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	<title>Marcel A. Dirsus &#8211; Berlin Policy Journal &#8211; Blog</title>
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		<title>A New Counterweight?</title>
		<link>https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/a-new-counterweight/</link>
				<pubDate>Wed, 29 Aug 2018 10:30:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcel A. Dirsus]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Berlin Policy Journal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[September/October 2018]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/?p=7136</guid>
				<description><![CDATA[<p>Foreign Minister Heiko Maas is suggesting a new world order. </p>
<p>The post <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/a-new-counterweight/">A New Counterweight?</a> appeared first on <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com">Berlin Policy Journal - Blog</a>.</p>
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								<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Germany’s foreign minister has suggested a new world order in which Europe acts as a counterweight to the United States when “it crosses the line.” The likely biggest obstacle to this idea: Germany.</strong></p>
<div id="attachment_7174" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><a href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE.jpg"><img aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7174" class="wp-image-7174 size-full" src="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="563" srcset="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE.jpg 1000w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE-300x169.jpg 300w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE-850x479.jpg 850w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE-257x144.jpg 257w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE-300x169@2x.jpg 600w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Dirsus_bear_ONLINE-257x144@2x.jpg 514w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><p id="caption-attachment-7174" class="wp-caption-text">© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke</p></div>
<p>German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas outlined his plans for a new world order at the end of August. In that new world order, Europe will not allow the United States to “go over our heads, and at our expense.” Instead, the EU will be a “counterweight when the US crosses the line.” It will project power where America retreats. Maas specifically mentioned the need to create payment channels that would be independent of the US—a European Monetary Fund and an independent SWIFT system.</p>
<p>Maas’ eyebrow-raising intervention is part of the broader debate about how Germany should react to Donald Trump and a less reliable America. Some believe that Trump is merely an accident, that the transatlantic relationship will return to normalcy once he no longer occupies the Oval Office. Maas sees it differently: he believes Europe and the United States have been drifting apart for some time now. As a consequence, Europe needs to be more united in order to be more independent. He also envisions an alliance of multilateralist middle powers that cooperate in order to defend the liberal international order—a proposal he sketched out in Tokyo in July.</p>
<p><strong>Wrangling Over Iran</strong></p>
<p>While Trump’s hostile and often erratic actions against Germany–the president’s favorite bête noir–have led the German Foreign Office to rethink the country’s strategic worldview, the ultimate trigger is the dispute between Europe and the United States over Iran. Europeans want to maintain the nuclear deal they painstakingly negotiated, Trump wants to dismantle it. More than that, he wants the Iranian regime to collapse.</p>
<p>American sanctions over Iran are hitting European businesses that are now forced to retreat from the Islamic Republic against the wishes of their governments. Europeans have spent months pretending that they can protect businesses investing in Iran, but it is not working. Giants of German industry like Siemens, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bahn, and Daimler have already announced that they are leaving. Elsewhere in Europe, more companies are following suit. British Airways and Air France announced that they will suspend flights to Iran from September. Trump is using brute force to get his way, and Maas now wants to make sure it cannot happen again.</p>
<p>How realistic is Maas’ vision? For starters, it is not the official position of the German government. Chancellor Angela Merkel quickly reined in her foreign minister, saying the initiative was nothing more than his opinion. While she clearly agrees with the need for a more united and independent Europe, she openly disagrees with his suggestion for a payment system that bypasses the US. Merkel stressed how important cooperation with the US is when it comes to fighting terror and providing security more generally. As much as she wants Europe “to take its fate into its own hands,” she doesn’t want to compromise European security, which is dependent on the US.</p>
<p><strong>Lacking Leadership</strong></p>
<p>To rebalance the transatlantic relationship in the way Maas has suggested, Europe would have to drastically increase its capabilities and muster the will to provide political leadership. Neither looks likely. Europe’s security dependence on the US not only extends to raw military power, but reaches well into related fields like intelligence. Changing that would be a herculean task that would cost billions and billions of euros, require entirely new structures, and take multiple decades. Even then, success would be far from guaranteed. America is an important pillar of the liberal international order precisely because it combines capability and leadership.</p>
<p>To provide effective leadership, Europe would have to find a common voice. That rarely happens in foreign policy, where EU decisions are currently required to be unanimous. Changing that is extremely difficult because these decisions are often at the heart of national sovereignty and vital national interests. Envision a scenario where Maas’ Europe needs to respond quickly to a security crisis; one in which Germany has to go to war against its will. It is hard to ever see that happening.</p>
<p><strong>Diverging Interests</strong></p>
<p>Europeans have deeply divergent interests. Some care more about North Africa than they do about Russia. Others are almost entirely consumed by the threat of the Russian bear. Poland and the Baltic countries see Moscow as an existential threat. The Austrian foreign minister danced with Vladimir Putin at her wedding.</p>
<p>American security guarantees have masked these differences. But the more independent Europe becomes, the more visible they will become. And how successful can Maas’ “alliance of multilateralists” possibly be when Europe can’t even agree on supporting Canada against Saudi Arabia in the dispute of the former’s support for a female human rights activist?</p>
<p>The biggest obstacle for Maas’ vision is likely Germany. While constantly portraying itself as a “good European,” Germany’s reluctance to pull its weight when it comes to security is a key impediment to a more independent Europe. Germany chooses not to have a functioning army. The country has taken on more responsibility, but it still lets others do the heavy lifting. While Maas himself is a vocal advocate of increased defense spending, his party is often the principal opponent.</p>
<p>The general idea of a stronger and more independent Europe is easy to support in theory, but the concrete steps needed to make that happen are likely to be hugely unpopular. It’s easy to win an election if you tell voters you want Europe to be strong and independent. It is tough to win an election if you tell voters you want a drastic increase in defense spending and a significant loss of national sovereignty. Maas knows this, and that is why his proposals are relatively vague apart from the call for an independent payment system. They are likely to stay this way.</p>
<p>The post <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/a-new-counterweight/">A New Counterweight?</a> appeared first on <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com">Berlin Policy Journal - Blog</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Her Last Battle?</title>
		<link>https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/her-last-battle/</link>
				<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jun 2018 09:33:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcel A. Dirsus]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Berlin Observer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CDU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CSU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Horst Seehofer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Refugee Crisis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/?p=6791</guid>
				<description><![CDATA[<p>Three years after the peak of the refugee crisis, a simmering conflict over migration policy with Angela Merkel's Bavarian sister party has turned into open warfare.</p>
<p>The post <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/her-last-battle/">Her Last Battle?</a> appeared first on <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com">Berlin Policy Journal - Blog</a>.</p>
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								<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Angela Merkel is in serious trouble. Three years after the peak of the refugee crisis, a simmering conflict over migration policy with her Bavarian sister party, the CSU, has turned into open warfare.</strong></p>
<div id="attachment_6796" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><a href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut.jpg"><img aria-describedby="caption-attachment-6796" class="wp-image-6796 size-full" src="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="563" srcset="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut.jpg 1000w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut-300x169.jpg 300w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut-850x479.jpg 850w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut-257x144.jpg 257w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut-300x169@2x.jpg 600w, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/IP/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RTX691TC-cut-257x144@2x.jpg 514w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><p id="caption-attachment-6796" class="wp-caption-text">© REUTERS / Michele Tantussi</p></div>
<p>The signs of trouble emerged earlier this week, when Interior Minister Horst Seehofer of the CSU announced he would <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/new-german-migration-master-plan-delayed-as-conservatives-bicker/a-44165671">delay the presentation of his “migration master plan” </a>– a blueprint for Germany’s strategy for handling migration going forward.</p>
<p>The CSU wants Germany to turn away asylum-seekers at the border if they’ve already been registered in other European countries, or if they’ve already been refused asylum in Germany.</p>
<p>Merkel, however, has rejected the idea of Germany taking unilateral action (this is the only point in Seehofer’s master plan, incidentally, which Merkel does not support). She wants a European solution, or failing that, bilateral deals with countries like Italy. Either of those would allow for a legal, orderly way of returning migrants. A unilateral rejection of asylum-seekers at the border, on the other hand, could trigger a domino effect in which other countries close their borders, too. That would ultimately push the burden squarely onto countries like Greece and Italy, which have already taken in a large share of migrants and refugees.</p>
<p>Merkel also argues that unilateral action could make the entire migration process far more complicated than it already is. If pre-registered asylum-seekers are rejected at the German border, other European countries might simply stop registering asylum-seekers. That would make the entire process more chaotic, not less. That certainly isn’t in Germany’s interest.</p>
<p>That is why Merkel is fighting for more time – two weeks to hammer out a shared solution with Germany’s European partners. But her critics argue that she has already spent years trying to do so. The CSU sees its credibility at stake with a key regional election looming this fall; it is keen to appear tough on migration, an issue that continues to roil the country. The case of an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44425783">Iraqi asylum</a>-seeker suspected of raping and killing a 14-year-old girl, Susanna F., and the ongoing scandal surrounding Germany&#8217;s refugee authority – accused of incorrectly approving thousands of asylum cases – have heightened tensions in recent weeks. The CSU wants to show its voters in Bavaria that it‘s taking action.</p>
<p>The rift among Merkel’s conservative bloc escalated so dramatically on Thursday that many in government circles were discussing the possibility of a vote of no confidence that could oust Merkel. A Bundestag session was interrupted as CDU and CSU lawmakers held separate meetings.</p>
<p>A high-ranking leader of the CSU <u><a href="https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/asylrecht/asyl-streit-zwischen-merkel-und-seehofer-56001078.bild.html#abcdefgh">described</a></u> the conflict with the CDU as “very serious.” There were rumors of the two breaking their union, an alliance that has stood for decades. That would lead to an historic shift in German politics. According <u><a href="https://twitter.com/robinalexander_/status/1007241618519478272">to</a></u> German newspaper <em>Welt</em>, a CSU parliamentarian went as far as telling a CDU lawmaker that Merkel doesn’t care about the German “Volk,” or people.</p>
<p><strong>What’s at Stake</strong></p>
<p>The debate is as much about individual policy as it is about larger principles. German conservatives have long complained that Angela Merkel has abandoned the center-right in favor of the center. Under her leadership, the military draft was abolished. Her government introduced a minimum wage. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power and hard-working German tax payers have “bailed out” other European countries. Gay marriage is now legal. All of these decisions were controversial amongst Christian Democrats, but none of them are as significant as Merkel’s handling of the refugee crisis. Many members of her own CDU caucus support Seehofer’s hardliner approach.</p>
<p>The situation is all the more dangerous for Merkel because the conflict ultimately isn’t about the individual policy decisions. It’s about her handling of the refugee crisis as a whole. Merkel is now trying to buy time in order strike a compromise that’s favorable to German partners abroad and the CSU at home. While the conservatives argue among themselves, meanwhile, the other parties profit. The Social Democrats have called on the CDU and CSU to stop arguing and start concentrating on governing the country. The Free Democrats  have called for a vote on Seehofer’s policy in order to demonstrate to everyone just how divided the conservative bloc is.</p>
<p>At this point, creating a compromise that allows both Merkel and the CSU to save face will be incredibly difficult. CSU leaders have staked their credibility on winning this battle months before Bavarian elections in October. If Merkel fails to find a compromise abroad in the next couple of weeks and the CSU doesn’t back down, she can either give in to Seehofer’s demands or enter an open confrontation that could well cost her the chancellery.</p>
<p>There is a more immediate concern, as well. Seehofer could use the nuclear option of going above Merkel’s head and make an executive decision on turning asylum-seekers away at the border. Merkel would then face an impossible choice: She could let him get away with implementing a policy she has clearly rejected or fire him. If she lets him get away with it, her authority will disintegrate. If she fires the leader of the Christian Social Union, the government will collapse. Either way, her position would be under threat.</p>
<p>Angela Merkel is in serious trouble, but there is still good reason to believe that she will survive the crisis. Her critics have an incentive to appear tough on migration, but not to topple their own chancellor. Merkel continues to be popular, after all. Her critics need her to appeal to the center; she needs her critics in order to appeal to more conservative voters. In the end, Merkel is most likely going to stay in power by finding a way to make everyone a little unhappy, but not too much.</p>
<p>The post <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/her-last-battle/">Her Last Battle?</a> appeared first on <a rel="nofollow" href="https://berlinpolicyjournal.com">Berlin Policy Journal - Blog</a>.</p>
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