doing Putin a great favor, reinforcing Russian propaganda that “it’s all the Yankees’ fault.” In reality, Russia’s leadership has no interest in attacking NATO members, but it is now trapped in a mobilization spiral, and the West playing along will only make this situation more dangerous.

NATO’s decision to strengthen its preparedness by forming a spearhead to its rapid reaction force, a step announced at the September 2014 Wales summit, was the right move to reassure its eastern European partners. On the other hand, sending troops and heavy weapons to these countries now could spur new Russian arming and greatly exacerbate a situation that is not, in fact, as explosive as it seems. Economically, Putin finds himself with his back to the wall; even if sanctions were dropped tomorrow, without Western investment and structural reform he cannot escape the corner he painted himself into. This should make Washington and the Eastern Europeans think twice: deterrence, yes; provocation, no.

The post In a Downward Spiral appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Artwork: Cristóbal Schmal

Beyond sanctioning certain segments of the Russian elite and specific branches of the economy, German and European policy needs a positive agenda to present to the Russian public. Thus easing of visa restrictions (such as the removal of visa fees or the lowering of entrance requirements) for the great majority of the Russian population should now follow the travel ban on leading representatives of Putin’s system. EU member states could in part make such changes immediately within the existing legal framework, and the act would be symbolic of a policy of engagement with Russian society. Further, existing exchange programs for young elites, journalists, and students (such as the Erasmus program) should be massively expanded. Existing civil society exchange formats should receive more support, and a shift from the dominance of dialogue between elites to a broader dialogue with varied actors within Russian society should follow.

At the same time, improved communication with Russian society and the Russian-speaking minority within the EU must be used as a short-term instrument: Although the Russian leadership is trying to limit cultural exchange, the work of NGOs, and a free press, we can pursue communication streams reaching Russian society directly to explain European policy decisions. Putin appears on German television – leading German and European politicians should do the same in Russia. The half-truths and lies of Russian policy and media outlets must be made transparent. To this end, an Internet platform (in German, English, and Russian) could be developed to systematically counter the Russian leadership’s propaganda through facts and levelheaded analysis, as well as to provide policy arguments. Further, Russian-language media offerings by EU member states should be increased, and a professional and independent Russian-language news program for broadcast on the pan-European channel euronews developed.

It is equally important to expand capacities for the analysis of political, cultural, economic, and security policy-related developments in every post-Soviet state, as well as to improve coordination between EU member states. To this end, cooperation between state and non-governmental institutions and closer coordination with existing political consulting institutes focusing on the countries in question are essential. Central to this is more effective coordination on the European level, as well as increased cooperative strategy development within existing EU frameworks.

Given the current Russian regime, no real policy change is possible; the Russian leadership is using every resource at its command in its fight to retain power, and only regime change could usher in real change. Such change can only come from inside Russia itself, which appears unlikely for the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, there is a risk of further Russian destabilization due to increasingly difficult economic conditions and the strengthening of nationalistic forces at the cost of liberal ones. For this reason, we must pursue a mixture of containment and engagement: keeping Russia in check where necessary and cooperating with it wherever possible, with the aim of medium- to long-term policy change. Projects working to prevent further Russian isolation or to increase understanding of Russian policy must be counted here. Such projects should not legitimize the Russian leadership – as has been the case with the Russo-German Petersburg Dialogue – but rather be developed into true civil society platforms.

In the short term, the situation in Ukraine must be stabilized through agreements recognizing the limited sovereignty of common neighbor states. For the medium term, this means abandoning NATO integration of Ukraine and other states in the region. Parallel to this, new concepts and increased resources are required to enable the stabilization of security institutions in states outside of NATO as well as to offer them a membership perspective over the long term. Should the EU’s policies fail in its immediate neighborhood, its entire security and foreign policy will be called into question.

The OSCE is simply too weak an instrument to negotiate with Russia on security matters or to ensure the security of Ukraine. We must continue to work within the OSCE framework to secure the Ukrainian-Russian border and to include the separatists in that dialogue; at the same time, however, we need to develop a new format in which to discuss these complex hard security questions. The NATO-Russia Council could be one such forum, given that NATO cannot be blocked unilaterally by the Russians and that the US – both a negotiating partner and important security policy actor – is included.

The conflict with Russia is a long-term challenge that requires both a fundamental strategy change as well as a stronger German and EU policy focus, expanded across the entire post-Soviet region. The destabilization potential of the current Russian regime is enormous – both domestically and in its neighborhood. Such a policy change requires grounded analysis, improved cooperation with other EU countries, and consultation with the US. Germany’s improved Eastern European policy will require closer coordination of all parties active in the region.

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