© REUTERS/US Navy/Greg Messier

US President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy describe a contested global landscape challenged by China and Russia as well as rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea. While the degree to which to the US will adhere to this strategy is unclear, these two documents accurately reflect the strategic reorientation that is currently underway in US security and defense policy. The Trump administration’s focus on inter-state competition may be a continuation of trends initiated years ago, but it sits awkwardly with the outlook and priorities of Washington’s European allies.

For reasons ranging from internal tensions to a fervent belief in a justice-bound “arc of history,” most Europeans have been reluctant to embrace the notion of great power competition. The zero-sum view of international affairs reflected in the NSS and NDS therefore clashes with the worldview that has been promoted in Europe for the last 70 years.

Of course, this is not to suggest Europeans are naïve. If anything, Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has ended Europe’s strategic slumber, bringing about a strengthening of the continent’s defense posture. Several European strategic documents—including, notably, the 2017 French Review of Defence and National Security—also offer clear-eyed assessments on the consequences of global strategic competition.

The US and Europe do share an over-arching interest in rolling back the influence of authoritarian powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Yet they differ in their respective threat perceptions and prioritizations. Concepts such as the Trump administration’s “peace through strength” mantra worry European leaders, most of whom are more accustomed to soft power and diplomatic tools. In this regard, while the NSS and NDS enjoy broad support with European decision-makers for their view of Russia as a revisionist power, the potential for further deterioration in US-Russian relations, such as over nuclear issues, and the effects this would have on European security are nevertheless a cause for concern.

Meanwhile, few European capitals share the Trump administration’s view of China as a revisionist power actively challenging the international order. Although the European view on China is hardening, this is so far mostly confined to the economic sphere. Some European leaders even see Beijing as a potentially useful partner when it comes to upholding multilateralism or combating climate change in the age of Trump. Few European states have either the presence (only France and the UK have overseas territories in the Asia-Pacific) or the necessary capabilities to approach China as a strategic military challenge.

North Korea is viewed in Europe as a serious threat to regional order in Asia and to the non-proliferation regime, but is far from the highest priority in most European capitals. Similarly, most European countries do not share the Trump administration’s adversarial view of Iran, preferring instead to insist on strict adherence to the JCPOA nuclear deal and seeking a deepening of political and economic ties with Tehran.

In contrast to these seemingly remote threats, European leaders have to contend with several serious crises closer to home: Brexit will deprive the bloc of one of its foremost economic and military powers; tension between Brussels and some Central and Eastern European capitals is only getting worse as nationalistic movements threaten to cripple the EU’s internal cohesion; and a revanchist Russia is now seeking to restore its sphere of influence in the East, aggressively subverting national democratic institutions through disinformation, cyber-warfare, and economic coercion.

In a sense, while the NSS and NDS offer a strategic long-term vision of the evolving international system, Europe is mired in short-term challenges that cloud its field of vision. Rather than great power competition and rogue regimes, Europe is fixated on curbing migration and terrorism stemming from disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East and from instability in North Africa, the Sahel, and sub-Saharan Africa. In the east, the potential for renewed instability in the Western Balkans and Russia’s destabilizing actions occupy what is left of the bloc’s strategic attention. On top of this, addressing climate change remains a top EU foreign policy objective.

Reconcilable Priorities

Yet the diverging priorities of the US and Europe are far from irreconcilable. Countering Russian interference and revisionism is key to securing the EU’s eastern flank, and also fits into the Trump administration’s strategy. Stabilizing the bloc’s southern neighborhood aligns with Washington’s interests, and also coincides with the aims of US allies in the Middle East. And, as the world’s largest trading bloc, the EU has every interest in working with Washington to ensure that intellectual property rights and freedom of navigation are respected by its second largest trading partner, China.

That being said, the divergence is real, and some significant introspection is required on both sides of the Atlantic lest the gap between Washington and Brussels become a chasm. Europe has to be prepared to show courage and resolve. Courage because European leaders have for too long relied on an “end of history” narrative to justify their continued reliance on the American military. In order to effectively protect democracy and the global liberal order, Europe will have to take the lead on certain operations, for instance on stabilization and counter-terrorism efforts in the southern neighborhood, especially as the US shifts its focus to great power competition. In addition, Europe must develop its own strategic culture, sharpen its understanding of what inter-state strategic competition means for itself, and invest in emerging capabilities such as artificial intelligence, cyber countermeasures, and drone swarm technology. Europeans must also show resolve: they must be prepared to sustain commitment to their own security in the face of severe budgetary constraints and possibly even the loss of life.

On the other hand, the US must play a supporting and encouraging role in Europe. If the Trump administration intends to keep with its predecessor’s “leading from behind” approach on many matters pertaining to European security, it must at the very least tolerate a more independent European defense posture. More importantly, the US must support European efforts such as PESCO and EDF. American capabilities will remain crucial to European security for decades to come, especially with regard to military deterrence against Russia. In this regard, the Trump administration’s reassurances on NATO are most welcome. But American benevolence should also extend to the EU. Supporting actors that seek to weaken or dismantle the bloc undermine transatlantic trust and do not further US interests.

The NSS and NDS show that Washington, for one, is already giving serious thought to how the world will develop in the coming decades. However, the US is misguided when it comes to non-military responses to security challenges. From its gutting of aid programs to its downsizing of the State Department, the Trump administration seems loath to think outside of the military toolbox. Be it revisionist powers’ insidious sapping of the global informational space, state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, or the already-observable consequences of climate change, some of the challenges to US power and prosperity in the 21^st century will not be solved by military means alone.

Above all, Europe and the United States need a joint vision. The security architecture that binds the two continents is founded upon shared political and strategic concerns. The NSS and NDS highlight the challenges that democratic societies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean will have to grapple with in the coming decades. Whether the EU can muster the determination to power through its current crises and accept a larger share of the global security burden remains to be seen. Similarly, it is uncertain whether Washington is willing to accept a more militarily autonomous Europe and whether US global leadership can be preserved in the absence of investing in soft power tools. Absent this major course correction on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe and the United States seem condemned to move, ever so slightly, further apart.

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© REUTERS/Axel Schmidt

One needs look no further than Europe’s response to its three most recent crises – Greece, Ukraine and the refugee situation – to recognize that Germany has emerged as Europe’s principal powerbroker today. The Greece debt deal was essentially a bilateral affair between Berlin and Athens, the Ukraine ceasefire was hammered out by Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and on the current refugee crisis Germany is leading both by example and by calling for a common EU response. But with a series of unresolved crisis in Europe and its near abroad, the real question is whether Berlin is fully ready to assume a true leadership role on the continent — and whether other powers are willing to accept this.

Make no mistake: Germany’s rise is a welcome development, assuming it is exercised wisely, benignly and with a common European purpose in mind. Europe is in desperate need of leadership these days. At home, the entire “European Project” is under pressure on multiple fronts: rather than moving towards to the communautaire method of an “ever closer Union”, Europe is facing a wave of re-nationalization. The political blocs that have traditionally driven European integration – moderate social democrats and liberal conservatives – are quickly loosing ground to radical parties on both sides of the political spectrum, several of which now hold pivotal roles in governmental coalitions in Scandinavian and Eastern European member states.

What is more, the post-1989 European mythology that used to define the European Union as a “normative power” and an “example” to the neighborhood and rest of the world is now falling apart. The last few years have seen gross violations of European rules in the financial and monetary domain, an absence of European influence in its neighborhood, and a lack of European solidarity to address the recent influx of refugees.

These failures are not the fault of one country, but the result of collective European inaction. For too long, Brussels has been overly concerned with the Eurozone agenda at the expense of the larger strategic picture. Paris, the continent’s traditional driver, has lately taken a back seat to focus on France’s domestic economic woes, while London is pulling away from the rest of Europe, with the possibility of Brexit looming around the corner in 2017. Even Washington, Europe’s traditional outside power broker, has become more reluctant to engage on the continent under Obama.

This has meant that Germany has emerged as the continent’s de facto leader. Still, neither Berlin nor any of the other major powers has yet come to grips with what this German “Unipolar Moment” actually means in 21st century Europe. There are three lingering doubts that must first be resolved.

Three Lingering Doubts

The first doubt is whether Germany itself truly wants to play the role of hegemonic power in Europe, taking on the many burdensome responsibilities that entails. Up until now Berlin has been quite reluctant to assume them – remaining on the sidelines of NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, continuously opposing a banking union and eurobonds, mismanaging the growing north-south divide within the Eurozone, and not doing enough to keep the UK in the EU or to prevent the rise of Orban in Hungary.

However, there is also no such thing as an empty chair in politics, and several signs point in the direction of more German leadership in Europe. The recent refugee crisis is an example of German leadership by both example and policy. Berlin has adopted a new narrative on defense and security matters that would have been unthinkable a decade or two ago. It is a strong champion of free trade, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. Berlin is also the only European capital with influence in Washington, Beijing, and even Moscow. All of these assets are European assets, not only German ones.

Secondly, how will other European powers react to German hegemony, especially if the United Kingdom were to leave the EU and Marine Le Pen were to became France’s next President, pulling Paris closer to Moscow rather than to Berlin? If this nightmare scenario were to become reality, the year 2017 might be Europe’s annus horribilis, with several European nations potentially challenging German primacy and taking steps to roll back the EU. Any movement by London to escape from the EU would likely necessitate growing American involvement to balance the continental powers, with Washington possibly becoming more involved in key European political, financial, and security decisions. In this scenario, Germany would be asked to act and lead to avert the end of the European Union as we know it.

The third doubt is how far the United States is open to revising its Cold War role as offshore balancer in Europe. Regardless of who wins the 2016 presidential election, the next US administration will have to confront a plethora of serious challenges in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia all at once. A Hillary Clinton administration would perhaps redouble on the pivot to Asia, while a Republican administration may want to play a more active military role in Middle Eastern conflicts. If the US wants to play significant roles in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East all at once in order to retain its primacy in the global order, it will need strong allies to help it out. In a European context, we might well see Germany replacing the UK as the US’ special ally; if so, this would further upgrade Berlin’s power, allowing it to comfortably exercise its leadership in Europe.

While the notion of German hegemony may be as uncomfortable in Berlin as it is in London, Paris, and Washington, it is hard to see any realistic alternatives to Europe’s current leadership deficit and the multitude of threats the continent faces. To further diminish European fracturing, it therefore behooves both Berlin and the other major European powers to ultimately accept the inevitability of the German Unipolar Moment in Europe.

This begins with a few necessary adjustments to the existing reality. For Germany, this means guaranteeing the long-term sustainability of the common currency, taking steps towards a banking union and a real monetary union, and an openness to reviewing some fundamentals of EU rules such as common asylum policy and neighborhood strategy.

For the rest of Europe, this means having faith that German leadership can be a driving force for a strong EU, while at the same time taking steps to shape this leadership to ensure that it is benign and for the common European good. Growing German leadership in Europe could encourage the UK to remain inside the EU to balance Germany’s growing power on the continent, and France to make the reforms necessary to board the economic train of globalization. And it could persuade Washington to be more present in Europe again, pushing for TTIP, strengthening NATO, and encouraging LNG gas exports to address the continent’s energy security dilemma.

2017 will be Europe’s year of reckoning. The current set of challenges the continent faces, however serious they are, pale in comparison to what may be lurking around the corner. This leaves less than two years to fix the current European mess before the pulling apart of Europe risks reaching a breaking point. The outcome will determine not only Angela Merkel’s legacy, but also Europe’s common and peaceful future.

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