© REUTERS/Olivier Matthys/Pool

Since the summer, Emmanuel Macron has made a sudden reappearance on the front lines of international politics. In August, he invited Vladimir Putin to Fort de Brégançon, the French presidential retreat, where the two leaders discussed the conflict in Ukraine and the possibility of Russia’s readmission to the G7 economic summit. Later that month, as G7 host, Macron welcomed leaders of the world’s largest industrial nations, but also brought along a surprise guest, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif.

At the United Nations in September, the French president called on his fellow world leaders to show “the courage of responsibility.” This prompts the question: is Macron is speaking here on behalf of France or of the European Union as a whole, and can the two positions be reconciled?

A Sense of Urgency

Political observers in the French capital agree on this: Europe’s security architecture is under threat to a degree not seen in three or even four decades. In Macron’s own words: “The international order is being disrupted in an unprecedented way…for the first time in our history, in almost all areas and on a historic scale. Above all, there is a transformation, a geopolitical and strategic reconfiguration.” The French president was referring to the challenge to multilateralism from great powers like the United States and China, but also to intensifying armed conflicts close to Europe’s frontiers. Yet another worry for Macron is the distance the Trump administration has taken from questions of European security.

Macron believes the world now emerging will have a bipolar structure, with the United States on one side and China on the other. All other states will play a subordinate role; this includes Russia, which faces marginalization within this new bipolar order. For Europe, the outlook is little better: “We will have to choose between the two dominant powers,” he told the conference of French ambassadors in August. In other words, the choice open to a future Europe will be whom to serve as junior partner.

But Macron would not be Macron if he gave up in the face of adversity. Having made his bleak assessment, he concluded by demanding that Europe turn itself into an autonomous international actor. As outlined in his famous 2017 Sorbonne speech, Macron wants to see the construction of a sovereign Europe. This Europe would be able to live according to its own values (by no means identical to American values), safeguard its own political and economic interests, and, not least, defend itself militarily. For Macron, this is a matter of urgency.

A Common Front with Russia

France’s desire to improve relations with Russia should be seen against this backdrop. Macron is well aware of Moscow’s hostile stance toward the EU, but he continues to push for constructive cooperation in the relatively near future, for example on arms control and in space. The aim is to prevent Russia from further destabilizing the EU and its surrounding regions. Macron also has another goal in mind: he ultimately sees Russia as a possible ally for Europe in the emerging bipolar world system.

At the conference of ambassadors, Macron was explicit: “To rebuild a real European project in a world that is at risk of bipolarization, [we must] succeed at forming a common front between the EU and Russia.” The statement provoked anger, and not only among EU member states in Eastern Europe, where many fear that closer ties to Moscow inevitably spell danger. There is also a distinct air of skepticism among French political and diplomatic elites. Macron is well aware of this, hence his insistence that French ambassadors adopt a new and different mentality.

This is Macron’s vision of the future. But present-day realities look somewhat different. For a number of years, Islamist terror attacks have been a pressing, immediate danger to France. It is clear that the French government can only win out in the battle against terrorism through cooperation with partners and allies. The same goes for overseas military operations, where France rapidly comes up against the limits of its own power.

This explains French pragmatism on the question of allies. “We need to find support everywhere we can,” Defense Minister Florence Parly told a conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington in 2017. In this respect, the US remains indispensable to France. Particularly in the Sahel region of West Africa, France relies on Washington for logistical support and intelligence sharing. Considerable flexibility is needed to combine that sort of dependency with France’s aspirations to autonomy. All the more so when dealing with an unpredictable interlocutor like Donald Trump.

Disappointed with Berlin

Macron’s new foreign policy may seek to invoke the independent French position of previous presidents Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac. However, the current president has added a new element to traditional Fifth Republic foreign policy. No president prior to Macron has ever made such a clear push for European integration, including foreign and security policy. This has particular relevance to the question of autonomy, something Macron desires both for France and for Europe. French policy elites still regard the EU as a force multiplier, useful for a country now without the capacities to match its ambition, despite its nuclear weapons and its permanent UN Security Council seat. But France also regards the EU as a community of interests that must present a united front in an increasingly turbulent world. For this reason, goes the argument, the EU must develop its capacities to operate autonomously in the long term, if necessary without its traditional American partner.

Immediately after his election, Macron attempted to achieve this through close cooperation on fiscal and monetary policy with Germany. However, it rapidly became clear that Berlin had no intention of supporting his ambitious projects for the eurozone. For Paris, this German reluctance increased the importance of another aspect of bilateral relations: defense and arms industry cooperation. The Aachen Treaty, signed by the two countries in January 2019, committed them to “continue to intensify the cooperation between their armed forces with a view to the establishment of a common culture and joint deployments.”

Paris has now distinctly lowered its expectations of a grand alliance with Berlin. In any case, an arrangement like that can only be a project for the very long term. One recent move can been seen as a small first step. The Franco-German agreement at the countries’ most recent bilateral talks in Toulouse makes important changes to arms export regulation. Crucially, Germany will no longer claim the right to block exports of jointly-manufactured weapons systems if German components make up less than 20 percent of the arms in question.

In practice, however, Franco-German cooperation continues to occupy precarious political ground, not least because of stark differences in foreign policy traditions. This is why Paris has sought British participation in European security policy instruments, including the recently established European Intervention Initiative, a 13-nation military project outside both the EU and NATO. Brexit or no Brexit, the United Kingdom and France share a particular strategic outlook, as well as a long tradition of overseas military intervention. In this context, Britain will remain an important partner for France.

A Change of Strategy

Growing frustrations, above all the disappointment with Berlin, led Macron to change his European strategy ahead of May’s European elections. First, Paris now no longer shied away from confrontation with Berlin. Second, the French government intensified its involvement in EU institutional politics and wants to use this more strongly as leverage. Macron supported the formation of Renew Europe, a new liberal grouping in the European parliament, in which French parliamentarians are the biggest delegation (21 out of 74).

Macron also robustly intervened in the struggle over key EU leadership posts. He actively opposed the so-called Spitzenkandidat (“lead candidate”) system, by which the winning party in European parliamentary elections could claim the presidency of the European Commission. Instead, Macron backed Ursula von der Leyen for president. He was gratified that her Europe Agenda 2019–2024 borrowed key ideas from his Sorbonne speech, including ambitious climate goals, a European minimum wage, and the creation of an EU defense union. The French president also pushed for the appointment of Charles Michel as European Council president and Josep Borrell as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In Paris, both men are regarded as close to French positions.

Macron’s final tactical maneuver would have seen Sylvie Goulard appointed as a commissioner in charge of a beefed-up portfolio including internal market affairs, as well as industry, aerospace, digitization and culture. Goulard would have overseen the implementation of Macron’s preferred EU projects. But the European parliament rejected Goulard’s nomination, a severe blow to Macron.

In picking Thierry Breton, a businessman and one-time French Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry, as a substitute for Goulard, Macron signaled that knowledge of Germany and therefore the ability to explain his project to the Germans (which Goulard had) was no longer a requirement for the job. The top priority is now to maintain the portfolio that Paris had negotiated and which is in line with its European agenda. A top-level partnership between Goulard and von der Leyen could have been a dynamic driving force for Franco-German cooperation at the EU level. This is now a more difficult proposition, particularly since von der Leyen’s own position has turned out to be more fragile than expected, while the European Parliament seems set to remain riven by political tensions.

Difficult Road to Europeanization

In Paris, the unexpected obstacles in Brussels have been the cause of even more frustration. This French impatience is prompted by the general sense of urgency, along with the country’s aspirations to leadership. In response, the Macron administration has sought room for maneuver elsewhere, going beyond EU frameworks and other traditional diplomatic formats.

The recent rapprochement with Russia is a case in point. Paris will do what it regards as right for both itself and the EU, although where interests actually overlap is a matter for debate. France also hopes its actions will persuade other partners to get on board: French foreign policy is meant to be inclusive. The talks with Putin, for example, were regarded in Paris as a first step, to be followed by the continuation of the “Normandy format” Ukrainian peace talks, which also involved Germany and Ukraine. However, such solo activism may run the risk of offending France’s EU partners, fomenting unnecessary trouble.

One example of this was France’s recent veto of Albania’s and North Macedonia’s application to join the EU, in what would have been a further expansion, this time into south-eastern Europe. Macron’s arguments on the subject are actually entirely legitimate. He is quite right to suggest that the EU’s accession process is problematic: the prospective new members gave inadequate assurances on the rule of law, where improvements are clearly required. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the EU, already embroiled in a painful Brexit saga, would be prepared to admit new members before it has reformed its own institutions and internal processes.

Macron’s veto was meant to signal that expansion would endanger integration, risking the EU’s cohesion and unity. Here, he continued a long-standing tradition in France’s European policy that regards deepening and enlargement as mutually contradictory. Opponents of Macron’s position argue that the EU’s borders should be stabilized, demanding a more pragmatic approach. The French president understands this objection. However, he has maintained his veto, which has come at a high price. The issue has seen him isolated, and has weakened his pro-European credibility.

Be Patient, Be Polite

For all his pro-European convictions, Macron has no intention of silencing France’s voice on the world stage. Like all French politicians, he is not prepared to hand over the country’s permanent UN Security Council seat to an EU representative. At best, Macron may coordinate policy with other European members of the Security Council, thus fulfilling the Aachen Treaty’s stipulation that France and Germany should act “in accordance with the positions and interests of the European Union.”

Given this logic, it is unsurprising that Macron welcomed Borrell’s appointment as High Representative. Borrell is familiar with France’s strategic culture, but also with the sensitivities of member states that are jealous of their prerogatives, the result of many years serving as Spanish foreign minister. He realizes it would be an error to seek the limelight. Of course, he will set the tone for his own department, but his main focus will be on internal coordination processes. All foreign affairs issues will probably be discussed in the Council of Ministers, where larger states tend to have greater visibility. Nonetheless, the EU needs unity in order, for example, to impose economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument. The voices of the larger states only dominate if the entire EU goes along with them and implements their decisions. This interplay of forces will determine what happens.

For Macron this means that he must constantly strike a balance between national self-assertion and integration within EU structures. If he wants to exert influence within the EU, he cannot go it alone. That’s no easy task for a man of Macron’s impatience. Here, he runs a twofold risk: first, he may offend his partners and come across as arrogant, especially to smaller EU states, who feel he patronizes them. The second risk is that Macron will lose credibility if his well-publicized plans end up going nowhere. In both cases, it is a question of reliability and trust, a basic requirement if the project of European autonomy is to gain sustainable momentum.

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© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

As the European election campaign approaches, Emmanuel Macron is going back to a familiar playbook: He is promising to use a progressive centrist movement to leave behind the classic right/left framework. He made this bet in 2017 for the French presidential election—and won. Macron continues to follow this logic today, describing himself and his party, La République en Marche, as the antithesis of Viktor Orbán’s right-wing nationalist vision of Europe, and seeking new partners all across Europe.

The French president argues that an alliance of pro-European “Democrats and Progressives” will be better placed to address new divisions between “open” and “closed” societies than the existing Europe-wide party groupings which are aligned along the traditional left-right-divide. Macrons new forces won’t be able to replace the European People’s Party (EPP) as the strongest grouping in the European Parliament, but he would be glad to assume the role of kingmaker, thereby increasing his influence on the European stage.

Many of the concepts from his 2017 campaign are being reused. Just as he told French voters that his “Flexicurity” model would bring both an economic upswing and greater social protection, he now vows to live up to Europe’s promise of prosperity by combining open markets with protective measures like a “Buy European Act” and common social standards.

France’s return to diplomatic heavyweight status is reflected in Macron’s demand for a “sovereign”—i.e. strong and unified—Europe as a response to the unstable relationships with the USA, Russia, and China. And Macron presents himself and his movement as the only effective answer to right-wing populism, to Marine Le Pen in France, and to Orbán and his partners in Europe.

Macron’s program is coherent, both on the national and international level. But as he tries to transfer his blueprint for success to Europe, it’s becoming obvious that this is a different challenge. Macron can no longer rely on being a fresh face. Instead, he has to count on his authority as the President of France, which has begun to diminish in recent months. And Macron has only had limited success on the EU stage so far.

For Macron’s strategy to work in the European campaign, it needs to fulfill three conditions: the movement must achieve a certain success in his own country; it must find reliable partners in as many EU member states as possible; and last but not least, it must be a convincingly pro-European force that positions itself beyond the traditional party-political divisions.

European Policy as Domestic Policy

It may sound paradoxical that national context is important for, of all things, the European elections. Yet Macron’s authority as Europe’s creative director heavily depends on his success within France’s border. This is all the truer since the French leader has declared the elections a top priority and will, unlike his predecessors, make himself the face of the campaign. “I will do my best to ensure that progressives, democrats, and those for whom I speak are heard”, Macron said on September 29 in an interview with Le Journal du dimanche.

There is no doubt Macron is credible. His ideas for EU reform have long been well known, even before the famous Sorbonne Speech of September 2017. They were a major topic of his presidential campaign, and he is taking the same approach in the EU context. What’s more, the attacks of Marine Le Pen, his main adversary from the Rassemblement National or RN (until recently Front National), have boosted Macron’s profile. It helps both sides to duel in public. Macron has denounced the nationalism that is “spreading like leprosy all over Europe,” while Le Pen has called on the right-wing nationalist parties of Europe to band together. To this end, she met on October 8th with the Italian interior minister and Lega leader, Matteo Salvini, who stands for a brutal anti-migrant policy, and announced from a press conference in Rome “the emergence of a Europe of nations and protection.”

Le Pen won’t give Macron any peace in the coming months. For her, this election is a one-off opportunity to avenge her defeat in the 2017 presidential election. Her goal is to shore up her party’s position in the European parliament.Macron must keep something else in mind: European policy credentials are one thing, electoral success another. The French president is a professed believer in European integration, but this was not the reason for his victory in 2017. In France, as in many other European countries, the EU continues to be a target of criticism. Even if radical steps like leaving the euro continue to be rejected by large majorities—Le Pen was calling for a euro-exit until her electoral defeat—the French left in particular often criticizes Brussels’s supposedly excessively liberal economic policy. And pro-Europeans are disappointed with the meager results of Macron’s EU reforms, regardless of whether intra-European blockades or German reluctance are responsible.

Moreover, Macron’s road to victory may become more difficult if domestic policy issues dominate the election. The fast pace at which the government is reforming the labor market, the education system, and social policy is unsettling many French; the promised positive effects have so far failed to materialize. In order to be successful, Macron’s movement urgently needs some tangible successes.

A lot can happen before May 2019, but the most recent polls give the president reason to worry. A large majority of respondents have negative views of Macron’s record. He is considered arrogant and, after the recent resignations of the environment and interior ministers, a weak leader. The fact that both ministers were symbols of Macron’s cross-party government (Nicolas Hulot as an environmental activist without any background as a career politician, and the interior minister Gérard Collomb as a former socialist) raises questions about the durability of any new alliances. The European elections could turn into a neck-and-neck race between Macron and Le Pen.

Liberal Temptation

An alliance of pro-European forces can, moreover, only have success when all or at least most EU member-states are represented. There is more to this than having representation from seven member-states, the minimum required to form a grouping in the European Parliament. For only a broad-based movement can reach the critical mass necessary to change the balance of power in the European Parliament and do justice to its claim of pan-Europeanism. Two options are conceivable: either an entirely new movement, like the one Macron successfully created in En Marche!, or a movement based on already existing forces. Of course, the first would have the advantage of embodying the renewal Macron is advocating. Yet because of the complex relations inside the EU and the growing time pressure, the second option is more likely.

The main liberal grouping in the European Parliament, ALDE, appears to be interested in joining forces. The acting leader, Guy Verhofstadt, is already planning to campaign side by side with Macron: “We share not only the same analysis of the problem but also have more or less the same proposals. [Macron’s] speech in the Sorbonne was well received by the ALDE parties,” Verhofstadt told Ouest France on September 9.

It’s not yet clear what the cooperation will look like, but the goal is certain: ideally, after the election, the two sides want to form a grouping. In Germany, too, some (liberal) FDP politicians have long called for cooperation with the French president. While some differences seem irreconcilable, such as the question of a budget for the Eurozone, what matters is that Macron and other liberals share a common market-liberal and reform-oriented approach. Negotiations are underway to make Margrethe Vestager, the liberal EU competition commissioner from Denmark, the future Commission president on the strength of this alliance.

As fleshed-out as this plan may sound, such cooperation could be tricky for Macron. For one thing, the liberal label can be a burden in parts of Europe, especially in France, where many take it to mean growing social inequality and the dismantling of the welfare state. This danger is clear to Macron, who advocated for a “Europe that protects” in the presidential campaign and today ostentatiously criticizes the EU’s “ultraliberal” course. For another, the pro-Europeans cannot allow themselves to be imprisoned by party-political logic. If anything, Macron’s strategy is based on overcoming the traditional dividing line of right and left. But if he only cooperates with the liberals in the European elections, he would no longer be able to credibly advocate this strategy.

A Wider Alliance?

Indeed, the pro-European alliance that Macron desires is meant to thrive on a diversity of party-political preferences. Just as there is in France, where for the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic socialists, conservatives, and civil society representatives are sitting at the same cabinet table, there should also be an amalgamation of various groupings, of party families, in Europe. The motto: for Europe, against nationalism. Names of possible allies are already circulating. According to the most optimistic predictions, the conservative president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the liberal prime minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, the socialist Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, and the radical-left Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, are all supporters. But officially nothing has been determined yet.

What looks promising on paper will have to overcome a lot of obstacles in practice. It is far from certain that the bigwigs from the two main groupings, the EPP (Christian Democrats) and the Socialists & Democrats (Social Democrats), will be prepared to turn their backs on their political families: that was only possible in France because the established parties had lost their credibility and thus any chance of electoral success. For many of their representatives, working with En Marche! was a question of political survival.

It’s not only that the political relationships are more complex in a European context. Some of the established “people’s parties” are also in better shape than their French counterparts, which makes radical reorganization more difficult. It’s also unclear how exactly cooperation would work in an alliance based on the common goal of combating nationalism. One wonders what actually unites Tsipras and Tusk with regard to the future of Europe.

Macron propagates the idea of a dichotomy between democrats and populists in order to mobilize as many pro-Europeans as possible for the elections. But this also generates another effect: the urgently necessary debate about the conservatives’ and social democrats’ thoroughly different concepts of Europe, which go well beyond populism or anti-populism, is swept under the rug. This is not just dangerous for the parties, as they risk further blurring the lines between them; it also prevents a real European debate about reforming the eurozone, migration policy, or the design of a social Europe.

At the moment, it’s others who are showing that clear political positioning and transnational movements are possible. Other new formations are staking a claim to build a pan-European movement. They are in the process of forming transnational lists. This is a good thing for European democracy, though it could weaken Macron’s alliance. The strongest competition certainly comes from Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek finance minister and the founder of European Spring. With his pro-European, progressive vision, Varoufakis is doing more than simply challenging the En Marche! claim to be unique. He is, by virtue of his left-wing roots, reintroducing the divide between left and right that Macron’s allies reject, and forcing conservatives and liberals to keep things in perspective.

Macron and his party have picked the basic tone for their campaign before the others have. Yet now the detailed work of coming up with a coherent strategy begins. The results of the “Grande Marche pour L’Europe”, a “listening tour” where En Marche! activists talked about Europe with everyday citizens, have been analyzed and are meant to provide the basis of the campaign program. Candidates have been able to apply for the electoral lists of the République en Marche for a few weeks now; the final list will be released in January. In parallel, better communication of the positive effects of Macron’s reforms is supposed to help improve his low poll numbers.

Unfamiliar Competition

In Berlin, Macron has hardly been able to get anywhere. Angela Merkel opposes an approach that assumes the division of Europe. Outspoken criticism came from Norbert Röttgen, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag: “If Mr. Macron would like to be the leader of a certain camp in Europe, he cannot be at the same time the leader of Europe,” he told Le Monde on September 6.

Furthermore, it remains axiomatic that the CDU and CSU belong to the EPP. Macron might have tried to attract progressive parts of the EPP by pointing to the fact that the grouping is also home to Viktor Orbán’s party, Fidesz. Yet the CDU preempted any such attempt by making a decisive contribution in the European Parliament to the triggering of the Article 7 procedure against Hungary. Cooperation with Macron would be delicate for EPP politicians, because if they do in fact decide to kick Fidesz out of the grouping before the 2019 elections, they would risk losing their status as the strongest parliamentary force.

Another question about Germany will become urgent if Macron has success with his pan-European movement. How can the two countries continue to work on Franco-German compromises in European politics? So far, France has sent a clear signal: Without Germany—in other words without the governing CDU/CSU—progress in Brussels is not possible. And yet this progress has so far failed to materialize. By the time of the elections, Merkel and Macron will not just be partners as heads of government, but also competitors as party representatives. That makes it more difficult to put forward Franco-German initiatives for Europe.

After the election, there will certainly be a new window for progress. But even if it’s hard to imagine an open rupture in Franco-German coordination, this will take place under new conditions, whether across new front lines or in new alliances.

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© REUTERS/Leah Millis

In May, US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. Now Europeans are waiting for another blow from Washington: the beginning of a transatlantic trade war. On March 23, Trump announced sweeping tariffs on steel and aluminum imports based on national security concerns. Though this decision was mainly directed against China, long-term allies such as Canada and EU member states are also affected. The temporary exemption that the US granted the EU will expire on June 1, and the tariffs will kick in then unless the Trump administration changes its mind.

Troublingly for Europe, the United States only wants to exempt Europe permanently from the steel tariffs if the EU offers significant market access concessions, for example lowering its tariffs on US cars. In addition, Trump has threatened to impose tariffs up to 25 percent on imported cars, based again on the same national security provision used for the metal tariffs, Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962. If Trump decides to impose these tariffs, it could start a spiral of protectionism.

What are the chances of defusing trade tensions? A compromise on steel is possible. If the US sets a steel quota of 100 percent of last year’s steel and aluminum exports from Europe, EU countries probably would not be willing to retaliate. But if the quota is lower, retaliation is more likely. However, for car tariffs, there is no easy solution in sight. Nor is there any agreement on how to move forward in the future. It would make economic sense in the long run to start talks about an EU-US trade deal (previously known as TTIP), negotiated on the basis of an equal partnership. But for this, Germany and France need to find a common ground. At the moment, intra-European disputes look set to weaken the EU’s position as a global player in world trade.

Using the EU’s Economic Power

So far, Europeans have reacted the wrong way to the American threats. The European Commission is responsible for the Common Commercial Policy, one of the EU’s most integrated policy areas. But instead of going through the Commission and forming a unified position vis-à-vis the US, the two largest EU member-states, Germany and France, have rushed ahead on their own.

For example, the German economy minister, Peter Altmaier (pictured), has proposed talks with the US about a “TTIP light”, which would only deal with industrial market access. He wants talks with the Trump administration to be positive and constructive in order to alleviate the tensions in the transatlantic trade relationship. Through this offer Germany also wants to protect its fabled car industry which has caught Trump’s attention.

Meanwhile French President Emmanuel Macron has made a great show of his close personal relationship with his American counterpart. However, with regard to trade, France is taking a much less conciliatory tone than Germany. France supports the European Commission’s view, namely that there is no reason to negotiate under (an unjustified) threat. Cracks in Franco-German cooperation are also appearing with regard to a potential transatlantic trade deal. Macron has said that such a agreement with the US must also include non-tariff barriers as well as agriculture and public procurement. And he has suggested that the EU should only negotiate trade deals with partners who support the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, though he would likely be willing to make concessions in this regard.

The divergent positions of Germany and France weaken the European position, and help the US to divide the individual European member-states. It sent the wrong signal when German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Macron made individual visits to Washington in April to discuss trade as the US president has difficulties understanding and accepting the concept of the EU.

Still, Donald Trump knows that a unified EU strengthens the European position, which is why he is trying to drive a wedge between European powers. During Macron’s visit he said that “trade with France is complicated because we have the European Union. I would rather deal just with France. The Union is very tough for us. They have trade barriers that are unacceptable.” Trump’s lack of knowledge on the subject notwithstanding, the point of the EU is that its members act together on trade: The EU must use the unified power of all its member states (including Germany and France) to deal on equal terms with the US.

Acknowledging Imbalances

A compromise in trade is an important test for Franco-German cooperation. Paris and Berlin should prove that they take common European interests seriously in the medium- and long-term. In other words, they must be willing to accept that national interests need to temporarily take a back seat. A common European position in trade sends a strong signal, particularly in times where the centrifugal forces in the EU are increasing. Without a common understanding between the two largest member-states, the success of the supranational European common commercial policy would be threatened.

There are three key elements to what should be a common Franco-German strategy.

First, Paris and Berlin should keep in mind that the US remains the most important trade and investment partner for the EU and vice versa, harsh rhetoric and political chaos in Washington nonwithstanding. Therefore, the economic rationale for a transatlantic trade deal has not changed. Both sides would benefit from a reduction of trade and investment barriers. France and Germany should not approach the Trump administration on their own; rather, they should convince the Commission that talks about a comprehensive free trade agreement are important in the long-term.

Paris should move closer to the German position, showing greater readiness to open talks between the EU and the US. Here, the good relationship between Macron and Trump can be used to promote European interests. Macron may not have convinced Trump to stick to the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, but their apparent friendship is still a basis for future talks. At the same time, Berlin should accept that the agreement needs to be comprehensive and not just focused on good market access for industrial goods, German ones in particular.

Admittedly, the difficult TTIP talks will hardly have any chance of success under President Trump and his protectionist trade policy. However, it is still worthwhile to review the agreements reached in previous negotiating rounds, and to look where negotiations could continue in the long run. To this end, the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which was founded in 2007, should be used intensively to talk on a working level about regulatory cooperation.

Second, Europe must commit itself to defining new rules in international trade and solving existing problems on a multilateral level. The American concerns about Chinese subsidies for key industries and theft of foreign intellectual property are not imaginary; indeed, Europe shares many of them.

However, the introduction of punitive tariffs is the wrong way to move forward. For example, the problem of (largely Chinese) steel overcapacity should not be solved bilaterally, but on a multilateral level in the context of the G20/OECD Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity. German and France should work with the White House to ensure US cooperation in these forums.

Third, there should be a discussion about international trade imbalances. Germany should take seriously the American and European—and particularly French—criticism of its huge export surplus. Trump’s claim that trade deficits are a sign of unfairness lacks any economic credibility. But it is true that Germany does not comply with European rules stating that a member-state’s trade surplus may not exceed 6 per cent of GDP. The typical German response—that its surplus is a sign of competitiveness—is no longer sufficient. Germany should strengthen its internal demand through increased investment in infrastructure and digital networks, thus reducing its surplus. If the new German government is still committed to restrained spending and no budget deficits whatsoever, the least it could do is to show more openness for dialogue. This would be an important gesture of goodwill with regard to Paris, Brussels, and Washington.

If Germany and France incorporate these three elements in their trade strategy, the EU will be less divided and better able to reach a deal with the difficult partner in the White House.

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Cover artwork: © Mitch Blunt

Dear new Chancellor,

Your predecessor – to whom you may well bear a striking resemblance – recently said, “We Europeans have to take our fate in our own hands.” She was quite right. Now that the election is won, it’s time to add the next logical part: “Now.” Yes, the EU has been making quite a comeback of late. But now, it’s mostly up to you to make sure that the European project not only survives but thrives.

Tradition has it that once coalition negotiations have concluded and you and your government have been sworn in, your first foreign engagement will take you to Paris – usually on that very same evening.

But when you touch down at Charles de Gaulle, please make sure you have a detailed reform plan for the EU and the eurozone in your Longchamp handbag – and a number of proposals likely to please your counterpart, President Emmanuel Macron. He will be weathering a substantial dip in his approval ratings as he’s started implementing the changes France urgently needs. For him, Christmas really needs to come early.

However, meeting Macron at least halfway has a wider purpose than simply putting a smile back on the young president’s face. For Europe’s hour to come in earnest, the Franco-German tandem needs to get back in gear – something it can only do when Paris is no longer treated as a junior partner, or used for mere window dressing (as was wont to happen during former president François Hollande’s time in office). The French need to regain their self confidence, and you are up to the job.

Why not look up “Frankreich” in Helmut Kohl’s memoirs? Or even Konrad Adenauer’s? Before the French elections in May, Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, not daring to voice his “love” for France, professed “great admiration” (“großen Respekt”), though that sentiment had not been much in evidence for quite some time.

Meeting Macron as freshly-minted chancellor would be a good time to echo such feelings and demonstrate your own conviction that the nation is becoming truly grande again, in an even more grande EU. In other words, under your leadership, Berlin’s attitude is ripe for a change – less Oberlehrer (schoolmarm),  more trusted friend.

Working together with Macron, a reform of the eurozone, an overhaul of European foreign and security policy, and an ambitious EU-wide immigration policy are all key. While this will require loosening the purse-strings, just remember that every euro spent on consolidating the common currency and improving the EU’s infrastructure is a euro well spent. It is also in Germany’s interest to let France take the lead, and not only in security as has traditionally been the case.

That said, don’t forget that the European project is more than just a Franco-German love story. It is essential that you also strengthen the overall cohesion among the remaining 27 EU member states. Germany needs to become everyone’s good friend again – and mean it. To share leadership would help, even if it implies giving up some control yourself.

This will be easier said than done, of course, once the EU progresses at different speeds. Again, striking a new, humbler tone will help, as will more generosity – even where it may not be strictly deserved.

This doesn’t mean that Germany’s role will be solely moderation and mediation. No, Berlin also needs to become a capital of ideas. Germany’s political class, led by your good self, needs to think “European” – and creatively – first and foremost. To strengthen the EU, your government now needs to come up with new projects palatable to all EU member states. Please always be open-minded about initiatives from others for the improvement of the lives of all 510 million EU citizens.

How about that for a legacy?

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© REUTERS/Eric Vidal

An audible sigh of relief emerged from Berlin when Emmanuel Macron triumphed in France’s presidential elections, overcoming right-wing populist Marine Le Pen and her Front National. Germany’s two main parties, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) led by Martin Schulz, made no secret of their support for Macron and his unabashedly pro-EU stance. From the beginning, Macron vowed to reform his country and to deepen its ties with Germany in particular, eliciting the much-quoted retort from Le Pen: “France will be led by a woman: either me or Ms. Merkel.”

Both the CDU and the SPD are looking to Macron as the European Union’s new hope, reviving the Franco-German tandem, particularly as the EU continues to face various crises: Brexit, populism, the rising threat of terror, refugees, migration, as well as increasing friction among the member states, which had led the EU to the brink of collapse. In Berlin a great deal of hope has been placed on the political newcomer, and for good reason: Macron’s victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections could be the last chance to stabilize and restore the EU’s legitimacy. If his presidency fails, it cannot be ruled out that anti-European and anti-German forces will surge to power in France in five years’ time. Regardless of which party wins the German election in September, it is in Berlin’s own interest that Macron’s presidency will be a success.

It remains to be seen whether the couple franco-allemand will finally be Europe’s integration engine again. In Germany, most signs point to a victory for Chancellor Angela Merkel in September’s elections, but even were Martin Schulz to pull off a dramatic upset, both candidates are strong champions of the European project and closer ties with France.

Still, in some areas, cooperation could be easier said than done.

The Future of the EU

The debate about the EU’s future is playing out against different backdrops on both sides of the Rhine. In France some 40 percent of the electorate chose anti-EU candidates in the first round of voting on the far left and far right of the spectrum. In fact, Macron emerged as the only unequivocally pro-EU candidate in the running.

In Germany, meanwhile, commitment to the EU is part of the political mainstream. Even if the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has successfully thrust euroskeptic views into the spotlight, those have not reached the center of political or public discourse. Consequently, Berlin still enjoys greater room for maneuver in European affairs.

Still, crises have battered and destabilized the European Union, and both Germany and France are well aware that the argument for an ever closer union is starting to ring hollow. Macron is therefore championing a differentiated approach to integration – an approach that grants member states willing to integrate deeper more scope to push ahead, particularly in the eurozone and within the realm of Common Security and Defense Policy, but also in energy and digital policies. In these areas, Berlin and Paris are in step.

But Macron is also in favor of a smaller core circle of member states led by the two countries that would function as an avant-garde. Merkel’s government is hesitant to support such an idea, conscious of the criticism that Germany has grown too powerful in Europe. Berlin has sought to protect the interests of less powerful EU countries that are suspicious of a stronger German-French duo.

Neither the CDU nor the SPD has taken up one of Macron’s campaign proposals to establish conventions in each member state in order to enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Since all member states’ governments would need to get behind this idea, it is likely to fall flat.

The Eurozone and Europe’s Economy

The eurozone and economic integration have always been among the points of real friction between Germany and France. The two governments have wrangled over economic policies often in recent years.

Macron’s views on European economic policy took form during his time as economy minister under François Hollande. Today Macron is pushing to overhaul the ailing French economy by reforming the labor market and welfare regulations and consolidating the budget, thereby restoring France’s credibility on the European stage. In Germany, his approach has been well received across party lines.

But Macron’s ambitions do not stop at France’s borders: He is bidding to reshape European policy as well, finding ways to deepen integration and cultivate greater solidarity among member states. He has advocated for a European economics and finance minister for the eurozone, complete with their own budget to finance mutual investment projects, help member states in need, and offer backing in crisis situations.

Such proposals have met with positive response from Schulz and the SPD: They have thrown their support behind Macron’s bid for common European investment projects, and are calling for binding minimum wages across the EU. Chancellor Merkel’s conservatives, meanwhile, have distanced themselves from such initiatives thus far, although Merkel has not ruled them out entirely.

Moreover, the new French president welcomes global free trade but has urged Europe to extend anti-dumping regulations, sharpen laws on foreign investment, and integrate environmental and social standards into the EU’s trade agreements. Macron has also called for a Buy European Act that would ensure that public tenders are only awarded to companies that produce at least half their goods in the EU.

Protectionism does not serve Germany well; it has profited from global trade more than any other European country. That is why Germany’s main parties have largely rejected linking environmental and social standards to any trade agreements. After all, such demands could deal a blow to Germany’s powerful export industry.

Common Defense and Security

There is far more common ground on common defense and security policy (CSDP). Even before the vote, Germany’s Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and her French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian (now Macron’s foreign minister) released a joint policy paper on expanding the EU’s CSDP.

The policy paper links this deepening cooperation to PESCO, short for Permanent Structured Cooperation, an article in the Lisbon Treaty allowing a core group of member states to integrate security and defense policy without dividing the European Union. The defense ministers also called for a permanent EU headquarters for civilian and military defense and security operations, closer cooperation on logistics, and coordinated training. A revised Athena mechanism for financing common EU military costs would provide a framework for funding CSDP initiatives. The SPD has already signalled its approval of many of these proposals.

Macron aims not to build a European army, but rather to better coordinate member states’ existing resources and create a path toward a European defense union. The French-German partnership stands at the core of that policy. Merkel and Schulz are well aware that common defense and security would grant France a platform to appear bold and strong, on equal footing with Germany (and thus make Germany look less dominant).

France suffered a series of major terror attacks in 2015-16 that reshaped its security and counterterrorism policy. Like his predecessor, Macron sees military missions abroad as a key element of counterterrorism and has vowed to carry forward the military’s current engagements along with its partners. That is why Paris is likely to demand more military engagement from Berlin. In Germany, however, opposition toward military missions abroad remains significant.

Merkel and Macron believe military cooperation with the US is still a core element of European defense. Schulz, however, has positioned himself as the anti-Trump, and would seek to untangle defense and security cooperation with Washington. While Merkel and Macron have pledged to ramp up defense spending and meet the two percent GDP target for NATO members, Schulz has argued he will not bow to Trump’s ambitious weapons aims.

The Refugee Debate and Schengen

The refugee crisis of 2015 tested ties between Germany and France: Paris and Berlin strove for common solutions but were driven apart by their different interests. Asylum policy will remain a core issue that will require them to work together constructively – especially because the EU has yet to come up with a sustainable solution to the influx of refugees and migrants.

Macron has advocated defensive measures and called for a reform of the Dublin asylum system. He has proposed the fast-tracking of asylum and deportation procedures and checkpoints in the refugees’ countries of origin and transit areas.

His proposals are in line with Chancellor Merkel’s strategy. The German leader has launched a campaign to strike deals with countries of origin and transit countries, like Turkey and Afghanistan, in order to stem the flow of migration. Macron has pledged more development aid as well to help create opportunities there and battle smuggling operations – proposals welcomed by both the CDU and the SPD.

Although Macron was the only candidate to praise Germany’s refugee policy during the presidential campaign in France, he has not indicated that his government would be willing to take in more asylum seekers. Instead, he is seeking a fair distribution of refugees across Europe and sanctions levied against member states that refuse to honor their obligation.

More “solidarity” in the fair distribution of refugees and migrants has also been championed by Schulz. He has avoided speaking of sanctions but has indicated that he would try to link refugee policy with the distribution of funding for agriculture and infrastructure. Merkel, on the other hand, has positioned herself against any initiatives to punish uncooperative member states with fines.

Macron has also argued for the need to strengthen the EU’s external borders; he has suggested making Frontex more robust, adding 5,000 new positions and additional resources and responsibilities. Both the CDU and the SPD have made the securing of external borders a focus as well. At the same time, Macron has made clear he stands behind the Schengen agreement, championing the free movement of people. This does not prevent him from striving to reform the guidelines for foreign (“posted”) workers, though.

Europe in Paris

The new French president is a crucial partner for Germany in the attempt to reform the European Union. He is the most EU- and Germany-friendly leader France has seen in years, if not in history. On the campaign trail and now in office, he has strived to both show French voters the benefits of European integration and make Paris a powerful player in Brussels. The strengthening of the Franco-German tandem is at the core of this: His cabinet includes several policymakers with close ties to Germany, like Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire (see our Close-Up of him in this issue), and Philippe Etienne, ambassador to Germany 2015-17, who now serves as one of the president’s top foreign policy advisers.

Both Merkel and Schulz have already emphasized that they are ready to work closely with the French president. “Mercron” has the potential for advances in the defense and security field and with regard to migration policy, whereas eurozone reform and implementing a “social Europe” would be easier with “Schucron.”

However, the next German chancellor and the French president are likely to face major structural hurdles in further strengthening Paris-Berlin ties. Many French voters are still skeptical of an overly powerful EU – and of Germany, the most dominant member, in particular. Macron’s proposals for eurozone reforms are highly unpopular among Germans who are wary of carrying the financial burden while other member states continue to pile up debt.

Paris and Berlin will need to strike clear agreements to show their own citizens the will to compromise goes both ways – the first steps in deepening trust and cooperation for the path forward.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

They might not be running for office in Germany, but for France’s presidential candidates, a campaign stop on German soil has become par for the course. French politicians have often used their larger, more powerful neighbor as a platform to lay out their visions for France and Europe. It was little surprise therefore to see former Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron, who has built his own “En Marche!” movement, arguing for a more proactive France in front of a crowd at Berlin’s Humboldt University.

Conservative François Fillon, on the other hand, traveled to the German capital to meet with his fellow Christian Democrat, Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the start of the year; he also delivered a speech calling for a more streamlined Europe. As for the leader of the right-wing populist Front National, Marine Le Pen, she teamed up with the German populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party at a gathering of far-right leaders in Koblenz in January, where she took aim at Berlin’s pro-European policies.

All three candidates have drastically different visions for France and its role in Europe, and this May’s presidential election will undoubtedly have a significant impact on Germany and France’s unique bilateral relationship – by far the closest within the EU. It still holds true that any European solution requires Berlin and Paris at the helm, whether it’s dealing with eurozone woes or the migration crisis. Yet in recent years, Europe’s two most powerful states have been increasingly limited in their ability to advance a common agenda.

Disappearing Power

The last few years have shown that Berlin and Paris are finding it ever more difficult to strike compromises and mobilize partners. Despite a series of crises within the EU and beyond, pressing questions remain unresolved. Joint efforts to deal with the refugee crisis in 2016 proved difficult. Merkel and President François Hollande met various times over many months in an effort to find a common solution, with little to show for it: the proposal that emerged from those hours of negotiations aimed to strengthen the EU’s external borders and reform the Dublin asylum regulation. But their in part quite far-reaching proposals met with opposition, and Berlin and Paris proved unable to convince their  European partners of the wisdom of their ideas.

Interests within the bloc have grown increasingly diverse, and European-level governance has become controversial, particularly with the wave of right-wing populism sweeping the continent. And in some policy areas, integration is already so advanced that any step forward threatens to tread upon national sovereignty.

It is precisely the question of integration and sovereignty that Germany and France have failed to address adequately; daily cooperation between the two governments has helped in times of crisis, but neither Merkel nor Hollande have succeeded in setting out a clear vision for Europe or taking responsibility of a fragile community. If the two leaders don’t present a series of goals and agree to compromise on European policy at the highest level, the vaunted French-German partnership could slowly grind to a halt. More importantly, both countries are facing key tests in national elections this year, and new faces could well reshape bilateral relations significantly, redefining a long-standing partnership.

A Fluid Balance

France and Germany’s relationship was long defined by a relatively fluid yet stable equilibrium: Germany was traditionally stronger economically, and France drew its influence from foreign policy and military prowess. But after the end of the Cold War, France’s traditional tools of power – its nuclear arsenal, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and its ties to the United States – started to lose their shine. At the same time, Germany discovered a newfound confidence on the world stage, building a mighty export-oriented economy and assuming a leading role in the EU. The scales began to tip decisively, and the chasm between the two countries sparked tensions.

In the back halls of the National Assembly in Paris, frustration brewed amid feelings that the French government had been relegated to second fiddle and no longer held the keys to its own future. Berlin, on the other hand, felt increasingly vulnerable to the mistakes and weaknesses of France and other European countries. These doubts and misunderstandings still plague their relationship today.

Some perceptions have improved: Gone are the days of 2012, when controversy over German dominance in the EU stirred hefty debates in France. Yet even if Germany is not explicitly mentioned in campaign rhetoric, Berlin’s relative strength has cast a shadow over growth, competitiveness, and economic reforms. For many French voters, Germany is clearly setting the course for the EU.

In a country where a sense of national pride and sovereignty run deep, it is not entirely surprising that German power has become a source of irritation among voters and lawmakers – particularly for those on the more extreme ends of the political spectrum. Marine Le Pen has accused Germany of enslaving “the peoples of Europe.” The far-left politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon, meanwhile, has demanded a showdown with the German government. Voices of discontent have even emerged from mainstream parties: the Socialists’ candidate, Benoît Hamon, is calling for an alliance of Europe’s left to counter Berlin’s policies, and Fillon aims to make France a solid counterweight to Germany. Until now, only Macron appears to see France and Germany bound by their commonalities rather than their differences.

Tensions between France and Germany are hardly new. The familiar power play between the two neighbors featured prominently in the 1970s after the oil crisis, during the ensuing economic crisis, and even in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War and German reunification. At that time, French newspapers were awash with the question of whether a dominant Germany posed a threat to France because it wielded far more economic and political influence. These days, anti-German sentiment has returned.

Yet in these debates, it is often forgotten just how much Germany depends upon a politically and economically stable France. Germany has often been described as a reluctant hegemon, uncomfortable, self-conscious, and uncertain of its own power. In recent years in particular, Berlin has longed for a stronger, more robust partner in Paris willing and able to share the burden of responsibility. France’s weak points are seen as a liability, both politically and economically.

What’s more, fears abound in Berlin, too, where some lawmakers are increasingly concerned they are being hoodwinked, with suspicions that Paris is undermining the eurozone’s rules. In some circles in Berlin, there is the belief and expectation that France “must do its homework” before further steps can be taken. On both sides, mistrust and strained communication have hindered actual progress.

Reset Needed

The framework of France’s and Germany’s relationship has also faced significant structural changes that make it difficult to restore ties to what they once were.

First, Europe’s debt crisis has sharpened the lines of asymmetry between the two; while Germany was barely affected, France is still struggling with an unemployment rate of around ten percent, sluggish growth, and towering public debt. Meanwhile Germany is enjoying full employment, record surpluses, and a balanced budget; and the US has overtaken France to become its largest trading partner.

France has also seen the president’s authority suffer a blow in recent years, due to the governing Socialists’ internal squabbling on European and economic policy. The Front National, meanwhile, has pushed public discourse to the right and destabilized the political landscape. These developments have weakened France’s position in the EU as Paris has become a less reliable partner. Germany has witnessed a long period of stability, but the AfD is threatening to rattle the status quo. If the populists garner enough votes to enter parliament in September (which looks likely at this point), mainstream parties in government will be reluctant to pursue more integrationist policies.

Second, structural changes have reinforced the uneven distribution of power in the EU. A series of crises have tarnished the bloc’s image and made Germany’s disproportionate strength loom especially large. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon shifted power in Brussels, enhancing the role of the European Council and weakening that of the European Commission. That has benefited large countries like Germany that could build coalitions and frame policy; France, meanwhile, has been facing domestic battles and has struggled to appear credible.

Third, skepticism and downright hostility toward the European project has grown significantly in France over the last decade. According to a study from the Pew Research Center in June 2016, 32 percent of those polled were in favor of the European Union, compared to 69 percent in 2004. It’s no wonder then that most of this year’s presidential candidates have curried voters’ favor by portraying the EU as the problem, rather than part of the solution.

For years, European integration was sold to French voters as a form of protection, especially from the powerful forces of globalization. But doggedly high unemployment and the rising number of people in precarious living conditions have seen trust in Europe dwindle. Germany is seen as the main architect behind the EU’s strict “austerity” rules as well. In short, many French believe they have been forced to implement policies that are directly responsible for their economic and social woes.
The EU enlargement in Eastern Europe of 2004 – bringing the bloc to 25 members – was regarded with skepticism, too, triggering feelings of uncertainty and alienation. A year later, those sentiments bubbled to the surface as a majority of French voters rejected the EU’s proposed constitutional treaty. The commitment to more fiscal discipline only fueled frustration further.

Germans, on the other hand, mostly saw the 2004 enlargement as an historic and strategic necessity and a further economic opportunity. Doubling down on fiscal discipline was considered a prerequisite for long-term sustainable growth, and financial solidarity was a key cornerstone of future success. Clearly, France and Germany were drifting apart.

Bringing Back Old Habits

In the past, Germany and France have countered mistrust and resentment with more cooperation: Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing built the foundation for a common currency in the 1970s, for example. Some twenty years later, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand brought their governments together for a conference that paved the way for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Integration, it seemed, was a natural reflex to uncertainty. These days, that seems no longer the natural thing to do.

The task of keeping the EU together and preserving the single market in the face of Brexit and the Trump presidency has taken top priority, while the question of reforming treaties is no longer considered realistic. Yet it is time to return to the old reflex, with a new approach: fresh Franco-German initiatives could be effective if they are based on a deep understanding of the economic and social circumstances in both countries. The labor market is a prime example. German companies have complained time and again about a shortage of skilled labor; France, meanwhile, is struggling to combat high unemployment. French youth lack real prospects at home, and that threatens to destabilize social cohesion with serious consequences. Front National has scored well with young people by portraying itself as a champion of the weak. Together, Germany and France could bridge the labor gap.

This year is likely to be a decisive one for the EU and the French-German relationship. There is no denying that the two countries have the power to tackle crucial questions on integration and reform. It is equally clear, however, that competing interests and political polarization will threaten to drive a wedge between Berlin and Paris, particularly with elections drawing closer. Joint initiatives might fail to overcome anti-European sentiment; yet it is more likely that the EU itself will fail if these two countries do not forge a path ahead together.

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In the wake of Brexit, crowing right-wing populists throughout the continent are calling for the further dismantling of the European project. But they are contending with very different domestic audiences.

© REUTERS/Alessandro Garofalo

France: Fists Are Flying

There was celebration among both right- and left-wing populists when the results of the Brexit referendum were announced. But while the Front de Gauche still hopes for a remodeling of the EU, the Front National is already preparing France’s exit.

Two fists circled by the stars of the EU flag are freeing themselves from their chains – a quickly understood image, accompanied by the caption: “Brexit, and now France!” The result of the British referendum has barely been announced, and the Front National is already presenting its new poster repeating its demand for an exit referendum in its own country.

No wonder: in that far-right party, British refutation of the EU is cause for celebration. Party leader Marine Le Pen triumphantly spoke of a “victory of freedom.” In the week following the referendum, she celebrated in a press marathon, the result of which is supposed to pave the way for a “free and sovereign” France.

No other party followed the campaign as closely as Front National. If Le Pen were to become president, she would want to organize a referendum on France’s EU membership within the first six months of her mandate. She would use the interim to negotiate the country’s retrieval of complete sovereignty from Brussels. In the ideal world of the far-right, France would regain control over its borders and currency – meaning it would leave both Schengen and the eurozone. Moreover, it would reduce its net contribution to the EU budget to zero, and have a free hand in matters of economic policy so that it can engage in “smart protectionism.” National rights would have precedence over community rights. A newly created “Ministry for Sovereignties” would be responsible for the coordination of such negotiations.

It is difficult to assess whether Front National would follow this hard line if it won the national elections. The debate within the party is more divided than it may seem, but the representatives of other policies – such as those advocating remaining in the eurozone – are completely marginalized.

The Front National’s stance on Europe does not yet have majority appeal. According to a study conducted shortly after the British referendum, 45 percent of the French are in favor of remaining in the EU, while 33 percent would like to leave. But even if the supporters of a “Frexit” are still a minority, they are nonetheless a consequential bloc, one which will influence political discussion in the coming months. And as the population remains unenthusiastic about the future of the European project, political parties will utilize these doubts and fears all the more.

When asked about the ideal reaction to Brexit, a clear majority of the French call for the member states to be more independent from the EU; only a quarter of the sampled population wishes for new steps toward further integration. – BY CLAIRE DEMESMAY

The Netherlands: Wilders’ West

The Brexit decision was grist for the Dutch far-right populists’ mill. Is “Nexit” looming? Even if there is at present no legal basis for a referendum, holding one could unleash an uncontrollable political dynamic.

Geert Wilders enjoyed June 24. The far-right Dutch populist tweeted, “Now it’s our turn” right after the results of the British referendum were released to the public; he then repeated his longstanding demand for such a referendum in his own country.

Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) has been the most popular party in Dutch polls for almost a year. A majority of the increasingly euroskeptic Netherlands would like to vote on a potential exit from the EU. Right now, 48 percent of Netherlanders would vote for a “Nexit”, 43 percent against.

This does not mean that anything is pre-determined. The legal basis for Nexit is lacking, for one thing. Referendums can only be held on new laws and contracts – though some are already wondering whether Nexit would not count as a contract modification, which would allow a referendum.

But it is unlikely that Wilders would want to support such a tricky move. What looks more promising is the prospect of a corrective referendum, which would allow the country to address the question of EU membership directly. This possibility is stuck in parliament – the necessary change in the constitution would require a two-thirds majority that the first chamber does not have.

But majorities could change, as there are new legislative elections in March. Most of the campaign will revolve around the country’s relationship with Europe. And the more the British government succeeds in mitigating the direst economic consequences of Brexit, the stronger Wilders’ position will be in the upcoming elections.

Moreover, the central parties are not only under fire from the right: when it comes to Europe, the PVV has an eager comrade-in-arms in the similarly euroskeptic and often populist Socialist Party (SP). Even though the left is not demanding a complete exit from the EU, it does call for a significantly downgraded EU membership.

Neither the SP nor the PVV has made it into either national or local office so far. In 2010 Wilders came rather close to obtaining power, playing a minority role in a coalition of right-wing liberals and Christian Democrats under the current Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Wilders helped Rutte reach a majority, but the structure fell apart in 2012 when an MP left the PVV, saying he could no longer suffer Wilders’ “dictatorial leadership style.” Wilders cut the experiment short, recognizing correctly that he is better in opposition than in government. He has since become even more radical in his assertions.

Politically, a Nexit vote would put the Netherlands in a difficult situation. A pro-European cabinet like the one currently in power could not bring about an exit; it would inevitably crumble. And if he wanted to avoid sizeable economic damage, a Prime Minister Wilders would have to put together a constructive hybrid solution for his country, which could prove challenging.

He claims to have a plan for this, based mostly on reports he ordered from two British institutes. According to these studies, there would be short-term risks, but Nexit would be beneficial in the long run, bringing each Netherlander €9,800 more per year.

The institutes admittedly assumed that the Netherlands would easily succeed in securing advantageous trade deals with the rest of the world, including the EU – even Wilders acknowledges that retaining access to the single market is essential.

Under Wilders’ plan, however, Poland and Romania would maintain freedom of movement, and the Netherlands would still be on the hook for relatively high contributions to the EU. The Hague would have to accept EU laws almost entirely, without the ability to shape them in Brussels. If the guilder were re-introduced as an independent currency, it would, according to Wilders, entail costs for two years but then settle down; but he also thinks it would be possible to “follow the euro,” meaning the guilder would become a pseudo-euro. In terms of security policy, Wilders’ motto is “Out of Schengen, thick borders.” Muslims would stay out of the country. Police and law enforcement officers would cooperate outside the framework of the EU.

Does this look like a promising future for the Netherlands? The other parties will band together to prevent Wilders from becoming prime minister. The question is whether that will be enough: an EU referendum, even one lost in advance, could trigger a dynamic beyond control. – BY THOMAS KIRCHNER

Northern Europe: Playing with Fire, Using a Small Flame

Precautionary Brexit tourism among the Finns, disunity within the Danish People’s Party, a clearer anti-Europe course for the Swedish Democrats. As soon as the populists of Northern Europe are in power, they fall apart on EU questions.

Resistance against the EU rescue fund, along with criticism of the common currency and Brussels in general, have helped the Perussuomalaiset party (the Finns, formerly known as the True Finns) grow.

They first made it into government in the elections of April 2015, winning almost 18 percent of the vote. But only a few months passed before the party abandoned one of its main demands and voted for a new aid package for Greece in the summer 2015 for the sake of peace within the coalition.

The Finns have had to learn how to build voter support when they are shaping policies from within government rather than rejecting policies from outside. In the meantime, the party’s approval ratings have fallen drastically; at the moment, only 8 percent of voters say that they would vote for them.

In fact, many Northern European right-wing populists seem willing to compromise as soon as they reach power. After the Brexit vote, calls for EU exit referenda were understandably muted – it is one thing when such demands come from the opposition, and another entirely when they stand a realistic chance of success.

For a long time now, Scandinavia has been a paragon of social democracy. Those times are over. It is now the Northern European countries – with the exception of Iceland –where right-wing populists are enjoying some of their most dramatic victories, often earlier than in other countries.

In (non-EU) Norway, the right – the Fremskrittspartiet, or Progress Party – has shown itself willing to negotiate on some of its core issues: now it takes the stance that the country’s robust financial cushion should be tapped only conservatively to avoid destabilizing the economy. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (DF) was not ready to take on the responsibility of leading the government, even though it has represented the second strongest faction in parliament since June 2015. Instead, it has attempted to steer the ruling conservative government under Lars Lokke Rasmussen.

Morten Messerschmidt is one of the DF’s most important representatives on EU questions. For seven years now he has pulled off a tricky balancing act: he has simultaneously been a part of the EU system as a parliamentary representative, while also one of its greatest – and most popular – critics. He received over 465,000 votes in the European elections two years ago, more than any Danish candidate had ever achieved.

This means that Messerschmidt’s voice has a particular weight when it comes to deciding whether the Danes should demand a referendum following the British example. Yet Messerschmidt originally expressed a wish that the British majority would vote against Brexit; now he merely advises to “keep calm.” Conversely, the EU political speaker of the party – the far less influential Kenneth Kristensen Berth – has already declared that he would like a referendum to take place in Denmark if Britain succeeds in securing a good deal with the EU.

In Sweden, the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), which barely attained 6 percent of the vote in the 2014 elections, demands that Sweden’s EU membership put up for debate again; and the right Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, 13 percent) want an exit referendum. Both are part of the opposition; a red-green minority government is in power.

The Sweden Democrats reject EU membership, but they have never made European questions a major topic; they have instead traditionally focused more on policies toward foreigners and domestic security. In Sweden, there is a clear majority in favor of remaining in the EU – unlike in Finland, Norway, and Denmark, working with the right-wing populists on the national level is currently unthinkable. The probability that the Sweden Democrats would have to shift away from anti-European discourse to reach power is thus remarkably low. – BY CLEMENS BOMSDORF

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2016 issue.

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While “Breversal” – a reversal of Britain’s June 23 referendum – is not impossible, the likeliest outcome is that the United Kingdom will exit the EU one way or other. What does this mean for Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw?

© Artwork: Katinka Reinke

The Servant Leader

A European Union without Britain demands a new kind of balancing act from Germany.

The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has catapulted Germany to the next stage of its post-World War II existence: that of the neo-Bismarckian balancer. With the departure of Britain, the traditional outside balancer of continental affairs, much of the balancing within the EU will be left to the big country in the middle: balancing between northern and southern mentalities in economics; balancing between free traders and protectionists; balancing between East and West; and balancing between those who are tough on security and those who don’t feel threatened.

Germany is roughly in the middle on all of these issues, but balancing means more than just finding reasonable middle ground. It means building alliances and accommodating those whose worldview does not prevail in the compromises of the day. The balancing act Berlin will have to perform without the help of the open-market, free-trade, militarily robust, naturally globalist Anglo-Saxons will be a daunting task. It will be more than the country has had to face since it became fully sovereign in 1990 – or since the beginning of the European integration process, for that matter. What does this mean in concrete terms?

Over the next five to ten years, the EU will need at least three decisive reforms. First, and most crucially, it needs to create some sort of fiscal (read: political) union in the eurozone if the common currency is to survive. Secondly, as this will almost inevitably lead to two-speed (read: two-class) Europe, a politically acceptable and practically workable arrangement for an EU divided into euro countries and non-euro countries needs to be found. Thirdly, the EU, or at least the refurbished eurozone, will need to democratize so that citizens feel that they have a say in decision-making at the most integrated level. All of these are long-term reforms, but clear signals need to be sent soon. In addition, an urgent short-term issue looms large on the horizon: finding a workable compromise on refugees that includes improved EU border controls, a shared asylum system among Schengen countries, a system that allows unwilling countries to buy themselves out of their quota, and beefed-up relations with the countries of origin.

Unfortunately, Chancellor Angela Merkel has been wavering on the eurozone. Shortly before the British referendum she said it was “unavoidable” that the eurozone would develop into some sort of political union. Shortly after the Brexit vote she announced that it was not the right time to deepen the eurozone. While this is not exactly contradictory, it is confused messaging – the opposite of the finely tuned EU diplomacy that will now be in demand.

Just as important as action on the euro will be an urgently needed shift in German mentality. Germany will need to become the EU’s “servant leader”, creating acceptance for its outsize influence by visibly defending the common good of the EU, sacrificing some of its own immediate diplomatic gains if necessary. Germany needs to become Europe’s integrationist reserve power again, willing to compromise just a little earlier and pay just a little more than everyone else so that the whole thing can thrive.

Since the late Kohl era, and increasingly so under Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Merkel herself, Germany had abandoned this position. This needs to be reversed. Naturally, there is no way back to the good old days. Being Europe’s reserve power today means something different from thirty years ago; it is far more demanding. But being the servant leader of Europe is a natural outflow of Germany’s size, geography, history – and own national interest. Bismarck would have understood.
– BY JAN TECHAU

Putting Down a Marker

France will push Britain for a quick exit, hoping to regain greater parity with Germany.

French President François Hollande’s reaction to the news that the British had opted for Brexit was swift: Immediately after the official result was known, Hollande declared that now was the time to act – and act fast. The view from Paris is clear: A quick departure from the European Union is meant to create a warning – pour encourager les autres, as they say in England.

This message is addressed not only to EU member states eyeing an exit themselves or those mulling the idea of threating to leave in order to secure preferential treatment. It is also – and in particular – aimed at Hollande’s domestic audience: there will be presidential elections in France in less than ten months. The election campaign will start right after the summer break, and the Socialist, who is likely to run for a second term, knows how dangerous “Europe” can become as a topic. His Socialist Party (PS) is deeply divided on the issue, still reeling from the trauma of the lost referendum of 2005. In the run-up to that vote, the French political parties tore into each other and themselves; the PS has since been unable to agree on a European line. Hollande will do everything to keep this Pandora’s box tightly shut this time.

One way or another, however, European policy will pop up in the election campaign – directly and through issues like the economy, security, counter-terrorism, identity, and migration. And Brexit will hang over all the debates. Politicians from the right are already demanding a referendum on the future of the EU, among them former President Nicolas Sarkozy, who wants to rebuild the European project and hold a EU-wide referendum to validate this.

Then there are radical parties of the left and right which denounce the “German Europe” of today and demand and “end to austerity.” The leader of the Front National (FN), Marine Le Pen, is wellplaced to enter the final round of elections and has been dreaming of a referendum along the lines of the UK vote. According to several polls, about a third of the French – and three quarters of FN voters – agree with her. Those numbers are too low to lead to “Frexit”, but they are also too high to be ignored. This will likely mean that criticism of the EU will grow, even among politicians in “mainstream” parties.

To win over some of the malcontents, Hollande is trying to use Brexit to put the EU on a different course. His promise of “a different Europe,” on which he campaigned in 2012, was left unrealized. Now he senses another chance – and he is already demanding closer cooperation in security and defense policy, and, as in 2012, increased investment to promote growth and job creation, along with a harmonization of Europe’s fiscal policy regime. This is not least to strengthen France’s role in Europe – and regain greater parity in the German-French tandem power relationship. And Berlin might not mind: Brexit has weakened the traditional “motor” of European integration, removing London as an impetus for greater German-French cooperation. With London out, it is hard to see how the Franco-German axis could facilitate a change of course for the EU without at least some realignment given the differences in their interests and priorities. – BY CLAIRE DEMESMAY

Loss of an Ally

Poland sees its position strengthened in that the European Union needs “adaptation”.

With the United Kingdom gone, Poland and its Law and Justice (PiS) government will lose its favorite ally within the EU. After all, the UK is a country that shares the PiS’ opposition toward further integration, wants to defend its national sovereignty, and rejects the EU common currency.

When the UK leaves, Poland will become the largest country of the non-euro bloc in the EU – though the entire bloc combined will make up just 14 percent of the EU’s economic output, something that will further weaken Warsaw’s bargaining position when it comes to relations between eurozone outs and ins.

But as far as Warsaw is concerned, the most immediate issue to be addressed in the upcoming exit negotiations with the UK will be the status of around 700,000 Polish citizens living and working in the UK. According to current regulations, around half of them would lose their right to stay in the UK once Brexit becomes a reality. Large numbers of Polish migrants returning to Poland would aggravate the domestic labor market and become a source of social and political tension. When the referendum results were announced, Polish officials maintained that securing the rights of these Polish citizens would be the Polish governmentʼs most important goal.

Given the political capital and emotion that have been invested into the Polish-British relationship in recent months, Poland will belong to the group of countries striving for a compromise-oriented approach to the exit negotiations as it seeks to “restore an as-close-as-possible relationship” with the UK, as the government put it. It remains unclear whether this indicates an openness towards a “special deal” with the UK (outside of the obvious options of EEA or WTO membership, or an European Free Trade Association), but Warsaw would be unlikely to make the UK’s Brexit wounds any more painful than necessary and would seek to be flexible in the negotiations on all issues but migration.

Most importantly, however, Brexit serves as a confirmation of the Polish government’s assessment of the EU as a project in need of a substantial “adaptation”. Speaking after the referendum, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, stressed the necessity of a “reform of the EU, which would be also an offer for the UK.”

Such a reform – based on treaty change – should include, according to Kaczyński, a clarification of EU competencies, a strengthening of the subsidiarity principle, and the “widening of unanimity voting.” After the results were announced, Polish President Andrzej Duda wondered aloud whether “the EU does not impose too much on the member states.” In other words: the vote for Brexit is seen as one against the idea of a federalist Europe and an “ever closer union,” rather than an outcome brought about by domestic developments in the UK. This narrative reinforces the Polish government’s approach to the EU.

In the past weeks and months, Warsaw promoted its reform ideas on the back of David Cameron’s February 2016 “deal” – Deputy Foreign Minister Konrad Szymański, in charge of European affairs, called it a “pilot project” that might push the EU “in the right direction and to the right issues.” Cameron’s deal is no longer valid, but its philosophy corresponds with mainstream thinking in Warsaw. In Warsaw’s opinion, a new political contract for Europe would be based on the ideas of flexibility, differentiation, and equal treatment of all EU member states, regardless of their individual levels of integration. Each EU member state should be allowed to define its own integration path – it would be a “multipolar union,” as opposed to a Kerneuropa or European federation.

It remains to be seen how much energy and political capital Warsaw will be ready to invest into translating these ideas into a political initiative. But however much Brexit poses a strategic challenge for the Polish government, it may also create momentum for the Europe á la carte favored today by Warsaw. – BY PIOTR BURAS

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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Paris views the refugee crisis through a different lens than Berlin. It only reluctantly accepted it as a European – rather than a German – problem and feels it is doing enough on other fronts to address it.

© REUTERS/Philippe Wojazer

While the refugee crisis has been shaping German politics for a year now and making considerable demands on the country’s social and political forces, it seems to have had little effect on France, Germany’s closest European partner. It is important to note that the situation is not the same on both sides of the Rhine, though: only 70,600 applications for asylum were filed in France in 2015, compared to 441,800 in Germany, according to Eurostat; and while the number of asylum seekers did increase in France in 2015, it was only by 20 percent compared with the previous year.

This factual asymmetry is coupled with an asymmetry in the way the crisis is perceived, giving rise to considerable differences in interpretation. This is reflected in the vocabulary of public debate: rather than the “refugee crisis” discussed in Germany, the French tend to speak of a “migration crisis” or a “migrant crisis.” …

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2016 issue.

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